https://archive.org/details/vocabularyofphil01flem 


THE 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


(( 'Ap%ri  tt)s  7 raiScvaeiog  f]  twv  dvopuruv  hrfaKtipis.” — Epictetus . 

“ Nomina  si  nescis,  perit  et  cognitio  rcrum.” 

“ He  has  been  at  a great  feast  of  languages,  and  stolen  the  scraps. 

0!  they  have  lived  long  in  the  alms-basket  of  words.” 

Love's  Labour's  Lost,  Act  v.,  Sc.  1. 

“If  we  knew  the  original  of  all  the  words  we  meet  with,  we  should  thereby  be  very 
much  helped  to  know  the  ideas  they  were  first  applied  to,  and  made  to  stand  for.” — 
Locke. 

‘•In  a language  like  ours,  so  many  words  of  which  are  derived  from  other  languages, 
there  are  few  modes  of  instruction  more  useful  or  more  amusing  than  that  of  accus- 
toming j’oung  people  to  seek  the  etymology  or  primary  meaning  of  the  words  they  use. 
There  are  cases  in  which  more  knowledge,  of  more  value,  may  be  conveyed  by  the 
history  of  a word  than  by  the  history  of  a campaign.” — Coleridge's  Aids  to  Reflection , 
Aphor.  12. 

“In  words  contemplated  singly,  there  are  boundless  stores  of  moral  and  historic 
truth.” — Trench  on  Study  of  Words , 12mo.,  Lond.,  1853. 

“Jock  Ashler,  the  stane  mason  that  ca’s  himsel’  an  arkiteck— there’s  nae  living  for 
new  words  in  this  new  warld  neither,  and  that’s  anither  vex  to  auld  folks  such  as  me.” 
— Quoth  Meg  Dods  ( St . Ronan's  Well,  chap.  2). 

“A  good  dictionary  is  the  best  metaphysical  treatise.” 

“ Etymology,  in  a moderate  degree,  is  not  only  useful,  as  assisting  the  memory,  but 
highly  instructive  and  pleasing.  But  if  pushed  so  far  as  to  refer  all  words  to  a few 
primary  elements,  it  loses  all  its  value.  It  is  like  pursuing  heraldry  up  to  the  first 
pair  of  mankind.” — Copleston's  Remains,  p.  101. 


(2) 


THE 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY, 

v' 

MENTAL,  MORAL,  AND  METAPHYSICAL; 

WITH 

QUOTATIONS  AND  REFERENCES; 

FOR  THE  USE  OF  STUDENTS. 


BY 

WILLIAM  FLEMING,  D.  D., 

PROFESSOR  OF  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  GLASGOW. 


FROM  THE 

SECOND,  REVISED  AND  ENLARGED,  LONDON  EDITION. 


WITH  AN 

INTRODUCTION,  CHRONOLOGY  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
BROUGHT  DOWN  TO  1S60,  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX, 
SYNTHETICAL  TABLES,  AND  OTHER  ADDITIONS, 


BY 


CHAS.  P.  KRAUTH,  D.  D. 

TRANSLATOR  OF  “THOLUCK  ON  THE  GOSPEL  OF  JOHN.” 


PHILADELPHIA; 

SMITH,  ENGLISH  & CO., 

No.  23  NORTH  SIXTH  ST. 

NEW  YORK:  SHELDON  & CO.  BOSTON:  GOULD  & LINCOLN. 

I 860. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1860,  by 
SMITH,  ENGLISH  & CO., 

In  the  Clerk’s  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Eastern  District 
of  Pennsylvania. 


/ A «? 


INTRODUCTION 

BY  THE  EDITOR. 


It  will,  we  think,  be  conceded  by  all  who  are  familiar  with 
philosophical  writings,  that  there  has  never  been  gathered  in 
our  language  in  that  department  a fund  of  thought  and  of  in- 
formation which  within  as  small  a compass  presents  more  that 
is  valuable  than  we  find  in  the  Vocabulary  of  Philosophy  by 
Professor  Fleming.  Jean  Paul  tells  us  that  he  never  took 
up  a book,  the  title  of  which  excited  extraordinary  anticipa- 
tion, without  finding  that  he  was  destined  to  disappointment. 
It  may  safely  be  affirmed,  on  the  other  hand,  that  where  the 
modesty  of  a title  is  unfeigned,  the  book,  if  it  disappoint  us  at 
all,  disappoints  us  agreeably.  Of  this  class  is  the  Vocabulary 
of  Philosophy.  It  is  much  more  than  the  title  promises,  for  it 
illustrates  the  matter  of  philosophy  as  well  as  its  terms.  It 
gives  incidentally  a great  deal  of  the  history  of  philosophy,  and 
notices  its  literature  on  the  leading  subjects..  It  is  to  a large 
extent  made  up  of  the  very  words  of  the  most  distinguished 
philosophical  writers,  and  thus  becomes  a guide  to  their  opinions 
and  to  the  most  important  portions  of  their  works.  Professor 
Fleming  has  not  laboured  single-handed,  but  has  in  this  way 
drawn  into  his  service,  as  co-workers,  many  of  the  greatest 
1*  (v) 


336317 


VI 


INTRODUCTION. 


minds  of  all  lands  and  of  all  time.  It  is  true  everywhere,  and 
especially  in  the  philosophical  sciences,  that  the  knowledge 
of  words  is,  to  a large  extent,  the  knowledge  of  things.  To 
grasp  the  full  meaning  of  a term,  we  must  ofttimes  not  only 
have  a definition  of  it,  but  we  must  trace  its  history  — and  to 
know  its  history,  we  must  know  the  views  of  the  men  who 
employed  it,  and  the  circumstances  under  which  those  views 
were  formed  and  expressed ; for  the  history  of  words  is  the 
history  of  the  world.  A Vocabulary  with  this  large  aim  would 
be  in  fact  a dictionary  or  Cyclopmdia  of  subjects  and  of  au- 
thors. A V ocabulary,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  strictest  sense, 
would  simply  give  us  terms  and  a definition  of  them.  Professor 
Fleming’s  book  is  midway  between  these  classes.  It  rises  as 
far  above  the  second  class,  as  from  its  compactness  and  the  na- 
ture of  its  design  it  necessarily  comes  short  of  the  first.  In 
the  Preface  to  the  Second  Edition,  however,  a conditional 
promise  is  given  that  he  may  attempt  such  a work  as  the  first 
would  be.  We  hope  that  the  author  may  be  encouraged  to 
carry  out  his  purpose,  and  that  in  conjunction  with  the  best 
philosophical  thinkers  in  our  language,  he  may  give  us  what 
is  so  much  needed  — a Cyclopscdial  Dictionary  of  the  Philoso- 
phical Sciences,  and  of  their  literature  and  history. 

The  Editor,  at  the  request  of  the  Publishers,  consented  to 
make  the  effort  to  render  the  Vocabulary  of  Philosophy  still 
more  useful,  so  far  a^  the  very  brief  time  of  the  passage  of  the 
work  through  the  press  would  allow  him.  To  have  made  addi- 
tions to  the  text  of  a living  author  he  would  have  considered 
an  unwarranted  liberty;  and,  apart  from  this  consideration, 
such  additions  are  really  not  needed,  nor  would  they  be  con- 
sistent with  the  plan  and  purpose  of  the  book,  to  both  which 
compactness  is  indispensable.  To  have  made  the  book  a large 


INTRODUCTION. 


Vll 


and  expensive  one  would  have  destroyed  one  of  its  distinctive 
aims. 

He  directed  his  main  efforts,  therefore,  to  what  he  considers 
the  proper  functions  of  an  editor,  to  the  bringing  more  com- 


the author.  He  has  aimed  at  the  accomplishment  of  this  end 
in  the  present  case  in  the  following  way : 

I.  He  has  thrown  into  the  margin,  where  the  eye  readily 
catches  them,  when  they  are  needed,  the  citations  which,  in 
the  English  edition,  encumber  and  disfigure  the  text. 

II.  He  has  added  a Vocabulary  of  some  of  the  principal 
terms  used  by  Herman  philosophers. 

III.  He  has  given,  from  Tennemann’s  Manual,  a Chronolo- 
gical Table  of  the  History  of  Philosophy,  enlarged  somewhat 
in  its  closing  part,  and  brought  down  to  the  year  1860 ; and 
with  this  has  been  connected  a classification,  by  schools,  of  the 
latest  German  philosophers. 

It  is  in  matters  connected  with  German  philosophy  that 
Professor  Fleming  seems  least  at  home.  He  is  evidently  de- 
pendent upon  translators  and  critics  for  his  knowledge  of  them; 
and  of  translations  from  the  German,  especially  in  this  depart- 
ment, we  may  use  the  reply  which  Canova  made  when  Na- 
poleon, as  an  inducement  to  the  artist  to  reside  in  the  French 
Capital,  proposed  to  transfer  the  works  of  Art  from  Rome  to 
Paris  : “ When  you  remove  all  that  can  be  removed,  there  will 
remain  infinitely  more  than  all  you  have  taken  away." 

IV.  The  largest  measure  of  labour  has  been  bestowed  upon 
the  Bibliographical  Index.  Though  this  is  so  arranged  as  to 
form  an  Index  to  the  Vocabulary,  it  has  nevertheless  an  inde- 
pendent value.  It  gives  every  name  quoted  or  alluded  to  in 
the  Vocabulary,  and  these  embrace  all  the  names  of  the  most  im- 


pletely  within  the  reach  of  the  reader  the  treasures  offered  by 


vm 


INTRODUCTION. 


portance  in  Philosophy.  In  the  Index,  as  a general  thing,  the 
names  of  the  authors  are  given  in  full,  the  dates  of  their  birth 
and  death,  or  of  the  period  in  which  they  flourished  are  added, 
together  with  the  titles  of  their  works,  not  only  of  those  cited 
in  the  Vocabulary,  but  in  many  cases  of  others  that  are  most 
important,  with  the  dates  either  of  their  composition  or  of  the 
best  editions,  and  in  many  cases  the  dates  of  both.  The  re- 
ference is  not  by  the  page  but  by  the  subject  under  which  they 
are  quoted,  so  that  the  Index  shows  the  topics  of  the  works 
catalogued,  and  thus  presents  a special  vocabulary  of  the  terms 
of  the  leading  authors.  By  turning,  for  instance,  to  the  arti- 
cles Aristotle,  Plato,  Hamilton,  or  Leibnitz,  the  reader  will  find 
himself  able  to  examine  consecutively  the  views  of  those  great 
leaders  in  the  World  of  Philosophical  Science.  Some  of  the 
most  important  philosophical  works  are  destitute  of  an  Index. 
Hamilton’s  Reid,  for  example,  has  none.  The  Vocabulary,  with 
its  Bibliographical  additions,  becomes  to  some  extent  an  Index 
to  such  works.  In  preparing  this  Index  with  its  Bibliographical 
feature,  which,  with  all  its  imperfections,  is,  so  far  as  the  Editor 
knows,  the  only  one  of  its  kind,  he  has  sometimes  found  all 
the  sources  within  his  reach,  inadequate.  It  is  based  first  of  all 
upon  an  actual  inspection  of  the  works,  where  this  was  practi- 
cable. The  facilities  for  this  have  been  furnished  by  his  own 
library,  by  the  Philadelphia  Library,  and  by  the  bookstores  of 
the  city.  In  this  department  he  found  the  stock  of  his  Pub- 
lishers rich  and  well  selected,  and  he  acknowledges  the  facilities 
which  they  kindly  gave  to  his  labours  by  the  unrestricted  use 
of  the  whole.  There  still  remained,  however,  a large  number 
of  works,  for  an  ability  to  notice  which  he  is  indebted  to  various 
valuable  books  of  reference.  Among  these  might  be  mentioned, 
First,  the  works  in  which  the  Bibliography  of  Philosophy  is 


INTRODUCTION. 


ix 


treated  as  a part  of  general  Bibliography.  The  best  English, 
American,  French,  and  German  Cyclopedias  present  more  or 
less  largely  such  materials.  The  works  in  Bibliography,  and 
in  Literary  History,  Watt,  Brunet,  Ebert,  Grsesse,  Darling, 
also  furnish  valuable  matter.  The  best  general  Biographies 
are  also  necessarily  bibliographical,  and  special  attention  has 
been  given  to  this  department  in  the  admirable  work  edited  by 
Hoefer,  and  now  in  process  of  publication  by  the  Didots.1 

In  English  and  American  Bibliography,  the  Editor  has  had 
the  best  works  of  reference  at  hand,  including  the  various 
Catalogues  to  the  latest  dates.  Although  all  of  them  have 
been  in  various  degrees  necessary  in  the  preparation  of  the 
Index,  yet  in  a large  proportion  of  cases  the  work  of  Mr.  Alli- 
bone,  as  far  as  it  is  completed,  is,  for  English  and  American 
authors,  instar  omnium,  and  sometimes  much  more,  for  it 
largely  embodies  matter  not  before  in  print.  On  many  names 
it  will  always  remain  the  primary  source  of  information.  Though 
the  minute  testing,  letter  by  letter,  most  of  all  in  a specialty 
like  that  of  Philosophy,  is  one  which  very  few  works  of  a 
general  character  will  at  all  endure,  we  have  found,  to  a sur- 
prising extent,  in  this  comprehensive  work,  what  we  searched 
it  for,  and  we  could  not  but  feel  a grateful  regret  in  parting 
company  with  it  in  the  very  middle  of  the  vast  forest  of  the 
noblest  Literature  of  the  modern  World. 

For  the  French  and  German  Literature  he  has  also  had  access 
to  the  best  sources.2 


1 Nouvelle  Biographie  Generate  depuis  les  temps  les  plus  recules  jusqu’ii 
nos  Jours.  1857.  Thirty-one  vols.  have  appeared. 

a For  the  French,  among  others,  La  France  Literaire,  with  its  continuation 
under  the  title  La  Litterature  Fran^aise  Contemporaine.  16  vols.  1827 — 1857. 
Bossange.  Bibliographic  de  la  France.  1850—1860.  Reinwald,  Catalogue 
Annuel,  1859—60.  For  the  German,  Georgi,  Heinsius,  Kayser,  and  the  semi- 
annual Catalogues. 


X 


INTRODUCTION. 


The  works  in  which  the  Bibliography  of  Philosophy  is  a 
SPECIALTY  are  comparatively  few.  Among  them  may  be  enu- 
merated the  best  Dictionaries  of  Philosophy ; Walch,  Krug, 
the  Dictionnaire  des  Sciences  Philosophiques,  and  Furtmaier : 1 
and  the  Histories  of  Philosophy,  which  give  its  literature, 
among  which,  as  valuable  in  this  aspect,  and  easy  of  access,  may 
be  mentioned  Tennemann’s  Manual  and  Blakcy’s  History  of  the 
Philosophy  of  Mind.  The  books  devoted  exclusively  to  the 
Bibliography  of  Philosophy  are  of  course  very  few.  The  Editor 
would  mention  those  only  which  he  has  on  his  own  shelves. 
These  are  — the  Psychological  Library  of  Graesse,2  in  which 
he  presents  in  alphabetical  order  the  titles  of  the  most  im- 
portant works  of  ancient  and  of  modern  times  relating  to  the 
soul,  and  to  the  doctrine  of  immortality;  the  Bibliographical 
Manual  of  German  Philosophical  Literature  from  the  middle 
of  the  XVIIIth  Century  to  the  present  day,  by  Erscii3  and 
Geissler;  the  Philosophical  Literature  of  Germany,  from 
A.  d.  1400  to  the  present  time,  by  Gumfoscii4;  and  the  Phi- 
losophical Library  of  Ladrange,5  which  is  a useful  list  of  the 
best  works  of  this  class  in  French,  original  and  translated. 

Y.  The  final  labours  of  the  Editor  have  been  devoted  to  the 
preparation  of  the  Synthetical  Tables  which  follow  this 
Introduction.  The  utility  of  these  tables  will,  we  think,  at 
once  strike  the  reader.  The  First  Part  forms  a skeleton  of  the 
Philosophical  Sciences ; the  Second  Part  presents  an  outline  of 
their  history.  It  will  be  perceived  that  all  these  additions, 
which  have  increased  the  size  of  the  book  by  110  pages,  have 

1 Philosophisches  Real-Lexicon.  4 vols.  8vo.  1853-1855. 

1 Bibliotheca  Psychologica.  Leipzig.  1845. 

3 Bibliograpbisches  Handbuch.  Dritte  Auflage.  Leipz.  1850. 

‘ Die  Philosoph.  Literatur  der  Doutschen.  Regensburg,  1851. 

‘ Librairie  Pbilosophiquc.  Paris,  1S56. 


INTRODUCTION. 


XI 


a certain  internal  unity,  and  are  designed  to  co-operate  in  pro- 
ducing a common  result.  Very  far  more  than  in  the  ratio  in 
which  they  have  enlarged  the  work,  the  Editor  believes,  they 
have  added  to  its  value  as  a Manual.  The  student  will  find 
such  bibliographical  aid  as  he  needs  in  beginning  to  form  an 
acquaintance  with  philosophical  literature.  The  Vocabulary, 
without  undergoing  a change  in  what  its  author  has  done,  has 
to  some  extent  become  a Compendious  Dictionary  of  Philoso- 
phy. Its  leading  articles,  as  indeed  those  of  any  work  which 
arranges  philosophical  matter  alphabetically,  can,  by  the  aid 
of  the  first  part  of  the  Synthetical  Tables,  be  read  in  the  order 
of  nature.  The  general  character  and  succession  of  the  philo- 
sophical schools  of  all  times  are  briefly  presented  in  the  second 
part.  The  Chronology  of  the  History  of  Philosophy  used  in 
conjunction  with  the  Bibliographical  Index  will  enable  the 
student,  to  some  extent,  to  trace,  by  the  aid  of  the  Vocabulary, 
the  theories  and  views  of  philosophers  in  the  order  of  time. 
The  work  might  indeed,  in  its  present  shape,  be  used  advan- 
tageously, not  merely  as  an  indispensable  aid  in  easily  reaching 
the  meaning  of  other  works,  but  as  a text-book  for  the  syste- 
matic study  of  the  Elements  of  Philosophy,  It  is  a thread  for 
the  hand  of  the  student  who  is  entering  that  labyrinth  which, 
beyond  all  the  structures  of  man,  proves  the  majesty  of  the 
mind,  and  the  invincible  character  of  some  of  its  limitations. 

It  may  not  be  improper  here  to  correct  a mistake  of  Professor 
Fleming,  found  in  the  statement  under  “ Psychopan nychism,” 
that  Luther  was  inclined  to  the  doctrine  that  the  soul  sleeps 
between  death  and  the  resurrection.  Whatever  may  have  been 
the  confusion  of  his  views  on  the  world  of  the  dead  while  he 
was  still  under  the  influence  of  early  education,  there  is  no 
satisfactory  evidence  that  he  ever  held  this  error,  and  his 


INTRODUCTION. 


xii 

mature  judgment  against  it  has  been  expressed  most  decidedly 
in  his  Commentary  on  Genesis,  the  latest,  and  in  many  respects 
the  best  of  his  longer  works.  He  says  in  that : “ In  the  in- 
terim (between  death  and  the  resurrection),  the  soul  does  not 
sleep,  but  is  awake,  and  enjoys  the  vision  of  angels  and  of 
God,  and  has  converse  with  them.”1 
Philadelphia,  Aug.  10th,  I860. 


1 In  Genes,  xxv.  321.  Interim  Anima  non  dormiat. 


/ 


SYNTHETICAL  TABLE 


PHILOSOPHICAL  SCIENCES.* 


PART  FIRST. 
THEORY  AND  DEFINITIONS. 
I.  PHILOSOPHY. 


Its  relation  to  — 

Mythology. 

The  Fine  Arts. 

The  Sciences  in  general. 
The  Mathematical  Sciences. 


Its  relation  to 

The  Natural  Sciences — the 
different  theories  of  Nature. 
The  Science  of  Language  and 
Grammar. 


II.  PSYCHOLOGY. 


Its  relation  to  — 

Anthropology. 

Ideology. 

Pneumatology. 

1.  Faculties. 

2.  Capacities. 

3.  Modes. 

4.  Intelligence,  Intellect,  In- 

tellection. 

Thought. 


Conscience. 

Consciousness. 

Apperception. 

Sense,  or  Exterior  Percep- 
tion. 

Sensus  Communis. 

Common  Sense. 

Reason. 

Intuition. 

Contemplation. 


• On  the  basis  of  the  Table  Synthetique  of  the  Dictionnaire  des  Sciences  Philoso- 
pbiques,  tome  VI.  pp.  1029 — 1832,  Paris,  1852. 

A 2 


( xiii ) 


xiv 


SYNTHETICAL  TABLE  OF  THE 


II.  PSYCHOLOGY.  ( Continued .) 


Reflection. 

Notion. 

Concept,  Conception. 
Apprehension. 

Idea. 

Species  (Impressa,  Expressa). 
Category. 

Imagination. 

Memory. 

Reminiscence. 

Association  of  Ideas. 

5.  Sensibility,  or  Sensitivity. 
Impression. 

Sensation. 

Appetite. 

Desire. 

Propensiou,  Inclination. 
Affections. 

Passions. 

Antipathy. 


Hatred. 

Love. 

Remorse. 

Faith. 

Enthusiasm. 

Ecstasy. 

6.  Activity. 

' Instinct. 

Habit,  Habitude. 

Will. 

Attention. 

Liberty. 

7.  Ego  (I). 

8.  Person,  Personality. 

9.  Soul. 

10.  Seat  of  the  Soul,  or  Sen- 

sorium. 

11.  Life. 

12.  Sleep. 

13.  Insanity. 


III.  LOGIC. 


Organon. 

Canon  (of  Epicurus). 
Analytics. 

Dialectics. 

a.  Of  Truth  in  general  and  its  re- 
lation to  Thought. 
Criterion  of  Truth. 
Evidence. 

Certainty. 

Probability. 

Doubt. 

Assent. 

Judgment. 

Relation. 

Attribute  and  Subject. 


Quality. 

Quantity. 

Modality. 

Identity. 

Difference. 

Possible  and  Impossible. 
Contingent  and  Necessary. 
Absolute  and  Relative. 
Objective  and  Subjective. 
Concrete  and  Abstract. 
Adequate,  Inadequate. 
Immanent  and  Transcendent. 
A posteriori,  A priori. 
Principles. 

Axioms. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  SCIENCES. 


XV 


III.  LOGIC.  ( Continued .) 


b.  Of  the  Means  of  discovering 

Truth. 

Method. 

Analysis,  Synthesis. 
Experience,  Observation. 
Comparison. 

Abstraction. 

Generalization. 

Classification. 

Results  of  Classification  : 
Genus. 

Species. 

Induction. 

Analogy. 

Deduction. 

Human  Testimony,  Autho- 
rity. 

System. 

Speculation. 

Science. 

c.  Of  the  Means  of  expressing  and 

of  demonstrating  Truth. 
Signs,  Language. 
Proposition. 

Predicate,  Subject. 
Prsedicament. 

Copula. 

Comprehension,  Extension 
(Logical). 

Affirmation. 

Negation. 

Contradiction. 

Contraries  ( Propositions ). 
Complex,  Simple  (Proposi- 
tion). 

Assertory  (Proposition). 
Apodictical  (Propositions'). 
Problematical  (Propositions). 


Problem. 

Lemma. 

Postulate. 

Anticipation. 

Definition. 

Division. 

Distinction. 

Demonstration. 

Argumentation. 

Syllogism. 

Syllogistic  Signs. 
Enthymeme. 

Antecedent. 

Consequent. 

Corollary. 

Conclusion. 

Disjunction. 

Disjunctive  Argument, or  Pro- 
position. 

Dilemma. 

Epicheirema. 

Sorites. 

Argument  a fortiori. 
Reduction  ad  absurdum. 
Argument. 

Argument  a pari,  Example, 
see  Analogy. 

d.  Signs  of  Error  and  its  Re- 
medy. 

Opinion. 

Hypothesis. 

Prejudice. 

Error. 

Antinomy. 

Paralogism. 

Sophism,  SophisticaL 
Amphibology. 

Petitio  Principii,  Fallacy. 


XVI 


SYNTHETTICAL  TABLE  OE  THE 


Beautiful. 

Sublime. 

Ideal. 

Taste. 


IV.  AESTHETICS. 

Genius. 

Imitatiou. 

Arts  (The  Fine). 


V.  MORALS,  ETHICS. 


Goodness. 

Apathy. 

Honesty. 

Justice. 

Order. 

Penalty. 

Law. 

Philanthropy. 

Autonomy. 

Charity. 

Perfection. 

Self-preservation. 

Duty. 

Suicide. 

Imperative  (Categorical, 

Property. 

The). 

Family. 

Right. 

Education. 

Merit  and  Demerit. 

State. 

Virtue. 

Society. 

Vice. 

Socialism. 

Cardinal  Virtues. 

Human  Destiny, 

Ascetic  Virtues,  Asceticism. 

Humanity. 

Abstinence. 

Progress. 

Stoicism. 

Perfectibility. 

VI.  METAPHYSICS. 


Ontology. 

Being. 

Nihilum,  or  Nothing. 
Privation. 

Unity. 

Essence. 

Entity. 

Quiddity. 

Substantial  Forms. 

Archetypes. 

Noumenon. 


Phenomenon. 

Actual. 

Virtual. 

Cause. 

Causes  (Final). 
Causes  (Occasional). 
Abstract. 

Accident. 

Force. 

Entelechy. 

Monad. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  SCIENCES. 


xvii 


VI.  METAPHYSICS. 
Individuality. 

Time. 

Space. 

Extension. 

Externality  or  Outness. 

Motion. 

Number. 

Indefinite. 


( Continued.) 

Infinite. 

A parte  ante. 
A parte  post. 
Spirit. 

Matter. 

Nature. 

Macrocosm. 

Microcosm. 


VII.  THEODICY. 


Theology. 

Theosophy. 

Teleology. 

God. 

Demiurge. 

Anima  Mundi  (Soul  of  the 
World.) 

Emanation. 

Creation. 


Prescience. 

Providence. 

Evil. 

Chance. 

Necessity. 

Destiny. 

Predestination. 

Immortality. 


PART  SECOND. 
HISTORICAL  AND  CRITICAL. 
FIRST.  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 


OF  SYSTEMS 

Dogmatism. 

Scepticism. 

Rationalism. 

Empiricism. 

Idealism. 

Sensualism. 

Nominalism. 

Realism. 

Conceptualism. 


IN  GENERAL. 

Spiritualism. 

Materialism. 

Ilylozoism. 

Atomism. 

Atheism. 

Theism 

Deism. 

Anthropomorphism. 

Optimism. 


xvm 


SYNTHETICAL  TABLE  OF  THE 


OF  SYSTEMS  IN  GENERAL.  {Continued.) 


Dualism. 

Pantheism. 

Fatalism. 

Metempsychosis. 


Mj’sticism. 

Quietism. 

Syncretism. 

Eclecticism. 


SECOND.  PHILOSOPHICAL  SCHOOLS. 


I.  PHILOSOPHY.  ORIENTAL. 


1. 

Philosophy  of  India. 

6. 

Philosophy  of  Persians. 

2. 

“ “ China. 

7. 

<4 

“ Phoenicians. 

3. 

“ “ Egypt. 

8. 

<( 

“ Jews. 

4. 

“ “ Chaldea. 

9. 

(t 

“ Syrians. 

6. 

“ “ Sabeists. 

II.  PHILOSOPHY.  GREEK. 


1.  Mysteries.  Esoteric  doctrine. 

2.  Hymns  of  Orpheus.  Orphic 

Philos. 

3.  Homeric  Philosophy. 

4.  Gnomic  “ 

5.  Sages  of  Greece. 

6.  Ionic  School. 

7.  ItalicorPy-|SchooL 
thagorean  J 

8.  Eleatic  “ 

9.  Atomistic  “ 

10.  Sophistic  “ 

11.  Socratic  “ 

12.  Cynic  “ 

13.  Cyreniac  “ 

14.  Megaric  “ 

15.  Eristic  “ 

16.  Elis  & Eretria  “ 

17.  Platonic  “ Academy. 

18.  Peripatetic  “ Lyceum. 

19.  Pyrrlionic  “Scepticism. 

20.  Epicurean  “ 


21.  Stoic  School. 

22.  New  Academy. 

23.  Greek  Philosophy  among  the 
Romans. 

a.  Political  Philosophy. 

b.  Roman  Jurisconsults. 

c.  “ Epicureans. 

d.  “ Stoics,  Pythagoreans,  and 

Cynics. 

e.  “ Practical  Eclecticism,  New 

Academy  (Cicero). 

24.  Decadence  of  the  Greek  Phi- 

losophy. 

a.  New  Pythagoreans. 

b.  New  Platonists ; Erudite  Plato- 

nisls. 

c.  New  Peripatetics. 

d.  New  Sceptics. 

e.  Sophists,  Rhetoricians,  Compilers. 

25.  School  of  Alf-xandiiia. 

26.  Gnosticism.  Gnostic  School. 


III.  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHERS  AND  CHURCH  FATHERS. 
a.  Greek  Church.  [ b.  Latin  Church. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  SCIENCES. 


XIX 


IV.  ARABIAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


V.  SCHOLASTIC 

1.  First  Epoch.  Beginning  of 

IXtli  to  end  of  Xllth  Cent. 

2.  Second  Epoch.  Xlllth  and 

XIVth  Centuries. 
a.  Mystics  opposed  to  the  Scho- 

VI.  PHILOSOPHY  OF 

1.  Greek  Refugees  in  Italy. 

2.  Men  of  letters  opposed  to  Scho- 

lasticism (Von  Ilutten,  Lu- 
ther, Melanctkon,  Erasmus). 

3.  Peripatetics. 

4.  Platonician?  & Pythagoreans. 

5.  Stoics. 


PHILOSOPHY. 

lastic  Philos.  (Tauler,  Ger- 
son,  Petrarch.) 

3.  Third  Epoch.  Decline  and 
fall  of  the  Scholastic  Philos. 

THE  RENAISSANCE. 

6.  Sceptic. 

7.  Mystic. 

8.  Efforts  at  Reform  and  Resto- 

ration. 

9.  Moralists  and  Political  Phi- 

losophers. 


VII.  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY.  GENERAL  CHARACTERISTICS. 
(Bacon,  Des  Cartes.) 


A.  ENGLISH  SCHOOL. 


I.  Sensualism,  school  of. 
II.  Spiritualism,  “ 

1.  Naturalistic,  “ 


2.  Metaphysicians  & theologians. 

3.  Moralists,  Critics. 

III.  Sceptical  school. 


B.  SCOTCH  PHILOSOPHY. 


C.  FRENCH  PHILOSOPHY. 


I.  Cartesianism,  Cartesian 
school. 

1.  Disciples  of  Des  Cartes. 

2.  Friends  of  Des  Cartes,  and  of 

Cartesianism. 

3.  Disciples  of  Des  Cartes  dis- 

senting from  him;  Spino- 
zism. 

4.  Adversaries  of  Des  Cartes ; 

theologians. 

5.  Sensualistic  and  Sceptical  Ad- 

versaries. 

II.  Sensualistic  school  of  the 
XVlIIth  Century. 


1.  Ideologists  and  Physiologists. 

2.  Encyclopedists. 

3.  Epicureans.  Atheists. 

III.  Moralists.  Political  Philoso- 

phers. Economists. 

IV.  Adversaries  of  the  Sensualis- 

tic Philosophy  of  the  XVlIIth 
Century. 

1.  Isolated  adversaries. 

2.  Mystics  and  theologians. 

3.  Spiritualistics  and  Eclectics 

of  the  XIXth  Century. 


XX 


TABLE  OP  PHILOSOPHICAL  SCIENCES. 


D.  ITALIAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

E.  GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


First  Epoch  from  Leibnitz  to  Kant. 


I.  School  of  Leibnitz  and  Wolf. 

II.  Adversaries  of  Leibnitz  and 
Wolf. 


III.  Independent  Eclectics.  Aca- 

demicians of  Berlin. 

IV.  Moralists.  Political  Philoso- 

phers. 


Second  Epoch  from  Kant  to  our  own  time1 II.. 


I.  School  of  Kant. 
a.  Dissenters  from  the  School  of 
Kant. 

II.  School  of  Fichte. 


III.  School  of  Jacobi. 

IV.  School  of  Schelling  and  of 

IJegel. 

V.  Mystics  and  Dissidents. 


• See  list  of  German  Philosophers,  p.  679. 


PREFACE 


T 0 

THE  FIRST  EDITION. 


The  aim  of  the  following  work,  as  its  title  indicates,  is 
humble.  It  is  not  proposed  to  attempt  an  adequate  illustration 
of  the  difficult  and  important  topics  denoted  or  suggested  by 
the  several  vocables  which  are  successively  explained.  All  that 
is  intended  is,  to  assist  the  student  towards  a right  understand- 
ing of  the  language  of  philosophy,  and  a right  apprehension 
of  the  questions  in  discussing  which  that  language  has  been 
employed.  Instead  of  affixing  a positive  or  precise  significa- 
tion to  the  vocables  and  phrases,  it  has  been  thought  better  to 
furnish  the  student  with  the  means  of  doing  so  for  himself — 
by  showing  whence  they  are  derived,  or  of  what  they  are  com- 
pounded, and  how  they  have  been  employed.  In  like  manner, 
the  quotations  and  references  have  not  been  selected  with  the 
view  of  supporting  any  particular  system  of  philosophy,  but 
rather  with  the  view  of  leading  to  free  inquiry,  extended  read- 
ing, and  careful  reflection,  as  the  surest  means  of  arriving  at 
true  and  sound  conclusions. 

In  our  Scottish  Universities,  the  study  of  philosophy  is 
entered  upon  by  those  who,  in  respect  of  maturity  of  years  and 
intellect,  and  in  respect  of  previous  preparation  and  attain- 
ts5) 


xxu 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION. 


ment,  differ  widely  from  one  another.  To  many,  a help  like 
the  present  may  not  be  necessary.  To  others,  the  Author  has 
reason  to  think  it  may  he  useful.  Indeed,  it  was  the  felt  want 
of  some  such  help,  in  the  discharge  of  professional  duty,  which 
prompted  the  attempt  to  supply  it.  The  labor  has  been  greater 
than  the  result  can  indicate  or  measure.  But,  should  the 
Vocabulary  assist  the  young  student  by  directing  him  what 
to  read,  and  how  to  understand  what  he  reads,  in  philosophy, 
the  labourer  shall  have  received  the  hire  for  which  he  wrought. 

The  College,  Glasgow, 

November , 1856. 


PREFACE 


T 0 

THE  SECOND  EDITION. 


The  Vocabulary  of  Philosophy  was  originally  prepared 
for  tlie  use  of  a Class  of  students  who  give  attendance  on  a 
lengthened  course  of  Lectures  on  Moral  Philosophy.  The 
words  and  phrases  selected  for  explanation,  were  chiefly  such 
as  were  actually  employed  in  the  Lectures,  or  such  as  the 
students  were  likely  to  meet  with  in  the  course  of  their  read- 
ing. Of  the  words  and  phrases  of  the  German  Philosophy, 
only  such  were  introduced  as  had  found  their  way  into  com- 
mon use. 

The  Vocabulary  having  been  found  useful,  beyond  the 
limits  for  which  it  was  originally  intended,  a Second  Edition 
has  speedily  been  called  for.  Useful  suggestions  have  sponta- 
neously been  made  to  the  Author  by  persons  with  whom  he 
was  previously  unacquainted ; and,  among  others,  by  Mr.  Hay- 
wood, the  Translator  of  the  Criticism  of  the  Pure  Reason. 
Mr.  Morell,  who  was  formerly  a student  at  this  University,  and 
who  is  now  so  well  known  by  his  valuable  contributions  to 
Philosophy,  had  the  kindness  to  go  over  the  contents  of  the 
Vocabulary,  and  to  furnish  a list  of  such  additional  words 
and  phrases  as  might  be  introduced  with  advantage.  The  like 

(xxiii) 


xxiv  PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION. 

good  office  was  rendered  by  Dr.  M‘Cosh,  the  distinguished  Pro- 
fessor of  Logic  and  Metaphysics  in  Queen’s  College,  Belfast; 
and  the  Author  has  done  what  he  could  to  make  this  Edition 
more  complete  and  useful.  The  quotations  have,  in  some  in- 
stances, been  shortened ; and,  without  much  increasing  the  size 
of  the  work,  many  additional  words  and  phrases,  from  the 
different  departments  of  Philosophy,  have  been  introduced. 

It  still  retains  the  name  and  form  of  a Vocabulary,  in  the 
hope  that  it  may  prove  useful  in  our  higher  Academies  and 
Colleges.  But,  should  suitable  encouragement  and  co-operation 
be  obtained,  it  is  in  contemplation,  by  extending  the  plan  and 
enlarging  the  articles,  to  claim  for  the  work  a higher  title,  by 
trying  to  make  it  instrumental  in  rendering  to  Philosophy 
among  ourselves,  a service  similar  to  what  has  been  rendered 
to  Philosophy  in  France,  by  the  publication  of  the  Dictionnaire 
des  Sciences  Pliilosophiqucs. 


The  College,  Glasgow, 
February,  1858. 


VOCABULARY  OE  PHILOSOPHY. 


ABDUCTION  ( abdudio , cbtaywyij,  a leading  away)  is  a kind  of 
syllogism  in  which  it  is  plain  that  the  major  extreme  is  con- 
tained in  the  middle  ; but  it  is  not  apparent  that  the  middle  is 
included  in  the  minor  extreme,  although  this  is  equally  credible 
or  more  so  than  the  conclusion.  From  this,  therefore,  that  its 
major  proposition  is  plain,  it  approaches  to  demonstration  ; but 
it  is  not  yet  demonstration,  sinco  its  assumption  or  minor  pro- 
position is  not  evident.  But  the  assumption  is  not  evident 
because  it  is  not  immediate,  but  requires  proof  to  make  the  de- 
monstration complete.  For  example — All  whom  God  absolves 
are  free  from  sin.  But  God  absolves  all  who  are  in  Christ. 
Therefore  all  who  are  in  Christ  are  free  from  sin.  In  this 
apagogic  syllogism  the  major  proposition  is  self-evident;  but 
the  assumption  is  not  plain  till  another  proposition  proving  it 
is  introduced,  namely,  God  condemns  sin  in  them  by  the 
mission  of  his  Son.  This  mode  of  reasoning  is  called  abduc- 
tion, because  it  withdraws  us  from  the  conclusion  to  the  proof 
of  a proposition  concealed  or  not  expressed.  It  is  described 
by  Aristotle.1 

ABILITY  and  INABILITY  - (Natural  and  Moral). 

Ability  (Nat.)  is  power  to  do  certain  acts,  in  consequence  of 
being  possessed  of  the  requisite  means,  and  being  unrestrained 
in  their  exercise ; thus  we  say  ability  to  walk,  the  power  of 
seeing,  &c. 

Inability  (Nat.)  is  the  opposite  of  this;  as  when  we  say  of  a 
blind  man,  he  is  unable  to  see ; or  when  an  object  is  too  dis- 
tant, we  say  we  are  unable  to  see  it. 


2 


1 Prior.  Analyt .,  lib.  ii.,  cap.  25. 
B 


(i) 


2 


VOCABULARY  OF  FIIILOSOPHY. 


ABILITY  — 

Ability  (Mor.)  is  tlic  disposition  to  use  rightly  the  powers  and. 
opportunities  which  God  lias  given  ; as  when  it  is  written,  “It 
is  a joy  to  the  just  to  do  judgment.” 

Inability  (Mor.)  is  the  want  of  a right  disposition ; as  in  those 
of  whom  it  is  written,  “ They  have  eyes  full  of  adultery,  and 
cannot  cease  from  sin.”  “ If  there  is  anything  besides  want 
of  inclination  which  prevents  a man  from  performing  a par- 
ticular act,  he  is  said  to  be  naturally  unable  to  do  it.  If 
unwillingness  is  the  only  obstacle  in  the  way,  he  is  said  to 
be  morally  unable.  That  which  prevents  a man  from  doing 
as  Tie  will,  is  natural  inability.  That  which  prevents  him  from 
doing  as  he  ought,  is  moral  inability.” 1 
ABSCISSIO  INFINITI  is  a phrase  applied  by  some  logical 
writers  to  a series  of  arguments  used  in  any  inquiry  in  which 
we  go  on  excluding,  one  by  one,  certain  suppositions,  or  certain 
classes  of  things,  from  that  whose  real  nature  we  are  seeking 
to  ascertain.  Thus,  certain  symptoms,  suppose,  exclude 
“small-pox that  is,  prove  this  not  to  be  the  patient’s  dis- 
order; other  symptoms,  suppose,  exclude  “ scarlatina ” &c., 
and  so  one  may  proceed  by  gradually  narrowing  the  range  of 
possible  suppositions.”2 

ABSOLUTE  ( absolutum , from  ab  and  solvo,  to  free  or  loose  from) 
signifies  what  is  free  from  restriction  or  limit. 

“We  must  know  what  is  to  be  meant  by  absolute  or  absolute- 
ness ; whereof  I find  two  main  significations.  Eixst^-aZisfifcfe 
-■adgpifieth  perfect.,  and  absoluteness,  perfection ; hence  we  have 
in  Latin  this  expression — Perfectum  est  omnibus  numeris  absol- 
utum. And  in  our  vulgar  language  we  say  a thing  is  absolutely 
good  when  it  is  perfectly  good.  Next,  absolute  signifieth  free 
from  tie  or  bond,  wrhich  in  Greek  is  arto\ii.vyivov.” 3 

1.  Asjneani-ng  rvhat  is  complete  or  perfect  in  itself,  as  a 
r-man,  a tree,  it  is  opposed  to  what  is  relative. 

2.  As  meaning  what  is  free  from  restriction,  it  is  opposed  to 
what  exists  secundum  quid.  The  soul  of  man  is  immortal 
absolutely ; man  is  immortal  only  as  to  his  soul. 


1 Day,  On  the  Will,  pp.  96,  97. 

a Whately.  Log.  b.  ii.,  ch.  iii.,  s.  4,  and  ch.  v.,  8.  1,  subs.  7. 

3 Knox,  Hist,  of  Reform .,  Prof. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


3 


ABSOLUTE— 

3.  As  meaning  what  is  underbred,  it  denotes  self-existence. 
andAs-predicable  only  of  the  First  Cause. 

4.  It  signifies  not  only  what  is  free  from  external  cause,  hut 
also  free  from  condition. 

Absolute,  Unconditioned,  Infinite. — “ The  Absolute,  taking  its 
etymological  sense,  may  he  explained  as  that  which  is  free 
from  all  necessary  relation  ; which  exists  in  and  by  itself,  and 
does  not  require  the  prior  or  simultaneous  existence  of  any- 
thing else.  The  Unconditioned,  in  like  manner,  is  that  which 
is  subject  to  no  law  or  condition  of  being  ; which  exists,  there- 
fore, in  and  by  itself,  and  does  not  imply  the  prior  or  simul- 
taneous existence  of  anything  else.  The  Absolute  and  Uncon- 
ditioned are  also  identical  with  the  Real;  for  relation  is  but  a 
phenomenon,  implying  and  depending  on  the  prior  existence 
of  things  related  ; while  the  true  Real  is  unrelated.  Such  a 
science  as  metaphysics,  which  has  in  all  ages  been  proclaimed 
as  the  science  of  the  Absolute,  the  Unconditioned,  and  the  Real, 
according  to  Kant,  must  be  unattainable  by  man  ; for  all  know- 
ledge is  consciousness,  and  all  consciousness  implies  a relation 
between  the  subject  or  person  conscious,  and  the  object  or  thing 
of  which  he  is  conscious.  An  object  of  consciousness  cannot 
be  Absolute ; for  consciousness  depends  on  the  laws  of  the  con- 
scious mind,  its  existence  as  such  implies  an  act  of  conscious- 
ness, and  consciousness  is  a relation.  It  cannot  be  the  Uncon- 
ditioned; for  consciousness  depends  on  the  laws  of  the  con- 
scious mind,  and  these  are  conditions.  It  cannot  be  the  Real; 
for  the  laws  of  our  consciousness  can  only  give  us  things  as  they 
appear  to  us,  and  do  not  tell  us  what  they  are  in  themselves.” 1 

“ Mr.  Calderwood  defines  the  Absolute,  which  he  rightly 
identifies  with  the  Infinite,  as  ‘ that  which  is  free  from  all  ne- 
cessary relation  ‘ it  may  exist  in  relation,  provided  that  re- 
lation be  not  a necessary  condition  of  its  existence.  Hence  he 
holds  that  the  Absolute  may  exist  in  the  relation  of  conscious- 
ness, and  in  that  relation  be  apprehended,  though  imperfectly, 
by  man.  On  this  theory  we  have  two  absolutes : the  Absolute 
as  it  exists  out  of  consciousness,  and  the  Absolute  as  it  is  known 
in  consciousness.  Mr.  Calderwood  rests  his  theory  on  the 


1 Mansel,  Lecture  on  Philosophy  of  Kant,  p.  25. 


4 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ABSOLUTE  - 

assumption  that  these  two  are  one.  How  is  this  identity  to  be 
ascertained  ? IIow  do  I know  that  the  absolute  is  my  absolute? 
I cannot  compare  them  ; for  comparison  is  a relation,  and  the 
first  Absolute  exists  out  of  relation.  Again,  to  compare  them, 
I must  be  in  and  out  of  consciousness  at  the  same  time ; for 
the  first  Absolute  is  never  in  consciousness,  and  the  second  is 
never  out  of  it.  Again,  the  Absolute  as  known  is  an  object  of 
consciousness  ; and  an  object  of  consciousness  as  such,  cannot 
exist,  save  in  relation.  But  the  true  Absolute,  by  its  definition, 
can  exist  out  of  relation ; therefore  the  Absolute  as  known  is 
not  the  true  Absolute.  Mr.  Calderwood’s  Absolute  in  conscious- 
ness is  only  the  Relative  under  a false  name.”1 

According  to  Sir  William  Hamilton,2  “ The  Unconditioned 
denotes  the  genus  of  which  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute  are 
the  species.” 

As  to  our  knowledge  or  conception  of  the  Absolute,  there 
are  different  opinions. 

1.  According  to  Sir  William  Hamilton,  “ The  mind  can 
conceive,  and  consequently  can  know,  only  the  limited,  and 
the  conditionally  limited.  The  unconditionally  unlimited,  or 
the  Infinite, The  unconditionally  limited,  or  the  Absolute,  cannot 
positively  be  construed  to  the  mind ; they  can  be  conceived 
at  all  only  by  thinking  away,  or  abstraction  of  those  very 
conditions  under  which  thought  itself  is  realized ; consequently 
the  notion  of  the  Unconditioned  is  only  negative — negative  of 
the  conceivable  itself.” 

2.  According  to  Kant,  the  Absolute  or  Unconditioned  is  not 
an  object  of  knowledge;  but  its  notion  as  a regulative  princi- 
ple of  the  mind  itself,  is  more  than  a mere  negation  of  the 
conditioned. 

3.  According  to  Schelling,  it  is  cognizable,  but  not  con- 
ceivable ; it  can  be  known  by  a sinking  back  into  identity  with 
the  Absolute,  but  is  incomprehensible  by  consciousness  and 
reflection,  which  are  only  of  the  Relative  and  the  Different. 

4.  According  to  Cousin,  it  is  cognizable  and  conceivable  by 
consciousness  and  reflection,  under  relation,  difference,  and 
plurality. 

Instead  of  saying  that  God  is  Absolute  and  Infinite, 


1 Manse],  lecture  on  rhilosojiluj  of  Kant,  p.  38. 


* Discussions , p.  13. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


5 


ABSOLUTE  — 

Ivrause,  and  his  admirer,  Tiberghien,1  ascribe  to  him  Sfeit6 
(, selbheit ) and  Totality.  Totality  or  the  Infinite  manifests 
itself  everywhere  in  nature.  Nature  is  made  up  of  wholes, 
and  all  these  constitute  one  whole.  In  spirit  everything 
manifests  itself  under  the  character  of  spontaneity  or  seite. 
Spirit  always  is  what  it  is  by  its  own  individual  efforts. 

All  philosophy  aims  at  a knowledge  of  the  Absolute  under 
different  phases.  In  psychology,  the  fundamental  question  is, 
have  we  ideas  that  are  a priori  and  absolute?  — in  logic,  is 
human  knowledge  absolute  ? — -in  ethics,  is  the  moral  law  abso- 
lute rectitude  ? — and  in  metaphysics,  what  is  the  ultimate 
ground  of  all  existence  or  absolute  being?2 — F.  Infinite, 
Unconditioned,  Real. 

ABSTINENCE  ( abs  teneo,  to  hold  from  or  off) — “is  whereby  a 
man  refraineth  from  anything  which  he  may  lawfully  take.”3 
Abstinence  is  voluntarily  refraining  from  things  which 
nature,  and  especially  physical  nature,  needs  or  delights  in, 
for  a moral  or  religious  end.  It  corresponds  to  the  ’Artt'^ou 
of  the  precept  of  Epictetus,  ’Avl^ou  xai  ardx°o  ; Sustine  et 
abstine.  The  Stoics  inculcated  abstinence  in  order  to  make 
the  soul  more  independent  of  the  body  and  the  things  belong- 
ing to  the  body. — Christian  abstinence  is  founded  in  humility 
and  self-mortification. — F.  Asceticism. 

ABSTRACT,  ABSTRACTION  ( abstractio , from  abs  traho,  to 
draw  away  from.  It  is  also  called  separatio  and  resolutio). 

Dobrisch  observes  that  the  term  abstraction  is  used  some- 
times in  a psychological,  sometimes  in  a logical  sense.  In  the 
former  we  are  said  to  abstract  the  attention  from  certain 
distinctive  features  of  objects  presented  ( abstraliere  \mentem\ 
a differentiis).  In  the  latter,  we  are  said  to  abstract  certain 
portions  of  a given  concept  from  the  remainder  ( abstraliere 
differentias)  ,4 

Abstraction  (Psychological),  says  Mr.  Stewart,5  “ is  the  power 
of  considering  certain  qualities  or  attributes  of  an  object  apart 


1 Essai  dcs  Connaissances  Humaines,  pp.  738,  745. 

a See  Edinburgh  Review  for  October,  1829;  Sir  William  Hamilton  (Discussions) ; 
Tiberghien  (Essai  des  Connaissances  Humaines). 

3 Elyot,  Governour,  b.  iii.,  c.  16.  4 Mansel,  Prolegom.  Log.,  note,  p.  26. 

6 Elements  of  the  Philosophy  of  Human  Mind , chap.  iv. 

2* 


6 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ABSTRACTION — 

from  the  rest ; or,  as  I would  rather  choose  to  define  it,  the 
power  which  the  understanding  has  of  separating  the  combina- 
tions which  are  presented  to  it.”  Perhaps  it  may  be  more 
correctly  regarded  as  a process  rather  than  a ’power — as  a func- 
tion rather  than  a faculty.  Dr.  Reid  has  called  it1  “ an  opera- 
tion of  the  understanding.  It  consists  in  the  resolving  or  ana- 
lyzing a subject  (object)  into  its  known  attributes,  and  giving 
a name  to  each  attribute,  which  shall  signify  that  attribute 
and  nothing  more.”  Attributes  are  not  presented  to  us  singly 
in  nature,  but  in  the  concrete,  or  growing  together,  and  it  is 
by  abstraction  that  we  consider  them  separately.  In  looking 
at  a tree  we  may  perceive  simultaneously  its  trunk,  and  its 
branches,  and  its  leaves,  and  its  fruit ; or  we  may  contemplate 
any  one  of  these  to  the  exclusion  of  all  the  rest;  and  when 
we  do  so  it  is  by  the  operation  of  mind  which  has  been  called 
abstraction.  It  implies  an  exercise  of  will  as  well  as  of  under- 
standing ; for  there  must  be  the  determination  and  effort  to 
fix  the  energy  of  the  mind  on  the  attribute  specially  con- 
templated. 

The  chemist  really  separates  into  their  elements  those  bodies 
which  are  submitted  to  his  analysis.  The  psychologist  does 
the  same  thing  mentally.  Hence  abstraction  has  been  dis- 
tinguished as  real  and  mental.  But  as  the  object  presented  to 
the  psychologist  may  be  an  object  of  sense  or  an  object  of 
thought,  the  process  of  abstraction  may  be  either  real  or 
mental.  He  may  pluck  off  a branch  from  a tree,  or  a leaf 
from  a branch,  in  order  to  consider  the  sensation  or  percep- 
tion which  is  occasioned  in  him.  And  in  contemplating 
mind,  he  may  think  of  its  capacity  of  feeling  without  think- 
ing of  its  power  of  activity,  or  of  the  faculty  of  memory 
apart  from  any  or  all  of  the  other  faculties  with  which  it  is 
allied. 

Abstraction  (Logical),  “As  we  have  described  it,”  says  Mr. 
Thomson,2  “would  include  three  separate  acts;  first,  an  act 
of  comparison,  which  brings  several  intuitions  together;  next., 
one  of  reflection,  which  seeks  for  some  marks  which  they  all 
possess,  and  by  which  they  may  be  combined  into  one  group  ; 
and  last,  one  of  generalization,  which  forms  the  new  general 


1 lntell.  Powers , essay  y.,  chap.  3. 


Outline  of  the  Laws  of  Thought , p.  107. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


7 


ABSTRACTION  — 

notion  or  conception.  Kant,  however,  confines  the  name  ot 
abstraction  to  the  last  of  the  three  ;•  others  apply  it  to  the 
second.  It  is  not  of  much  consequence  whether  we  enlarge 
or  narrow  the  meaning  of  the  word,  so  long  as  we  see  the 
various  steps  of  the  process.  The  word  means  a drawing 
away  of  the  common  marks  from  all  the  distinctive  marks 
which  the  single  objects  have.” 

“The  process,”  says  Dr. Whately,1  “by  which  the  mind 
arrives  at  the  notions  expressed  by  ‘ common’  (or  in  popular 
language,  ‘ general’)  terms  is  properly  called  ‘ generalization,’ 
though  it  is  usually  (and  truly)  said  to  be  the  business  of 
abstraction ; for  generalization  is  one  of  the  purposes  to  which 
abstraction  is  applied.  lYlien  we  draw  off  and  contemplate, 
separately  any  part  of  an  object  presented  to  the  mind,  disre- 
garding the  rest  of  it,  we  are  said  to  abstract  that  part  of  it. 
Thus,  a person  might,  when  a rose  was  before  his  eye  or  his 
mind,  make  the  scent  a distinct  object  of  attention,  laying 
aside  all  thought  of  the  colour,  form,  &c. ; and  thus,  even 
though  it  were  the  only  rose  he  had  ever  met  with,  he  would 
be  employing  the  faculty  of  abstraction ; but  if,  in  contem- 
plating several  objects,  and  finding  that  they  agree  in  certain 
points,  we  abstract  the  circumstances  of  agreement,  disregard- 
ing the  differences,  and  give  to  all  and  each  of  these  objects  a 
name  applicable  to  them  in  respect  of  this  agreement, — i.e.,  a 
common  name,  as  ‘ rose  ;’  or,  again,  if  we  give  a name  to  some 
attribute  wherein  they  agree,  as  ‘ fragrance,’  or  ‘ redness,’  we 
are  then  said  to  ‘ generalize.’  Abstraction,  therefore,  does  not 
necessarily  imply  generalization,  though  generalization  implies 
abstraction.”  In  opposition  to  this,  see  Thomson.2 

“A  person  who  had  never  seen  but  one  rose,”  says  Mr. 
Stewart,3  “ might  yet  have  been  able  to  consider  its  eolemr 
apart  from  its  other  qualities ; and,  therefore,  there  may  be 
such  a thing  as  an  idea  which  is  at  once  abstract  and  particu- 
lar. After  having  perceived  this  quality  as  belonging  to  a 
variety  of  individuals,  we  can  consider  it  without  reference  to 
any  of  them,  and  thus  form  the  notion  of  redness  or  whiteness 


1 Log.,  book  i.,  sect.  6. 

2 Outline  of  the  Laws  of  Thought,  part  i.,  sect.  24. 

3 Addenda  to  vol.  i.,  Phil,  of  Hum.  Mind. 


8 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ABSTRACTION  — 

in  general,  which  may  be  called  a general  abstract  idea.  The 
words  abstract  and  general,  therefore,  when  applied  to  ideas, 
are  as  completely  distinct  from  each  other  as  any  two  words 
to  be  found  in  the  language.  It  is  indeed  true,  that  the  for- 
mation of  every  general  notion  presupposes  abstraction,  but  it 
is  surely  improper,  on  this  account,  to  call  a general  term  an 
abstract  term,  or  a general  idea  an  abstract  idea.” 

Mr.  John  S.  Mill  also  censures  severely1  the  practice  of 
applying  the  expression  “ abstract  name”  to  all  names  which 
are  the  result  of  abstraction  or  generalization,  and  consequently 
to  all  general  names,  instead  of  confining  it  to  the  names  of 
attributes.  He  uses  the  term  abstract  as  opposed  to  concrete. 
By  an  abstract  name  he  means  the  name  of  an  attribute — by 
a concrete  name  the  name  of  an  object.  The  sea  is  a concrete 
name.  Saltness  is  an  abstract  name.  Some  abstract  names 
are  general  names,  such  as  colour ; but  rose-colour,  a name 
obtained  by  abstraction,  is  not  a general  name. 

“ By  abstract  terms,  which  should  be  carefully  distinguished 
from  general  names,  I mean  those  which  do  not  designate  any 
object  or  event,  or  any  class  of  objects  or  events,  but  an  attri- 
bute or  quality  belonging  to  them  ; and  which  are  capable  of 
standing  grammatically  detached,  without  being  joined  to 
other  terms : such  as,  the  words  roundness,  swiftness,  length, 
innocence,  equity,  health,  whiteness.”2 

“ When  the  notion  derived  from  the  view  taken  of  any 
object,”  says  Dr.  Whately,3  “ is  expressed  with  a reference  to, 
or  as  in  conjunction  with,  the  object  that  furnished  the  notion, 
it  is  expressed  by  a concrete  term,  as  ‘ foolish’  or  ‘ fool when 
without  any  such  reference,  by  an  abstract  term,  as  ‘ folly.’  ” 
And  he  adds  in  a note,  “ It  is  unfortunate  that  some  writers 
have  introduced  the  fashion  of  calling  all  common  terms  ab- 
stract terms.” — V.  Term. 

A French  philosopher  has  expressed  himself  on  this  point  to 
the  following  effect: — “ In  every  class,  genus,  or  species,  there 
are  two  things  which  may  be  conceived  distinctly,  the  objects 
united  in  the  class,  and  the  characters  which  serve  to  unite  them. 


1 Log.,  vol.  i.,  2d  edition,  p.  35. 

a S.  Bailey,  Letters  on  Phil.  Unman  Mind , p.  195. 

3 Log book  ii.,  chap.  5,  sect.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


9 


ABSTRACTION  — 

Ilencc  it  follows,  that  under  every  term  -which  represents  that 
ideal  whole  which  we  call  genus,  under  the  term  ‘ bird,’  for  ex- 
ample, there  are  two  different  ideas, — the  idea  of  the  number 
of  the  objects  united,  and  the  idea  of  the  common  characters ; 
this  is  what  is  called  the  extension  and  the  comprehension  of 
general  terms.  Sometimes  there  is  a word  to  denote  the  ex- 
tension, and  another  word  to  denote  the  comprehension ; as 
‘ mortals  ’ and  1 mortality.’  And  this  has  led  some  philosophers 
to  say  that  there  are  general  ideas  which  are  concrete  and  gene- 
ral ideas  which  are  abstract  — the  latter  referring  only  to  the 
qualities  which  are  common,  and  the  former  to  the  qualities 
and  to  the  objects  which  possess  them,” 

“ The  mind,”  says  Mr.  Locke,1  “ makes  particular  ideas  re- 
ceived from  particular  objects  to  become  general,  which  is 
done  by  considering  them  as  they  are  in  the  mind  such  ap- 
pearances, separate  from  all  other  existences,  and  the  circum- 
stances of  real  existence,  as  time,  place,  or  any  other  concomi- 
tant ideas.  This  is  called  abstraction,  whereby  ideas  taken 
from  particular  beings,  become  general  representatives  of  all 
of  the  same  kind  ; and  their  names  general  names,  applicable 
■ to  whatever  exists  conformable  to  such  abstract  ideas.”2 

In  reference  to  this,  Bishop  Berkeley  has  said,3  “ I own  my- 
self able  to  abstract  ideas,  in  one  sense,  as  when  I consider 
some  particular  parts  or  qualities  separated  from  others,  with 
which,  though  they  are  united  in  some  object,  yet  it  is  possi- 
ble they  may  really  exist  without  them.  But  I deny  that  I 
can  abstract  one  from  another,  or  conceive  separately  those 
qualities  which  it  is  impossible  should  exist  separately ; or 
that  I can  frame  a general  notion  by  abstracting  from  particu- 
lars, as  aforesaid,  which  two  last  are  the  proper  acceptation 
of  abstraction." 

“ It  seems  to  me,”  says  Mr.  Hume,4  “ not  impossible  to 
avoid  these  absurdities  and  contradictions,5  if  it  be  admitted 
that  there  are  no  such  things  as  abstract  in  general  ideas, 
properly  speaking,  but  that  all  general  ideas  are  in  reality 


1 Essay  on  Hum.  Under.,  book  ii.,  chap.  11,  sect.  9. 

3 See  also  book  iv.,  chap.  7,  sect.  9. 

3 Principles  of  Hum.  Know.,  In  trod.,  sect.  10. 

4 Essays , p.  371,  n.  c.  edit.,  1758.  * See  his  Essay  on  Sceptical  Philosophy . 


10 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


ABSTRACTION  - 

particular  ones  attached  to  a general  term  ■which  recalls,  upon 
occasion,  other  particular  ones  that  resemble  in  certain  cir- 
cumstances the  idea  present  to  the  mind.  Thus,  when  the 
term  ‘ horse  ’ is  pronounced,  we  immediately  figure  to  our- 
selves the  idea  of  a black  or  white  animal  of  a particular  size 
or  figure  ; but  as  that  term  is  also  used  to  be  applied  to  ani- 
mals of  other  colours,  figures,  and  sizes,  their  ideas,  though 
not  actually  present  to  the  imagination,  are  easily  recalled, 
and  our  reasoning  and  conclusion  proceed  in  the  same  way  as 
if  they  were  actually  present.” 

In  reference  to  the  views  of  Berkeley  and  Hume  which  are 
supported  by  S.  Bailey  in  Letters  on  Phil.  Ilum.  Mind,  see  Dr. 
Reid.1 

The  Rev.  Sidney  Smith2  mentions  an  essay  on  Abstraction 
by  Dumarsais,  and  calls  it  an  admirable  abridgment  of  Locke’s 
.Essay. — V.  Common,  Concrete,  Generalization. 

S ABSTRACTIVE  (KNOWLEDGE)  and  INTUITIVE. 

The  knowledge  of  the  Deity  has  been  distinguished  into  ab- 
stractive and  intuitive,  or  knowledge  of  simple  intelligence  and 
knowledge  of  vision,  or  immediate  beholding.  By  the  former 
mode  of  knowing,  God  knows  all  things  possible,  whether  they 
are  actually  to  happen  or  not.  By  the  latter  He  knows  things 
future  as  if  they  were  actually  beheld  or  envisaged  by  him.3 

ABSURD  ( ab  surdo,  a reply  from  a deaf  man  who  has  not  heard 
what  he  replies  to,  or,  according  to  Vossius,  that  which  should 
be  heard  with  deaf  ears)  properly  means  that  which  is  logi- 
cally contradictory ; as,  a triangle  with  four  sides.  What  is 
contrary  to  experience  merely  cannot  be  called  absurd,  for  ex- 
perience extends  only  to  facts  and  laws  which  we  know  ; but 
there  may  be  facts  and  laws  which  we  have  not  observed  and 
do  not  know,  and  facts  and  laws  not  actually  manifested  may 
yet  be  possible. — V.  Arcument  (Indirect). 

ACADEMICS.  — “There  are  some  philosophers  who  have  made 
denying  their  profession,  and  who  have  even  established  on  that 
foundation  the  whole  of  their  philosophy  ; and  amongst  these 
philosophers,  some  are  satisfied  with  denying  certainty,  admit- 


1 Intell.  Powers,  essay  v.,  chap.  6. 

0 Baronius,  Mdaphys.,  sect.  12,  disput.  ii. 


a Lectures  on  Mor.  Phil.,  lcct.  iii. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


11 


ACADEMICS  — 

ting  at  the  same  time  probability,  and  these  are  the  New  Acad- 
emics ; the  others,  who  are  the  Pyrrhonisms,  have  denied  even 
this  probability,  and  have  maintained  that  all  things  are 
equally  certain  and  uncertain.” 1 

The  Academic  school  embraces  a period  of  four  ages,  from 
Plato  to  Antiochus.  Some  admit  three  Academies — first,  that 
of  Plato,  388  b.c.  ; middle,  that  of  Arcesilas,  244  b.c.  ; new, 
that  of  Carneades  and  Clitomachus,  1G0  b.c.  To  these  some 
add  a fourth,  that  of  Philon  and  Charmides,  and  a fifth,  that  of 
Antiochus.  But  Plato,  and  his  true  disciples,  Speusippus  and 
Xenocrates,  should  not  be  classed  with  these  semi-sceptics, 
whose  characteristic  doctrine  was  -to  rtidavov,  or  the  probable.2 

ACADEMY. — Academus  or  Hecademus  left  to  the  inhabitants  of 
Athens  a piece  of  ground  for  a promenade,  Hipparchus,  son 
of  Piristratus  enclosed  it  with  walls,  Cimon,  son  of  Miltiades, 
planted  it  with  trees.  Plato  assembled  his  disciples  in  it, 
hence  they  were  called  Academics .3 

ACATALEPSY  (a,  privative ; and  xa-tdxr^i.^,  compreTiensio,  in- 
comprehensibility) is  the  term  employed  by  Bacon'1  to  denote 
the  doctrine  held  by  the  ancient  academics  and  sceptics  that 
human  knowledge  never  amounts  to  certainty,  but  only  to  pro- 
bability. “ Their  chief  error,”  says  Bacon,  “ lay  in  this,  that 
. they  falsely  charged  the  perceptions  of  the  senses ; by  doing 
which  they  tore  up  the  sciences  by  the  root.  But  the  senses, 
though  they  may  often  either  deceive  or  fail  us,  yet  can  afford 
a sufficient  basis  for  real  science.”  Hence  he  says,0  “We  do 
not  meditate  or  propose  acatalepsy,  but  eucatalepsy,  for  we  do 
not  derogate  from  sense,  but  help  it,  and  we  do  not  despise 
the  understanding,  but  direct  it.”  Arcesilas,  chief  of  the 
second  Academy,  taught  that  we  know  nothing  with  certainty, 
in  opposition  to  the  dogmatism  of  the  Stoics,  who  taught 
xatd'krj^i^,  or  the  possibility  of  seizing  the  truth.  All  Sceptics 
and  Pyrrhonians  were  called  Acataleptics. — V.  Academics. 

ACCIDENT  ( accido , to  happen)  is  a modification  or  quality  which 


1 Port.  Roy.  Log.,  part  iv.,  chap.  1. 

3 See  Foucher  ( Dissertatio  dt  Phil.  Academ.,  12,  Paris,  1692);  Gerlach  ( Commentalio 

Exhibens  de  Probabilitate  Dispulalionts,  4to,  Goett.) 

3 Biograph.  Univers.  4 * 6 Adv.  of  Learning,  Moffet's  trans.,  p.  140. 

6 Eovum  Organum,  b.  i.,  aphor.  126. 


12 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ACCIDENT  - 

does  not  essentially  belong  to  a thing,  nor  form  one  of  its  con- 
stituent and  invariable  attributes ; as  motion  in  relation  to 
matter,  or  heat  to  iron.  The  scholastic  definition  of  it  is  ens 
eniis,  or  ens  in  alio,  •while  substance  was  defined  to  be  ens  per  se. 

“ Accident,  in  its  widest  technical  sense  (equivalent  to  attri- 
bute), is  anything  that  is  attributed  to  another,  and  can  only 
be  conceived  as  belonging  to  some  substance  (in  which  sense 
it  is  opposed  to  substance) ; in  its  narrower  and  more  properly 
logical  sense,  it  is  a predicable  which  may  be  present  or  ab- 
sent, the  essence  of  the  species  remaining  the  same  ; as  for  a 
man  to  be  ‘ walking,’  cr  ‘ a native  of  Paris.’  Of  these  two  ex- 
amples, the  former  is  what  logicians  call  a separable  accident, 
because  it  may  be  separated  from  the  individual  ( e . g.,  ho  may 
sit  down)  ; the  latter  is  an  inseparable  accident,  being  not 
separable  from  the  individual  (i.  e.,  he  who  is  a native  of  Paris 
can  never  be  otherwise) ; from  the  individual,  I say,  because 
every  accident  must  be  separable  from  the  species,  else  it  would 
be  a property.”1  — V.  Substance,  Phenomenon. 

ACCIDENTAL.  — Aristotle2  says,  “Suppose  that  in  digging  a 
trench  to  plant  a tree  you  found  a treasure,  that  is  accident, 
for  the  one  is  neither  the  effect  nor  the  consequent  of  the 
other  ; and  it  is  not  ordinarily  that  in  planting  a tree  you  find 
a treasure.  If,  then,  a thing  happen  to  any  being,  even  with 
the  circumstances  of  place  and  time,  but  which  has  no  cause 
to  determine  its  being,  either  actually,  or  in  such  a place,  that 
thing  is  an  accident.  An  accident,  then,  has  no  cause  deter- 
minate, but  only  fortuitous ; but  a fortuitous  cause  is  undeter- 
mined. Accident  is  also  that  which  exists  in  an  object  with- 
out being  one  of  the  characters  distinctive  of  its  essence ; 
such  is  the  property  of  a triangle  that  its  three  angles  are 
equal  to  two  right  angles.  Such  accidents  may  be  eternal ; 
accidents  properly  so  called  are  not.” 

A phenomenon  may  be  constant,  inherent  in  the  nature  of 
things,  and  in  that  sense  essential,  as  the  sparkling  of  the 
diamond  in  light,  or  the  sinking  of  a stone  in  the  water ; but 
an  accident,  according  to  Aristotle,  is  that  which  neither 
occurs  necessarily  nor  ordinarily.  — V.  Chance. 


1 Whately,  Lng.,  book  ii.,  chap.  5,  sect.  4,  and  index. 

2 Mdaphys.,  lib.  iv.,  cap.  SO. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOFHY. 


13 


ACOSMIST  (a,  priv.,  and  xob/j-o j,  world). — “ Spinoza  did  not  deny 
the  existence  of  God ; he  denied  the  existence  of  the  world ; 
he  was  consequently  an  acosmist,  and  not  an  atheist.”  1 * 

“ It  has  of  late  been  a favourite  criticism  of  Spinoza  to  say 
with  Hegel,  that  his  system  is  not  atheism  but  acosmism  ; and 
this  is  true  in  a speculative  point  of  view.  But  if  I allow  of 
no  God  distinct  from  the  aggregate  of  the  universe,  myself  in- 
cluded, what  object  have  I of  worship?  Or  if,  according  to 
the  later  manifestations  of  Pantheism,  the  Divine  mind  is  but 
the  sum  total  of  every  finite  consciousness,  my  own  included, 
what  religious  relation  between  God  and  man,  is  compatible 
with  the  theory  ? And,  accordingly,  the  Pantheism  of  Hegel  has 
found  its  natural  development  in  the  atheism  of  Feuerbach.” 3 
ACROAMATICAL  (from  axpodoftau,  to  hear). — “Aristotle  was 
wont  to  divide  his  lectures  and  readings  into  Acroamatical  and 
Exoterical ; some  of  them  contained  only  choice  matter,  and 
they  were  read  privately  to  a select  auditory  ; others  contained 
but  ordinary  stuff,  and  were  promiscuously,  and  in  public,  ex- 
posed to  the  hearing  of  all  that  would.”3 — V.  Exoteric. 

“ In  the  life  of  Aristotle,  by  Mr.  Blakeslev,4  it  has  been 
shown,  we  think  most  satisfactorily,  that  the  acroamatic  trea- 
tises of  Aristotle  differed  from  the  exoteric,  not  in  the  ab- 
struseness or  mysteriousness  of  their  subject-matter,  but  in 
this,  that  the  one  formed  part  of  a course  or  system,  while 
the  other  were  casual  discussions  or  lectures  on  a particular 
thesis.”5 

Some  of  the  early  Fathers  adopted  a similar  distinction,  in 
giving  instructions  to  the  Catechumens,  beginners  (star’ 
according  to  sound  — viva  voce  instruction),  and  the  Teleioi 
(finished,  or  thoroughly  instructed,  from  tixo;,  an  end). 

This  corresponds  to  the  difference  between  the  written  law 
and  the  traditions  of  the  elders. 

Plutarch6  and  Aulus  Gellius7  maintain  that  the  acroamatic 
works  had  natural  philosophy  and  logic  for  their  subjects, 


1 Lewes,  Biograph.  Hist,  of  Philosophy  p.  1. 

3 Mansel,  Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  279,  note. 

3 Hales.  Golden  Remains  (on  John  xviii.  36). 

4 Published  in  the  Encyclop.  Meirop. 

* Mor.  and  3Iet.  Phil.,  by  Maurice,  note,  p.  165. 

6 In  Alexand.  1 L.  xx.,  c.  4. 


3 


14 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ACROAMATICAL  — 

whereas  the  exoteric  treated  of  rhetoric,  ethics,  and  politics. 
Strabo,1  Cicero,* 3  and  Ammonius  Ilerm,3  maintain  that  they 
were  distinguished,  not  by  difference  of  subject,  but  of  form; 
the  acroamatic  being  discourses,  the  exoteric  dialogues.  Sim- 
plicius4 thus  characterizes  the  acroamatic  in  contradistinction 
to  the  exoteric  works,  “ distinguished  by  pregnant  brevity, 
closeness  of  thought,  and  quickness  of  transitions,”  from  his 
more  expanded,  more  perspicuous,  and  more  popular  pro- 
ductions.4 

ACT,  in  Metaphysics  and  in  Logic,  is  opposed  to  power.  Power  is 
simply  a faculty  or  property  of  anything,  as  gravity  of  bodies. 
Act  is  the  exercise  or  manifestation  of  a power  or  property, 
the  realization  of  a fact,  as  the  falling  of  a heavy  body.  We 
cannot  conclude  from  power  to  act;  a posse  ad  aclvm ; but 
from  ad  to  power  the  conclusion  is  good.  Ab  adu  ad  posse 
valet  illatio. 

An  act  is  Immanent  or  Transient.  An  immanent  act  has 
no  effect  on  anything  out  of  the  agent.  Sensation  is  an 
immanent  act  of  the  senses,  cognition  of  the  intellect.  A tran- 
sient act  produces  au  operation  or  result  out  of  and  beyond 
the  agent.  The  ad  of  writing  and  of  building  are  transient 
acts  — they  begin  with  the  agent,  but  produce  results  which 
may  affect  others. 

An  act  of  the  will  is  Elicit  or  Imperate.  An  elicit  act  of 
will  is  an  act  produced  immediately  by  the  will,  and  contained 
within  it,  as  velle  and  nolle,  to  determine  to  do  or  not  to  do. 
An  elicit  act  of  will  is  either  volition,  which  has  reference  to 
an  end  or  ultimate  object,  or  election,  which  has  reference  to 
means.  — V.  Volition,  Election. 

An  imperate  act  of  will  is  a movement  of  body  or  mind 
following  on  a determination  of  will,  as  running  after  or  run- 
ning away,  attending  or  not  attending.  Also  an  act  done  by 
others,  when  we  order  or  forbid  them  to  do,  encourage  or  dis- 
suade, assist  or  prevent. 

ACTION.— “ The  word  action  is  properly  applied  to  those  exertions 

‘ L.  13,  p.  608.  * Ad  Atticum.,  13,  19. 

3 Ad  Categor.  Aristot.  4 Ad  Catcgor.  in  Proem. 

‘ Buhle  has  a Commentatio  de  Libi’is  Arist.,  Exot.  et  Acroam .,  in  his  edit,  of  the  works 
of  Aristotle,  5 toIs.,  8vo.,  l)eux  Fonts,  1791,  pp.  142,  143. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


15 


ACTION— 

•which  are  consequent  on  volition,  -whether  the  exertion  he 
made  on  external  objects,  or  he  confined  to  our  mental  opera- 
tions. Thus -we  say  the  mind  is  active  when  engaged  in  study.” 1 
It  is  by  the  presence  of  will  and  intention  that  an  action  is 
distinguished  from  an  event.  The  intention  is  one  thing ; the 
effect  is  another  ; the  two  together  constitute  the  action. 

ACTION  and  ACT  are  not  synonymous.  1.  Act  does  not  neces- 
sarily imply  an  external  result,  action  does.  We  may  speak 
of  repentance  as  an  act,  we  could  not  call  it  an  action.  2.  An 
act  must  be  individual ; we  may  speak  of  a course  of  action. 
Lastly,  act,  when  qualified,  is  oftener,  though  not  universally, 
coupled  with  another  substantive:  action  always  by  anadjective 
preceding  it.  We  say  a kind  action,  not  an  act  of  kindness. 
A kind  act  might  he  admissible,  though  not  usual,  hut  an 
action  of  kindness  is  not  used,  though  an  action  of  great  kind- 
ness might  be.  Deed  is  synonymous  with  act. 

“Act  [actum)  is  a thing  done;  action  (actio)  is  doing:  act, 
therefore,  is  an  incident ; an  action,  a process  or  habit ; a vir- 
tuous act;  a course  of  virtuous  action.”2 
Actions,  in  Morals,  are  distinguished,  according  to  the  manner 
of  their  being  called  forth,  into  spontaneous  or  instinctive, 
voluntary  or  reflective,  and  free  or  deliberate ; according  to 
the  faculty  from  which  they  proceed,  into  physical,  intellectual, 
and  moral ; and  according  to  the  nature  of  the  action  and 
character  of  the  agent,  into  right  and  wrong,  virtuous  or 
vicious,  praiseworthy  or  blameworthy. 

An  action  is  said  to  be  materially  right,  when,  without  regard 
to  the  end  or  the  intention  of  the  agent,  the  action  is  in 
conformity  with  some  moral  law  or  rule.  An  action  is  said  to 
he  formally  right,  when  the  end  or  the  intention  of  the  agent 
is  right,  and  the  action  is  not  materially  wrong.  For  a man 
to  give  his  goods  to  feed  the  poor  is  materially  right,  even 
though  he  should  not  have  charity  or  brotherly  love,  but 
when  he  has  charity  or  brotherly  love,  and  throws  even  a mite 
into  the  treasury  of  the  poor,  the  action  is  formally  right, 
although,  in  effect,  it  may  fall  short  of  that  which  is  only 
materially  right. 


1 Stewart,  Outlines,  No.  111. 


Taylor,  Synonyms. 


16 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ACTIVE  . — That  which  causes  change  is  active;  that  which  is 
changed  is  passive.' 

ACTIVITY.—  V.  Will. 

ACTUAL  ( quod  est  in  ache ) is  opposed  to  potential.  Before  a 
thing  is,  it  has  a capacity  of  becoming.  A rough  stone  is  a 
statue  potentially ; when  chiselled,  actually. 

“ The  relation  of  the  potential  to  the  actual  Aristotle  exhibits 
by  the  relation  of  the  unfinished  to  the  finished  work;  of  the 
unemployed  carpenter  to  the  one  at  work  upon  his  building; 
of  the  individual  asleep  to  him  awake.  Potentially  the  seed- 
corn  is  the  tree,  but  the  grown-up  tree  is  it  actually ; the  poten- 
tial philosopher  is  he  who  is  not  at  this  moment  philosophiz- 
ing ; even  before  the  battle  the  better  general  is  the  potential 
conqueror;  in  fact  everything  is  potentially  which  possesses  a 
principle  of  motion,  of  development,  or  of  change;  and  which, 
if  unhindered  by  anything  external,  will  be  of  itself.  Actuality 
or  entelechy,  on  the  other  hand,  indicates  the  perfect  art,  the 
end  as  gained,  the  completely  actual  (the  grown-up  tree,  e.g., 
is  the  entelechy  of  the  seed-corn),  that  activity  in  which  the 
act  and  the  completeness  of  the  act  fall  together,  e.  g.,  to  see, 
to  think  where  he  sees  and  he  has  seen,  he  thinks  and  he  has 
thought  (the  acting  and  the  completeness  of  the  act),  are  one 
and  the  same,  while  in  these  activities  which  involve  a beco- 
ming, e.g.,  to  learn,  to  go,  to  become  well,  the  two  are  separated.”  2 

Actual  is  also  opposed  to  virtual.  The  oak  is  shut  up  in  the 
acorn  virtually. 

Actual  is  also  opposed  to  real.  My  will,  though  really  ex- 
isting as  a faculty,  only  begins  to  have  an  actual  existence 
from  the  time  that  I will  anything. — V.  Beal,  Virtual. 

ACTUS  PBIMUS  (in  scholastic  philosophy) — est  rci  esse,  or  actus 
quiddilativus. 

ACTUS  SECUNDUS  — est  rei  operari,  or  actus  entitatimis. 

ADAGE  ( ad  agendum  aptum) — a practical  saying,  fit  for  use,  a rule 
of  action.  “From  the  Latin  adagium,  a saying  handed  down 
from  antiquity,  comes  the  English  adage , which  denotes  an 
antique  proverb.”3  On  the  disagreement  and  similitude  be- 
tween adagies,  apophthegms,  and  moral  Tvihfmi,  see  Erasmus.4 


1 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought . 
3 Taylor,  Synonyms. 


3 Schwegler,  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  123. 

4 In  the  Prolegomena  to  his  Adagia. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


17 


ADJURATION  (from  ad-juro,  to  put  upon  oath). — “ Our  Saviour, 
when  the  high  priest  adjured  him  by  the  living  God,  made  no 
scruple  of  replying  upon  that  adjuration.”  1 
ADMIRATION.  — “ We  shall  find  that  admiration  is  as  superior 
to  surprise  and  wonder,  simply  considered,  as  knowledge  is 
superior  to  ignorance ; for  its  appropriate  signification  is  that 
act  of  the  mind  by  which  we  discover,  approve,  and  enjoy 
some  unusual  species  of  excellence.”2 
ADORATION.  — -To  adore  (from  the  Latin  ad  oro ),  signifies,  to 
carry  to  the  mouth  ; as  in  order  to  kiss  one’s  hand,  the  hand 
is  carried  to  the  mouth ; but  it  also  includes  in  this  action  a 
sense  of  veneration  or  worship.  “ If  I beheld  the  sun  when  it 
shined,  or  the  moon  walking  in  brightness,  and  my  mouth  had 
kissed  my  hand,  this  also  were  iniquity.” 3 As  an  act  of  wor- 
ship, adoration  is  due  only  to  God.  But  the  form  of  kissing 
the  hand  to  mortals  was  also  used  in  the  East.  Pharaoh 
speaking  to  Joseph  says,  “According  to  thy  word  shall  all  my 
people  kiss  ” — that  is,  in  token  of  veneration  to  your  order.4 5 
ADSCITITIOUS  (from  ad-scisco,  to  seek  after),  that  which  is 
added  or  assumed.  “ You  apply  to  your  hypothesis  of  an 
adscilitious  spirit,  what  he  (Philo)  says  concerning  this  rtvsii/xa 
Oiiov,  divine  spirit  or  soul,  infused  into  man  by  God’s  breath- 
ing.”6 

ESTHETICS  (ai'o^eaf,  perception  or  feeling).  — “That  science 
which  refers  the  first  principles  in  the  arts  to  sensation  and 
sentiment,  as  distinguished  from  mere  instruction  and 
utility.” 

The  science  of  the  beautiful  and  the  philosophy  of  the  fine 
arts.  Various  theories  have  been  entertained  as  to  the  idea 
of  the  beautiful,  by  Plato,  Plotinus,  and  Augustine.  In 
modern  times,  the  term  cesthetics  was  first  used  in  a scientific 
sense  by  A.  Baumgarten,  a disciple  of  Christian  Wolf.  In 
his  JEsthetica?  he  considered  the  idea  of  the  beautiful  as 
an  indistinct  perception  or  feeling  accompanying  the  moral 
ideas.  Mendelsshon  and  others  identified  the  idea  of  the 
beautiful  with  the  idea  of  the  good.  Shaftesbury  and  Ilutche- 


1 Clarke,  TFwfcs,  vol.  ii.,  ser.  125.  * Cogan,  On  the  Passions,  part  i.,  c.  2. 

8 Job  xxxi.  26,  27.  4 Gen.  xli.  40,  margin. 

5 Clarke,  Letter  to  Dodwell.  6 2 vols.,  8vo,  Frankf.,  1750-8 

3* 


c 


18 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


AESTHETICS  — 

son  regarded  the  two  ideas  as  intimately  connected.  At  the 
close  of  the  eighteenth  century,  (esthetics  was  scientifically 
developed  in  Germany  by  Kant,  and  has  been  zealously  pro- 
secuted by  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Ilegel.'  — V.  Beauty,  Ideal 
(Beau). 

AETIOLOGY  (aiV«x,  cause;  ?.dyoj,  discourse),  is  coming  into  use, 
by  Dr.  Whewell  and  others,  to  denote  that  department  of  Phi- 
losophy which  inquires  into  causes. 

AFFECTION.  — “ There  are  various  principles  of  action  in  man 
which  have  perso ns  for  their  immediate  object,  and  imply,  in 
their  very  nature,  our  being  well  or  ill  affected  to  some  person, 
or  at  least  to  some  animated  being.  Such  principles  I shall 
call  by  the  general  name  of  affections,  whether  they  dispose 
us  to  do  good  or  hurt  to  others.”1  2 

They  are  usually  distinguished  into  benevolent,  as  esteem, 
gratitude,  friendship ; and  malevolent,  as  hatred,  envy,  jeal- 
ousy, revenge. 

This  term  is  applied  to  all  the  modes  of  the  sensibility,  or 
to  all  states  of  mind  in  which  we  are  purely  passive.  By  Des- 
cartes3 it  is  employed  to  denote  some  degree  of  love. — V.  Love, 
Sensibility. 

AFFINITY  is  a relation  contracted  by,  or  resulting  from,  mar- 
riage ; in  contradistinction  to  consatif/uini/ij,  or  relation  by 
blood. — V.  Consanguinity. 

AFFIRMATION  (xara^aai;)  is  the  attributing  of  one  thing  to  an- 
other, or  the  admitting  simply  that  something  exists.  A 
mental  affirmation  is  a judgment ; when  expressed  it  becomes 
a proposition.  — V.  Judgment,  Proposition. 

In  Law,  affirmation  is  opposed  to  oath.  There  are  certain 
separatists,  who,  from  -having  scruples  as  to  the  lawfulness  of 
oath-taking,  are  allowed  to  make  a solemn  affirmation  that 
what  they  say  is  true ; and  if  they  make  a false  affirmation 
they  are  liable  to  the  penalties  of  perjury. 


1 Besides  the  writings  of  these  philosophers,  consult  Cours  cV Esth clique  par  Ph.  Djv- 
miror\  8vo,  Paris,  1842;  The  Philnsojyhy  of  the  Beautiful,  by  John  G.  MucYicar,  D.D., 
Edit).,  1855;  Reid,  JnleU.  Povj.,  essay  viii.,  ch.  4. 

a Reid,  Act.  Poiv.,  essay  iii.,  part  ii.,  chap.  3-6. 

3 Traile  del  Passions,  art.  83. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


19 


AFFIRMATION  — 

“ To  affirm  is  a solitary,  to  confirm  is  an  assisted  assevera- 
tion. A man  affirms  what  he  declares  solemnly ; he  confirms 
what  he  aids  another  to  prove.”  1 
A FORTIORI. — V.  Argument  (Indirect). 

AGENT  [ago,  to  act),  one  who,  that  which,  acts.  “Nor  can 
I think  that  anybody  has  such  an  idea  of  chance  as  to  make 
it  an  agent,  or  really  existing  and  acting  cause  of  anything, 
and  much  less  sure  of  all  things.”  2 
AGNOIOLOGY  (xdyo$  vijj  ayvotas,  the  theory  of  true  ignorance), 
is  a section  of  Philosophy  intermediate  between  Epistomology 
and  Ontology.  “Absolute  Being  may  be  that  which  we  are 
ignorant  of.  We  must,  therefore,  examine  and  fix  what  igno- 
rance is,  what  we  are,  and  can  be  ignorant  of.” 3 
ALCHEMY  or  ALCIIYMY  (at,  the  article,  and  ^ta,  what  is 
poured,  according  to  Yossius),  is  that  branch  of  chemistry 
which  proposed  to  transmute  metals  into  gold,  to  find  the 
panacea  or  universal  remedy,  &c.4 — V.  Hermetic  Philosophy, 
Rosicrucian. 

ALLEGORY  {0x7,0  dyopevsiv,  to  say  another  thing),  says  Quin- 
tilian, exhibits  one  thing  in  words  and  another  in  meaning. 

“An  Allegory  is  a continued  metaphor.  It  consists  in  repre- 
senting one  subject  (object)  by  another  analogous  to  it;  the 
subject  thus  represented  is  not  formally  mentioned,  but  we 
are  left  to  discover  it  by  reflection ; and  this  furnishes  a very 
pleasant  exercise  to  our  faculties.  A metaphor  explains  itself 
by  the  words  which  are  connected  with  it  in  their  proper  and 
natural  meaning.  When  I say,  ‘Wallace  was  a thunderbolt 
of  war,’  ‘ In  peace  Fingal  was  the  gale  of  spring,’  the  thunder- 
bolt of  war  and  the  gale  of  spring  are  sufficiently  explained  by 
the  mention  of  Wallace  and  Fingal.  But  an  allegory  may  be 
allowed  to  stand  more  unconnected  with  the  literal  meaning ; 
the  interpretation  is  not  so  directly  pointed  out,  but  is  left  to 
our  own  discovery. 

“When  the  Jewish  nation  is  represented  under  the  notion 
of  a vine  or  a vineyard,  as  is  done  in  the  Psalms  and  the  Pro- 


1 Taylor,  Synonyms. 

2 Wollaston,  Itelig.  of  Nat.,  8,  5. 

? Furrier,  Inst,  of  Metaphys .,  p.  48. 

4 Louis  Figuier,  L'Alchcmie  et  Les  Alchemistes.  Paris,  1850. 


20 


VOCABULARY  OF  nilLOSOniY. 


ALLEGORY  — 

phets,  you  have  a fine  example  of  an  Allegory.”  1 — V.  Meta- 
phor,  Myth. 

AMBITION  (from  ambio,  to  go  about  seeking  place  or  power), 
is  the  desire  of  power,  which  is  regarded  as  one  of  the  pri- 
mary or  original  desires  of  human  nature.2 

AMPHIBOLOGY  [dy^o%la,  ambiguity),  is  to  use  a proposi- 
tion which  presents  not  an  obscure,  but  a doubtful  or  double 
sense.  It  is  enumerated  among  the  sophisms  by  Aristotle, 
who  distinguishes  it  from  equivocatio,  opwrufna,  by  which 
he  understands  ambiguity  in  terms  taken  separately. — V. 
Fallacy. 

AMPHIBOLY  is  applied  by  Kant  to  that  kind  of  amphibology 
which  is  natural,  and  consists  in  confounding  pure  notions  of 
the  understanding  with  objects  of  experience,  and  attributing 
to  the  one  characters  and  qualities  which  belong  to  the  other ; 
as  when  we  make  identity,  which  is  a notion  d priori,  a real 
quality  of  phenomena,  or  objects  which  experience  makes 
known  to  us. — V.  Antinomy,  Proposition. 

ANALOGUE  {dvaxoy o;,  proportionate).  — “By  an  Analogue  is 
meant  an  organ  in  one  animal  having  the  same  function  as  a 
different  organ  in  a different  animal.  The  difference  between 
Ilomologue  and  Analogue  may  be  illustrated  by  the  wing  of  a 
bird  and  that  of  a butterfly  ; as  the  two  totally  differ  in  ana- 
tomical structure,  they  cannot  be  said  to  be  homologous,  but 
they  are  analogous  in  function,  since  they  both  serve  for 
flight.”  3 

In  Logic  a term  is  analogous  whose  single  signification  ap- 
plies with  equal  propriety  to  more  than  one  object — as  the  leg 
of  the  table,  the  leg  of  the  animal.4 

ANALOGY  [dva'hoyla,  proportion),  has  been  defined,  “The  simi- 
larity of  ratios  or  relations.”  “ But  in  popular  language  we 
extend  the  word  to  resemblances  of  things  as  well  as  rela- 
tions. Employed  as  an  argument,  analogy  depends  upon  the 
canon,  the  same  attributes  may  bo  assigned  to  distinct,  but 
similar  things,  provided  they  can  be  shown  to  accompany  the 

1 Irving,  English  Composition , p.  239. 

a See  Iteid,  Act,  Pow.,  essay  iii.,  part  2,  ebap.  2;  Stewart,  Act.  Poiu.,  book  i.,  chap.  2, 

Beet.  4. 

3 ITCosb,  Typical  Forms,  p.  25. 


4 Wbately,  Log.,  b.  iii.,  £ 10. 


VOCABULARY  OF  FIIILOSOPHY. 


21 


ANALOGY  - 

points  of  resemblance  in  the  things,  and  not  the  points  of 
difference.” 1 

“Analogy  does  not  mean  the  similarity  of  two  things,  hut 
the  similarity,  or  sameness  of  two  relations.  There  must  be 
more  than  two  things  to  give  rise  to  two  relations  ; there  must 
he  at  least  three,  and  in  most  cases  there  ar z four.  Thus  A 
may  he  like  B,  hut  there  is  no  analogy  between  A and  B : it  is 
an  abuse  of  the  word  to  speak  so,  and  it  leads  to  much  con- 
fusion of  thought.  If  A has  the  same  relation  to  B which  C 
has  to  D,  then  there  is  an  analogy.  If  the  first  relation  be 
well  known,  it  may  serve  to  explain  the  second,  which  is  less 
known ; and  the  transfer  of  name  from  one  of  the  terms  in 
the  relation  best  known  to  its  corresponding  term  in  the  other, 
causes  no  confusion,  but  on  the  contrary  tends  to  remind  us 
of  the  similarity  that  exists  in  these  relations,  and  so  assists 
the  mind  instead  of  misleading  it.”2 

“ Analogy  implies  a difference  in  sort,  and  not  merely  in 
degree  ; and  it  is  the  sameness  of  the  end  with  the  difference 
of  the  means  which  constitutes  analogy.  No  one  could  say 
the  lungs  of  a man  were  analogous  to  the  lungs  of  a monkey, 
but  any  one  might  say  that  the  gills  of  a fish  and  the  spira- 
cula  of  insects  are  analogous  to  lungs.”3 

Between  one  man  and  another,  as  belonging  to  the  same 
genus,  there  is  identity.  Between  a flint  and  a flower,  as 
belonging  to  different  genera,  there  is  diversity.  Between 
the  seasons  of  the  year  and  the  periods  of  human  life,  or  be- 
tween the  repose  of  an  animal  and  the  sleep  of  a plant,  when 
we  think  wherein  they  agree,  without  forgetting  wherein  they 
differ,  there  is  analogy. 

“ When  some  course  of  events  seems  to  follow  the  same 
order  with  another,  so  that  we  may  imagine  them  to  be  influ- 
enced by  similar  causes,  we  say  there  is  an  analogy  between 
them.  And  when  we  infer  that  a certain  event  will  take  place 
in  some  other  case  of  a similar  nature,  we  are  said  to  reason 
from  analogy ; as  when  we  suppose  that  the  stars,  like  the 
sun,  are  surrounded  with  planets,  which  derive  from  them 


1 Thomson,  Outlines  of  Laws  of  Thought , p.  363,  1st.  edit. 

Q Coplestone,  Four  Discourses,  p.  122,  8yo,  London,  1821. 

3 Coleridge,  Physiology  of  Life,  p.  64. 


22 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ANALOGY  - 

light  and  heat.  The  word  analogy  is  employed  with  strict 
propriety  only  in  those  cases  where  there  is  supposed  to  be 
a sajnaiess  in  the  causes  of  similar  effects.  When  there  is  a 
mere  similarity  in  effects  or  appearances,  the  word  resemblance 
should  be  used.  Resemblances  may  be  well  adduced  in  illus- 
tration of  an  argument ; but  then  they  should  be  proposed 
merely  as  similes,  or  metaphors,  uot  as  analogies.1 

“ The  meaning  of  analogy  is  resemblance  (?),  and  hence  all 
reasoning  from  one  case  to  others  resembling  it  might  be 
termed  analogical ; but  the  word  is  usually  confined  to  cases 
where  the  resemblance  is  of  a slight  or  indirect  kind.  We  do 
not  say  that  a man  reasons  from  analogy  when  he  infers  that  a 
stone  projected  into  the  air  will  fall  to  the  ground.  The  cir- 
cumstances are  so  essentially  similar  to  those  which  have  been 
experienced  a thousand  times,  that  we  call  the  cases  identical, 
not  analogical.  But  when  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  reflecting  on  the 
tendency  of  bodies  at  the  surface  of  the  earth  to  the  centre, 
inferred  that  the  moon  had  the  same  tendency,  his  reasoning, 
in  the  first  instance,  was  analogical. 

“ By  some  writers  the  term  has  been  restricted  to  the  resem- 
blance of  relations  ; thus  knowledge  is  said  to  bear  the  same 
relation  to  the  mind  as  light  to  the  eye — to  enlighten  it.  But 
although  the  term  is  very  properly  applied  to  this  class  of  re- 
semblances, I think  it  is  not  generally  confined  to  them ; it  is 
commonly  used  with  more  latitude,  except,  indeed,  in  mathe- 
matics, when  it  is  employed  to  designate  the  identity  of 
ratios." 2 

“ As  analogy  is  the  resemblance  of  ratios  (or  relations),  two 
things  may  be  connected  by  analogy,  though  they  have  in 
themselves  no  resemblance ; thus  as  a sweet  taste  gratifies  the 
palate,  so  does  a sweet  sound  gratify  the  ear,  and  hence  the 
same  word,  ‘ sweet,’  is  applied  to  both,  though  no  flavour  can 
resemble  a sound  in  itself.  To  bear  this  in  mind  would  serve 
to  guard  us  against  two  very  common  errors  in  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  analogical  language  of  Scripture : — 1.  The  error  of 
supposing  the  things  themselves  to  be  similar,  from  their 
bearing  similar  relation  to  other  things ; 2.  The  still  more 


1 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

a Sam.  Bailey,  Discourses , p.  181,  8vo,  London,  1852. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


23 


ANALOGY— 

common  error  of  supposing  the  analogy  to  extend  farther  than 
it  does,  or  to  be  more  complete  than  it  really  is,  from  not  con- 
sidering in  what  the  analogy  in  each  case  consists.” 1 

“ Analogy  is  a Greek  word  used  by  mathematicians  to  signify 
a similitude  of  proportions.  For  instance,  when  we  observe 
that  two  is  to  six  as  three  is  to  nine,  this  similitude  or  equality 
of  proportion  is  termed  analogy.  And  although  proportion 
strictly  signifies  the  habitude  or  relation  of  one  quantity  to 
another,  yet,  in  a looser  and  translated  sense,  it  hath  been 
applied  to  signify  every  other  habitude,  and  consequently  the 
term  analogy,  all  similitude  of  relations  or  habitudes  whatsoever. 
Hence  the  schoolmen  tell  us  there  is  analogy  between  intellect 
and  sight ; forasmuch  as  intellect  is  to  the  mind  what  sight  is 
to  the  body : and  that  he  who  governs  the  state  is  analogous 
to  him  who  steers  a ship.  Hence  a prince  is  analogically 
styled  a pilot,  being  to  the  state  as  a pilot  is  to  his  vessel.2 
For  the  further  clearing  of  this  point,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that 
a twofold  analogy  is  distinguished  by  the  schoolmen,  metapho- 
rical and  proper.  Of  the  first  kind  there  are  frequent  instances 
in  Holy  Scripture,  attributing  human  parts  and  passions  to 
God.  When  He  is  represented  as  having  a finger,  an  eye, 
or  an  ear ; when  He  is  said  to  repent,  to  be  angry,  or 
grieved,  every  one  sees  the  analogy  is  merely  metaphorical ; 
because  these  parts  and  passions,  taken  in  the  proper  sig- 
nification, must  in  every  degree  necessarily,  and  from  the 
formal  nature  of  the  thing,  include  imperfection.  When, 
therefore,  it  is  said  the  finger  of  God  appears  in  this  or  that 
event,  men  of  common  sense  mean  no  more,  but  that  it  is 
as  truly  ascribed  to  God,  as  the  works  wrought  by  human 
fingers  are  to  man ; and  so  of  the  rest.  But  the  case  is  differ- 
ent when  wisdom  and  knowledge  are  attributed  to  God. 
Passions  and  senses,  as  such,  imply  defect;  hut  in  knowledge 
simply,  or  as  such,  there  is  no  defect.  Knowledge,  therefore, 
in  the  proper  formal  meaning  of  the  word,  may  be  attributed 
to  God  proportionally,  that  is,  preserving  a proportion  to  the 
infinite  nature  of  God.  We  may  say,  therefore,  that  as  God 
is  infinitely  above  man,  so  is  the  knowledge  of  God  infinitely 


1 Whately. 

a Vide  Cajetan,  de  Nom.  Analog c.  iii. 


24 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ANALOGY— 

above  the  knowledge  of  man,  and  this  is  what  Cajetan  calls 
analogia  proprie  facia. — And  after  the  same  analogy  we  must 
understand  all  those  attributes  to  belong  to  the  Deity,  which 
in  themselves  simply,  and  as  such,  denote  perfection.” 1 
Analogy  and  Metaphor. — Metaphor,  in  general,  is  asubstitution 
of  the  idea  or  conception  of  one  thing  with  the  term  belonging  to 
it,  to  stand  for  another  thing,  on  account  of  an  appearing  simili- 
tude only,  without  any  real  resemblance  and  true  correspon- 
dency between  the  things  compared ; as  when  the  Psalmist 
describes  the  verdure  and  fruitfulness  of  valleys  by  laughing 
and  singing.  Analogy,  in  general,  is  the  substituting  the  idea 
or  conception  of  one  thing  to  stand  for  and  represent  another, 
on  account  of  a true  resemblance  and  correspondent  reality  in 
the  very  nature  of  the  things  compared.  It  is  defined  by  Aris- 
totle ’lootys  rov  Xoyov,  an  equality  or  parity  of  reason,  though, 
in  strictness  and  truth,  the  parity  of  reasoning  is  rather  built 
on  the  similitude,  and  analogy,  and  consequent  to  them,  than 
the  same  thing  with  them. 

“ The  ground  and  foundation  of  Metaphor  consists  only  in 
an  appearing  or  imaginary  resemblance  and  correspondency ; 

■ as  when  God  is  said  to  have  hands,  and  eyes,  and  ears.  But 
the  foundation  of  analogy  is  an  actual  similitude  and  a real 
correspondency  in  "the  very  nature  of  things ; which  lays  a 
foundation  for  a parity  of  reason  even  between  things  different 
in  nature  and  kind ; as  when  God  is  said  to  have  knowledge, 
power,  and  goodness. 

“ Metaphor  is  altogether  arbitrary,  and  the  result  merely  of 
imagination,  it  is  rather  a figure  of  speech  than  a real  simili- 
tude and  comparison  of  things  ; and,  therefore,  is  properly  of 
consideration  in  rhetoric  and  poetry.  But  analogy  being  built 
on  the  very  nature  of  things  themselves,  is  a necessary  and 
useful  method  of  conception  and  reasoning ; and,  therefore,  of 
consideration  in  Physics  and  Metaphysics.”2 

“ I am  not  of  the  mind  of  those  speculators  who  seem  as- 
sured that  all  states  have  the  same  period  of  infancy,  man- 
hood, and  decrepitude  that  are  found  in  individuals.  Parallels 


1 Berkeley,  Min.  Philosophy  Dialog.  4. 

a Brown,  Divine  Analogy , p.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


ANALOGY  - 

of  this  sort  rather  furnish  similitudes  to  illustrate  or  to  adorn, 
than  supply  analogies  from  whence  to  reason.  The  objects 
which  are  attempted  to  be  forced  into  an  analogy  are  not 
found  in  the  same  classes  of  existence.  Individuals  are  phy- 
sical beings  — commonwealths  are  not  physical,  but  moral 
essences.”1 

Many  fallacies  become  current  through  false  metaphorical 
analogies.  See  an  example  of  false  analogy 2 in  the*  supposed 
likeness  between  the  decay  of  vegetables  and  of  living  crea- 
tures. 

Analogy  and  Example.  — Analogy  is  not  unfrequently  used  to 
mean  mere  similarity.  But  its  specific  meaning  is  similarity  of 
relations,  and  in  this  consists  the  difference  between  the  argu- 
ment by  example  and  that  by  analogy,  — that  in  the  one  we 
argue  from  mere  similarity,  from  similarity  of  relations  in  the 
other.  In  the  one  we  argue  from  Pisistratus  to  Dionysius, 
who  resembles  him  ; in  the  other,  from  the  relation  of  induc- 
tion to  demonstration,  to  the  corresponding  relation  of  the 
example  to  the  enihymeme? 

Analogy  and  Experience. — “Experience  is  not  the  mere  collec- 
tion of  observations  ; it  is  the  methodical  reduction  of  them  to 
their  principles  . . . Analogy  supposes  this,  but  it  goes  a step 
farther.  Experience  is  mere  analysis.  Analogy  involves  also 
a synthesis.  It  is  applied  to  cases  in  which  some  difference 
of  circumstances  is  supposed  ; as,  for  instance,  in  arguing 
from  the  formation  of  particular  parts  of  one  class  of  animals 
to  the  correspondence  in  another,  the  different  nature,  habits, 
circumstances,  of  the  one  class,  are  considered  and  allowed 
for,  in  extending  the  given  observation.4 

In  the  Schools,  what  was  termed  the  analogy  of  faith,6  was 
showing  that  the  truth  of  one  scripture  is  not  repugnant  to 
the  truth  of  another,  or  of  the  whole.  “ Analogia  vero  est, 
cum  veritas  unius  scripturse  ostenditur  veritati  alterius  non 
repugnare.”6 

In  Logic,  three  modes  of  reasoning  are  called  analogical. 

1 Burke,  Letters  on  Regicide  Peace , b.  iy.  a Butler,  Analogy , part  i.,  chap.  7. 

3 Karslake,  Aids  to  Log.,  yoI.  ii.,  p.  74.  4 Hampden,  Introd.  Mor.  Phil.,  lect.  v. 

* See  Rom.  xii.  6.  i 

0 Thom.  Aquinas,  Sumni.  Theolog.,  pars  prima,  queest.  i.,  art.  10. 

4 


26 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ANALOGY  — 

1.  From  effect  to  cause,  or  from  cause  to  effect.  2.  From 
means  to  ends,  or  from  ends  to  means.  3.  From  mere  resem- 
blance or  concomitance.  Condillac 1 has  shown  how  these 
modes  of  reasoning  all  concur  to  prove  that  the  human  beings 
around  us,  who  arc  formed  like  ourselves  ( analogy  of  resem- 
blance), who  act  as  we  act  ( analogy  of  cause),  who  have  the 
same  organs  ( analogy  of  means),  should  be  in  all  respects  like 
ourselves,  and  have  the  same  faculties. 

Analogy  and  Induction.  — “ There  are  two  requisites  in  order 
to  every  analogical  argument : 1.  That  the  two  or  several  par- 
ticulars concerned  in  the  argument  should  be  known  to  agree 
in  somp  one  point ; for  otherwise  they  could  not  bo  referable 
to  any  one  class,  and  there  would  consequently  be  no  basis  to 
the  subsequent  inference  drawn  in  the  conclusion.  2.  That 
the  conclusion  must  be  modified  by  a reference  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  particular  to  which  we  argue.  For  herein  con- 
sists the  essential  distinction  between  an  analogical  and  an  in- 
ductive argument.” 2 

ANALYSIS  and  SYNTHESIS  (<b'd  %i>a,  avv,  rlOr^i,  resolutio, 
compositio),  or  decomposition  and  recomposition.  Objects  of 
sense  and  of  thought  are  presented  to  us  in  a complex  state, 
but  we  can  only,  or  at  least  best,  understand  what  is  simple. 
Among  the  varied  objects  of  a landscape,  I behold  a tree,  I 
separate  it  from  the  other  objects,  I examine  separately  its 
different  parts — trunk,  branches,  leaves,  &c.,  and  then  reunit- 
ing them  into  one  whole  I form  a notion  of  the  tree.  The  first 
part  of  this  process  is  analysis,  the  second  is  synthesis.  If  this 
must  be  done  with  an  individual,  it  is  more  necessary  with  the 
infinitude  of  objects  which  surround  us,  to  evolve  the  one  out 
of  many,  to  recall  the  multitude  to  unity.  IVe  compare  objects 
with  one  another  to  see  wherein  they  agree ; we  next,  by  a 
synthetical  process,  infer  a general  law,  or  generalize  the  coin- 
cident qualities,  and  perform  an  act  of  induction  which  is  purely 
a synthetical  process,  though  commonly  called  analytical.  Thus, 
from  our  experience  that  bodies  attract  within  certain  limits, 

1 Art.  de  Raisonner. 

2 Ilampden,  Essay  on  Phil.  Ev id.  of  Christianity,  pp.  60-64.  See  Locke,  On  Hum.  Un- 
derstand.,  book  iv.,  chap.  16,  sect.  12;  Beattie’s  Essay  on  Truth , part  i.,  chap.  2,  sect.  7 ; 
Stewart’s  Elematts,  vol.  ii.,  chap.  4,  sect.  4 ; Stewart’s  Essays,  v.,  c.  3. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


27 


ANALYSIS  — 

we  infer  that  all  bodies  gravitate  towards  each  other.  The 
antecedent  here  only  says  that  certain  bodies  gravitate,  the 
consequent  says  all  bodies  gravitate.  They  are  brought  to- 
gether by  the  mental  insertion  of  a third  proposition,  which  is, 
“ that  nature  is  uniform.”  This  is  not  the  product  of  induc- 
tion, but  antecedent  to  all  induction.  The  statement  fully  ex- 
pressed is,  this  and  that  body,  which  we  know,  gravitate,  but 
nature  is  uniform  ; this  and  that  body  represent  all  bodies  — 
all  bodies  gravitate.  It  is  hhe  mind  which  connects  these  things, 
and  the  process  is  synthetical.  This  is  the  one  universal 
method  in  all  philosophy,  and  different  schools  have  differed 
only  in  the  way  of  employing  it.  Method  is  the  following  of 
one  thing  through  another.  Order  is  the  following  of  one 
thing  after  another.  Analysis  is  real , as  when  a chemist  sepa- 
rates two  substances.  Logical,  as  when  we  consider  the  pro- 
perties of  the  sides  and  angles  of  a triangle  separately,  though 
we  cannot  think  of  a triangle  without  sides  and  angles. 

For  an  explanation  of  the  processes  of  analysis  and  synthesis, 
see  Stewart.1 

The  instruments  of  analysis  are  observation  and  experiment; 
of  synthesis,  definition  and  classification. 

Take  down  a watch,  analysis ; put  it  up,  synthesis .2 

“ Hac  analysi  liccbit,  ex  rebus  compositis  ratiocinatione  col- 
ligere  simplices;  ex  motibus,  vires  moventes ; et  in  vniversum,  ex 
effect  is  causas;  ex  ccptsique  particularibus  generates;  donee  ad 
generalissimas  tandem  sit  deventum.”3 

Analysis  is  decomposing  what  is  compound  to  detect  its  ele- 
ments. Objects  may  be  compound,  as  consisting  of  several 
distinct  parts  united,  or  of  several  properties  equally  distinct. 
In  the  former  view,  analysis  will  divide  the  object  into  its 
parts,  and  present  them  to  us  successively,  and  then  the  rela- 
tions by  which  they  are  united.  In  the  second  case,  analysis 
will  separate  the  distinct  properties,  and  show  the  relations  of 
every  kind  which  may  bo  between  them.4 

Analysis  is  the  resolving  into  its  constituent  elements  of  a 


1 Elements,  part  ii.,  chap.  4. 

a Lord  Brougham,  Prelimin.  Discourse,  part  i.,  sect.  7. 

3 Newton,  Optices , 2d  edit.,  p.  413. 

4 Cardaillac,  Eludes  Element,  tom.  i.,  pp.  8,  9. 


28 


VOCABULARY  OF*  PHILOSOPHY. 


ANALYSIS  — 

compound  heterogeneous  substance.  Thus,  water  can  be 
analyzed  into  oxygen  and  hydrogen,  atmospheric  air  into 
these  and  azote.1 

Abstraction  is  analysts,  since  it  is  decomposition,  but  what 
distinguishes  it  is  that  it  is  exercised  upon  qualities  which  by 
themselves  have  no  real  existence.  Classification  is  synthesis. 
Induction  rests  upon  analysis.  Deduction  is  a synthetical  pro- 
cess. Demonstration  includes  both. 

ANALYTICS  (Ti  ’Ara^vtixd)  is  the  title  which  in  the  second 
century  was  given,  and  which  has  since  continued  to  be 
applied,  to  a portion  of  the  Organon  or  Logic  of  Aristotle. 
This  portion  consists  of  two  distinct  parts ; the  First  Ana- 
lytics, which  teaches  how  to  reduce  the  syllogism  to  its  diverse 
figures  and  most  simple  elements,  and  the  Posterior  Ana- 
lytics, which  lays  down  the  rules  and  conditions  of  demon- 
stration in  general.  It  was  in  imitation  of  this  title  that 
Kant  gave  the  name  of  Transcendental  Analytic  to  that  part 
of  the  Criticism  of  Pure  Reason  which  reduces  the  faculty  of 
knowing  to  its  elements. 

ANGELOLOGY  (dyyfv,f,  a messenger;  ?.dyo;,  discourse),  is  the 
doctrine  of  Angels. — V.  Pneumatology. 

ANIMA  MUNDI  (soul  of  the  world.)- — Animism  is  the  doctrine  of 
the  anima  mundi  as  held  by  Stahl.  The  hypothesis  of  a force, 
immaterial,  but  inseparable  from  matter,  and  giving  to  matter 
its  form  and  movement,  is  coeval  wittf  the  birth  of  philosophy. 
Pythagoras  obscurely  acknowledged  such  a force,  but  held  that 
there  was  an  infinitely  perfect  being  above  it.  From  Pythag- 
oras it  passed  into  the  system  of  Plato,  who  could  not  conceive 
how  pure  spirit,  the  seat  of  eternal  ideas,  could  act  directly 
upon  matter.  lie  thought  also  that  the  world  would  be  more 
perfect  if  endowed  with  life.  The  soul  of  the  world  was  the 
source  of  all  life,  sensibility,  and  movement.  The  school  of 
Alexandria  adhered  to  the  views  of  Plato,  and  recognized  in- 
telligence and  Deity  as  above  the  anima  mundi,  which  in  the 
system  of  the  Stoics  usurped  the  place  of  God,  and  even  His 
name ; while  Straton  of  Lampsacus  called  it  nature.  The 
hypothesis  of  tho  anima  muncli.  was  not  entertained  by  the 

1 Peemans,  Introd.  ad  Philosophy  p.  75, 12mo,  Lovan.,  1840. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


29 


ANIMA  MTJNDI  — 

scholastic  philosophers.  But  it  reappeared  under  the  name  of 
Archceus,  in  the  systems  of  Cornelius  Agrippa,  Paracelsus,  and 
Van  Helmont ; while  Henry  More  recognized  a principium 
hylarchicum,  and  Cud  worth  aplastic  nature,  as  the  universal 
agent  of  physical  phenomena,  the  cause  of  all  forms  of  organ- 
ization, and  the  spring  of  all  the  movements  of  matter.  About 
the  same  time,  some  German  divines,  as  Amos  Comenius,  and 
John  Bayer,  attempted  to  rest  a similar  opinion  on  Genesis  i. 
2,  and  maintained  that  the  spirit  which  moved  on  the  face  of 
the  waters  still  gives  life  to  all  nature.1 

The  doctrine  of  the  anima  mundi,  as  held  by  the  Stoics  and 
Stratonicians,  is  closely  allied  to  pantheism;  while  according 
to  others  this  soul  of  the  universe  is  altogether  intermediate 
between  the  Creator  and  His  works.2 

ANTECEDENT  ( antecedo , to  go  before). — “And  the  antecedent 
shall  you  fynde  as  true  when  you  rede  over  my  letter  as  him- 
self can  not  say  nay,  but  that  the  consecusyon  is  formal.”3 

In  a relation,  whether  logical  or  metaphysical,  the  first  term 
is  the  antecedent,  the  second  the  consequent.  Thus  in  the  re- 
lation of  causality — the  cause  is  the  antecedent,  and  the  effect 
the  consequent. 

In  Logic,  antecedent  is  the  former  of  two  propositions,  in  a 
species  of  reasoning,  which,  without  the  intervention  of  any 
middle  proposition,  leads  directly  to  a fair  conclusion ; and 
this  conclusion  is  termed  the  consequent.  Thus,  I reflect, 
therefore  I exist.  I reflect,  is  the  antecedent  — therefore  I 
exist,  is  the  consequent .4 

Antecedent  is  that  part  of  a conditional  proposition  on  which 
the  other  depends.5 

In  Grammar  the  word  to  which  the  relative  refers  is  called 
the  antecedent;  as,  “God  whom  we  worship,” — where  God  is 
the  antecedent,  to  which  whom  the  relative  refers. 
ANTHROPOLOGY  (drtfp uxo;  and  ix>y os,  the  science  of  man). — 
Among  naturalists  it  means  the  natural  history  of  the  human 


1 Buddeus,  Elem.  Phil.,  pars  3,  cap.  6,  sect.  11, 12,  et  seq. 

a See  Plato,  Timceus,  29  d. — 30  c.  Schelling,  De  VAme  de  Monde. , 8vo,  Hamb.,  1809. 

3 Sir  T.  More's  Works,  p.  1115. 

4 Euler,  Letters  to  a German  Princess. 

& Whately,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  chap.  4,  \ 6. 

4* 


30 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ANTHROPOLOGY- 

species.  According  to  Dr.  Latham,’  anthropology  determines 
the  relations  of  man  to  the  other  mammalia ; ethnology,  the 
relations  of  the  different  varieties  of  mankind  to  each  other, 
p.  559.  The  German  philosophers  since  the  time  of  Kant 
have  used  it  to  designate  all  the  sciences  which  in  any  point 
of  view  relate  to  man — soul  and  body — individual  and  species 
— facts  of  history  and  phenomena  of  consciousness — the  abso- 
lute rules  of  morality  as  well  as  interests  material,  and  chang- 
ing ; so  that  works  under  the  general  title  of  anthropology 
treat  of  very  different  topics. 

“ Anthropology  is  the  science  of  man  in  all  his  natural  vari- 
ations. It  deals  with  the  mental  peculiarities  which  belong 
specifically  to  different  races,  ages,  sexes,  and  temperaments, 
together  with  the  results  which  follow  immediately  from  them 
in  their  application  to  human  life.  Under  psychology,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  include  nothing  but  what  is  common  to  all 
mankind,  and  forms  an  essential  part  of  human  nature.  The 
one,  accordingly,  may  be  termed  the  science  of  mental  varia- 
bles; the  other,  the  science  of  mental  constants ,”2 

In  an  anonymous  work  entitled  Anihropologie  Abstracted ,3 
Anthropology  is  divided  into  Psychology  and  Anatomy. 
ANTHROPOMORPHISM  (dr0purtof,  man;  form). — “It 

was  the  opinion  of  the  Anthropomorphites  that  God  had  all  the 
parts  of  a man,  and  that  we  are,  in  this  sense,  made  according 
to  his  image.”4 5 

Melito,  of  Sardis,  was  the  first  Christian  writer  who  ascribed 
body  to  Deity.  The  ascribing  of  bodily  parts  or  members  to 
Deity  is  too  gross  a delusion  to  call  for  refutation.  It  is  wit- 
tily exposed  by  Cicero.6  But  there  is  a spiritual  anthropo- 
morphism, sometimes  also  called  anthropopathy,  which  ascribes 
to  him  the  acts,  passions,  sentiments,  and  proceedings  of 
human  nature. 

“We  ought  not  to  imagine  that  God  is  clothed  with  a hu- 
man body,  as  the  Anthropomorphites  asserted,  under  colour 
that  that  figure  was  the  most  perfect  of  any.”6 

1 Nat.  Hist,  of  Varieties  of  Man , Lond.,  1S30. 

2 Morel),  Psychology , pp.  1,2.  3 8vo,  Lond.,  1655. 

4 More,  Dcf.  of  Cabbala , c.  1.  . 

5 j De  Nat.  Dear .,  lib.  i.,  cop.  27. 

6 Malebrancbe,  Search  after  Truth , book  iii.,  chap.  9. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


31 


ANTHROPOMORPHISM  — 

Hume  applies  the  name  to  those  who  think  the  mind  of  God 
is  like  the  mind  of  man. 

“ When  it  is  asked,  what  cause  produces  order  in  the  ideas 
of  the  Supreme  Being,  can  any  other  reason  be  assigned  by 
you  Antliropomorphites,  than  that  it  is  a rational  faculty,  and 
that  such  is  the  nature  of  Deity.” 1 
ANTICIPATION  ( anlicipatio , rtpo?u;4if),  is  a term  which  was 
first  used  by  Epicurus  to  denote  a general  notion  which  en- 
ables us  to  conceive  beforehand  of  an  object  which  had  not 
yet  come  under  the  cognizance  of  the  senses.  But  these  gene- 
ral notions  being  formed  by  abstraction  from  a multitude  of 
particular  notions,  were  all  originally  owing  to  sensation,  or 
mere  generalizations  a posteriori.  Buhle2  gives  the  following 
account : — “ The  impressions  which  objects  make  on  the 
senses,  leave  in  the  mind  traces  which  enable  us  to  recognize 
these  objects  when  they  present  themselves  anew,  or  to  com- 
pare them  with  others,  or  to  distinguish  them.  When  we  see 
an  animal  for  the  first  time,  the  impression  made  on  the  senses 
leaves  a trace  which  serves  as  a type.  If  we  afterwards  see 
the  same  animal,  we  refer  the  impression  to  the  type  already 
existing  in  the  mind.  This  type  and  the  relation  of  the  new 
impression  to  it,  constituted  what  Epicurus  called  the  antici- 
pation of  an  idea.  It  was  by  this  anticipation  that  we  could 
determine  the  identity,  the  resemblance  or  the  difference  of 
objects  actually  before  us,  and  those  formerly  observed.” 

The  language  of  Cicero3  soems  to  indicate  that  by  Epicurus 
the  term  rtp<A>pDf  Y"as  extended  to  what  is  supersensual,  and 
included  what  is  now  called  knowledge  d priori.  “ Qua;  eat 
enim  gens,  aat  quod  genus  hominum,  quod  non  habeat,  sine  doc- 
trina,  anticipationem  quondam  Deorum  ? quam  apcllat  .-tpoX^tv 
Epicurus,  id  est,  anteceptam  animo  rei  quandam  in  formationem, 
sine  qua  nec  intelligi  quidquam,  nec  quari,  nec  disputari 
potest.”  And  according  to  Diogenes  Laertius,4  the  Stoics 
defined  rtpdx^t;  to  mean  “a  natural  conception  of  the  uni- 
versal.” It  would  appear,  however,  that  this  definition  was 

1 Dialogues  on  Nat.  Delig .,  parts  iv , v. 

2 Hist,  de  la  Phil.  Mod.,  tom.  i.,  pp.  87,  88. 

3 De  Nat.  Dcor.,  lib.  i.,  cap.  16. 

* Lib.  vii , sect.  51,  53,  51. 


32 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ANTICIPATION  — 

not  adopted  by  all.  And  Sir  William  Hamilton  lias  said:1 
— “It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  xoivai  tWoiou,  tyvcnxai 
of  the  Stoics,  far  less  of  the  Epicureans,  were  more 
than  generalizations  d posteriori.  Yet  this  is  a mistake,  into 
which,  among  many  others,  Lipsius  and  Leibnitz  have  fallen 
in  regard  to  the  former.”2 

Anticipation  of  Nature  is  a phrase  employed  by  Lord  Bacon3 
to  denote  a hasty  and  illicit  generalization,  as  opposed  to  a due 
and  gradual  generalization,  which  he  called  an  Interpretation 
of  Nature." 

ANTINOMY  (am,  against ; voyos,  law),  the  opposition  of  one  law 
or  rule  to  another  law  or  rule. 

“ If  He  once  willed  adultery  should  be  sinful,  all  his  omni- 
potence will  not  allow  Him  to  will  the  allowance  that  His 
holiest  people  might,  as  it  were,  by  His  own  antinomy  or 
counter  statute,  live  unreproved  in  the  same  fact  as  He  Him- 
self esteemed  it,  according  to  our  common  explainers.”4 
According  to  Kant,  it  means  that  natural  contradiction 
which  results  from  the  law  of  reason,  when,  passing  the  limits 
of  experience,  we  seek  to  know  the  absolute.  Then,  we  do 
not  attain  the  idea  of  the  absolute,  or  we  overstep  the  limits 
of  our  faculties,  which  reach  only  to  phenomena. 

If  the  world  be  regarded  not  as  a phenomenon  or  sum  of 
phenomena,  but  as  an  absolute  thing  in  itself,  the  following 
Antinomies  or  counter-statements,  equally  capable  of  being 
supported  by  arguments,  arise  : — 

Thesis.  I.  Antithesis. 

Tlio  world  has  an  origin  in  time,  and  The  world  has  no  beginning  and 
is  quoad  space  shut  up  in  boundaries,  no  bounds. 

II. 

Every  compound  substance  in  the  No  composite  consists  of  simple 
world  consists  of  simple  parts;  and  parts  ; and  there  exists  nowhat  simple 
there  is  nothing  but  the  simple,  or  in  the  world, 
that  which  i3  compounded  from  it. 


1 Reid's  Works,  note  A,  p.  774. 

* See  Manuductio  ad  Sloicam  Phil.,  lib.  ii.,  dissert.  11 ; and  Leibnitz,  Nouveaux  Es- 

sais,  l’ref.  See  also  Kernius,  Dissert,  in  Epicuri  rrpd Xrjipiv,  &c.,  Goett.,  1736. 

s Prof,  to  Nov.  Organ.  4 Milton,  Doct.  and  Disc,  of  Diu.,  b.  ii.,  c.  3. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


33 


ANTINOMY — 

ill. 

Thesis.  Antithesis. 

It  is  requisite  to  assume  a Free  There  is  no  Freedom.  Everything 
causality  to  explain  the  phenomena  in  the  world  happens  according  to  the 
of  the  world.  laws  of  nature. 


IV. 

To  the  world  there  belongs  some-  There  exists  no  absolutely  necessary 
what  which,  either  as  its  part  or  its  Being,  neither  in  the  world  nor  out  of 
cause,  is  an  absolutely  necessary  being,  the  world,  as  its  cause. 


At  the  bottom  of  the  two  first  antinomies  lies  the  absurdity 
of  transferring  to  the  world  in  itself  predicates  which  can  bo 
applied  only  to  a world  of  phenomena.  We  get  rid  of  the 
difficulty  by  declaring  that  both  thesis  and  antithesis  are  false. 
With  regard  to  the  third,  an  act  may  be  in  respect  of  the 
causality  of  reason  a first  beginning,  while  yet,  in  respect  of 
the  sequences  of  phenomena,  it  is  no  more  than  a subordinate 
commencement,  and  so  be,  in  the  first  respect,  free ; but  in  the 
second,  as  mere  phenomenon,  fettered  by  the  law  of  the  causal 
nexus.  The  fourth  antinomy  is  explained  in  the  same  man- 
ner ; for  when  the  cause  qua  phenomenon  is  contradistin- 
guished from  the  cause  of  phenomena,  so  far  forth  as  this  last 
may  be  a thing  in  itself,  then  both  propositions  may  consist 
together.1 

Others  think  that  when  the  principles  are  carefully  inducted 
and  expressed,  the  contradiction  disappears.2 

ANTIPATHY  (am  7tddo 5,  feeling  against).  — “There  are  many 
ancient  and  received  traditions  and  observations  touching  the 
sympathy  and  antipathy  of  plants  ; for  that  some  will  thrive 
best  growing  near  others,  which  they  impute  to  sympathy, 
and  some  worse,  which  they  impute  to  antipathy ,”3 

According  to  Sylvester  Rattray,  M.  D.,4  there  is  antipathy 
and  sympathy  not  only  between  plants,  but  also  between 
minerals  and  animals. 


1 Semple,  Inlrod.  to  Metaphysic  of  Ethics,  p.  95. 

3 M;Cosh,  Meth.  of  Div.  Govern .,  p.  530,  5th  edit. 

3 Bacon,  Nat.  Hist , sect.  479. 

4 Aditus  Novus  ad  Occultas  Sympathies  et  Antipathies  causas  invcniendcu.  12mo, 
Glasg.,  1658. 


D 


34 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOFIIY. 


ANTIPATHY  - 

A blind  and  instinctive  movement,  which,  without  any 
appreciable  reason,  makes  us  averse  to  the  company  or  char- 
acter of  some  persons  at  first  sight.  An  involuntary  dislike 
or  aversion  entertained  by  an  animate  being  to  some  sensible 
object.  A man  may  have  an  antipathy  to  particular  smells 
or  tastes,  a turkey  cock  or  bull  to  the  colour  red,  a horse  to 
the  smell  of  raw  flesh.  Some  are  natural,  others  are  acquired, 
as  a surfeit  of  any  food  gives  antipathy.  Some  are  founded 
on  sensation,  others  on  sentiment.1 — V.  Sympathy. 

A PARTE  ANTE,  and  A PARTE  POST. — These  two  expres- 
sions, borrowed  from  the  scholastic  philosophy,  refer  to  eter- 
nity ; of  which  man  can  only  conceive  as  consisting  of  two 
parts  ; the  one  without  limits  in  the  past,  a parte  aide ; and 
the  other  without  limits  in  the  future,  a parte  post.  Both  are 
prodicable  of  Deity;  only  the  latter  of  the  human  soul. — V. 
Eternity. 

APATHY  (a,  privative;  and  rfdOof,  passion).  — The  absence  of 
passion.  “ What  is  called  by  the  Stoics  apathy,  or  dispassion ; 
by  the  Sceptics  indisturbance,  drapaffa, ; by  the  Molinists, 
quietism  ; by  common  men,  peace  of  conscience : seem  all  to 
mean  but  great  tranquillity  of  mind.”2 

As  the  passions  are  the  springs  of  most  of  our  actions,  a 
state  of  apathy  has  come  to  signify  a sort  of  moral  inertia — • 
the  absence  of  all  activity  or  energy.  According  to  the  Stoics, 
apathy  meant  the  extinction  of  the  passions  by  the  ascendancy 
of  reason. 

“By  the  perfect  apathy  which  that  philosophy  (the  Stoical) 
prescribes  to  us,  by  endeavouring  not  merely  to  moderate 
but  to  eradicate,  all  our  private,  partial,  and  selfish  affec- 
tions, by  suffering  us  to  feel  for  whatever  can  befall  our- 
selves, our  friends,  our  country,  not  even  the  sympathetic 
and  reduced  passions  of  the  impartial  spectator,  — it  endea- 
vours to  render  us  altogether  indifferent  and  unconcerned 
in  the  success  or  miscarriage  of  everything  which  nature  has 
prescribed  to  us  as  the  proper  business  and  occupation  of  our 
lives.”3 


1 Locke,  On  Hum.  Understand .,  book  ii.,  chap.  33,  sect.  7,  8. 

* Sir  W.  Temple,  Of  Gardening. 

3 Smith,  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,  part  vii.,  sect.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


35 


APATHY— 

“ In  general,  experience  will  show,  that  as  the  wants  of 
natural  appetite  to  food  supposes  and  proceeds  from  some 
natu'ral  disease ; so  the  apathy  the  Stoics  talk  of,  as  much 
supposes  or  is  accompanied  with  something  amiss  in  the  moral 
character,  in  that  which  is  the  health  of  the  mind.”1 

In  lazy  apathy  let  Stoics  toast 

Their  virtue  fix’d ; ’tis  fix’d  as  in  a frost ; 

Contracted  all,  retiring  to  the  breast; 

But  strength  of  mind  is  exercise,  not  rest.”  — Pope.2 

APHORISM,  determinate  position,  from  d^opt^u,  to  hound,  or 
limit;  whence  our  horizon.  “In  order  to  get  the  full  sense 
of  a word,  we  should  first  present  to  our  minds  the  visual 
image  that  forms  its  primary  meaning.  Draw  lines  of  dif- 
ferent colours  round  the  different  counties  of  England,  and 
then  cut  out  each  separately,  as  in  the  common  play-maps 
that  children  take  to  pieces  and  put  together,  so  that  each  dis- 
trict can  be  contemplated  apart  from  the  rest,  as  a whole  in 
itself.  This  twofold  act  of  circumscribing  and  detaching, 
when  it  is  exerted  by  the  mind  on  subjects  of  reflection  and 
reason,  is  to  aphorise,  and  the  result  an  aphorism.”3 

A precise,  sententious  saying ; e.  g.,  “It  is  always  safe  to 
learn  from  our  enemies,  seldom  safe  to  instruct  even  our 
friends.” 

Like  Hippocrates,  Boerhaave  has  written  a book  entitled 
Aphorisms,  containing  medical  maxims,  not  treated  argumenta- 
tively, but  laid  down  as  certain  truths.  In  civil  la w aphorisms 
are  also  used. 

The  three  ancient  commentators  upon  Hippocrates,  viz., 
Theophilus,  Meletius,  and  Stephanus,  have  given  the  same 
definition  of  an  aphorism,  i.  e.,  “a  succinct  saying,  compre- 
hending a complete  statement,”  or  a saying  poor  in  expres- 


1 Butler,  Sermon  v. 

a Niemeierus  (Joh.  Barth.),  Dissert.  dt  Stoicorum  A ndScta,  &c.  4to,  Helmst,  1679. 
Becnius,  Dispp.,  libb.  3,  AraQua  Sapientis  Stoici.  4to,  Copenhag.,  1C93. 

Fischerus  (John  Hen.),  Diss.  de  Stoicis  ardQtias  fatso  suspectis.  4to,  Leips.,  1716. 
Quadius  Disputatio  tritum  iUud  Stoicorum  paradoxon  nepi  ri/f  axaQtias  expendens. 
4to,  Sedini,  1720. 

Meiners,  Melanges,  tom.  ii.,  p.  130. 

3 Coleridge,  Aids  to  Reflection,  vol.  i.,  p.  16,  edit.  1848. 


36 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


APHORISM  — 

sion,  bat  rich  in  sentiment.  The  first  aphorism  of  Hippo- 
crates is,  “Life  is  short,  and  the  art  is  long;  the  occasion 
fleeting  ; experience  fallacious,  and  judgment  difficult.  The 
physician  must  not  only  be  prepared  to  do  what  is  right  him- 
self, but  also  to  make  the  patient,  the  attendants,  and  exter- 
nals, co-operate.” 

“ The  first  and  most  ancient  inquirers  into  truth  were  wont 
to  throw  their  knowledge  into  aphorisms,  or  short,  scattered, 
unmethodical  sentences.”  1 

Heraclitus  is  known  by  his  aphorisms,  which  are  among 
the  most  brilliant  of  those 

“ Jewels,  fire  words  long, 

That  on  the  stretched  fore-finger  of  all  time, 

Sparkle  for  ever.” 

Among  the  most  famous  are, — War  is  father  of  all  things, 
i.  e.,  all  things  arc  evolved  by  antagonistic  force.  No  man 
can  bathe  twice  in  the  same  stream,  i.  e.,  all  things  are  in 
perpetual  flux. 

APQDEICTIC,  APODEICTXCAL  (<bto sdxw^,  to  show).— 

“ The  argumentation  is  from  a similitude,  therefore  not  apo- 
dictick,  or  of  evident  demonstration.”2 

This  term  was  borrowed  by  Kant  from  Aristotle.3  He  made 
a distinction  between  propositions  which  admitted  of  contra- 
diction or  dialectic  discussion,  and  such  as  were  the  basis  or 
result  of  demonstration.  Kant  wished  to  introduce  an  analo- 
gous distinction  between  our  judgments,  and  to  give  the  name 
of  apodeictic  to  such  as  Avere  above  all  contradiction. 
APOLOGUE  (cbtoxoyoj,  fahula),  “a  novel  story,  contrived  to 
teach  some  moral  truth.”  — Johnson. 

“ It  Avould  be  a high  relief  to  hear  an  apologue  or  fable  well 
told,  and  with  such  humour  as  to  need  no  sententious  moral 
at  the  end  to  make  the  application.”4  It  is  essential  to  an 
apologue  that  the  circumstances  told  in  it  should  be  fictitious. 

1 Nov.  Organ.,  book  i.,  sect.  86.  And  the  Novum  Organum  itself  is  written  in 
aphorisms. 

a Ilobinson,  Eudoxa,  p.  23. 

8 Analyt.  Prior..,  lib.  i.,  cap.  1. 

4 Shaftesbury,  vol.  iii.,  Miscell.  4,  c.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


37 


APOLOGUE  — 

The  difference  between  a,  parable  and  an  apologue  is,  that  the 
former  being  drawn  from  human  life  requires  probability  in 
the  narration  ; whereas  the  apologue  being  taken  from  inani- 
mate things  or  the  inferior  animals,  is  not  confined  strictly  to 
probability.  The  fables  of  iEsop  are  apologues. 

For  an  admirable  instance  of  the  ^dyoj  or  apologue,  see 
Coleridge’s  Friend,  where  the  case  of  the  seizure  of  the 
Danish  fleet  by  the  English  is  represented  in  this  form. 

APOLOGY  (artoXoyia,  a defence  made  in  a court  of  justice). — 
"We  have  a work  of  Xenophon,  entitled  the  Apology  of  Socrates, 
and  another  with  the  same  title  by  Plato.  The  term  was 
adopted  by  the  Christian  fathers,  and  applied  to  their  writings 
in  defence  of  Christianity,  and  in  answer  to  its  opponents. 
About  the  year  125,  Quadratus  and  Aristides  presented  Apolo- 
gies to  the  Emperor  Hadrian  when  on  a visit  to  Athens.  Ter- 
tullian  addressed  his  Apologetic  to  the  magistrates  of  Rome, 
the  Emperor  Severus  being  then  absent. 

APOPHTHEGM  (drfo^fyyo^cu.,  to  speak  out  plainly).  — A short 
and  pithy  speech  or  saying  of  some  celebrated  man ; as  that 
of  Augustus,  Festina  lente. 

“ In  a numerous  collection  of  our  Saviour’s  apophthegms, 
there  is  not  to  be  found  one  example  of  sophistry.”1 * 

The  Lacedaemonians  used  much  this  mode  of  speaking. 
Plutarch  has  a collection  entitled  the  Apophthegms  of  Kings 
and  Generals,  many  of  which  are  anecdotes  ; and  also  another 
entitled  Laconica.  Drusius  (Joan.  Prof.  Heb.  Lugd.  Bat.) 
published  in  1612,  a collection  of  Hebrew  and  Arabic  Apoph- 
thegms. Erasmus  has  a collection  of  Apophthegms? 

“Of  Blackmore’s  (Sir  Richard)  attainments  in  the  ancient 
tongues,  it  may  be  sufficient  to  say  that  in  his  prose,  he  has 
confounded  an  aphorism  with  an  apophthegm.” 3 4 

In  Guesses  at  Truth*  the  saying  of  Demosthenes,  “ that 
action  was  the  first,  second,  and  third  essential  of  eloquence,” 
is  called  an  apophthegm. 

1 Paley,  Evidences , part  ii.,  c.  2. 

3 12mo,  Basil,  1558. 

3 Macaulay,  On  Addison , p.  11. 

4 2d  series,  1848. 

5 


38 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


APPERCEPTION  (Self-consciousness).  — “By  apperception  he 
(Leibnitz)  understands  that  degree  of  perception  which  re- 
flects as  it  were  upon  itself;  by  which  Are  arc  conscious  of  our 
oavu  existence,  and  conscious  of  our  perceptions,,  by  Avhich  Ave 
can  reflect  upon  the  operation  of  our  o\Arn  minds,  and  can 
comprehend  abstract  truths.”1 

“ By  apperception  the  Leibnitzio-Wolfians  meant  the  act  by 
which  the  mind  is  conscious  immediately  of  the  representa- 
tive object,  and  through  it,  mediately  of  the  remote  object 
represented.”2 3 

Apperception  according  to  Kant  is  consciousness  of  one’s 
self,  or  the  simple  representation  of  the  I.  If  a subject 
capable  of  representations  possesses  such,  it,  besides,  always 
connects  with  these  representations  that  it  (the  subject)  has 
them.  This  second  representation,  that  I,  the  representing 
subject,  has  these  representations,  is  called  the  consciousness 
of  myself,  or  the  apperception.  This  representation  is  simple, 
and  is  an  effect  of  the  understanding,  AA'hich  thereby  connects 
all  the  diversity  of  a representation  in  a single  representation, 
or,  according  to  Kant’s  mode  of  expression,  produces  a syn- 
thesis.”5 

“ The  term  consciousness  denotes  a state,  apperception  an 
act  of  the  ego;  and  from  this  alone  the  superiority  of  the 
latter  is  apparent.”4 

“ Cousin  maintains  that  the  soul  possesses  a mode  of  spon- 
taneous thought,  into  which  volition  and  reflection,  and  there- 
fore personality,  do  not  enter,  and  Avhich  gives  her  an  intui- 
tion of  the  absolute.  For  this  he  has  appropriated  the  name 
apperception,  explaining  it  also  as  a true  inspiration,  and  hold- 
ing therefore,  that  inspirations  come  to  man,  not  by  the  special 
volitions  of  God,  as  commonly  believed,  but  fall  to  reason  in  it’s 
own  right,  thus  constituting  a scientific  organ  of  discovery.”5 
APPETITE.  — “ The  Avord  appetitus,  from  which  that  of  appetite 
is  derived,  is  applied  by  the  Romans  and  the  Latinists  to  de- 
sires in  general,  whether  they  primarily  relate  to  the  body  or 
not,  and  with  obvious  propriety  ; for  the  primitive  signification 

1 Reid,  Intell.  Pow.,  essay  ii.,  c.  15. 

a Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Worlcs,  note  d*,  sect  1. 

3 Haywood,  Criticlc  of  Pure  Reason , p.  592. 

4 Meiklejohn,  Criticism  of  Pure  Reason , note,  p.  81. 

6 MacYicar,  Enquiry  into  Human  Nature , 8vo,  Edin.,  1853,  p.  216, 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


39 


APPETITE  — 

is  the  seeking  after  whatever  may  conduce  either  to  gratifica- 
tion or  happiness.  Thus  Cicero  observes,  ‘ Motus  animorum 
dupUces  sunt;  alteri,  cogitationis  ; alteri,  appelitus.  Cogitatio 
in  vero  cxquirendo  maxime  versatur;  appetitus  impellit  ad  agen- 
dum.’ By  two  powers  of  action  being  thus  placed  in  contrast 
with  each  other,  and  the  one  applied  to  thought  simply,  it  is 
obvious  that  the  other  comprehends  every  species  of  desire, 
whether  of  a mental  or  corporeal  nature.  Metaphysicians 
also,  who  have  written  in  the  Latin  language,  use  the  word 
appetitus  in  the  same  latitude.”  1 

In  modern  use,  appetites  refer  to  corporeal  wants,  each  of 
which  creates  its  correspondent  desire.  But  desire  proper  re- 
fers to  mental  objects. 

“ The  word  appetite,  in  common  language,  often  means 
hunger,  and  sometimes  figuratively  any  strong  desire.”2 
As  our  perceptions  are  external,  which  are  common  to  us 
with  the  brutes;  and  internal,  which  are  proper  to  us  as 
rational  beings — so  appetite  is  sensitive  and  rational.  The  sen- 
sitive appetite  was  distinguished  into  the  irascible  and  the 
concupisciple.3 

Appetite  and  Instinct.  — “Appetites  have  been  called  instinc- 
tive, because  they  seek  their  own  gratification  without  the 
aid  of  reason,  and  often  in  spite  of  it.  They  are  common  to 
man  with  the  brute ; but  they  differ  at  least  in  one  important 
respect  from  those  instincts  of  the  lower  animals  which  are 
usually  contrasted  with  human  reason.  The  objects  towards 
which  they  are  directed  are  prized  for  their  own  sake  ; they 
are  sought  as  ends,  while  instinct  teaches  brutes  to  do  many 
things  which  are  needed  only  as  means  for  the  attainment  of 
some  ulterior  purpose.  Thus  instinct  enables  a spider  to  en- 
trap his  prey,  while  appetite  only  leads  him  to  devour  it  when 
in  his  possession. 

“ Instinct  is  an  impulse  conceived  without  instruction,  and 
prior  to  all  experience,  to  perform  certain  acts,  which  are  not 
needed  for  the  immediate  gratification  of  the  agent,  which,  in 
fact,  are  often  opposed  to  it,  and  are  useful  only  as  means  for 


1 Cogan,  On  the  Passions,  yol.  i.,  p.  15. 
a Beattie,  Mor.  Science,  part  i.,  c.  1. 

8 Beiil,  Act.  Pow essay  iii. ; Stewart,  Act.  Pow.,  toI.  i.,  p.  14. 


40 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


APPETITE - 

the  accomplishment  of  some  ulterior  object ; and  this  object  is 
usually  one  of  pre-eminent  utility1-  or  necessity,  either  for  the 
preservation  of  the  animal’s  own  life,  or  for  the  continuance 
of  its  species.  The  former  quality  separates  it  from  intelli- 
gence, properly  so  called,  which  proceeds  only  by  experience 
or  instruction  ; and  the  latter  is  its  peculiar  trait  as  distin- 
guished from  appetile,  which  in  strictness  uses  no  means  at 
all,  but  looks  only  to  ends.”  1 

APPREHENSION  ( apprehendo , to  lay  hold  of). — “By  the  appre- 
hensive power,  we  perceive  the  species  of  sensible  things,  pre- 
sent or  absent,  and  retain  them  as  wax  doth  the  print  of  a 
seal.”2 

Here  it  includes  not  only  conception  or  imagination,  hut 
also  memory  or  retention. 

“ How  can  he  but  be  moved  willingly  to  serve  God,  who 
hath  an  ap>prehcnsion  of  God’s  merciful  design  to  save  him!”3 

“ It  may  be  true,  perhaps,  that  the  generality  of  the  negro 
slaves  are  extremely  dull  of  apprehension  and  slow  of  under- 
standing.” 4 

Apprehension  in  Logic,  is  that  act  or  condition  of  the  mind 
in  which  it  receives  a notion  of  any  object;  and  which  is  ana- 
logous to  the  perception  of  the  senses.  Incomplex  apprehen- 
sion regards  one  object,  or  several,  without  any  relation  being 
perceived  between  them,  as  a man,  a card,  &c.  Complex  ap- 
prehension regards  several  objects  with  such  a relation,  as  a 
man  on  horseback,  a pack  of  cards,  &c.5 6 

11  Apprehension  is  the  Kantian  word  for  perception,  in  the 
largest  sense  in  which  we  employ  that  term.  It  is  the  genus 
which  includes  under  it,  as  species,  perception  proper  and 
sensation  proper.” B 

Apprehend  and  Comprehend.  — “ We  apprehend  many  truths 
which  we  do  not  comprehend.  The  great  mysteries  of  our 
faith,  the  doctrine,  for  instance,  of  the  Holy  Trinity  — we  lay 
hold  upon  it  (ad  prehendo),  we  hang  upon  it,  our  souls  live  by 
it ; but  we  do  not  take  it  all  in,  we  do  not  comprehend  it ; for 

1 Bowen,  Lowell  Led.,  1849,  p.  228. 

a Burton,  Anal,  of  Melancholy , p.  21. 

3 Barrow,  Serin,  xlii.  4 Porteus,  On  Civilization  of  Slaves. 

5 Whatcly,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  1.  £ 1. 

6 Meiklejohn,  Criticism  of  Pure  Peason,  note,  p.  127. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


41 


APPREHENSION— 

it  is  a necessary  attribute  of  God  that  He  is  incomprehensible ; 
if  He  were  not  so  He  would  not  be  God,  or  the  being  that 
comprehended  Him  would  be  God  also.  But  it  also  belongs 
to  the  idea  of  God  that  He  may  be  ‘apprehended,’  though  not 
‘ comprehended ’ by  His  reasonable  creatures;  lie  has  made 
them  to  know  Him,  though  not  to  know  Him  all,  to  ‘ appre- 
hend' though  not  to  ‘comprehend’  Him.”  1 

APPROBATION  (Moral)  includes  a judgment  of  an  action  as 
right,  and  a feeling  favourable  to  the  agent.  The  judgment 
precedes  and  the  feeling  follows.  But  in  some  cases  the  feel- 
ing predominates;  and  in  others  the  judgment  is  more  promi- 
nent. Hence  some  have  resolved  an  exercise  of  the  moral 
faculty  into  an  act  of  the  reason ; while  others  would  refer  it 
altogether  to  the  sensibility.  But  both  the  judgment  and  the 
feeling  should  be  taken  into  account.2 

A PRIORI  and  A POSTERIORI.  — “There  are  two  general 

ways  of  reasoning,  termed  arguments  d priori  and  d posteriori, 
or  according  to  what  is  usually  styled  the  synthetic  and  ana- 
lytic method ; the  one  lays  down  some  previous,  self-evident 
principles ; and  in  the  next  place,  descends  to  the  several  con- 
sequences that  may  be  deduced  from  them  ; the  other  begins 
with  a view  of  the  phenomena  themselves,  traces  them  to  their 
original,  and  by  developing  the  properties  of  these  pheno- 
mena, arrives  at  the  knowledge  of  the  cause.”3 

By  an  d priori  argument  a conclusion  is  drawn  from  an 
antecedent  fact,  whether  the  consequence  be  in  the  order  of 
time  or  in  the  necessary  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  By  the 
argument  d posteriori  we  reason  from  what  is  consequent  in 
the  order  of  time  to  what  is  antecedent,  or  from  effect  to  cause. 
An  individual  may  fall  under  suspicion  of  murder  for  two 
reasons : he  may  have  coveted  the  deceased’s  property,  or  he 
may  be  found  with  it  in  his  possession  ; the  former  is  an  d 
priori,  the  latter  an  d posteriori  argument  against  him. 

“ Of  demonstrations  there  are  two  sorts ; demonstrations 
a priori,  when  we  argue  from  the  cause  to  the  effect ; and  d 


1 Trench,  On  Study  of  Words , p.  110,  12mo,  Lond.,  1851. 

3 See  Manual  of  Mor.  Phil.,  p.  102;  Reid,  Act.  Pow .,  essay  v.,  ch.  7. 
n King,  Essay  on  Evil,  Prcf.,  p.  9. 

5* 


42 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


A PRIORI — 

posteriori,  when  we  argue  from  the  effect  to  the  cause.  Thus 
when  we  argue  from  the  ideas  we  have  of  immensity,  eternity, 
necessary  existence,  and  the  like,  that  such  perfections  can 
reside  but  in  one  being,  and  thence  conclude  that  there  can 
be  but  one  supreme  God,  who  is  the  cause  and  author  of  all 
things,  and  that  therefore  it  is  contradictory  to  this  to  suppose 
that  there  can  be  two  necessary  independent  principles,  the 
one  the  cause  of  all  the  good,  and  the  other  the  cause  of  all 
the  evil  that  is  in  the  world ; this  is  an  argument  a jwiori. 
Again,  when  the  Manicheans  and  Paulicians,  from  what  they 
observe  in  things  and  facts,  from  the  many  natural  evils  which 
they  see  in  the  world,  and  the  many  moral  wickednesses 
which  are  committed  by  men,  conclude  that  there  must  be 
two  different  causes  or  principles  from  whence  each  of  these 
proceed;  this  is  arguing  d posteriori.” 1 

“ The  term  d priori,  by  the  influence  of  Kant  and  his  school, 
is  now  very  generally  employed  to  characterize  those  elements 
of  knowledge  which  are  not  obtained  d posteriori  — are  not 
evolved  out  of  factitious  generalizations  ; but  which  as  native 
to,  are  potentially  in,  the  mind  antecedent  to  the  act  of  ex- 
perience, on  occasion  of  which  (as  constituting  its  subjective 
condition)  they  are  first  actually  elicited  into  consciousness. 
Previously  to  Kant  the  terms  a priori  and  d posteriori  were, 
in  a sense  which  descended  from  Aristotle,  properly  and  usually 
employed  — the  former  to  denote  a reasoning  from  cause  to 
effect — the  latter  a reasoning  from  effect  to  cause.  The  term 
a priori  came,  however,  in  modern  times,  to  be  extended  to 
any  abstract  reasoning  from  a given  notion  to  the  conditions 
which  such  a notion  involved ; hence,  for  example,  the  title  d 
priori  bestowed  on  the  ontological  and  cosmological  arguments 
for  the  existence  of  the  Deity.  The  latter  of  these,  in  fact, 
starts  from  experience — from  the  observed  contingency  of  the 
world,  in  order  to  construct  the  supposed  notion  on  which  it 
founds.  Clarke’s  cosmological  demonstration  called  d priori, 
is  therefore,  so  far,  properly  an  argument  d posteriori.”1  2 
“By  knowledge  d priori,”  says  Kant,3  “we  shall  in  the 

1 Dr.  John  Clark,  Enquiry  into  Evil , pp.  31-2. 

Sir  W.  Hamilton,  IleicVs  Works , p.  762, 

3 Criticism  of  Piirti  Reason , Introd.,  § 1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


43 


A PRIORI  — 

sequel  understand,  not  such  as  is  independent  of  this  or  that 
kind  of  experience,  but  such  as  is  absolutely  so  of  all  experi- 
ence. Opposed  to  this  is  empirical  knowledge,  or  that  which 
is  possible  only  a posteriori,  that  is,  through  experience. 
Knowledge  a priori  is  either  pure  or  impure.  Pure  knowledge 
d priori  is  that  with  which  no  empirical  element  is  mixed  up. 
For  example,  the  proposition,  ‘Every  change  has  a cause,’  is 
a proposition  d priori,  but  impure  because  change  is  a con- 
ception which  can  only  be  derived  from  experience.” 

“We  have  ordinarily  more  consideration  for  the  demon- 
stration called  propter  quid  or  a priori,  than  for  that  which 
we  call  quia  or  d posteriori ; because  the  former  proceeds  from 
universals  to  particulars,  from  causes  to  effects,  while  the  lat- 
ter proceeds  in  a manner  wholly  contrary.  We  must  never- 
theless see  whether  we  have  a right  to  do  this ; since  no 
demonstration  d priori  can  have  credence,  or  be  received, 
without  supposing  the  demonstration  d posteriori,  by  which  it 
must  be  proved.  For  how  is  it,  for  example,  that  having  to 
prove  that  man  feels,  from  this  proposition,  every  animal  feels 
— how,  I say,  will  you  establish  the  truth  of  this  position, 
should  some  one  hesitate  to  grant  it,  except  by  making  induc- 
tion of  the  individual  animals,  of  whom  there  is  not  one  that 
does  not  feel?”  1 2 

“If  there  are  any  truths  which  the  mind  possesses,  whether 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  before  and  independent  of  ex- 
perience, they  may  be  called  a priori  truths,  as  belonging  to 
it  prior  to  all  that  it  acquires  from  the  world  around.  On  the 
other  hand,  truths  which  are  acquired  by  observation  and  ex- 
perience, are  called  d posteriori  truths,  because  they  come  to 
the  mind  after  it  has  become  acquainted  with  external  facts. 
How  far  d priori  truths  or  ideas  are  possible,  is  the  great  caw- 
pus  philosophorum,  the  great  controverted  question  of  mental 
philosophy.” - — V.  Demonstration". 

ARBOR  PORPHYRIAIfA.  — In  the  third  century  Porphyry 
wrote  or  an  Introduction  to  Logic.  lie  represented 

the  five  predicables  under  the  form  of  a tree  with  its  trunk 


1 Bernier,  Abridgment  of  Gassendi  “ De  V Entendemektf  i\o\.  Yi..  pp.  340-1. 

2 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought,  2d  edit.,  pp?^S-9. 


44 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


r 

ARBOR  PQRPHYRIAHA— 

and  branches,  and  hence  the  name.  By  the  Greek  logicians 
it  was  called  the  ladder  (xUyo4)  of  Porphyry.  A delineation 
of  the  Arbor  Porphyriana  is  given  by  Aquinas.1 

ARCHAEUS  is  the  name  given  by  Paracelsus  to  the  vital  prin- 
ciple which  presides  over  the  growth  and  continuation  of 
living  beings.  lie  called  it  body  ; but  an  astral  body,  that  is 
an  emanation  from  the  substance  of  the  stars,  which  defends 
us  against  the  external  agents  of  destruction  till  the  inevita- 
ble term  of  life  arrives.*  The  hypothesis  was  extended  by 
Van  Ilelmont  to  the  active  principle  which  presides  not  only 
over  every  body,  but  over  every  particle  of  organized  body, 
to  which  it  gives  its  proper  form. 

The  word  is  used  by  More2  as  sjmonymous  with  form. 

ARCHELOGY  (xoyoj  rtf  pi  tthv  ap%u>v)  treats  of  principles,  and 
should  not  be  confounded  with  Archaeology  (%6yo$  rttpi  fwu 
ap^cu'w),  which  treats  of  antiquities  or  things  old.3 — V.  Prin- 
ciple. 

ARCHETYPE  [apxri,  first  or  chief;  and  viirtoj,  form),  a model 
or  first  form.  — “ There  were  other  objects  of  the  mind,  uni- 
versal, eternal,  immutable,  which  they  called  intelligible 
ideas,  all  originally  contained  in  one  archetypal  mind  or  un- 
derstanding, and  from  thence  participated  by  inferior  minds 
or  souls.”4 

“ The  first  mind  is,  according  to  this  hypothesis,  an  arche- 
typal world  which  contains  intelligibly  all  that  is  contained 
sensibly  in  our  world.”5 

Cornelius  Agrippa  gave  the  name  of  Archetype  to  God,  con- 
sidered as  the  absolute  model  of  all  being. 

In  the  philosophy  of  Locke,  the  archetypes  of  our  ideas  are 
the  things  really  existing  out  of  us.  “ By  real  ideas,  I mean 
such  as  have  a foundation  in  nature ; such  as  have  a con- 
formity with  the  real  being  and  existence  of  things,  or  with 
their  archetypes .”6 


1 Opusc.  xlviii.,  tract,  ii.,  cap.  3. 

a Antidote  to  Atheism,  pt.  i.,  c.  11. 

3 See  Alstedius  (J.  II.).  Scientiarum  Omnium  Encyclopaedia. 

4 Cudworth,  lntell.  Syst.,  p.  387. 

8 Bolingbrokc,  Essay  iv.,  sect.  28. 

6 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand .,  b.  ii.,  c.  30. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOBIIY. 


45 


ARCHETYPE— 

“ There  is  truth  as  well  as  poetry  in  the  Platonic  idea  of 
things  being  formed  after  original  archetypes.  But  we  hold 
that  these  archetypes  are  not  uncreated,  as  Plato  seems  to  sup- 
pose ; we  maintain  that  they  have  no  necessary  or  indepen- 
dent existence,  but  that  they  are  the  product  of  Divine 
wisdom ; and  that  we  can  discover  a final  cause  for  their  pre- 
valence, not,  indeed,  in  the  mere  convenience  and  comfort  of 
the  animal,  but  in  the  aid  furnished  to  those  created  intelli- 
gences who  are  expected  to  contemplate  and  admire  their  pre- 
determined forms.” 1 * 

“Apelles  paints  a head  of  Jupiter.  The  statue  of  Phidias 
was  his  archetype,  if  he  paints  after  it  from  memory,  from 
idea.  It  was  his  model,  if  he  paints  after  it  in  presence  of 
the  statue.  He  paints  a likeness,  if  the  resemblance  is  striking. 
If  he  makes  a second  painting  in  imitation  of  the  first,  he 
takes  a copy.”'1 

ARCHITECTONICS.  — “I  understand  by  an  Architectonick  the 
art  of  systems.  As  the  systematic  unity  is  what  first  of  all 
forms  the  usual  cognition  into  science,  that  is,  from  a mere 
aggregate  of  it  forms  a system,  so  is  Architectonick  the 
doctrine  of  the  Scientific  in  our  cognition  in  general,  and 
belongs  therefore  necessarily  to  the  doctrine  of  Method.”3 
ARGUMENT  ( arguo , from  dpyoj,  clear,  manifest — to  show,  reason, 
or  prove),  is  an  explanation  of  that  which  is  doubtful,  by  that 
which  is  known. 

Reasoning  (or  discourse)  expressed  in  words,  is  Argument. 
Every  argument  consists  of  two  parts;  that  which  is  proved ; 
and  that  by  means  of  which  it  is  proved.  The  former  is  called, 
before  it  is  proved,  the  question;  when  proved  the  conclusion 
(or  inference ) ; that  which  is  used  to  prove  it,  if  stated  last  (as 
is  often  done  in  common  discourse),  is  called  the  reason,  and  is 
introduced  by  “ because,”  or  some  other  causal  conjunction  ; 
e.  g.,  “ Caesar  deserved  death  because  he  was  a tyrant,  and  all 
tyrants  deserve  death.”  If  the  conclusion  be  stated  last 
(which  is  the  strict  logical  form,  to  which  all  reasoning  may 
be  reduced),  then,  that  which  is  employed  to  prove  it  is  called 

1 M;Cosb,  Meth . of  Div.  Govern .,  b.  ii.,  ch.  1,  g 4. 

* Taylor,  Synonyms. 

3 Kant,  Crilick  of  Pare  Reason , by  Haywood,  p,  624. 


46 


VOCABULARY  OF  rillLOSOPIIY. 


ARGUMENT— 

the  premises,  and  the  conclusion  is  then  introduced  by  some 
illative  conjunction,  as  therefore ; e.g., 

“All  tyrants  deserve  death: 

Caesar  was  a tyrant ; 

Therefore  lie  deserved  death.”  1 
The  term  argument  in  ordinary  discourse,  has  several  mean- 
ings.— 1.  It  is  used  for  the  premises  in  contradistinction  to  the 
conclusion,  e.g.,  “the  conclusion  which  this  argument  is  in- 
tended to  establish  is,”  &c.  2.  It  denotes  what  is  a course  or 
series  of  arguments,  as  when  it  is  applied  to  an  entire  disser- 
tation. 3.  Sometimes  a disputation  or  two  trains  of  argument 
opposed  to  each  other.  4.  Lastly,  the  various  forms  of  stating 
an  argument  are  sometimes  spoken  of  as  different  kinds  of 
argument,  as  if  the  same  argument  were  not  capable  of  being 
stated  in  various  ways.2 

“ In  technical  propriety  argument  cannot  be  used  for  argu- 
mentation, as  Dr.  Whately  thinks,  but  exclusively  for  its  middle 
term.  In  this  meaning,  the  word  (though  not  with  uniform 
consistency)  was  employed  by  Cicero,  Quintilian,  Boethius, 
&c. ; it  was  thus  subsequently  used  by  the  Latin  Aristotelians, 
from  whom  it  passed  even  to  the  Itamists ; and  this  is  the 
meaning  which  the  expression  always  first  and  most  natu- 
rally suggests  to  a logician.”  3 

In  this  sense,  the  discoverg  of  arguments  means  the  dis- 
covery of  middle  terms. 

Argument  (The  Indirect).  — It  is  opposed  to  the  Ostensive  or 
Direct.  Of  Indirect  arguments  several  kinds  are  enumerated 
by  logicians. 

Argumentum  ad  hominem,  an  appeal  to  the  principles  of  an 
opponent. 

Argumentum  ex  concesso,  a proof  derived  from  some  truth 
already  admitted. 

Argumentum  a fortiori,  the  proof  of  a conclusion  deduced 
from  that  of  a less  probable  supposition  that  depends  upon  it. 
— Matthew  vi.  30,  vii.  11. 

Argumentum  ad  judicium,  an  appeal  to  the  common  sense  of 
mankind. 


1 Whately,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  3,  $ 2. 

8 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Discussions,  p.  147. 


Ibid.,  Appendix  i. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


47 


Argumentum  ad  vereeundiam,  an  appeal  to  our  reverence  for 
some  respected  authority. 

Argumentum  ad  populum,  an  appeal  to  the  passions  and  pre- 
judices of  the  multitude. 

Argumentum  ad  ignorantiam,  an  argument  founded  on  the 
ignorance  of  an  adversary. 

Heductio  ad  absurdum  is  the  proof  of  a conclusion  derived  from 
the  absurdity  of  a contrary  supposition.  These  arguments  are 
called  Indirect,  because  the  conclusion  that  is  established  is 
not  the  absolute  and  general  one  in  question,  but  some  other 
relative  and  particular  conclusion,  ■which  the  person  is  bound 
to  admit  in  order  to  maintain  his  consistency.  The  lieductio 
ad  absurdum  is  the  form  of  argument  which  more  particularly 
comes  under  this  denomination.  In  geometry  this  mode  of 
reasoning  is  much  employed,  by  which,  instead  of  demon- 
strating what  is  asserted,  everything  which  contradicts  that 
assertion  is  shown  to  be  absurd.  For,  if  everything  which 
contradicts  a proposition  is  absurd,  or  unthinkable,  the  pro- 
position itself  must  be  accepted  as  true.  In  other  sciences, 
however,  which  do  not  depend  upon  definition,  nor  proceed  by 
demonstration,  the  supposable  and  the  false  find  a place  be- 
tween what  is  true  and  what  is  absurd. 

ARGUMENTATION  is  opposed  to  intuition  and  consciousness, 
and  used  as  synonymous  with  deduction  by  Dr.  Price.1 

Argumentation  or  reasoning  is  that  operation  of  mind  where- 
by we  infer  one  proposition  from  two  or  more  propositions 
premised.2 

Argumentation  must  not  be  confounded  with  reasoning. 
Reasoning  may  be  natural  or  artificial ; argumentation  is  al- 
ways artificial.  An  advocate  reasons  and  argues ; a Hottentot 
reasons,  but  does  not  argue.  Reasoning  is  occupied  with  ideas 
and  their  relations,  legitimate  or  illegitimate  ; argumentation 
has  to  do  with  forms  and  their  regularity  or  irregularity.  One 
reasons  often  with  one’s  self ; you  cannot  argue  but  with  two. 
A thesis  is  set  down  — you  attack,  I defend  it ; you  insist,  I 
reply ; you  deny,  I approve ; you  distinguish,  I destroy  your 
distinction;  your  objections  and  my  replies  balance  or  over- 


‘ Review,  chap.  5. 


a Watts,  Log.,  Introd. 


48 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ARGUMENTATION  - 

turn  oue  another.  Such  is  argumentation.  It  supposes  that 
there  are  two  sides,  and  that  both  agree  to  the  same  rules.1 

“ Argument alionis  nomine  iota  disputatio  ipsa  comprehenr 
ditur,  constans  ex  argumento  et  argumenti  confutatione.”  2 
ART  (Latin  ars,  from  Greek  apstri,  strength  or  skill ; or  from  dpw, 
to  fit,  join,  or  make  agree). 

Ars  est  ratio  recta  aliquomm  operum  faciendorurn? 

Ars  est  habitus  cum  recta  ratione  effectivus;  quia  per  precept  a 
sua  diriyit  effectionem  seu  productionem  operis  extend  sensibilis. 
Differt  autem  a natura,  quod  natura  operatur  in  eo  in  quo  est; 
ars  vero  nunquam  operatur  in  eo  in  quo  est;  nisi  per  accidens, 
puta  cum  mcdicus  seipsum  sanat.* 

Ars  est  methodus  aliquid  juxta  regulas  de.ierminatas  operandi.* * 6 

Ars  est  recta  ratio  factibilium,  atque  in  eo  differt  a prudentia, 
qua:  est  recta  ratio  agibilium.6 

Docti  rationem  artis  intelligvnt,  indocti  voluptatem.  — Quint. 
This  is  the  difference,  in  the  fine  arts  especially,  between 
acquired  knowledge  and  natural  taste. 

“We  speak  of  art  as  distinguished  from  nature;  but  art 
itself  is  natural  to  man.  ...  If  we  admit  that  man  is 
susceptible  of  improvement,  and  has  in  himself  a principle  of 
progression  and  a desire  of  perfection,  it  appears  improper  to 
say  that  he  has  quitted  the  state  of  his  nature,  when  he  has 
begun  to  proceed  ; or  that  he  finds  a station  for  which  he  was 
not  intended,  while,  like  other  animals,  he  only  follows  the 
disposition  and  employs  the  powers  that  nature  has  given. 
The  latest  efforts  of  human  invention  are  but  a continuation 
of  certain  devices  which  were  practised  in  the  earliest  ages  of 
the  wrorld,  and  in  the  rudest  state  of  mankind."7 

Art  is  defined  by  Lord  Bacon  to  be  “ a proper  disposal  of 
the  things  of  nature  by  human  thought  and  experience,  so  as 
to  make  them  answer  the  designs  and  uses  of  mankind."  It 
may  be  defined  more  concisely  to  be  the  adjustment  of  means 
to  accomplish  a desired  end .8 


1 J>ict.  des  Sciences  Philosoph.  2 Cicero.  3 Thomas  Aquinas. 

4 Derodon,  Phys p.  21.  1 Bouvier. 

® Peemans,  Intrnd.  ad  Philosoph.,  p.  31. 

1 Ferguson,  Essay  on  Hist,  of  Civ.  Soc.,  pp.  10-13. 

8 Stewart,  Works , vol.  ii.;  p.  36,  last  edition. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


49 


ART- 

“Art  has  in  general  preceded  science.  There  were  bleach- 
ing, and  dyeing,  and  tanning,  and  artificers  in  copper  and 
iron,  before  there  was  chemistry  to  explain  the  processes  used. 
Men  made  wine  before  there  was  any  theory  of  fermentation  ; 
and  glass  and  porcelain  were  manufactured  before  the  nature 
of  alkalies  and  earths  had  been  determined.  The  pyramids  of 
Nubia  and  Egypt,  the  palaces  and  sculptured  slabs  of  Nine- 
veh, the  Cyclopean  walls  of  Italy  and  Greece,  the  obelisks  and 
temples  of  India,  the  cromlechs  and  druidical  circles  of  coun- 
tries formerly  Celtic,  all  preceded  the  sciences  of  mechanics 
and  architecture.  There  was  music  before  there  was  a science 
of  acoustics ; and  painting  while  as  yet  there  was  no  theory 
of  colours  and  perspective.” 1 

On  the  other  hand  Cicero  has  said,2  “Nihil  est  enim,  quod 
ad  artem  redigi possit,  nisi  ille  prius  qui  ilia  tenet,  quorum,  artem 
instituere  vult,  liaheat  illam  scientiam,  id  ex  iis  rebus,  quarum 
ars  nondum  sit,  artem  efficere  possit.” 

And  Mr.  Harris3  has  argued  — “ If  there  were  no  theorems 
of  science  to  guide  the  operations  of  art,  there  would  be  no 
art ; but  if  there  were  no  operations  of  art,  there  might  still 
be  theorems  of  science.  Therefore  science  is  prior  to  art.” 

“ The  principles  which  art  involves,  science  evolves.  The 
truths  on  which  art  depends  lurk  in  the  artist’s  mind  unde- 
veloped, guiding  his  hand,  stimulating  his  invention,  balancing 
his  judgment,  but  not  appearing  in  the  form  of  enunciated 
propositions.  Art  in  its  earlier  stages  is  anterior  to  science — 
it  may  afterwards  borrow  aid  from  it.”4 * 

If  the  knowledge  used  be  merely  accumulated  experience, 
the  art  is  called  empirical;  but  if  it  be  experience  reasoned 
upon  and  brought  under  general  principles,  it  assumes  a 
higher  character  and  becomes  a scientific  art. 

The  difference  between  art  and  science  is  regarded  as  merely 
verbal  by  Sir  'William  Hamilton.6 

“ The  distinction  between  science  and  art  is,  that  a science  is 


1 M‘Cosh,  On  Div.  Govern.,  p.  151. 

a De  Oratore,  i.,  41. 

3 Phil.  Arrangements , chap.  15. 

4 Whewell,  Phil,  of  Induct.  Sciences , vol.  ii.,  pp.  111-2,  new  edit. 

8 In  Edin.  Rev.,  No.  115.  On  the  other  side,  see  Preface  of  St.  Hilaire’s  translation 
of  the  Organon , p.  12;  "Whewell,  Phil,  of  Induct.  Sciences , part  ii.,  hook  ii.,  chap.  8. 

6 E 


50 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ART  — 

a body  of  principles  and  deductions,  to  explain  the  nature  of 
some  object  matter.  An  art  is  a body  of  precepts  with  prac- 
tical skill  for  the  completion  of  some  work.  A science  teaches 
us  to  know,  an  art  to  do  ; the  former  declares  that  something 
exists,  with  the  laws  and  causes  which  belong  to  its  existence ; 
the  latter  teaches  how  something  may  be  produced.”1 

“ The  object  of  science  is  knowledge  ; the  objects  of  art  are 
works.  In  art,  truth  is  a means  to  an  end ; in  science  it  is  the 
only  end.  Hence  the  practical  arts  are  not  to  be  classed 
among  the  sciences.” 2 

“ Science  gives  principles,  art  gives  rules.  Science  is  fixed, 
and  its  object  is  intellectual;  art  is  contingent,  and  its  object 
sensible.”3 

ASCETICISM  (aaxtjais,  exercise).  — The  exercise  of  severe  virtue 
among  the  Pythagoreans  and  Stoics  was  so  called.  It  con- 
sisted in  chastity,  poverty,  watching,  fasting,  and  retirement. 

“ The  ascetics  renounced  the  business  and  the  pleasures  of 
the  age;  abjured  the  use  of  wine,  of  flesh,  and  of  marriage, 
chastised  the  body,  mortified  their  affections,  and  embraced 
a life  of  misery,  as  the  price  of  eternal  happiness.”4 

This  name  may  be  applied  to  every  system  which  teaches 
man  not  to  govern  his  wants  by  subordinating  them  to  reason 
and  the  law  of  duty,  but  to  stifle  them  entirely,  or  at  least  to 
resist  them  as  much  as  we  can  ; and  these  are  not  only  the 
wants  of  the  body,  but  still  more  those  of  the  heart,  the  ima- 
gination, and  the  mind ; for  society,  the  family,  most  of  the 
sciences  and  arts  of  civilization,  are  proscribed  sometimes  as 
rigorously  as  physical  pleasures.  The  care  of  the  soul  and  the 
contemplation  of  the  Deity  are  the  only  employments.  Ascet- 
icism may  be  distinguished  as  religious,  which  is  founded  on  the 
doctrine  of  expiation,  and  seeks  to  appease  the  Divine  wrath 
by  voluntary  sufferings,  and  philosophical , which  aims  at  ac- 
complishing the  destiny  of  the  soul,  developing  its  faculties, 
and  freeing  it  from  the  servitude  of  sense.5 

1 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought , p.  16,  2d  edit. 

a Whewell,  Phil,  of  Induct.  Sciences , aph.  25. 

s Harris,  Dialogue  on  Art. 

4 Gibbon,  Hist.,  c.  37. 

8 Diet,  des  Sciences  Phil. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


51 


ASCETICISM  — 

The  principle  of  asceticism  is  described  by  Bentham,1  as 
“ that  principle  which  approves  of  actions  in  proportion  as 
they  tend  to  diminish  human  happiness,  and  conversely  dis- 
approves of  them  as  they  tend  to  augment  it.”  But  this  is 
not  a fair  representation  of  asceticism  in  any  of  its  forms. 
The  only  true  and  rational  asceticism  is  temperance  or  mode- 
ration in  all  things. 

ASSENT  {ad  sentio— to  think  the  same — to  be  of  the  same  mind 
or  opinion). — “ Subscription  to  articles  of  religion,  though  no 
more  than  a declaration  of  the  subscriber’s  assent,  may  pro- 
perly enough  be  considered  in  connection  with  the  subject  of 
oaths,  because  it  is  governed  by  the  same  rule  of  interpre- 
tation.” 2 

Assent  is  that  act  of  the  mind  by  which  we  accept  as  true  a 
proposition,  a perception,  or  an  idea.  It  is  a necessary  part 
of  judgment ; for  if  you  take  away  from  judgment  affirmation 
or  denial,  nothing  remains  but  a simple  conception  without 
logical  value,  or  a proposition  which  must  be  examined  before 
it  can  be  admitted.  It  is  also  implied  in  perception,  which 
would  otherwise  be  a mere  phenomenon  which  the  mind  had 
not  accepted  as  true.  Assent  is  free  when  it  is  not  the  unavoid- 
able result  of  evidence,  necessary  when  I cannot  withhold  it 
without  contradicting  myself.  The  Stoics,  while  they  ad- 
mitted that  most  of  our  ideas  came  from  without,  thought  that 
images  purely  sensible  could  not  be  converted  into  real  cog- 
nitions without  a spontaneous  act  of  the  mind,  which  is  just 
assent,  or  belief,  ovyxatd.9eoi{.3 — V.  Belief,  Consent. 

“ Assent  of  the  mind  to  truth  is,  in  all  cases,  the  work  not 
of  the  understanding,  but  of  the  reason.  Men  are  not  con- 
vinced by  syllogisms;  but  when  they  believe  a principle,  or 
wish  to  believe,  then  syllogisms  are  brought  in  to  prove  it.”4 

ASSERTION  [ad  ‘sera,  to  join  to,  to  declare),  in  Logic  is  the 
affirmation  or  denial  of  something.5 

ASSERTORY. — “ But  whether  each  of  them  be  according  to  the 


1 Introd.  to  Prin.  of  Mor.  and  Legislation,  eh.  2. 

a Paley,  Mor.  Phil,  b.  iii.,  c.  22.  a jxct.  ges  Sciences  Philosoph. 

4 Sewell,  Christ.  Mor.,  chap.  21.  ‘ Whately,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  eh.  2,  § 


52 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ASSERTORY  - 

kinds  of  oaths  divided  by  the  schoolmen,  one  assertory,  tho 
other  promissory,  to  which  some  add  a third,  comminatory,  is 
to  me  unknown.”  1 * 

Judgments  have  also  been  distinguished  into  the  problematic, 
the  assertory,  and  the  apodeidic. — F.  Judgment,  Oath. 

ASSOCIATION  ( associo , to  accompany).  — “ Ideas  that  in  them- 
selves are  not  all  of  kin,  come  to  be  so  united  in  some  men’s 
minds,  that  it  is  very  hard  to  separate  them  ; they  always  keep 
company,  and  tho  one  no  sooner  at  any  time  comes  into  the 
understanding  but  its  associate  appears  with  it.” 2 — V.  Sug- 
gestion, Train  of  Thought. 

“ If  several  thoughts,  or  ideas,  or  feelings,  have  been  in  the 
mind  at  the  same  time,  afterwards,  if  one  of  these  thoughts 
return  to  the  mind,  some,  or  all  of  the  others,  will  frequently 
return  with  it;  this  is  called  the  association  of  ideas.”3 

“ By  the  law  of  continuity,  the  mind,  when  the  chord  has 
once  been  struck,  continues,  as  Hume  describes  it,  to  repeat  of 
itself  the  same  note  again  and  again,  till  it  finally  dies  away. 
By  association  it  falls  naturally  into  the  same  train  of  consecu- 
tive ideas  to  which  it  has  been  before  accustomed.  Imagine  a 
glass  so  constructed  that  when  the  face  placed  before  it  was 
withdrawn,  the  image  should  still  continue  reflected  on  it  for 
a certain  time,  becoming  fainter  and  fainter  until  it  finally 
disappeared.  This  would  represent  the  law  of  continuity. 
Imagine  that  when  a book  and  a man  had  been  once  placed 
before  it  together,  it  should  be  able,  when  the  book  was  next 
brought  alone,  to  recall  the  image  of  the  man  also.  This 
would  be  the  law  of  association.  On  these  two  laws  depends 
the  spontaneous  activity  of  the  mind.” 4— Sewell.5 

“ The  law  of  association  is  this, — That  empirical  ideas  which 
often  follow  each  other,  create  a habit  in  the  mind,  whenever 
the  one  is  produced,  for  the  other  always  to  follow.”6 

“ I employ  the  word  association  to  express  the  effect 


1 Fuller,  Worthies,  Cornwall. 

a Locke,  On  Hum.  Understand.,  b.  ii.,  c.  33,  sect.  5. 

8 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

4 See  the  use  which  Butler  has  made  of  these  in  his  Analogy , ch.  1 and  ch.  5. 

• Christ.  Mor.,  ch.  14.  0 Kant,  Anthropology , p.  182. 


• VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


53 


ASSOCIATION— 

which  an  object  derives  from  ideas,  or  from  feelings  which 
it  does  not  necessarily  suggest,  but  which  it  uniformly  re- 
calls to  the  mind,  in  consequence  of  early  and  long  continued 
habits.”  1 

“InteUigitur  per  associationem  idearum  non  qucevis  Jiaiuralis 
et  necessaria  earundem  conjunctio,  sed  quce  fortuita  est,  ant 
per  consuetudinem  vel  affectum  producitur,  qua  idece,  quce 
nullum  naturalem  inter  se  habcnt  nexum,  ita  copulantur,  ut 
recurrente  una,  tota  earum  catena  se  conspiciendam  intellectui 
prcebeat.” *  3 

“ The  influence  of  association  upon  morals  opens  an  ample 
field  of  inquiry.  It  is  from  this  principle  that  we  explain  the 
reformation  from  theft  and  drunkenness  in  servants  which  we 
sometimes  see  produced  by  a draught  of  spirits  in  which  tartar 
emetic  had  been  secretly  dissolved.  The  recollection  of  the 
pain  and  sickness  excited  by  the  emetic,  naturally  associates 
itself  with  the  spirits,  so  as  to  render  them  both  equally  the 
objects  of  aversion.  It  is  by  calling  in  this  principle  only  that 
we  can  account  for  the  conduct  of  Moses  in  grinding  the 
golden  calf  into  a powder,  and  afterwards  dissolving  it  (pro- 
bably by  means  of  liepar  sulphuris)  in  water,  and  compelling 
the  children  of  Israel  to  drink  of  it  as  a punishment  for  their 
idolatry.  This  mixture  is  bitter  and  nauseous  in  the  highest 
degree.  An  inclination  to  idolatry,  therefore,  could  not  be 
felt  without  being  associated  with  the  remembrance  of  this 
disagreeable  mixture,  and  of  course  being  rejected  with  equal 
abhorrence.”  3 — V.  Cohbixatiox. 

ASSUMPTION  ( assumo , to  take  for  granted). — “The  unities  of 
time  and  place  arise  evidently  from  false  assumptions.” 4 * 

Of  enunciations  or  premises,  that  which  is  taken  universally 
is  called  the  proposition,  that  which  is  less  universal  and 
comes  into  the  mind  secondarily  is  called  the  assumption ,6 


1 Stewart,  Works , vol.  ii.,  p.  449.  # 

3 Bruckerus,  De  Ideis.  Locke,  Essay,  book  ii.,  chap.  23;  Hume,  Essays , essay  iii. ; 
Hartley,  Observ.  on  Man  ; Reid,  Intell.  Eow.,  essay  iv. ; Stewart,  Elements,  vol.  ii.,  ch.  5 ; 
Brown,  Lectures , lect.  xxxiii. 

3 Dr.  Rush,  Medical  Enquiries , vol.  ii.,  8vo,  Philadelphia,  1793,  p.  42. 

4 Johnson,  Proposals  for , die.,  Shakspcare. 

6 Trendelenburg,  Notai  in  Arist. 

6* 


54 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ASSUMPTION  — 

The  Assumption  is  the  minor  or  second  propositi  >n  in  a 
categorical  syllogism. 

ATHEISM  (a,  priv. ; and  ©coj,  God). — The  doctrine  that  there  is 
no  God. 

“We  shall  now  make  diligent  search  and  inquiry,  to  see 
if  we  can  find  any  other  philosophers  who  atheized  before 
Democritus  and  Leucippus,  as  also  what  form  of  atheism  they 
entertained.” 1 

The  name  Atheist  is  said  to  have  been  first  applied  to 
Diagoras  of  Melos  (or  Delos),  a follower  of  Democritus,  who 
explained  all  things  by  motion  and  matter,  or  the  movement 
of  material  atoms.  The  other  form  of  atheism  in  ancient 
times  was  that  of  Thales,  Anaximenes,  and  Heraclitus,  who 
accounted  for  all  things  by  the  different  transformations  of 
the  one  clement  of  water.  Straton  of  Lampsacus  rejected 
the  purely  mechanical  system  of  Democritus,  and  ascribed  to 
matter  a power  of  organization  which  gave  to  all  beings  their 
forms  and  faculties.  Epicurus  was  the  contemporary  of 
Straton,  but  the  follower  of  Democritus,  on  whose  system  ho 
grafted  the  morality  which  is  suited  to  it.  And  the  material- 
ism of  Hobbes  and  others  in  modern  times  has,  in  like  manner, 
led  to  atheism. 

It  is  a fine  observation  of  Plato  in  his  Laws — that  atheism 
is  a disease  of  the  soul  before  it  becomes  an  error  of  the 
understanding.2 

“ To  believe  nothing  of  a designing  principle  or  mind,  nor 
any  cause,  measure,  or  rule  of  things  but  chance,  so  that  in 
nature  neither  the  interest  of  the  ichole,  nor  of  any  particulars, 
can  be  said  to  be  in  the  least  designed,  pursued,  or  aimed  at, 
is  to  be  a perfect  atheist.”3 4 

Hi  soli  sunt  athei,  qui  mundum  rectoris  sapientis  consilio 
negant  in  initio  constitutum  fuisse  atque  in  omni  tempore  ad- 
mimstrari.* 

Atheists  are  confounded  with  Pantheists ; such  as  Xeno- 
phanes among  the  ancients,  or  Spinoza  and  Schelling  among 

1 Cudworth,  Jntell.  Syst.,  p.  111. 

3 Leclerc,  Hist,  des  Systemes  des  Ancien  Athies.  In  Bibliothcque  Choisic. 

3 Shaftesbury,  Inquiry  Concerning  Virtue,  book  i.,  part  i.,  sect.  2. 

4 Ilutchcson,  Metaphys.,  pars  3,  c.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


55 


ATHEISM  — 

the  moderns,  who,  instead  of  denying  God,  absorb  everything 
into  Him,  and  are  rather  Acosmists. 

Atheism  has  been  distinguished  from  Antitheism ; and  the 
former  has  been  supposed  to  imply  merely  the  non-recognition 
of  God,  while  the  latter  asserts  His  non-existence.  This  dis- 
tinction is  founded  on  the  difference  between  unbelief  and  dis- 
belief1 and  its  validity  is  admitted  in  so  far  as  it  discriminates 
merely  between  sceptical  and  dogmatic  atheism .2 

“ The  verdict  of  the  atheist  on  tire  doctrine  of  a G od,  is  only 
that  it  is  not  proven.  It  is  not  that  it  is  disproven.  He  is 
but  an  atheist.  He  is  not  an  antitheist.”  3 
ATOM,  ATOMISM  (a,  priv. ; and  tifivu,  to  cut,  that  which  cannot 
be  cut  or  divided  is  an  atom). 

“Now,  I say,  as  Ecphantus  and  Archelaus  asserted  the  cor- 
poreal world  to  be  made  of  atoms,  yet  notwithstanding,  held 
an  incorporeal  deity,  distinct  from  the  same  as  the  first  prin- 
ciple of  activity  in  it,  so  in  like  manner  did  all  other  ancient 
atomists  generally  before  Democritus  join  theology  and  incor- 
porealism  with  their  atomical  physiology.” 4 

Leucippus  considered  the  basis  of  all  bodies  to  consist  of 
extremely  fine  particles,  differing  in  form  and  nature,  which 
he  supposed  to  be  dispersed  throughout  space,  and  to  which 
the  followers  of  Epicurus  first  gave  the  name  of  atoms.  To 
these  atoms  he  attributed  a rectilinear  motion,  in  consequence 
of  which,  such  as  are  homogeneous  united,  whilst  the  lighter 
were  dispersed  throughout  space. 

The  doctrine  of  atomism  did  not  take  its  rise  in  Greece,  but 
in  the  East.  It  is  found  in  the  Indian  philosophy.  Kanada, 
the  author  of  the  system,  admitted  an  infinite  intelligence 
distinct  from  the  world.  But  he  could  not  believe  matter  to 
be  infinitely  divisible,  as  in  this  case  a grain  of  sand  would  be 
equal  to  a mountain,  both  being  infinite.  Matter  consists, 
then,  of  ultimate  indivisible  atoms,  which  are  indestructible 
and  eternal.  Empedocles  and  Anaxagoras  did  not  exclude 
mind  or  spirit  from  the  universe.  Leucippus  and  Democritus 
did.  Epicurus  added  nothing  to  their  doctrine.  Lucretius 
gave  to  it  the  graces  of  poetry. 


1 Chalmers,  Nat.  Theol i.,  58. 
Chalmers,  ut  supra. 


a Buchanan,  Faith  in  God , vol.  i , p.  39G. 

4 Cud  worth,  Intdl.  Si/st.,  p.  26. 


56 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ATOM- 

In  all  its  forms,  explaining  the  universe  bj  chance  or  neces- 
sity, it  tends  to  materialism  or  atheism,  although  Gassendi  has 
attempted  to  reconcile  it  with  a belief  in  God.1 — V.  Molecule. 

ATTENTION  {attendo,  to  stretch  towards). 

“When  we  see,  hear,  or  think  of  anything,  and  feel  a desire 
to  know  more  of  it,  we  keep  the  mind  fixed  upon  the  object; 
this  effort  of  the  mind,  produced  by  the  desire  of  knowledge, 
is  called  attention.”2 

Attention  is  the  voluntary  directing  of  the  energy  of  the 
mind  towards  an  object  or  an  act.  It  has  been  said  by  Sir  II. 
Holland,3  that  “ The  phrase  of  direction  of  consciousness  might 
often  be  advantageously  substituted  for  it.”  It  implies  Will 
as  distinct  from  Intelligence  and  Sensibility.  It  is  the  volun- 
tary direction  of  the  intelligence  and  activity.  Condillac  con- 
founded it  with  a sensation  of  which  we  were  passively  con- 
scious, all  other  sensations  being  as  if  they  were  not.  Laro- 
miguiere  regarded  it  as  a faculty,  and  as  the  primary  faculty 
of  the  understanding,  which  gives  birth  to  all  the  rest.  But 
we  may  do  an  act  with  attention  as  well  as  contemplate  an 
object  with  attention.  And  we  may  attend  to  a feeling  as  well 
as  to  a cognition.  According  to  De  Tracy,4  it  is  a state  of 
mind  rather  than  a faculty.  It  is  to  be  acquired  and  improved 
by  habit.  We  may  learn  to  be  attentive  as  we  learn  to  walk 
and  to  write. 

According  to  Dr.  Reid,5  “ Attention  is  a voluntary  act;  it 
requires  an  active  exertion  to  begin  and  to  continue  it ; and  it 
may  be  continued  as  long  as  we  will ; but  consciousness  is 
involuntary,  and  of  no  continuance,  changing  with  every 
thought.” 

Attention  to  external  things  is  observation.  Attention  to  the 
subjects  of  our  own  consciousness  is  reflection. 

Attention  and  abstraction  are  the  same  process,  it  has  been 
said,  viewed  in  different  relations.  They  are  the  positive  and 
negative  poles  of  the  same  act.  The  one  evolves  the  other. 
Attention  is  the  abstraction  of  the  mind  from  all  things  else, 
and  fixing  it  upon  one  object ; and  abstraction  is  the  fixing  the 
mind  upon  one  object  to  the  exclusion  of  others. 


1 Stewart,  Act.  Pow .,  vol.  ii.,  last  edit.,  369. 

3 Mental  Physiol .,  p.  14.  4 Ideologic , c.  11. 


3 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 
6 Intell.  Pow.,  essay  i.,  cb.  5. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


57 


ATTEHTIOU  — 

Attention  and  Thought. — “ By  thought  is  here  meant  the  volun- 
tary reproduction  in  our  minds  of  those  states  of  consciousness, 
to  which,  as  to  his  best  and  most  authentic  documents,  the 
teacher  of  moral  or  religious  truth  refers  us.  In  attention, 
we  keep  the  mind  passive  ; in  thought,  we  rouse  it  into  activity. 
In  the  former,  we  submit  to  an  impression — we  keep  the  mind 
steady,  in  order  to  receive  the  stamp.  In  the  latter,  we  seek 
to  imitate  the  artist,  while  we  ourselves  make  a copy  or  dupli- 
cate of  his  work.  We  may  learn  arithmetic  or  the  elements 
of  geometry,  by  continued  attention  alone  ; but  self-knowledge, 
or  an  insight  into  the  laws  and  constitution  of  the  human 
mind,  and  the  grounds  of  religion  and  true  morality,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  effort  of  attention,  requires  the  energy  of  thought."1 * 

ATTRIBUTE  [attribuo,  to  apportion,  to  ascribe),  is  anything  that 
can  be  predicated  of  another. 

u Heaven  delights 

To  pardon  erring  man  ; sweet  mercy  seems 
Its  darling  attribute , which  limits  justice.” 

Dryden,  All  for  Love. 

“Attributes  are  usually  distributed  under  the  three  heads  of 
quality,  quantity,  and  relation.'” 

In  the  Schools,  the  definition,  the  genus,  the  proprium,  and 
the  accident,  were  called  dialectic  attributes  ; because,  accord- 
ing to  Aristotle,3  these  were  the  four  points  of  view  in  which 
any  subject  of  philosophical  discussion  should  be  viewed. 

“A  predicate,  the  exact  limits  of  which  are  not  determined, 
cannot  be  used  to  define  and  determine  a subject.  It  may  be 
called  an  attribute,  and  conveys  not  the  whole  nature  of  the 
subject,  but  some  one  quality  belonging  to  it.  ‘ Metals  are 
heavy,’  ‘some  snakes  are  venomous,’  are  judgments  in  which 
this  kind  of  predicable  occurs.4 

Attributes  (real  or  metaphysical)  are  always  real  qualities, 
essential  and  inherent,  not  only  in  the  nature,  but  even  in  the 
substance  of  things.  “By  this  word  attribute,”  said  Descartes 
(in  his  letter  to  Regius),  “is  meant  something  which  is 

1 Coleridge,  Aids  to  Refection , vol.  i.,  p.  4. 

a Mill.,  Log.,  2d  edit.,  vol.  i.,  p.  83. 

3 Topic,  lib.  i.,  c.  6. 

4 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought , 2d  edit.,  p.  161. 


53 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


ATTRIBUTE  — 

immovable  and  inseparable  from  the  essence  of  its  subject,  as 
that  which  constitutes  it,  and  which  is  thus  opposed  to  mode.” 
Thus  unity,  identity,  and  activity,  are  attributes  of  the  soul; 
for  I cannot  deny  them,  without,  at  the  same  time,  denying 
the  existence  of  the  soul  itself.  Sensibility,  liberty,  and  intel- 
ligence, are  but  faculties.  In  God  there  is  nothing  but  attri- 
butes, because  in  God  everything  is  absolute,  involved  in  the 
substance  and  unity  of  the  necessary  being.  In  Deo  non  pro- 
prie  i/iodos  aut  qualitates,  sed  atlributa  tantum  dicimus  esse.1 

In  man  the  essential  mark  is  reason  — attribute,  capacity  of 
learning — mode,  actual  learning — quality,  relatively  to  another 
more  or  less  learned.'2 — V.  Quality,  Mode. 

AUTHENTIC.  — “A  genuine  book  is  that  which  was  written  by 
the  person  whose  name  it  bears,  as  the  author  of  it.  An 
authentic  book  is  that  which  relates  matters  of  fact  as  they 
really  happened.  A book  may  be  genuine  without  being 
authentic ; and  a book  may  be  authentic  without  being  genuine. 
The  books  written  by  Richardson  and  Fielding  are  genuine 
books,  though  the  histories  of  Clarissa  and  Tom  Jones  are 
fables.  . . . Anson’s  voyage  may  be  considered  as  an 

authentic  book,  it  probably  containing  a true  narrative  of  the 
principal  events  recorded  in  it ; but  it  is  not  a genuine  book, 
having  not  been  written  by  Walters,  to  whom  it  is  ascribed, 
but  by  Robins.”3 

In  jurisprudence,  those  laws  or  acts  are  called  authentic 
which  are  promulgated  by  the  -proper  public  officer,  and  ac- 
companied with  the  conditions  requisite  to  give  them  faith  and 
force. 

AUTHORITY  (The  principle  of).  — “ The  principle  of  adopting 
the  belief  of  others,  on  a matter  of  opinion,  without  reference 
to  the  particular  grounds  on  which  the  belief  may  rest.” 4 — 
V.  Consent. 

Authority  (The  argument  from).  — It  is  an  argument  for  the 
truth  of  an  opinion  that  it  has  been  embraced  by  all  men,  in 


1 Descartes,  Princip.  Philosophy  i.,  p.  57. 

0 Peemans,  Introd.  ad  Philosophy  p.  6. 

8 Bp.  Watson,  Apology  for  the  Bible,  p.  33. 

4 Sir  Q.  C.  Lewis,  On  Authority  in  Matters  of  Opinion , p.  6. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


59 


AUTHORITY— 

all  ages,  and  in  all  nations.  Quod  semper,  libique,  et  ab  om- 
nibus, axe  the  marks  of  universality,  according  to  Vincentius 
Lirinensis.  “ This  vrord  is  sometimes  employed  in  its  primary 
sense,  when  we  refer  to  any  one’s  example,  testimony,  or 
judgment;  as  when,  e.g.,  we  speak  of  correcting  a reading  in 
some  book  on  the  authority  of  an  ancient  MS.,  or  giving  a 
statement  of  some  fact  on  the  authority  of  such  and  such  his- 
torians, &c.  In  this  sense  the  word  answers  pretty  nearly  to 
the  Latin  auctoritas.  It  is  a claim  to  deference. 

“ Sometimes,  again,  it  is  employed  as  equivalent  to  potestas, 
power,  as  when  we  speak  of  the  authority  of  a magistrate. 
This  is  a claim  to  obedience.” 1 

TJna  in  re  consentio  omnium  gentium  lex  naturae  pulanda 
est.2 3 

Multuni  dare  solemus  preesumptioni  omnium  hmninmn : Apud 
nos  veritatis  argumentum  est,  aliquid  omnibus  videri? 

AUTOCRASY  (aurd;,  self;  and  xpa-tia,  to  have  power). — “The 
Divine  will  is  absolute,  it  is  its  own  reason,  it  is  both  the  pro- 
ducer and  the  ground  of  all  its  acts.  It  moves  not  by  the 
external  impulse  or  inclination  of  objects,  but  determines 
itself  by  an  absolute  autocrasy.” 4 

“ God  extends  his  dominion  even  to  man’s  will,  that  great 
seat  of  freedom,  that  with  a kind  of  autocrasy  and  supremacy 
within  itself,  commands  its  own  actions,  laughs  at  all  compul- 
sion, scorns  restraint,  and  defies  the  bondage  of  human  laws 
Or  external  obligations.”5 — V.  Autonomy. 

AUTOMATON  (ahro/Mitov,  that  which  moves  of  itself.) 

Automatic. — “The  difference  between  an  animal  and  an  auto- 
matic statue  consists  in  this,  that  in  the  animal  we  trace  the 
mechanism  to  a certain  point,  and  then  we  are  stopped,  either 
the  mechanism  becoming  too  subtile  for  our  discernment,  or 
something  else  beside  the  known  laws  of  mechanism  taking 
place ; whereas,  in  the  automaton,  for  the  comparatively  few 
motions  of  which  it  is  capable,  we  trace  the  mechanism 
throughout.”6 

Automatic  motions  are  those  muscular  actions  which  are 


1 Whately,  Log.,  Appendix  1. 

3 Seneca,  Epist.  cxvii. 

s South,  vol.  i.,  ser.  vii. 


a Cicero,  i.,  Tuscul. 

4 South,  vol.  vii.,  ser.  x. 

0 Paley,  Nat.  Theol.,  c.  3. 


60 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


AUTOMATON  — 

not  dependent  on  the  mind,  and  which  are  either  persistent, 
or  take  place  periodically  .with  a regular  rhythm,  and  are 
dependent  on  normal  causes  seated  in  the  nerves  or  central 
organs  of  tire  nervous  system.  “ Movements  influenced  simply 
hy  sensation,  and  not  at  all  by  the  will,  are  automatic,  such 
as  winking.” 1 

Leibnitz2  has  said,  “ anima  liumana  est  spiriluale  quoddam 
automaton.'"  In  a note  on  this  passage,  Bilfinger  is  quoted  as 
saying  that  automaton  is  derived  from  av-to;  and  pdu>  or  patiu>, 
to  seek  or  desire.  The  soul  is  a being  desiring  of  itself, 
whose  changes  are  desired  by  itself ; whereas  the  common 
interpretation  of  the  word  is  self-moving.  The  soul,  in  strict 
propriety,  may  be  called  self-desiring,  or  desiring  changes  of 
itself,  as  having  the  principle  of  change  in  itself;  whereas 
machines  are  improperly  called  self-moving,  or  self-desiring, 
or  willing. 

“ By  the  compound  word  av-rop-atov  (drav  avro  pdtrtv  yiftjtai.) 
Aristotle  expresses  nature  effecting  either  more  or  less  than 
the  specific  ends  or  purposes  to  which  her  respective  opera- 
tions invariably  tend.” 3 4 Nature  operating  xatd 
and  producing  effects  not  in  her  intention,  is  called  avtoparov 
or  chance,  and  art  operating  xa-td  ovpfiiByxos,  and  producing 
effects  not  in  her  intention,  is  called  •tvxy,  fortune.  Thus, 
chance  or  fortune  cannot  have  any  existence  independently  of 
intention  or  design. 

Automatism  is  one  of  the  theories  as  to  the  activity  of  matter.'1 

AUTONOMY  (avroj  vopos,  a law  itself). — In  the  philosophy  of 
Kant,  autonomy  is  ascribed  to  the  reason  in  all  matters  of 
morality.  The  meaning  is,  that  reason  is  sovereign,  and  the 
laws  which  it  imposes  on  the  will  are  universal  and  absolute. 
Man,  as  possessed  of  reason,  is  his  own  lawgiver.  In  this, 
according  to  Kant,  consists  the  true  character  and  the  only 
possible  proof  of  liberty.  The  term  lieteronomy  is  applied  by 
him  to  those  laws  which  are  imposed  upon  us  by  nature,  or 
the  violence  done  to  us  by  our  passions  and  our  wants  or  de- 
sires.— V.  Autocrasv. 


1 Morell,  Psychology , p.  99.  2 Tom.  i.,  p.  156. 

3 Nat.  Auseult.,  lib.  ii.,  cap.  6;  Gillies,  Analysis  of  Aristotle's  Worlcs , chap.  2,  note. 

4 See  Stewart,  Act.  Fov ;.,  yoI.  ii.,  pp.  378,  379. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


61 


ATJTOTHEISTS  (avi-Tof  0fd{).  — Autotheistce  qui  nulla  alia  entia 
pr enter  se  agnoscunt.1 

AXIOM  ( afuo^a,  from  of  coco,  to  think  worthy),  a position  of 
worthy  or  authority.  In  science,  that  which  is  assumed  as 
the  basis  of  demonstration.  In  mathematics,  a self-evident 
proposition. 

Diogenes  Laertius,2  explains  an  axiom,  according  to  Chry- 
sippus,  as  meaning  a proposition  asserting  or  denying  some- 
thing. “ It  has  received  the  name  of  axiom,  a&upa,  because 
it  is  either  maintained,  dtcovrcu,  or  repudiated.” 

“ There  are  a sort  of  propositions,  which,  under  the  name 
of  maxims  and  axioms,  have  passed  for  principles  of  science.”  3 
“ Philosophers  give  the  name  of  axioms  only  to  self-evident 
truths  that  are  necessary,  and  are  not  limited  to  time  and 
place,  but  must  be  true  at  all  times  and  in  all  places.”4 
Mr.  Stewart5  contends  that  axioms  are  elemental  truths  ne- 
cessary in  reasoning,  but  not  truths  from  which  anything  can 
be  deduced. 

That  all  axioms  are  intuitive  and  self-evident  truths,  is,  ac- 
cording to  Mr.  Tatham,6  a fundamental  mistake  into  which 
Mr.  Locke,7 8  and  others,3  have  been  betrayed,  to  the  great 
injury  of  science.  All  axioms  though  not  intuitive  may,  how- 
ever, be  properly  said  to  be  self-evident ; because,  in  their 
formation,  reason  judges  by  single  comparisons  without  the 
help  of  a third  idea  or  middle  term ; so  that  they  are  not  in- 
debted to  any  other  for  their  evidence,  but  have  it  in  them- 
selves; and  though  inductively  framed,  they  cannot  be  syllo- 
gistically  proved.9 

This  term  was  first  applied  by  mathematicians  to  a certain 
number  of  propositions  which  are  self-evident,  and  serve  as 
the  basis  of  all  their  demonstrations.  Aristotle10  applied  it 
to  all  self-evident  principles,  which  are  the  grounds  of  all 
science.  According  to  him  they  were  all  subordinate  to  the 


1 Lacoudre,  Instil.  Philosophy  tom.  ii.,  p.  120.  a Life  of  Zeno , ch.  48. 

3 Locke,  On  Hum.  Understand .,  book  iv.,  ch.  7. 

4 Reid,  lntell.  Paw.,  essay  ii.,  chap.  20;  see  also  Sir  William  Hamilton’s  edition  of 

Peid,  note  A,  sect.  5. 

5 Elements , part  ii.,  ch.  1.  6 Chart  and  Scale  of  Truth , chap.  4. 

1 Essay , b.  iv.,  chap.  7,  \ 1. 

8 Ancient  Metaphysics , vol.  i.,  b.  y.,  chap.  3,  p.  389,  and  yol.  ii.,  p.  335. 

9 Ibid,  chap.  7,  sect.  1.  10  Analyt.  Post.,  lib.  i.,  chap.  2. 


02 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


AXIOM  - 

supreme  condition  of  all  demonstration,  the  principle  of 
identity  and  contradiction.  The  Stoics,  under  the  name  of 
axioms,  included  every  kind  of  general  proposition,  whether 
of  necessary  or  contingent  truth.  In  this  sense  the  term  is 
employed  by  Bacon,1  who,  not  satisfied  with  submitting 
axiotns  to  the  test  of  experience,  has  distinguished  several 
kinds  of  axioms,  some  more  general  than  others.  The  Car- 
tesians, who  wished  to  apply  the  methods  of  geometry  to  phi- 
losophy, have  retained  the  Aristotelian  use  of  the  term. 
Kant  has  consecrated  it  to  denote  those  principles  which  are 
the  grounds  of  mathematical  science,  and  which,  according  to 
him,  are  judgments  absolutely  independent  of  experience,  of 
immediate  evidence,  and  which  have  their  origin  in  the  pure 
intuition  of  time  and  space. 


BEAUTY.  — “All  the  objects  we  call  beautiful  agree  in  two 
things,  which  seem  to  concur  in  our  sense  of  beauty.  First, 
When  they  are  perceived,  or  even  imagined,  they  produce  a 
certain  agreeable  emotion  or  feeling  in  the  mind  ; and,  se- 
condly, This  agreeable  emotion  is  accompanied  with  an  opinion 
or  belief  of  their  having  some  perfection  or  excellence  belong- 
ing to  them.”2 

Beauty  is  absolute,  real,  and  ideal.  The  absolutely  beautiful 
belongs  to  Deity.  The  really  beautiful  is  presented  to  us  in 
the  objects  of  nature  and  the  actions  of  human  life.  The 
ideally  beautiful  is  aimed  at  by  art.  Plato  identified  the 
beautiful  with  the  good,  to  xa't.ov  xai  ayaOov.  But,  although 
the  ideas  of  the  beautiful,  of  the  good,  and  of  the  true  are 
related  to  each  other,  they  are  distinct.  There  may  be  truth 
and  propriety  or  proportion  in  beauty — and  there  is  a beauty 
in  what  is  good  or  right,  and  also  in  what  is  true.  But  still 
these  ideas  are  distinct. 

Dr.  Hutcheson3  distinguishes  beauty  into  “absolute;  or  that 


1 Novum  Organum,  lib.  i.,  aphor.  13, 17, 19,  &c. 

* Reid,  Intell.  Paw.,  essay  viii.,  chap.  4. 

3 Inquiry  Concerning  Beauty,  &c. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


63 


BEAUTY  - 

beauty  which  we  perceive  in  objects  without  comparison  to 
anything  external,  of  which  the  object  is  supposed  an  imita- 
tion or  picture  ; such  as  that  beauty,  perceived  from  the  works 
of  nature  ; and  comparative  or  relative  beauty,  which  we  per- 
ceive in  objects,  commonly  considered  as  imitations  or  resem- 
blances of  something  else.”  According  to  Hutcheson,1  the 
general  foundation  or  occasion  of  the  ideas  of  beauty  is  “ uni- 
formity amidst  variety.” 

Berkeley,  in  his  Alciphron,  and  Hume,  in  many  parts  of 
his  works,  make  utility  the  foundation  of  beauty.  But  objects 
which  are  useful  are  not  always  beautiful,  and  objects  which 
are  beautiful  are  not  always  useful.  That  which  is  useful  is 
useful  for  some  end  ; that  which  is  beautiful  is  beautiful  in 
itself,  and  independent  of  the  pleasure  which  it  gives,  or  the 
end  it  may  serve. 

On  the  question  whether  mental  or  material  objects  first 
give  us  feelings  of  beauty,  see  Stewart,2  Smith,3  and  Alison.4 

Dr.  Price5  has  some  remarks  on  natural  beauty.  See  also 
the  article  “Beauty”  in  the  Encyclop.  Brit.,  by  Lord  Jef- 
frey; Karnes,  Elements  of  Criticism ;6 * 8  Burke  On  the  Sublime 
and  Beautiful;  Knight’s  Enquiry  into  Principles  of  Taste; 
Sir  Uvedale  Price  On  the  Picturesque,  with  Preface  by  Sir  T. 
D.  Lauder,  8vo,  Edin.,  1842;  Stewart’s  Essays;1  Crousaz, 
Trait 6 de  Beau;  Andre,  Essai  sur  le  Beau. — V.  /Esthetics, 
Ideal. 

BEING  [to  oi'z'iof  ov,  that  which  is,  existence). 

“ First,  thou  madest  things  which  should  have  being  with- 
out life  ; then  those  which  should  have  life  and  being ; lastly, 
those  which  have  being,  life,  and  reason.”3 

“This  [being),  applies  to  everything  which  exists  in  any 
way  whether  as  substance  or  accident,  whether  actually  or  po- 
tentially, whether  in  the  nature  of  things,  or  only  in  our 
notions  ; for,  even  what  we  call  entia  rationis,  or  fictions  of  our 
minds,  such  as  hippo-centaur,  or  mountain  of  gold,  have  a 


1 Inquiry , sect.  2.  a Act.  Pow vol.  i.,  p.  279. 

3 Theory  of  Mot,  Sent.,  part  iv.,  chap.  1.  4 Essay  on  Taste . 

6 In  his  Review  of  Principal  Questions  in  Morals,  sect.  2. 

8 Yol.  i.,  chap.  3.  1 Part  ii. 

8 Bishop  Hall,  Conlcm.pl .,  “The  Creation.’* 


64 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


BEING  — 

being;  even  negation  or  privation  have  an  existence;  nay,  ac- 
cording to  Aristotle,1  we  can  say  that  nothing  has  a being.  In 
short,  whenever  we  can  use  the  substantive  verb  is,  there 
must  be  some  kind  of  being.”2 

According  to  some,3  we  can  have  no  idea  of  nothing ; ac- 
cording to  others,4  the  knowledge  of  contraries  being  one,  if 
we  know  what  being  is,  we  know  what  not  being  is. 

Being  is  either  substance  or  accident. 

Substance  is  either  matter  or  mind. 

Accident  is  divided  by  the  other  categories. — V.  Ontology. 

BELIEF  (that  which  we  live  by,  or  according  to,  or  Jief  in  Ger- 
man belieben,  from  lubet,  that  which  pleases). 

“ The  first  great  instrument  of  changing  our  whole  nature, 
is  a firm  belief,  and  a perfect  assent  to,  and  hearty  entertain- 
ment of  the  promises  of  the  gospel.”5 

“Belief  assent,  conviction,  are  words  which  I do  not  think 
admit  of  logical  definition,  because  the  operation  of  mind 
signified  by  them  is  perfectly  simple,  and  of  its  own  kind. 
Belief  must  have  an  object.  For  he  who  believes  must  be- 
lieve something,  and  that  which  he  believes  is  the  object  of 
his  belief.  Belief  is  always  expressed  in  language  by  a pro- 
position wherein  something  is  affirmed  or  denied.  Belief 
admits  of  all  degrees,  from  the  slightest  suspicion  to  the  full- 
est assurance.  There  are  many  operations  of  mind  of  which 
it  is  an  essential  ingredient,  as  consciousness,  perception,  re- 
membrance. We  give  the  name  of  evidence  to  whatever  is  a 
ground  of  belief  What  this  evidence  is,  is  more  easily  felt 
than  described.  The  common  occasions  of  life  lead  us  to  dis- 
tinguish evidence  into  different  kinds ; such  as  the  evidence 
of  sense,  of  memory,  of  consciousness,  of  testimony,  of  axioms, 
and  of  reasoning.  I am  not  able  to  find  any  common  nature 
to  which  they  may  all  be  reduced.  They  seem  to  me  to  agree 
only  in  this,  that  they  are  all  fitted  by  nature  to  produce 
belief  in  the  human  mind,  some  of  them  in  the  highest  degree, 


1 Melaphys.,  lib.  iv.,  c.  2.  a Monboddo,  Ancient  Mdaphys.,  book  i.,  chap.  4. 

3 Diet,  des  Sciences  Philosophy  art.  “ Etre.” 

4 Smart,  Man.  of  Log .,  1849,  p.  130. 


* Bp.  Taylor,  vol.  i.,  Ser.  xi. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


65 


BELIEF  - 

■which  we  call  certainty,  others  in  various  degrees  according 
to  circumstances.” 1 

“ St.  Austin  accurately  says,  ‘We  knoio  what  rests  upon 
reason;  we  believe  what  rests  upon  authority.’  But  reason 
itself  must  rest  at  last  upon  authority ; for  the  original  data 
of  reason  do  not  rest  upon  reason,  hut  are  necessarily  accepted 
by  reason  on  the  authority  of  what  is  beyond  itself.  These 
data  are,  therefore,  in  rigid  propriety,  beliefs  or  trusts.  Thus 
it  is,  that  in  the  last  resort,  we  must,  perforce,  philosophically 
admit,  that  belief  is  the  primary  condition  of  reason,  and  not 
reason  the  ultimate  ground  of  belief.  We  are  compelled  to 
surrender  the  proud  Intellige  ut  credas  of  Abelard,  to  content 
ourselves  with  the  humble  Crede  ut  intelligas  of  Anselm.”2  — 
V.  Feeling,  Knowledge,  Opinion. 

See  Guizot,  Meditations,  &c.  Quel  est  le  vrai  sens  du  mot 
Foi,  p.  135,  8vo,  Paris,  1852. 

To  believe  is  to  admit  a thing  as  true,  on  grounds  sufficient, 
subjectively  ; insufficient,  objectively .3 

“ The  word  believing  has  been  variously  and  loosely  em- 
ployed. It  is  frequently  used  to  denote  states  of  consciousness 
which  have  already  their  separate  and  appropriate  appella- 
tions. Thus  it  is  sometimes  said,  ‘ I believe  in  my  own  exist- 
ence and  the  existence  of  an  external  world,  I believe  in  the 
facts  of  nature,  the  axioms  of  geometry,  the  affections  of  my 
own  mind,’  as  well  as  ‘ I believe  in  the  testimony  of  witnesses, 
or  in  the  evidence  of  historical  documents.’  ” 

“ Setting  aside  this  loose  application  of  the  term,  I propose 
to  confine  it,  First,  to  the  effect  on  the  mind  of  the  premises 
in  what  is  termed  probable  reasoning,  or  what  I have  named 
contingent  reasoning — in  a word,  the  premises  of  all  reasoning, 
but  that  which  is  demonstrative ; and,  Secondly,  to  the  state  of 
holding  true  when  that  state,  far  from  being  the  effect  of  any 
premises  discerned  by  the  mind,  is  dissociated  from  all  evi- 
dence,”4 

“ I propose  to  restrict  the  term  belief  to  the  assent  to  propo- 
sitions, and  demarcate  it  from  those  inferences  which  are 

1 Reid,  Intdl.  Po to.,  essay  ii.,  chap.  20,  and  Inquiry,  chap.  20,  sect.  5. 

3 Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  RcuVs  Works , note  a,  sect.  5. 

3 Kant,  Crit.  de  la  Rais.  Rrak,  p.  11. 

4 Bailey,  Letters  on  Philosoph.  of  Hum.  Mindy  8vo,  1851,  p.  75. 

7*  F 


66 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


BELIEF  — 

made  in  the  presence  of  objects  and  have  reference  to  them. 

I would  say,  we  believe  in  the  proposition  ‘ Fire  burns,’  but 
know  the  fact  that  the  paper  about  to  be  thrust  into  the  flame 
will  ignite.” 1 

BENEVOLENCE  ( benevolent ia , well-wishing). — “When  our  love 
or  desire  of  good  goes  forth  to  others,  it  is  termed  good-will  or 
benevolence.” 2 

Bishop  Butler  has  said,3  that  “ there  are  as  real  and  the 
same  kind  of  indications  in  human  nature,  that  we  were  made 
for  society  and  to  do  good  to  our  fellow-creatures,  as  that  we 
were  intended  to  take  care  of  our  own  life,  and  health,  and 
private  good.”  These  principles  in  our  nature  by  which  we 
arc  prompted  to  seek  and  to  secure  our  own  good  are  compre- 
hended under  the  name  of  self-love,  and  those  which  lead  us 
to  seek  the  good  of  others  are  comprehended  under  the  name 
of  benevolence.  The  term  corresponding  to  this  among  the 
Greeks  was  q>aavdpurtla,  among  the  writers  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment dya'rtjy,  and  among  the  Romans  humanitas.  Under  these 
terms  arc  comprehended  all  those  feelings  and  affections  which 
lead  us  to  increase  the  happiness  and  alleviate  the  sufferings 
of  others,  while  the  term  self-love  includes  all  those  principles 
of  our  nature  which  prompt  us  to  seek  our  own  good.  Ac- 
cording to  some  philosophers,  our  own  good  is  the  ultimate 
and  only  proper  end  of  human  actions,  and  when  we  do  good 
to  others  it  is  done  with  a view  to  our  own  good.  This  is 
what  is  called  the  selfish  philosophy,  which  in  modern  times 
has  been  maintained  "by  Hobbes,  Mandeville,  Rochefoucault, 
and  others.  The  other  view,  which  is  stated  above  in  the 
words  of  Butler,  has  been  strenuously  defended  by  Cumber- 
land, Hutcheson,  Adam  Smith,  and  Reid. 

ELA5PHEMY  (ifoarffw,  to  hurt).  — “ Bxae^ijjuia  properly  denotes 
calumny , detraction,  reproachful  or  abusive  language,  against 
whomsoever  it  be  vented.”4 

As  commonly  used,  it  means  the  wanton  and  irreverent  use 
of  language  in  reference  to  the  Divine  Being  or  to  His  worship 


1 Lewes,  Biograph.  ITist.  of  Philosophy  p.  492. 

a Cogan,  On  the  Passions , part  i.,  chap.  2. 

3 Sermon  i.,  On  Human  Nature. 

4 Campbell,  On  the  Gospels , Prelim.  Dissert,  ix.,  part  ii. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


67 


BLASPHEMY  - 

and  service.’  This  is  an  offence  against  the  light  of  nature, 
and  was  severely  condemned  by  ancient  ethical  writers. 
Among  the  Jews,  blasphemy  was  punished  by  death  (Levit. 
xxiv.  14,  16).  And  by  the  laws  of  many  Christian  nations 
it  has  been  prohibited  under  heavy  penalties.  So  late  as  the 
end  of  the  seventeenth  century,  a man  suffered  death  at  Edin- 
burgh for  blasphemy ,2 

Blasphemy  differs  from  sacrilege,  in  that  the  former  consists 
in  using  language,  the  latter  in  some  overt  act. 

BODY.  — “The  primary  ideas  we  have  peculiar  to  body,  as  con- 
tradistinguished to  spirit,  are  the  cohesion  of  solid  and  con- 
sequently separable  parts,  and  a power  of  communicating 
motion  by  impulse.”3 4 

“Body  is  the  external  cause  to  which  we  ascribe  our  sen- 
sations.” i 

Monboddo5  distinguishes  between  matter  and  body,  and 
calls  body  matter  sensible,  that  is,  with  those  qualities  which 
make  it  perceptible  to  our  senses.  This  leaves  room  for  under- 
standing what  is  meant  by  a spiritual  body,  aHya  TCvivy.a-ti.x6v, 
of  which  we  read  1 Cor.  xv.  44.  He  also  calls  body,  “ matter 
with  form,”  in  contradistinction  to  “first  matter,”  which  is 
matter  without  form. 

Body  is  distinguished  as  physical,  mathematical,  and  meta- 
physical. Physical  body  is  incomplete  or  complete.  Incomplete 
as  in  the  material  part  of  a living  being;  thus  man  is  said  to 
consist  of  body  and  mind,  and  life  is  something  different  from 
the  bodily  frame  in  animals  and  vegetables.  Complete,  when 
composed  of  matter  and  form,  as  all  natural  bodies  are.  Mathe- 
matical body  is  the  threefold  dimensions  of  length,  breadth, 
and  thickness.  Metaphysical  body  is  body  as  included  under 
the  predicament  of  substance,  which  it  divides  with  spirit. — 
V.  Matter,  Mind,  Spirit. 

BGHTJM,  when  given  as  one  of  the  transcendental  properties  of 
being,  means  that  God  hath  made  all  things  in  the  best  pos- 


I Augustine  said, — Jam  vulgo  blasphcmia  non  accipitur  nisi  mala  verba  de  Deo 
diccre. 

II  Sec  Arnot,  Crim.  Trials. 

3 Locke,  Essay  on  Ham.  Understand book  ii.,  chap.  23. 

4 Mill,  Logic , 2d  edit.,  vol.  i.,  p.  74.  5 Ancient  Metaphys book  ii.,  ebap.  1. 


63 


VOCABULARY  OF  FIIILOSOPHY. 


BONUM— 

sible  manner  to  answer  the  wisest  ends,  or  that  no  thing  is 
destitute  of  its  essential  properties,  which  metaphysicians  call 
perfections.  Perfections  are  distinguished  into  absolute  and 
relative,  the  former  making  the  nature  to  which  they  belong 
happy,  and  excluding  all  imperfection ; the  latter  belonging 
to  inferior  natures,  and  not  excluding  imperfection,  but  afford- 
ing help  and  relief  under  its  effects.1 

Bonum  Morale,  or  what  is  good,  relatively  to  man,  was  distin- 
guished into  bonum  jucundum,  or  what  is  calculated  to  give 
pleasure,  as  music  ; bonum  xitile,  or  what  is  advantageous,  as 
wealth  ; and  bonum  lionestum,  or  what  is  right,  as  temperance. 
These  may  be  separate  or  conjoined  in  human  actions. 

Bonum  Summum — the  chief  good. — This  phrase  was  employed 
by  ancient  ethical  philosophers  to  denote  that  in  the  prosecu- 
tion and  attainment  of  which  the  progress,  perfection,  and 
happiness  of  human  beings  consist.  The  principal  opinions 
concerning  it  are  stated  by  Cicero  in  his  treatise  De  Finibus. 
See  also  Augustin,  De  Summo  Bono. 

Tucker,  Light  of  Nature,  has  a chapter,2  entitled  “ Ultimate 
Good,”  which  he  says  is  the  right  translation  of  summum 
bonum. 

According  to  Kant,  “ virtue  is  not  the  entire  complete  good 
as  an  object  of  desire  to  reasonable  finite  beings ; for,  to  have 
this  character  it  should  be  accompanied  by  happiness,  not  as 
it  appears  to  the  interested  eyes  of  our  personality,  which  wo 
conceive  as  an  end  of  itself,  but  according  to  the  impartial 
judgment  of  reason,  which  considers  virtue  in  general,  in  the 
world,  as  an  end  in  itself.  Happiness  and  virtue,  then, 
together  constitute  the  possession  of  the  sovereign  good  in  an 
individual,  but  with  this  condition,  that  the  happiness  should 
be  exactly  proportioned  to  the  morality  (this  constituting  the 
value  of  the  individual,  and  rendering  him  worthy  of  happi- 
ness). The  sovereign  good,  consisting  of  these  two  elements, 
represents  the  entire  or  complete  good,  but  virtue  must  bo 
considered  as  the  supreme  good,  because  there  can  be  no 
condition  higher  than  virtue ; whilst  happiness,  which  is 
unquestionably  always  agreeable  to  its  possessor,  is  not  of 


1 Hutcheson,  Melaphys.,  pars  1,  cap.  3. 


27,  of  vol.  i. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


69 


BQRTJM- 

itself  absolutely  good,  but  supposes  as  a condition,  a morally 
good  conduct.” 

BROCARD.  — “I  make  use  of  all  the  brocardics,  or  rules  of  in- 
terpreters ; that  is,  not  only  what  is  established  regularly,  in 
law,  but  what  is  concluded  wise  and  reasonable  by  the  best 
interpreters.”  1 

“ To  the  Stoics  and  not  to  the  Stagyrite,  are  we  to  refer  the 
first  announcement  of  the  brocard — In  intelleciu  nihil  est,  quod 
non prius  fuerit  in  sensu.”2 


CvENESTHESIS.  — V.  Sensation,  Senses  Communis. 

CAPACITY.— 

“Is  it  for  that  such  outward  ornament 
Was  lavished  on  their  sex,  that  inward  gifts 
Were  left  for  haste  unfinish’d,  judgment  scant, 

Capacity  not  raised  to  apprehend, 

Or  value,  what  is  best 

In  choice,  but  oftest  to  affect  the  wrong” 

Milton,  Samson  Agonistes. 

“ The  original  power  which  the  mind  possesses  of  being 
taught,  we  call  natural  capacity ; and  this  in  some  degree  is 
common  to  all  men.  The  superior  facility  of  being  taught, 
which  some  possess  above  the  rest,  we  call  genius.  The  first 
transition  or  advances  from  natural  power,  we  call  proficiency ; 
and  the  end  or  completion  of  proficiency  we  call  habit.  If  such 
habit  be  conversant  about  matter  purely  speculative,  it  is  then 
called  science;  if  it  descend  from  speculation  to  practice,  it  is 
then  called  art;  and  if  such  practice  be  conversant  in  regulat- 
ing the  passions  and  affections,  it  is  then  called  moral  virtue.”3 
“ From  habit,  necessarily  results  power  or  capacity  (in 
Greek  bvray.15),  which  Aristotle  has  distinguished  into  two 
kinds.  The  first  is  the  mere  capacity  of  becoming  anything. 
The  second  is  t\\Q  power  or  faculty  of  energizing,  according  to 
the  habit  when  it  is  formed  and  acquired ; or,  in  other  words, 

1 Jeremy  Taylor,  Preface  to  Ductor  Ihibitantium. 

Q Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Herd’s  Worlcs , note  A,  p.  772. 

3 Harris,  Philosoph.  Arrang.,  chap.  8. 


70 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


CAPACITY  — 

after  the  thing  is  become  and  actually  exists,  -which  at  first 
■was  only  in  the  capacity  of  existing.  This,  Aristotle  illus- 
trates by  the  example  of  a child,  who  is  then  only  a general 
in  power  (tV  Swayst),  that  is,  has  the  power  of  becoming  a 
general,  but  when  he  has  grown  up  and  has  become  a general, 
then  he  has  the  power  of  the  second  kind,  that  is,  the  power 
of  performing  the  office  of  a general.” 1 

“ There  are  powers  which  are  acquired  by  use,  exercise,  or 
study,  which  are  called  Jiabits.  There  must  be  something  in 
the  constitution  of  the  mind  necessary  to  our  being  able  to 
acquire  habits,  and  this  is  commonly  called  capacity.” 2 

Dr.  Reid  did  not  recognize  the  distinction  of  power  as  active 
or  passive.  But  capacity  is  a passive  power,  or  natural  recep- 
tivity. A faculty  is  a power  which  we  are  conscious  we  can 
direct  towards  an  end.  A capacity  is  rather  a disposition  or 
aptitude  to  receive  certain  modifications  of  our  consciousness, 
in  receiving  which  we  are  passive.  But  an  original  capacity, 
though  at  first  passive,  may  be  brought  under  the  influence  of 
will  and  attention,  and  when  so  exercised  it  corresponds  to  a 
mental  power,  and  is  no  longer  a pure  receptivity.  In  sensa- 
tion, we  are  in  the  first  instance  passive,  but  our  capacity  of 
receiving  sensations  may  be  employed  in  various  ways  under 
the  direction  of  will  and  attention,  or  personal  activity. 

CARDINAL  (The)  Virtues,  prudence,  temperance,  fortitude,  and 
justice,  were  so  called  from  cardo,  a hinge ; because  they  were 
the  hinges  on  which  other  virtues  turned.  Each  one  of  them 
was  a foils  et  principium,  from  which  other  virtues  took  their 
rise. 

The  four  cardinal  virtues  are  rather  the  necessary  and  es- 
sential conditions  of  virtue,  than  each  individually  a virtue. 
For  no  one  can  by  itself  be  manifested  as  a virtue,  without  the 
other  three.3 

This  division  of  the  virtues  is  as  old  as  moral  philosophy.  It 
is  found  in  the  teaching  of  Socrates  as  recorded  by  Xenophon, 
with  this  difference,  that  iveefeia  or  regard  to  the  Deity  holds 
the  place  of  prudence  or  knowledge,  which,  united  to  virtue, 


1 Monboddo,  Ancient  MdapJiys.,  b.  i.,  ebap.  4. 

a Reid,  Intdl.  Pow.,  essay  i.,  chap.  1. 

a Thurot,  De  V Entcndcmcnt,  tom.  i.,  p.  1G2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


71 


CARDINAL  — 

forms  true  wisdom.  Plato  notices  temperance,  fortitude,  and 
prudence,  and  in  connection  with  or  arising  out  of  these,  jus- 
tice, which  he  considered  not  as  the  single  virtue  of  giving  all 
their  due,  but  as  the  perfection  of  human  nature  and  of  human 
society.  The  term  justice  had  been  employed  in  the  same 
large  sense  by  Pythagoras,  and  the  corresponding  term 
righteousness,  is  used  in  Scripture  to  signify  not  one  virtue, 
but  all  the  virtues.  The  four  cardinal  virtues  are  alluded  to 
in  the  Apocrypha,  Wisdom,  viii.  7. 

The  theological  virtues  are  faith,  hope,  and  charity ; which 
being  added  to  the  cardinal,  make  the  number  seven. 

“ Justice,  temperance,  fortitude,  and  prudence,  the  old  heads 
of  the  family  of  virtues,  give  us  a division  which  fails  alto- 
gether ; since  the  parts  are  not  distinct,  and  the  whole  is  not 
complete.  The  portions  of  morality  so  laid  out,  both  overlap 
one  another,  or  are  undistinguishable ; and  also  leave  parts 
of  the  subject  which  do  not  appear  in  the  distribution  at  all.” 1 

Clodius,  Be  Virtutibus  quas  Cardinales  Appellant,  4to, 
Leips.,  1815.  Plethon,  Be  Quatuor  Virtutibus  Cardinalibus, 
8vo,  Basl.,  1552. 

The  cardinal  or  principal  points  of  the  compass  are  the 
North,  South,  East,  and  West. 

The  cardinal  numbers  are  one,  two,  three,  &c.,  in  opposition 
to  the  ordinal,  as  first,  second,  third,  &c. 

CASUISTRY  is  a department  of  ethics  — “the  great  object  of 
which  is  to  lay  down  rules  or  canons  for  directing  us  liow  to 
act  wherever  there  is  any  room  for  doubt  or  hesitation.” 2 

To  casuistry,  as  ethical  or  moral,  belongs  the  decision  of 
what  are  called  cases  of  conscience  — that  is,  cases  in  which 
we  are  under  obligation,  but  which,  from  the  special  circum- 
stances attending,  give  rise  to  doubt  whether  or  how  far  the 
obligation  may  be  relaxed  or  dissolved  — such  as  the  obliga- 
tion to  keep  a promise  obtained  by  fraud,  or  extorted  by 
force. 

“All  that  philosophy  of  right  and  wrong  which  has  be- 
come famous  or  infamous  under  the  name  of  Casuistry,  had 


* Whcwell,  Systemat.  Mor.,  lect.  iv. 

2 Stewart,  Act.  Paw.,  b.  iv.,  chap.  5,  sect.  4 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


72 

CASUISTRY— 

its  origin  in  the  distinction  between  Mortal1  and  Venial 
Sin.”2 

CATALEPSY  (xataXqtys,  catalepsy).  — “The  speculations  of 
Berkeley  and  Boscovich  on  the  non-existence  of  matter,  and 
of  Kant  and  others  on  the  arbitrariness  of  all  our  notions,  are 
interested  in,  for  they  appear  to  be  confuted  by,  the  intuitions 
of  cataleptics.  The  cataleptic  apprehends  or  perceives  directly 
the  objects  around  her ; but  they  are  the  same  as  when  real- 
ized through  her  senses.  She  notices  no  difference ; size, 
form,  colour,  distance,  are  elements  as  real  to  her  now  as  be- 
fore. In  respect  again  to  the  future,  she  sees  it,  but  not  in 
the  sense  of  the  annihilation  of  time ; she  foresees  it ; it  is 
the  future  present  to  her  ; time  she  measures,  present  and 
future,  with  strange  precision — strange,  yet  an  approximation, 
instead  of  this  certainty,  would  have  been  more  puzzling. 

“ So  that  it  appears  that  our  notions  of  matter,  force,  and 
the  like,  and  of  the  conditions  of  space  and  time,  apart  from 
which  we  can  conceive  nothing,  are  not  figments  to  suit  our 
human  and  temporary  being,  but  elements  of  eternal  truth.”3 

IIow  far  is  the  argument  in  the  foregoing  passage  affected 
by  the  fact,  that  in  sleep  and  in  dreams  we  have  sensations 
and  perceptions  in  reference  to  objects  which  are  not  within 
the  reach  of  the  senses  ? 

The  paradox  of  Berkeley  may  be  confuted  in  two  ways : — 
First,  by  a reduclio  ad  absurdum  ; second,  no  single  existence 
can  effect  any  change  or  event,  and  a change  or  event  of  some 
kind  there  must  be,  in  order  to  create  those  sensations  or 
states  of  mind  in  which  consciousness  consists.  There  must, 
therefore,  be  something  in  existence  foreign  to  ourselves,  for 
no  change,  in  other  words,  nothing  which  stands  in  the  rela- 
tion of  cause  and  effect,  is  conceivable,  but  what  is  the  result 
of  two  existences  acting  upon  each  other.4 
CATEGOREMATIC  (zar^yoptw,  to  predicate).  — “A  word  is  so 
called  which  may  by  itself  be  employed  as  a Term.  Adverbs, 

1 This  subject  is  fully  and  clearly  discussed  by  Mr.  Jowett.  — Epistles  of  St.  Pauly 

Yol.  ii.,  pp.  351,  352. 

2 Cambridge  Essays , 1856,  p.  6. 

3 Mayo,  On  Popular  Superstitions , p.  125,  8vo,  3d  edit.,  Edin.,  1851. 

4 See  Sir  Gilbert  Blane  on  Muscular  Motion , p.  258,  note. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


73 


CATEGQREMATXC  - 

Propositions,  &c.,  and  also  Nouns  in  any  other  case  besides 
the  Nominative,  are  Syncategorematic,  i.  e.,  can  only  form  part 
of  a Term.” 1 

CATEGORICAL. — V.  Proposition. 

CATEGORY  (xai’qyopiu,  to  predicate). 

“So  again  the  distribution  of  things  into  certain  tribes, 
which  we  call  categories  or  predicaments,  are  hut  cautions 
against  the  confusion  of  definitions  and  divisions.”2 

The  categories  are  the  highest  classes  to  which  all  the  objects 
of  knowledge  can  be  reduced,  and  in  which  they  can  he 
arranged  in  subordination  and  system.  Philosophy  seeks  to 
know  all  things.  But  it  is  impossible  to  know  all  things 
individually.  They  are,  therefore,  arranged  in  classes,  accord- 
ing to  properties  which  are  common  to  them.  And  when  we 
know  the  definition  of  a class,  we  attain  to  a formal  knowledge 
of  all  the  individual  objects  of  knowledge  contained  in  that 
class.  Every  individual  man  we  cannot  know ; but  if  we  know 
the  definition  of  man,  we  know  the  nature  of  man,  of  which 
every  individual  of  the  species  participates ; and  in  this  sense 
we  may  he  said  to  know  all  men.  This  attempt  to  render 
knowledge  in  some  sense  universal,  has  been  made  in  all  ages 
of  philosophy,  and  has  given  rise  to  the  categories  which  have 
appeared  in  various  forms.  They  are  to  be  found  in  the 
philosophy  of  Eastern  nations,  as  a classification  of  things  and 
of  ideas.  The  categories  of  the  followers  of  Pythagoras  have 
been  preserved  by  Aristotle  in  the  first  book  of  his  Metaphysics. 
Those  ascribed  to  Archytas  are  now  regarded  as  apocryphal, 
and  as  having  been  fabricated  about  the  beginning  of  the 
Christian  era,  to  lower  the  reputation  of  Aristotle,  whose 
categories  are  well  known.  They  are  ten  in  number,  viz., — 
ovattt,  substance ; rtduor,  quantity  ; hoiov,  quality  ; rtpo;  ni,  rela- 
tion ; rtoC,  place;  Ttotc,  time;  xtioBat.,  situation;  posses- 

sion, or  manner  of  holding ; riouiv,  action ; and  tcuozsiv,  suf- 
fering. The  Mnemonic  verses  which  contain  them,  are : — - 

Arbor  sex  servos  ardore  refrigerat  ustos 
Cras  rure  stabo,  sed  tunicatus  ero.8 


1 "Whately,  Log b.  ii.,  ch.  1,  § 3.  3 Bacon,  Adv.  of  Learning,  b.  ii. 

3 A humorous  illustration  of  the  categories  is  given  by  Cornelius  to  his  pupil  Mar- 
tinus  Scriblerus.  Calling  up  the  coachman,  he  asked  him  what  he  had  seen  at  the 
8 


74 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


CATEGORY  - 

The  categories  of  Aristotle  are  both  logical  and  metaphysical, 
and  apply  to  things  as  -well  as  to  words.  Regarded  logically, 
they  are  reducible  to  two,  substance  and  attribute.  Regarded 
metaphysically,  they  are  reducible  to  being  and  accident.  The 
Stoics  reduced  them  to  four,  viz.,  substance,  quality,  manner 
of  being,  and  relation.  Plotinus  attempted  a new  system.  But 
the  categories  of  Aristotle  were  acquiesced  in  till  the  time  of 
Bacon,  who  recommended  observation  rather  than  classifica- 
tion. Descartes  arranged  all  things  under  two  great  catego- 
gies,  the  absolute  and  the  relative.  In  the  Port  lloyal  Logic, 
seven  categories  are  established.  In  more  modern  times  the 
categories  of  Kant  are  well  known.  They  are  quantity,  qual- 
ity, relation,  and  modality.  But  they  are  purely  subjective, 
and  give  merely  a classification  of  the  conceptions  or  judg- 
ments of  the  understanding.  In  the  history  of  philosophy, 
the  categories  have  been  successively  a classification  universal 
of  things,  of  words,  of  ideas,  or  of  forms  of  thought.  And  a 
complete  theory  of  classification,  or  a complete  system  of  cate- 
gories, is  still  a desideratum.* 1  — V.  Predicament,  Universal. 

Sir  William  Hamilton,2  gives  a deduction  and  simplification 
of  the  categories  of  Aristotle.3 

Mr.  Mill4  gives  the  following  classification  of  all  nameable 
things : — 

1.  Feelings  or  state  of  consciousness. 

2.  The  minds  which  experience  these  feelings. 

3.  The  bodies  or  external  objects  which  excite  certain  of 
these  feelings,  together  with  the  power  or  properties  whereby 
they  excite  them. 

4.  The  successions  and  co-existences,  the  likenesses  and  un- 
likenesses, between  feelings  or  states  of  consciousness. 


bear-garden  ? The  man  answered  that  he  had  seen  two  men  fight  for  a prize ; one  was 
a fair  man.  a sergeant  in  the  Guards;  the  other  black,  a butcher;  the  sergeant  had  red 
breeches,  the  butcher  blue;  they  fought  upon  a stage  ahout  four  o’clock,  and  the  ser- 
geant wounded  the  butcher  in  the  leg.  Mark  (quoth  Cornelius)  how  the  fellow  runs 
through  the  predicaments— men  (substantia)— two  (quantilas)— fair  and  black  ( qualitas ) 
—sergeant  and  butcher  ( relatio ) — wouuded  the  other  (actio  el,  passin)— fighting  (situs)— 
stage  (ubi) — four  o'clock  ( qiuindo ) — blue  and  red  breeches  (habitus). 

1 Monboddo,  Origin  of  Lang.,  vol.  i.,  p.  620,  and  Anc'ent  Melapliys..  b.  iii.,  chap.  1. 

4 ReicCs  Works,  p.  687.  3 See  also  Discussions,  pp.  26,  27,  2d  edit. 

4 Log.,  I.  iii.,  ult. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


75 


CAUSALITY,  CAUSATION,  CAUSE. 

CAUSE.  — 

“lie  knew  the  cause  of  every  maladie, 

Were  it  of  cold,  or  hot,  or  moist,  or  drie.” 

Chaucer,  Prologue , v.  421. 

“ The  general  idea  of  cause  is,  that  without  which  another 
thing  called  the  effect,  cannot  he ; and  it  is  divided  by  Aris- 
totle,1 into  four  kinds,  known  by  the  name  of  the  material,  the 
formal,  the  efficient,  and  the  final.  The  first  is  that  of  which 
anything  is  made.  Thus  brass  or  marble  are  the  material 
causes  of  a statue ; earth,  air,  fire,  and  water,  of  all  natural 
bodies.  The  formal  cause  is  the  form,  idea,  archetype,  or  pat- 
tern of  a thing ; for  all  these  words  Aristotle  uses  to  express 
it.  Thus  the  idea  of  the  artist  is  the  formal  cause  of  the 
statue ; and  of  all  natural  substances,  if  we  do  not  suppose 
them  the  work  of  chance,  the  formal  cause  are  the  ideas  of  the 
Divine  mind ; and  this  form  concurring  with  the  matter,  pro- 
duces every  work,  whether  of  nature  or  art.  The  efficient 
cause  is  the  principle  of  change  or  motion  which  produces  the 
thing.  In  this  sense  the  statuary  is  the  cause  of  the  statue, 
and  the  God  of  nature  the  cause  of  all  the  works  of  nature. 
And  lastly,  the  final  cause  is  that  for  the  sake  of  which  any- 
thing is  done.  Thus  the  statuary  makes  the  statue  for 
pleasure  or  for  profit ; and  the  works  of  nature  are  all  for 
some  good  end.”2 

Aristotle3  says  we  may  distinguish  four  kinds  of  causes. 
The  first  is  the  form  proper  to  each  thing.  To  ml  fjv  th ai. 
This  is  the  quidditas  of  the  schoolmen,  the  causa  formalis. 
The  second  is  the  matter  and  the  subject.  ‘H  vkt]  xai  to 
irtoxilyuvov,  causa  materialis.  The  third  is  the  principle  of 
movement  which  produced  the  thing.  ’Apxq  trjs  xivrpsos, 
causa  effeiens.  The  fourth  is  the  reason  and  good  of  all 
things ; for  the  end  of  all  phenomena  and  of  all  movement  is 
good.  To  ov  svsxa  xai  to  ayadov,  causa  finalis.  The  sufficient 
reason  of  Leibnitz,  which  he,  like  Aristotle,  thought  to  be 
essentially  good. 

Aristotle4  says,  “It  is  possible  that  one  object  may  combine 
all  the  kinds  of  causes.  Thus,  in  a house,  the  principle  of 


1 Metaphys.,  lib.  v.,  cap.  2. 

3 In  Metaphys.,  lib.  i.,  cap.  3. 


3 Monboddo,  Ancient  Metaphys.,  b.  i.,  chop.  4. 

4 Ibid,  lib.  iii.,  cop.  2. 


76 


VOCABULARY  OF  riilLOSOFIIY. 


CAUSE  - 

movement  is  the  art  and  the  workmen,  th v final  cause  is  the  work, 
the  matter  the  earth  and  stones,  and  the  plan  is  theybrm.”1 

In  addition  to  these  four  causes,  Dr.  Gillies2  says,  “The 
model  or  exemplar  was  considered  as  a cause  by  the  Pythago- 
reans and  Platonists ; the  former  of  whom  maintained  that 
all  perceptible  things  were  imitations  of  numbers;  and  the 
latter,  that  they  owed  their  existence  to  the  participation  of 
ideas ; but  wherein  either  this  imitation  or  this  participation 
consisted,  these  philosophers,  Aristotle  observes,  omitted  to 
show.” 

Seneca,3  explains  the  common  and  Platonic  divisions  of 
causes ; and  arraigns  both,  because  he  conceived  that  space, 
time,  and  motion,  ought  to  be  included. 

Sir  W.  Hamilton4  says,  “ The  exemplary  cause  was  intro- 
duced by  Plato ; and  was  not  adopted  by  the  schoolmen  as  a 
fifth  cause  in  addition  to  Aristotle’s  four.”  It  is  noticed  by 
Suarez  and  others. 

According  to  Derodon,5  material  and  formal  causes  are  in- 
ternal, and  constitute  the  essence  of  a thing ; efficient,  final, 
and  exemplary  causes  are  external,  that  is,  out  from  or  of 
the  essence  of  a thing.  The  material  cause  is  that,  ex  quo, 
anything  is,  or  becomes.  The  formal  cause  is  that,  per  quod. 
The  efficient  cause  is  that,  a quo.  The  final  cause  is  that, 
propter  quod.  And  the  exemplary  cause  is  that,  ad  citjus  imi- 
talioncm  res  Jit. 

When  the  word  cause  is  used  without  an  adjective,  it  com- 
monly means,  active  power,  that  which  produces  change,  or 
efficient  cause. 

Suarez,  Itivius,  and  others,  define  a cause  thus: — Causam 
esse  principium  per  se  influens  esse  in  aliud. 

Ens  quod  in  se  continet  rationem,  cur  olterum  existat,  diciiur 
hvjus  causa. — Wolfius. 

“A  cause  is  that  which,  of  itself,  makes  anything  begin 
to  be.”6 

We  conceive  of  a cause  as  existing  and  operating  before  the 
effect  which  is  produced.  But,  to  the  production  of  an  effect, 

1 See  also  Nat.  Auscult , lib.  ii.,  cap.  3,  quoted  by  Harris,  Concerning  Art,  p.  24. 

2 Analysis  of  Aristotle's  Works , chap.  2,  note,  p.  100. 

3 Epist.  66  and  67.  4 Reid’s  Wd'ks,  p.  690,  note. 

c De  Rrccdicam .,  p.  114.  c Irons,  Final  Causes , p.  74. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


77 


CAUSE  — 

more  causes  than  one  may  be  necpssary.  Hence  it  has  been 
said  by  Mr.  Karslake,1 *  “ The  cause  of  a thing  is  that  ante- 
cedent (or  aggregate  of  antecedents),  -which  is  seen  to  have  an 
intimate  connection  -with  the  effect,  viewed,  if  it  be  not  itself 
a self-determining  agent,  in  reference  to  self-acting  power, 
whose  agency  it  exhibits.”  And  some,  instead  of  the  word 
cause,  would  prefer  in  many  cases  to  use  the  word  concauses. 

“ Though  the  antecedent  is  most  strictly  the  cause  of  a thing 
being , as,  e.  g.,  the  passage  of  the  moon  between  the  earth  and 
the  sun  is  the  cause  of  an  eclipse,  yet  the  effect  is  that  which 
commonly  presents  itself  to  us  as  the  cause  of  our  Icnoioing  it 
to  be.  Hence,  by  what  seems  to  us  a strange  inversion  of  cause 
and  effect,  effect  was  said  to  be  a cause,  a causa  cognoscendi, 
as  distinguished  from  a causa  essendi,  the  strict  cause.”1  — F. 
Occasion. 

CAUSALITY  and  CAUSATION. 

“ Now,  if  there  be  no  spirit,  matter  must  of  necessity  move 
itself,  where  you  cannot  imagine  any  activity  or  causality,  but 
the  bare  essence  of  the  matter,  from  whence  the  motion 
comes.”3 

“ Now,  always  God’s  word  hath  a causation  with  it.  He 
said  to  him,  Sit,  that  is,  he  made  him  sit,  or  as  it  is  here  ex- 
pressed, he  made  him  sit  with  a mighty  power.”4 5 

Causality,  in  actu  primo,  is  the  energy  or  power  in  the 
cause 5 by  which  it  produces  its  effect;  as  heat  in  the  fire. 
Causality,  in  actu  secundo,  is  causation  or  the  operation  of 
the  power  by  which  the  cause  is  actually  producing  its  effect. 
It  is  inflexus  iile,  a quo  causa  influit  esse  in  effectum  quae  dis- 


1 Aids  to  the,  Study  of  Logic , vol.  ii.,  p.  43. 

* Ibid,  vol.  ii.,  p.  38. 

3 II.  More,  Immortality  of  the  Soul , book  i.,  chap.  6. 

4 Goodwin,  Works , vol.  i.,  part  i.,  p.  406. 

5 The  idea  of  the  reason  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  that  of  causality.  It  is  a more 
elevated  idea,  because  it  applies  to  all  orders  of  things,  while  causality  extends  only  t.o 
things  in  time.  It  is  true  we  speak  sometimes  of  the  eternal  cause;  but  thus  the  idea 
of  cause  is  synonymous  with  that  of  the  reason.  This  idea  of  the  reason  expresses  the 
relation  of  a being  or  thing  to  what  is  contained  within  it ; in  other  words,  the  reason 
expresses  the  rapport  du  contenant  au  contenu,  or  the  reason  is  that  whose  essence  en- 
closes the  essence  and  existence  of  another  thing.  We  thus  arrive  at  the  conception 
of  all  being  contained  in  God*  who  is  the  supreme  reason.  — Ahrens,  Cours  de  Psychol ., 
tom.  ii. — F.  Reason. 


78 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CAUSALITY— 

tinf/uitur  a parte  rei,  tarn  a principio,  qnarn  a tennino,  sive  ab 
effectu  ad  quern  iendit.  “ The  changes  of  which  I am  conscious 
in  the  state  of  my  own  mind,  and  those  which  I perceive  in 
the  external  universe,  impress  me  with  a conviction  that  some 
cause  must  have  operated  to  produce  them.  There  is  an  intui- 
tive judgment  involving  the  simple  idea  of  causation."1 * 

From  the  explanation  of  these  terms,  it  appears  that  a cause 
is  something  which  not  only  precedes,  but  has  power  to  produce 
the  effect.  And  when  the  effect  has  been  produced,  we  say  it 
is  in  consequence  of  the  power  in  the  cause  having  operated. 
The  belief  that  every  exchange  implies  a cause,  or  that  every 
change  is  produced  by  the  operation  of  some  power,  is  re- 
garded by  some  as  a primitive  belief,  and  has  been  denomi- 
nated by  the  phrase,  the 2 principle  of  causality.  Hume,  and 
others,  however,  have  contended  that  we  have  no  proper  idea 
of  cause  as  implying  power  to  produce,  nor  of  any  necessary 
connection  between  the  operation  of  this  power  and  the  pro- 
duction of  the  effect.  All  that  we  see  or  know  is  mere 
succession,  antecedent  and  consequent;  but  having  seen 
things  in  this  relation,  we  associate  them  together,  and 
imagining  that  there  is  some  vinculum  or  connection  between 
them,  we  call  the  one  the  cause,  and  the  other  the  effect. 
Dr.  Thomas  Brown  adopts  this  view  with  the  modification 
that  it  is  in  cases  where  the  antecedence  and  consequence  is 
invariable3  that  we  attain  to  the  idea  of  cause.  Experience, 
however,  can  only  testify  that  the  succession  of  one  thing  to 

1 Stewart,  Pliilosoph.  Essays , i.,  chap.  3. 

a Lord  Bacon  (Nov.  Organ.,  book  ii.,  sect.  14),  says,  “ There  are  some  things  ultimate 
and  incausable.” 

3 “A  cause,  in  the  fullest  definition  which  it  philosophically  admits,  may  be  said  to 
be  that  which  immediately  precedes  any  change,  and  which,  existing  at  any  time  in 
similar  circumstances,  has  been  always,  and  will  be  always,  immediately  followed  by  a 
similar  change.”  — Brown,  Inquiry , p.  13. 

“Antecedency  and  subsequency  are  immaterial  to  the  proper  definition  of  cause  and 
effect;  on  the  contrary,  although  an  object,  in  order  to  act  as  a cause,  must  be  in  being 
antecedently  to  such  action;  yet  when  it  acts  as  a cause,  its  effects  arc  synchronous 
with  that  action  and  are  included  in  it,  which  a close  inspection  into  the  nature  of 
cause  will  prove.  For  effects  are  no  more  than  the  new  qualities  of  newly  formed 
objects.  Each  conjunction  of  bodies  (now  separately  in  existence,  and  of  certain  de- 
fined qualities),  produces  upon  their  union  these  new  natures,  whose  qualities  must 
necessarily  be  in  and  with  them  in  the  very  moment  of  their  formation.”  — Essay  on 
Cause  and  Effect , 8vo,  Lond.,  1824,  p.  50. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


79 


CAUSALITY  - 

another  has,  in  so  far  as  it  has  been  observed,  been  unvaried, 
not  that  in  the  nature  of  things  it  is  invariable.  Mr.  Locke1 
ascribes  the  origin  of  our  idea  of  cause  to  our  experience  of 
the  sensible  changes  which  one  body  produces  on  another,  as 
lire  upon  wax.  Our  belief  in  an  external  world  rests  partly 
on  the  principle  of  causality.  Our  sensations  are  referred  to 
external  objects  as  their  causes.  Yet,  the  idea  of  power  which 
is  involved  in  that  of  cause,  he  traces  to  the  consciousness  of 
our  possessing  power  in  ourselves.  This  is  the  view  taken  of 
the  origin  of  our  idea  of  cause  by  Dr.  Reid.2  “ In  the  strict 
philosophical  sense,  I take  a cause  to  be  that  which  has  the 
relation  to  the  effect  which  I have  to  my  voluntary  and  de- 
liberate actions  ; for  I take  this  notion  of  a cause  to  be  derived 
from  the  power  I feel  in  myself  to  produce  certain  effects.  In 
this  sense  we  say  that  the  Deity  is  the  cause  of  the  uni- 
verse.” And  at  p.  81  he  has  said,  “I  see  not  how  mankind 
could  ever  have  acquired  the  conception  of  a cause,  or  of  any 
relation  beyond  a mere  conjunction  in  time  and  place  between 
it  and  its  effects,  if  they  were  not  conscious  of  active  exer- 
tions in  themselves,  by  which  effects  are  produced.  This 
seems  to  me  to  be  the  origin  of  the  idea,  or  conception  of  pro- 
duction.” 

By  origin,  however,  Dr.  Reid  must  have  meant  occasion. 
At  least  he  held  that  the  principle  of  casuality,  or  the  belief 
that  every  change  implies  the  operation  of  a cause,  is  a natu- 
ral judgment,  or  a priori  conviction,  necessary  and  universal. 
But  if  the  idea  of  a cause  be  empirical  and  grounded  on 
experience,  it  may  be  difficult  to  show  how  a higher  origin 
can  be  claimed  for  the  principle  of  causality.  Mr.  Stewart 
has  expressed  himself  in  language  equivalent  to  that  of  Dr. 
Reid.  And  Maine  de  Biran3  thinks  that  the  true  origin  of 
our  idea  of  cause  is  to  be  found  in  the  activity  of  the  will,  or 
in  the  consciousness  that  we  are  causes,  or  have  in  ourselves 
the  power  of  producing  change.  Having  found  the  idea  of 
power  within  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  we,  by  a process 


1 Essay  on  Ham.  Understand book  ii.,  chaps.  21  and  26. 

3 Correspondence  of  Dr.  Reid , p.  77. 

3 Nouvelies  Considerat.  sur  le  Rapport  da  Physique  et  da  Moral  de  V Homme,  8yo,  Par., 
1834,  pp.  27 1,  290,  363,  402. 


80 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CAUSALITY  — 

which  lie  calls  natural  induction,  project  this  idea  into  the 
external  world,  and  ascribe  power  to  that  which  we  call  cause. 
According  to  Kant  we  have  the  idea  of  cause,  and  also  the 
belief  that  every  commencing  phenomenon  implies  the  ope- 
ration of  a cause.  But  these  are  merely  forms  of  our  under- 
standing, subjective  conditions  of  human  thought.  In  con- 
formity with  a pre-existing  law  of  our  intelligence,  we  arrange 
phenomena  according  to  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect. 
But  we  know  not  whether,  independently  of  our  form  of 
thought,  there  be  any  reality  corresponding  to  our  idea  of 
cause,  or  of  productive  power.  The  view  that  the  idea  of 
cause  is  furnished  by  the  fact  of  our  being  conscious  of  pos- 
sessing power,  meets  the  idealism  of  Kant,  for  what  greater 
reality  can  be  conceived  than  a fact  of  consciousness  ? But 
if  experience  of  external  phenomena  can  be  accepted  as  the 
origin  (or  rather  as  the  occasion)  of  our  notion  of  change,  and 
if  consciousness  of  internal  phenomena  can  be  accepted  as 
the  origin  (or  rather  as  the  occasion)  of  our  notion  of  power 
to  produce  change,  the  idea  of  a necessary  and  universal  con- 
nection between  change  and  the  power  which  produces  it,  in 
other  words,  a belief  in  the  principle  of  causality,  can  only  be 
referred  to  the  reason,  the  faculty  which  apprehends,  not 
what  is  contingent  and  passing,  but  what  is  permanent  and 
absolute. 

“ Cousin’s  theory  concerning  the  origin  of  idea  of  causality 
is,  that  the  mind,  when  it  perceives  that  the  agent  and  the 
change  vary  in  cases  of  personal  agency  (though  here  he  is  not 
very  explicit),  several  times  repeated;  while  the  relation  be- 
tween them,  viz.,  the  strict  idea  of  personal  causation,  never 
varies,  but  is  necessary  ; that  the  mind  abstracts  the  invariable 
and  necessary  element  from  the  variable  and  contingent  ele- 
ments of  the  fact,  and  thus  arrives  at  the  idea  of  causality.”  1 
“CAUSATION  is  not  an  object  of  sense.  The  only  experience  we 
can  have  of  it  is  in  the  consciousness  we  have  of  exerting 
some  power  in  ordering  our  thoughts  and  actions.  But  this 
experience  is  surely  too  narrow  a foundation  for  a general 
conclusion,  that  all  things  that  have  had  or  shall  have  a 


1 Essay  on  Causality,  By  an  Undergraduate,  1654,  p.  3. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


81 


CAUSATION  — 

beginning  must  have  a cause.  This  is  to  be  admitted  as  a 
first  or  self-evident  principle.” 1 

But  Locke  has  said,2  “ The  idea  of  the  beginning  of  motion 
we  have  only  from  reflection  on  what  passes  in  ourselves, 
where  we  find  by  experience,  that  hardy  by  willing  it,  barely 
by  a thought  of  the  mind,  we  can  move  the  parts  of  our  bodies 
which  were  before  at  rest.” 

See  Cousin.3 4  See  also  on  the  various  theories  as  to  the  ori- 
gin of  our  judgment  of  cause  and  effect,  Sir  Will.  Hamilton."1 

CAUSES  (Final,  Doctrine  of). — When  we  see  means  independ- 
ent of  each  other  conspiring  to  accomplish  certain  ends,  we 
naturally  conclude  that  the  ends  have  been  contemplated,  and 
the  means  arranged  by  an  intelligent  agent ; and,  from  the 
nature  of  the  ends  and  of  the  means,  we  infer  the  character 
or  design  of  the  agent.  Thus,  from  the  ends  answered  in 
creation  being  wise  and  good,  we  infer  not  only  the  existence 
of  an  Intelligent  Creator,  but  also  that  He  is  a Being  of  infi- 
nite wisdom  and  goodness.  This  is  commonly  called  the 
argument  from  design  or  from  final  causes.  It  was  used  by 
Socrates,5  and  found  a place  in  the  scholastic  philosophy. 
But  Lord  Bacon  has  said,6  that  the  inquiry  into  final  causes  is 
sterile.  And  Descartes  maintained  that  we  cannot  know  the 
designs  of  God  in  creating  the  universe,  unless  he  reveal  them 
to  us.  But  Leibnitz,  in  maintaining  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason,  upheld  the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  and  thought  it 
equally  applicable  in  physics  and  in  metaphysics.  It  is  true 
that  in  physical  science  we  should  prosecute  our  inquiries 
without  any  preconceived  opinion  as  to  the  ends  to  be  an- 
swered, and  observe  the  phenomena  as  they  occur,  without 
forcing  them  into  the  service  of  an  hypothesis.  And  it  is 
against  this  error  that  the  language  of  Bacon  was  directed. 
But  when  our  contemplations  of  nature  reveal  to  us  innumera- 
ble adjustments  and  arrangements  working  out  ends  that  are 
wise  and  good,  it  is  natural  to  conclude  that  they  have  been 
designed  by  a cause  sovereignly  wise  and  good.  Notwithstand- 

1 Reid,  Intell.  Pow .,  essay  vi.,  chap.  6. 

9 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  book  ii.,  chap.  21,  § 4. 

3 ( Euvres , Prem.  Ser.,  tom.  i.,  cours  1817,  and  Hist,  de  Philosoph.  Mod.,  sect.  19. 

4 Discussions , App.  1.  fi  See  Xenophon,  Memorabilia . 

6 De  Aug.  Scient.,  lib.  iii.,  cap.  5. 

G 


82 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CAUSES - 

ing  tho  doubts  as  to  the  logical  validity  of  this  argument, 
■which  have  been  started  by  Kant,  Coleridge,  and  others,  it 
continues  to  be  regarded  as  the  most  popular  and  impressive 
mode  of  proving  the  being  and  perfections  of  God.  And  the 
validity  of  it  is  implied  in  the  universally  admitted  axiom  of 
modern  physiology,  that  there  is  no  organ  without  its  function. 
We  say  of  some  things  in  nature  that  they  are  useless.  All 
we  can  truly  say  is,  that  we  have  not  yet  discovered  their  use. 
Everything  has  an  end,  to  the  attainment  or  accomplishment 
of  which  it  continually  tends.  This  is  the  form  in  which  the 
doctrine  of  final  causes  was  advocated  by  Aristotle.  With 
him  it  was  not  so  much  an  argument  from  design,  as  an  argu- 
ment against  chance.  But  if  things  do  not  attain  their  ends 
by  chance  it  must  be  by  design.  Aristotle,  it  is  true,  was 
satisfied  that  ends  were  answered  by  tendencies  in  nature. 
But  whence  or  why  these  tendencies  in  nature,  but  from  an 
Intelligent  Author  of  nature  ? 

“ If  we  are  to  judge  from  the  explanations  of  the  principle 
given  by  Aristotle,  the  notion  of  a final  cause,  as  originally 
conceived,  did  not  necessarily  imply  design.  The  theological 
sense  to  which  it  is  now  commonly  restricted,  has  been  derived 
from  the  place  assigned  to  it  in  the  scholastic  philosophy ; 
though,  indeed,  the  principle  had  been  long  before  beautifully 
applied  by  Socrates  and  by  the  Stoics  to  establish  the  truth  of 
a Divine  Providence.  Whenever,  indeed,  we  observe  the 
adjustment  of  means  to  an  end,  we  seem  irresistibly  impelled 
to  conclude  that  the  whole  is  the  effect  of  design.  The  pre- 
sent acceptation,  therefore,  of  the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  is 
undoubtedly  a natural  one.  Still  it  is  not  a necessary  con- 
struction of  the  doctrine.  With  Aristotle,  accordingly,  it  is 
simply  an  inquiry  into  tendencies  — an  investigation  of  any 
object  or  phenomenon,  from  considering  the  tvexa.  -too,  the 
reason  of  it,  in  something  else  which  follows  it,  and  to  which 
it  naturally  leads. 

“ His  theory  of  final  causes  is  immediately  opposed  to  a 
doctrine  of  chance,  or  spontaneous  coincidence  ; and  must  be 
regarded  as  the  denial  of  that,  rather  than  as  a positive  asser- 
tion of  design.  He  expressly  distinguishes,  indeed,  between 
thought  and  nature.  lie  ascribes  to  nature  the  same  working 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


83 


CAUSES  — 

in  order  to  ends,  which  is  commonly  regarded  as  the  attribute 
of  thought  alone.  He  insisted  that  there  is  no  reason  to 
suppose  deliberation  necessary  in  these  workings  of  nature, 
since  it  is  ‘ as  if  the  art  of  shipbuilding  were  in  the  timber,  or 
just  as  if  a person  should  act  as  his  own  physician.’”  1 

“The  argument  from  final  causes,”  says  Dr.  Reid,2  “when 
reduced  to  a syllogism,  has  these  two  premises:  — First,  that 
design  and  intelligence  in  the  cause  may,  with  certainty,  be 
inferred  from  marks  or  signs  of  it  in  the  effect.  This  we  may 
call  the  major  proposition  of  the  argument.  The  second, 
which  we  call  the  minor  proposition,  is,  that  there  are  in  fact 
the  clearest  marks  of  design  and  wisdom  in  the  works  of 
nature ; and  the  conclusion  is,  that  the  works  of  nature  are 
the  effects  of  a wise  and  intelligent  cause.  One  must  either 
assent  to  the  conclusion,  or  deny  one  or  other  of  the  premises.” 
Hampden,  Introd.  io  Mor.  Phil.;3  Irons,  Doctrine  of  Final 
Causes,  8vo,  Lond.,  1856.  The  argument  from  design  is  pro- 
secuted by  Paley,  in  Nat.  Theol. ; in  Bridgewater  Treatises; 
Burnett  Prize  Essays,  &e.  . 

CAUSES  (Occasional,  Doctrine  of). — This  phrase  has  been  em- 
ployed by  the  Cartesians  to  explain  the  commerce  or  mode  of 
communicating  between  mind  and  matter.  The  soul  being  a 
thinking  substance,  and  extension  being  the  essence  of  body, 
no  intercourse  can  take  place  between  them  without  the  inter- 
vention of  the  First  Cause.  It  is  Deity  himself,  therefore, 
who,  on  the  occasion  of  certain  modifications  in  our  minds, 
excites  the  corresponding  movements  of  body ; and,  on  the 
occasion  of  certain  changes  in  our  body,  awakens  the  corre- 
sponding feelings  in  the  mind.  This  theory,  which  is  involved 
in  the  philosophy  of  Descartes,  was  fully  developed  by  Malc- 
branche,  Regis,  and  Geulinx.  Laforge  limited  the  theory  to 
involuntary  movements,  and  thus  reconciled  it  in  some  degree 
to  experience  and  common  sense.  Malebranche’s  doctrine  is 
commonly  called  the  “ vision  of  all  things  in  God” — who  is 
the  “ light  of  all  our  seeing.” 

According  to  this  theory,  the  admirable  structure  of  the 


1 Hampden,  Introd.  to  Mor.  Phil.,  lect.  iv.,  p.  113. 

a lntell.  Pow.,  essay  yi.,  chap.  6. 

a Pp.  110-113. 


81 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


CAUSES  — 

body  and  its  organs  is  useless ; as  a dull  mass  would  have 
answered  the  purpose  equally  well. 

CERTAINTY*  CERTITUDE  ( Cerium  (from  cerno),  propne 
idem  sit,  quod  decrelum  ac  proinde  jirmuin.  Vossius). 

“ This  way  of  certainty  by  the  knowledge  of  our  own  ideas, 
goes  a little  farther  than  bare  imagination  ; and  I believe  it 
will  appear  that  all  the  certainty  of  general  truths  a man  has, 
lies  in  nothing  else.”  1 

“ Certain , in  its  primary  sense,  is  applied  (according  to  its 
etymology,  from  cerno),  to  the  state  of  a person’s  mind;  de- 
noting any  one’s  full  and  complete  conviction  ; and  generally, 
though  not  always,  implying  that  there  is  sufficient  ground  for 
such  conviction.  It  was  thence  easily  transferred  metonymic- 
ally  to  the  truths  or  events,  respecting  which  this  conviction  is 
rationally  entertained.  And  xuicertain  (as  well  as  the  sub- 
stantives and  adverbs  derived  from  these  adjectives)  follows 
the  same  rule.  Thus  we  say,  ‘It  is  certain,’  &c.,  meaning 
that  we  are  sure  ; whereas  the  fact  may  be  uncertain  and  cer- 
tain to  different  individuals.  From  not  attending  to  this,  the 
words  uncertain  and  contingent  have  been  considered  as  denot- 
ing some  quality  in  the  things  themselves  — and  chance  has 
been  regarded  as  a real  agent.”2 

“ Certainty  is  truth  brought  methodically  to  the  human 
intellect,  that  is,  conducted  from  principle  to  principle,  to  a 
point  which  is  evident  in  itself.  It  is  the  relation  of  truth  to 
knowledge,  of  God  to  man,  of  ontology  to  psychology.” 3 

“In  accurate  reasoning,  the  word  certain  ought  never  to  be 
used  as  merely  synonymous  with  necessary.  Physical  events 
we  call  necessary,  because  of  their  depending  on  jixed  causes, 
not  on  known  causes ; when  they  depend  also  on  known  causes, 
they  may  be  called  certain.  The  variations  of  the  weather 
arise  from  necessary  and  Jixed  causes,  but  they  are  proverbially 
uncertain.” 1 

"When  we  affirm,  without  any  doubt,  the  existence  or  non- 
existence of  a being  or  phenomenon,  the  truth  or  falsity  of  a 
proposition,  the  state  in  which  our  mind  is  we  call  certainty — 

1 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand book  iii.,  chap.  4. 

2 Whately,  Log.,  Appendix  1.  3 Tiberghien,  Essai  des  Connais.  Hum.,  p.  35. 

4 Coplestone,  Remains , 8vo,  Lond.,  1854,  p.  98. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


85 


CERTAINTY  - 

and  we  say  of  the  object  of  knowledge  that  it  is  evident  oi 
certain.  According  to  the  mode  in  which  it  is  attained, 
certainty  is  immediate  by  sense  and  intuition,  and  mediate  by 
reasoning  and  demonstration.  According  to  the  grounds  on 
which  it  rests,  it  is  called  metaphysical,  when  we  firmly  adhere 
to  truth  which  cannot  be  otherwise  ; such  as  the  first  principles 
of  natural  law,  or  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong. 
Physical,  when  we  adhere  to  truth  which  cannot  be  otherwise, 
according  to  the  laws  of  nature,  but  which  may  be  by  miracle ; 
as,  fire  will  certainly  burn  — although  it  did  not  burn  the 
Hebrew  youths  (Dan.,  chap,  iii.)  Moral,  when  we  adhere  to 
truth  which  is  in  accordance  with  the  common  order  of  things, 
and  the  common  judgment  of  men — although  it  may  be  other- 
wise without  a miracle. 

Moral  certainty  may  amount  to  the  highest  degree  of  proba- 
bility, and  to  all  practical  purposes  may  be  as  influential  as 
certainty.  For  it  should  be  observed  that  probability  and 
certainty  are  two  states  of  mind,  and  not  two  modes  of  the 
reality.  The  reality  is  one  and  the  same,  but  our  knowledge 
of  it  may  be  probable  or  certain.  Probability  has  more  or 
less  of  doubt,  and  admits  of  degrees.  Certainty  excludes 
doubt,  and  admits  neither  of  increase  nor  diminution. 

Certainty  supposes  an  object  to  be  known,  a mind  to  know, 
and  the  result  of  a communication  or  relation  being  established 
between  them  which  is  knowledge  ; and  certain  knowledge  or 
certainly  is  the  confidence  with  which  the  mind  reposes  in  the 
information  of  its  faculties.  Self-consciousness  reveals  with 
certainty  the  different  states  and  operations  of  our  own  minds. 
The  operations  of  memory  may  give  us  certainty  as  to  the 
past.  We  cannot  doubt  the  reality  of  what  our  senses  clearly 
testify.  Reason  reveals  to  us  first  truths  with  intuitive  cer- 
tainty. And  by  demonstration  we  ascend  with  certainty  from 
one  truth  to  another.  For  to  use  the  words  of  Thomas  Aqui- 
nas,1 “ Tunc  conclusiones  pro  certo  sciuntur,  quando  resolvuniur 
inprincipia,  et  idea,  quod  aliquod  per  certitudinem  sciatur,  est 
ex  lumine  rationis  divinitus  interius  indito,  quo  in  nobis  loquitur 
Veus,  non  autem  ab  homine  exterius  docente,  nisi  quatenus  con- 


9 


1 £>e  Veritate. 


80 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CERTAINTY - 

clusiones  in  principia  resolvit,  nos  doccns,  ex  quo  iamen  nos  cer- 
liiudinr.m  non  acciperemus,  nisi  in  nobis  esset  certitudo  princi- 
piornm  in  qua:  conchtsiones  resolvuniur.” 

“ The  criterion  of  true  knowledge  is  not  to  be  looked  for 
anywhere  abroad  without  our  own  minds,  neither  in  the 
height  above,  nor  in  the  depth  beneath,  but  only  in  our  know- 
ledge and  conceptions  themselves.  For  the  entity  of  all 
theoretical  truth  is  nothing  else  but  clear  intelligibility,  and 
whatever  is  clearly  conceived,  is  an  entity  and  a truth ; but 
that  which  is  false,  Divine  power  itself  cannot  make  it  to  be 
clearly  and  distinctly  understood,  because  falsehood  is  a non- 
entity, and  a clear  conception  is  an  entity ; and  Omnipotence 
itself  cannot  make  a non-entity  to  be  an  entity.” 1 

“ The  theories  of  cent  Unde  may  be  reduced  to  three  classes. 
They?rsi!  places  the  ground  of  certitude  in  reason;  the  second 
in  authority ; the  third  in  evidence;  including,  under  that  term, 
both  the  external  manifestations  of  truth,  and  the  internal 
principles  or  laws  of  thought  by  which  we  are  determined  in 
forming  our  judgments  in  regard  to  them.”2 

“ De  veritatis  criteria  frustra  laborantur  quidain:  quum  non 
alia  reperienda  sit  prater  ipsarn  rationis  Jdcullatem,  aut  menti 
congenitam  intelligendi  vim.”3 

Protagoras  and  Epicurus  in  ancient  times,  and  Hobbes  and 
the  modern  sensationalists,  have  made  sense  the  measure  and 
ground  of  certainty.  Descartes  and  his  followers  founded  it 
on  self-consciousness,  Cogiio  ergo  sum;  while  others  have 
received  as  certain  only  what  is  homologated  by  human  reason 
in  general.  But  certainty  is  not  the  peculiar  characteristic  of 
knowledge  furnished  by  any  one  faculty,  but  is  the  common 
inheritance  of  any  or  all  of  our  intellectual  faculties  when 
legitimately  exercised  within  their  respective  spheres.  When 
so  exercised  we  cannot  but  accept  the  result  as  true  and 
certain. 

But  if  we  are  thus  naturally  and  necessarily  determined  to 
accept  the  knowledge  furnished  by  our  faculties,  that  know- 
ledge, according  to  Kant,  cannot  be  proved  to  be  absolute, 


* Cudworth,  Eternal  and  Immuia'ble,  Mor.,  book  iv.,  chap.  5. 

0 Buchanan,  Faith  in  God , vol.  ii.,  p.  304. 

3 Hutcheson,  Metaphys.,  pars  i.,  cap.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


87 


CERTAINTY— 

or  a knowledge  of  things  in  themselves,  and  as  they  must 
appear  to  all  intelligent  beings,  but  is  merely  relative,  or  a 
knowledge  of  things  as  they  appear  to  us.  Now,  it  is  true 
that  we  cannot,  as  Kant  has  expressed  it,  objectify  the  sub- 
jective. Without  rising  out  of  human  nature  to  the  possession 
of  a higher,  we  cannot  sit  in  judgment  on  the  faculties  of  that 
nature.  But  in  admitting  that  our  knowledge  is  relative,  we 
are  merely  saying  it  is  human.  It  is  according  to  the  measure 
of  a man.  It  is  attained  by  human  faculties,  and  must  be 
relative,  or  bear  proportion  to  the  faculties  by  which  it  is 
attained.  In  like  manner,  the  knowledge  of  angels  may  be 
called  angelic,  but  this  is  not  to  call  it  uncertain.  We  may 
not  know  all  that  can  be  known  of  the  objects  of  our  know- 
ledge, but  still,  what  we  do  know,  we  may  know  with  cer- 
tainty. Human  knowledge  may  admit  of  increase  without 
being  liable  to  be  contradicted  or  overturned.  We  come  to  it 
by  degrees,  but  the  higher  degree  of  knowledge  to  which  we 
may  ultimately  attain,  does  not  invalidate  the  lower  degree  of 
knowledge.  It  rests  upon  it  and  rises  out  of  it,  and  the  ground 
and  encouragement  of  all  inquiry  is,  that  there  is  a truth  and 
reality  in  things,  which  our  faculties  are  fitted  to  apprehend. 
Their  testimony  we  rejoice  to  believe.  Faith  in  their  trust- 
worthiness is  spontaneous.  Doubt  concerning  it  is  an  after- 
thought. And  scepticism  as  a creed  is  self-destructive.  He 
who  doubts  is  certain  that  he  doubts.  Omnis  qui  uirum,  sit 
veritas  dubitat,  in  se  ipso  habet  verum,  unde  non  dubitet.1 

Eiiam  qiii  negat  veritatem  esse;  concedit  veritatem  esse;  si 
enim  veritas  non  est,  verum,  est,  veritatem  non  esse.  Thomas 
Aquin.,  Sum.  Theol. ; Savary,  Sur  la  Certitude,  8vo,  Paris, 
1847. — V.  Evidence,  Criterion,  Knowledge. 

CHANCE.  — Aristotle2  says,  “According  to  some,  chance  is  a 
cause  not  manifest  to  human  reasoning."  Aoxfi  pkv  curia  y 
a brjV.or  5k  avSp urdurj  Siaroia. 

“ Many  things  happen,  besides  what  man  intends  or  pur- 
poses ; and  also  some  things  happen  different  from  -what  i3 
aimed  at  by  nature.  We  cannot  call  them  natural  things,  or 
from  nature,  neither  can  we  say  that  they  are  from  human 


1 Augustin,  Dc  vera  Religione. 


3 Phr/s.y  ii.,  4. 


88 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CHANCE  - 

intention.  They  are  what  we  call  fortuitous  events,  and  the 
cause  which  produces  them  is  called  chance.  But  they  have 
all  respect  to  some  end  intended  by  nature  or  by  man.  So 
that  nothing  can  be  more  true  than  what  Aristotle 1 says,  that 
if  there  were  no  end  intended,  there  could  be  no  chance. 

“A  man  digs  a piece  of  ground,  to  sow  or  plant  it ; but,  in 
digging,  he  finds  a treasure.  This  is  beside  his  intention,  and 
therefore  it  is  said  to  be  by  chance. 

“ When  a hanging  wall  falls  upon  a passenger  and  crushes 
him,  the  destination  of  nature  was  only,  that  the  stones  of  the 
wall  being  no  longer  kept  together  by  the  cement,  should  fall 
to  the  ground,  according  to  their  natural  movement ; so  that 
the  crushing  of  the  man  was  something  beside  the  purpose  of 
nature,  or  rfapa  2 

As  to  Aristotle’s  views  of  fortune  and  chance,  see  Piccolo- 
mineus.3 

Chance  is  opposed  to  law  in  this  sense,  viz.,  that  what  hap- 
pens according  to  law  may  be  predicted,  and  counted  on.  But 
everything  has  its  own  law  and  its  proper  cause ; and  chance 
merely  denotes  that  we  know  not  the  proper  cause,  nor  the 
law  according  to  which  a phenomenon  occurs. 

An  event  or  series  of  events  which  seems  to  be  the  result 
neither  of  a necessity  inherent  in  the  nature  of  things,  nor  of 
a plan  conceived  by  intelligence,  is  said  to  happen  by  chance. 

“It  is  not,  I say,  merely  in  a pious  manner  of  expression, 
that  the  Scripture  ascribes  every  event  to  the  providence 
of  God ; but  it  is  strictly  and  philosophically  true  in  nature 
and  reason,  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  chance  or  acci- 
dent; it  being  evident  that  these  words  do  not  signify  any- 
thing that  is  truly  an  agent  or  the  cause  of  any  event;  but 
they  signify  merely  men’s  ignorance  of  the  real  and  imme- 
diate cause.”4 

“ If  a die  be  thrown,  we  say  it  depends  upon  chance  what 
side  may  turn  up ; and,  if  we  draw  a prize  in  a lottery,  we  as- 
cribe our  success  to  chance.  We  do  not,  however,  mean  that 


1 Phys.y  lib.  ii. 

2 Monboddo,  Ancient  Mctaphys.,  book  ii.,  chap.  20. 

3 Philosoph.  de  Moribus , 1583,  p.  713. 

4 Clarke,  vol.  i.,  Sermon  xcviii. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


89 


CHANCE— 

these  effects  were  produced  by  no  cause,  but  only  that  we  are 
ignorant  of  the  cause  that  produced  them.”  1 

In  what  sense  we  may  say  there  is  such  a thing  as  chance, 
and  in  what  sense  not,  see  M'Cosh,2  and  Mill,  Log ,3 
CHANCES  (Theory  of). — “The  theory  of  chances  consists  in  re- 
ducing all  events  of  the  same  kind  to  a certain  number  of  cases 
equally  possible,  that  is,  such  that  we  are  equally  undecided  as 
to  their  existence ; and  in  determining  the  number  of  these 
cases  which  are  favourable  to  the  event  of  which  the  proba- 
bility is  sought.  The  ratio  of  that  number  to  the  number  of 
all  the  possible  cases,  is  the  measure  of  the  probability ; which 
is  thus  a fraction,  having  for  its  numerator  the  number  of 
cases  favourable  to  the  event,  and  for  its  denominator  the 
number  of  all  the  cases  which  are  possible.”4 
CHAEITY  (dyd.-tj?),  as  one  of  the  theological  virtues,  is  a princi- 
ple of  prevailing  love  to  God,  prompting  to  seek  his  glory  and 
the  good  of  our  fellow-men. 

Sometimes  it  is  used  as  synonymous  with  brotherly  love,  or 
that  principle  of  benevolence  which  leads  us  to  promote,  in 
all  possible  ways,  the  happiness  of  others. 

In  a more  restricted  sense  it  means  almsgiving,  or  relieving 
the  wants  of  others  by  communication  of  our  means  and  sub- 
stance. 

CHASTITY  is  the  duty  of  restraining  and  governing  the  appetite 
of  sex.  It  includes  purity  of  thought,  speech,  and  behaviour. 
Lascivious  imaginings,  and  obscene  conversation,  as  well  as 
incontinent  conduct,  are  contrary  to  the  dutv  of  chastity. 

CHOICE. 

“The  necessity  of  continually  choosing  one  of  the  two,  either 
to  act  or  to  forbear  acting,  is  not  inconsistent  with  or  an  argu- 
ment against  liberty,  but  is  itself  the  very  essence  of  liberty.”6 

“For  the  principle  of  deliberate  choice,  Aristotle  thought 
that  the  rational  and  irrational  should  concur,  producing 
“orectic  intellect,”  or  “dianoetic  appetite,”  of  which  he  em- 
phatically says, — “And  this  principle  is  man.”6 

Mr.  Locke  says,  “The  will  signifies  nothing  but  a power  or 

1 Arthur,  Discourses,  p.  17.  a Typical  Forms,  p.  40. 

3 B.  iii.,  chap.  17. 

4 Laplace,  Essai  Phil,  sur  les  Probabilites , 5th  edit.,  p.  7. 

5 Clarke,  Demonstration , prop.  10.  6 Catholic  Philosophy , p.  46. 

9 * 


90 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOFIIY. 


CHOICE - 

ability  to  prefer  or  choose."  And  in  another  passage  he  says, 
“ The  word  preferring  seems  best  to  express  the  act  of  volition ; 
yet  it  does  not  precisely,  for  though  a man  would  prefer  flying 
to  walking,  yet  who  can  say  he  ever  wills  it?” — By  Jonathan 
Edwards,1  choice  and  volition  are  completely  identified.  But, 
in  popular  language,  choosing  or  preferring  may  mean  — 1.  A 
conclusion  of  the  understanding  ; as  when  I say  — I prefer  or 
choose  peaches  rather  than  plums  ; i.  e.,  I reckon  them  a bet- 
• ter  and  safer  fruit. 

2.  A state  of  inclination  or  sensibility;  as,  I prefer  or  choose 
plums  rather  than  pears  ; that  is,  I like  them  better  ; or — 

3.  A determination  of  will ; as,  I prefer  or  choose  pears, 
meaning  that,  with  the  offer  of  other  fruits,  I take  this. 

It  is  only  in  the  latter  sense  that  choice  and  volition  are  the 
same.2 

“ Choice  or  preference,  in  the  proper  sense,  is  an  act  of  the 
understanding ; but  sometimes  it  is  improperly  put  for  volition, 
or  the  determination  of  the  will  in  things  jvhere  there  is  no 
judgment  or  preference;  thus,  a man  who  owes  me  a shilling, 
lays  down  three  or  four  equally  good,  and  bids  me  take  which 
I choose.  I take  one  without  any  judgment  or  belief  that 
there  is  any  ground  of  preference ; this  is  merely  an  act  of 
will,  that  is,  a volition.”3 

“ To  prefer  is  an  act  of  the  judgment ; and  to  choose  is  an 
act  of  the  will.  The  one  describes  intellectual,  and  the  other 
practical  decision.”4 

CHREMATISTICS  (xpg/xa,  goods),  is  the  science  of  wealth,  or 
as  it  is  more  commonly  called,  Political  Economy,  or  that  de- 
partment of  social  science  which  treats  of  the  resources  of  a 
country,  and  of  the  best  means  of  increasing  them,  and  of 
diffusing  them  most  beneficially  among  the  inhabitants,  re- 
garded as  individuals,  or  as  constituting  a community. 
CIVILITY  or  COURTEOUSNESS  belongs  to  what  have  been 
called  the  lesser  moralities.  It  springs  from  benevolence  or 
brotherly  love,  and  manifests  itself  by  kindness  and  consider- 
ation in  manner  and  conversation  towards  others.  It  is  distin- 


1 Essay  on  Freedom  of  Will,  sect.  1. 

3 See  Tappan,  Appeal  to  Consciousness , ch.  3,  sect.  4,  5. 

3 Correspondence  of  Dr.  Reid , p.  79.  4 Taylor,  Synonyms. 


91 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

/ 

CIVILITY— 

guished  into  natural  and  conventional.  It  is  opposed  to  rude- 
ness. Dr.  Ferguson  says  civility  avoids  giving  offence  by  our 
conversation  or  manner.  Politeness  seeks  to  please.1 
CLASSIFICATION  (xXtjacs,  classis,  from  xaXeu,  to  call,  a multi- 
tude called  together). 

“ Montesquieu  observed  very  justly,  that  in  their  classifica- 
tion of  the  citizens,  the  great  legislators  of  antiquity  made  the 
greatest  display  of  their  powers,  and  even  soared  above  them- 
selves.” 2 

“A  class  consists  of  several  things  coming  under  a common 
description.” 3 

“ The  sorting  of  a multitude  of  things  into  parcels,  for  the 
sake  of  knowing  them  better,  and  remembering  them  more 
easily,  is  classification.  When  we  attempt  to  classify  a multi- 
tude of  things,  we  first  observe  some  respects  in  which  they 
differ  from  each  other ; for  we  could  not  classify  things  that 
are  entirely  alike  ; as,  for  instance,  a bushel  of  peas ; we  then 
separate  things  that  are  not  alike,  and  bring  together  things 
that  are  similar.”4 

“ In  every  act  of  classification,  two  steps  must  be  taken ; 
certain  marks  are  to  be  selected,  the  possession  of  which  is  to 
be  the5  title  to  admission  into  the  class,  and  then  all  the  objects 
that  possess  them  are  to  be  ascertained.  When  the  marks 
selected  are  really  important  and  connected  closely  with  the 
nature  and  functions  of  the  thing,  the  classification  is  said  to 
be  natural ; where  they  are  such  as  do  not  affect  the  nature 
of  the  objects  materially,  and  belong  in  common  to  things  the 
most  different  in  their  main  properties,  it  is  artificial.” 6 

The  condition  common  to  both  modes  of  classification,  is  to 
comprehend  everything  and  to  suppose  nothing.  But  the  rules 
for  a natural  classification  are  more  strict  than  for  an  artificial 

1 Knox,  j Essays,  No.  95.  2 Burke,  On  the  French  Revolution. 

3 Whately,  Log .,  b.  i.,  § 3.  * Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

5 Abstraction,  generalization,  and  definition , precede  classification;  for  if  we  wish  to 

reduce  to  regularitj'  the  observations  we  have  made,  we  must  compare  them,  in  order 

to  unite  them  by  their  essential  resemblances,  and  express  their  essence  with  all  possi- 
ble precision.  We  might  classify  a library  by  dividing  the  books  into  history  and  philo- 
sophy. History  into  ancient  and  modern;  ancient , according  to  the  people  to  whom  it 
referred,  and  modern  into  general , particular , and  individual,  or  memoirs.  These  divi- 
sions and  subdivisions  might  be  cailed  a classification. 

6 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought,  2d  edit.,  p.  377. 


92 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOrilY. 


CLASSIFICATION  — 

or  arbitrary  one.  Wc  may  classify  objects  arbitrarily  in  any 
point  of  view  in  which  we  are  pleased  to  regard  them.  But  a 
natural  classification  can  only  proceed  according  to  the  real 
nature  and  qualities  of  the  objects.  The  advantages  of  classi- 
fication are  to  give  a convenient  form  to  our  acquirements, 
and  to  enlarge  our  knowledge  of  the  relations  in  which  differ- 
ent objects  stand  to  one  another.  A good  classification  should 
— 1st,  Rest  on  one  principle  or  analogous  principles.  2d,  The 
principle  or  principles  should  be  of  a constant  and  permanent 
character.  3d,  It  should  bo  natural,  that  is,  even  when  artifi- 
cial, it  should  not  be  violent  or  forced.  4th,  It  should  clearly 
and  easily  apply  to  all  the  objects  classified. 

The  principles  on  which  classification  rests  are  these  : — 1st, 
of  Generalization  ; 2d,  of  Specification  ; and  3d,  of  Continuity, 
— q.  v. 

Classification  proceeds  upon  observed  resemblances.  Gene- 
ralization rests  upon  the  principle,  that  the  same  or  similar 
causes  will  produce  similar  effects.1 

COGNITION  ( cognosco , to  know). — According  to  Kant,  cognition 
[Erkenntniss)  is  the  determined  reference  of  certain  repre- 
sentations to  an  object,  that  is,  that  object  in  the  conception 
whereof  the  diverse  of  a given  intuition  is  united.  Erkennt- 
niss  vermogen  is  the  cognition  faculty,  or  the  faculty  of  cog- 
nition. To  cognize,  is  to  refer  a perception  to  an  object  by 
means  of  a conception.  For  cognizing,  understanding  is 
required.  A dog  knows  his  master,  but  he  does  not  cognize 
him. 

Representing  something  to  one’s  self  ( vorstellen ) is  the  first 
degree  of  cognition;  representing  to  one’s  self  with  consciousness 
(wahrnehmen) , or  perceiving,  is  the  second  ; knowing  ( kennen ) 
something,  or  representing  to  one’s  self  something  in  comparison 
with  other  things,  as  well  in  respect  of  identity  as  difference,  is 
the  third ; cognizing  ( erkennen ) or  knowing  something  with 
consciousness,  the  fourth ; understanding  ( verstanden ) cogniz- 
ing through  the  understanding  by  means  of  the  conceptions,  or 
conceiving  something,  the  fifth  ; cognizing  something  through 
reason  or  pcrspecting  [einsehen),  the  sixth ; and  comprehending 
something  ( begriefen ),  that  is,  cognizing  it  through  reason  a 


1 Mill,  Log.,  b.  i.,  chap.  7,  g 4 ; M'Cosli,  Typical  Farms,  b.  iii.,  chap.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


93 


COGNITION  - 

priori  in  a degree  sufficient  for  our  purpose,  the  seventh.  For 
all  our  comprehending  is  only  relative,  that  is,  sufficient  for  a 
certain  purpose  ; absolutely  we  do  not  comprehend  anything.1 

COLLIGATION  OF  FACTS  in  Induction,  is  a phrase  employed 
by  Dr.  Whewell  to  denote  the  binding  together  groups  of 
facts  by  means  of  some  suitable  conception.  The  conception 
must  be  capable  of  explanation  or  definition,  not  indeed  of 
adequate  definition,  since  we  shall  have  to  alter  our  description 
of  it  from  time  to  time  with  the  advance  of  knowledge,  but 

still  capable  of  a precise  and  clear  explanation 

Conceptions  not  wholly  correct  may  serve  for  a time  for  the 
colligation  of  facts,  and  may  guide  us  in  researches  which  shall 

end  in  a more  exact  colligation As  soon  as  facts 

occur  which  a conception  is  inadequate  to  explain,  we  unite  it 
or  replace  it  by  a new  one.2 

COMBINATION  and  CONNECTION  of  IDEAS  are  phrases  to 
be  found  in  Locke's  Essay,3  in  which  he  treats  of  what  is  more 
commonly  called  Association  of  Ideas,  — q.  v. 
COMBINATION  OF  IDEAS.  — The  phrase  Association  of  Ideas 
seems  to  have  been  introduced  by  Locke.  It  stands  as  the 
title  to  one  of  the  chapters  in  his  Essay  on  the  Human  Under- 
standing. But  in  the  body  of  the  chapter  he  uses  the  phrase 
combination  of  ideas.  These  two  phrases  have  reference  to 
the  two  views  which  may  be  taken  of  the  train  of  thought  in 
the  mind.  In  both,  under  ideas  are  comprehended  all  the 
various  modes  of  consciousness.  In  treating  of  the  association 
of  ideas,  the  inquiry  is  as  to  the  laws  which  regulate  the  suc- 
cession or  order  according  to  which  one  thought  follows  an- 
other. But,  it  has  been  observed,  that  the  various  modes  of 
consciousness  not  only  succeed  in  some  kind  of  order,  but  that 
they  incorporate  themselves  with  one  another  so  as  to  form 
permanent  and  almost  indissoluble  combinations. 

“When  many  impressions  or  ideas  are  operating  in  the 
mind  together,  there  sometimes  takes  place  a process,  of  a 
similar  kind  to  chemical  combination.  When  impressions 
have  been  so  often  experienced  in  conjunction,  that  each 


1 Haywood,  Crit.  of  Pure  Reason,  p.  593,  2d  edit. 

3 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought,  2d  edit.,  p.  353. 
8 In  book  ii.,  chap.  33. 


94 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


COMBINATION  — 

of  them  calls  up  readily  and  instantaneously  the  ideas  of 
the  whole  group,  these  ideas  sometimes  melt  and  coalesce 
into  one  another,  and  appear  not  several  ideas,  hut  one ; 
in  the  same  manner  as  when  the  seven  prismatic  colours 
are  presented  to  the  eye  in  rapid  succession,  the  sensation 
produced  is  that  of  white.  But,  as  in  this  last  case,  it  is  cor- 
rect to  say,  that  the  seven  colours,  when  they  rapidly  follow 
one  another,  generate  white,  but  not  that  they  actually  are 
white  ; so  it  appears  to  me  that  the  Complex  Idea,  formed  by 
the  blending  together  of  several  simple  ones,  should,  when  it 
really  appears  simple  (that  is,  when  the  separate  elements  are 
not  consciously  distinguishable  in  it),  be  said  to  result  from, 
or  to  be  generated  by,  the  simple  ideas,  not  to  consist  of  them. 
Our  idea  of  an  orange  really  consists  of  the  simple  ideas  of  a 
certain  colour,  a certain  form,  a certain  taste,  and  smell,  &c., 
because  we  can  by  interrogating  our  consciousness,  perceive 
all  these  elements  in  the  idea.  But  we  cannot  conceive,  in  so 
apparently  simple  a feeling  as  our  perception  of  the  shape  of 
an  object  by  the  eye,  all  that  multitude  of  ideas  derived  from 
other  senses,  without  which,  it  is  well  ascertained,  that  no  such 
visual  perception  would  ever  have  had  existence  ; nor  in  our 
idea  of  extension  can  we  discover  these  elementary  ideas  of 
resistance  derived  from  our  muscular  frame,  in  which  Dr. 
Brown  has  shown  it  to  be  highly  probable  that  the  idea  origi- 
nates. These,  therefore,  are  cases  of  mental  chemistry,  in 
which  it  is  proper  to  say  that  the  simple  ideas  generate,  rather 
than  that  they  compose  the  complex  ones.” 1 

Suppose,  that,  in  eating  an  apple  we  had  made  use  of  a 
fruit  knife  ; a connection  comes  to  be  established  in  our  minds 
between  an  apple  and  a fruit  knife ; so  that  when  the  idea  of 
the  one  is  present,  the  idea  of  the  other  also  will  appear ; and 
these  two  ideas  are  said  to  be  associated  in  the  way  of  com- 
bination. 

Or,  the  same  kind  of  connection  may  be  established  between 
two  feelings,  or  between  a cognition  and  a feeling,  or  between 
a feeling  and  a volition,  — between  any  two  or  more  mental 
movements. 


1 Mill,  Log.,  b.  vi.,  cb.  4,  § 4. 


VOCABULARY  OF  FHILOSOFUY. 


95 


COMBINATION— 

In  cutting  an  apple,  we  may  have  wounded  our  finger ; and, 
afterwards,  the  sight  of  an  apple  will  raise  a sense  or  feeling 
of  the  wound.  Having  eaten  of  honey,  we  have  afterwards 
suffered  pain;  and,  when  honey  is  again  presented,  there  will 
he  a feeling  of  dislike,  and  a purpose  to  abstain  from  it. 

The  association,  which  thus  takes  place  between  different 
mental  movements,  is  more  than  mere  juxtaposition  of  separate 
things.  It  amounts  to  a perfect  combination  or  fusion.  And, 
as  in  matter,  compounds  have  properties  which  are  not  mani- 
fested by  any  of  the  component  parts,  in  their  separate  state, 
so  it  is  in  mind  ; the  result  of  various  thoughts  and  feelings 
being  fused  into  one  whole,  may  be  to  produce  a new  princi- 
ple, with  properties  differing  from  the  separate  influence  of 
each  individual  thought  and  feeling.  In  this  way,  many 
secondary  and  factitious  principles  of  action  are  formed. 

COMMON  SENSE  is  a phrase  employed  to  denote  that  degree  of 
intelligence,  sagacity,  and  prudence,  which  is  common  to  all 
men. 

“ There  is  a certain  degree  of  sense  which  is  necessary  to 
our  being  subjects  of  law  and  government,  capable  of  manag- 
ing our  own  affairs  and  answerable  for  our  conduct  to  others. 
This  is  called  common  sense,  because  it  is  common  to  all  men 
with  whom  we  can  transact  business. 

“ The  same  degree  of  understanding  which  makes  a man 
capable  of  acting  with  common  prudence  in  life,  makes  him 
capable  of  discerning  what  is  true  and  what  is  false  in  matters 
that  are  self-evident,  and  which  he  distinctly  apprehends.”  1 

“It  is  by  the  help  of  an  innate  power  of  distinction  that  we 
recognize  the  differences  of  things,  as  it  is  by  a contrary  power 
of  composition  that  we  recognize  their  identities.  These 
powers,  in  some  degree,  are  common  to  all  minds ; and  as 
they  are  the  basis  of  our  whole  knowledge  (which  is,  of  neces- 
sity, either  affirmative  or  negative),  they  may  be  said  to  con- 
stitute what  we  call  common  sense.” 2 

COMMON  SENSE  (The  Philosophy  of)  is  that  philosophy  which 
accepts  the  testimony  of  our  faculties  as  trustworthy  within 


1 Reid,  Intel l.  Pow.,  essay  ri.,  cb.  2. 

a Harris,  Philosoph.  Arrange chap.  9. 


96 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


COMMON  SENSE— 

their  respective  spheres,  and  rests  all  human  knowledge  on 
certain  first  truths  or  primitive  beliefs,  which  are  the  consti- 
tutive elements  or  fundamental  forms  of  our  rational  nature, 
and  the  regulating  principles  of  our  conduct. 

“As  every  ear  not  absolutely  depraved  is  able  to  make 
some  general  distinctions  of  sound;  and,  in  like  manner,  every 
eye,  with  respect  to  objects  of  vision;  and  as  this  general  use 
of  these  faculties,  by  being  diffused  through  all  individuals, 
may  be  called  common  hearing  and  common  vision,  as  opposed 
to  those  more  accurate  energies,  peculiar  only  to  artists ; so 
fares  it  with  respect  to  the  intellect.  There  are  truths  or  uni- 
versal of  so  obvious  a kind,  that  every  mind  or  intellect  not 
absolutely  depraved,  without  the  least  help  of  art,  can  hardly 
fail  to  recognize  them.  The  recognition  of  these,  or  at  least 
the  ability  to  recognize  them,  is  called  rou?  xoivos,  common 
sense,  as  being  a sense  common  to  all  except  lunatics  and 
idiots. 

“Further,  as  this  power  is  called  xoiroj  roif,  so  the  several 
propositions  which  are  its  proper  objects,  are  called  rtpoxfyeif, 
or  pre-conceptions,  as  being  previous  to  all  other  conceptions. 
It  is  easy  to  gather  from  what  has  been  said  that  those 
must  be  general,  as  being  formed  by  induction ; as 
also  natural,  by  being  common  to  all  men,  and  previous  to  all 
instruction  — hence,  therefore,  their  definition.  A pre-con- 
ception is  the  natural  apprehension  of  what  is  general  or 
universal.”  1 

A fundamental  maxim  of  the  Stoics  was,  that  there  is  no- 
thing in  the  intellect  which  has  not  first  been  in  the  sense. 
They  admitted,  however,  natural  notions,  which  they  called 
anticipations,  and  artificial  notions  formed  in  us  by  the  under- 
standing. They  also  recognized  notions  which  all  men  equally 
receive  and  understand.  These  cannot  be  opposed  to  one 
another  ; they  form  what  is  called  common  sense.2 

“A  power  of  the  mind  which  perceives  truth,  not  by  pro- 
gressive argumentation,  but  by  an  instinctive  and  instantaneous 
impulse ; derived  neither  from  education  nor  from  habit,  but 
from  nature ; acting  independently  upon  our  will,  whenever 


1 Harris,  On  Happiness , p.  46. 

Q Bouvier,  Hist,  de  la  Philosophy  tom.  i.,  p.  149,  8vo,  Paris,  1844. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


97 


COMMON  SENSE  - 

the  object  is  presented,  according  to  an  established  law ; and, 
therefore,  not  improperly  called  a sense,  and  acting  in  the 
same  manner  upon  all  mankind ; and,  therefore,  properly 
called  common  sense,  the  ultimate  judge  of  truth.”  1 

“ Common  sense,"  says  Mons.  Jaques,2  “ is  the  unanimous 
sentiment  of  the  whole  human  race,  upon  facts  and  questions 
which  all  may  know  and  resolve — or,  more  precisely,  it  is  the 
ensemble  (complement)  of  notions  and  opinions  common  to  all 
men  of  all  times  and  places,  learned  or  ignorant,  barbarous  or 
civilized.  Spontaneity,  impersonality,  and  universality,  are 
the  characteristics  of  truths  of  common  sense;  and  hence 
their  truth  and  certainty.  The  moral  law,  human  liberty,  the 
existence  of  God,  and  immortality  of  the  soul,  are  truths  of 
common  sense.” 

On  the  nature  and  validity  of  the  common  sense  philosophy, 
see  Reid's  Works  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton ; 3 Oswald,  Appeal  to 
Common  Sense;  Beattie,  Essay  on  Truth,  &c. 

COMMON.— F.  Term. 

COMPACT  ( compingo , to  bind  close),  is  that  by  which  or  to  which 
men  bind  or  oblige  themselves.  It  is  a mutual  agreement 
between  two  or  more  persons  to  do  or  to  refrain  from  doing 
something. — V.  Pact,  Contract. 

COMPARISON  is  the  act  of  carrying  the  mind  from  one  object 
to  another,  in  order  to  discover  some  relation  subsisting 
between  them.  It  is  a voluntary  operation  of  the  mind,  and 
thus  differs  from  the  perception  or  intuition  of  relations,  which 
does  not  always  depend  upon  the  will.  The  result  of  compari- 
son is  knowledge,  which  the  intellect  apprehends,  but  the  act 
is  an  exercise  of  attention  voluntarily  directing  the  energy  of 
the  mind  to  a class  of  objects  or  ideas.  The  theorems  of  ma- 
thematics are  a series  of  judgments  arrived  at  by  comparison, 
or  viewing  different  quantities  and  numbers  in  their  relations. 
The  result  of  comparison  is  a judgment. 

COMPASSION.— F Sympathy. 

COMPLEX.  — “ That  which  consists  of  several  different  things,  so 
put  together  as  to  form  a whole,  is  called  complex.  Complex 


1 Beattie,  Essay  on  Truth , pp.  36-42. 

tt  Mem.  de  VAcadem .,  Roy.  des  Sciences  Mor.  et  Pol.,  tom.  i.,  p.  349,  Paris,  1841. 
3 Appendix,  note  A. 

10  n 


98 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


COMPLEX  — 

things  are  the  subjects  of  analysis.  The  analysis  of  complex 
notions  is  one  of  the  first  and  most  important  exercises  of  the 
understanding.” 1 

COMPREHENSION  means  the  act  of  comprehending  or  fully 
understanding  any  object  or  idea. — V.  Apprehension.  For 
the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  by  the  logicians,  V.  Extension. 

COMPUNCTION  {compungo,  to  prick  or  sting),  is  the  pricking 
or  uneasy  feeling  of  the  conscience  on  account  of  something 
wrong  being  done.  “All  men  are  subject  more  or  less  to 
compunctions  of  conscience.”  — Blair. 

“Stop  up  th’  access  aDd  passage  to  remorse; 

That  no  compunctious  visitings  of  nature 
Shake  my  fell  purpose.”  — Macbeth. 

CONCEIVING  and  APPREHENDING,  or  UNDERSTAND- 
ING. — Dr.  Reid  begins  his  essay  on  Conception  by  saying, 
“ Conceiving,  imagining,  agoprehending,  and  understanding, 
having  a notion  of  a thing,  are  common  words  used  to  express 
that  operation  of  the  understanding  which  the  logicians  call 
simple  apprehension.” 

In  reference  to  this  it  has  been  remarked  by  Mr.  Mansel,2 
that  “conception  must  be  distinguished  as  well  from  mere 
imagination,  as  from  a mere  understanding  of  the  meaning 
of  words.3  Combinations  of  attributes  logically  impossible, 
may  be  expressed  in  language  perfectly  intelligible.  There 
is  no  difficulty  in  understanding  the  meaning  of  the  phrase 
bilinear  figure,  or  iron-gold.  The  language  is  intelligible, 
though  the  object  is  inconceivable.  On  the  other  hand, 
though  all  conception  implies  imagination,  yet  all  imagination 
does  not  imply  conception.  To  have  a conception  of  a horse, 
I must  not  only  know  the  meaning  of  the  several  attributes 
constituting  the  definition  of  the  animal,  but  I must  also  be 
able  to  combine  these  attributes  in  a representative  image, 
that  is,  to  individualize  them.  This,  however,  is  not  mere 
imagination,  it  is  imagination  relatively  to  a concept.  I not 
only  see,  as  it  were,  the  image  with  the  mind’s  eye,  but  I also 
think  of  it  as  a horse,  as  possessing  the  attributes  of  a given 


1 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought.  2 Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  24. 

3 These  have  been  confounded  by  Aldrich,  and  Reid,  and  others. 


VOCABULARY  OR  PHILOSOPHY. 


99 


CONCEIVING  - 

concept,  and  called  by  the  name  expressive  of  them.  But 
mere  imagination  is  possible  without  any  such  relation.  My 
mind  may  recall  a sensible  impression  on  whose  constituent 
features  I have  never  reflected,  and  relatively  to  which  I have 
never  formed  a concept  or  applied  a name.  Imagination 
would  be  possible  in  a being  without  any  power  of  distin- 
guishing or  comparing  his  presentations  ; it  is  compatible  with 
our  ignorance  or  forgetfulness  of  the  existence  of  any  presen- 
tations, save  the  one  represented  by  the  image.  Conception, 
in  its  lowest  degree,  implies  at  least  a comparison  and  distinc- 
tion of  this  from  that.  Conception  proper  thus  holds  an  inter- 
mediate place  between  the  intuitive  and  symbolical  knowledge 
of  Leibnitz,  being  a verification  of  the  latter  by  reference  to 
the  former.” 

“ The  words  conception,  concept,  notion,  should  be  limited  to 
the  thought  of  what  cannot  be  represented  in  the  imagination, 
as  the  thought  suggested  by  a general  term.  The  Leibnitzians 
call  this  symbolical,  in  contrast  to  intuitive  knowledge.  This 
is  the  sense  in  which  conceptio  and  conceptus  have  been  usu- 
ally and  correctly  employed.”1  — V.  Knowledge. 

CONCEPT,  A,  “is  a collection  of  attributes,  united  by  a sign, 
and  representing  a possible  object  of  intuition.”’ 

It  was  used,  or  conceit  as  synonymous  with  it,  by  the  older 
English  writers.3 

Kant  and  his  followers,  while  they  reserve  the  word  idea  to 
denote  the  absolute  products  of  the  reason,  and  intuition  to 
denote  the  particular  notions  which  we  derive  from  the  senses, 
have  applied  the  word  concept  ( begriff ) to  notions  which  are 
general  without  being  absolute.  They  say  they  are  of  three 

. kinds,  — 1.  Pure  concepts,  which  borrow  nothing  from  experi- 
ence ; as  the  notions  of  cause,  time,  and  space.  2.  Empirical 
concepts,  which  are  altogether  derived  from  experience  ; as  the 
notion  of  colour  or  pleasure.  3.  Mixed  concepts,  composed  of 
elements  furnished  partly  by  experience,  and  partly  by  the 
pure  understanding.4 

1 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works,  p.  360,  note.  2 Mansel,  Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  60. 

3 See  Baynes,  Essay  on  Analytic  of  Log.  Forms,  Svo,  Edin.,  1850,  pp.  5,  6;  Sir  W.  Ham- 

ilton, Reid's  Works,  p.  393. 

4 See  Schmid,  Diclionnaire  pour  servir  aux  cents  de  Kant,  12mo,  Jena,  1798. 


100 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CONCEPT  - 

A concept  is  clear,  when  its  object,  as  a whole,  can  he  dis- 
tinguished from  any  other  ; it  is  distinct,  when  its  several  con- 
stituent parts  can  be  distinguished  from  each  other.  The 
merit  of  first  pointing  out  these  characteristics  of  the  logical 
perfection  of  thought  is  ascribed  to  Leibnitz.1 
CONCEPT,  CONCEPTION  ( conceptus , conception  to  notio  or 
notion). — “ Conception  consists  in  a conscious  act  of  the  under- 
■ standing,  bringing  any  given  object  or  impression  into  the 
same  class  with  any  number  of  other  objects  or  impressions, 
by  means  of  some  character  or  characters  common  to  them  all. 
Concipimus,  id  est,  capimus  hoc  cum  illo  — we  take  hold  of 
both  at  once,  we  comprehend  a thing,  when  we  have  learnt  to 
comprise  it  in  a known  class.” 2 

“Conception  is  the  forming  orbringing  an  image  or  idea 
into  the  mind  by  an  eifort  of  the  will.  It  is  distinguished 
from  sensation  and  perception,  produced  by  an  object  present 
to  the  senses  ; and  from  imagination,  which  is  the  joining  to- 
gether of  ideas  in  new  ways  ; it  is  distinguished  from  memory, 
by  not  having  the  feeling  of  past  time  connected  with  the 
idea.”3 

According  to  Mr.  Stewart,4  conception  is  “ that  faculty,  the 
business  of  which  is  to  present  us  with  an  exact  transcript  of 
what  we  have  felt  or  perceived,”  or  that  faculty,  whose  pro- 
vince it  is  “to  enable  us  to  form  a notion  of  our  past  sensa- 
tions or  of  the  objects  of  sense  which  we  have  formerly  per- 
ceived.” But  what  Mr.  Stewart  would  thus  assign  to  the  faculty 
of  conception  belongs  to  imagination  in  its  reproductive  func- 
tion. Hence  Sir  Will.  Hamilton  has  said,5  “ Mr.  Stewart  has  be- 
stowed on  the  reproductive  imagination  the  term  conception  ; 
happily,  we  do  not  think ; as,  both  in  grammatical  propriety  and 
by  the  older  and  correcter  usage  of  philosophers,  this  term  (or 
rather  the  product  of  this  operation,  concept)  is  convertible  with 
general  notion,  or  more  correctly,  notion  simply,  and/in  this  sense 


1 See  Meditationes  de  Cognitione , Yeritaie  et  Ideis. 

a Coleridge,  Church  and  State , Prelim.  Rem.,  p.  4. 

3 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

* Elements , vol.  i.,  chap.  3. 

5 Discussions , p.  276. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


101 


CONCEPTION  — 

is  admirably  rendered  by  the  begrijf  (which  is,  grasped  vp) 
of  the  Germans.” 

According  to  Kant,  cognition  by  conception  ( begrijf ) is  a 
inode  of  cognizing  an  object,  when  I have  not  the  same  imme- 
diately before  me.  If  I see  a tree  before  me,  its  immediate 
representation  strikes  upon  the  senses,  and  I have  an  intuition 
of  it ; but  if  I represent  to  myself  the  tree  by  means  of  certain 
characteristics,  which  I seek  for  in  the  intuition  of  it,  as,  for 
example,  the  trunk,  branches,  and  leaves,  these  characteristics 
are  termed  signs,  and  the  complex  of  them  is  termed  the 
content  of  the  conception,  and  affords  a mediate  representation 
of  the  tree.  The  difference  between  pure  and  empirical  con- 
ceptions does  not  concern  the  origin  of  either  in  time,  or  the 
mode  whereby  we  come  to  the  consciousness  thereof,  but  the 
origin  of  the  same,  from  the  source  and  content.  Hence  an 
empirical  conception  is  that  which  does  not  only  arise  by  occa- 
sion of  experience,  but  to  which  experience  also  furnishes  the 
matter.  A pure  conception  is  that  with  which  no  sensation  is 
mixed  up.  The  conception  of  cause  is  a pure  conception  of 
this  kind,  since  I have  no  sensible  object  winch  I would  term 
Cause.1 

CONCEPTION  and  IMAGINATION.— “ Properly  and  strictly 
to  conceive  is  an  act  more  purely  intellectual  than  imagining, 
proceeding  from  a faculty  superior  to  those  of  sense  and  fancy, 
or  imagination,  which  are  limited  to  corporeal  things,  and 
those  determined,  as  all  particulars  must  be,  to  this  or  that, 
place,  time,  manner,  &c.  When  as  that  higher  power  in  man, 
which  we  may  call  the  mind,  can  form  apprehensions  of  what 
is  not  material  (viz.,  of  spirits  and  the  affections  of  bodies 
which  fall  not  under  sense),  and  also  can  frame  general  ideas 
or  notions,  or  consider  of  things  in  a general  way  without 
attending  to  their  particular  limited  circumstances,  as  when 
we  think  of  length  in  a road,  without  observing  its  determin- 
ate measure.” 2 

“ It  is  one  thing  to  imagine  and  another  thing  to  conceive. 
For  do  we  conceive  anything  more  clearly  than  our  thought 

4 Haywood,  Crit.  of  l*ure  Reason , p.  594 ; Baynes,  Essay  on  Analyt.  of  Log.  Forms , 
pp.  5,  6. 

3 Oldfield,  Essay  on  Reason,  p.  11. 

10* 


102 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CONCEPTION  — 

when  we  think?  And  yet  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  a thought, 
or  to  paint  any  image  of  it  in  the  brain.”  1 

“ The  distinction  between  conception  and  imagination  is  real, 
though  it  be  too  often  overlooked  and  the  words  taken  to  be 
synonymous.  I can  conceive  a thing  that  is  impossible,  but  I 
cannot  distinctly  imagine  a thing  that  is  impossible.  I can 
conceive  a proposition  or  a demonstration,  but  I cannot  imagine 
either.  I can  conceive  understanding  and  will,  virtue  and  vice, 
and  other  attributes  of  mind,  but  I cannot  imagine  them.  In 
like  manner,  I can  distinctly  conceive  universals,  but  I cannot 
imagine  them.”2 

Imagination  has  to  do  only  with  objects  of  sense,  conception 
with  objects  of  thought.  The  things  which  we  imagine  are 
represented  to  the  mind  as  individuals,  as  some  particular 
man,  or  some  particular  horse.  The  things  of  which  we  con- 
ceive are  such  as  may  be  denoted  by  general  terms,  as  man, 
horse. 

“ The  notions”  (or  conceptions)  which  the  “mind  forms  from 
things  offered  to  it,  are  either  of  single  objects,  as  of  ‘this 
pain,  that  man,  Westminster  Abbey;'  or  of  many  objects 
taken  together,  as  ‘pain,  man,  abbey.’”  Notions  of  single 
objects  are  called  intuitions,  as  being  such  as  the  mind  receives 
when  it  simply  attends  to  or  inspects  ( intuetur ) the  object. 
Notions  formed  from  several  objects  are  called  conceptions,  as 
being  formed  by  the  power  which  the  mind  has  of  taking 
things  together  ( conciperc , i.  e.,  capere  hoc  cum  illo). 

“On  inspecting  two  or  more  objects  of  the  same  class,  we 
begin  to  compare  them  with  one  another,  and  with  those  which 
are  already  reposited  in  our  memory ; and  we  discover  that 
they  have  some  points  of  resemblance.  All  the  houses,  for 
example,  which  come  in  our  way,  however  they  may  differ  in 
height,  length,  position,  convenience,  duration,  have  some 
common  points ; they  are  all  covered  buildings,  and  fit  for  the 
habitation  of  men.  By  attending  to  these  points  only,  and 
abstracting  thorn  from  all  the  rest,  we  arrive  at  a general 
notion  of  a house,  that  it  is  a covered  building  fit  for  human 
habitation  ; and  to  this  notion  we  attach  a particular  name, 


1 Port  Roy.  Log.,  part  i.,  chap.  1. 
3 Reid,  Intcll.  row ,,  essay  iv. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


103 


CONCEPTION  — 

house,  to  remind  us  of  the  process  ire  hare  gone  through,  and 
to  record  its  results  for  use.  The  general  notion  so  formed  ire 
call  a conception  ; the  common  points  ire  observed  in  the  vari- 
ous objects  are  called  marks  or  notes;  and  the  process  of 
observing  them  and  forming  one  entire  notion  from  them  is 
termed  abstraction.” 1 

CONCEPTION  and  IDEA. — “ By  conception  is  meant  the  simple 
view  we  have  of  the  objects  which  are  presented  to  our  mind ; 
as  when,  for  instance,  we  think  of  the  sun,  the  earth,  a tree,  a 
circle,  a square,  thought,  being,  without  forming  any  determi- 
nate judgment  concerning  them  ; and  the  form  through  which 
we  consider  these  things  is  called  an  idea.” — Port.  Hoy.  Log. 

“ The  having  an  idea  of  a thing  is,  in  common  language, 
used  in  the  same  sense  (as  conceiving),  chiefly,  I think,”  says 
Dr.  Reid,  “ since  Mr.  Locke’s  time.” 

“ A conception  is  something  derived  from  observation ; not 
so  ideas,  which  meet  with  nothing  exactly  answering  to  them 
within  the  range  of  our  experience.  Thus  ideas  are  a priori, 
conceptions  are  a posteriori;  and  it  is  only  by  means  of  the 
former  that  the  latter  are  really  possible.  For  the  bare  fact, 
taken  by  itself,  falls  short  of  the  conception  which  may  be 
described  as  the  synthesis  of  the  fact  and  the  idea.  Thus  we 
have  an  idea  of  the  universe,  under  which  its  different  phe- 
nomena fall  into  place,  and  from  which  they  take  their  mean- 
ing ; we  have  an  idea  of  God  as  creator,  from  which  we  derive 
the  power  of  conceiving  that  the  impressions  produced  upon 
our  minds,  through  the  senses,  result  from  really  existing 
things ; we  have  an  idea  of  the  soul,  which  enables  us  to  real- 
ize our  own  personal  identity,  by  suggesting  that  a feeling, 
conceiving,  thinking  subject,  exists  as  a substratum  of  every 
sensation,  conception,  thought.”2 

“ Every  conception,”  says  Coleridge,3  “ has  its  sole  reality  in 
its  being  referable  to  a thing  or  class  of  things,  of  which,  or 
of  the  common  characters  of  which,  it  is  a reflection.  An 
idea  is  a power,  Svrajut;  votpa,  which  constitutes  its  own  reality, 


1 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought , p.  105,  Principles  of  Necessary  and  Contin • 
gent  Truth , p.  141. 

54  Chretien,  Essay  on  Log.  Meth p.  137. 

3 Notes  on  English  Divines , 12mo,  1853,  vol.  i.,  p.  27. 


104 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CONCEPTION  — 

and  is,  in  order  of  thought,  necessarily  antecedent  to  the 
things  in  which  it  is  more  or  less  adequately  realized,  while  a 
conception  is  as  necessarily  posterior.” 

Conception  is  used  to  signify — 1.  The  power  or  faculty  of 
conceiving,  as  when  Mr.  Stewart  says,  “ Under  the  article  of 
conception  I shall  confine  myself  to  that  faculty  whose  province 
it  is  to  enable  us  to  form  a notion  of  our  past  sensations,  or  of 
the  objects  of  sense  that  we  have  formerly  perceived.” 

2.  The  act  or  operation  of  this  power  or  faculty.  “ Concep- 
tion,” says  Sir  John  Stoddart,1  “which  is  derived  from  con 
and  caj)io,  expresses  the  action  by  which  I take  zip  together  a 
portion  of  our  sensations,  as  it  were  water,  in  some  vessel 
adapted  to  contain  a certain  quantity.” 

“ Conception  is  the  act  by  which  we  comprehend  by  means 
of  a general  notion,  as  distinguished  both  from  the  perception 
of  a present,  and  the  imagination  of  an  absent  individual.” 2 

3.  The  result  of  the  operation  of  this  power  or  faculty ; as 
when  Dr.  Whewell  says,* 3  “ our  conceptions  are  that,  in  the 
mind,  which  we  denote  by  our  general  terms,  as  a triangle,  a 
square  number,  a force.” 

This  last  signification,  however,  is  more  correctly  and  con- 
veniently given  by  the  word  concept,  i.  e.,  conception,  or  id 
quod  conccptum  est. 

CONCEPTUALISM  is  a doctrine  in  some  sense  intermediate  be- 
tween realism  and  nominalism,  q.  v.  Have  genera  and  species 
a real  independent  existence  ? The  Idealist  answers  that  they 
exist  independently ; that  besides  individual  objects  and  the 
general  notion  from  them  in  the  mind,  there  exist  certain  ideas, 
the  pattern  after  which  the  single  objects  are  fashioned;  and 
that  the  general  notion  in  our  mind  is  the  counterpart  of  the  idea 
without  it.  The  Nom  inalist  says  that  nothing  exists  but  things, 
and  names  of  things ; and  that  universals  are  mere  names, 
flatus  venti.  The  Conccptualists  assign  to  universals  an  exist- 
ence which  may  be  called  logical  or  psychological,  that  is,  in- 
dependent of  single  objects,  but  dependent  upon  the  mind  of  the 
thinking  subject,  in  which  they  are  as  notions  or  conceptions.4 

1 Univ.  Gram.,  in  Encyclop.  Mctropol.  a North  Brit.  Rev..  No.  27,  p.  45. 

3 Pref.  to  the  Philosoph.  of  the  Induct.  Sciences,  p.  13. 

4 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought,  2d  edit.,  p.  112. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


105 


CONCEPTUALISM  - 

Dr.  Brown,  while  liis  views  approach  those  of  the  Concep- 
tualisls,  'would  prefer  to  call  himself  a llelationist? 

CONCLUSION.  — When  something  is  simply  affirmed  to  he  true, 
it  is  called  a proposition ; after  it  has  been  found  to  be  true, 
by  several  reasons  or  arguments,  it  is  called  a conclusion. 
“ Sloth  and  prodigality  will  bring  a man  to  want,”  this  is  a 
proposition ; after  all  the  arguments  have  been  mentioned 
which  prove  this  to  be  true,  we  say,  “therefore  sloth  and 
prodigality  will  bring  a man  to  want this  is  now  the  con - 
elusion.'1 2 3 

That  proposition  which  is  inferred  from  the  premises  of  an 
argument  is  called  the  conclusion? 

CONCEETE  [concresco,  to  grow  together),  is  opposed  to  abstract. 

A concrete  notion  is  the  notion  of  an  object  as  it  exists  in 
nature,  invested  with  all  its  qualities.  An  abstract  notion,  on 
the  contrary,  is  the  notion  of  some  quality  or  attribute  sepa- 
rated from  the  object  to  which  it  belongs,  and  deprived  of  all 
the  specialities  with  which  experience  invests  it ; or  it  may  be 
the  notion  of  a substance  stripped  of  all  its  qualities.  In  this 
way  concrete  comes  to  be  synonymous  with  particular,  and 
abstract  with  general. 

The  names  of  classes  are  abstract,  those  of  individuals  con- 
crete; and  from  concrete  adjectives  are  made  abstract  substan- 
tives.— Y.  Abstract,  Term. 

CONDIGNITY.—  v.  Merit. 

CONDITION — ( Conditio  fere  sumitur  pro  qualitaie  qua  quid  condi, 
id  est  fieri. — Yossius.  Or  it  may  be  from  condo,  to  give  along 
with,  i.  e.,  something  given  or  going  along  with  a cause). 

A condition  is  that  which  is  pre-requisite  in  order  that 
something  may  be,  and  especially  in  order  that  a cause  may 
operate.  A condition  does  not  operate  but  by  removing  some 
impediment,  as  opening  the  eyes  to  see ; or  by  applying  one’s 
strength  in  conjunction  with  another,  when  two  men  are  re- 


1 See  Physiol,  of  Ham.  Mind , p.  295.  Cousin,  Introd.  Aux  Ouvrages  Inedits  cC Abe- 
lard, 4to,  Par.,  1S3C,  p.  181 ; Reid,  lntell.  Poiu.,  essay  v.,  chap.  6,  with  Sir  W.  Hamilton’s 
note,  p.  412. 

2 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

3 Whately,  Log b.  ii.,  ch.  3,  § 1. 


10G 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


CONDITION  — 

quircd  to  lift  or  carry  a weight,  it  being  a condition  of  tlieir 
doing  so  that  their  strength  be  exerted  at  the  same  time.  A 
condition  is  prior  to  the  production  of  an  effect ; but  it  docs 
not  produce  it.  It  is  fire  that  burns ; but,  before  it  burns,  it 
is  a condition  that  there  be  an  approximation  of  the  fire  to  the 
fuel,  or  the  matter  that  is  burned.  Where  there  is  no  wood 
the  fire  goeth  out.  The  cause  of  burning  is  the  element  of 
fire,  fuel  is  a con-causc,  and  the  condition  is  the  approxima- 
tion of  the  one  to  the  other.  The  impression  on  the  wax  is 
the  effect — the  seal  is  the  cause  ; the  pressure  of  the  one  sub- 
stance upon  the  other,  and  the  softness  or  fluidity  of  the  wax 
are  conditions. 

“ By  a condition ,”  says  Mr.  Karslake,1  “ is  meant  something 
more  negative,  whereas  a cause  is  regarded  as  something  more 
positive.  We  seem  to  think  of  a condition  rather  as  that 
whose  absence  would  have  prevented  a thing  from  taking 
place ; of  a cause,  rather  as  that  whose  presence  produced  it. 
Thus  we  apply,  perhaps,  the  word  cause  rather  to  that  between 
which  and  the  result  we  can  see  a more  immediate  connection. 
If  so,  then  in  this  way,  also,  every  cause  will  be  a condition, 
or  antecedent,  but  not  every  antecedent  will  be  a cause.  The 
fact  of  a city  being  built  of  wood  will  be  a condition  of  its 
being  burnt  down : some  inflammable  matter  having  caught 
fire  will  be  the  cause.” — V.  Occasion. 

Condition  and  Conditioned  ( Bcdingung  and  Bcdingies ) are 
correlative  conceptions.  The  condition  is  the  ground  which 
must  be  presupposed ; and  what  presupposes  a condition  is 
the  conditioned,  conditionate,  or  conditional. 

CONDITIONAL.  — V.  Proposition,  Syllogism. 

CONG-NUTTY  (from  congruo,  to  come  together  as  cranes  do, 
who  feed  and  fly  in  companies),  means  the  fitness  or  agreement 
of  one  thing  to  another.  Congruitg  to  the  relations  of  the 
agent  is  given  by  some  philosophers  as  the  characteristic  cf 
all  right  actions.  Thus  there  is  a congruitg  or  fitness  in  a 
creature  worshipping  his  Creator,  in  a son  honouring  his  father. 
In  this  use  of  the  word  it  belongs  to  the  theory  which  places 
virtue  in  the  nature,  reason,  and  fitness  of  things. — V.  Merit. 


1 Aids  lo  Leg.,  vol.  it,  p.  43. 


VOCABULARY  OR  PIIILOSOrHY. 


107 


CONJUGATE.  — Words  of  the  same  stock  or  kindred,  as  ivise,  to 
be  wise,  wisely,  are  called  conjugate  or  paronymous  words. 

CONNOTATIVE,  A,  or  attributive  term  is  one  which,  when 
applied  to  some  object,  is  such  as  to  imply  in  its  signification 
some  attribute  belonging  to  that  object.  It  connotes,  i.  e., 
notes  along  with  the  object  (or  implies),  something  considered 
as  inherent  therein ; as  “ The  capital  of  France,”  “ The 
founder  of  Rome.”  The  founding  of  Rome  is,  by  that  appel- 
lation, attributed  to  the  person  to  whom  it  is  applied. 

A term  which  merely  denotes  an  object,  without  implying 
any  attribute  of  that  object,  is  called  .absolute  or  non-con- 
notative  ; as  Paris,  Romulus.  The  latter  terms  denote  respec- 
tively the  same  objects  as  the  former,  but  do  not,  like  them, 
connote  ( imply  in  their  signification)  any  attribute  of  those 
individuals.1 

CONSANGUINITY  [con  sanguis,  of  the  same  blood),  is  defined 
to  be,  vinculum  personarum  ab  eodem  stipite  descendentium,  the 
relation  of  persons  descended  from  the  same  stock  or  common 
ancestor.  It  is  either  lineal  or  collateral.  Lineal  consanguinity 
is  that  which  subsists  between  persons  of  whom  one  is  de- 
scended in  a direct  line  from  the  other ; as  son,  grandson, 
great  grandson,  &c.  Collateral  relations  agree  with  the  lineal 
in  this,  that  they  descend  from  the  same  stock  or  ancestor ; 
but  differ  in  this,  that  they  do  not  descend  the  one  from  the 
other.  John  has  two  sons,  who  have  each  a numerous  issue  ; 
both  these  issues  are  lineally  descended  from  John,  or  their 
common  ancestor  ; and  they  are  collateral  kinsmen  to  each 
other,  because  all  descended  from  this  common  ancestor, -and 
all  have  a portion  of  his  blood  in  their  veins,  which  denomi- 
nates them  consanguineous. — F.  Affinity. 

CONSCIENCE  ( conscientia , joint  or  double  knowledge),  means 
knowledge  of  conduct  in  reference  to  the  law  of  right  and 
wrong. 

“ Conscience  is  the  reason,  employed  about  questions  of 
right  and  wrong,  and  accompanied  with  the  sentiments  of 
approbation  and  condemnation,  which,  by  the  nature  of  man, 
cling  inextricably  to  his  apprehension  of  right  and  wrong.”2 


1 Whately,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  5,  § 1 ; Mill,  Log.,  b.  i.,  cb.  2.  sect.  5. 

2 Whowell,  Syst.  Mor.,  lect.  Yi. 


108 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CONSCIENCE  — 

According  to  some,  conscience  takes  cognizance  merely  of 
our  own  conduct.  Thus  Bishop  Butler  has  said : 1 “ The 
principle  in  man  by  which  he  approves  or  disapproves  of  his 
heart,  temper,  and  actions,  is  conscience — for  this  is  the  strict 
sense  of  the  word,  though  it  is  sometimes  used  so  as  to  take  in 
more.” 

Locke  defined  conscience  to  be  “ our  own  judgment  of  the 
rectitude  and  pravity  of  our  own  actions.” 

Dr.  Rush2  has  said:  “The  moral  faculty  exercises  itself 
upon  the  actions  of  others.  It  approves,  even  in  books,  of 
the  virtues  of  a Trajan,  and  disapproves  of  the  vices  of  a 
Marius,  while  conscience  confines  its  operations  to  our  own 
actions.” 

“The  word  ‘ conscience ’ does  not  immediately  denote  any 
moral  faculty  by  which  we  approve  or  disapprove.  Conscience 
supposes,  indeed,  the  existence  of  some  such  faculty,  and  pro- 
perly signifies  our  consciousness  of  having  acted  agreeably  or 
contrary  to  its  directions.”3 

“ Conscience  coincides  exactly  with  the  moral  faculty,  with 
this  ditferenco  only,  that  the  former  refers  to  our  own  conduct 
alone,  whereas  the  latter  is  meant  to  express  also  the  power  by 
which  we  approve  or  disapprove  of  the  conduct  of  others.”1 

By  these  writers  conscience  is  represented  as  being  the  func- 
tion of  the  moral  faculty  in  reference  to  our  own  conduct,  and 
as  giving  us  a consciousness  of  self-approbation  or  of  self- 
condemnation. 

By  a further  limitation  of  the  term,  conscience  has  been  re- 
garded by  some  as  merely  retrospective  in  its  exercise ; and 
by  a still  further  limitation  as  only,  or  chiefly,  punitive  in  its 
exercise,  and  implying  the  consciousness  of  our  having  acted 
wrong. 

But  of  late  years,  and  by  the  best  writers,  the  term  con- 
science, and  the  phrases  moral  faculty,  moral  judgment,  faculty 
of  moral  perception,  moral  sense,  susceptibility  of  moral  emo- 


1 Sermon  i.,  On  Hum.  Nature. 

3 Inquiry  into  the  Influence  of  Physical  Causes  upon  the  Moral  Faculty,  p.  3. 

3 Smith,  Theory  of  Mor.  Sent.,  pt.  vii.,  sect.  3. 

* Stewart,  Act.  row.,  pt.  i.,  ch.  2.  See  also  Tayne,  Elements  of  Mor.  Science,  1845, 
p.  283. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


109 


CONSCIENCE  — 

tion,  have  all  been  applied  to  that  faculty,  or  combination  of 
faculties,  by  which  we  have  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  in 
reference  to  actions,  and  correspondent  feelings  of  approba- 
tion and  disapprobation.  This  faculty,  or  combination  of 
faculties,  is  called  into  exercise  not  merely  in  reference  to  our 
own  conduct,  but  also  in  reference  to  the  conduct  of  others. 
It  is  not  only  reflective  but  prospective  in  its  operations.  It  is 
antecedent  as  well  as  subsequent  to  action  in  its  exercise ; and 
is  occupied  defaciendo  as  well  as  de  facto.1 

In  short,  conscience  constitutes  itself  a witness  of  the  past 
and  of  the  future,  and  judges  of  actions  reported  as  if  present 
when  they  were  actually  done.  It  takes  cognizance  not  merely 
of  the  individual  man,  but  of  human  nature,  and  pronounces 
concerning  actions  as  right  or  wrong,  not  merely  in  reference 
to  one  person,  or  one  time,  or  one  place,  but  absolutely  and 
universally. 

With  reference  to  their  views  as  to  the  nature  of  conscience 
and  the  constitution  of  the  moral  faculty,  modern  philoso- 
phers may  be  arranged  in  two  great  schools  or  sects.  The 
difference  between  them  rests  on  the  prominence  and  prece- 
dence which  they  assign  to  reason  and  to  feeling  in  the  exer- 
cise of  the  moral  faculty ; and  their  respective  theories  may  be 
distinctively  designated  the  intellectual  theory  and  the  senti- 
mental theory.  A brief  view  of  the  principal  arguments  in 
support  of  each  may  be  found  in  Ilume.2 

CONSCIOUSNESS  [conscientia,  joint  knowledge,  a knowledge  of 
one  thing  in  connection  or  relation  with  another). 

Sir  William  Hamilton3  has  remarked  that  “the  Greek  has 
no  word  for  consciousness,”  and  that  “ Tertullian  is  the  only 
ancient  who  uses  the  word  conscientia  in  a psychological  sense, 
corresponding  with  our  consciousness.”  * 

The  meaning  of  a word  is  sometimes  best  attained  by 
means  of  the  word  opposed  to  it.  Unconsciousness,  that  is, 
the  want  or  absence  of  consciousness,  denotes  the  suspension 
of  all  our  faculties.  Consciousness,  then,  is  the  state  in 
which  we  are  when  all  or  any  of  our  faculties  are  in  exer- 


1 See  Reid,  Act.  Pow essay  iii.,  pt.  iii.,  ch.  8. 
a Inquiry  concerning  the  Principles  of  Morals,  sect  5. 

3 Discussions , p.  110,  note.  4 Reid's  Works,  p.  775. 

n 


110 


VOCABULARY  OF  PniLOSOPHY. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  — 

cise.  It  is  the  condition  or  accompaniment  of  every  mental 
operation. 

The  scholastic  definition  was,  perceptio  qua  mens  depresenti 
suo  statu  admonetur. 

“Consciousness  is  the  necessary  knowledge  which  the  mind 
has  of  its  own  operations.  In  knowing,  it  knows  that  it 
knows.  In  experiencing  emotions  and  passions,  it  knows  that 
it  experiences  them.  In  willing,  or  exercising  acts  of  cau- 
sality, it  knows  that  it  wills  or  exercises  such  acts.  This  is 
the  common,  universal,  and  spontaneous  consciousness.”  . . . 
“ By  consciousness  more  nicely  and  accurately  defined,  we 
mean  the  power  and  act  of  self-recognition : not  if  you  please, 
the  mind  knowing  its  knowledges,  emotions,  and  volitions ; 
hut  the  mind  knowing  itself  in  these.”  1 

Mr.  Locke  has  said,2  “ It  is  altogether  as  intelligible  to  say 
that  a body  is  extended  without  parts,  as  that  anything  thinks 
without  being  conscious  of  it,  or  perceiving  that  it  does  so. 
They  who  talk  in  this  way,  may,  with  as  much  reason,  say 
that  a man  is  always  hungry,  but  that  he  does  not  always  feel 
it ; whereas  hunger  consists  in  that  very  sensation,  as  thinking 
consists  in  being  conscious  that  one  thinks  ! ” 

“ We  not  only  feel,  but  we  know  that  we  feel;  we  not  only 
act,  but  we  know  that  we  act ; we  not  only  think,  but  we  know 
that  we  think ; to  think,  without  knowing  that  we  think,  is  as 
if  we  should  not  think ; and  the  peculiar  quality,  the  funda- 
mental attribute  of  thought,  is  to  have  a consciousness  of  itself. 
Consciousness  is  this  interior  light  which  illuminates  every- 
thing that  takes  place  in  the  soul ; consciousness  is  the  ac- 
companiment of  all  our  faculties ; and  is,  so  to  speak,  their 
echo.” 3 

On  consciousness  as  the  necessary  form  of  thought,  see  lec- 
ture v.  of  the  same  volume. 

That  consciousness  is  not  a particular  faculty  of  the  mind, 
but  the  universal  condition  of  intelligence,  the  fundamental 
form  of  all  the  modes  of  our  thinking  activity,  and  not  a 
special  mode  of  that  activity,  is  strenuously  maintained  by 

1 Tappan,  Doctrine  of  the  Will  by  an  Appeal  to  Consciousness,  chap.  2,  sect.  1. 

a Essay  on  Hum.  Understand book  ii.,  ck.  1. 

3 Cousin,  Hist,  of  Mod.  Philosophy  vol.  i.,  pp.  274-5 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


Ill 


CONSCIOUSNESS  — 

Amadee  Jacques,1  and  also  by  two  American  writers,  Mr. 
Bowen2  and  Mr.  Tappan.  This  view  is  in  accordance  with 
the  saying  of  Aristotle,  ot-x  ttmr  aioOiiaeos — there  is 

not  a feeling-  of  a feeling;  and  that  of  the  schoolmen — “Non 
sentimus,  nisi  sentiamus  nos  seniire  — non  intelligimus,  nisi  in- 
telligamvs  nos  intelligerc.”  “No  man,”  said  Dr.  Reid,  “can 
perceive  an  object  without  being  conscious  that  he  perceives 
it.  No  man  can  think,  without  being  conscious  that  he  thinks.” 
And  as  on  the  one  hand  we  cannot  think  or  feel  without  being 
conscious,  so  on  the  other  hand  we  cannot  be  conscious  without 
thinking  or  feeling.  This  would  be,  if  possible,  to  be  con- 
scious of  nothing,  to  have  a consciousness  which  was  no  con- 
sciousness, or  consciousness  without  an  object.  "Annihilate 
the  object  of  any  mental  operation  and  you  annihilate  the 
operation;  annihilate  the  consciousness  of  the  object,  and  you 
annihilate  the  operation.” 

This  view  of  consciousness,  as  the  common  condition  under 
which  all  our  faculties  are  brought  into  operation,  or  of  con- 
sidering these  faculties  and  their  operations  as  so  many  modi- 
fications of  consciousness,  has  of  late  been  generally  adopted; 
so  much  so,  that  psychology,  or  the  science  of  mind,  has  been 
denominated  an  inquiry  into  the  facts  of  consciousness.  All 
that  we  can  truly  learn  of  mind  must  be  learned  by  attending 
to  the  various  ways  in  which  it  becomes  conscious.  None  of 
the  phenomena  of  consciousness  can  be  called  in  question. 
They  may  be  more  or  less  clear — more  or  less  complete ; but 
they  either  are  or  are  not. 

In  the  Diet,  des  Sciences  Philosoph.,3  it  is  maintained  that 
consciousness  is  a separate  faculty,  having  self,  or  the  ego,  for 
its  object. 

Instead  of  regarding  consciousness  as  the  common  condition 
or  accompaniment  of  every  mental  operation,  Royer  Collard 
and  Adolphe  Gamier  among  the  French,  and  Reid  and  Stewart 
among  the  Scotch  philosophers,  have  been  represented  as 
holding  the  opinion  that  consciousness  is  a separate  faculty, 
having  for  its  objects  the  operations  of  our  other  faculties. 
“Consciousness,”  says  Dr.  Reid,4  “is  a word  used  by  philoso- 

1 Tn  the  Manuel  de  Philosophic , Partic  Psycholog ique. 

a In  his  Critical  Essays , p.  131.  3 Art.  “ Conscience.” 

4 Intcll.  Povj essay  i.,  chap.  1 ; sec  also  essay  Ti.,  chap.  5. 


112 


VOCABULARY  OF  I>IiILOSOriIY. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  — 

pliers  to  signify  that  immediate  knowledge  which  we  have  of 
our  present  thoughts  and  purposes,  and  in  general,  of  all  the 
present  operations  of  our  minds.  Whence  we  may  observe 
that  consciousness  is  only  of  things  present.  To  apply  con- 
sciousness to  things  past,  which  sometimes  is  done,  in  popular 
discourse,  is  to  confound  consciousness  with  memory ; and  all 
such  confusion  of  words  ought  to  be  avoided  in  philosophical 
discourse.  It  is  likewise  to  be  observed  that  consciousness  is 
only  of  things  in  the  mind,  and  not  of  external  things.  It  is 
improper  to  say,  ‘ I am  conscious  of  the  table  which  is  before 
me.’  I perceive  it,  I see  it,  but  do  not  say  I am  conscious  of 
it.  As  that  consciousness  by  which  we  have  a knowledge  of 
the  operations  of  our  own  minds,  is  a different  power  from 
that  by  which  we  perceive  external  objects ; and  as  these  dif- 
ferent powers  have  different  names  in  our  language,  and,  I 
believe,  in  all  languages,  a philosopher  ought  carefully  to 
preserve  this  distinction  and  never  confound  things  so  different 
in  their  nature.”  In  this  passage  Dr.  Reid  speaks  of  conscious- 
ness properly  so  called  as  that  consciousness  which  is  distinct 
from  the  cojiscioustiess  by  which  we  perceive  external  objects 
— as  if  perception  was  another  kind  or  mode  of  consciousness. 
Whether  all  his  language  be  quite  consistent  with  the  opinion 
that  all  our  faculties  are  just  so  many  different  modes  of  our 
becoming  conscious,  may  be  doubted.  But  there  is  no  doubt 
that  by  consciousness  he  meant  especially  attention  to  the  ope- 
rations of  our  own  minds,  or  reflection  ; while  by  observation 
he  meant  attention  to  external  things.  This  language  has 
been  interpreted  as  favourable  to  the  opinion  that  consciousness 
is  a separate  faculty.  Yet  he  has  not  distinctly  separated  it 
from  reflection  except  by  saying  that  consciousness  accompa- 
nies all  the  operations  of  mind.  Now  reflection  does  not.  It 
is  a voluntary  act — an  energetic  attention  to  the  facts  of  con- 
sciousness. But  consciousness  may  be  either  spontaneous  or 
reflective. 

“ This  word  denotes  the  immediate  knowledge  which  the 
mind  has  of  its  sensations  and  thoughts,  and,  in  general,  of 
all  its  present  operations.”  1 


1 Outlines  of  Nor.  Philosophy  part  i.,  sect.  1, 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


113 


CONSCIOUSNESS  - 

Mr.  Stewart1  has  enumerated  consciousness  as  one  of  our 
intellectual  powers,  co-ordinate  with  perception,  memory, 
judgment,  &c.  But  consciousness  is  not  confined  to  the  ope- 
ration of  the  intellectual  powers.  It  accompanies  the  develop- 
ment of  the  feelings  and  the  determinations  of  the  will.  And 
the  opinion  that  consciousness  is  a separate  faculty,  is  not  only 
founded  on  a false  analysis,  hut  is  an  opinion,  which  if  pro- 
secuted to  its  results  would  overturn  the  doctrine  of  immediate 
knowledge  in  perception — a doctrine  which  Stewart  and  Reid 
upheld  as  the  true  and  only  harrier  against  the  scepticism  of 
Hume.  “Once  admit  that,  after  I have  perceived  an  object, 
I need  another  power  termed  consciousness,  hy  which  I become 
cognizant  of  the  perception,  and  hy  the  medium  of  which  the 
knowledge  involved  in  perception  is  made  clear  to  the  think- 
ing self,  and  the  plea  of  common  sense  against  scepticism  is 
cut  off.  ....  I am  conscious  of  self  and  of  notself ; my 
knowledge  of  both  in  the  act  of  perception  is  equally  direct 
and  immediate.  On  the  other  hand,  to  make  consciousness  a 
peculiar  faculty,  by  which  we  are  simply  cognizant  of  our 
own  mental  operations,  is  virtually  to  deny  the  immediatecy 
of  our  knowledge  of  an  external  world.”2 

“We  may  give  consciousness  a separate  name  and  place, 
Avithout  meaning  to  degrade  it  to  the  level  of  the  other  facul- 
ties. In  some  respects  it  is  superior  to  them  all,  having  in  it 
more  of  the  essence  of  the  soul,  and  being  exercised  whenever 
the  soul  is  intelligently  exercised.”3 
CONSCIOUSNESS  and  PEELING.  — “ Feeling  and  sensation 
are  equivalent  terms,  the  one  being  merely  the  translation  of 
the  other ; but  feeling  and  consciousness  are  not  equivalent, 
for  we  are  conscious  that  we  feel,  but  we  do  not  feel  that  we 
are  conscious.  Consciousness  is  involved  in  all  mental  opera- 
tions, active  or  passive  ; but  these  are  not  therefore  kinds  or 
parts  of  consciousness.  Life  is  involved  in  every  operation, 
voluntary  or  involuntary,  of  our  bodily  system ; but  move- 
ment or  action  are  not,  therefore,  a species  of  life.  Conscious- 
ness is  mental  life.”4 

1 In  his  Outlines.  2 Morell,  Hist,  of  Spec.  Philosophy  vol.  ii.,  p 13. 

3 M;Cosh,  Method  of  Div.  Govern p.  533,  fifth  edition.  See  Fearn,  Essay  on  Con- 

sciousness. 

4 Agonistes;  or,  Philosophical  Strictures . p.  336. 

n*  i 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


114 

CONSENT.  — “ Believing  in  the  prophets  and  evangelists  with  a 
calm  and  settled  faith,  with  that  consent  of  the  will,  and  heart, 
and  understanding,  which  constitutes  religious  belief,  I find 
in  them  the  clear  annunciation  of  the  kingdom  of  God  upon 
earth.” 1 

Assent  is  the  consequence  of  a conviction  of  the  understand- 
ing. Consent  arises  from  the  state  of  the  disposition  and  the 
will.  The  one  accepts  what  is  true;  the  other  embraces  it  as 
true  and  good,  and  Avorthy  of  all  acceptation. — V.  Assent. 
CONSENT  (Argument  from  Universal).  — V.  Authority. 

Reid2  applies  this  argument  to  establish  first  principles. 
lie3  uses  it  against  the  views  of  Berkeley  and  Hume. 

Cicero4  says,  Major  enim  pars  eo  fere  deferri  solct  quo  a na- 
tura  deducitur.  It  is  used  to  prove  the  existence  of  the  gods. 
De  quo  autem  omnium  natura  consentit,  id  verum  esse  necesse 
est.  Esse  igitur  deos,  conftendum  est?  Cotta6  argues  against 
it.  The  argument  it  also  used,  where  we  read,  Omni  autem 
in  re,  consensio  omnium  gentium  lex  naturae  putanda  est.1 

Bacon  is  against  this  argument.* 8 

“ These  things  are  to  be  regarded  as  first  truths,  the  credit 
of  which  is  not  derived  from  other  truths,  but  is  inherent  in 
themselves.  As  for  probable  truths,  they  are  such  as  are  ad- 
mitted by  all  men,  or  by  the  generality  of  men,  or  by  wise 
men ; and  among  these  last,  either  by  all  the  Aviso,  or  by  the 
generality  of  the  wise,  or  by  such  of  the  wise  as  are  of  the 
highest  authority.” 9 

Multum  dare  solemus  preesumptioni  omnium  hominum.  Apud 
nos  veritatis  argnmentum  est  aliquid  omnibus  videri.10 

CONSEQUENT.  — V.  Antecedent,  Necessity. 

CONSILIENCE  of  INDUCTIONS  takes  place  when  an  induc- 
tion obtained  from  one  class  of  facts  coincides  with  an  induc- 
tion obtained  from  a different  class.  This  consilience  is  the 
test  of  the  truth  of  the  theory  in  which  it  occurs.11 


1 Southey,  Progress  of  Society,  colloquy  2.  1 Intell.  Pnw.,  essay  i.,  chap.  2. 

8 Essay  ii.,  chap.  19.  4 T>c  Officiis,  lib.  i.,  cap.  41 

6 De  Nat.  Deorum;  lib.  i,.  cap.  17.  c Cap.  23. 

I Dc  Nat.  Dear.,  lib.  ii.,  2;  ami  Tuscul.  Quaesl.,  lib.  i.  13. 

e In  till!  preface  to  bis  Inslauratio  Magna,  in  aphorism  77,  and  in  Cogilafa  ct  Visa. 
s Aristotle,  Topic.,  i,  1.  10  Scncca,  Epist.,  cyii.,  cxvii. 

II  AVliewell,  Philosoph.  Induct.  Sciences,  aphorism  14. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  115 

CONSILIENCE  — 

Paley’s  Horce  Paulince,  which  consists  of  gathering  together 
undesigned  coincidences,  is  an  example  of  the  consilience  of 
inductions. 

“ The  law  of  gravitation  may  he  proved  by  a consilience  of 
inductions.”  1 

CONSTITUTIVE  (in  German,  constitutiv),  means  objectively  de- 
termining, or  legislating.  It  is  a predicate  which  expresses 
that  something  a priori  determines  how  something  else  must 
he,  or  is  to  he.  That  which  is  constitutive  is  opposed  to  that 
which  is  regulative  — q.  v. 

CONTEMPLATION  ( contemplor ),  means  originally  to  gaze  on 
a shire  of  the  heavens  marked  out  by  the  augur.2  “ The  next 
faculty  of  the  mind  (i.  e.,  to  perception),  whereby  it  makes  a 
further  progress  towards  knowledge,  is  that  which  I call  re- 
tention, or  the  keeping  of  these  simple  ideas  which  from  sen- 
sation or  reflection  it  hath  received.  This  is  done  two  ways  ; 
first,  by  keeping  the  idea  which  is  brought  into  it  for  some 
time  actually  in  view,  which  is  called  contemplation.”  3 

When  an  object  of  sense  or  thought  has  attracted  our  ad- 
miration or  love  we  dwell  upon  it ; not  so  much  to  know  it 
better,  as  to  enjoy  it  more  and  longer.  This  is  contemplation, 
and  differs  from  reflection.  The  latter  seeks  knowledge,  and 
our  intellect  is  active.  In  the  former,  we  think  we  have  found 
the  knowledge  which  reflection  seeks,  and  luxuriate  in  the  en- 
joyment of  it.  Mystics  have  exaggerated  the  benefits  of  con- 
templation, and  have  directed  it  exclusively  to  God,  and  to  the 
cherishing  of  love  to  Him. 

CONTINENCE  ( contineo , to  restrain),  is  the  virtue  which  consists 
in  governing  the  appetite  of  sex.  It  is  most  usually  applied 
to  men,  as  chastity  is  to  women.  Chastity  may  be  the  result 
of  natural  disposition  or  temperament — continence  carries  with 
it  the  idea  of  struggle  and  victory. 

CONTINGENT  ( contingo , to  touch).  — “ Perhaps  the  beauty  of 
the  world  requireth  that  some  agents  should  work  without 
deliberation  (which  his  lordship  calls  necessary  agents),  and 
some  agents  with  deliberation  (and  those  both  he  and  I call 


1 Quarterly  Rev,,  vol.  xlviii.,  p.  233.  a Taylor,  Synonyms. 

3 Locke,  "Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  book  ii.,  chap.  10. 


116 


VOCABULARY  OF  FIIILOSOPIIY. 


CONTINGENT  — 

free  agents),  and  that  some  agents  should  work,  and  we  know 
not  how  (and  their  effects  we  call  contingents).”  1 

“ When  any  event  takes  place  which  seems  to  us  to  have  no 
cause,  why  it  should  happen  in  one  way,  rather  than  another, 
it  is  called  a contingent  event ; as,  for  example,  the  falling  of 
a leaf  on  a certain  spot,  or  the  turning  up  of  any  particular 
number  when  the  dice  are  thrown.”2 

The  contingent  is  that  which  does  not  exist  necessarily,  and 
which  we  can  think  as  non-existing  without  contradiction. 
Everything  which  had  a beginning,  or  will  have  an  end,  or 
which  changes,  is  contingent.  The  necessary,  on  the  contrary, 
is  that  which  we  cannot  conceive  as  non-existing — that  which 
has  always  been,  which  will  always  be,  and  which  does  not 
change  its  manner  of  being. 

“ Contingent  is  that  which  does  not  happen  constantly  and 
regularly.  Of  this  kind  ancient  philosophy  has  distinguished 
three  different  opinions ; for  either  the  event  happens  more 
frequently  one  way  than  another,  and  then  it  is  said  to  be 
ini  to  no'Kv  ; of  this  kind  are  the  regular  productions  of  na- 
ture, and  the  ordinary  actions  of  men.  Or  it  happens  more 
rarely,  such  as  the  birth  of  monsters,  or  other  extraordi- 
nary productions  of  nature,  and  many  accidents  that  happen 
to  man.  Or,  lastly,  it  is  betwixt  the  two,  and  happens  as 
often  the  same  way  as  the  other ; or,  as  they  express  it  in 
Greek,  onotsfi  itvxy.  Of  this  kind  are  some  things  in  nature, 
such  as  the  birth  of  a male  or  female  child ; a good  or  bad 
day  in  some  climates  of  the  earth  ; and  many  things  among 
men,  such  as  good  or  bad  luck  at  play.  All  these  last-men- 
tioned events  are  in  reality  as  necessary  as  the  falling  of 
heavy  bodies,  &c.  But  as  they  do  not  happen  constantly 
and  uniformly,  and  as  we  cannot  account  for  their  happen- 
ing sometimes  one  way  and  sometimes  another,  we  say  they 
are  contingent.”  3 

The  contingent  is  known  empirically  — the  necessary  by  the 
reason.  There  are  but  two  modes  of  being,  the  necessary  and 
the  contingent.  But  the  contingent  has  degrees:  1.  Simple 


1 Hobbes,  Liberty  and  Necessity.  2 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thovght. 

8 Monboddo,  Ancient  Metaphys.,  vol.  i.,  p.  295. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


117 


CONTINGENT— 

facts  -which  appear  and  disappear,  or,  in  the  language  of  the 
Schools,  accidents.  2.  Qualities  or  properties  inherent  in  a 
substance,  which  constitute^its  specific  character.  3.  The 
substance  itself  considered  as  a particular  and  finite  existence. 

A thing  may  be  contingent  in  three  ways : — 

1.  JEqualiler,  when  the  thing  or  its  opposite  may  equally 
be,  from  the  determination  of  a free  will. 

2.  TJt  plurimum,  as  when  a man  is  born  with  five  digits, 
though  sometimes  with  more  or  less. 

3.  Raro,  as  when  it  happens  seldom;  by  a necessary  agent, 
as  when  a tile  falls  on  a man’s  head ; or  by  a free  agent,  as 
when  a man  cleaving  wood  wounds  the  bystander.1 

An  event,  the  opposite  of  which  is  possible,  is  contingent. 

An  event,  the  opposite  of  which  is  impossible,  is  necessary. 

An  event  is  impossible  when  the  oj>posite  of  it  is  necessary. 

An  event  is  possible  when  the  opposite  of  it  is  contingent. 

CONTINUITY  (Law  of).  — “ The  supposition  of  bodies  perfectly 
hard,  having  been  shown  to  be  inconsistent  with  two  of  the 
leading  doctrines  of  Leibnitz,  that  of  the  constant  maintenance 
of  the  same  quantity  of  force  in  the  universe,  and  that  of  the 
proportionality  of  forces  to  the  squares  of  the  velocities  — he 
found  himself  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  maintaining  that  all 
changes  are  produced  by  insensible  gradations,  so  as  to  render 
it  impossible  for  a body  to  have  its  state  changed  from  motion 
to  rest,  or  from  rest  to  motion,  without  passing  through  all  the 
intermediate  states  of  velocity.  From  this  assumption  he 
argued  with  much  ingenuity,  that  the  existence  of  atoms,  or  of 
perfectly  hard  bodies,  is  impossible  ; because,  if  two  of  them 
should  meet  with  equal  and  opposite  motions,  they  would 
necessarily  stop  at  once,  in  violation  of  the  law  of  continuity.”2 

“I  speak,”  said  John  Bernouilli,3  “of  that  immovable  and 
perpetual  order  established  since  the  creation  of  the  universe, 
which  may  be  called  the  law  of  continuity,  in  virtue  of  which 
everything  that  is  done,  is  done  by  degrees  infinitely  small. 

. It  seems  to  be  the  dictate  of  good  sense  that  no  change  is 
made  per  saltum;  natura  non  operatur  per  saltum;  and  nothing 


1 See  Chauvin,  Lexicon  Philosoph. 

3 Stewart,  Dissert.,  part  ii.,  p.  275. 
8 Discourse  on  Motion , 1727. 


118 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CONTINUITY— 

can  pass  from  one  extreme  to  another  without  passing  through 
all  the  intermediate  degrees.” 

The  law  of  continuity,  though  originally  applied  to  continuity 
of  motion,  was  extended  by  Charles  Bonnet  to  continuity  of 
being.  lie  held  that  all  the  various  beings  which  compose 
the  universe,  form  a scale  descending  downwards  without 
any  chasm  or  saltus,  from  the  Deity  to  the  simplest  forms  of 
unorganized  matter.  A similar  view  had  been  held  by  Locke 
and  others.1  The  researches  of  Cuvier  have  shown  that  it 
can  only  be  held  with  limitations  and  exceptions,  even  when 
confined  to  the  comparative  anatomy  of  animals.  — Y.  Asso- 
ciation. 

CONTRACT  ( contralto , to  draw  together).  — A contract  is  an 
agreement  or  pact  in  which  one  party  comes  under  obligation 
to  do  one  thing,  and  the  other  party  to  do  some  other  thing. 
Paley  calls  it  a mutual  promise.  Contracts  originate  in  the 
insufficiency  of  man  to  supply  all  his  needs.  One  wants  what 
another  has  abundance  of  and  to  spare ; while  the  other  may 
want  something  which  his  neighbour  has.  Men  are  drawn 
more  closely  together  by  their  individual  insufficiency,  and 
they  enter  into  an  agreement  each  to  give  what  the  other 
needs  or  desires. 

Contracts  being  so  necessary  and  important  for  the  welfare 
of  society,  the  framing  and  fulfilling  of  them  have  in  all  coun- 
tries been  made  the  object  of  positive  law.  Viewed  ethically, 
the  obligation  to  fulfil  them  is  the  same  with  that  to  fulfil  a 
promise.  The  consideration  of  contracts,  and  of  the  various 
kinds  and  conditions  of  them  belongs  to  Jurisprudence. 

While  all  contracts  are  pacts,  all  pacts  are  not  contracts.  In 
the  Roman  law,  a distinction  was  taken  between  pacts  or 
agreements  entered  into  without  any  cause  or  consideration 
antecedent,  present  or  future,  and  pacts  which  were  entered 
into  for  a cause  or  consideration,  that  is,  containing  a ewax- 
Xa-yya,  or  bargain,  or  as  it  may  be  popularly  expressed,  a quid 
pro  quo — in  which  one  party  came  under  obligation  to  give  or 
do  something,  on  account  of  something  being  done  or  given  by 
the  other  party.  Agreements  of  the  latter  kind  were  properly 


1 Spectator,  No.  519. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


119 


CONTRACT  — 

contracts,  while  those  of  the  former  were  called  hare  pads.  A 
padnm.  nudum,  or  hare  pact,  was  so  called  because  it  was  not 
clothed  with  the  circumstances  of  mutual  advantage,  and  was 
not  a valid  agreement  in  the  eye  of  the  Roman  law.  Nuda 
pactio  obligationem  nonfacit.  It  is  the  same  in  the  English 
law,  in  which  a contract  is  defined : “ An  agreement  of  two  or 
more  persons,  upon  sufficient  consideration,  to  do  or  not  to  do 
a particular  thing,” — and  the  consideration  is  necessary  to  the 
validity  of  the  contract. 

CONTRADICTION,  Principle  of  ( contradico , to  speak  against). 
— It  i6  usually  expressed  thus : A thing  cannot  be  and  not  be 
at  the  same  time,  or  a thing  must  either  be  or  not  be,  or  the 
same  attribute  cannot  at  the  same  time  be  affirmed  and  denied 
of  the  same  subject.1  — V.  Identity. 

Aristotle  laid  down  this  principle  as  the  basis  of  all  Logic 
and  of  all  Metaphysic. 

Leibnitz  thought  it  insufficient  as  the  basis  of  all  truth  and 
reasoning,  and  added  the  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason — q.  v. 

Kant  thought  this  principle  good  only  for  those  judgments 
of  which  the  attribute  is  the  consequence  of  the  subject,  or,  as 
he  called  them,  analytic  judgments  ; as  when  we  say,  all  body 
has  extension.  The  idea  of  extension  being  enclosed  in  that 
of  body,  it  is  a sufficient  warrant  of  the  truth  of  such  a judg- 
ment, that  it  implies  no  contradiction.  But  in  synthetic 
judgments,  we  rest  either  on  a belief  of  the  reason  or  the 
testimony  of  experience,  according  as  they  are  a priori  or  & 
posteriori.2 

“ The  law  of  contradiction  vindicates  itself.  It  cannot  be 
denied  without  being  assented  to,  for  the  person  who  denies 
it  must  assume  that  he  is  denying  it,  in  other  words,  he  must 
assume  that  he  is  saying  what  he  is  saying,  and  he  must  admit 
that  the  contrary  supposition  — to  wit,  that  he  is  saying  what 
he  is  not  saying  — involves  a contradiction.  Thus  the  law  is 
established.”3 

It  has  also  been  called  the  law  of  non-contradiction.  It  is 
one  and  indivisible,  but  develops  itself  in  three  specific  forms, 


1 Pierron  and  Zevort,  Introd.  d la  Metaphys.  d'Aristote , 2 tom.,  Paris,  1840. 

a Aristot.,  Metaphys.,  lib.  iii.,  cap.  3 ; lib.  ix.,  cap.  7 ; lib.  x.,  cap.  5. 

3 Perrier,  Inst,  of  Metaphys.,  p.  21. 


120 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CONTRADICTION  — 

which  have  been  called  the  Three  Logical  Axioms.  First, 
“ A is  A.”  Second,  “.A  is  not  Not-A.”  Third,  “ Everything 
is  either  A or  Not-A.”  This  last  is  sometimes  called  the  Law 
of  Excluded  Middle  — q.  v. 

The  principle  of  contradiction  is  the  same  with  the  Dictum 
de  omni  et  nullo  — q.  v.1 

CONTRARIES.  — Aristotle2  says  — “ There  seems  to  be  one  and 
the  same  error,  and  one  and  the  same  science,  with  respect  to 
things  contrary.”  This,  by  Themistius,  in  his  Paraphrase, 
is  thus  illustrated  : — “ Of  things  contrary  there  is  one  science 
and  one  ignorance.  For  thus,  he  who  knows  good  to  be  some- 
thing beneficial,  knows  evil  at  the  same  time  to  be  something 
pernicious ; aud  he  who  is  deceived  with  respect  to  one  of 
these,  is  deceived  also  with  respect  to  the  other.” 

“ There  is  an  essential  difference  between  opposite  and  con- 
trary. Opposite  powers  are  always  of  the  same  kind,  and  tend 
to  union  either  by  equipoise  or  by  a common  product.  Thus 
the  + and  the  — poles  of  the  magnet,  thus  positive  and  nega- 
tive electricity,  are  opposites.  Sweet  and  sour  are  opposites ; 
sweet  and  bitter  are  contraries.  The  feminine  character  is 
opposed  to  the  masculine ; but  the  effeminate  is  its  contrary.”  3 
Wo  should  say  opposite  sides  of  the  street,  not  contrary. 
Aristotle  defines  contrary,  “ that  which  in  the  same  genus 
differs  most ;”  as  in  colour,  white  and  black ; in  sensation, 
pleasure  and  pain;  in  morals,  good  and  evil.  Contraries 
never  co-exist,  but  they  may  succeed  in  the  same  subject. 
They  are  of  two  kinds,  one  admitting  a middle  term,  partici- 
pating at  once  in  the  nature  of  the  things  opposed.  Thus, 
between  absolute  being  and  nonentity,  there  may  be  contin- 
gent being.  In  others  no  middle  term  is  possible.  There  are 
contraries  of  which  the  one  belongs  necessarily  to  a subject,  or 
is  a simple  privation,  as  health  and  sickness  ; light  and  dark- 
ness ; sight  and  blindness.  Contraries  which  admit  of  no 
middle  term  are  contradictories ; and  form,  when  united,  a 
contradiction.  On  this  rests  all  logic.  Aristotle  wished  to 
make  virtue  a middle  term,  between  two  extremes.4 


1 See  Poste,  Poster.  Analyt.,  Appendix  A. 

8 Coleridge,  Church  and  Slate,  note,  p.  18. 


8 De  Anima,  lib.  iii.,  cap.  3. 

4 Diet,  des  Sciences  Philosoph. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


121 


CONVEKSION,  in  Logic,  is  the  transposition  of  the  subject  of  a 
proposition  into  the  place  of  the  predicate,  and  of  the  predi- 
cate into  the  place  of  the  subject.  The  proposition  to  be  con- 
verted is  called  the  convertend  or  ex posita,  and  that  into  -which 
it  is  converted  the  converse.  Logical  conversion  is  illative, 
that  is,  the  truth  of  the  convertend  necessitates  the  truth  of  the 
converse.  It  can  only  take  place  when  no  terra  is  distributed 
in  the  converse  which  was  undistributed  in  the  convertend.  It 
is  of  three  kinds,  viz.,  simple  conversion,  conversion  per  acci- 
dens,  and  conversion  by  negation  or  contraposition .' 

COPULA  (The)  is  that  part  of  a proposition  which  indicates  that 
the  predicate  is  affirmed  or  denied  of  the  subject.  This  is 
sometimes  done  by  inflection;  as  when  we  say,  Fire  burns; 
the  change  from  burn  to  burns  showing  that  we  mean  to  affirm 
the  predicate  burn  of  the  subject  fire.  But  this  function  is 
more  commonly  fulfilled  by  the  word  is,  when  an  affirmation 
is  intended  — is  not,  when  a negation;  or  by  some  other  part 
of  the  verb  to  be.  Sometimes  this  verb  is  both  copula  and  pre- 
dicate, e.  g.,  “ One  of  Jacob’s  sons  is  not.”  But  the  copula, 
merely  as  such,  does  not  imply  real  existence,  e.g.,  “A  fault- 
less man  is  a being  feigned  by  the  Stoics.”1 2 
COSMOGONY  [xoago f,  world  ; yiyvo/xai,  to  come  into  being) . — 
“ It  was  a most  ancient,  and,  in  a manner,  universally  re- 
ceived tradition  among  the  Pagans,  that  the  cosmogonia,  or 
generation  of  the  world,  took  its  first  beginning  from  a chaos 
(the  divine  cosmogonists  agreeing  therein  with  the  atheistic 
ones) : this  tradition  having  been  delivered  down  from  Or- 
pheus and  Linus  (among  the  Greeks)  by  Hesiod  and  Homer, 
and  others.”3 

The  different  theories  as  to  the  origin  of  the  world  may  he 
comprehended  under  three  classes : — 

1.  Those  which  represent  the  world,  in  its  present  form,  as 
having  existed  from  eternity.  — Aristotle. 

2.  Those  which  represent  the  matter  but  not  the  form  of 
the  world  to  be  from  eternity. — Leucippus,  Democritus,  Epi- 
curus. 

3.  Those  which  assign  both  the  matter  and  form  of  the 
world  to  the  direct  agency  of  a spiritual  cause. 


12 


1 Whately,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  2,  § 4. 

a Ibid.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  1,  g 3.  Mill,  Log.,  b.  i.,  ch.  4,  \ 1. 

3 Cudworth,  Intdl.  Syst.,  p.  248. 


122 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOrilY. 


COSMOGONY— 

“ Cosmogony  treats  of  the  birth,  cosmography  of  the  descrip- 
tion, and  cosmology  of  the  theory  of  the  world.”  1 
COSMOLOGY,  Rational. — V.  Metaphysics. 

CRANIQLOGY. — V.  Phrenology. 

CRANIGSCOPY. — V.  Phrenology,  Organ,  Organology. 

CREATION  is  the  act  by  which  God  produced  out  of  nothing  all 
things  that  now  exist.  Unless  we  deny  altogether  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  we  must  either  believe  in  creation  or  accept  one 
or  other  of  the  two  hypotheses,  which  may  be  called  theologi- 
cal dualism  anti,  pantheism.  According  to  the  former,  there 
are  two  necessary  and  eternal  beings,  God  and  matter.  Ac- 
cording to  the  latter,  all  beings  are  but  modes  or  manifesta- 
tions of  one  eternal  and  necessary  being.  A belief  in  creation 
admits  only  the  existence  of  one  necessary  and  eternal  being, 
who  is  at  once  substance  and  cause,  intelligence  and  power, 
absolutely  free  and  infinitely  good.  God  and  the  universe  are 
essentially  distinct.  God  has  self-consciousness,  the  universe 
has  not  and  cannot  have.2 

CREDULITY,  or  a disposition  to  believe  what  others  tell  us,  is 
set  down  by  Dr.  Reid  as  an  original  principle  implanted  in  us 
by  the  Supreme  Being.  And  as  the  counterpart  of  this  he 
reckons  veracity  or  a propensity  to  speak  truth  and  to  use 
language  so  as  to  convey  our  real  sentiments,  to  be  also  an 
original  principle  of  human  nature.3 

CRITERION  (xpitiipiov,  from  the  Greek  verb  xpivu,  to  judge), 
denotes  in  general,  all  means  proper  to  judge.  It  has  been 
distinguished  into  the  criterion  a quo,  per  quod,  and  secundum 
quod — or  the  being  who  judges,  as  man  ; the  organ  or  faculty 
by  which  he  judges,  and  the  rule  according  to  which  he 
judges.  Unless  utter  scepticism  be  maintained,  man  must  be 
admitted  capable  of  knowing  what  is  true. 

“ With  regard  to  the  criterion ,4  or  organ  of  truth  among 
the  ancient  philosophers,  some  advocated  a simple  and  others 


1 Taylor,  Synonyms. 

0 Diet.  dcs  Sciences  Philosoph. 

3 Ileid,  Inquiry , chap.  6,  g 24 ; and  also  Act.  Pow.y  essay  iii.,  pt.  i.,  chap.  2;  Stewart, 
Act.  Pow.,  yoI.  ii.,  p.  344;  Priestley,  Exam.,  p.  86;  Brown,  Lect.  lxxxiv. 

4 Says  Edw.  Poste,  M.  A.,  Introd.,  p.  14,  to  trans.  of  Poster.  Analyt.  of  Aristotle. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


123 


CRITERION  — 

a mixed  criterion.  The  advocates  of  the  former  were  di- 
vided into  Sensationalists  or  Rationalists,  as  they  advocated 
sense  or  reason ; the  advocates  of  the  latter  advocated  both 
sense  and  reason.  Democritus  and  Leucippus  were  Sensation- 
alists ; Parmenides  and.  the  Pythagoreans  were  Rationalists  ; 
Plato  and  Aristotle  belonged  to  the  mixed  school.  Among 
those  who  advocated  reason  as  a criterion,  there  was  an  im- 
portant difference : some  advocating  the  common  reason,  as 
Heraclitus  and  Anaxagoras  ; others,  the  scientific  reason,  or 
the  reason  as  cultivated  and  developed  by  education,  as  Par- 
menides, the  Pythagoreans,  Plato,  and  Aristotle.  In  the  Re- 
public,1 Plato  prescribes  a training  calculated  to  prepare  the 
reason  for  the  perception  of  the  higher  truths.  Aristotle  re- 
quires education  for  the  moral  reason.  The  older  Greeks  used 
the  word  measure,  instead  of  criterion;  and  Protagoras  had 
said,  that  man  was  the  measure  of  all  truth.  This  Aristotle2 
interprets  to  mean  that  sense  and  reason  are  the  organs  of 
truth,  and  he  accepts  the  doctrine,  if  limited  to  these  faculties 
in  a healthy  and  perfect  condition.  These  names,  then,  can- 
not properly  be  ranked  among  the  common  sense  philosophers, 
where  they  are  placed  by  Sir  William  Hamilton. 

“ When  reason  is  said  to  be  an  organ  of  truth,  we  must  in- 
clude, besides  the  intuitive,  the  syllogistic  faculty.  This  is 
the  instrument  of  the  mediate  or  indirect  apprehension  of 
truth,  as  the  other  of  immediate.  The  examination  of  these 
instruments,  in  order  to  discover  their  capabilities  and  right 
use,  is  Logic.  This  appears  to  be  the  reason  why  Aristotle 
gave  the  title  of  Organon  to  his  Logic.  So  Epicurus  called 
his  the  Canon  or  Criterion.”  The  controversy  on  the  Criterion 
is  to  be  found  at  length  in  Sextus  Empiricus.3 

Criterion  is  now  used  chiefly  to  denote  the  character  which 
distinguishes  truth  from  falsity.  In  this  sense  it  corresponds 
with  the  ground  of  certitude. — V.  Certitude. 

CRITICS,  CRITICISM,  CRITiaUE  (German,  critik),  is  the 

examination  of  the  pure  reason,  and  is  called  in  Germany 
simply  the  critick  or  critik,  xa t’  i%oxrtv.  It  is  the  science  of 


1 7,  sect.  9. 

s Hypot. , lib  ii.j  cap.  5-7. 


Metaphys.,  x.  2 ; xi.  6. 


124 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOFHY. 


CRITICK- 

the  pure  faculty  of  reason,  or  the  investigation  of  that  which 
reason  is  able  to  know  or  elfect,  independently  of  experience, 
and  is  opposed  to  dogmatism.  Sir  J.  Mackintosh  terms  the 
critical  philosophy  a self-reviewing  philosophy. 
CUMULATIVE  (The  Argument).  — “The  proof  of  a Divine 
agency  is  not  a conclusion  which  lies  at  the  end  of  a chain  of 
reasoning,  of  which  chain  each  instance  of  contrivance  is  only 
a link,  and  of  which,  if  one  link  fail,  the  whole  falls ; but  it 
is  an  argument  separately  supplied  by  every  separate  example. 
An  error  in  stating  an  example  affects  only  that  example. 
The  argument  is  cumulative  in  the  fullest  sense  of  that  term. 
The  eye  proves  it  without  the  ear,  the  ear  without  the  eye. 
The  proof  in  each  example  is  complete  ; for  when  the  design 
of  the  part,  and  the  conducivcncss  of  its  structure  to  that 
design  is  shown,  the  mind  may  set  itself  at  rest ; no  future 
consideration  can  detract  anything  from  the  force  of  the 
example.” 1 

CUSTOM.  — “Let  custom,”  says  Locke,2  “from  the  very  child- 
hood, have  joined  figure  and  shape  to  the  idea  of  God,  and 
what  absurdities  will  that  mind  be  liable  to  about  the 
Deity.” 

Custom  is  the  queen  of  the  world. 

“Such  precedents  are  numberless;  we  draw 
Our  right  from  custom;  custom  is  a law 
As  high  as  heaven,  as  wide  as  seas  or  land.” 

Lansdown,  Beauty  and  Laiv. 

A custom  is  not  necessarily  a usage.  A custom  is  merely 
that  which  is  often  repeated ; a usage  must  be  often  repeated 
and  of  long  standing.  Hence  we  may  speak  of  a “ new  cus- 
tom,” but  not  of  a “ new  usage.”  Custom  had  probably  the 
same  origin  as  “accost,”  to  come  near,  and  thence  to  be 
habitual.  The  root  is  the  Latin  costa,  the  side  or  rib.3 

“ An  aggregate  of  habits,  either  successive  or  contempora- 
neous, in  different  individuals,  is  denoted  by  the  words  custom, 


1 Paley,  Nat.  Theol .,  chap.  6» 

0 Essay  an  Hum.  Understand .,  book  ii.,  chap.  33,  17  ; and  book  i.,  chap.  4,  16. 

3 See  Karnes,  Elements  of  Criticism , chap.  14;  Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  On  Politics , chap.  20, 
sect.  9. 


VOCABULARY  OF  rillLOSOPIIY. 


125 


CUSTOM - 

-usage,  or  practice.1  "When  many  persons  — either  a class  of 
society,  or  the  inhabitants  of  a district,  or  an  entire  nation  — 
agree  in  a certain  habit,  they  are  said  to  have  a custom  or 
usage  to  that  effect. 

“ Customs  may  be  of  two  kinds: — First,  There  may  be  vol- 
untary customs — customs  which  arc  adopted  spontaneously  by 
the  people,  and  originate  from  their  independent  choice,  such 
as  the  modes  of  salutation,  dress,  eating,  travelling,  <fcc.,  pre- 
valent in  any  country,  and  most  of  the  items  which  constitute 
the  manners  of  a people.  — Secondly,  There  are  the  customs 
which  are  the  result  of  laws — customs  which  have  grown  up  in 
consequence  of  the  action  of  the  government  upon  the  people. 
Thus,  when  successive  judges  in  a court  of  justice  have  laid 
down  certain  rules  of  procedure,  and  the  advocates  pleading- 
before  the  court  have  observed  these  rules,  such  is  called  the 
established  practice  of  the  court.  The  sum  of  the  habits  of 
the  successive  judges  and  practitioners  constitute  the  practice 
of  the  court.  The  same  may  be  said  of  a deliberative  assembly 
or  any  other  body,  renewed  by  a perpetual  succession  of  its 
members.  In  churches  the  equivalent  name  is  rites  and  cere- 
monies.”— V.  Habit. 

Custom  is  a frequent  repetition  of  the  same  act ; habit  is  the 
effect  of  such  repetition:  fashion  is  the  custom  of  numbers; 
usage  is  the  habit  of  numbers.  It  is  a good  custom  to  rise 
early ; this  will  produce  a habit  of  so  doing  ; and  the  example 
of  a distinguished  family  may  do  much  toward  reviving  the 
fashion,  if  not  re-establishing  the  usage.2 

Usage  has  relation  to  space,  and  custom  to  time  ; usage  is 
more  universal,  and  custom  more  ancient ; usage  is  what  many 
people  practise,  and  custom  is  what  people  have  practised  long. 
A vulgar  usage;  an  old  custom.3 

CYNIC  . — After  the  death  of  Socrates,  some  of  his  disciples,  under 
Antisthenes,  were  accustomed  to  meet  in  the  Cynosarges,  one 
of  the  gymnasia  of  Athens,  — and  hence  they  were  called 
Cynics.  According  to  others,  the  designation  comes  from  xwv, 


1 A similar  distinction  between  mos  and  consuetudo  is  made  by  Macrobius,  Saturn. 
iii.,  8,  commenting  on  Virgil,  JEneid , 6,  601.  He  quotes  Yarro  as  stating  that  mos  is  the 
unit,  and  consuetudo  the  resulting  aggregate. 

2 Taylor,  Synonyms.  8 Ibid. 

12* 


126 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CYNIC  - 

a clog,  because  like  the  dog  they  were  destitute  of  all  modesty. 
Antisthenes,  Diogenes,  and  Crates  were  the  first  heads  of  the 
sect.  Zeno,  by  checking  and  moderating  their  doctrines,  gave 
birth  to  the  sect  of  Stoics.1 


DjEMONIST.  — “To  believe  the  governing  mind,  or  minds,  not 
absolutely  and  necessarily  good,  nor  confined  to  what  is  best, 
but  capable  of  acting  according  to  mere  will  or  fancy,  is  to  be 
a Dcemonist."2 

DATA  (the  plural  of  datum  — given  or  granted).  — “ Those  facts 
from  which  an  inference  is  drawn,  are  called  data;  for  ex- 
ample, it  has  always  been  found  that  the  inhabitants  of  tem- 
perate climates  have  excelled  those  of  very  hot  or  very  cold 
climates  in  stature,  strength,  and  intelligence : these  facts  are 
the  data,  from  which  it  is  inferred  that  excellence  of  body  and 
mind  depend,  in  feome  measure,  upon  the  temperature  of  the 
climate.”3 

DEDUCTION  (from  deduco,  to  draw  from,  to  cause  to  come  out 
of),  is  the  mental  operation  which  consists  in  drawing  a par- 
ticular truth  from  a general  principle  antecedently  known.  It 
is  opposed  to  induction,  which  consists  in  rising  from  parti- 
cular truths  to  the  determination  of  a general  principle.  Let 
it  be  proposed  to  prove  that  Peter  is  mortal ; I know  that 
Peter  is  a man,  and  this  enables  me  to  say  that  all  men 
are  mortal ; from  which  affirmation  I deduce  that  Peter  is 
mortal. 

The  syllogism  is  the  form  of  deduction.  Aristotle4  has  de- 
fined it  to  be  “ an  enunciation  in  which  certain  assertions 
being  made,  by  their  being  true,  it  follows  necessarily,  that 
another  assertion  different  from  the  first  is  true  also.” 

Before  we  can  deduce  a particular  truth  we  must  be  in  pos- 


1 Richterus,  Dissertalio  de  Cynicis,  Leips.,  1701 ; Diogenes  Laertius,  lib.  vi.,  c.  103. 

2 Shaftesbury,  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue , book  i.,  pt.  i.,  sect.  2. 

3 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought.  4 Prior.  Analyte  lib.  i.,  cap.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


127 


DEDUCTION— 

session  of  the  general  truth.  This  may  be  acquired  intuitively, 
as  every  change  implies  a cause ; or  inductively,  as  the  volume 
of  gas  is  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  the  pressure. 

Deduction,  when  it  uses  the  former  kind  of  truths,  is  demon- 
stration or  science.  Truths  drawn  from  the  latter  kind  are 
contingent  and  relative,  and  admit  of  correction  by  increasing 
knowledge. 

The  principle  of  deduction  is,  that  things  which  agree  with 
the  same  thing  agree  with  one  another.  The  principle  of 
induction  is,  that  in  the  same  circumstances,  and  in  the 
same  substances,  from  the  same  causes  the  same  effects  will 
follow. 

The  mathematical  and  metaphysical  sciences  are  founded 
on  deduction,  the  physical  sciences  rest  on  induction .' 

DE  EACTO  and  DE  JURE.  — In  some  instances  the  penalty 
attaches  to  the  offender  at  the  instant  when  the  fact  is  com- 
mitted ; in  others,  not  until  he  is  convicted  by  law.  In  the 
former  case  he  is  guilty  de  facto,  in  the  latter  de  jure. 

De  facto  is  commonly  used  in  the  sense  of  actually  or  really, 
and  de  jure  in  the  sense  of  rightfully  or  legally ; as  when  it  is 
said  George  II.  was  king  of  Great  Britain  de  facto;  but 
Charles  Stuart  was  king  dejure. 

DEFINITION  ( definio , to  mark  out  limits). — Est  clef  nit  io,  earum 
rerum,  quce  sunt  ejvs  rei  proprice,  quam  defnire  volumus,  brevis 
et  circumscripta  qucedam  explicatio.- 

“ The  simplest  and  most  correct  notion  of  a definition  is,  a 
proposition  declaratory  of  the  meaning  of  a word.”1 2 3 

Definition  signifies  “laying  down  a boundary and  is  used 
in  Logic  to  signify  “ an  expression  which  explains  any  term 
so  as  to  separate  it  from  everything  else,  as  a boundary  sepa- 
rates fields.  Logicians  distinguish  definitions  into  Nominal 
and  Real. 

“ Definitions  are  called  nominal,  which  explain  merely  the 
meaning  of  the  term;  and  real,  which  explain  the  nature  of  the 


1 For  the  different  views  of  deduction  and  induction , see  Whewell,  Philosoph.  of 
Induct.  Sciences , hook  i.,  chap.  6;  Mill,  Log.,  book  ii.,  chap.  5;  Quarterly  Rev.,  vol. 
lxviii.,  art.  on  “ Whewell.” 

2 Cicero,  De  Orat.,  lib.  i.,  c.  42. 

3 Mill,  Log.,  2d  edit.,  vol.  i.,  p.  182. 


128 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


DEFINITION— 

thing  signified  by  that  term.  Logic  is  concerned  with  nominal 
definitions  alone.”  1 

“ By  a real,  in  contrast  to  a,  verbal  or  nominal  definition,  the 
logicians  do  not  intend  1 the  giving  an  adequate  conception  of 
the  nature  and  essence  of  a thing that  is,  of  a thing  con- 
sidered in  itself,  and  apart  from  the  conceptions  of  it  already 
possessed.  By  verbal  definition  is  meant  the  more  accurate 
determination  of  the  signification  of  a ivord;  by  real  the  more 
accurate  determination  of  the  contents  of  a notion.  The  one 
clears  up  the  relation  of  words  to  notions;  the  other  of  notions 
to  things.  The  substitution  of  notional  for  real  would,  perhaps, 
remove  the  ambiguity.  But  if  we  retain  the  term  real,  the 
aim  of  a verbal  definition  being  to  specify  the  thought  denoted 
by  the  word,  such  definition  ought  to  be  called  notional,  on  the 
principle  on  which  the  definition  of  a notion  is  called  real; 
for  this  definition  is  the  exposition  of  what  things  are  com- 
prehended in  a thought.”2 

“ In  the  sense  in  which  nominal  and  real  definitions  were 
distinguished  by  the  scholastic  logicians,  logic  is  concerned 
with  real,  i.  e.,  notional  definitions  only ; to  explain  the  mean- 
ing of  words  belongs  to  dictionaries  or  grammars.”3 

“ There  is  a real  distinction  between  definitions  of  names 
and  what  are  erroneously  called  definitions  of  things ; but  it 
is  that  the  latter,  along  with  the  meaning  of  a name,  covertly 
asserts  a matter  of  fact.  This  covert  assertion  is  not  a defini- 
tioni but  a postulate.  The  defitiition  is  a mere  identical  pro- 
position, which  gives  information  only  about  the  use  of  lan- 
guage, and  from  which  no  conclusions  respecting  matters  of 
fact  can  possibly  be  drawn.  The  accompanying  postulate,  on 
the  other  hand,  affirms  a fact  which  may  lead  to  consequences 
of  every  degree  of  importance.  It  affirms  the  real  existence 
of  things,  possessing  the  combination  of  attributes  set  forth  in 
the  definition,  and  this,  if  true,  may  be  foundation  sufficient 
to  build  a whole  fabric  of  scientific  truth.”4 

Real  definitions  are  divided  into  essential  and  accidental. 


1 Whately,  Log.,  b.  ii..  ch.  2,  $ 6. 

2 Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works,  p.  691,  note. 

3 Mansel,  Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  189. 

4 Mill,  Log.,  p.  197. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


129 


DEFIHITIOH  — 

An  essential  definition  states  what  are  regarded  as  the  con- 
stituent parts  of  the  essence  of  that  which  is  to  be  defined; 
and  an  accidental  definition  (or  description)  lays  down  what 
are  regarded  as  circumstances  belonging  to  it,  viz.,  properties 
or  accidents,  such  as  causes,  effects,  &c. 

“ Essential  definition  is  divided  into  physical  (natural),  and 
logical  (metaphysical) ; th e physical  definition  being  made  by 
an  enumeration  of  such  parts  as  are  actually  separable ; such 
as  are  the  hull,  masts,  &c.,  of  a ‘ ship ;’  the  root,  trunk, 
branches,  bark,  &c.,  of  a ‘tree.’  The  logical  definition  consists 
of  the  genus  and  difference,  which  are  called  by  some  the 
metaphysical  (ideal)  parts ; as  being  not  two  real  parts  into 
which  an  individual  object  can  (as  in  the  former  case),  be 
actually  divided,  but  only  different  views  taken  (notions 
formed)  of  a class  of  objects,  by  one  mind.  Thus  a magnet 
would  be  defined  logically,  ‘ an  iron  ore  having  attraction  for 
iron.’  ” 1 

Accidental  or  descriptive  definition  may  be — 1.  Causal;  as 
when  man  is  defined  as  made  after  the  image  of  God,  and  for 
his  glory.  2.  Accidental ; as  when  he  is  defined  to  be  animal, 
bipes  implume.  3.  Genetic;  as  when  the  means  by  which  it  is 
made  are  indicated  ; as,  if  a straight  line  fixed  at  one  end  be 
drawn  round  by  the  other  end  so  as  to  return  to  itself,  a circle 
will  be  described.  Or,  4.  Per  oppositum ; as,  when  virtue  is 
said  to  be  flying  from  vice. 

The  rules  of  a good  definition  are: — 1.  That  it  be  adequate. 
If  it  be  too  narrow,  you  explain  a part  instead  of  a whole; 
if  too  extensive,  a whole  instead  of  a part.  2.  That  it  be 
clearer  (i.  e.,  consist  of  ideas  less  complex)  than  the  thing  de- 
fined. 3.  That  it  be  in  just  a sufficient  number  of  proper 
words.  Metaphorical  words  are  excluded  because  they  are 
indefinite.2 


1 Whately,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  5,  § 6. 

a Mansel’s  Aldrich.,  p.  35.  Aristotle,  Poster.  Analyt.,  lib.  ii. ; Topic.,  lib.  yi.;  Port 
Royal  Log.,  part  i.,  chap.  12,  13,  14;  part  ii.,  chap.  16;  Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Under- 
stand., book  iii.,  c.  3 and  4;  Leibnitz,  Noveaux  Essais,  liv.  iii.,  cap.  3 et  4;  Reid, 
Account  of  Aristotle's  Logic , chap.  2,  sect.  4 ; Tappan,  Appeal  to  Consciousness , chap. 
2, \ 1. 


130 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


DEIST  (Deux,  God).  — There  are  different  kinds  of  deists  noticed 
by  Dr.  Sam.  Clarke, 1 

1.  Those  who  believe  in  an  Eternal  and  Intelligent  Being, 
bat.  deny  a Providence,  either  conserving  or  governing. 

2.  Those  who  believe  in  God  and  in  Providence,  but  deny 
moral  distinctions  and  moral  government. 

3.  Those  who  believe  in  God  and  His  moral  perfections,  but 
deny  a future  state. 

4.  Those  who  believe  in  God  and  His  moral  government, 
here  and  hereafter,  in  so  far  as  the  light  of  nature  goes ; but 
doubt  or  deny  the  doctrines  of  revelation. 

Kant  has  distinguished  between  a t heist  and  a deist  — the 
former  acknowledging  a God,  free  and  intelligent,  the  creator 
and  preserver  of  all  things ; the  latter  believing  that  the  first 
principle  of  all  things  is  an  Infinite  Force,  which  is  inherent  in 
matter,  and  the  blind  cause  of  all  the  phenomena  of  nature. 
Deism,  in  this  sense,  is  mere  materialism.  But  deism  is  gene- 
rally employed  to  denote  a belief  in  God,  without  implying  a 
belief  in  revelation. 

“ That  modern  species  of  infidelity,  called  deism,  or  natural 
religion,  as  contradistinguished  from  revealed." 2 

“ Tindal  appears  to  have  been  the  first  who  assumed  for 
himself,  and  bestowed  on  his  coadjutors,  the  denomination  of 
Christian  deists,  though  it  implied  no  less  than  an  absolute 
contradiction  in  terms."3  — V.  Theist. 

DEMIURGE  (Sq/uiovpyo;,  workman,  architect).  — Socrates  and 
Plato  represented  God  as  the  architect  of  the  universe.  Plo- 
tinus confounded  the  demiurge  with  the  soul  of  the  world,  and 
represented  it  as  inferior  to  the  supreme  intelligence.  The 
Gnostics  represented  it  as  an  emanation  from  the  supreme 
divinity,  and  having  a separate  existence.  The  difficulty  of 
reconciling  our  idea  of  an  infinite  cause  to  the  variable  and 
contingent  effects  observable  in  the  universe,  has  given  rise  to 
the  hypotheses  of  a demiurge,  and  of  a plastic  nature ; but 
they  do  not  alleviate  the  difficulty.  This  term  is  applied  to 
God,  Heb.  xi.  10. 


* Worlcs,  yol.  ii.,  p.  12. 

0 Van  Mildert,  Bampton  Led sermon  ix. 

3 Ibid.,  sermon  x.  See  Leland,  View  of  Dcistical  Writers, 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


131 


DEMOll  (8o.ifj.uv). — “ The  demon  kind  is  of  an  intermediate  nature 
between  the  divine  and  human.  What  is  the  power  and 
virtue,  said  I,  of  this  intermediate  kind  of  being?  To  trans- 
mit and  to  interpret  to  the  gods,  what  comes  from  men ; and 
to  men,  in  like  manner,  what  comes  from  the  gods ; from 
men  their  petitions  and  their  sacrifices ; from  the  gods,  in 
return,  the  revelation  of  their  will.” 1 

Socrates  declared  that  he  had  a friendly  spirit,  or  Demon, 
who  restrained  him  from  imprudence,  and  revealed  to  him 
what  was  true.  Plutarch  has  a Dialogue  on  the  Demon  of 
Socrates,  and  Apuleius  also  wrote  De  Deo  Socratis.  In 
modern  times  we  have  Lelut,  Du  Demon  de  Socrate.2  He 
thinks  Socrates  was  subject  to  hallucinations  of  sight  and 
hearing. 

DEMON STKATION  ( demonstro , to  point  out,  to  cause  to  see). — 
In  old  English  writers  this  word  was  used  to  signify  the  point- 
ing out  the  connection  between  a conclusion  and  its  premises, 
or  that  of  a phenomenon  with  its  asserted  cause.  It  now 
denotes  a necessary  consequence,  and  is  synonymous  with 
proof  from  first  principles.  To  draw  out  a particular  truth 
from  a general  truth  in  which  it  is  enclosed,  is  deduction:  from 
a necessary  and  universal  truth  to  draw  consequences  which 
necessarily  follow,  is  demonstration.  To  connect  a truth  with 
a first  principle,  to  show  that  it  is  this  principle  applied  or 
realized  in  a particular  case,  is  to  demonstrate.  The  result  is 
science,  knowledge,  certainty.  Those  general  truths  arrived 
at  by  induction  in  the  sciences  of  observation,  are  certain 
knowledge.  But  it  is  knowledge  which  is  not  definite  or  com- 
plete. It  may  admit  of  increase  or  modification  by  new  dis- 
coveries ; but  the  knowledge  which  demonstration  gives  is  fixed 
and  unalterable. 

A demonstration  is  a reasoning  consisting  of  one  or  more 
arguments,  by  which  some  proposition  brought  into  question 
is  evidently  shown  to  be  contained  in  some  other  proposition 
assumed,  whose  truth  and  certainty  being  evident  and  acknow- 
ledged, the  proposition  in  question  must  also  be  admitted  as 
certain. 

Demonstration  is  direct  or  indirect.  Direct  demonstration  is 


1 Sydenham,  Plato,  The  Banquet. 


* Paris,  1836, 1866. 


132 


VOCABULARY  OR  PHILOSOPHY. 


BEMONSTKATION  — 

descending — when  starting  from  a general  truth  we  come  to  a 
particular  conclusion,  which  we  must  affirm  or  deny ; or  as- 
cending— when  starting  from  the  subject  and  its  attributes, 
we  arrive  by  degrees  at  a general  principle,  with  which  we 
connect  the  proposition  in  question.  Both  these  are  deduc- 
tive, because  they  connect  a particular  truth  with  a general 
principle.  Indirect  demonstration  is  when  we  admit  hypo- 
thetically a proposition  contradictory  of  that  which  we  wish 
to  demonstrate,  and  show  that  this  admission  leads  to  absurd-* 
ity  ; that  is,  an  impossibility  or  a contradiction.  This  is,  de- 
monstrate per  impossible,  or  reductio  ad  absurdum.  It  should 
only  be  employed  when  direct  demonstration  is  unattainable. 

“ Demonstration  was  divided  by  ancient  writers  into  two 
kinds : one  kind  they  called  demonstration  bit, ; the  other  de- 
monstration Sibil. 

“ The  demonstration  dibit,  or  argument  from  cause  to  effect, 
is  most  commonly  employed  in  anticipating  future  events. 
When,  e.  g.,  we  argue  that  at  a certain  time  the  tides  will  be 
unusually  high,  because  of  its  being  the  day  following  the  new 
or  the  full  moon,  it  is  because  we  know  that  that  condition  of 
the  moon  is  in  some  way  connected  as  a cause  with  an  un- 
usually high  rising  of  the  tides  as  its  effect,  and  can  argue, 
therefore,  that  it  will  produce  what  is  called  spring  tide. 

“ On  the  other  hand,  the  demonstration  on,  or  argument 
from  effect  to  cause,  is  more  applicable,  naturally,  to  past 
events,  and  to  the  explanation  of  the  phenomena  which  they 
exhibit  as  effects.  Thus  the  presence  of  poison  in  the  bodies 
of  those  whose  death  has  been  unaccountably  sudden,  is 
frequently  proved  in  this  way  by  the  phenomena  which  such 
bodies  present,  and  which  involve  the  presence  of  poison  as 
their  cause.”1 

The  theory  of  demonstration  is  to  be  found  in  the  Organon 
of  Aristotle,  “since  whose  time,”  said  Kant,  “Logic,  as  to 
its  foundation,  has  gained  nothing.” 

DENOMINATION,  External.  — V.  Mode. 

DEONTOLOGY  (ib  Uov,  what  is  due,  or  binding ; Xoyo;,  dis- 
course). 


1 Karslalse,  Aids  to  Logic,  vol.  ii.,  p.  46. . 


VOCABULARY  OF  FHILOSOPEY. 


133 


DEONTOLOGY— 

“Deontology,  or  that  which  is  proper,  has  been  chosen  as  a 
fitter  term  than  any  other  which  could  he  found,  to  represent, 
in  the  field  of  morals,  the  principle  of  utilitarianism,  or  that 
which  is  useful.”1 

“ The  term  deontology  expresses  moral  science,  and  ex- 
presses it  well,  precisely  because  it  signifies  the  science  of 
duty,  and  contains  no  reference  to  utility.”2 

Deontology  involves  the  being  bound  or  being  under  obliga- 
tion ; the  very  idea  which  it  was  selected  to  avoid,  and  which 
utility  does  not  give. 

“ The  ancient  Pythagoreans  defined  virtue  to  be  ”E|t;  rov 
hiovio;  (that  is,  the  habit  of  duty,  or  of  doing  what  is  binding), 
the  oldest  definition  of  virtue  of  which  we  have  any  account, 
and  one  of  the  most  unexceptionable  which  is  yet  to  be  found 
in  any  system  of  philosophy.”  3 

And  Sir  W.  Hamilton4  has  observed  that  ethics  are  well 
denominated  deontology. 

DESIGN  ( designo , to  mark  out).  — “ The  atomic  atheists  further 
allege,  that  though  there  be  many  things  in  the  world  which 
serve  well  for  uses,  yet  it  does  not  at  all  follow  that  there- 
fore they  were  made  intentionally  and  designedly  for  those 
uses.”5 

“ What  is  done,  neither  by  accident,  nor  simply  for  its  own 
sake,  but  with  a view  to  some  effect  that  is  to  follow,  is  said  to 
be  the  result  of  design.  None  but  intelligent  beings  act  with 
design;  because  it  requires  knowledge  of  the  connection  of 
causes  and  effects,  and  the  power  of  comparing  ideas,  to  con- 
ceive of  some  end  or  object  to  be  produced,  and  to  devise  the 
means  proper  to  produce  the  effect.  Therefore,  whenever  we 
see  a thing  which  not  only  may  be  applied  to  some  use,  but 
which  is  evidently  made  for  the  sake  of  the  effect  which  it 
produces,  we  feel  sure  that  it  is  the  work  of  a being  capable 
of  thought.”6 

“ When  we  find  in  nature  the  adaptation  of  means  to  an 
end,  we  infer  design  and  a designer ; because  the  only  circum- 

1 Bentham,  Deontology ; or,  the  Science  oj  Morality,  vol.  i.,  p.  34. 

2 Whewell,  Preface  to  Macintosh's  Prelim.  Dissert.,  p.  20. 

3 Stewart,  Act.  and  Mor.  Powers,  vol.  ii.,  p.  446.  4 Reid’s  Worlcs,  p.  540,  note. 

1 CuSwortb,  Inlell.  Sysl.,  p.  670.  6 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

13 


134 


VOCABULARY  OR  PHILOSOPHY. 


DESIGN  — 

stances  in  which  we  can  trace  the  origination  of  adaptation, 
are  those  in  which  human  mind  is  implicated.”*  1 

On  the  argument  for  the  being  of  God  from  the  evidences 
of  design,  or  the  adaptation  of  means  to  ends  in  the  universe, 
see  Xenophon,  Memorabilia  of  Socrates ,2  Huffier,  Treatise  on 
First  Truths,3  Reid,4  Stewart,6  Paley,6  Bridgewater  Treatises ; 
Burnett  Prize  Essays. — V.  Cause  (Final). 

DESIRE.  — “ Desire  may  he  defined  that  uneasy  sensation  excited 
in  the  mind  by  the  view  or  by  the  contemplation  of  any  de- 
sirable good  which  is  not  in  our  possession,  which  we  are  so- 
licitous to  obtain,  and  of  which  the  attainment  appears  at 
least  possible.”7 

According  to  Dr.  Hutcheson,8  “desires  arise  in  our  mind  from 
the  frame  of  our  nature,  upon  apprehension  of  good  or  evil  in 
objects,  actions,  or  events,  to  obtain  for  ourselves  or  others  the 
agreeable  sensation  when  the  object  or  event  is  good;  or  to 
prevent  the  uneasy  sensation  when  it  is  evil.” 

But,  while  desires  imply  intelligence,  they  are  not  the  mere 
efflux,  or  product  of  that  intelligence  ; and,  while  the  objects 
of  our  desires  are  known,  it  is  not,  solely,  in  consequence  of 
knowing  them,  that  we  desire  them ; but,  rather,  because  we 
have  a capacity  of  desiring.  There  is  a tendency,  on  our 
part,  towards  certain  ends  or  objects,  and  there  is  a fitness  in 
them  to  give  us  pleasure,  when  they  are  attained.  Our  desires 
of  such  ends  or  objects  are  natural  and  primary.  Natural, 
but  not  instinctive,  for  they  imply  intelligence  ; primary,  and 
not  factitious,  for  they  result  from  the  constitution  of  things, 
and  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind,  antecedent  to  expe- 
rience and  education. 

It  has  been  maintained,  however,  that  there  are  no  original 
principles  in  our  nature,  carrying  us  towards  particular  objects, 
but  that,  in  the  course  of  experience,  we  learn  what  gives  us 
pleasure  or  pain — what  does  us  good  or  ill— that  we  flee  from 
the  one  class  of  objects,  and  follow  after  the  other;  that 
in  this  way,  likings  and  dislikings — inclination  and  aversion, 

1 Dove,  Theory  of  Hum.  Progression , p.  482.  aBook.,  chap.  4. 

3 Part  ii.,  chap.  16.  * Act.  Poio.,  essay  yi.,  chap.  6. 

6 Act.  and  Mor.  Povj .,  hook  iii.,  chap.  ii.  6 Nat.  Theol. 

1 Cogan,  On  Passions , part  i.,  chap.  2,  sect.  3.  8 Essay  on  the  Passions , sect.  L 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


135 


DESIRE— 

spring  up  within  us ; and  that  all  the  various  passions  and 
pursuits  of  human  life  are  produced  and  prompted  by  sensi- 
bility to  pleasure  and  pain,  and  a knowledge  of  what  affects 
that  sensibility : and  thus,  all  our  desires  may  be  resolved  into 
one  general  desire  of  happiness  or  well-being. 

There  is  room  for  difference  off  opinion  as  to  the  number  of 
those  desires  which  are  original ; but  there  is  little  room  for 
doubting,  that  there  are  some  which  may  be  so  designated. 
Every  being  has  a nature.  Everything  is  what  it  is,  by  having 
such  a nature.  Man  has  a nature,  and  his  nature  has  an  end. 
This  end  is  indicated  by  certain  tendencies.  lie  feels  incli- 
nation or  desire  towards  certain  objects,  which  are  suited  to 
his  faculties  and  fitted  to  improve  them.  The  attainment  of 
these  objects  gives  pleasure,  the  absence  of  them  is  a source 
of  uneasiness.  Man  seeks  them  by  a natural  and  spontaneous 
effort.  In  seeking  them,  he  comes  to  know  them  better  and 
desire  them  more  eagerly.  But  the  intelligence  which  is  gra- 
dually developed,  and  the  development  which  it  may  give  to 
the  desires,  should  not  lead  us  to  overlook  the  fact,  that  the 
desires  primarily  existed,  as  inherent  tendencies  in  our  nature", 
aiming  at  their  correspondent  objects  ; spontaneously,  it  may 
be,  in  the  first  instance,  but  gradually  gaining  clearness  and 
strength,  by  the  aid  and  concurrence  of  our  intellectual  and 
rational  powers. 

DESTINY  ( destination , fixed),  is  the  neeessary  and  unalterable 
connection  of  events ; of  which  the  heathens  made  a divine 
power,  superior  to  all  their  deities.  The  idea  of  an  irresisti- 
ble destiny,  against  which  man  strives  in  vain,  pervades  the 
whole  of  Greek  tragedy.  — V.  Fatalism. 

DETERMINISM. — This  name  is  applied  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton1 
to  the  doctrine  of  Hobbes,  as  contradistinguished  from  the 
ancient  doctrine  of  fatalism.  The  principle  of  the  svfficient 
reason  is  likewise  called  by  Leibnitz  the  principle  of  the 
determining  reason.  In  the  Did.  des  Sciences  Dhilosoph., 
nothing  is  given  under  determinism,  but  a reference  made 
to  fatalism ,2  And  fatalism  is  explained  as  the  doctrine 

1 Raid's  TH>r7.s.  p.  G01,  note. 

3 But  ia  the  article  “ Liberie,”  determinism  is  applied  to  the  doctrine  that  motives 
invincibly  determine  the  will,  and  is  opposed  to  liberty  of  indifference,  which  is  described 
as  the  doctrine  that  man  can  determine  himself  without  motives. 


136 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


DETERMINISM  - 

which  denies  liberty  to  man.  — V.  Necessity,  Fatalism,  Li- 
berty. 

DIALECTIC  ( dialektiJc ) is  the  logic  of  appearance  as  distinguished 
from  universal  Logic,  or  it  may  be  that  which  teaches  us  to 
excite  appearance  or  illusion.  As  logical  or  formal  it  treats  of 
the  sources  of  error  and  illusion,  and  the  mode  of  destroying 
them ; as  transcendental,  it  is  the  exposure  of  the  natural  and 
unavoidable  illusion  that  arises  from  human  reason  itself, 
which  is  ever  inclined  to  look  upon  phenomena  as  things  in 
themselves,  and  cognitions  & priori,  as  properties  adhering  to 
these  things,  and  in  such  way  to  form  the  super-sensible,  ac- 
cording to  this  assumed  cognition  of  things  in  themselves.” 1 
“ How  to  divide  and  subdivide,  and  dissect,  and  analyze  a 
topic,  so  as  to  be  directed  to  the  various  roads  of  argument 
by  which  it  may  be  approached,  investigated,  defended,  or 
attacked,  is  the  province  of  dialectic.  How  to  criticise  those 
arguments,  so  as  to  reject  the  sophistical,  and  to  allow  their 
exact  weight  to  the  solid,  is  the  province  of  Logic.  The  dia- 
lectician is  praised  in  proportion  as  his  method  is  exhaustive  ; 
that  is,  in  proportion  as  it  supplies  every  possible  form  of  argu- 
ment applicable  to  the  matter  under  discussion.  The  logician 
is  praised  in  proportion  as  his  method  is  demonstrative ; that 
is,  in  proportion  as  it  determines  unanswerably  the  value  of 
every  argument  applied  to  the  matter  under  discussion.  Dia- 
lectic provides,  and  Logic  appreciates  argumentation;  dialectic 
exercises  the  invention,  and  Logic  the  judgment.”2 
DIALECTICS  (StaXsx-tixij  “tlxvri)-  — “The  Greek  verb  SiaAsy- 
foflcu,  in  its  widest  signification, — 1.  Includes  the  use  both  of 
reason  and  speech  as  proper  to  man.  Hence  dialectics  may 
mean  Logic,  as  including  the  right  use  of  reason  and  language. 
2.  It  is  also  used  as  synonymous  with  the  Latin  word  disserere, 
to  discuss  or  dispute;  hence,  dialectics  has  been  used  to  denote 
the  Logic  of  probabilities,  as  opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  demon- 
stration and  scientific  induction.  3.  It  is  also  used  in  popular 
language  to  denote  Logic  properly  so  called.  But  dialectics, 
like  science,  is  not  Logic,  but  the  subject  matter  of  Logic. 


1 Haywood,  Transl.  of  Kant,  p.  596. 

Q Taylor,  Synonyms. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


137 


DIALECTICS  — 

Dialectics  is  handled,  anatomized,  and  its  conditions  deter- 
mined by  Logic ; but,  for  all  that,  it  is  not  Logic,  any  more 
than  the  animal  kingdom  is  Zoology,  or  the  vegetable  king- 
dom is  Botany.”  1 

“Xenophon2  tells  us,  that  Socrates  said,  ‘That  dialectic 
(to  5t,au-yso8ai)  was  so  called  because  it  is  an  inquiry  pursued 
by  persons  -who  take  counsel  together,  separating  the  subjects 
considered  according  to  their  kinds  (SiaAc'yoytas).  He  held 
accordingly  that  men  should  try  to  be  well  prepared  for  such 
a process,  and  should  pursue  it  with  diligence.  By  this  means 
he  thought  they  would  become  good  men,  fitted  for  respon- 
sible offices  of  command,  and  truly  dialectical’  (Siatextir 
jcutatotf).  -And  this  is,  I conceive,  the  answer  to  Mr.  Grote’s 
interrogatory  exclamation.3  ‘ Surely  the  etymology  here  given 
by  Xenophon  or  Socrates  of  the  word  (ScaTJyeadai),  cannot  be 
considered  as  satisfactory.'  The  two  notions,  of  investigatory 
dialogue  and  distribution  of  notions  according  to  their  kinds, 
which  are  thus  asserted  to  be  connected  in  etymology,  were, 
among  the  followers  of  Socrates,  connected  in  fact ; the  dia- 
lectic dialogue  was  supposed  to  involve  of  course  the  dialectic 
division  of  the  subject.”4 
DIAHGIOLOGY — V.  Nooloqy. 

DICHOTOMY  (8 txofojuta,  cutting  in  two,  division  into  two  parts, 
logically),  is  a bimembral  division.  — “Our  Saviour  said  to 
Pilate,  ‘ Sayest  thou  this  thing  of  thyself,  or  did  others  tell 
thee?’  And  all  things  reported  are  reducible  to  this  clielio- 
tomie,  — 1.  The  fountain  of  invention.  2.  The  channel  of 
relation.”5 

“ The  divisions  of  Peter  Ramus  always  consisted  of  two 
members,  one  of  which  was  contradictory  of  the  other,  as  if 
one  should  divide  England  into  Middlesex.”  In  a note  on 
this  passage,  Sir  William  Hamilton  says,  “ There  is  nothing 
new  in  Ramus’  Dichotomy  by  contradiction.  -It  was,  ’ in  par- 
ticular, a favourite  with  Plato.”6 

“Every  division,  however  complex,  is  reducible  at  each  of 

1 Poste,  lntrod.  to  Poster.  Analyt .,  p.  16.  12mo,  London,  1850. 

3 Mem.,  iv.  5,  11.  3 Yol.  viii.,  p.  577. 

4 Dr.  Whewell,  On  Plato's  Notion  of  Dialectic , Trans,  of  Camb.  Philosoph.  Soc vol. 
ix.,  part  4. 

* Puller,  Worthies , vol4  i.,  c.  23. 

13* 


6 Reid's  Works,  p. 


138 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


DICHOTOMY— 

its  steps  to  a Dichotomy ; that  is,  to  the  division  of  a class  into 
two  sub-classes,  opposed  to  each  other  by  contradiction.  The 
term  X,  if  divisible  positively  by  several  terms,  of  which  Y is 
one,  is  divisible  also  by  the  terms  Y and  not  Y.” 1 
DICTUM  DE  OMNI  ET  HULLO  may  be  explained  to  mean 
“whatever  is  predicated  [i.e.,  affirmed,  or  denied)  universally 
of  any  class  of  things,  may  be  predicated  in  like  manner  (viz., 
affirmed,  or  denied)  of  anything  comprehended  in  that  class.” 
— V.  Contradiction. 

DICTUM  SIMPLICITEE.  — When  a term  or  proposition  is  to 
be  understood  in  its  plain  and  unlimited  sense,  it  is  used  sim- 
pliciter  ; when  with  limitation  or  reference,  it  is  said  to  be 
used  secundum  quid  — q.  v. 

DIFFERENCE  (8ax<j>opd,  differentia).  — When  two  objects  are 
compared  they  may  have  qualities  which  are  common  to  both, 
or  the  one  may  have  qualities  which  the  other  has  not.  The 
first  constitutes  their  resemblance,  the  second  their  difference. 
If  the  qualities  constituting  their  resemblance  be  essential 
qualities,  and  the  qualities  constituting  their  difference  be 
merely  accidental,  the  objects  are  only  said  to  bo  distinct ; but 
if  the  qualities  constituting  their  difference  be  essential  quali- 
ties, then  the  objects  are  different.2  One  man  is  distinct  from 
another  man,  or  one  piece  of  silver  from  another ; but  a man 
is  different  from  a horse,  and  gold  is  different  from  silver. 
Those  ace'  iental  differences  which  distinguish  objects  whose 
essence  is  common,  belong  only  to  individuals,  and  are  called 
individual  or  numerical  differences.  Those  differences  which 
cause  objects  to  have  a different  nature,  constitute  species,  and 
are  called  specific  differences.  The  former  are  passing  and 
variable ; but  the  latter  are  permanent  and  form  the  objects 
of  science,  and  furnish  the  grounds  of  all  classification,  divi- 
sion, and  definition — q.  v. 

“ Difference  or  differentia,  in  Logic,  means  the  formal  or 
distinguishing  part  of  the  essence  of  a species.”  When  I say 
that  the  differentia  of  a magnet  is  “ its  attracting  iron,”  and 
that  its  property  is  “ polarity,”  these  are  called  respectively,  a 


1 Spalding,  Logic , p.  146. 

2 Derodon,  De  Universalibus , seems  to  use  differentia  and  distinctio  indiscriminately. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


139 


DIFFERENCE  — 

specific  difference  and  properly ; because  magnet  is  (I  have  sup- 
posed) an  iifima  species  (i.  e.,  only  a species).  "When  I say 
that  the  differentia  of  iron  ore  is  “its  containing  iron,”  and  its 
property  “ being  attracted  by  the  magnet,”  these  are  called 
respectively,  a generic  difference  and  property,  because  “ iron 
ore”  is  a subaltern  species  or  genus ; being  both  the  genus  of 
magnet,  and  the  species  of  mineral.” 1 

The  English  word  divers  expresses  difference  only,  but  di- 
verse expresses  difference  with  opposition.  The  Evangelists 
narrate  the  same  events  in  “divers  manners,”  but  not  in 
“ diverse  manners.” 2 — F.  Distinction. 

DILEMMA  is  a syllogism  with  a conditional  premiss,  in  which 
either  the  antecedent  or  consequent  is  disjunctive.  When  an 
affirmative  is  proved,  the  Dilemma  is  said  to  be  in  the  modus 
ponens,  and  the  argument  is  called  constructive ; when  a 
negative  is  proved,  the  Dilemma  is  said  to  be  in  the  modus 
tellens,  and  the  argument  is  called  destructive.  Of  the  con- 
structive dilemma  there  are  two  sorts — the  simple,  which  con- 
cludes categorically,  and  the  complex,  which  has  a disjunctive 
conclusion.  There  is  but  one  sort  of  the  true  destructive 
dilemma. 

The  dilemma  is  used  to  prove  the  absurdity  or  falsehood  of 
some  assertion.  A conditional  proposition  is  assumed,  the 
antecedent  of  which  is  the  assertion  to  be  disproved,  while 
the  consequent  is  a disjunctive  proposition  enumerating  the 
suppositions  on  which  the  assertion  can  be  true.  Should  the 
supposition  be  rejected,  the  assertion  also  must  be  rejected. 
If  A is  B,  either  C is  D or  E is  E.  But  neither  C is  D nor  E 
is  F ; therefore,  A is  not  B. 

This  syllogism  was  called  the  Syllogismus  Cornutvs,  the  two 
members  of  the  consequent  being  the  horns  of  the  dilemma, 
on  which  the  adversary  is  caught  between  (StaXa/i^avs-rai) 
two  difficulties.  And  it  was  called  dilemma,  quasi  Si{  '/,ag- 
fiavav ; according  to  others  it  was  so  called  from  Si;,  twice, 
and  Xygya,  an  assumption,  because  in  the  major  premiss  there 


1 Wbately,  Log .,  book  ii.,  chap.  5,  § 4. 

3 See  Porphyry,  lntrcd.  to  Gitegor. ; Arist.,  Top.,  lib.  Tii.,  c.  1,  2. 


140 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


DILEMMA  - 

are  generally  two  antecedents,  which  in  the  minor  become 
two  assumptions. 

The  hypothetico-disjunctive  syllogism,  or  dilemma,  must  not 
be  confounded  with  the  sophism  called  dilemma,  in  which,  by 
a fallacy,  two  contradictories  seem  to  be  proved. 
DISCOVERY.  — V.  Invention. 

DISCURSTJS.  — “If  the  mind  do  not  perceive  intuitively  the  con- 
nection betwixt  the  predicate  and  subject,  as  in  the  case  of 
axioms,  or  self-evident  propositions,  it  can  do  so  no  otherwise 
than  by  the  intervention  of  other  ideas,  or  by  the  use  of  middle 
terms,  as  they  are  called,  in  the  language  of  Aristotle.  And 
this  application  of  the  middle  term,  first  to  one  of  the  terms  of 
a proposition,  and  then  to  the  other,  is  performed  by  that  ex- 
ercise of  the  intellect  which  is  very  properly  called  in  Greek 
$uxvoi.a,  because  the  intellect  in  this  operation  goes  betwixt 
the  two  terms,  as  it  were,  and  passes  from  the  one  to  the  other. 
In  Latin,  as  there  is  not  the  same  facility  of  composition,  it  is 
expressed  by  two  words,  discursus  mentis,  mens  being  the 
same  thing  in  Latin  as  Noi?  in  Greek  ; and  the  Latin  expres- 
sion is  rendered  into  English  by  discourse  of  reasoning,  or  as 
it  is  commonly  called,  reasoning.”  1 

“Reasoning  (or  discourse ) is  the  act  of  proceeding  from 
certain  iudarnents  to  another  founded  on  them  (or  the  result 
of  them.)”2 

DISJUNCTIVE.  — V.  Proposition,  Syllogism. 

DISPOSITION  (ScaSiaii,  dispositio),  according  to  Aristotle,3  is 
the  arrangement  of  that  which  has  parts,  either  according  to 
place,  or  to  potentiality,  or  according  to  species ; for  it  is 
necessary  that  there  be  a certain  position,  as  also  the  name 
disposition  makes  manifest.” 

As  applied  to  mind,  it  supposes  the  relation  of  its  powers  and 
principles  to  one  another,  and  means  the  resultant  bias,  or 
tendency  to  be  moved  by  some  of  them  rather  than  by  others. 

Mind  is  essentially  one.  But  we  speak  of  it  as  having  a 
constitution  and  as  containing  certain  primary  elements;  and, 
according  as  these  elements  are  combined  and  balanced  there 


1 Monboddo,  Ancient  Metaphys .,  book  v.,  ch.  4. 

a Whately,  Log book  ii.,  ch.  1,  } 2. 

3 Metaphys lib.  iv.,  cap.  19. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


141 


DISPOSITION  — 

may  be  differences  in  the  constitution  of  individual  minds,  just 
as  there  are  differences  of  bodily  temperaments ; and  these  dif- 
ferences may  give  rise  to  a disposition  or  bias,  in  the  one  case, 
more  directly  in  the  other.  According  as  intellect,  or  sensi- 
tivity, or  will,  prevails  in  any  individual  mind,  there  will  be 
a correspondent  bias  resulting. 

But  it  is  in  reference  to  original  differences  in  the  primary 
desires,  that  differences  of  disposition  are  most  observable. 
Any  desire,  when  powerful,  draws  over  the  other  tendencies 
of  the  mind  to  its  side ; gives  a colour  to  the  whole  character 
of  the  man,  and  manifests  its  influence  throughout  all  his 
temper  and  conduct.  His  thoughts  run  in  a particular  chan- 
nel, without  his  being  sensible  that  they  do  so,  except  by  the 
result.  There  is  an  under-current  of  feeling,  flowing  continu- 
ally within  him,  which  only  manifests  itself  by  the  direction 
in  which  it  carries  him.  This  constitutes  his  temper.1  Dis- 
position is  the  sum  of  a man’s  desires  and  feelings. 

DISTINCTION  (Stoa'pEfjts)  is  wider  in  signification  than  differ- 
ence; for  all  things  that  are  different  are  also  distinct;  but  all 
things  that  are  distinct  are  not  also  different.  One  drop  of 
water  does  not  specifically  differ  from  another ; but  they  are 
individually  distinct. 

Distinction  is  a kind  of  alietas  or  otherness.  Those  things 
are  said  to  be  distinct  of  which  one  is  not  the  other.  Thus 
Peter,  precisely  because  he  is  not  Paul,  is  said  to  be  distinct 
from  Paul.  Union  is  not  opposed  to  distinction;  for  things 
may  be  so  united  that  the  one  shall  not  be  confounded  with 
the  other.  Thus  the  soul  is  united  to  the  body.  Indeed  union 
implies  distinction ; it  is  when  two  things  which  are  mutually 
distinct  become,  as  it  were,  one. 

Distinction  is  real  and  mental,  a parte  rei  and  per  intellectum. 
Real  distinction  is  founded  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  and 
amounts  to  difference.  It  is  threefold: — 1.  Object  from  object 
— as  God  from  man.  2.  Mode  from  mode — as  blue  from  black. 
3.  Mode  from  thing — as  body  from  motion.  Mental  distinction 
is  made  by  the  mind  — as  when  we  distinguish  between  light 


1 “The  balance  of  our  animal  principles,  I think,  constitutes  what  we  call  a man’s 
natural  temper.”— Reid,  Act.  row.,  essay  iii.,  part  ii.,  ch.  8. 


142 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


DISTINCTION  - 

and  heat,  -which  are  naturally  united,  or  between  the  length 
and  breadth  of  a body.  It  amounts  to  abstraction .' 

“ Separation  by  the  touch  [dis  and  tango)  makes  a distinc- 
tion; by  turning  apart  ( dis  and  vcrto)  makes  a diversity;  by 
carrying  asunder  [dis  andyb-o)  makes  a difference;  by  affixing 
a mark  [dis  and  crimen)  makes  a discrimination.  Distinction, 
therefore,  is  applied  to  delicate  variations  ; diversity  to  glaring 
contrasts ; difference  to  hostile  unlikenesses ; and  discrimina- 
tion to  formal  criticism.” 2 

DISTRIBUTION  — “ is  the  placing  particular  things  in  the  places 
or  compartments  which  have  already  been  prepared  to  receive 
them.”3 

“ In  Logic,  a term  is  said  to  be  distributed  when  it  is  em- 
ployed in  its  full  extent,  so  as  to  comprehend  all  its  signifi- 
cates  — everything  to  which  it  is  applicable.”4 

“A  term  is  said  to  be  ‘distributed,’  when  an  assertion  is 
made  or  implied  respecting  every  member  of  the  class  which  the 
term  denotes.  Of  every  universal  proposition,  therefore,  the 
subject  is  distributed ; e.  g.,  all  men  arc  mortal ; No  rational 
being  is  responsible  ; Whatsoever  things  were  written  aforetime 
were  written  for  our  learning.  When  an  assertion  is  made  or 
applied  respecting  some  member  or  members  of  a class,  but 
not  necessarily  respecting  all,  the  term  is  said  to  be  ‘ undis- 
tributed as,  for  example,  the  subjects  of  the  following  pro- 
positions : — Some  men  are  benevolent ; There  are  some  stand- 
ing here  that  shall  not  die ; Not  every  one  that  invokes  the 
sacred  name  shall  enter  into  the  heavenly  kingdom.”5 

“ When  the  whole  of  either  term  (in  a proposition)  is  com- 
pared with  the  other,  it  is  said  to  be  distributed ; when  a part 
only  is  so  compared,  it  is  said  to  be  undistributed.  In  the  pro- 
position ‘All,  A is  B,’  the  term  A is  distributed;  but  in  the 
proposition  ‘ Some,  A is  B,’  it  is  undistributed.”6 
The  rules  for  distribution  are : — 

1.  All  universal  propositions,  and  no  particular,  distribute 
the  subject. 

* Bossuet,  Lng.,  liy.  i.,  c.  25 ; Reid,  Account  of  Aristotle's  Logic , ch.  2,  sect.  3. 

3 Taylor,  Synonyms.  3 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

4 Whately,  Logic,  b.  ii.,  ch.  3,  $ 2. 

5 Kidd,  Principles  of  Reasoning,  ch.  4,  sect.  3,  p.  179. 

9 Solly,  SyU.  of  Log.,  p.  47. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


148 


DISTRIBUTION  — 

2.  All  negative,  and  no  affirmative,  the  predicate.1 

“A  singular  term  can  never  denote  anything  less  than  the 
object  of  which  it  is  a name.  A common  term  may  he  under- 
stood as  denoting  all,  or  fewer  than  all,  of  the  objects  of  the 
class.  When  it  denotes  all,  it  is  said  to  he  taken  universally, 
or  to  be  distributed ; that  is,  to  be  spread  over  the  whole  class, 
or  to  be  applied  to  all  the  objects  distributively  — not  collect- 
ively — to  each,  not  to  all  together.  When  it  denotes  fewer 
than  all  the  objects  of  the  class,  it  is  said  to  be  taken  particu- 
larly, or  to  be  undistributed.” 2 

DITHEISM. -“As  for  that  fore-mentioned  ditheism,  or  opinion 
of  two  gods  — a good  and  an  evil  one,  it  is  evident  that  its 
original  sprung  from  nothing  else,  but  from  a firm  persuasion 
of  the  essential  goodness  of  Deity,  &c.”3 — V.  Dualism. 

DIVISION  — “is  the  separating  things  of  the  same  kind  into 
parcels  ; analysis  is  the  separating  of  things  that  are  of  dif- 
ferent kinds  ; we  divide  a stick  by  cutting  it  into  two,  or  into 
twenty  pieces ; we  analyze  it  by  separating  the  bark,  the 
wood,  and  the  pith  — a divisicni  may  be  made  at  pleasure,  an 
analysis  must  be  made  according  to  the  nature  of  the  object.”4 

Division  is  either  division  proper  or  partition.  Partition  is 
the  distribution  of  some  substance  into  its  parts;  as  of  the 
globe  into  Europe,  Asia,  Africa,  and  America.  Division 
proper  is  the  distribution  of  genus  and  species  into  what  is 
under  them  ; as  when  substance  is  divided  into  spiritual  and 
material.  The  members  which  arise  from  division  retain  the 
name  of  their  whole  ; but  not  those  from  partition. 

“ Division  is  the  separation  of  a whole  into  its  parts. 

“But  as  there  are  two  kinds  of  ivholes,  there  are  also  two 
kinds  of  division.  There  is  a whole  composed  of  parts  really 
distinct,  called  in  Latin,  totum,  and  whose  parts  are  called 
integral  parts.  The  division  of  this  whole  is  called  properly 
partition;  as  when  we  divide  a house  into  its  apartments,  a 
town  into  its  wards,  a kingdom  or  state  into  its  provinces,  man 
into  body  and  soul,  the  body  into  its  members.  The  sole  rule 

1 Wesley,  Guide  to  Syllogism,  p.  10. 

a Spalding,  Log.,  p.  57. 

3 Cudworth,  Intell.  System,  p.  213. 

4 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 


144 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


DIVISION  - 

of  their  division  is,  to  make  the  enumeration  of  particulars 
very  exact,  and  that  there  he  nothing  wanting  to  them. 

“The  other  whole  is  called,  in  Latin,  omne,  and  its  parts 
subjected  or  inferior  parts,  inasmuch  as  the  whole  is  a,  common 
term,  and  its  parts  are  the  terms  comprising  its  extension. 
The  word  animal  is  a whole  of  this  nature,  of  which  the  in- 
feriors, as  man  and  beast,  which  are  comprehended  under  its 
extension,  are  subjected  parts.  This  division  obtains  properly 
the  name  of  division,  and  there  are  four  kinds  of  division 
which  may  be  noticed. 

“ Thej^?'s<  is,  when  we  divide  the  genus  by  its  species ; every 
substance  is  body  or  mind,  every  animal  is  man  or  beast.  The 
second  is,  when  we  divide  the  genus  by  its  differences ; every 
animal  is  rational  or  irrational,  every  number  is  even  or  un- 
even. The  third  is,  when  we  divide  a common  subject  info  the 
opposite  accidents  of  which  it  is  susceptible,  these  being  accord- 
ing to  its  different  inferiors,  or  in  relation  to  different  times ; 
as,  every  star  is  luminous  by  itself,  or  by  reflection  only ; 
every  body  is  in  motion  or  at  rest,  &c.  Th a fourth  is,  that  of 
an  accident  into  its  different  subjects,  as  division  of  goods  into 
those  of  mind  and  body.” 1 

“ Division  (Logical)  is  the  distinct  enumeration  of  several 
things  signified  by  one  common  name.  It  is  so  called  from 
its  being  analogous  to  the  real  division  of  a whole  into  its 
parts.” 2 

The  rules  of  a good  division  are : — 

1.  Each  of  the  parts,  or  any,  short  of  all,  must  contain  less 
( i . e.,  have  a narrower  signification)  than  the  thing  divided. 
“ Weapon  ” could  not  be  a division  of  the  term  “ sword.”  2. 
All  the  parts  taken  together  must  be  exactly  equal  to  the 
thing  divided.  In  dividing  the  term  “ weapon  ” into  “ sword,” 
“ pike,”  “ gun,”  &c.,  we  must  not  omit  anything  of  which 
“ weapon  ” can  be  predicated,  nor  introduce  anything  of  which 
it  cannot.  3.  The  parts,  or  members,  must  be  opposed,  i.  e., 
must  not  be  contained  in  one  another.  “ Book  ” must  not  be 
divided  into  “ Quarto,”  “ French  ;”  for  a French  book  may  be 
a quarto,  and  a quarto  French.  It  may  be  added,  that  a divi- 


1 Port  Roy.  Log.,  part  ii.,  chap.  15. 


Whately,  Log.,  book  ii.,  ch.  5,  J5. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


145 


DIVISION — 

sion  should  proceed  throughout  upon  the  same  principle- 
Books  may  be  divided  according  to  size,  language,  mailer,  &c., 
all  these  being  so  many  cross-divisions. 

Aristotle,1  Reid.- — V.  Whole,  Fallacy. 

DIVORCE  ( diverto , to  separate),  is  a separation,  especially  of 
husband  and  wife.  It  is  used  to  signify,  — 1.  Separation  of  a 
married  pair  without  any  right  of  re-marriage.  2.  The  like 
separation  with  that  right ; and  3.  The  declaratory  sentence, 
pronouncing  a marriage  to  have  been  void  ab  initio  — that  is, 
never  to  have  existed  in  law. — Paley 3 understands  by  divorce, 
“ the  dissolution  of  the  marriage  contract  by  the  act  and  at 
the  will  of  the  husband.”4 

DOGMATISM  (hoyga,  from  Soxs'u,  to  think).  — “Philosophers,” 
said  Lord  Bacon,  “ may  bo  divided  into  two  classes,  the  em- 
pirics and  the  dogmatists.  The  empiric,  like  the  ant,  is  content 
to  amass,  and  then  consume  his  provisions.  The  dogmatist, 
like  the  spider,  spins  webs  of  which  the  materials  are  ex- 
tracted from  his  own  substance,  admirable  for  the  delicacy  of 
their  workmanship,  but  without  solidity  or  use.  The  bee 
keeps  a middle  course — she  draws  her  matter  from  flowers  and 
gardens ; then,  by  art  peculiar  to  her,  she  labours  and  digests 
it.  True  philosophy  does  something  like  this.” 

“ Ho  who  is  certain,  or  presumes  to  say  he  knows,  is, 
whether  he  be  mistaken  or  in  the  right,  a dogmatist.” 5 

Kant  defined  dogmatism,  “the  presumption  that  we  are  able 
to  attain  a pure  knowledge  based  on  ideas,  according  to  prin- 
ciples which  the  reason  has  long  had  in  use,  without  any 
inquiry  into  the  manner  or  into  the  right  by  which  it  has 
attained  them.”6 

“ By  dogmatism  we  understand,  in  general,  both  all  pro- 
pounding and  all  receiving  of  tenets  merely  from  habit, 
without  thought  or  examination,  or,  in  other  words,  upon  the 
authority  of  others ; in  short,  the  very  opposite  of  critical 
investigation.  All  assertion  for  which  no  proof  is  offered  is 
dogmatical." 7 

1 Poster.  Analyt.,  lib.  ii.,  c.  13.  Q Account  of  Aristotle's  Logic,  chap,  ii.,  sect.  2. 

2 Mar.  Phil.,  b.  Hi.,  pt.  iii.,  c.  7.  4 Quarterly  Rev.,  No.  203,  p.  256. 

5 Shaftesbury,  Miscell.  Reflect.,  Miscell.  ii.,  c.  2. 

8 Morell,  Elements  of  Psychology,  p.  236,  note. 

1 Chalvbaeus,  Specul.  Philosoph.,  p.  4. 

’14 


L 


146 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


DOGMATISM— 

To  maintain  that  man  cannot  attain  to  knowledge  of  the 
truth,  is  scepticism.  To  maintain  that  he  can  do  so  only  by 
renouncing  his  reason,  which  is  naturally  defective,  and  sur- 
rendering himself  to  an  internal  inspiration  or  superior  intui- 
tion, by  which  he  is  absorbed  into  God,  and  loses  all  personal 
existence,  is  mysticism.  Dogmatism  is  to  maintain  that  know- 
ledge may  be  attained  by  the  right  use  of  our  faculties,  each 
within  its  proper  sphere,  and  employed  in  a right  method. 
This  is  the  natural  creed  of  the  human  race.  Scepticism  and 
mysticism  are  after  thoughts. 

Dogmatism,  or  faith  in  the  results  of  the  due  exercise  of  our 
faculties,  is  to  be  commended.  But  dogmatism  in  the  method 
of  prosecuting  our  inquiries  is  to  be  condemned.  Instead  of 
laying  down  dogmatically  truths  which  are  not  proven,  we 
should  proceed  rather  by  observation  and  doubt.  The  scho- 
lastic philosophers  did  much  harm  by  their  dogmatic  method. 
It  is  not  to  be  mistaken  for  the  synthetic  method.  There  can 
be  no  synthesis  without  a preceding  analysis.  But  they  started 
from  positions  which  had  not  been  proved,  and  deduced  con- 
sequences which  were  of  no  value.1 

There  is  wisdom  as  well  as  wit  in  the  saying  that,  Dogma- 
tism is  Puppyism  come  to  maturity. 

DOUBT  ( dubito , to  go  two  ways).  — Man  knows  some  things  and 
is  ignorant  of  many  things,  while  he  is  in  doubt  as  to  other 
things.  Doubt  is  that  state  of  mind' in  which  we  hesitate  as 
to  two  contradictory  conclusions  — having  no  preponderance 
of  evidence  in  favour  of  either.  Philosophical  doubt  has  been 
distinguished  as  provisional  or  definitive.  Definitive  doubt  is 
scepticism.  Provisional,  or  methodical  doubt  is  a voluntary 
suspending  of  our  judgment  for  a time,  in  order  to  come  to  a 
more  clear  and  sure  conclusion.  This  was  first  given  as  a rule 
in  philosophical  method  by  Descartes,  who  tells  us  that  he 
began  by  doubting  everything,  discharging  his  mind  of  all 
preconceived  ideas,  and  admitting  none  as  clear  and  true  till 
he  had  subjected  them  to  a rigorous  examination. 

“Doubt  is  some  degree  of  belief,  along  with  the  conscious- 
ness of  ignorance,  in  regard  to  a proposition.  Absolute  dis- 


1 Did.  des  Sciences  Philosoph. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


147 


DOUBT— 

belief  implies  knowledge:  it  is  the  knowledge  that  such  or  such 
a thing  is  not  true.  If  the  mind  admits  a proposition  without 
any  desire  for  knowledge  concerning  it,  this  is  credulity.  If 
it  is  open  to  receive  the  proposition,  but  feels  ignorance  con- 
cerning it,  this  is  doubt.  In  proportion  as  knowledge  increases, 
doubt  diminishes,  and  belief  or  disbelief  strengthens.”1  — V. 
Certainty,  Scepticism. 

DREAMING.  — The  phenomena  of  sleep  and  dreaming,  are  treated 
by  almost  all  writers  on  psychology.  Dreams  very  often  take 
their  rise  and  character  from  something  in  the  preceding  state 
of  body  or  mind.  “ Through  the  multitude  of  business  cometh 
. a dream,”  said  Solomon  ; and  Aristotle  regarded  dreams  as  the 
vibrations  of  our  waking  feelings.2 

According  to  these  views,  dreams,  instead  of  being  prospec- 
tive or  prophetic,  are  retrospective  and  resultant.  The  former 
opinion,  however,  has  prevailed  in  all  ages  and  among  all 
nations ; and  hence,  oneiromancy  or  prophesjdng  by  dreams, 
that  is,  interpreting  them  as  presages  of  coming  events. 

DUALISM,  DUALITY.  — “ Pythagoras  talked,  it  is  said,  of  an 
immaterial  unity,  and  a material  duality,  by  which  he  pre- 
tended to  signify,  perhaps,  the  first  principles  of  all  things, 
the  efficient  and  material  causes.3 

Dualism  is  the  doctrine  that  the  universe  was  created  and 
is  preserved  by  the  concurrence  of  two  principles,  equally  ne- 
cessary, eternal,  and  independent. 

Mythological  dualism  was  held  by  Zoroaster  and  the  Magi, 
who  maintained  the  existence  of  a good  principle  and  an  evil 
principle  ; and  thus  explained  the  mixed  state  of  things  which 
prevails.  It  would  appear,  however,  according  to  Zoroaster, 
that  both  Ormuzd  and  Ahrimanes  were  subordinate  to  Akerenes, 
or  the  Supreme  Deity  ; and  that  it  was  only  a sect  of  the  Magi 
who  held  the  doctrine  of  dualism  in  its  naked  form.  Their 
views  were  revived  in  the  second  century  by  the  Gnostics,  and 
in  the  third  century  were  supported  by  Manes,  whose  follow- 
ers were  called  Manicheans. 

Many  of  the  ancient  philosophers  regarded  the  universe  as 
constituted  by  two  principles,  the  one  active,  the  other  pas- 


1 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

* Bolingbroke,  Hum.  Reason,  essay  ii. 


3 Ethic , lib.  i.,  cap.  13. 


148 


VOCABULARY  OF  MILOSOBHY. 


DUALISM  — 

sive,  the  one  mind,  the  other  matter  — the  one  soul,  the  other 
body.  But  the  supposition  of  two  infinites,  or  of  two  first 
causes,  is  self-contradictory,  and  is  now  abandoned. 

The  term  dualism  also  finds  a place  in  the  theory  of  percep- 
tion— q.  v. 

DURATION.  — “After  some  thought  has  entirely  disappeared 
from  the  mind  it  will  often  return,  joined  with  the  belief  that 
it  has  been  in  the  mind  before  ; this  is  called  memory.  Memory 
and  the  consciousness  of  succession  give  us  the  notion  signi- 
fied by  the  word  duration.”  1 

According  to  Kant,  duration  or  time,  and  also  space,  are 
necessary  forms  of  the  human  mind,  which  cannot  think.of 
bodies  but  as  existing  in  space,  nor  of  events  but  as  occurring 
in  time. — V.  Time. 

DUTY.  — That  which  we  ought  to  do  — that  which  we  are  under 
obligation  to  do.  In  seeing  a thing  to  be  right,  we  see  at  the 
same  time  that  it  is  our  duty  to  do  it.  There  is  a complete 
synthesis  between  rectitude  and  obligation.  Price  has  used 
ouglilness  as  synonymous  with  rightness.  — V.  Obligation. 

Duty  and  right  are  relative  terms.  If  it  be  the  duty  of  one 
party  to  do  some  thing,  it  is  the  right  of  some  other  party  to 
expect  or  exact  the  doing  of  it.2  — V.  Right,  Rectitude. 

DYNAMISM,  the  doctrine  of  Leibnitz,  that  all  substance  in- 
volves force. — V.  Matter. 


ECLECTICISM  (ixliyu,  to  select,  to  choose  out).  — The  Alex- 
andrian philosophers,  or  Neo-Flatonicians,  who  arose  at 
Alexandria  about  the  time  of  Pertinax  and  Severus,  and 
continued  to  flourish  to  the  end  of  the  reign  of  Justinian, 
professed  to  gather  and  unite  into  one  body,  what  was  true  in 
all  systems  of  philosophy.  To  their  method  of  philosophizing, 
the  name  eclecticism  was  first  applied.  Clemens  Alexandrinus3 
said,  “ By  philosophy  I mean  neither  the  Stoic,  nor  the  Pla- 
tonic, nor  the  Epicurean,  nor  the  Aristotelian ; but  whatever 


1 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand  , book  ii..  chap.  15. 

* See  Wordsworth,  Ode  to  Duty.  8 Stromm.,  lib.  i.,  p.  228. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


149 


ECLECTICISM — 

things  have  been  properly  said  by  each  of  these  sects,  incul- 
cating justice  and  devout  knowledge,  — this  whole  selection  I 
call  philosophy.”  Diogenes  Laertes'  tell  us,  that  Potamos  of 
Alexandria  introduced  ix’Ksx-axrjv  atpeew.  But  the  method 
had  been  adopted  by  Plato  and  Aristotle  before,  and  has  been 
followed  by  many  in  all  ages  of  philosophy.  Leibnitz  said 
that  truth  was  more  widely  diffused  than  was  commonly 
thought ; but  it  was  often  burdened  and  weakened,  mutilated 
and  corrupted  by  additions  which  spoiled  it  and  made  it  less 
useful.  In  the  philosophy  of  the  ancients,  or  those  who  had 
gone  before,  he  thought  there  was  perennis  quondam  philoso - 
phia — -if  it  could  only  be  disintricated  from  error  and  disin- 
terred from  the  rubbish  which  overwhelmed  it.  In  modern 
times  the  great  advocate  of  eclecticism  is  Mons.  Cousin.  But 
its  legitimacy  as  a mode  of  philosophizing  has  been  chal- 
lenged. 

“The  sense  in  which  this  term  is  used  by  Clemens”  (of 
Alexandria)  says  Mr.  Maurice,2  “ is  obvious  enough.  He  did 
not  care  for  Plato,  Aristotle,  Pythagoras,  as  such ; far  less 
did  he  care  for  the  opinions  and  conflicts  of  the  schools  which 
bore  their  names ; he  found  in  each  hints  of  precious  truths 
of  which  he  desired  to  avail  himself ; he  would  gather  the 
flowers  without  asking  in  what  garden  they  grew,  the  prickles 
he  would  leave  for  those  who  had  a fancy  for  them.  Eclecti- 
cism, in  this  sense,  seemed  only  like  another  name  for  catholic 
wisdom.  A man,  conscious  that  everything  in  nature  and  in 
art  was  given  for  his  learning,  had  a right  to  suck  honey 
wherever  it  was  to  be  found ; he  would  find  sweetness  in  it  if 
it  was  hanging  wild  on  trees  and  shrubs,  he  could  admire  the 
elaborate  architecture  of  the  cells  in  which  it  was  stored.  The 
Author  of  all  good  to  man  had  scattered  the  gifts,  had  im- 
parted the  skill ; to  receive  them  thankfully  was  an  act  of 
homage  to  Him.  But  once  lose  the  feeling  of  devotion  and 
gratitude,  which  belonged  so  remarkably  to  Clemens — -once  let 
it  be  fancied  that  the  philosopher  was  not  a mere  receiver  of 
treasures  which  had  been  provided  for  him,  but  an  ingenious 
chemist  and  compounder  of  various  naturally  unsociable  in- 
gredients, and  the  eclectical  doctrine  would  lead  to  more  self- 


* 1,  sect. 21 . 

14* 


- Mor.  and  Mdaphys.  Phil.,  p.  53. 


150 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ECLECTICISM— 

conceit,  would  be  more  unreal  and  heartless  than  any  one 
of  the  sectarian  elements  out  of  which  it  was  fashioned.  It 
would  want  the  belief  and  conviction  which  dwell,  with  what- 
ever unsuitable  companions,  even  in  the  narrowest  theory. 
Many  of  the  most  vital  characteristics  of  the  original  dogmas 
would  be  effaced  under  pretence  of  taking  off'  their  rough 
edges  and  fitting  them  into  each  other.  In  general  the  super- 
ficialities and  formality  of  each  creed  would  be  preserved  in 
the  new  system ; its  original  and  essential  characteristics 
sacrificed.” 

“ In  philosophy  Cicero  was  never  more  than  an  eclectic,  that 
is,  in  point  of  fact,  no  philosopher  at  all.  For  the  very  essence 
of  the  philosophical  mind  lies  in  this,  that  it  is  constrained  by 
an  irresistible  impulse  to  ascend  to  primary,  necessary  prin- 
ciples, and  cannot  halt  until  it  reaches  the  living,  streaming 
sources  of  truth  ; whereas  the  eclectic  will  stop  short  where  he 
likes,  at  any  maxim  to  which  lie  chooses  to  ascribe  the  autho- 
rity of  a principle.  The  philosophical  mind  must  be  system- 
atic, ever  seeking  to  behold  all  things  in  their  connection,  as 
parts  or  members  of  a great  organic  whole,  and  impregnating 
them  all  with  the  electric  spirit  of  order ; while  the  eclectic  is 
content  if  he  can  string  together  a number  of  generalizations. 
A philosopher  incorporates  and  animates ; an  eclectic  heaps 
and  ties  up.  The  philosopher  combines  multiplicity  into 
unity ; the  eclectic  leaves  unity  straggling  about  in  multi- 
plicity. The  former  opens  the  arteries  of  truth,  the  latter  its 
veins.  Cicero’s  legal  habits  peer  out  from  under  his  philoso- 
phical cloak,  in  his  constant  appeal  to  precedent,  his  ready 
deference  to  authority.  For  in  law,  as  in  other  things,  the 
practitioner  docs  not  go  beyond  maxims,  that  is,  secondary  or 
tertiary  principles,  taking  his  stand  upon  the  mounds  which 
his  predecessors  have  erected.” 1 

See  Cousin,2  Jouffroy,3  and  Damiron.4 

ECONOMICS  (ofzoj,  a house;  ro^oj,  a law).- — Treatises  under 
this  title  were  written  by  Xenophon,  Aristotle,  and  Cicero. 


1 Second  Series  of  Guesses  at  Truth,  edition  1818,  p.  238. 

3 Frogmens  Philosophiques,  8vo,  Paris,  1826. 

3 Melanges  P/dlosophiques,  Svo,  Paris,  1833. 

4 Essai  sur  VHisloire  de  la  Philosophie  au  dimeuvieme  siecle,  2 tom.,  Svo,  Paris,  1831. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


151 


ECONOMICS  — 

They  seem  to  have  treated  of  the  best  means  of  managing 
and  increasing  the  comforts  and  resources  of  a household. 
Only  fragments  of  them  remain.  But  in  modern  times 
justice  or  social  duty  has  been  distinguished  by  Henry  More 
into  ethical,  economical,  and  political.  And  economics  has 
been  employed  to  denote  those  duties  which  spring  from  the 
relations  which  exist  in  a family  or  household.  These  are  the 
duties  — 

1.  Of  husband  and  wife. 

2.  Of  parent  and  child. 

3.  Of  master  and  servant. 

ECSTASY  (exstaavs,  standing  out),  a transport  of  the  soul  by 
which  it  seems  as  if  out  of  the  body. 

“ Whether  that  which  we  call  ecstasy  be  not  dreaming  with 
the  eyes  open,  I leave  to  be  examined.”1 

This  word  does  not  occur  in  philosophy  before  the  time  of 
Philo  and  the  Alexandrians.  Plotinus  and  Porphyry  pre- 
tended to  have  ecstasies  in  which  they  were  united  to  God. 
Among  Christian  writers,  Bonaventura  ( Ilinerarinm  Mentis  in 
Deum ),  Gerson  ( Theologia  Mystica),  and  Francis  de  Sales,  re- 
commend those  contemplations  which  may  lead  to  ecstasy. 
But  there  is  danger  of  their  leading  to  delusion,  and  to  con- 
found the  visions  of  a heated  imagination  with  higher  and 
nearer  views  of  spiritual  things.2 

EDUCATION  ( educo , to  lead  out),  means  the  development  of 
the  bodily  and  mental  powers.  The  human  being  is  born  and 
lives  amidst  scenes  and  circumstances  which  have  a tendency 
to  call  forth  and  strengthen  his  powers  of  body  and  mind. 
And  this  may  be  called  the  education  of  nature.  But  by  edu- 
cation is  generally  meant  the  using  those  means  of  develop- 
ment which  one  man  or  one  generation  of  men  may  employ 
in  favour  of  another.  These  means  are  chiefly  instruction,  or 
the  communication  of  knowledge  to  enlighten  and  strengthen 
the  mind ; and  discipline,  or  the  formation  of  manners  and 
habits.  Instruction  and  discipline  may  be  physical  or  moral, 
that  is,  may  refer  to  the  body  or  to  the  mind.  Both,  when 
employed  in  all  their  extent,  go  to  make  up  education,  which 


1 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Undei'stajid book  ii.,  chap.  19. 
3 Baader,  Traite  sur  VExtase,  1817. 


152 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


EDUCATION  — 

is  tlie  aid  given  to  assist  the  development,  and  advance  the 
progress  of  the  human  being,  as  an  individual,  and  as  a mem- 
ber of  a family,  of  a community,  and  a race. 

“ The  business  of  education  is  to  educe  or  bring  out  that 
■which  is  within,  not  merely  or  mainly  to  instruct  or  impose  a 
form  from  without.  Only  we  aro  not  framed  to  be  self-suffi- 
cient, but  to  derive  oar  nourishment,  intellectual  and  spiritual, 
as  well  as  bodily,  from  without,  through  the  ministration  of 
others  ; and  hence  instruction  must  ever  be  a chief  element  of 
education.  Hence  too  we  obtain  a criterion  to  determine  what 
sort  of  instruction  is  right  and  beneficial  — that  which  minis- 
ters to  education,  which  tends  to  bring  out,  to  nourish  and  cul- 
tivate the  faculties  of  the  mind,  not  that  which  merely  piles  a 
mass  of  information  upon  them.  Moreover,  since  nature,  if 
left  to  herself,  is  ever  prone  to  run  wild,  and  since  there  are 
hurtful  and  pernicious  elements  around  us,  as  well  as  nourish- 
ing and  salutary,  pruning  and  sheltering,  correcting  and  pro- 
tecting are  also  among  the  principal  offices  of  education.”  1 

Milton,2  Locke,3  Guizot,4  Conseils  d’un  Ptre  sur  V Education. 

EFFECT.  — That  which  is  produced  by  the  operation  of  a cause. 
— V.  Cause. 

EGO  (I). — “ Supposing  it  proved  that  my  thoughts  and  my  con- 
sciousness must  have  a subject,  and  consequently  that  I exist, 
how  do  I know  that  all  that  train  and  succession  of  thoughts 
which  I remember  belong  to  one  subject,  and  that  the  I of 
this  moment  is  the  very  individual  I of  yesterday,  and  of  time 
past?”6 

Sir  William  Hamilton’s  note  upon  this  passage  is  as  follows: 
— “ In  English,  we  cannot  say  the  1 and  the  not  I,  so  happily 
as  the  French  le  moi  and  Je  non-moi,  or  even  the  German  das 
Ich  and  das  nicht  lch.  The  ambiguity  arising  from  identity 
of  sound  between  the  I and  the  eye,  would  itself  preclude  the 
ordinary  employment  of  the  former.  The  eyo  and  the  non-ego 
are  the  best  terms  we  can  use ; and  as  the  expressions  are 
scientific,  it  is  perhaps  no  loss  that  their  technical  precision  is 
guarded  by  their  non-vernacidavity 


1 Second  Series,  Guesses  at  Truth , 1848,  p.  145. 

3 On  Education. 

3 Reid,  Inquiry , Introd.,  sect.  3. 


2 On  Education. 

* Meditations , 8to,  Paris,  1852. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


153 


EGO- 

In  another  note1  he  has  added : — “ The  ego  as  the  subject 
of  thought  and  knowledge,  is  now  commonly  styled  by  phi- 
losophers the  subject;  and  subjective  is  a familiar  expression 
for  what  pertains  to  the  mind  or  thinking  principle.  In  con- 
trast and  correlation  to  these,  the  terms  object  and  objective  are, 
in  like  manner,  now  in  general  use  to  denote  the  non-ego,  its 
affections  and  properties,  and  in  general,  the  really  existent  as 
opposed  to  the  ideally  known.” 

EGOISM,  EGOIST.  — “ Those  Cartesians  who  in  the  progress  of 
their  doubts  ended  in  absolute  egoism.” 

“A  few  bold  thinkers,  distinguished  by  the  name  of  egoists, 
had  pushed  their  scepticism  to  such  a length  as  to  doubt  of 
everything  but  their  own  existence.  According  to  these,  the 
proposition,  Cogilo  ergo  sum,  is  the  only  truth  which  can  be 
regarded  as  absolutely  certain.” 2 

Dr.  Reid3  says,  that  some  of  Descartes’  disciples  who  doubted 
of  everything  but  their  own  existence,  and  the  existence  of 
the  operations  and  ideas  of  their  own  mind,  remained  at  this 
stage  of  his  system  and  got  the  name  of  egoists.  But  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton,  in  a note  on  the  passage,  says,  “He  is  doubt- 
ful about  the  existence  of  this  supposed  sect  of  egoists.” 

The  first  sense  and  aspect  of  egoism  may  seem  to  be  selfish- 
ness. But  this  is  contradicted  by  the  following  epitaph : — 
In  the  churchyard  of  Homersfield  (St.  Mary,  Southelm- 
ham),  Suffolk,  was  the  gravestone  of  Robert  Cry  toft,  who  died 
Nov.  17,  1810,  aged  ninety,  bearing  the  following  epitaph:  — 
“MYSELF. 

“As  I walk’d  by  myself,  I talk’d  to  myself, 

And  thus  myself  said  to  me, 

Look  to  thyself,  and  take  care  of  thyself, 

For  nobody  cares  for  thee. 

11  So  I turned  to  myself  and  I answered  myself, 

In  the  self-same  reverie, 

Look  to  myself,  or  look  not  to  myself, 

The  self-same  thing  will  it  be.” 

ELECTION  ( eligo , to  choose),  is  an  elicit  act  of  will,  by  which, 
after  deliberation  of  several  means  to  an  end  proposed  by  the 


1 Reid's  Works,  note  B,  sect.  1,  p.  S06. 

a Stewart,  Dissert .,  part  ii.,  p.  1G1,  and  p.  175. 


3 Intel l.  Pow.,  essay  ii.,  chap.  8. 


154 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ELECTION  — 

understanding,  the  will  elects  one  rather  than  any  other.  T o- 
lition  lias  reference  to  the  end,  election  is  of  the  means.  Ac- 
cording to  others,  no  distinction  should  be  taken  between 
election  and  volition ; as  to  will  an  end  is  the  same  act  as  to 
choose  the  means.  But  an  end  may  be  accomplished  by  dif- 
ferent means  — of  one  or  other  of  which  there  is  election. 

Aristotle1  says,  “moral  preference,  Ttpoca'pms,  then,  relates 
to  those  things  only  which  may  be  accomplished  by  our  own 
exertions  ; it  is  appetite  or  affection,  combined  with  and  modi- 
fied by  reason  ; and  conversant  not  about  ends,  but  about  the 
best  means  by  which  they  may  be  attained.  Volition,  on  the 
contrary,  is  conversant  only  about  ends;  which  consist,  ac- 
cording to  some,  in  real,  and  according  to  others,  in  seeming 
good.” 

ELEMENT  (sroi^ftoi').  — The  Stoic  definition  of  an  element  is, 
“ that  out  of  which,  as  their  first  principle,  things  generated 
are  made,  and  into  which,  as  their  last  remains,  they  are 
resolved.”5 

“ We  call  that  elementary  which  in  a composition  cannot  be 
divided  into  heterogeneous  parts- — -thus  the  elements  of  sound 
constitute  sound,  and  the  last  parts  into  which  you  divide  it — 
parts  which  you  cannot  divide  into  other  sounds  of  a different 
kind.  The  last  parts  into  which  bodies  can  be  divided — parts 
which  cannot  be  divided  into  parts  of  a different  kind,  are  the 
elements  of  bodies.  The  elements  of  every  being  are  its  con- 
stitutive principle.”3 4 

“ Elements  are  -td  iwrtdpxovta  alVta — the  inherent  or  inexist- 
ing  causes,  such  as  matter  and  form.  There  are  other  causes, 
such  as  the  tribe  of  efficient  causes,  which  cannot  be  called 
elements,  because  they  make  no  part  of  the  substances  which 
they  generate  or  produce.  Thus  the  statuary  is  no  part  of  his 
statue  ; the  painter  of  his  picture.  Hence  it  appears  that  all 
elements  are  causes,  but  not  all  causes  elements.” 4 And  in  the 
chap,  he  says,  “ In  form  and  matter  we  place  the  elements  of 
natural  substance.” 

Materia  prima,  or  matter  without  form — v%tj,  was  an  element 
ready  to  receive  form.  This  seems  to  be  the  use  of- the  word 


1 Ethics , book  iii.,  chap.  3,  4. 

8 Arifit.,  Metajfhys.,  lib.  iv.,  c.  3. 


2 Diog.  Laert.,  vii.,  176. 

4 Harris,  Philosoph.  Arravg chap.  5,  note. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


155 


ELEMENT— 

as  retained  in  the  communion  service.  Bread  and  wine  are 
dements  ready  to  receive  the  form  of  the  body  and  blood  of 
Christ.  “Like  the  elements  of  the  material  world,  the  bases 
of  the  sacred  natures  into  which  they  were  transformed.”  1 — 
See  Doublado’s  Letters. 

“ The  elementes  be  those  originall  thynges  unmyxt  and  un- 
compounde,  of  whose  temperance  and  myxture  all  other 
thynges  having  corporal  substance  be  compact ; of  them  be 
foure,  that  is  to  say,  earth,  water,  ayre,  and  fyre.” 2 

Element  is  applied  analogically  to  many  things ; as  to  letters, 
the  elements  of  words;  to  words  the  elements  of  speech;  and  in 
general  to  the  principles  or  first  truths  or  rules  of  any  science 
or  art. 

ELEMENTQLOGY.  — V.  Methodology. 

ELICIT  ( elicio , to  draw  out),  is  applied  to  acts  of  will  which  are 
produced  directly  by  the  will  itself,  and  are  contained  within 
it;  as  velle  a.ut  nolle.  An  elicit  act  of  will  is  either  election  or 
volition  — the  latter  having  reference  to  ends,  and  the  former 
to  means. 

ELIMINATION  ( elimino , to  throw  out),  in  Mathematics,  is  the 
process  of  causing  a function  to  disappear  from  an  equation, 
the  solution  of  which  would  be  embarrassed  by  its  presence 
there.  In  other  writings  the  correct  signification  is,  “the  ex- 
trusion of  that  which  is  superfluous  or  irrelevant.”  Thus, 
Sir  W.  Hamilton3  says  : — “ The  preparatory  step  of  the  dis- 
cussion was,  therefore,  an  elimination  of  those  less  precise  and 
appropriate  significations,  which,  as  they  would  at  best  only 
afford  a remote  genus  and  difference,  were  wholly  incompe- 
tent for  the  purpose  of  a definition.” 

It  is  frequently  used  in  the  sense  of  eliciting,  but  incor- 
rectly. 

EMANATION  ( emano , to  flow  from).  — According  to  several 
systems  of  philosophy  and  religion  which  have  prevailed  in  the 
East,  all  the  beings  of  which  the  universe  is  composed,  whether 
body  or  spirit,  have  proceeded  from,  and  are  parts  of,  the 
Divine  Being  or  substance.  This  doctrine  of  emanation  is 


1 Hampden,  On  Scholastic  Philosophy,  lect.  vii. 
3 Sir  T.  Elyot,  Castel  of  Health,  b.  i. 

2 In  Edin.  Rev.,  April,  1S33. 


156 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


EMANATION— 

to  be  found  in  the  systems  of  Zoroaster,  the  Gnostics,  and 
Neo-Platonicians.  It  differs  little,  if  at  all,  from  Pantheism. 
EMINENTLY.—  V.  Virtual. 

EMOTION  ( emoveo , to  move  out),  is  often  used  as  synonymous 
with  feeling.  Strictly  taken,  itmeans  “a  state  of  feeling  which, 
while  it  does  not  spring  directly  from  an  affection  of  body, 
manifests  its  existence  and  character  by  some  sensible  effect 
upon  the  body.” 

An  emotion  differs  from  a sensation,  by  its  not  originating 
in  a state  of  body ; and  from  a cognition,  by  its  being  pleasu- 
rable or  painful. 

Emotions,  like  other  states  of  feeling,  imply  knowledge. 
Something  beautiful  or  deformed,  sublime  or  ridiculous,  is 
known  and  contemplated  ; and  on  the  contemplation,  springs 
up  the  appropriate  feeling,  followed  by  the  characteristic  ex- 
pression of  countenance,  or  attitude,  or  manner. 

In  themselves  considered,  emotions 1 can  scarcely  be  called 
springs  of  action.  They  tend  rather,  while  they  last,  to  fix 
attention  on  the  objects  or  occurrences  which  have  excited 
them.  In  many  instances,  however,  emotions  are  succeeded  by 
desires  to  obtain  possession  of  the  objects  which  awaken  them, 
or  to  remove  ourselves  from  the  presence  of  such  objects. 
When  an  emotion  is  thus  succeeded  by  some  degree  of  desire, 
it  forms,  according  to  Lord  Kames,  a passion,  and  becomes, 
according  to  its  nature,  a powerful  and  permanent  spring  of 
action. 

Emotions,  then,  are  awakened  through  the  medium  of  the 
intellect,  and  are  varied  and  modified  by  the  conception  we 
form  of  the  objects  to  which  they  refer. 

Emotions  manifest  their  existence  and  character  by  sensible 
effects  upon  the  body. 

Emotions,  in  themselves,  and  by  themselves,  lead  to  quies- 
cence and  contemplation,  rather  than  activity.  But  they  com- 
bine with  springs  of  action,  and  give  to  them  a character  and 


* “The  feelings  of  beauty,  grandeur,  and  whatever  else  is  comprehended  under  the 
name  of  taste,  do  not  lead  to  action , but  terminate  in  delightful  contemplation,  which 
ronstitutes  the  essential  distinction  between  them  and  the  moral  sentiments,  to  which, 
In  some  points  of  view,  they  may  doubtless  be  likened.”  — Mackintosh,  Dissert 
p.  238. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


157 


EMOTION  — 

a colouring.  What  is  said  to  be  done  from  surprise  or  shame, 
has  its  proper  spring  — the  surprise  or  shame  being  con- 
comitant.1 

EMPIRIC,  EMPIRICISM. — Among  the  Greek  physicians  those 
who  founded  their  practice  on  experience  called  themselves 
empirics  {in7tn.pi.xoi) ; those  who  relied  on  theory,  methodisis 
{/xsOoSixoi)  ; and  those  who  held  a middle  course,  dogmatists 
(Soyparixoi).  The  term  empiricism  became  naturalized  in 
England  when  the  writings  of  Galen  and  other  opponents  of 
the  empirics  were  in  repute,  and  hence  it  was  applied  generally 
to  any  ignorant  pretender  to  knowledge.  It  is  now  used  to 
denote  that  kind  of  knowledge  which  is  the  result  of  expe- 
rience. Aristotle  applies  the  terms  historical  and  empirical  in 
the  same  sense.  Historical  knowledge  is  the  knowledge  that 
a thing  is.  Philosophical  knowledge  is  the  knowledge  of  its 
cause,  or  why  it  is.  The  Germans  laugh  at  our  phrase  philo- 
sophical transactions,  and  say,  “ Socrates  brought  down  philo- 
sophy from  the  clouds  — but  the  English  have  brought  her 
down  to  the  dunghill.” 

Empiricism  allows  nothing  to  be  true  nor  certain  but  what 
is  given  by  experience,  and  rejects  all  knowledge  d priori. 

In  antiquity  the  Ionian  school  may  be  said  to  have  been 
sensualist  or  empirical.  The  saying  of  Heraclitus  that  nothing 
is,  but  that  all  things  are  beginning  to  be,  or  are  in  a continual 
flux,  amounts  to  a denial  of  the  persistence  of  substance.  De- 
mocritus and  the  atomists,  if  they  admitted  the  substance  of 
atoms,  denied  the  fundamental  laws  of  the  human  mind. 
And  the  teaching  of  Protagoras,  that  sense  is  knowledge,  and 
man  the  measure  of  all  things,  made  all  science  individual 
and  relative.  The  influence  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  re-esta- 
blished the  foundation  of  true  philosophy,  and  empiricism  was 
regarded  as  scepticism. 

In  the  middle  ages  empiricism  was  found  only  among  the 
physicians  and  alchemists,  and  was  not  the  badge  of  any  school 
of  philosophy. 

Empiricism,  as  applied  to  the  philosophy  of  Locke,  means 
that  he  traces  all  knowledge  to  experience,  i/xTinpia.  Expe- 

1 See  Dr.  Chalmers,  Sketches  of  Merit,  and  Mm.  Phil.,  p.  88. 


15 


158 


VOCABULARY  OF  FIHLOSOPIIY. 


EMPIRIC  — 

rience,  according  to  him,  included  sensation  and  reflection. 
The  French  philosophers,  Condillac  and  others,  rejected  re- 
flection as  a distinct  source  of  knowledge  ; and  their  doctrine, 
to  distinguish  it  from  that  of  Locke,  is  called  sensualism. 
Ideology  gives  nothing  to  the  mind  hut  sensations  remembered 
or  generalized,  which  it  calls  ideas.  But  Reid  and  the  common 
sense  philosophers,  as  well  as  Cousin  and  the  rationalist 
philosophers,  hold  that  the  mind  has  primary  beliefs,  or 
universal  and  necessary  ideas,  which  are  the  ground  of  all 
experience  and  knowledge.  — V.  Experience. 

Empirical  or  experimental  “ is  an  epithet  used  by  Madame 
de  Stael  and  other  writers  on  German  philosophy,  to  distin- 
guish what  they  call  the  philosophy  of  sensation,  from  that  of 
Plato  and  of  Leibnitz.  It  is,  accordingly,  generally,  if  not 
always,  employed  by  them  in  an  unfavourable  sense.  In  this 
country,  on  the  contrary,  the  experimental  or  inductive  philo- 
sophy of  the  human  mind  denotes  those  speculations  concern- 
ing mind,  which,  rejecting  all  hypothetical  theories,  rest  solely 
on  phenomena  for  which  we  have  the  evidence  of  conscious- 
ness. It  is  applied  to  the  philosophy  of  Reid,  and  to  all  that 
is  truly  valuable  in  the  metaphysical  works  of  Descartes, 
Locke,  Berkeley,  and  Hume.”  1 

EMULATION  ( cemulus , striving;  from  ohuxxa,  a strife),  is  the 
desire  of  superiority.  It  is  one  of  those  primitive  desires 
which  manifest  themselves  in  very  early  years.  It  prompts, 
when  properly  directed  and  regulated,  to  the  most  strenuous 
and  persevering  exertion.  Its  influence  in  the  carrying  for- 
ward of  education  is  most  important. 

ENDS.  — Ends  are  of  two  kinds,  according  to  Aristotle,2  irlpysicu, 
operations ; tpya,  productions.  An  ivl pytta  is  the  end,  when 
the  object  of  a man’s  acting  is  the  pleasure  or  advantage  in 
being  so  employed,  as  in  music,  dancing,  contemplation,  &c., 
which  produce  nothing,  generally  speaking,  beyond  the  plea- 
sure which  the  act  affords.  An  'ipyov  is  something  which  is 
produced  beyond  the  operation  or  energy ; thus,  the  shoe  is 
the  tpyoK  produced  by  the  ivtpyna  of  shoe-making.3 

This  corresponds  to  Adam  Smith’s  distinction  of  labour  as 


1 Stewart,  Dissert.,  pt.  ii.,  p.  14(1,  note. 

3 Paul,  Analysis  of  Arist.,  p.  2. 


4 Eth.,  lib.  i.,  cap.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


159 


ENDS  — 

productive  or  unproductive,  according  as  it  gives  or  does  not 
give  a material  product. 

An  end  is  that  for  the  sake  of  which  an  action  is  done. 
Hence  it  has  been  said  to  be,  principiilm  in  intentione  el  ter- 
minus in  executione. 

When  one  end  has  been  gained,  it  may  be  the  means  of 
gaining  some  other  end.  Hence  it  is  that  ends  have  been 
distinguished,  as  supreme  and  ultimate , or  subordinate  and 
intermediate.  That  which  is  sought  for  its  own  sake,  is  the 
supreme  and  ultimate  end  of  those  actions  which  are  done  with 
a view  to  it.  That  which  is  sought  for  the  sake  of  some  other 
end,  is  a subordinate  and  intermediate  end. 

Ends  as  ultimate,  are  distinguished  into  the  end  simpliciter 
ullimus,  and  ends  which  are  ultimate  secundum  quid.  An  end 
which  is  the  last  that  is  successively  aimed  at,  in  a series  of 
actions,  is  called  ultimate  secundum  quid.  But  that  which  is 
aimed  at,  exclusively  for  its  own  sake,  and  is  never  regarded 
as  a means  to  any  other  end,  is  an  ultimate  end,  simply  and 
absolutely. 

See  Edwards,1  Cicero.2 

ENS  is  either  ens  reale  or  ens  rationis. 

Ens  Rationis.  — That  which  has  no  existence  but  in  the  idea 
which  the  mind  forms  of  it ; as  a golden  mountain. 

Ens  Reale,  in  philosophical  language,  is  taken  late  et  stride,  and 
is  distinguished  as  ens  potentiate,  or  that  which  may  exist,  and 
ens  actuate,  or  that  which  does  exist.  It  is  sometimes  taken 
as  the  concrete  of  essentia,  and  signifies  what  has  essence  and 
may  exist — as  a rose  in  winter.  Sometimes  as  the  participle 
of  esse,  and  then  it  signifies  what  actually  exists.  Ens  with- 
out intellect  is  res,  a thing. 

ENTELECHY  (h"t£'k£ztia,  from  A ■?£?./$,  perfect ; to  have ; 
and  r&o;,  an  end  ; in  Latin  perfect ihabia).  — “ In  one  of  the 
books  of  the  Pythagoreans,  viz.,  Ocellus  Lucanus,  Ilfpi  rou 
ridvtot,  the  word  avvtl’kti.o.  is  used  in  the  same  sense.  Hence 
it  has  been  thought  that  this  was  borrowed  from  the  Pytha- 
goreans.”3 


1 Dissertation  cancelling  the  End  for  which  God  created  the  World. 

2 De  Finihus  Bonorum  et  Malorum. 

3 Monboddo,  Ancient  Mctaphys b.  i.,  ck.  3,  p.  16,  note.  - 


160 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ENTELECHY— 

Cicero 1 interprets  it  to  mean  quandam  quasi  continuaiam 
motionem  et  perennem. 

Mclancthon2 3  gives  two  interpretations  of  Endelechy,  as  he 
writes  it.  He  says  that  iv8i% exh  signifies  continuus,  and 
£i'5£X.f^£ia  continuitas.  According  to  him,  Aristotle  used  it 
as  synonymous  with  hepytia.  Hence  Cicero  translated  it 
by  continuous  movement  or  agitation.  Argyropolus  blames 
Cicero  for  this,  and  explains  it  as  meaning  “interior  perfec- 
tion,” as  if  it  were  to  ivtos  tshsioh.  But  Melancthon  thinks 
Cicero’s  explanation  in  accordance  with  the  philosophy  of 
Aristotle. 

According  to  others,  ivSaixsiu  means  continuance,  and  is 
a totally  different  word  from  htt\exiia>  which  means  actu- 
ality? 

According  to  Leibnitz,  entelecheia  is  derived  apparently  from 
the  Greek  word  which  signifies  perfect,  and  therefore  the  cele- 
brated ILermohius  Barbaras  expressed  it  in  Latin,  word  for 
word,  \yy  perfect  ihabia,  for  act  is  the  accomplishment  of  power; 
and  he  needed  not  to  have  consulted  the  devil,  as  he  did,  they 
say,  to  tell  him  this  much.4 

“ You  may  give  the  name  of  entelechies  to  all  simple  sub- 
stances or  created  monads,  for  they  have  in  them  a certain 
perfection  to  htet.lt),  they  have  a sufficiency  (avtdpxfia) 

which  makes  them  the  source  of  their  internal  actions,  and  so 
to  say  incorporeal  automatons.”5  He  calls  a monad  an  autar- 
chic automaton,  or  first  entelechie — having  life  and  force  in 
itself. 

“Entelechy  is  the  opposite  to  potentiality,  yet  would  be  ill 
translated  by  that  which  we  often  oppose  to  potentiality, 
actuality.  liZSoj  expresses  the  substance  of  each  thing  viewed 
in  repose  — its  form  or  constitution;  hi pyeia  its  substance, 
considered  as  active  and  generative ; evtetJx Eta  seems  to  be 
the  synthesis  or  harmony  of  these  two  ideas.  The  effectio  of 
Cicero,  therefore,  represents  the  most  important  side  of  it,  but 
not  the  whole.”6 


1 Tuscul.  Quaest.,  lib.  i.,  quacst.  1.  3 Opera,  tom.  xiii.,  pp.  12-14,  edit.  1846. 

3 Arist.  Mdaphys.,  Holm's  Libr.,  pp.  68,  301;  Donaldson,  New  Cratylus,  pp.  339-344. 

4 Leibnitz,  Theodicee,  partie  i.,  sect.  87.  5 Mona.dologie,  sect.  18. 

8 Maurice,  Mor.  and  Metaphys.  Phil.,  note,  p.  191. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


161 


ENTELECHY— 

’Evtsxixeta  ce  qui  a en  soi  sa  fin,  qui  par  consequent  ne 
relhve  que  de  soi  meme,  et  constitue  une  unite  indivisible.1 

“L’Entelechie  est  oppose  a la  simple  puissance,  comme  la 
forme  a la  matibre,  l’etre  au  possible.  C’est  elle  qui,  par  la 
vertu  de  la  fin,  constitue  l’essence  meme  des  choses,  et  im- 
prime  le  mouvement  a la  matibre  aveugle ; et  c’est  en  ce  sens 
qu’  Aristote  a pu  donner  de  l’ame  cette  celebre  definition, 
qu’elle  est  l’entelechie  ou  forme  premiere  de  tout  corps  naturel 
qui  possede  la  vie  en  puissance.”2 

Aristotle  defines  the  soul  of  man  to  be  an  entelecliy ; a defi- 
nition of  which  Dr.  Eeid  said  he  could  make  no  sense. — V. 
Soul,  Actual. 

ENTHUSIASM  ( u 0so;  iv  vyEv) — “is  almost  a synonym  of  genius; 
the  moral  life  in  the  intellectual  light,  the  will  in  the  reason  ; 
and  without  it,  says  Seneca,  nothing  truly  great  was  ever 
achieved.”3 

The  word  occurs  both  in  Plato  and  Aristotle.  According 
to  its  composition  it  should  signify  “ divine  inspiration.”  But 
it  is  applied  in  general  to  any  extraordinary  excitement  or 
exaltation  of  mind.  The  raptures  of  the  poet,  the  deep  medi- 
tations of  the  philosopher,  the  heroism  of  the  warrior,  the 
devotedness  of  the  martyr,  and  the  ardour  of  the  patriot,  are 
so  many  different  phases  of  enthusiasm.  “According  to  Plu- 
tarch, there  be  five  kinds  of  Enthusiasm : — Divinatory,  Bac- 
cliical  (or  corybantical),  Poetical  (under  which  he  compre- 
hends musical  also),  Martial  and  Erotical,  or  Amatorie.” 4 
ENTHYMEME  [iv  dvyu,  in  the  mind),  is  an  irregular  syllogism 
in  which  one  of  the  premisses  is  not  expressed,  but  kept  in 
mind ; as  “ every  animal  is  a substance,  therefore,  every  man 
is  a substance  ;”  in  which  the  premiss,  “ man  is  an  animal,” 
is  suppressed.  “This  is  the  vulgar  opinion  regarding  Aris- 
totle’s Enthymeme,  but,  as  I have  shown,  not  the  correct.”5 

1 Cousin,  note  to  Transl.  of  Aristotle's  Metaphysics,  book  xii.,  p.  212. 

a Diet,  des  Sciences  Philosoph. 

3 Coleridge,  Notes  on  Eng.  Div .,  vol.  i.,  p.  33S. 

4 A Treatise  concerning  Enthusiasm  by  Meric  Casaubon,  D.D.,  cliap.  1.  Shaftesbury, 
Of  Enthusiasm.  See  also  Natural  Hist,  of  Enthusiasm , by  Isaac  Taylor;  Madame  de 
Stael,  Germany ; Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  book  iv.,  chap.  19;  More,  Enthiir 
siasmus  Triumphatus. 

g See  Edin.  Rev.,  vol.  lvii , p.  221 ; Sir  'William  Hamilton,  RcuVs  Works,  p.  704,  note. 

15  * M 


162 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOFIIY. 


ENTHYMEME  — 

Aristotle’s  Syllogism  vras  an  inference  in  matter  necessary ; 
his  Enthymeme  was  an  inference  in  matter  probable.1  The 
famous  expression  of  Descartes,  Cogilo  ergo  sum,  is,  as  to  form, 
an  enthymeme.  It  was  not  put,  however,  as  a proof  of  exist- 
ence, but  as  meaning  that  the  fact  of  existing  is  enclosed  in 
the  consciousness  of  thinking. 

ENTITY  ( entitas ),  in  the  scholastic  philosophy  was  synonymous 
with  essence  or  form. 

To  all  individuals  of  a species  there  is  something  in  com- 
mon— a nature  which  transiently  invests  all,  but  belongs  ex- 
clusively to  none.  This  essence,  taken  by  itself  and  viewed 
apart  from  any  individual,  was  what  the  scholastics  called  an 
entity.  Animals  had  their  entity,  which  was  called  animality. 
Men  had  their  entity,  which  was  called  humanity.  It  denoted 
the  common  nature  of  the  individuals  of  a species  or  genus. 
It  was  the  idea  or  model  according  to  which  we  conceived  of 
them.  The  question  whether  there  was  a reality  correspond- 
ing to  this  idea,  divided  philosophers  into  Nominalists  and 
Realists  — q.  v. 

It  is  used  to  denote  anything  that  exists,  as  an  object  of 
sense  or  of  thought. — V.  Ens. 

ENUNCIATION,  in  Logic,  includes  the  doctrine  of  propositions 
— q.  v. 

EPICHEIREMA  to  put  one’s  hand  to  a thing),  an 

attempted  proof — • is  a syllogism  having  the  major  or  minor 
premiss,  or  both,  confirmed  by  an  incidental  proposition  called 
a Prosyllogism.  This  proposition,  with  the  premiss  it  is  at- 
tached to,  forms  an  enthymeme.  The  incidental  proposition 
is  the  expressed  premiss  of  the  enthymeme,  and  the  premiss  it 
is  attached  to  is  the  conclusion  : e.  g.,  — 

All  sin  is  dangerous. 

Covetousness  is  sin  (for  it  is  a transgression  of  the  law), 
therefore, 

It  is  dangerous. 

The  minor  premiss  is  an  enthymeme.  “Covetousness  is  a 
transgression  of  the  law ; therefore,  it  is  sin.” 


1 UachmaD,  p.  260. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


163 


EPICUREAN  . — A follower  of  Epicurus,  a philosopher,  who  was 
horn  341,  n.  c. 

“ The  system  of  Epicurus  agreed  with  those  of  Plato,  Aris- 
totle, and  Zeno,  in  making  virtue  consist  in  acting  in  the  most 
suitable  manner  to  obtain  primary  objects  of  natural  desire. 
It  differed  from  all  of  them  in  two  other  respects  ; — 1st,  in  the 
account  which  it  gave  of  these  primary  objects  of  natural 
desire  ; and,  2dly,  in  the  account  which  it  gave  of  the  excel- 
lence of  virtue,  or  the  reason  why  that  quality  ought  to  be 
esteemed.” 1 

EPISTEMOLOGY  (xoyo*  rjjj  e' rtiatrgitis,  the  science  of  true  know- 
ing) — “the  doctrine  or  theory  of  knowing,  just  as  Ontology 
is  the  doctrine  or  theory  of  being.”2 

EPISYLLOGISM.  — In  a chain  of  reasoning  one  of  the  premisses 
of  the  main  argument  may  be  the  conclusion  of  another  argu- 
ment, in  that  case  called  a Prosyllogism ; or  the  conclusion 
of  the  main  argument  may  be  a premiss  to  a supplementary 
one,  which  is  called  an  episyllogism.  The  question  is,  “ Has 
A.  B.  been  poisoned?”  and  the  syllogism  is,  “A  man  who 
has  taken  a large  quantity  of  arsenic  has  been  poisoned,  and 
A.  B.  is  found  to  have  done  so,  therefore,  he  has  been 
poisoned.”  With  the  addition  of  a prosyllogism  and  an  epi- 
syllogism the  meaning  would  run  — “A  man  who  has  taken 
arsenic  has  been  poisoned ; and  A.  B.  has  taken  arsenic,  for 
tests  discover  it  ( Prosyl .),  therefore,  A.  B.  has  been  poisoned, 
and,  therefore,  there  cannot  be  a verdict  of  death  from  natural 
causes  ( Episyll .).” 

EQUANIMITY.  — F.  Magnanimity. 

EQUITY  (irtisLxs la,  or  to  loov,  as  distinguished  from  to  voyixov), 
is  described  by  Aristotle3  as  that  kind  of  justice  which  cor- 
rects the  irregularities  or  rigours  of  strict  legal  justice.  All 
written  laws  must  necessarily  speak  in  general  terms,  and 
must  leave  particular  cases  to  the  discretion  of  the  parties. 
An  equitable  man  will  not  press  the  letter  of  the  law  in  his 
own  favour,  when,  by  doing  so,  he  may  do  injustice  to  his 
neighbour.  The  ancients,  in  measuring  rusticated  building, 


1 Smith,  Theory  of  Mor.  Sent .,  part  Tii„  sect.  2.  See  Gassendi,  De  Vita  Moribus  et 

Doctrina,  Epicuri , 4to,  Lyons,  1647. 

a Ferrier,  Inst,  of  Metaphys p.  46. 


8 Ethics , book  v.,  chap.  10. 


164 


VOCABULARY  OF  nilLOSOPIIY. 


EQUITY  — 

in  which  the  stones  alternately  projected  and  receded,  used 
a leaden  rule.  Equity,  like  this  leaden  rule,  bends  to  the 
specialities  of  every  case,  when  the  iron  rule  of  legal  justice 
cannot  do  so. 

“ Equity  contemplates  the  mass  of  rights  growing  out  of  the 
law  of  nature ; and  justice  contemplates  the  mass  of  rights 
growing  out  of  the  law  of  society.  Equity  treats  of  our  dues 
as  equals;  justice  treats  of  our  dues  as  fellow-subjects.  The 
purpose  of  equity  is  respect  for  humanity ; the  purpose  of 
justice  is  respect  for  property.  Equity  withstands  oppression ; 
justice  withstands  injury.”' — V.  Justice. 

“ In  the  most  general  sense  we  are  accustomed  to  call  that 
equity  which,  in  human  transactions,  is  founded  in  natural 
justice,  in  honesty  and  right,  and  which  properly  arises  ex 
aequo  et  bono.  In  this  sense  it  answers  precisely  to  the  defi- 
nition of  justice  or  natural  law,  as  given  by  Justinian  in  his 
Pandects,  ‘Justitia  est  constans  et  perpelua  voluntas  jus  suum 
cuique  tribuendi.’  And  the  word  jus  is  used  in  the  same  sense 
in  the  Roman  law,  when  it  is  declared  that  jus  est  ars  boni  et 
aequi,  where  it  means  that  we  are  accustomed  to  call  jurispru- 
dence.” This  is  natural  jurisprudence.  In  this  sense  equity 
is  coincident  with  it.  ButWolfius  says,  “ Justum  appellatur 
quicquid,  fit  secundum  jus  per fectum  alter ius;  cequum  vero  quod 
secundum  imperf edum 2 

EQUIVOCAL  or  HOMONYMOUS  words  have  different  signifi- 
cations, as  bull,  the  animal,  the  Pope’s  letter,  a blunder. 
Gallus,  in  Latin,  a cock,  or  a Frenchman.  Canis,  a dog,  or 
the  dog-star.  They  originate  in  the  multiplicity  of  things  and 
the  poverty  of  language. 

Words  signifying  different  things  may  be  used, — 

First,  By  accident;  or,  second,  With  intention.  1st,  It  has 
happened,  that  Sandwich  is  the  name  of  a peer — of  a town — 
of  a cluster  of  Islands,  and  of  a slice  of  bread  and  meat.  2d, 
There  are  four  ways  in  which  a word  may  come  to  be  used 
equivocally  with  knowledge  or  intention  : — 

1.  On  account  of  the  resemblance  of  the  things  signified,  as 
when  a statue  or  a picture  is  called  a man. 


1 Taylor,  Synonyms. 


2 Story,  Comment,  on  Equity  Jurisp.,  pp.  1-3. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


165 


EQUIVOCAL  — 

2.  On  account  of  proportion,  as  when  a point  is  called  a 
principle  in  respect  to  a line,  and  unity  a principle  in  respect 
to  number. 

3.  On  account  of  common  derivation — thus,  a medical  man, 
a medical  book,  a medical  instrument,  are  all  derived  from 
medicine. 

4.  On  account  of  common  reduction  or  reference  — thus,  a 
healthful  medicine,  healthful  pulse,  healthful  herb,  all  referring 
to  human  health. 

Some  of  these  are  intermediate  between  equivocal  and  analo- 
gous terms,  particularly  No.  4. 

An  Equivocal  noun,  in  Logic,  has  more  than  one  significa- 
tion, each  of  its  significations  being  equally  applicable  to 
several  objects,  as  pen,  post.  “Strictly  speaking,  there  is 
hardly  a word  in  any  language  which  may  not  be  regarded 
as  in  this  sense  equivocal ; but  the  title  is  usually  applied  only 
in  any  case  when  a word  is  employed  equivocally  ; e.  g.,  when 
the  middle  term  is  used  in  different  senses  in  the  two  pre- 
mises, or  where  a proposition  is  liable  to  be  understood  in  dif- 
ferent senses,  according  to  the  various  meaning  of  one  of  its 
terms.”1 

EQUIVOCATION  ( ceque , voco,  to  use  one  word  in  different 
senses).  — “ How  absolute  the  knave  is  ! We  must  speak  by 
the  card,  or  equivocation  will  undo  us — Hamlet,  act  v., 
scene  1. 

In  morals,  to  equivocate  is  to  offend  against  the  truth  by 
using  language  of  double  meaning,  in  one  sense,  with  the 
intention  of  its  being  understood  in  another  — or  in  either 
sense  according  to  circumstances.  The  ancient  oracles  gave 
responses  of  ambiguous  meaning.  Aio,  te,  JEacide,  Romanos 
vincere  posse — may  mean  either  ; “ I say  that  thou,  0 descend- 
ant of  iEacus,  canst  conquer  the  Romans  or,  “ I say  that 
the  Romans  can  conquer  thee,  0 descendant  of  iEacus.”  La- 
tronem  Petrum  occidisse,  may  mean,  “ a robber  slew  Peter 
or,  “ Peter  slew  a robber.” 

Edwardum  occidere  nolite  timere  bonum  est.  The  message 
penned  by  Adam  Orleton,  Bishop  of  Hereford,  and  sent  by 


1 Whately,  Log.,  b.  iii.,  j!  10. 


166 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


EQUIVOCATION  — 

Q.  Isabella  to  the  gaolers  of  her  husband,  Edw.  II.  Being 
written  without  punctuation,  the  words  might  be  read  two 
ways ; with  a comma  after  timere,  they  would  mean,  “ Ed- 
ward, to  kill  fear  not,  the  deed  is  good ;”  but  with  it  after 
nolite,  the  meaning  would  be,  “ Edward  kill  not,  to  fear  the 
deed  is  good.” 

Henry  Garnet,  who  was  tried  for  his  participation  in  the 
Gunpowder  Plot,  thus  expressed  himself  in  a paper  dated 
20th  March,  1605-6  : — “ Concerning  equivocation,  this  is  my 
opinion ; in  moral  affairs,  and  in  the  common  intercourse 
of  life,  when  the  truth  is  asked  among  friends,  it  is  not  law- 
ful to  use  equivocation,  for  that  would  cause  great  mischief  in 
society  — wherefore,  in  such  cases,  there  is  no  place  for 
equivocation.  But  in  cases  where  it  becomes  necessary  to  an 
individual  for  his  defence,  or  for  avoiding  any  injustice 
or  loss,  or  for  obtaining  any  important  advantage,  without 
danger  or  mischief  to  any  other  person,  then  equivocation  is 
lawful.”  1 

Dr.  Johnson  would  not  allow  his  servant  to  say  he  was  not 
at  home  when  he  really  was.  “A  servant’s  strict  regard  for 
truth,”  said  he,  “ must  be  weakened  by  such  a practice.  A 
philosopher  may  know  that  it  is  merely  a form  of  denial,  but 
few  servants  are  such  nice  distinguishers.  If  I accustom  a 
servant  to  tell  a lie  for  me,  have  I not  reason  to  apprehend 
that  he  will  tell  many  lies  for  himself?” 2 

There  may  be  equivocation  in  sound  as  well  as  in  sense. 
It  is  told  that  the  queen  of  George  III.  asked  one  of  the  dig- 
nitaries of  the  church,  if  ladies  might  lenot  on  Sunday  ? His 
reply  was,  Ladies  may  not ; which,  in  so  far  as  sound  goes,  is 
equivocal. — V.  Reservation. 

ERROR.  — Knowledge  being  to  be  had  only  of  visible  certain 
truth,  error  is  not  a fault  of  our  knowledge,  but  a mistake  of 
our  judgment,  giving  assent  to  that  which  is  not  true.3 

“ The  true,”  said  Bossuet,  after  Augustine,  “is  that  which 
is,  the  false  is  that  which  is  not.”  To  err  is  to  fail  of  attaining 


1 Jardine,  Gunpowder  Plot,  p.  233. 

a Boswell,  Leith's,  p.  32. 

3 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  b.  iv.,  c.  20. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


167 


ERROR  — 

to  the  true,  which  we  clo  when  we  think  that  to  be  which  is 
not — or  think  that  not  to  be  which  is.  Error  is  not  in  things 
themselves,  but  in  the  mind  of  him  who  errs,  or  judges  not 
according  to  the  truth. 

Our  faculties,  when  employed  within  their  proper  sphere, 
are  fitted  to  give  us  the  knowledge  of  truth.  We  err  by  a 
wrong  use  of  them.  The  causes  of  error  are  partly  in  the 
objects  of  knowledge,  and  partly  in  ourselves.  As  it  is  only 
the  true  and  real  which  exists,  it  is  only  the  true  and  real 
which  can  reveal  itself.  But  it  may  not  reveal  itself  fully  — 
and  man,  mistaking  a part  for  the  whole,  or  partial  evidence 
for  complete  evidence,  falls  into  error.  Hence  it  is,  that  in 
all  error  there  is  some  truth.  To  discover  the  relation  which 
this  partial  truth  bears  to  the  whole  truth,  is  to  discover  the 
origin  of  the  error. 

The  causes  in  ourselves  which  lead  to  error,  arise  from 
wrong  views  of  our  faculties,  and  of  the  conditions  under 
which  they  operate.  Indolence,  precipitation,  passion,  custom, 
authority,  and  education,  may  also  contribute  to  lead  us  into 
error.1 — V.  Falsity. 

ESOTERIC  and  EXOTERIC  ( sgudev,  within;  i|co,  without). 
— “The  philosophy  of  the  Pythagoreans,  like  that  of  the 
other  sects,  was  divided  into  the  exoteric  and  the  esoteric; 
the  open,  taught  to  all ; and  the  secret,  taught  to  a select 
number.”2 

According  to  Origen,  Aulus  Gellius,  Porphyry,  and 
Jamblichus,  the  distinction  of  esoteric  and  exoteric  among 
the  Pythagoreans  was  applied  to  the  disciples  — according 
to  the  degree  of  initiation  to  which  they  had  attained, 
being  fully  admitted  into  the  society,  or  being  merely  pos- 
tulants.3 

Plato  is  said  to  have  had  doctrines  which  he  taught 
publicly  to  all  — and  other  doctrines  which  he  taught  only 
to  a few,  in  secret.  There  is  no  allusion  to  such  a distinc- 


1 Bacon,  Novum  Organum , lib.  i. ; Malebranchs,  Recherche  de  la  YCritc;  Descartes, 
On  Method;  Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand b.  vi..  c.  20. 

a Warburton,  Div.  Leg.,  book  ii.,  note  bb. 

3 Ritter,  Hist,  de  Philosophic , tom.  i.,  p.  298,  of  French  translation. 


168 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ESOTERIC  — 

tion  of  doctrines  in  the  writings  of  Plato.  Aristotle* 1  speaks 
of  opinions  of  Plato  which  were  not  written.  But  it  does 
not  follow  that  these  were  secret — ’Ey  roe;  Afyiyiirotj  aypafi; 
86yp.aaiv.  They  may  have  been  oral. 

Aristotle  himself  frequently  speaks  of  some  of  his  writings 
as  exoteric;  and  others  as  acroamatic,  or  esoteric.  The  former 
treat  of  the  same  subjects  as  the  latter,  but  in  a popular  and 
elementary  way  ; while  the  esoteric  are  more  scientific  in  their 
form  and  matter.2  — V.  Acroamatical. 

ESSENCE  ( essentia , from  essens,  the  old  participle  of  esse,  to  be 
— introduced  into  the  Latin  tongue  by  Cicero). 

“ Sicut  ah  eo  quod  est  sapere,  vocatur  sapientia;  sic  ab  eo 
quod  est  esse,  vocatur  essentia.”  — Augustine.3 

“ Totum  Mud  per  quod  res  est,  et  est  id  quod  est.”  — 
Chauvin.4 

“Essence  may  be  taken  for  the  very  being  of  anything, 
whereby  it  is  what  it  is.” 6 

Mr.  Locke  distinguishes  the  real  and  the  nominal  essence. 
The  nominal  essence  depends  upon  the  real  essence  ; thus  the 
nominal  essence  of  gold,  is  that  complex  idea  which  the 
word  “gold”  represents;  viz.,  “a  body  yellow,  heavy, 
malleable,  fusible,  and  fixed ;”  but  its  real  essence  is  the 
constitution  of  its  insensible  parts,  on  which  these  qualities 
and  all  its  other  properties  depend,  which  is  wholly  unknown 
to  us. 

“ The  essence  of  things  is  made  up  of  that  common  nature 
wherein  it  is  founded,  and  of  that  distinctive  nature  by  which 
it  is  formed.  This  latter  is  commonly  understood  when  we 
speak  of  the  formality  or  formalis  ratio  (the  formal  con- 
sideration) of  things;  and  it  is  looked  upon  as  being  more 
peculiarly  the  essence  of  things,  though  ’tis  certain  that  a 
triangle  is  as  truly  made  up  in  part  of  figure,  its  common 
nature,  as  of  the  three  lines  and  angles,  which  are  distinctive 
and  peculiar  to  it. 


1 Phys.,  lib.  iv.,  c.  2. 

1 Ravaisson,  Essai  sur  la  Mdaphysigue  cCAristote,  tom.  i.,  c.  1;  Tucker,  Light  of 
Nature , vol.  ii.,  chap.  2. 

8 De  Civ.,  lib.  xii.,  c.  11.  4 Lexicon  Plnlosoph. 

1 Locke,  Essay  on  Sum.  Understand.,  book  iii , chap.  3,  sect.  16. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


169 


ESSENCE  — 

“ The  essence  of  a thing  most  properly  and  strictly  is,  what 
does  first  and  fundamentally  constitute  that  thing,  and  that 
only  is  strictly  essential  which  is  either  the  whole  or  some  part 
of  the  constituent  essence;  as,  in  man  to  he  a living  creature, 
or  to  be  capable  of  religion ; his  being  capable  of  celestial 
happiness,  may  be  called  essential  in  the  way  of  consequence, 
or  consecutively,  not  constituency.”  1 

“Whatever  makes  a thing  to  be  what  it  is,  is  properly 
called  its  essence.  Self-consciousness,  therefore,  is  the  essence 
of  the  mind,  because  it  is  in  virtue  of  self-consciousness  that 
the  mind  is  the  mind  — that  a man  is  himself.” 2 

“All  those  properties  or  qualities,  without  which  a thing 
could  not  exist,  or  without  which  it  would  be  entirely  altered, 
make  up  what  is  called  the  essence  of  a thing.  Three  lines 
joining  are  the  essence  of  a triangle ; if  one  is  removed,  what 
remains  is  no  longer  a triangle.”3 
The  essential  attributes,  faciunt  esse  entia,  cause  things  to 
be  what  they  are. 

The  Greeks  had  but  one  word  for  essence  and  substance, 
viz.,  oi> tact.  The  word  vreoa-tast;  was  latterly  introduced.  By 
Aristotle  oiata  was  applied — 1.  To  the  form,  or  those  qualities 
which  constitute  the  specific  nature  of  every  being.  2.  To  the 
matter,  in  which  those  qualities  manifest  themselves  to  us  — 
the  substratum  or  subject  (vrtoxunsvov).  3.  To  the  concrete 
or  individual  being  (ovvo^ov),  constituted  by  the  union  of  the 
two  preceding. 

In  the  scholastic  philosophy  a distinction  began  to  be  esta- 
blished between  essence  and  substance.  Substance  was  applied 
to  the  abstract  notion  of  matter — the  undetermined  subject  or 
substratum  of  all  possible  forms,  to  vrtoxct/j.cvov ; Essence  to 
the  qualities  expressed  in  the  definition  of  a thing,  or  those 
ideas  which  represent  the  genus  and  species.  Descartes4  de- 
fined substance  as  “ that  which  exists  so  that  it  needs  nothing 
but  itself  to  exist”  — a definition  applicable  to  deity  only. 
Essence  he  stripped  of  its  logical  signification,  and  made  it 


1 Oldfield,  Essay  on  Reason , p.  184. 

a Ferrier,  Inst,  of  Metaphys.,  p.  245. 

3 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought . 

4 Princip.  Philosoph..  pars.  4,  sect.  1. 


16 


170 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


ESSENCE— 

the  foundation  of  all  those  qualities  and  modes  which  we  per- 
ceive in  matter.  Among  the  attributes  of  every  substance 
there  is  one  only  which  deserves  the  name  of  essence,  and  on 
which  the  others  depend  as  modifications — as  extension,  in 
matter,  and  thought,  in  mind.  He  thus  identified  essence  and 
substance.  But  extension  supposes  something  extended,  and 
thought  something  that  thinks.  With  Leibnitz  essence  and 
substance  were  the  same,  viz.,  force  or  power. 

Essence  is  analogically  applied  to  things  having  no  real  ex- 
istence; and  then  it  retains  its  logical  sense  and  expresses  the 
qualities  or  ideas  which  should  enter  into  the  definition  ; as 
when  we  speak  of  the  essence  of  an  equilateral  triangle  being 
three  equal  sides  and  three  equal  angles.  This  is  the  only 
sense  in  which  Ivant  recognizes  the  word.  In  popular  lan- 
guage essence  is  used  to  denote  the  nature  of  a thing. 

ETERNITY  is  a negative  idea  expressed  by  a positive  term.  It 
supposes  a present  existence,  and  denies  a beginning  or  an  end 
of  that  existence.  Hence  the  schoolmen  spoke  of  eternity,  a 
parte  ante,  and  a parte  post.  The  Scotists  maintained  that 
eternity  is  made  up  of  successive  parts,  which  drop,  so  to  speak, 
one  from  another.  The  Thomists  held  that  it  is  simple  dura- 
tion, excluding  the  past  and  the  future.  Plato  said,  time  is  the 
moving  shadow  of  eternity.  The  common  symbol  of  eternity  is 
a circle.  It  may  be  doubted  how  far  it  is  competent  to  the 
human  mind  to  compass  in  thought  the  idea  of  absolute  begin- 
ning, or  the  idea  of  absolute  ending. 

On  man’s  conception  of  eternity,  see  an  Examination  of 
Mr.  Maurice's  Theory  of  a Fixed  State  out  of  Time.  By  Mr. 
Hansel. 

“What  is  eternity  ? can  aught 
Paint  its  duration  to  the  thought? 

Tell  all  the  sand  the  ocean  laves, 

Tell  all  its  changes,  all  its  waves, 

Or,  tell  with  more  laborious  pains, 

The  drops  its  mighty  mass  contains 
Be  this  astonishing  account 
Augmented  with  the  full  amount 
Of  all  the  drops  that  clouds  have  shed, 

Where’er  their  wat’ry  fleeces  spread, 

Through  all  time’s  long  protracted  tour, 

From  Adam  to  the  present  hour;  — 


VOCABULARY  OB  PHILOSOPHY. 


171 


ETEEHITY— 

Still  short  the  sum,  nor  can  it  vie 
With  the  more  numerous  years  that  lie 
Embosomed  in  eternity. 

Attend,  0 man,  with  awe  divine, 

For  this  eternity  is  thine.”  — Gibbons. 

ETERFITY  (OF  GOD).  — Deus  non  est  duraiio  vel  spaiium, 
seel  durat  et  adest.  This  scholium  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton  con- 
tains the  germ  of  Dr.'Clarke’s  Demonstration  of  the  Being  of 
God.  Time  and  space  are  qualities,  and  imply  a substance. 
The  ideas  of  time  and  space  necessarily  force  themselves 
upon  our  minds.  We  cannot  think  of  them  as  not  existing. 
And  as  we  think  of  them  as  infinite,  they  are  the  infinite 
qualities  of  an  infinite  substance,  that  is,  of  God,  necessarily 
existing. 

ETHICS  “ extend  to  the  investigation  of  those  principles  by  which 
moral  men  are  governed  ; they  explore  the  nature  and  excel- 
lence of  virtue,  the  nature  of  moral  obligation,  on  what  it  is 
founded,  and  what  are  the  proper  motives  of  practice  ; moral- 
ity in  the  more  common  acceptation,  though  not  exclusively, 
relates  to  the  practical  and  obligatory  part  of  ethics.  Ethics 
principally  regard  the  theory  of  morals.”  1 

Aristotle2  says  that  rfio;,  which  signifies  moral  virtue,  is 
derived  from  e9o;,  custom ; since  it  is  by  repeated  acts  that 
virtue,  which  is  a moral  habit,  is  acquired.  Cicero3  says, 
Quia  pertinet  ad  mores,  quod  rfio j illi  vocant,  nos  earn  partem 
philosophies,  De  moribus,  appellare  solemus:  sed  decel  augentem 
linguam  Latinam  nominare  Moralem.  Ethics  is  thus  made 
synonymous  with  morals  or  moral  philosophy  — q.  v. 

Ethics  taken  in  its  widest  signification,  as  including  the 
moral  sciences  or  natural  jurisprudence,  may  be  divided  into — 

1.  Moral  Philosophy,  or  the  science  of  the  relations,  rights, 
and  duties,  by  which  men  are  under  obligation  towards  God, 
themselves,  and  their  fellow-creatures. 

2.  The  Law  of  Nations,  or  the  science  of  those  laws  by  which 
all  nations,  as  constituting  the  universal  society  of  the  human 
race,  are  bound  in  their  mutual  relations  to  one  another. 

3.  Public  or  Political  Law,  or  the  science  of  the  relations 
between  the  different  ranks  in  society. 


1 Cogan,  Ethic.  Treat,  on  Passions,  Introd. 

2 Eth.,  lib.  2.  De  Fato3  cap.  1. 


172 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


ETHICS  — 

4.  Civil  Law,  or  the  science  of  those  laws,  rights,  and  duties, 
by  which  individuals  in  civil  society  are  bound, — as  commer- 
cial, criminal,  judicial,  Roman,  or  modern. 

5.  History,  Profane,  Civil,  and  Political.1 

ETHNOGRAPHY  (edm  and  rPc^),  and  ETHNOLOGY  bear 

the  same  relation  almost  to  one  another  as  geology  and  geo- 
graphy. "While  ethnography  contents  herself  with  the  mere 
description  and  classification  of  the  races  of  man,  ethnology,  or 
the  science  of  races,  “ investigates  the  mental  and  physical 
differences  of  mankind,  and  the  organic  laws  upon  which  they 
depend  ; seeks  to  deduce  from  these  investigations  principles 
of  human  guidance,  in  all  the  important  relations  of  social 
and  national  existence.” 

“ Ethnology  treats  of  the  different  races  into  which  the 
human  family  is  subdivided,  and  indicates  the  bonds  which 
bind  them  all  together.”2 

ETHOLOGY  or  tfloj,  and  xdy of),  is  a word  coming  to  be 
used  in  philosophy.  Sir  William  Hamilton  has  said  that 
Aristotle’s  Rhetoric  is  the  best  ethology  extant,  meaning 
that  it  contains  the  best  account  of  the  passions  and  feel- 
ings of  the  human  heart,  and  of  the  means  of  awakening 
and  interesting  them  so  as  to  produce  persuasion  or  action. 
Mr.  Mill3  calls  ethology  the  science  of  the  formation  of  cha- 
racter. 

EUDEMONISM  (ehSuy  ovla,  happiness),  is  a term  applied  by  Ger- 
man philosophers  to  that  system  of  morality  which  places  the 
foundation  of  virtue  in  the  production  of  happiness.1 

This  name,  or  rather  Hedonism,  may  be  applied  to  the  sys- 
tem of  Chrysippus  and  Epicurus. 

EURETIC  or  EURISTIC. — V.  Ostensive. 

EVIDENCE  ( e and  video,  to  see,  to  make  see).  — “Evidence  sig- 
nifies that  which  demonstrates,  makes  clear,  or  ascertains  the 
truth  of  the  very  fact  or  point  in  issue,  either  on  the  one  side 
or  the  other.”5 


1 Peemans,  Introd.  ad  Philosophy  p.  95. 

0 Donaldson,  New  Cratylus,  p.  13.  Ethnological  Journal , June  1,  1848;  Edin.  Rev., 
Oct.,  1844. 

3 Log.,  book  vi.,  chap.  5.  4 Whewell,  Pref.  to  Mackintosh's  Dissert .,  p.  20. 

6 Blackstone,  Comment , b.  iii.,  c.  23. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


173 


EVIDENCE  - 

Evidence  is  the  ground  or  reason  of  knowledge.  It  is  the 
light  by  which  the  mind  apprehends  things  presented  to  it. 
Fulcjor  quid'am  mentis  assensum  rapiens. 

In  an  act  of  knowledge  there  is  the  object  or  thing  known, 
and  the  subject  or  person  knowing.  Between  the  faculties  of 
the  person  knowing  and  the  qualities  of  the  thing  known, 
there  is  some  proportion  or  relation.  The  qualities  manifest 
themselves  to  the  faculties,  and  the  result  is  knowledge ; or 
the  thing  is  made  evident  — that  is,  it  not  only  exists,  but  is 
revealed  as  existing. 

There  are  as  many  kinds  of  evidence  as  there  are  powers  or 
faculties  by  which  we  attain  to  truth.  But  according  as  truth 
may  be  attained,  more  or  less  directly,  evidence  is  distinguished 
into  intuitive  and  deductive. 

Intuitive  evidence  comprehends  all_y?rs<  truths,  or  principles 
of  common  sense,  as,  “ every  change  implies  the  operation  of 
a cause  ” — axioms,  in  science,  as,  “ things  equal  to  the  same 
thing  are  equal  to  one  another  ” — and  the  evidence  of  con- 
sciousness, whether  by  sense,  or  memory,  or  thought,  as  when 
we  touch,  or  remember,  or  know,  or  feel  anything.  Evidence 
of  this  kind  arises  directly  from  the  presence  or  contemplation 
of  the  object,  and  gives  knowledge  without  any  effort  upon 
- our  parts. 

Deductive  evidence  is  distinguished  as  demonstrative  and 
probable. 

Demonstrative  evidence  rests  upon  axioms,  or  first  truths, 
and  from  which,  by  ratiocination,  we  attain  to  other  truths. 
It  is  scientific,  and  leads  to  certainty.  It  admits  not  of  de- 
grees ; and  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  the  contrary  of  the  truth 
which  it  establishes. 

Probable  evidence  has  reference,  not  to  necessary,  but  con- 
tingent truth.  It  admits  of  degrees,  and  is  derived  from 
various  sources ; the  principal  are  the  following,  viz. : — Expe- 
rience, Analogy,  and  Testimony — -q.  v.1 


1 Glassford,  Essay  on  Principles  of  Evidence , 8vo,  Edin.,  1820;  Campbell,  Philosophy 
of  Rhetoric,  book  i. ; TJambier,  On  Moral  Evidence,  Svo,  Lond.,  1S24;  Smedlej,  Moral 
Evidence , Svo,  Lond.,  1850;  Butler,  Analogy , Introd. ; Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Under- 
stand.,  book  iv.,  chap.  15. 

16* 


174 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


EVIL  is  the  negation  or  contrary  of  good. — “ That  which  hath  in 
it  a fitness  to  promote  its  own  preservation  or  well-being,  is 
called  good.  And,  on  the  contrary,  that  which  is  apt  to  hinder 
it,  is  called  evil.” 1 

“Everyman  calleth  that  which  pleasetli,  and  is  delightful 
to  himself,  good  ; and  that  evil  which  displeaseth  him.”2 

Pleasure  is  fit  for,  or  agreeable  to,  the  nature  of  a sensible 
being,  or  a natural  good ; pain  is  unfit,  or  is  a natural  evil. 

“ The  voluntary  application  of  this  natural  good  and  evil  to 
any  rational  being,  or  the  production  of  it  by  a rational  being, 
is  moral  good  and  evil.”3 

“ Metaphysical  evil  consists  simply  in  imperfection,  physical 
evil  in  suffering,  and  moral  evil  in  sin.”4 5 

“ Evil  does  not  proceed  from  a principle  of  evil.  Cold  does 
not  proceed  from  a principle  of  coldness,  nor  darkness  from  a 
principle  of  darkness.  Evil  is  mere  privation.”6 

Evil  is  not  a generation,  but  a degeneration  ; and  as  Augus- 
tine often  expresses  it,  it  has  not  an  efficient,  but  only  a defi- 
cient cause.6 

Metaphysical  evil  is  the  absence  or  defect  of  powers  and 
capacities,  and  the  consequent  want  of  the  higher  enjoyment 
which  might  have  flowed  from  the  full  and  perfect  possession 
of  them.  It  arises  from  the  necessarily  limited  nature  of  all 
created  beings. 

Physical  evil  consists  in  pain  and  suffering.  It  seems  to  be 
necessary  as  the  contrast  and  heightencr  of  pleasure  or  enjoy- 
ment, and  is  in  many  ways  productive  of  good. 

Moral  evil  originates  in  the  will  of  man,  who  could  not 
have  been  capable  of  moral  good  without  being  liable  to  moral 
evil,  a power  to  do  right  being,  ex  necessitate  rei,  a power  to 
do  wrong. 

The  question  concerning  the  origin  of  evil  has  been  answered 
by— 1.  The  doctrine  of  pre-existence,  or  that  the  evils  we  are 
here  suffering  are  the  punishments  or  expiations  of  moral 
delinquencies  in  a former  state  of  existence.  2.  The  doctrine 
of  the  Maniclieans  which  supposes  two  co-eternal  and  inde- 

1 Wilkins,  Nat.  Relig .,  book  i.  a Hobbes,  Hum.  Nat.,  chap.  7. 

3 KiDg,  Essay  on  Origin  of  Evil,  translated  by  Law,  chap.  1,  sect.  3,  notes,  p.  38,  fifth 

edit. 

4 Leibnitz,  On  Goodness  of  God,  part  1,  sect.  21. 

5 T)c  Civ.  Dei,  1.  17,  c.  7. 


8 Part  2,  sect.  153. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOrilY. 


175 


EVIL  — 

pendent  agencies,  the  one  the  author  of  good,  and  the  other 
of  evil.  3.  The  doctrine  of  optimism,  or,  that  evil  is  part  of 
a system  conducted  by  Almighty  power,  under  the  direction 
of  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness.1 

On  the  origin  of  evil , its  nature,  extent,  uses,  &c.,  see  Plato, 
Cicero,  and  Seneca,  Malebranche  and  Fenelon,  Clarke  and 
Leibnitz,  Bledsoe,  Theodicy;  Young,  Mystery ; King,  J.  Mliller. 
EXAMPLE.  — V.  Analogy. 

EXCLUDED  MIDDLE.  — P>  ■incipium  exclusi  medii  inter  duo 
contradictor ia.  — “ By  the  principle  of  ‘ Contradiction’  we  are 
forbidden  to  think  that  two  contradictory  attributes  can  both 
be  present  in  the  same  object;  by  the  principle  of  ‘Excluded 
Middle  ’ we  are  forbidden  to  think  that  both  can  bo  absent. 
The  first  tells  us  that  both  differentiae  must  be  compatible 
with  the  genus : I cannot,  for  example,  divide  animal  into  ani- 
mate and  inanimate.  The  second  tells  us  that  one  or  the  other 
must  be  found  in  every  member  of  the  genus ; but  in  what 
manner  this  is  actually  carried  out,  whether  by  every  existing 
member  possessing  one  of  the  differentiae  and  none  of  the 
other,  or  by  some  possessing  one  and  some  the  other,  experi- 
ence alone  can  determine.”2 

The  formula  of  this  principle  is  — “ Everything  is  either  A 
or  not  A : everything  is  either  a given  thing,  or  something 
which  is  not  that  given  thing.”  That  there  is  no  mean  be- 
tween two  contradictory  propositions  is  proved  by  Aristotle.3 
“ So  that  if  we  think  a judgment  true,  we  must  abandon  its 
contradictory  ; if  false,  the  contradictory  must  be  accepted.”4 

EXISTENCE  ( exsisto , to  stand  out). — “ The  metaphysicians  look 
upon  existence  as  the  formal  and  actual  part  of  a being.”5 

It  has  been  called  the  actus  entitativus,  or  that  by  which 
anything  has  its  essence  actually  constituted  in  the  nature  of 
things. 

Essence  pertains  to  the  question,  Quid  est? 

Existence  pertains  to  the  question,  An  est? 


1 Stewart,  Act.  and  Mar.  Pow.,  b.  iii.,  c.  3,  sect.  1. 

2 Mansel,  Prolegom.,  Log.,  p.  193. 

3 Metaphys book  iii.,  ch.  7. 

4 Thomson,  Laws  of  Thought , p.  295. 

5 II.  More,  Antid.  agt.  Atheism,  app.,  c.  44. 


176 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


EXISTENCE  — 

Essence  formal,  combined  with  essence  substantial,  gives 
existence ; for  existence  is  essence  clothed  with  form.1 

Existence  is  the  actuality  of  essence.  It  is  the  act  by  which 
the  essences  of  things  arc  actually  in  rerum  natura  — beyond 
their  causes.  Before  things  are  produced  by  their  causes, 
they  are  said  to  be  in  the  objective  power  of  their  causes ; but 
when  produced  they  are  beyond  their  causes,  and  are  actually 
in  rerum  natura — as  maggots  before  they  are  warmed  into  life 
by  heat  of  the  sun. 

Existentia  est  unio  realis,  sive  actnalis  conjunctio  partium 

sive  attributorum  quibus  ens  constat Existentia 

dicitur  quasi  rei  extra  causas  et  nihilum  sistentia.”2 
Existence  and  Essence.  — Incaute  sibi  finxerunt  quidam,  “ Es- 
sentias  quasdam  casque  eternas,  fuisse  sine  existentia si- 
quando  autem  subnascatur  Res  istiusmodi  idece  similis,  tunc 
consent  cxistcntiam  essentice  supervenientem,  veram  rent  ejfcere, 
sive  ens  reale.  Atque  hinc,  essentiam  et  existentiam  dixerunt 
essendi  principia,  sive  entis  constitutive,.  Quicquid  vero  essen- 
tiam habet  veram,  eodem  temporehabet  existentiam,  eodem  sensn 
quo  habet  essentiam,  aid  quo  est  ens,  aid  aliquid.”3 4 * * 

“Essence,  in  relation  to  God,  must  involve  a necessary  exist- 
« ence ; for  we  cannot  in  any  measure  duly  conceive  what  he  is, 
without  conceiving  that  he  is,  and,  indeed,  cannot  but  be.  The 
name  he  takes  to  himself  is  I am  (or,  I will  be).  This  is  the 
contraction  of  that  larger  name,  I am  what  I am  (or,  I will 
be  what  I will  be),  which  may  seem  closely  to  conjoin  God’s 
unquestionable  necessary  existence  with  his  unsearchable, 
boundless  essence.’’* 

EXOTERIC.  — V.  Esoteric. 

EXPEDIENCY  (Doctrine  of).  — Paley  has  said,  “Whatever  is 
expedient  is  right.”- — Y.  Utility  (Doctrine  of). 
EXPERIENCE  (lyrteipta,  experientia). — According  to  Aristotle,8 
from  sense  comes  memory,  but  from  repeated  remembrance  of 
the  same  thing  we  get  experience. 

1 Tiberghien,  Essai  des  Connaiss.  Hum .,  p.  730,  note. 

a Peemans,  Introd.  ad  Philosophy  12mo,  Lovan,  1840,  p.  45. 

3 Hutcheson,  Mctaphys .,  p.  4. 

4 Oldfield,  Essay  on  Reason , p.  48.  See  art.  “ Existence,”  in  French  Encyclopedic , by 

Mons.  Turgot. 

b Anahjt.  Poster ii.,  19. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


177 


EXPEKIEU  CE  — 

Wolf1  used  experience  as  co-estensive  with  the  contents  of 
consciousness,  to  include  all  of  which  the  mind  is  conscious, 
as  agent  or  patient,  all  that  it  does  from  within,  as  well  as  all 
that  it  suffers  from  without.  “ Experiri  dicimur,  quicquid  ad 
perceptiones  nostras  attenti  cognoscimus.  Solera  lucere,  cog- 
noscimus  ad  ea  attenti,  quee  visit  percipimns.  TJnde  experieniia 
constare  dicilur,  quod  sol  luceat.  Similiter  ad  nosmet  ipsos 
attenti  cognoscimus,  nos  non  posse  assensum  prsebere  contra- 
dictoriis,  v.  g.  non  posse  sumere  tanquam  verum,  quod  simul 
pluit  ct  non  pluit.” 

“ Experience , in  its  strict  sense,  applies  to  what  has  occurred 
within  a person’s  own  knowledge.  Experience,  in  this  sense 
of  course,  relates  to  the  past  alone.  Thus  it  is  that  a man 
knows  by  experience  what  sufferings  he  has  undergone  in  some 
disease ; or  what  height  the  tide  reached  at  a certain  time  and 
place.  More  frequently  the  word  is  used  to  denote  that  judg- 
ment which  is  derived  from  experience  in  the  primary  sense,  by 
reasoning  from  that  in  combination  with  other  data.  Thus  a 
man  may  assert,  on  the  ground  of  experience,  that  he  was  cured 
of  a disorder  by  such  a medicine — that  that  medicine  is  gene- 
rally beneficial  in  that  disorder ; that  the  tide  may  always  be 
expected,  under  such  circumstances,  to  rise  to  such  a height. 
Strictly  speaking,  none  of  these  can  be  known  by  experience, 
but  are  conclusions  from  experience.  It  is  in  this  sense  only 
that  experience  can  be  applied  to  the  future,  or,  which  comes 
to  the  same  thing,  to  any  general  fact;  as,  e.  g.,  when  it  is 
said  that  we  know  by  experience  that  water  exposed  to  a cer- 
tain temperature  will  freeze.” 2 

Mr.  Locke3  has  assigned  experience  as  the  only  and  universal 
source  of  human  knowledge.  “Whence  hath  the  mind  all 
the  materials  of  reason  and  knowledge?  To  this  I answer,  in 
one  word,  from  experience;  in  that,  all  our  knowledge  is 
founded,  and  from  that  ultimately  derives  itself.  Our  obser- 
vation, employed  either  about  external  sensible  objects,  or 
about  the  internal  operations  of  our  minds,  perceived  and  re- 
flected on  by  ourselves,  is  that  which  supplies  our  under- 
standing with  all  the  materials  of  thinking.  These  arc  the 

1 Philosoph.  Pat.,  sect.  664.  a Whately,  Log.,  app.  i. 

3 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand .,  book  ii.,  chap.  1. 

N 


178 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


EXPERIENCE  — 

fountains  of  knowledge  from  whence  all  the  ideas  we  have, 
or  can  naturally  have,  do  spring  — that  is,  sensation  and  re- 
flection.” 

In  opposition  to  this  view,  according  to  which  all  human 
knowledge  is  d posteriori,  or  the  result  of  experience,  it  is  con- 
tended that  man  has  knowledge  a priori  — knowledge  which 
experience  neither  does  nor  can  give,  and  knowledge  without 
which  there  could  be  no  experience — inasmuch  as  all  the  gene- 
ralizations of  experience  proceed  and  rest  upon  it. 

“ No  accumulation  of  experiments  whatever  can  bring  a general 
law  home  to  the  mind  of  man;  because  if  we  rest  upon  experi- 
ments, our  conclusion  can  never  logically  pass  beyond  the  bounds 
of  our  premises ; we  can  never  infer  more  than  we  have  proved ; 
and  all  the  past,  which  we  have  not  seen,  and  the  future,  which  wo 
cannot  see,  is  still  left  open,  in  which  new  experiences  may  arise 
to  overturn  the  present  theory.  And  yet  the  child  will  believe 
at  once  upon  a single 1 experiment.  Why?  Because  a hand 
divine  has  implanted  in  him  the  tendency  to  generalize  thus 
rapidly.  Because  he  does  it  by  an  instinct,  of  which  he  can 
give  no  account,  except  that  he  is  so  formed  by  his  Maker.”2 

“We  may  have  seen  one  circle,  and  investigated  its  proper- 
ties, but  why,  when  our  individual  experience  is  so  circum- 
scribed, do  we  assume  the  same  relations  of  all?  Simply 
because  the  understanding  has  the  conviction  intuitively  that 
similar  objects  will  have  similar  properties;  it  does  not  acquire 
this  idea  by  sensation  or  custom;  the  mind  develops  it  by  its 
own  intrinsic  force — it  is  a law  of  our  faculties,  ultimate  and 
universal,  from  which  all  reasoning  proceeds.”3 

Experience,  more  especially  in  physical  philosophy,  is  either 
active  or  passive,  that  is,  it  is  constituted  by  observation  and 
experiment. 

“ Observationes  fiunt  spectando  id  quod  natura  per  seipsam 
sponie  exhibet.  Experimenta  fiunt  ponendo  naturam  in  eas 
circumsiantias,  in  quibas  debeat  agere,  et  nobis  ostendere  id 
quod  queerimus.”  4 


1 As  having  been  once  burnt  by  fire. 

3 Sewell,  Christ.  Mor .,  chap.  24. 

8 Dr.  Mill,  Essays , p.  337. 

4 Boscovicb,  Note  to  Stay’s  Poem,  Dc  Systematte . 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY'. 


179 


EXPERIENCE  — 

These  are  more  fully  explained  and  characterized  in  the 
following  passage  from  Sir  John  Ilerschel.1 

“ The  great,  and  indeed  the  only  ultimate  source  of  our 
knowledge  of  nature  and  its  laws  is  experience ; by  which  we 
mean  not  the  experience  of  one  man  only,  or  of  one  generation, 
but  the  accumulated  experience  of  all  mankind  in  all  ages, 
registered  in  books,  or  recorded  by  tradition.  But  experience 
may  be  acquired  in  two  ways : either,  first,  by  noticing  facts  as 
they  occur,  without  any  attempt  to  influence  the  frequency  of 
their  occurrence,  or  to  vary  the  circumstances  under  which  they 
occur ; this  is  observation : or,  secondly,  by  putting  in  action 
causes  and  agents  over  which  we  have  control,  and  purposely 
varying  their  combinations,  and  noticing  what  effects  take 
place  ; this  is  experiment.  To  these  two  sources  we  must  look 
as  the  fountains  of  all  natural  science.  It  is  not  intended, 
however,  by  thus  distinguishing  observation  from  experiment,  to 
place  them  in  any  kind  of  contrast.  Essentially  they  are  much 
alike,  and  differ  rather  in  degree  than  in  kind ; so  that,  perhaps, 
the  terms  passive  and  active  observation  might  better  express 
their  distinction  ; but  it  is,  nevertheless,  highly  important  to 
mark  the  different  states  of  mind  in  inquiries  carried  on  by 
their  respective  aids,  as  well  as  their  different  effects  in  pro- 
moting the  progress  of  science.  In  the  former,  we  sit  still  and 
listen  to  a tale,  told  us,  perhaps  obscurely,  piecemeal,  and  at 
long  intervals  of  time,  with  our  attention  more  or  less  awake. 
It  is  only  by  after  rumination  that  we  gather  its  full  import ; 
and  often,  when  the  opportunity  is  gone  by,  we  have  to  regret 
that  our  attention  was  not  more  particularly  directed  to  some 
point  which,  at  the  time,  appeared  of  little  moment,  but  of 
which  we  at  length  appreciate  the  importance.  In  the  latter, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  cross-examine  our  witness,  and  by 
comparing  one  part  of  his  evidence  with  the  other,  while  he  is 
yet  before  us,  and  reasoning  upon  it  in  his  presence,  are 
enabled  to  put  pointed  and  searching  questions,  the  answer  to 
which  may  at  once  enable  us  to  make  up  our  minds.  Accord- 
ingly it  has  been  found  invariably,  that  in  those  departments 
of  physics  where  the  phenomena  are  beyond  our  control,  or 


1 On  the  Study  of  Nat.  Phil.,  Lardner's  Cyclop.,  No.  xiv.;  p.  67. 


180 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


EXPERIENCE  — 

into  which  experimental  inquiry,  from  other  causes,  has  not 
been  carried,  the  progress  of  knowledge  has  been  slow,  uncer- 
tain, and  irregular  ; while  in  such  as  admit  of  experiment,  and 
in  which  mankind  have  agreed  to  its  adoption,  it  has  been 
rapid,  sure,  and  steady.” — V.  Analogy. 

EXPERIMENT. — V.  Observation. 

EXPERIMENTUM  CRUCIS.  — A crucial  or  decisive  experi- 
ment in  attempting  to  interpret  the  laws  of  nature  ; so  called, 
by  Bacon,  from  the  crosses  or  way-posts  used  to  point  out 
roads,  because  they  determine  at  once  between  two  or  more 
possible  conclusions. 

Bacon1  says,  “Crucial  instances  are  of  this  kind;  when  in 
inquiry  into  any  nature  the  intellect  is  put  into  a sort  of  equi- 
librium, so  that  it  is  uncertain  to  which  of  two,  or  sometimes 
more  natures,  the  cause  of  the  nature  inquired  into  ought  to 
be  attributed  or  assigned,  on  account  of  the  frequent  and  ordi- 
nary concurrence  of  more  natures  than  one ; the  instances  of 
the  cross  show  that  the  union  of  the  one  nature  with  the  nature 
sought  for  is  faithful  and  indissoluble  ; while  that  of  the  other 
is  varied  and  separable  ; whence  the  question  is  limited,  and 
that  first  nature  received  as  the  cause,  and  the  other  sent  off 
and  rejected.” 

Sir  G.  Blane?  notices  that  in  chemistry  a single  experiment 
is  conclusive,  and  the  epithet  experimentum  crucis  applied ; 
because  the  crucible  derives  its  name  from  the  figure  of  the 
cross  being  stamped  upon  it. 

A and  B,  two  different  causes,  may  produce  a certain  number 
of  similar  effects  ; find  some  effect  which  the  one  produces  and 
the  other  does  not,  and  this  will  point  out,  as  the  direction- 
post  (crux),  at  a point  where  two  highways  meet,  which  of 
these  causes  may  have  been  in  operation  in  any  particular 
instance.  Thus,  many  of  the  symptoms  of  the  Oriental  plague 
are  common  to  other  diseases  ; but  when  the  observer  discovers 
the  peculiar  bubo  or  boil  of  the  complaint,  he  has  an  instantia 
crucis  which  directs  him  immediately  to  its  discovery. 

“ If  all  that  the  senses  present  to  the  mind  is  sensations, 
Berkeley  must  be  right ; but  Berkeley  assumed  this  premiss 


1 Nov.  Org.,  book  ii.,  sect.  36. 


a Med.  Log.,  p.  30. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


181 


EXPERIMENTS  CRUCIS  — 

without  any  foundation  or  any  proof  of  it.  The  size  and  shape 
of  things  are  presented  to  us  by  our  senses,  yet  every  one 
knows  that  size  and  shape  are  not  sensations. 

“ This  I would  therefore  humbly  propose  as  an  experimen- 
tum  crucis,  by  which  the  ideal  system  must  stand  or  fall ; and 
it  brings  the  matter  to  a short  issue.  Extension,  figure,  and 
motion,  may  — any  one  or  all  of  them — be  taken  for  the  sub- 
ject of  this  experiment.  Either  they  are  ideas  of  sensation, 
or  they  are  not.  If  any  one  of  them  can  be  shown  to  be  an 
idea  of  sensation,  or  to  have  the  least  resemblance  to  any  sen- 
sation, I lay  my  hand  upon  my  mouth,  and  give  up  all  pre- 
tence to  reconcile  reason  to  common  sense  in  this  matter,  and 
must  suffer- the  ideal  scepticism  to  triumph.”1 

“ If,  in  a variety  of  cases  presenting  a general  resemblance, 
whenever  a certain  circumstance  is  present,  a certain  effect 
follows,  there  is  a strong  probability  that  one  is  dependent  on 
the  other ; but  if  you  can  also  find  a case  where  the  circum- 
stance is  absent  from  the  combination,  and  the  effect  also  dis- 
appears, your  conclusion  has  all  the  evidence  in  its  favour  of 
which  it  is  susceptible.  When  a decisive  trial  can  be  made 
by  leaving  out,  in  this  manner,  the  cause  of  which  we  wish 
to  trace  the  effect,  or  by  insulating  any  substances  so  as  to 
exclude  all  agents  but  those  we  wish  to  operate,  or  in  any 
other  way,  such  a decisive  trial  receives  the  title  of  experi- 
mentum  crucis.  One  of  the  most  interesting  on  record  is  that 
of  Dr.  Franklin,  by  which  he  established  the  identity  of  light- 
ning and  the  electricity  of  our  common  machines.” 2 
EXTENSION  ( extendo , to  stretch  from). — “ The  notions  acquired 
by  the  sense  of  touch,  and  by  the  movement  of  the  body, 
compared  with  what  is  learnt  by  the  eye,  make  up  the  idea 
expressed  by  the  word  extension .”3 

Extension  is  that  property  of  matter  by  which  it  occupies 
space  ; it  relates  to  the  qualities  of  length,  breadth,  and  thick- 
ness, without  which  no  substance  can  exist ; but  has  no  re- 
spect to  the  size  or  shape  of  a body.  Solidity  is  an  essential 
quality  of  matter  as  well  as  extension.  And  it  is  from  the 

1 Reid,  Inquiry  into  Hum.  Mind,  ch.  5,  sec.  7. 

a S.  Bailey,  Discourses , Lond.,  1S52,  p.  1G9. 

3 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

17 


182 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


EXTENSION  — 

resistance  of  a solid  body,  as  the  occasion,  that  we  get  the 
idea  of  externality  — q.  v. 

According  to  the  Cartesians,  extension  was  the  essence  of 
matter.  “ Sola  igitur  cxicnsio  corporis  naturam  constituit,  quum 
ilia  omni  solum  semper  que  conveniat,  adeo  ut  nihil  in  corpore 
prius  perciperc  possumns.” 1 

Hobbes’s  views  are  given,  Phil.  Prim  a. 2 * 

Locke’s  views  are  given,  in  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand? 
Extension  (Logical),  when  predicated  as  belonging  to  a general 
term,  means  the  number  of  objects  included  under  it,  and 
comprehension  means  the  common  characters  belonging  to 
such  objects. 

“ I call  the  comprehension  of  an  idea,  those  attributes  which 
it  involves  in  itself,  and  which  cannot  be  taken  away  from  it 
without  destroying  it ; as  the  comprehension  of  the  idea  tri- 
angle includes  extension,  figure,  three  lines,  three  angles,  and 
the  equality  of  these  three  angles  to  two  right  angles,  &c. 

“ I call  the  extension  of  an  idea  those  subjects  to  which  that 
idea  applies,  which  are  also  called  the  inferiors  of  a general 
term,  which,  in  relation  to  them,  is  called  superior,  as  the 
idea  of  triangle  in  general  extends  to  all  the  different  sorts  of 
triangles.” 4 

We  cannot  detach  any  properties  from  a notion  without  ex- 
tending the  list  of  objects  to  which  it  is  applied.  Thus,  if  we 
abstract  from  a rose  its  essential  qualities,  attending  only  to 
those  which  it  connotes  as  a plant,  we  extend  its  application, 
before  limited  to  flowers  with  red  petals,  to  the  oak,  fir,  &c. 
But  as  we  narrow  the  sphere  of  a notion,  the  qualities  which 
it  comprehends  proportionally  increase.  If  we  restrict  the 
term  body  to  animal,  we  include  life  and  sensation — if  to  man, 
it  comprehends  reason. 

Thus  emerges  the  law  of  the  inverse  ratio  between  the  ex- 
tension of  common  terms  and  their  comprehension,  viz.,  the 
greater  the  extension  the  less  the  comprehension,  and  vice 
versa. 

1 he  Grand,  Tnst.  Philosoph.,  pars  iv.,  p.  152. 

a Pars  ii.,  c.  8,  sect.  1. 

a B.  ii.,  chop.  13,  sco  also  chap.  15;  Reid,  Inquiry,  c.  5,  sect.  5,  6;  Intell.  Pow.,  essay 
ii.,  c.  19. 

4 Port.  Roy.  Logic,  part  i,  chap.  6. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


183 


EXTERNALITY  or  OUTNESS.  — “ Pressure  or  resistance  ne- 
cessarily supposes  externality  in  the  thing  which  presses  or 
resists.”  1 

“Distance  or  outness  is  neither  immediately  of  itself  per- 
ceived by  sight,  nor  yet  apprehended  or  judged  of  by  lines 
and  angles,  but  is  only  suggested  to  our  thoughts,”  &c.2 — V. 
Perception. 


FABLE.  — “ The  word  fable  is  at  present  generally  limited  to 
those  fictions  in  which  the  resemblance  to  the  matter  in  ques- 
tion is  not  direct  but  analogical.”3 

Fable  and  Myth  were  at  one  time  synonyms.  “ Fables  of 
JEsop  and  other  eminent  mythologists,”  by  Sir  Pi.  L’Estrange.1 
— V.  Apologue. 

FACT.  — “Whatever  really  exists,  whether  necessarily  or  rela- 
tively, may  be  called  a,  fact.  A statement  concerning  a num- 
ber of  facts,  is  called  a doctrine  (when  it  is  considered  abso- 
lutely as  a truth),  and  a law  (when  it  is  considered  relatively 
to  an  intelligence  ordaining  or  receiving  it).”5 

By  a matter  of  fact,  in  ordinary  usage,  is  meant  something 
which  might,  conceivably,  be  submitted  to  the  senses;  and 
about  which  it  is  supposed  there  could  be  no  disagreement 
among  persons  who  should  be  present,  and  to  whose  senses  it 
should  be  submitted  ; and  by  a matter  of  opinion  is  understood 
anything  respecting  which  an  exercise  of  judgment  would  be 
called  for  on  the  part  of  those  who  should  have  certain  objects 
before  them,  and  who  might  conceivably  disagree  in  their 
judgment  thereupon.”6  — V.  Opinion. 

“ By  a matter  of  fact,  I understand  anything  of  which  we 
obtain  a conviction  from  our  internal  consciousness,  or  any 
individual  event  or  phenomenon  which  is  the  object  of  sensa- 
tion.”7 

It  is  thus  opposed  to  matter  of  inference.  Thus,  the  destruc- 

1 Adam  Smith,  On  the  Senses. 

a Berkeley,  Principles  of  Knowledge. , part  i.,  sect.  43. 

3 wffitely,  Rhet .,  part  i.,  ch.  2,  § 8.  4 Fol.,  Lond.,  1704. 

0 Irous,  On  Pinal  Causes,  p.  48.  6 Wkately,  Rhet.,  pt.  i.,  ch.  2,  g 4. 

1 Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  Essay  on  Influence  of  Authority,  pp.  1-4. 


184 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


FACT— 

tivencss  of  cholera  is  matter  of  fact,  the  mode  of  its  propa- 
gation is  matter  of  inference.  Matter  of  fact  also  denotes  what 
is  certain,  as  opposed  to  matter  of  doubt.  The  existence  of 
God  is  matter  of  fact,  though  ascertained  by  reasoning. 

“ The  distinction  of  fact  and  theory  is  only  relative.  Events 
and  phenomena  considered  as  particulars  which  may  be  col- 
ligated by  induction,  are  facts;  considered  as  generalities 
already  obtained  by  colligation  of  other  facts,  they  are  theories 
The  same  event  or  phenomenon  is  a.  fact  or  a theory,  according 
as  it  is  considered  as  standing  on  one  side  or  the  other  of  the 
inductive  bracket.”  1 

“ Theories  which  are  true,  ar e facts.”2  — V.  Opinion. 
FACTITIOUS  ( factito , to  practise),  is  applied  to  what  is  the 
result  of  use  or  art,  in  distinction  to  what  is  the  product  of 
nature.  Mineral  waters  made  in  imitation  of  the  natural 
springs  arc  called  factitious. 

Cupidilas  aliorum  exist imationis  non  est  factitia  sed  nobis 
congenita ; deprehenditur  enim  et  in  infantibus  qvi,  etiam  ante 
reflectionis  usum,  molestia  aficiuntur,  quum  parvi  a ceteris 
periduntnr? 

“ It  is  enough  that  we  have  moral  ideas,  however  obtained ; 
whether  by  original  constitution  of  our  nature,  or  factitiously, 
makes  no  difference.”4 

“ To  Mr.  Locke,  the  writings  of  Hobbes  suggested  much  of 
the  sophistry  displayed  in  the  first  book  of  his  essay  on  the 
factitious  nature  of  our  moral  principles.”5 
FACULTY.  — Facilitates  sunt  aut  quibus  faciliusyW,  aut  sine  quibus 
omnino  confici  non  potest .6 

Facultas  est  qucclibet  vis  activa,  sen  virtus,  sen  potestas.  Solet 
etiam  vocari  potentia,  verum  tunc  intelligenda  estpotentia  activa, 
sen  habilitas  ad  agendum .7 

“ The  word  faculty  is  most  properly  applied  to  those  powers 
of  the  mind  which  are  original  and  natural,  and  which  make 
part  of  the  constitution  of  the  mind.”8 


1 Whcwcll,  Philosoph.  Induct.  Sciences,  aphorism  23. 

2 Ibid.,  On  Induction,  p.  23.  3 N.  Lacoudre,  Inst.  Philosoph.,  t.om.  iii.,  p.  21. 

4 Hampden,  Introd.  to  Mor.  Philosoph.,  p.  13. 

6 Stewart,  Prelim.  Dissert.,  p.  61  6 Cicero,  De  Invent .,  lib.  ii.,  40 

1 Cliauvin,  Lexicon  Philosoph.  8 Iteid,  Intctt.  Pow.,  essay  i.,  chap.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


185 


FACULTY  - 

A faculty  is  the  natural  power  hy  which  phenomena  are 
produced  by  a person  that  is  an  agent,  who  can  direct  and 
concentrate  the  power  which  he  possesses.1 

Bodies  have  the  property  of  being  put  in  motion,  or  of  being 
melted.  The  magnet  has  an  attractive  poiver.  Plants  have 
a medical  virtue.  But  instead  of  blind  and  fatal  activity,  let 
the  being  who  has  power  be  conscious  of  it,  and  be  able  to 
exercise  and  regulate  it ; this  is  what  is  meant  by  faculty.  It 
implies  intelligence  and  freedom.  It  is  personality  which 
gives  the  character  of  faculties  to  those  natural  powers  which 
belong  to  us.2 

“ The  faculties  of  the  mind  and  its  powers,”  says  Dr.  Reid, 
“ are  often  used  as  synonymous  expressions.  But,”  continues 
he,  “ as  most  synonyms  have  some  minute  distinction  that 
deserves  notice,  I apprehend  that  the  word  faculty  is  most 
properly  applied  to  those  powers  of  the  mind  which  are  original 
and  natural,  and  which  make  part  of  the  constitution  of  the 
mind.  There  are  other  powers  which  arc  acquired  by  use, 
exercise,  or  study,  which  are  not  called  faculties,  but  habits. 
There  must  be  something  in  the  constitution  of  the  mind 
necessary  to  our  being  able  to  acquire  habits,  and  this  is  com- 
monly called  capacity.” 

Such  are  the  distinct  meanings  which  Dr.  Reid  would  assign 
to  these  words,  and  these  meanings  are  in  accordance  both  with 
their  philosophical  and  more  familiar  use.  The  distinction 
between  power  and  faculty  is,  that  faculty  is  more  properly 
applied  to  what  is  natural  and  original,  in  opposition  or  con- 
trast to  what  is  acquired.  We  say  the  faculty  of  judging,  but 
the  power  of  habit.  But,  as  all  our  faculties  are  powers,  wo 
can  apply  the  latter  term  equally  to  what  is  original  and  to 
what  is  acquired.  And  we  can  say,  with  equal  propriety,  the 
power  of  judging  and  the  power  of  habit.  The  acquiring  of 
habits  is  peculiar  to  man : at  least  the  inferior  animals  do  so  to 
a very  limited  extent.  There  must,  therefore,  be  something  in 
the  constitution  of  the  human  mind  upon  which  the  acquiring 
of  habits  depends.  This,  says  Dr.  Reid,  is  called  a capacity. 
The  capacity  is  natural,  the  habit  is  acquired.  Dr.  Reid  did 


' Jouffroy,  Melanges,  Bruxell,  1831,  p.  219. 

17* 


3 Diet.  des  Sciences  Philosoph. 


186 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


FACULTY  - 

not  recognize  the  distinction  between  active  and  passive  power. 
But  a capacity  is  a passive  power.  The  term  is  applied  to 
those  manifestations  of  mind  in  which  it  is  generally  regarded 
as  passive,  or  as  affected  or  acted  on  by  something  external  to 
itself.  Thus,  we  say  a man  is  capable  of  gratitude,  or  love, 
or  grief,  or  joy.  We  speak  also  of  the  capacity  of  acquiring 
knowledge.  Now,  in  these  forms  of  expression,  the  mind  is 
considered  as  the  passive  recipient  of  certain  affections  or  im- 
pressions coming  upon  it.  Taking  into  account  the  distinction 
of  powers  as  active  and  passive,  “these  terms,”  says  Sir  Wm. 
Hamilton,1  “ stand  in  the  following  relations.  Powers  are 
active  and  passive,  natural  and  acquired.  Powers  natural  and 
active  are  called  faculties.  Powers  natural  and  passive,  ca- 
pacities or  receptivities.  Powers  acquired  are  habits,  and  habit 
is  used  both  in  an  active  and  passive  sense.  The  power, 
again,  of  acquiring  a habit  is  called  a disposition.”  This  is 
quite  in  accordance  with  the  explanations  of  Dr.  Reid,  only 
that  instead  of  disposition  he  employs  the  term  capacity,  to 
denote  that  on  which  the  acquiring  of  habits  is  founded.  Dis- 
position is  employed  by  Dr.  Reid  to  denote  one  of  the  active 
principles  of  our  nature. 

One  great  end  and  aim  of  philosophy  is  to  reduce  facts  and 
phenomena  to  general  heads  and  laws.  The  philosophy  of 
mind,  therefore,  endeavours  to  arrange  and  classify  the  opera- 
tions of  mind  according  to  the  general  circumstances  under 
which  they  are  observed.  Thus  we  find  that  the  mind  fre- 
quently exerts  itself  in  acquiring  a knowledge  of  the  objects 
around  it  by  means  of  the  bodily  senses.  These  operations 
vary  according  to  the  sense  employed,  and  according  to  the 
object  presented.  But  in  smelling,  tasting,  and  touching,  and 
in  all  its  operations  by  means  of  the  senses,  the  mind  comes 
to  the  knowledge  of  some  object  different  from  itself.  This 
general  fact  is  denoted  by  the  term  perception ; and  we  say 
that  the  mind,  as  manifested  in  these  operations,  has  the  poiccr 
or  faculty  of  perception.  The  knowledge  which  the  mind  thus 
acquires  can  be  recalled  or  reproduced,  and  this  is  an  operation 
which  the  mind  delights  to  perform,  both  from  the  pleasure 
which  it  feels  in  reviving  objects  of  former  knowledge,  and  the 


Reid's  IForfc,  p.  221. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


187 


FACULTY— 

benefit  -which  results  from  reflecting  upon  them.  But  the  re- 
calling or  reproducing  objects  of  former  knowledge  is  an  act 
altogether  different  from  the  act  of  originally  obtaining  it.  It 
implies  the  possession  of  a peculiar  power  to  perform  it.  And 
hence  we  ascribe  to  the  mind  a power  of  recollection  or  a 
faculty  of  memory.  A perception  is  quite  distinct  from  a recol- 
lection. In  the  one  we  acquire  knowledge  which  is  new  to  us — - 
in  the  other  we  reproduce  knowledge  which  we  already  possess. 

In  the  operations  of  recollection  or  memory  it  is  often  neces- 
sary that  the  mind  exert  itself  to  exclude  some  objects  which 
present  themselves,  and  to  introduce  others  which  do  not  at 
first  appear.  In  such  cases  the  mind  does  so  by  an  act  of  re- 
solving or  determining,  by  a volition.  Now,  a volition  is  alto- 
gether different  from  a cognition.  To  know  is  one  thing,  to 
will  is  quite  another  thing.  Hence  it  is  that  we  assign  these 
different  acts  to  different  powers,  and  say  that  the  mind  has  a 
power  of  understanding,  and  also  a power  of  willing.  The 
power  of  understanding  may  exert  itself  in  different  ways,  and 
although  the  end  and  result  of  all  its  operations  be  knowledge, 
the  different  ways  in  which  knowledge  is  acquired  or  improved 
may  be  assigned,  as  we  have  seen  they  are,  to  different  powers  or 
faculties — but  these  are  all  considered  as  powers  of  understand- 
ing. In  like  manner  the  power  of  willing  or  determining  may 
be  exerted  under  different  conditions,  and,  for  the  sake  of 
distinctness,  these  may  be  denoted  by  different  terms ; but  still 
they  are  included  in  one  class,  and  called  powers  of  the 
will. 

Before  the  will  is  exerted  we  are  in  a state  of  pleasure  or 
pain,  and  the  act  of  will  has  for  its  end  to  continue  that  state 
or  to  terminate  it.  The  pleasures  and  the  pains  of  which  we 
are  susceptible  are  numerous  and  varied,  but  the  power  or 
capacity  of  being  affected  by  them  is  denoted  by  the  term 
sensibility  or  feeling.  And  we  are  said  not  only  to  have  powers 
of  understanding  and  will,  but  powers  of  sensibility. 

When  we  speak,  therefore,  of  a power  or  faculty  of  the  mind, 
' we  mean  that  certain  operations  of  mind  have  been  observed, 
and  classified  according  to  the  conditions  and  circumstances 
under  which  they  manifest  themselves,  and  that  distinct  names 
have  been  given  to  these  classes  of  phenomena,  to  mark  what 


188 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


FACULTY— 

is  peculiar  in  the  act  or  operation,  and  consequently  in  the 
power  or  faculty  to  which  they  are  referred.  But  when  we 
thus  classify  the  operations  of  the  mind,  and  assign  them  to 
different  powers,  we  are  not  to  suppose  that  we  divide  the 
mind  into  different  compartments,  of  which  each  has  a different 
energy.  The  energy  is  the  same  in  one  and  all  of  the  oper- 
ations. It  is  the  same  mind  acting  according  to  different  con- 
ditions and  laws.  The  energy  is  one  and  indivisible.  It  is  only 
the  manifestations  of  it  that  we  arrange  and  classify. 

This  is  well  put  by  the  famous  Alcuin,  who  was  the  friend 
and  adviser  of  Charlemagne,  in  the  following  passage,  which 
is  translated  from  his  work  De  Batione  Animce: — “The  soul 
bears  divers  names  according  to  the  nature  of  its  operations ; 
inasmuch  as  it  lives  and  makes  live,  it  is  the  soul  (anima) ; 
inasmuch  as  it  contemplates,  it  is  the  spirit  ( spiritus ) ; inas- 
much as  it  feels,  it  is  sentiment  ( sensus ) ; since  it  reflects,  it 
is  thought  {animus) ; as  it  comprehends,  intelligence  {mens) ; 
inasmuch  as  it  discerns,  reason  {ratio);  as  it  consents,  will 
{voluntas);  as  it  recollects,  memory  {memoria).  But  these 
things  are  not  divided  in  substance  as  in  name,  for  all  this  is 
the  soul,  and  one  soul  only.” 

Faculties  of  the  Mind  (Classification  of). — The  faculties  of  the 
human  mind  were  formerly  distinguished  as  gnostic  or  cogni- 
tive, and  orectic  or  appetent.  They  have  also  been  regarded 
as  belonging  to  the  understanding  or  to  the  will,  and  have  been 
designated  as  intellectual  or  active.  A threefold  classification 
of  them  is  now  generally  adopted,  and  they  are  reduced  to  the 
heads  of  intellect  or  cognition,  of  sensitivity  or  feeling,  and  of 
activity  or  will.  Under  each  of  these  heads,  again,  it  is 
common  to  speak  of  several  subordinate  faculties. 

“ This  way  of  speaking  of  faculties  has  misled  many  into  a 
confused  notion  of  so  many  distinct  agents  in  us,  which  had 
their  several  provinces  and  authorities,  and  did  command,* 
obey,  and  perform  several  actions,  as  so  many  distinct  beings : 
which  has  been  no  small  occasion  of  wrangling,  obscurity, 
and  uncertainty,  in  questions  relating  to  them.” 1 

Dr.  Brown,2  instead  of  ascribing  so  many  distinct  faculties  to 


1 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum . Understand book  ii.,  chap.  21,  g 17,  20. 
3 Lecture  xvi. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


189 


FACULTY  — 

the  mind,  which  is  one,  would  speak  of  it  as  in  different 
states,  or  under  different  affections. — V.  Operations  of  the 
Mind. 

“ Les  divers  facultes  que  l’on  considerc  dans  l’ame,  ne  sont 
point  des  choses  distinctes  reellement,  mais  le  meme  §tre  dif- 
ferement  considere.”  1 

“ Quoique  nous  donnions  a ces  facultes  des  noms  differents, 
par  rapport  a leur  diverses  operations,  cela  ne  nous  oblige 
pas  a les  regarder  comme  des  choses  differentes.  car  l’entende- 
ment  n’est  autre  chose  que  l’ame,  en  taut  qu’elle  retient  et  se 
ressouvient;  la  volonte  n’est  autre  chose  que  l’ame,  en  tant 

qu’elle  veut  et  qu’elle  choisit De  sorte  qu’on 

peut  entendre  que  toutes  ces  facultes  ne  sont,  au  fond,  que 
le  meme  ame,  qui,  recoit  divers  noms,  a cause  de  ses  differentes 
operations.”2 

“ Man  is  sometimes  in  a predominant  state  of  intelligence, 
sometimes  in  a predominant  state  of  feeling,  and  sometimes  in 
a predominant  state  of  action  and  determination.  To  call 
these,  however,  separate  faculties,  is  altogether  beside  the 
mark.  No  act  of  intelligence  can  be  performed  without  the 
will,  no  act  of  determination  without  the  intellect,  and  no  act 
either  of  the  one  or  the  other  without  some  amount  of  feeling 
being  mingled  in  the  process.  Thus,  whilst  they  each  have 
their  own  distinctive  characteristics,  yet  there  is  a perfect 
unity  at  the  root.”  3 

“I  feel  that  there  is  no  more  reason  for  believing  my  mind 
to  be  made  up  of  distinct  entities,  or  attributes,  or  faculties, 
than  that  my  foot  is  made  up  of  walking  and  running.  My 
mind,  I firmly  believe,  thinks,  and  wills,  and  remembers,  just 
as  simply  as  my  body  walks,  and  runs,  and  rests.”4 

“ It  would  be  well  if,  instead  of  speaking  of  ‘the  powers 
(or faculties)  of  the  mind’  (which  causes  misunderstanding)! 
we  adhered  to  the  designation  of  the  several  ‘ operations  of 
one  mind which  most  psychologists  recommend,  but  in  the 
sequel  forget.”  6 

1 Arnaud.  Des  Yrais  et  des  Fausses  Jdees,  ch.  27. 

0 Bossuet,  Connaissance  de  Dieu,  ch.  2,  art.  20. 

3 Morell,  Psychology , p.  61.  4 Irons,  Final  Causes,  p.  93. 

8 Feuchtersleben,  Medical  Psychol.,  Svo,  1847,  p.  120. 


190 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


FACULTY  — 

“The  judgment  is  often  spoken  of  as  if  it  were  a distinct 
power  or  f acidly  of  the  soul,  differing  from  the  imagination, 
the  memory,  &c.,  as  the  heart  differs  from  the  lungs,  or  the 
brain  from  the  stomach.  All  that  ought  to  be  understood  by 
these  modes  of  expression  is,  that  the  mind  sometimes  com- 
pares objects  or  notions;  sometimes  joins  together  images; 
sometimes  has  the  feeling  of  past  time  with  an  idea  now 
present,  &c.”1 

“Notwithstanding  we  divide  the  soul  into  several  powers 
and  faculties,  there  is  no  such  division  in  the  soul  itself,  since 
it  is  the  whole  soul  that  remembers,  understands,  wills,  or 
imagines.  Our  manner  of  considering  the  memory,  under- 
standing, will,  imagination,  and  the  like  faculties,  is  for  the 
better  enabling  us  to  express  ourselves  in  such  abstracted 
subjects  of  speculation,  not  that  there  is  any  such  division  in 
the  soul  itself.”2 

“ The  expression,  ‘ man  perceives,  and  remembers,  and 
imagines,  and  reasons,’  denotes  all  that  is  conveyed  by  the 
longer  phrase,  ‘the  mind  of  man  has  the  faculties  of  percep- 
tion, and  memory,  and  imagination,  and  reasoning.’”3 

“Herbart  rejects  the  whole  theory  of  mental  inherent 
faculties  as  chimerical,  and  has,  in  consequence,  aimed  some 
severe  blows  at  the  psychology  of  Kant.  But,  in  fact,  it  is 
only  the  rational  psychology  which  Kant  exploded,  which  is 
open  to  this  attack.  It  may  be  that  in  mental,  as  in  physical 
mechanics,  we  know  force  only  from  its  effects ; but  the  con- 
sciousness of  distinct  effects  will  thus  form  the  real  basis  of 
psychology.  The  faculties  may  then  be  retained  as  a con- 
venient method  of  classification,  provided  the  language  is 
properly  explained,  and  no  more  is  attributed  to  them  than  is 
warranted  by  consciousness.  The  same  consciousness  which 
tells  me  that  seeing  is  distinct  from  hearing,  tells  me  also  that 
volition  is  distinct  from  both ; and  to  speak  of  the  faculty  of 
will  does  not  necessarily  imply  more  than  the  consciousness 
of  a distinct  class  of  mental  phenomena.” 4 
FAITH. — V.  Belief. 


1 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

3 9.  Bailey,  Letters  on  Philosopli.  Hum.  Mind , p.  13. 

4 Manselj  Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  34,  note. 


Spectator , No.  600. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


191 


FALLACY  (A)  is  an  argument,'  or  apparent  argument,  profess- 
ing to  decide  the  matter  at  issue,  while  it  really  does  not. 
Fallacies  have  been  arranged  as  logical,  semi-logical,  and  non- 
logical.  By  Aristotle  they  were  arranged  in  two  classes  — • 
according  as  the  fallacy  lay  in  the  form,  in  dictione;  or  in  the 
matter,  extra  dictionem.  The  fallacies,  in  form  or  expression, 
are  the  following  : — 

Fallacia  iFquivocationis,  arising  from  the  use  of  an  equivo- 
cal word  ; as,  the  dog  is  an  animal ; Sirius  is  the  dog ; there- 
fore, Sirius  is  an  animal. 

Fallacia  Amphibolies,  arising  from  doubtful  construction ; 
quod  tangitur  a Socrate  illvd  sentit ; columna  tangitur  a So- 
crate ; ergo  columna  sentit.  In  the  major  proposition  sentit 
means  “ Socrates  feels.”  In  the  conclusion,  it  means  “feels 
Socrates.” 

Fallacia  Compositionis,  when  what  is  proposed,  in  a divided 
sense,  is  afterwards  taken  collectively ; as,  two  and  three  are 
even  and  odd ; five  is  two  and  three ; therefore  five  is  even 
and  odd. 

Fallacia  Divisionis,  when  what  is  proposed  in  a collective,  is 
afterwards  taken  in  a divided  sense ; as,  the  planets  are  seven ; 
Mercury  and  Yenus  are  planets  ; therefore  Mercury  and  Venus 
are  seven. 

Fallacia  Accentus,  when  the  same  thing  is  predicated  of  dif- 
ferent terms,  if  they  be  only  written  or  pronounced  in  the 
same  way  ; as,  Equns  est  quadrupes ; Aristides  est  cequiis;  ergo 
Aristides  est  quadrupes. 

Fallacia  Figurae  Dictionis,  when,  from  any  similitude  between 
two  words,  what  is  granted  of  one  is,  by  a forced  application, 
predicated  of  another;  as,  projectors  are  unfit  to  be  trusted; 
this  man  has  formed  a project ; therefore,  this  man  is  unfit  to 
be  trusted. 

Fallacies  in  the  matter,  or  extra  dictionem,  according  to 
some,  are  the  only  fallacies  strictly  logical ; while,  according 
to  the  formal  school  of  logicians,  they  are  beyond  the  province 
of  logic  altogether. 

Fallacia  Accidentis,  when  what  is  accidental  is  confounded 
with  what  is  essential;  as,  we  are  forbidden  to  kill;  using 
capital  punishment  is  killing ; we  are  forbidden  to  use  capital 
punishment. 


192 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


FALLACY— 

Fallacia  a Dicto  Secundum  quid  ad  Dictum  Simpliciter, 

when  a term  is  used,  in  one  premiss,  in  a limited,  and  in  the 
other  in  an  unlimited  sense;  as,  the  Ethiopian  is  while  as  to 
Ids  ieeth;  therefore  he  is  white. 

Fallacia  Ignorationis  Elenchi,  an  argument  in  which  the 
point  in  dispute  is  intentionally  or  ignorantly  overlooked,  and 
the  conclusion  is  irrelevant ; as  if  any  one,  to  show  the  inu- 
tility of  the  art  of  logic,  should  prove  that  men  unacquainted 
with  it  have  reasoned  well. 

Fallacia  a non  Causa  pro  Causa,  is  divided  into  fallacia  a non 
vera  pro  vera,  and  fallacia  a non  tali  pro  tali;  as,  “a  comet 
has  appeared,  therefore,  there  will  be  war.”  “ What  intoxi- 
cates should  be  prohibited.  Wine  intoxicates.”  Excess  of  it 
does. 

Fallacia  Consequentis,  when  that  is  inferred  which  does  not 
logically  follow;  as,  “he  is  an  animal;  therefore  he  is  a 
man.” 

Fallacia  Petitionis  Principii  (begging  the  question),  when 
that  is  assumed  for  granted,  which  ought  to  have  been  proved ; 
as,  when  a thing  is  proved  by  itself  (called  petitio  statim),  “ he 
is  a man,  therefore,  he  is  a man ; or  by  a,  synonym;  as,  “a 
sabre  is  sharp,  therefore  a scimitar  is  ;”  or  by  anything  equally 
unknown ; as,  Paradise  was  in  Armenia,  therefore,  Gihon  is 
an  Asiatic  river;  or  by  anything  more  unknown;  as,  “this 
square  is  twice  the  size  of  this  triangle,  because  equal  to  this 
circle ;”  or  by  reasoning  in  a circle,  i.  e.,  when  the  disputant 
tries  to  prove  reciprocally  conclusion  from  premises,  and  pre- 
mises from  conclusion  ; as,  “ fire  is  hot,  therefore  it  burns  ;” 
and  afterwards,  “fire  burns,  therefore  it  is  hot;”  “the  stars 
twinkle,  therefore  they  are  distant ;”  “ the  stars  are  distant, 
therefore  they  twinkle.” 

Fallacia  Plurium  Interogationum,  when  two  or  more  questions, 
requiring  each  a separate  answer,  are  proposed  as  one,  so  that 
if  one  answer  be  given,  it  must  be  inapplicable  to  one  of 
the  particulars  asked  ; as,  “ was  Pisistratus  the  usurper  and 
scourge  of  Athens?”  The  answer  “no”  would  be  false  of 
the  former  particular,  and  “ yes”  would  be  false  of  the  latter. 
The  fallacy  is  overthrown  by  giving  to  each  particular  a sepa- 
rate reply. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


193 


FALSE,  FALSITY. — The  false,  in  one  sense,  applies  to  things  ; 
and  there  is  falsity  either  when  things  really  are  not,  or  when 
it  is  impossible  they  can  be ; as  when  it  is  said  that  the  pro- 
portion of  the  diagonal  to  the  side  of  a square  is  commensur- 
able, or  that  you  sit  — the  one  is  absolutely  false,  the  other 
accidentally  — for  in  the  one  case  and  the  other  the  fact 
affirmed  is  not. 

The  false  is  also  predicated  of  things  which  really  exist,  but 
which  appear  other  than  they  are,  or  what  they  are  not ; a 
portrait,  or  a dream.  They  have  a kind  of  reality,  but  they 
really  are  not  what  they  represent.  Thus,  we  say  that  things 
are  false,  either  because  they  do  not  absolutely  exist,  or  be- 
cause they  are  but  appearances  and  not  realities. 

Falsity  is  opposed  to  verity  or  truth  — q.  v. 

To  transcendental  truth,  or  truth  of  being,  the  opposite  is 
nonentity  rather  than  falsity.  A thing  that  really  is,  is  what 
it  is.  A thing  that  is  not  is  a nonentity.  Falsity,  then,  is  two- 
fold — objective  and  formal.  Objective  falsity  is  when  a thing 
resembles  a thing  which  it  really  is  not,  or  when  a sign  or 
proposition  seems  to  represent  or  enunciate  what  it  does  not. 
Formal  falsity  belongs  to  the  intellect  when  it  fails  to  discover 
objectively  falsity,  and  judges  according  to  appearances  rather 
than  the  reality  and  truth  of  things.  Formal  falsity  is  error  ; 
which  is  opposed  to  logical  truth.  To  moral  truth,  the  oppo- 
site is  falsehood  or  lying. 

FANCY  [tyavtaolo.). — “Imagination  or  phantasy,  in  its  most  ex- 
tensive meaning,  is  the  faculty  representative  of  the  phenomena 
both  of  the  internal  and  external  worlds.” 1 

“In  the  soul 

Are  many  lesser  faculties,  that  serve 
Reason  as  chief;  among  them  fancy  next 
Her  office  holds  ; of  all  external  things 
Which  the  five  watchful  senses  represent 
She  forms  imaginations,  airy  shapes.” 

Milton,  Paradise  Lost,  book  v. 

“ Where  fantasy,  near  handmaid  to  the  mind, 

Sits  and  beholds,  and  doth  discern  them  all; 

Compounds  in  one  things  different  in  their  kind, 

Compares  the  black  and  white,  the  great  and  small.” 

Sir  John  Davies,  Immortality. 


18 


* Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Reid’s  Worts,  note  B,  sect.  1. 
O 


194 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


“ When  nature  rests, 

Oft  in  her  absence  mimic  fancy  wakes 
To  imitate  her,  but,  misjoining  shapes, 

Wild  work  produces  oft,  but  most  in  dreams.” 

“ Tell  me  where  is  fancy  bred, 

Or  in  the  heart,  or  in  the  head? 

IIow  begot,  how  nourished?” 

Mercli.  of  Venice , act  iii.,  scene  2. 

il  Break,  Phantsie , from  thy  care  of  cloud, 

And  wave  thy  purple  wings, 

Now  all  thy  figures  are  allowed, 

And  various  shapes  of  things. 

Create  of  airy  forms  a stream; 

It  must  have  blood  and  nought  of  phlegm ; 

And  though  it  be  a waking  dream, 

Yet  let  it  like  an  odour  rise 
To  all  the  senses  here, 

And  fall  like  sleep  upon  their  eyes, 

Or  music  on  their  ear.”  — Ben  Jonson. 

“ How  vai’ious  soever  the  pictures  of  fancy,  the  materials, 
according  to  some,  are  all  derived  from  sense;  so  that  the 
maxim — Nihil  est  in  intelledu  nisiprius  fuerit  in  sensu — though 
not  true  of  the  intellect,  holds  with  regard  to  the  ph a n iasy.’ ’ 1 

Addison2  said  that  he  used  the  words  imagination  and  fancy 
indiscriminately. 

Mr.  Stewart3  said,  “ It  is  obvious  that  a creative  imagina- 
tion, when  a person  possesses  it  so  habitually  that  it  may  be 
regarded  as  forming  one  characteristic  of  his  genius,  implies 
a power  of  summoning  up  at  pleasure  a particular  class  of 
ideas ; and  of  ideas  related  to  each  other  in  a particular 
manner ; which  power  can  be  the  result  only  of  certain  habits 
of  association,  which  the  individual  has  acquired.  It  is  to 
this  power  of  the  mind,  which  is  evidently  a particular  turn 
of  thought,  and  not  one  of  the  common  principles  of  our 
nature,”  that  Mr.  Stewart  would  appropriate  the  name  fancy. 
“ The  office  of  this  power  is  to  collect  materials  for  the 
imagination  ; and  therefore,  the  latter  power  presupposes  the 
former,  while  the  former  does  not  necessarily  suppose  the  latter. 
A man  whose  habits  of  association  present  to  him,  for  illustra- 
ting or  embellishing  a subject,  a number  of  resembling  or 


* Monboddo,  Ancient  Afctaphys .,  b.  ii.,  ch.  7. 

* Spectator,  No.  411. 


Elements,  chap.  5* * 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


195 


FANCY— 

analogous  ideas,  we  call  a man  of  fancy ; but  for  an  effort  of 
imagination,  various  other  powers  are  necessary,  particularly 
the  powers  of  taste  and  judgment;  without  which  we  can  hope 
to  produce  nothing  that  will  be  a source  of  pleasure  to  others. 
It  is  the  power  of  fancy  which  supplies  the  poet  with  meta- 
phorical language,  and  with  all  the  analogies  which  are  the 
foundation  of  his  allusions:  hut  it  is  the  power  of  imagination 
that  creates  the  complex  scenes  he  describes,  and  the  fictitious 
characters  he  delineates.  To  fancy  we  apply  the  epithets 
of  rich  or  luxuriant ; to  imagination,  those  of  beautiful  or 
sublime.” 

Fancy  was  called  by  Coleridge  “ the  aggregative  and  associa- 
tive power.”  But  Wordsworth  says,  “ To  aggregate  and  to 
associate,  to  evoke  and  to  combine,  belong  as  well  to  imagina- 
tion as  to  fancy.  But  fancy  does  not  require  that  the  materials 
which  she  makes  use  of  should  be  susceptible  of  change  in 
their  constitution  from  her  touch  ; and,  where  they  admit  of 
modification,  it  is  enough  for  her  purpose  if  it  be  slight, 
limited,  and  evanescent.  Directly  the  reverse  of  these  are 
the  desires  and  demands  of  the  imagination.  She  recoils 
from  everything  but  the  plastic,  the  pliant,  and  the  indefinite.” 
—Wordsworth.1 — V.  Imagination. 

FATALISM,  FATE.  — “Fatam  is  derived  from  fari;  that  is,  to 
pronounce,  to  decree ; and  in  its  right  sense,  it  signifies  the 
decree  of  Providence.” — Leibnitz.2  “Fate,  derived  from  the 
Latin  fari,  to  speak,  must  denote  the  word  spoken  by  some 
intelligent  being  who  has  power  to  make  his  words  good.” — - 
Tucker.3 

Among  all  nations  it  has  been  common  to  speak  of  fate  or 
destiny  as  a power  superior  to  gods  and  men  — swaying  all 
things  irresistibly.  This  may  be  called  th c,  fate  of  poets  and 
mythologisls.  Philosophical  fate  is  the  sum  of  the  laws  of  the 
universe,  the  product  of  eternal  intelligence,  and  the  blind 
properties  of  matter.  Theological  fate  represents  Deity  as 
above  the  laws  of  nature,  and  ordaining  all  things  according 
to  his  will  — the  expression  of  that  will  being  the  law. 


1 Preface,  to  Works,  vol.  i.,  12mo,  Lond.,  1836. 

3 Fifth  Paper  to  Dr.  Clarice. 

3 Light  of  Nature , vol.  ii.,  part  ii.,  chap.  26. 


196 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


FATALISM— 

Leibnitz*  1 says : — “ There  is  a Faium  Mahometanum,  a,  Fatum 
Stoicinn,  and  a Fatum,  Christianum.  The  Turkish  fate  will 
have  an  effect  to  happen,  even  though  its  cause  should  be 
avoided ; as  if  there  was  an  absolute  necessity.  The  Stoical 
fate  will  have  a man  to  be  quiet,  because  he  must  have  pa- 
tience whether  he  will  or  not,  since  ’t  is  impossible  to  resist 
the  course  of  things.  But  'tis  agreed  that  there  is  Fatum 
Christianum,  a certain  destiny  of  everything,  regulated  by  the 
fore-knowledge  and  providence  of  God.” 

“ Fatalists  that  hold  the  necessity  of  all  human  actions  and 
events,  may  be  reduced  to  these  three  heads  — First,  such  as 
asserting  the  Deity,  suppose  it  irrespectively  to  decree  and 
determine  all  things,  and  thereby  make  all  actions  necessary  to 
us;  which  kind  of  fate,  though  philosophers  and  other  ancient 
writers  have  not  been  altogether  silent  of  it,  yet  it  has  been 
principally  maintained  by  some  neoteric  Christians,  contrary 
to  the  sense  of  the  ancient  church.  Secondly,  such  as  suppose 
a Deity  that,  acting  wisely,  hut  necessarily,  did  contrive  the 
general  frame  of  things  in  the  world ; from  whence,  by  a 
series  of  causes,  doth  unavoidably  result  whatsoever  is  so  done 
in  it:  which  fate  is  a concatenation  of  causes,  all  in  themselves 
necessary,  and  is  that  which  was  asserted  by  the  ancient  Stoics, 
Zeno,  and  Chrysippus,  whom  the  Jewish  Essenes  seemed  to 
follow.  And,  lastly,  such  as  hold  the  material  necessity  of  all 
things  without  a Deity ; which  fate  Epicurus  calls  trjv  *Z>v 
fyvaixuv  dyapyinjv,  the  fate  of  the  naturalists,  that  is,  indeed, 
the  atheists,  the  assertors  whereof  may  be  called  also  the 
Democritical  fatalists .”2 

Cicero,  Be  Fato;  Plutarchus,  Be  Faio;  Grotius,  Fliiloso - 
phorum  Sententice  De  Fato. 

FEAR  is  one  of  the  passions.  It  arises  on  the  conception  or  con- 
templation of  something  evil  coming  upon  us. 

FEELING.  — “ This  word  has  two  meanings.  First,  it  signifies 
the  perceptions  we  have  of  external  objects,  by  the  sense  of 
touch.  When  we  speak  of  feeling  a body  to  be  hard  or  soft,  or 
rough  or  smooth,  hot  or  cold,  to  feel  these  things  is  to  perceive 


1 Fifth  Paper  to  Dr.  Samuel  Clarice. 

1 Cudwortb,  Intell.  Si/st.,  book  i.,  ebap.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


107 


FEELING  — 

them  by  touch.  They  are  external  things,  and  that  act  of  the 
mind  by  which  vre  feel  them  is  easily  distinguished  from  the 
objects  felt.  Secondly,  the  word  feeling  is  used  to  signify  the 
same  thing  as  sensation;  and  in  this  sense,  it  has  no  object; 
the  feeling  and  the  thing  felt  are  one  and  the  same. 

“ Perhaps  betwixt  feeling,  taken  in  this  last  sense,  and  sen- 
sation, there  may  be  this  small  difference,  that  sensation  is 
most  commonly  used  to  signify  those  feelings  which  we  have 
by  our  external  senses  and  bodily  appetites,  and  all  our  bodily 
pains  and  pleasures.  But  there  are  feelings  of  a nobler 
nature  accompanying  our  affections,  our  moral  j udgments,  and 
our  determinations  in  matters  of  taste,  to  which  the  word  sen- 
sation is  less  properly  applied.” 1 — Reid.2 

“ Feeling , beside  denoting  one  of  the  external  senses,  is  a 
general  term,  signifying  that  internal  act  by  which  we  are 
made  conscious  of  our  pleasures  and  our  pains ; for  it  is  not 
limited,  as  sensation  is,  to  any  one  sort.  Thus,  feeling  being 
the  genus  of  which  sensation  is  a species,  their  meaning  is 
the  same  when  applied  to  pleasure  and  pain  felt  at  the  organ 
of  sense  ; and  accordingly  we  say  indifferently,  ‘ I feel  plea- 
sure from  heat,  and  pain  from  cold  or,  ‘ I have  a sensation 
of  pleasure  from  heat  and  of  pain  from  cold.’  But  the  mean- 
ing of  feeling,  as  is  said,  is  much  more  extensive.  It  is  proper 
to  say,  I feel  pleasure  in  a sumptuous  building,  in  love,  in 
friendship  ; and  pain  in  losing  a child,  in  revenge,  in  envy  ; 
sensation  is  not  properly  applied  to  any  of  these. 

“ The  term  feeling  is  frequently  used  in  a less  proper  sense, 
to  signify  what  we  feel  or  are  conscious  of ; and  in  that  sense 
it  is  a general  term  for  all  our  passions  and  emotions,  and  for 
all  our  other  pleasures  and  pains.”3 

All  sensations  are  feelings ; but  all  feelings  are  not  sensa- 
tions. Sensations  are  those  feelings  which  arise  immediately 
and  solely  from  a state  or  affection  of  the  bodily  organism. 
But  we  have  feelings  which  are  connected  not  with  our  animal, 


1 The  French  use  of  sensation  — as  when  we  say  such  an  occurrence  excited  a great 
sensation,  that  is,  feeling  of  surprise,  or  indignation,  or  satisfaction,  is  becoming  more 
common. 

2 Intell.  Pow.,  essay  i.,  chap.  1. 

3 Karnes,  Elements  of  Criticism,  Appendix, 

18* 


198 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


FEELING  - 

but  with  our  intellectual,  and  rational,  and  moral  nature ; 
such  as  feelings  of  the  sublime  and  beautiful,  of  esteem  and 
gratitude,  of  approbation  and  disapprobation.  Those  higher 
feelings  it  has  been  proposed  to  call  Sentiments  — q.  v. 

From  its  most  restricted  sense  of  the  perceiving  by  the 
sense  of  touch,  feeling  has  been  extended  to  signify  immediate 
perceiving  or  knowing  in  general.  It  is  applied  in  this  sense 
to  the  immediate  knowledge  which  we  have  of  first  truths  or 
the  principles  of  common  sense.  “ By  external  or  internal 
perception,  I apprehend  a phenomenon  of  mind  or  matter  as 
existing ; I therefore  affirm  it  to  be.  Now,  if  asked  how  I 
know,  or  am  assured,  that  what  I apprehend  as  a mode  of 
mind,  may  not,  in  reality,  be  a mode  of  mind ; I can  only  say, 
using  the  simplest  language,  ‘ I know  it  to  be  true,  because  I 
feel,  and  cannot  but  feel,’  or  ‘ because  I believe,  and  cannot 
but  believe,’  it  so  to  be.  And  if  further  interrogated  how  I 
know,  or  am  assured  that  I thus  feel  or  thus  believe,  I can 
make  no  better  answer  than,  in  the  one  case,  ‘ because  I believe 
that  I feel;’  in  the  other,  ‘because  I fed  that  I believe.’  It 
thus  appears,  that  when  pushed  to  our  last  resort,  we  must 
retire  either  upon  feeling  or  belief,  or  upon  both  indifferently. 
And,  accordingly,  among  philosophers,  we  find  that  a great 
many  employ  one  or  other  of  these  terms  by  which  to  indicate 
the  nature  of  the  ultimate  ground  to  which  our  cognitions  are 
reducible ; while  some  employ  both,  even  though  they  may 
award  a preference  to  one.  ...  In  this  application  of  it 
we  must  discharge  that  signification  of  the  word  by  which 
we  denote  the  phenomena  of  pain  and  pleasure.”1 — F.  Belief. 

FETICHISM  is  supposed  to  have  been  the  first  form  of  the  theo- 
logical philosophy  ; and  is  described  as  consisting  in  the  as- 
cription of  life  and  intelligence  essentially  analogous  to  our 
own,  to  every  existing  object,  of  whatever  kind,  whether 
organic  or  inorganic,  natural  or  artificial.2  The  Portuguese 
call  the  objects  worshipped  by  the  negroes  of  Africa  felisso — 
bewitched  or  possessed  by  fairies.  Such  are  the  grisgris  of 
Africa,  the  manitous  and  the  ockis  of  America,  and  the  bark- 


1 Sir  William  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works,  note  A,  sect.  5. 

Q Comte,  Philosoph.  Positive , i.,  3. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


199 


FETICHISM  — 

lians  of  Siberia  — good  and  evil  genii  inhabiting  the  objects 
of  nature  which  they  worship.  The  priests  of  this  worship 
are  called  griots  in  Africa,  jongleurs  or  jugglers  in  America, 
and  cliamanes  in  Central  Asia. 

Mr.  Grote,1  in  reference  to  Xerxes  scourging  the  Hellespont 
which  had  destroyed  his  bridge,  remarks,  that  the  absurdity 
and  childishness  of  the  proceeding  is  no  reason  for  rejecting 
it  as  having  actually  taken  place.  “ To  transfer,”  continues 
he,  “ to  inanimate  objects  the  sensitive  as  well  as  the  willing 
and  designing  attributes  of  human  beings,  is  among  the 
early  and  wide-spread  instincts  of  mankind,  and  one  of  the 
primitive  forms  of  religion ; and  although  the  enlargement 
of  reason  and  experience  gradually  displaces  this  element- 
ary fetichism,  and  banishes  it  from  the  region  of  reality  into 
those  of  conventional  fictions,  yet  the  force  of  momentary  pas- 
sion will  often  suffice  to  supersede  the  acquired  habit,  and 
even  an  intelligent  man  may  be  impelled  in  a moment  of  agoni- 
zing pain  to  kick  or  beat  the  lifeless  object  from  which  he  has 
suffered.” 

Dr.  Reid  was  of  opinion  that  children  naturally  believed  all 
things  around  them  to  be  alive — a belief  which  is  encouraged 
by  the  education  of  the  nursery.  And  when  under  the  smarting 
of  pain  we  kick  or  strike  the  inanimate  object  which  is  the 
occasion  of  it,  we  do  so,  he  thought,  by  a momentary  relapse 
into  the  creed  of  infancy  and  childhood. 

FIGURE.  — V.  Syllogism. 

FITNESS  and  UNFITNESS  “ most  frequently  denote  the  con- 
gruity  or  incongruity,  aptitude  or  inaptitude,  of  any  means 
to  accomplish  an  end.  But  when  applied  to  actions,  they 
generally  signify  the  same  with  right  and  wrong ; nor  is  it  often 
hard  to  determine  in  which  of  these  senses  these  words  are  to 
be  understood.  It  is  worth  observing  thaty^iess  in  the  former 
sense  is  equally  undefinable  with_/?hie.s\s  in  the  latter;  or,  that 
it  is  as  impossible  to  express  in  any  other  than  synonymous 
words,  what  we  mean  when  we  say  of  certain  objects,  ‘that 
they  have  a ftness  to  one  another  ; or  ar eft  to  answer  certain 
purposes,’  as  when  we  say,  ‘ reverencing  the  Deity  is  ft,  or 


1 Hist,  of  Greece,  vol.  v.,  p.  22. 


200 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


FITNESS  — 

beneficence  is  fit  to  be  practised.’  In  the  first  of  these  in- 
stances, none  can  avoid  owning  the  absurdity  of  making  an 
arbitrary  sense  the  source  of  the  idea  of  ftness,  and  of  con- 
cluding that  it  signifies  nothing  real  in  objects,  and  that  no 
one  thing  can  be  properly  the  means  of  another.  In  both 
cases  the  term  ft  signifies  a simple  perception  of  the  under- 
standing.” 1 

According  to  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke,  virtue  consists  in  acting 
in  conformity  to  the  nature  and  ftness  of  things.  In  this 
theory  the  term  ftness  does  not  mean  the  adaptation  of  an 
action,  as  a means  towards  some  end  designed  by  the  agent ; 
but  a congruity,  proportion,  or  suitableness  between  an  action 
and  the  relations,  in  which,  as  a moral  being,  the  agent  stands. 
Dr.  Clarke  has  been  misunderstood  on  this  point  by  Dr. 
Brown2  and  others.3 

“ Our  perception  of  vice  and  its  desert  arises  from,  and  is 
the  result  of,  a comparison  of  actions  with  the  nature  and 
capacities  of  the  agent.  And  hence  arises  a proper  application 
of  the  epithets  incongruous,  unsuitable,  disproportionate,  unft, 
to  actions  which  our  moral  faculty  determines  to  be  vicious.”4 

In  like  manner,  when  our  moral  faculty  determines  actions 
to  be  virtuous,  there  is  a propriety  in  the  application  of  the 
epithets  congruous,  suitable,  proportionate,  y?'. 

FOECE  is  an  energy  or  power  which  has  a tendency  to  move  a 
body  at  rest,  or  to  affect  or  stop  the  progress  of  a body  already 
in  motion.  This  is  sometimes  termed  active  force,  in  contra- 
distinction to  that  which  merely  resists  or  retards  the  motion 
of  a body,  but  is  itself  apparently  inactive.  But  according  to 
Leibnitz,  by  whom  the  term  force  was  introduced  into  modern 
philosophy,  no  substance  is  altogether  passive.  Force,  or  a 
continual  tendency  to  activity,  was  originally  communicated 
by  the  Creator  to  all  substances,  whether  material  or  spiritual. 
Every  force  is  a substance,  and  every  substance  is  a,  force.  The 
two  notions  are  inseparable  ; for  you  cannot  think  of  action 
without  a being,  nor  of  a being  without  activity.  A substance 
entirely  passive  is  a contradictory  idea.5 — V.  Monad. 

1 Price,  Review,  ch.  6.  a Lect.  lxxvi. 

3 See  WardJaw,  Christ.  Ethics,  note  e.  4 Butler,  Dissertation  on  Virtue. 

5 Sec  Leibnitz,  De  pi'ima  Philosophies  emendatione , d de  notione  substantial. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


201 


FORCE  — 

In  like  manner  Boscovich1  maintained  that  the  ultimate 
particles  of  matter  are  indivisible  and  unextended  points, 
endowed  with  the  forces  of  attraction  and  repulsion. 

According  to  the  dynamic  theory  of  Kant,  and  the  atomic 
theory  of  Leucippus,  the  phenomena  of  matter  were  explained 
by  attraction  and  repulsion. 

“ La  force  proprement  elite,  e'est  ce  qui  regit  les  actes,  scuis 
regler  les  volontes.”  If  this  definition  of  force,  which  is  given 
by  Mons.  Comte,  be  adopted,  it  would  make  a distinction 
between  force  and  power.  Power  extends  to  volitions  as  well 
as  to  operations,  to  mind  as  well  as  matter.  But  we  also  speak 
of  force  as  physical,  vital,  and  mental. 

FORM  “is  that  of  which  matter  is  the  receptacle,”  says  Lord 
Monboddo.2  A trumpet  may  be  said  to  consist  of  two  parts ; 
the  matter  or  brass  of  which  it  is  made,  and  the  form  which 
the  maker  gives  to  it.  The  latter  is  essential,  but  not  the 
former ; since  although  the  matter  were  silver,  it  would  still 
be  a trumpet;  but  without  the  form  it  would  not.  Now,  al- 
though there  can  be  no  form  without  matter,  yet  as  it  is  the 
form  which  makes  the  thing  what  it  is,  the  word  form  came 
to  signify  essence  or  nature.  “ Form  is  the  essence  of  the 
thing,  from  which  result  not  only  its  figure  and  shape,  but  all 
its  other  qualities.” 

Matter  void  of  form,  but  ready  to  receive  it,  was  called, 
in  metaphysics,  materia  prima,  or  elementary ; in  allusion  to 
which  Butler  has  made  Iludibras  say,  that  he 

Professed 

He  had  first  matter  seen  undressed, 

And  found  it  naked  and  alone, 

Before  one  rag  of  form  was  on. 

Form  was  defined  by  Aristotle  Xoyoj  ovolol$,  and  as  ovoia* 
signifies,  equally,  substance  and  essence,  hence  came  the 
question  whether  form  should  be  called  substantial  or  essen- 
tial; the  Peripatetics  espousing  the  former  epithet,  and  the 
Cartesians  the  latter. 


1 Itissertationes  duce  de  viribus  vivis , 4to,  1745.  See  also  Stewart,  Philosophical  Essays , 
essay  ii.,  chap.  1. 

a Ancient  Metaphys.,  book  ii.,  chap.  2. 


202 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


FORM  — 

According  to  the  Peripatetics,  in  any  natural  composite 
body,  there  were  — 1.  The  matter.  2.  Quantity,  which  fol- 
lowed the  matter.  3.  The  substantial  form.  4.  The  qualities 
which  followed  the  form.  According  to  others,  there  were 
only — 1.  Matter.  2.  Essential  form;  as  quantity  is  identified 
with  matter,  and  qualities  with  matter  or  form,  or  the  com- 
pound of  them. 

According  to  the  Peripatetics,  form  was  a subtle  substance, 
penetrating  matter,  and  the  cause  of  all  acts  of  the  compound ; 
in  conformity  with  the  saying .forrnce  est  agere,  matericc  vero 
pati.  According  to  others,  form  is  the  union  of  material 
parts,  as  atoms,  or  elements,  &c.,  to  which  some  added  a 
certain  motion  and  position  of  the  parts.1 * 

He  who  gives  form  to  matter,  must,  before  he  do  so,  have 
in  his  mind  some  idea  of  the  particular  form  which  he  is 
about  to  give.  And  hence  the  word  form  is  used  to  signify 
an  idea. 

Idea  and  Law  are  the  same  thing,  seen  from  opposite  points. 
“ That  which  contemplated  objectively  (that  is,  as  existing  ex- 
ternally to  the  mind),  we  call  a law;  the  same  contemplated 
subjectively  (that  is,  as  existing  in  a subject  or  mind),  is  an 
idea.  Hence  Plato  often  names  ideas  laws  ; and  Lord  Bacon, 
the  British  Plato  (?),  describes  the  laws  of  the  material  uni- 
verse as  ideas  in  nature.  Quod  in  naiura  naturata  lex,  in 
natura  naturante  idea  dictur." 2 Bacon3  says,  “When  we 
speak  of  forms,  we  understand  nothing  more  than  the  laws 
and  modes  of  action  which  regulate  and  constitute  any  simple 
nature,  such  as  heat,  light,  weight,  in  all  kinds  of  matter  sus- 
ceptible of  them ; so  that  the  form  of  heat,  or  the  form  of 
light,  and  the  law  of  heat,  and  the  laio  of  light,  are  the  same 
thing.”  Again  he  says,4  “ Since  the  form  of  a thing  is  the 
very  thing  itself,  and  the  thing  no  otherwise  differs  from  the 
form,  than  as  the  apparent  differs  from  the  existent,  the  out- 
ward from  the  inward,  or  that  which  is  considered  in  relation 
to  man  from  that  which  is  considered  in  relation  to  the  uni- 
verse, it  follows  clearly  that  no  nature  can  be  taken  for  the 


1 Derodon,  Phys.,  pars  prima,  pp.  11, 12. 

0 Coleridge,  Church  and  State , p.  12. 

3 In  Nov.  Org.,  ii.,  17. 


4 Ibid.,  2, 13. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


203 


FOKM  — 

true  form,  unless  it  ever  decreases  when  the  nature  itself  de- 
creases, and  in  like  manner  is  always  increased  when  the 
nature  is  increased.” 

As  the  word  form,  denotes  the  law,  so  it  may  also  denote 
the  class  of  cases  brought  together  and  united  by  the  law. 
“ Thus  to  speak  of  the  form  of  animals  might  mean,  first,  the 
law  or  definition  of  animal  in  general;  second,  the  part  of 
any  given  animal  by  which  it  comes  under  the  law,  and  is 
what  it  is ; and  last,  the  class  of  animals  in  general  formed 
by  the  law.”  1 

“ The  sense  attached  at  the  present  day  to  the  words 
form  and  matter,  is  somewhat  different  from,  though  closely 
related  to,  these.  The  form  is  what  the  mind  impresses 
upon  its  perceptions  of  objects,  which  are  the  matter ; form 
therefore  means  mode  of  viewing  objects  that  are  presented 
to  the  mind.  When  the  attention  is  directed  to  any  object, 
we  do  not  see  the  object  itself,  but  contemplate  it  in  the  light 
of  our  own  prior  conceptions.  A rich  man,  for  example,  is 
regarded  by  the  poor  and  ignorant  under  the  form  of  a very 
fortunate  person,  able  to  purchase  luxuries  which  are  above 
their  own  reach ; by  the  religious  mind  under  the  form  of 
a person  with  more  than  ordinary  temptations  to  contend 
with ; by  the  political  economist,  under  that  of  an  exam- 
ple of  the  unequal  distribution  of  wealth ; by  the  tradesman, 
under  that  of  one  whose  patronage  is  valuable.  Now,  the 
object  is  really  the  same  to  all  these  observers;  the  same 
rich  man  has  been  represented  under  all  these  different  forms. 
And  the  reason  that  the  observers  are  able  to  find  many  in 
one,  is  that  they  connect  him  severally  with  their  own  prior 
conceptions.  The  form,  then,  in  this  view,  is  mode  of  know- 
ing; and  the  matter  is  the  perception,  or  object,  we  have  to 
know.”2 

Sir  W.  Hamilton3  calls  the  theory  of  substantial  forms,  “ the 
theory  of  qualities  viewed  as  entities  conjoined  with,  and  not 
as  mere  dispositions  or  modifications  of  matter.” 


1 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought,  p.  33,  2d  edit. 

8 Ibid.,  p.  31.  3 Reid's  Works,  p.  827. 


204 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


FORM- 

Aristotle,1  Michelet,2  Ravaisson.3 — V.  Law,  Matter. 

FORMALLY. — V.  Real,  Virtual,  Action. 

FORTITUDE  is  one  of  the  virtues  called  cardinal.  It  may  dis- 
play itself  actively  by  resolution  or  constancy,  which  con- 
sists in  adhering  to  duty  in  the  face  of  danger  and  difficulty 
which  cannot  be  avoided,  or  by  intrepidity  or  courage,  which 
consists  in  maintaining  firmness  and  presence  of  mind  in  the 
midst  of  perils  from  which  there  may  be  escape.  The  dis- 
plays of  fortitude  passively  considered  maybe  comprehended 
under  the  term  patience,  including  humility,  meekness,  sub- 
mission, resignation,  &c. 

FREE  WILL. — V.  Liberty,  Necessity,  Will. 

FRIENDSHIP  is  the  mutual  affection  cherished  by  two  persons 
of  congenial  minds.  It  springs  from  the  social  nature  of  man, 
and  rests  on  the  esteem  which  each  entertains  for  the  good 
qualities  of  the  other.  The  resemblance  in  disposition  and 
character  between  friends  may  sometimes  be  the  occasion  of 
their  contracting  friendship ; but  it  may  also  be  the  effect  of 
imitation  and  frequent  and  familiar  intercourse.  And  the 
interchange  of  kind  offices  which  takes  place  between  friends 
is  not  the  cause  of  their  friendship,  but  its  natural  result. 
Familiarities  founded  on  views  of  interest  or  pleasure  are  not 
to  be  dignified  by  the  name  of  friendship. 

Dr.  Brown4  has  classified  the  duties  of  friendship  as  they 
regard  the  commencement  of  it,  the  continuance  of  it,  and  its 
close. 

See  the  various  questions  connected  with  friendship  treated 
by  Aristotle,5  and  by  Cicero.® 

FUNCTION  ( fungor , to  perform). — “ The  pre-constituted  forms  or 
elements  under  which  the  reason  forms  cognitions  and  assigns 
laws,  are  called  ideas.  The  capacities  of  the  reason  to  know  in 
different  modes  and  relations,  we  shall  call  its  functions.” 7 

“ The  function  of  conception  is  essential  to  thought/'  The  first 
intention  of  every  word  is  its  real  meaning ; the  second  inten- 


1 Metaphys .,  lib.  7 et  8. 

2 Examen  Ci'itique  de  la  Metaphysique  (TArislote,  8vo,  Paris,  183G;  p.  164  et  p.  287. 

3 Essai  sur  la  Metaphysique  d’Aristote,  8vo,  Paris,  1837,  tom.  i.,  p.  149. 

4 Lect.  lxxxix.  6 In  Ethics,  books  viii.  and  ix. 

8 In  bis  troatiso  De  Amicita.  1 Tappan,  Log.,  p.  119. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


205 


FUNCTION  — 

tion,  its  logical  value,  according  to  the  function  of  thought  to 
which  it  belongs.” 1 

“ Th ef  Diction  of  names  is  that  of  enabling  us  to  remember 
and  to  communicate  our  thoughts.”2 


GENERAL  TERM.— F.  Term. 

GENERALIZATION  “ is  the  act  of  comprehending,  under  a 
common  name,  several  objects  agreeing  in  some  point  which 
we  abstract  from  each  of  them,  and  which  that  common  name 
serves  to  indicate.” 

“ When  we  are  contemplating  several  individuals  which 
resemble  each  other  in  some  part  of  their  nature,  we  can  (by 
attending  to  that  part  alone,  and  not  to  those  points  wherein 
they  differ)  assign  them  one  common  name,  which  will  express 
or  stand  for  them  merely  as  far  as  they  all  agree  ; and  which, 
of  course,  will  be  applicable  to  all  or  any  of  them  (which  pro- 
cess is  called  generalization ) ; and  each  of  these  names  is  called 
a common  term,  from  its  belonging  to  them  all  alike ; or  a 
predicable,  because  it  may  be  predicated  affirmatively  of  them 
or  any  of  them.”s 

Generalization  is  of  two  kinds — classification  and  generaliza- 
tion properly  so  called. 

When  we  observe  facts  accompanied  by  diverse  circum- 
stances, and  reduce  these  circumstances  to  such  as  are  essen- 
tial and  common,  we  obtain  a law. 

When  we  observe  individual  objects  and  arrange  them 
according  to  their  common  characters,  we  obtain  a class. 
When  the  characters  selected  are  such  as  belong  essentially  to 
the  nature  of  the  objects,  the  class  corresponds  with  the  law. 
When  the  character  selected  is  not  natural  the  classification 
is  artificial.  If  we  were  to  class  animals  into  white  and  red, 
we  would  have  a classification  which  had  no  reference  to  the 
laws  of  their  nature.  But  if  we  classify  them  as  vertebrate 
or  invertebrate,  we  have  a classification  founded  on  their  or- 
ganization. Artificial  classification  is  of  no  value  in  science, 

1 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought,  pp.  25  and  40,  2d  edit. 

3 Mill,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  2,  (i  2.  3 Whately,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  5,  g 2. 

19 


206 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


GENERALIZATION — 

it  is  a mere  aid  to  the  memory.  Natural  classification  is  the 
foundation  of  all  science.  This  is  sometimes  called  generaliza- 
tion. It  is  more  properly  classification.  — V.  Classification. 

The  law  of  gravitation  is  exemplified  in  the  fall  of  a single 
stone  to  the  ground.  But  many  stones  and  other  heavy  bodies 
must  have  been  observed  to  fall  before  the  fact  was  gene- 
ralized, and  the  law  stated.  And  in  this  process  of  generalizing 
there  is  involved  a principle  which  experience  does  not  fur- 
nish. Experience,  how  extensive  soever  it  may  be,  can  only 
give  the  particular,  yet  from  the  particular  we  rise  to  the 
general,  and  affirm  not  only  that  all  heavy  bodies  which  have 
been  observed,  but  that  all  heavy  bodies  whether  they  have 
been  observed  or  not,  gravitate.  In  this  is  implied  a belief 
that  there  is  order  in  nature,  that  under  the  same  circum- 
stances the  same  substances  will  present  the  same  phenomena. 
This  is  a principle  furnished  by  reason,  the  process  founded  on 
it  embodies  elements  furnished  by  experience. — V.  Induction. 

The  results  of  generalization  are  general  notions  expressed 
by  general  terms.  Objects  are  classed  according  to  certain 
properties  which  they  have  in  common,  into  genera  and  spe- 
cies. Hence  arose  the  question  which  caused  centuries  of 
acrimonious  discussion.  Have  genera  and  species  a real,  inde- 
pendent existence,  or  are  they  only  to  be  found  in  the  mind? 
— V.  Realism,  Nominalism,  Conceptualism.1 

The  principle  of  generalization  is,  that  beings  howsoever 
different  agree  or  are  homogeneous  in  some  respect. 

GENIUS  (from  geno,  the  old  form  of  the  verb  gigno,  to  produce). 

This  word  was  in  ancient  times  applied  to  the  tutelary  god 
or  spirit  appointed  to  watch  over  every  individual  from  his 
birth  to  his  death.  As  the  character  and  capacities  of  men 
were  supposed  to  vary  according  to  the  higher  or  lower  nature 
of  their  genius,  the  word  came  to  signify  the  natural  powers 
and  abilities  of  men,  and  more  particularly  their  natural  in- 
clination or  disposition.  But  the  peculiar  and  restricted  use  of 
the  term  is  to  denote  that  high  degree  of  mental  power  which 
produces  or  invents.  “ Genius,”  says  Dr.  Blair,2  “ always 
imports  something  inventive  .or  creative.”  “ It  produces,” 


* Reid,  Jntell.  Pow.,  essay  v.,  chap.  6;  Stewart,  Elements,  chap.  4. 
a Lectures  on  Rhetoric,  lect.  iii. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


207 


GENIUS  — 

says  another,  “ what  has  never  been  accomplished,  and  which 
all  in  all  ages  are  constrained  to  admire.  Its  chief  elements 
are  the  reason  and  the  imagination,  which  are  alone  inventive 
and  productive.  According  as  one  or  other  predominates, 
genius  becomes  scientific  or  artistic.  In  the  former  case,  it 
seizes  at  once  those  hidden  affinities  which  otherwise  do  not 
reveal  themselves,  except  to  the  most  patient  and  vigorous 
application ; and  as  it  were  intuitively  recognizing  in  pheno- 
mena the  unalterable  and  eternal,  it  produces  truth.  In  the 
latter,  seeking  to  exhibit  its  own  ideas  in  due  and  appropriate 
forms,  it  realizes  the  infinite  under  finite  types,  and  so  creates 
the  beautiful.” 

“ To  possess  the  powers  of  common  sense  in  a more  eminent 
degree,  so  as  to  be  able  to  perceive  identity  in  things  widely 
different,  and  diversity  in  things  nearly  the  same ; this  it  is 
that  constitutes  what  we  call  genius,  that  power  divine,  which 
through  every  sort  of  discipline  renders  the  difference  so  con- 
spicuous between  one  learner  and  another.” 1 

“ Nature  gives  men  a bias  to  their  respective  pursuits,  and 
that  strong  propensity,  I suppose,  is  what  we  mean  by  genius.” 2 

Dryden  has  said,  — 

“What  the  child  admired, 

The  youth  endeavoured , and  the  man  acquired 

He  read  Polybius,  with  a notion  of  his  historic  exactness, 
before  he  was  ten  years  old.  Pope,  at  twelve,  feasted  his  eyes 
in  the  picture  galleries  of  Spenser.  Murillo  filled  the  margin 
of  his  schoolbooks  with  drawings.  Le  Brun,  in  the  beginning 
of  childhood,  drew  with  a piece  of  charcoal  on  the  walls  of 
the  house.3 

“ In  its  distinctive  and  appropriate  sense,  the  term  genius 
is  applied  to  mind  only  when  under  the  direction  of  its  indi- 
vidual tendencies,  and  when  those  are  so  strong  or  clear  as  to 
concentrate  all  its  powers  upon  the  production  of  new,  or  at 
least  independent  results  ; and  that  whether  manifested  in  the 
regions  of  art  or  science.  Bacon,  Descartes,  and  Newton,  were 
no  less  men  of  genius,  than  Michael  Angelo,  Raphael,  Shake- 


1 Harris,  Philosoph.  Arrange.,  chap.  9.  2 Couper. 

3 Pleasures , <£c.,  of  Literature , 12mo,  Lond.,  1851,  pp.  27,  28. 


208 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


GENIUS  - 

spcaro,  and  Scott,  although  the  -work  they  performed  and  the 
means  they  employed  were  different.” *  1 

Sharp,  Dissertation  on  Genius;2  Duff,  Essays  on  Original 
Genius;3  Gerard,  Essay  on  Genius ;4  Lcelius  and  Hortensia;  or. 
Thoughts  on  the  Nature  and  Objects  of  Taste  and  Genius;6 
Beattie,  Dissertations,  Of  Imagination ,6 
Genius  and  Talent.  — “Genius  is  that  mode  of  intellectual 
power  which  moves  in  alliance  with  the  genial  nature ; i.  e., 
with  the  capacities  of  pleasure  and  pain;  whereas  tafe«<has  no 
vestige  of  such  an  alliance,  and  is  perfectly  independent  of  all 
human  sensibilities.  Consequently,  genius  is  a voice  or  breath- 
ing that  represents  the  total  nature  of  man,  and  therefore,  his 
enjoying  and  suffering  nature,  as  well  as  his  knowing  and 
distinguishing  nature ; whilst,  on  the  contrary,  talent  repre- 
sents only  a single  function  of  that  nature.  Genius  is  the 
language  which  interprets  the  synthesis  of  the  human  spirit 
with  the  human  intellect,  each  acting  through  the  other; 
whilst  talent  speaks  only  of  insulated  intellect.  And  hence 
also  it  is  that,  besides  its  relation  to  suffering  and  enjoyment, 
genius  always  implies  a deeper  relation  to  virtue  and  vice ; 
whereas  talent  has  no  shadow  of  a relation  to  moral  qualities 
any  more  than  it  has  to  vital  sensibilities.  A man  of  the 
highest  talent  is  often  obtuse  and  below  the  ordinary  standard 
of  men  in  his  feelings  ; but  no  man  of  genius  can  unyoke  him- 
self from  the  society  of  moral  perceptions  that  are  brighter, 
and  sensibilities  that  are  more  tremulous,  than  those  of  men 
in  general.”7 

GENUINE.  — V.  Authentic. 

GENUS  is  “ a predicable  which  is  considered  as  the  material  part 
of  the  species  of  which  it  is  affirmed.”8  It  is  either  summum 
or  subalternum,  that  is,  having  no  genus  above  it,  as  being,  or 
having  another  genus  above  it,  as  quadruped;  proximum  or 
remoium,  when  nothing  intervenes  between  it  and  the  spe- 
cies, as  animal  in  respect  of  man,  or  when  something  inter- 
venes, as  animal  in  respect  of  a crow,  for  between  it  and  crow, 


i Moffat,  Study  of  (Esthetics,  p.  203,  Cincinnati,  1850.  8 Lond.,  1755. 

3 Lond.,  1707.  * I.ond.,  1774.  5 Edin.,  1782.  3 Chap.  3,  4to,  Lond.,  1783. 

1 De  Quincy,  SJcetches,  Crit.  and  Biograph.,  p.  275 

» Whatcly,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  5,  g3. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


209 


GENUS— 

brute  and  bird  intervene.  A genus  physicum  is  part  of  the 
species,  as  animal  in  respect  of  man,  who  has  an  animal  body 
and  a rational  soul.  A genus  metaphysicum  is  identified  ade- 
quately with  the  species  and  distinguished  from  it  extrinsi- 
cally,  as  animal  in  respect  of  brute,  colour  in  respect  of 
blackness  in  ink.  Logically  the  genus  contains  the  species ; 
whereas  metaphysically  the  species  contains  the  genus;  e.  g., 
we  divide  logically  the  genus  man  into  European,  Asiatic,  &c., 
but  each  of  the  species,  European,  &c.,  contains  the  idea  of 
man,  together  with  the  characteristic  difference. 

In  modern  classification,  genus  signifies  “a  distinct  but  sub- 
ordinate group,  which  gives  its  name  as  a prefix  to  that  of  all 
the  species  of  which  it  is  composed. 

GNOME  (yru>grj)  a weighty  or  memorable  saying. — The  saying  in 
the  parable  (Matt.  xx.  1-16),  “Many  that  are  first  shall  be 
last,  and  the  last  shall  be  first,”  is  called  by  Trench1  a gnome. 
— V.  Adage. 

GOD,  in  Anglo-Saxon,  means  good. 

One  of  the  names  of  the  Supreme  Being.  The  correspond- 
ing terms  in  Latin  ( Deus ) and  in  Greek  (©fdj)  were  applied 
to  natures  superior  to  the  human  nature.  With  us,  God  al- 
ways refers  to  the  Supreme  Being. 

That  department  of  knowledge  which  treats  of  the  being, 
perfections,  and  government  of  God,  is  Theology  — q.  v. 

“The  true  and  genuine  idea  of  God  in  general,  is  this  — a 
perfect  conscious  understanding  being  (or  mind),  existing  of 
itself  from  eternity,  and  the  cause  of  all  other  things.”2 

“ The  true  and  proper  idea  of  God,  in  its  most  contracted 
form,  is  this — a being  absolutely  perfect;  for  this  is  that  alone 
to  which  necessary  existence  is  essential,  and  of  which  it  is 
demonstrable.”3 

“ I define  God  thus — an  essence  or  being,  fully  and  absolutely 
perfect.  I say  fully  and  absolutely  perfect,  in  contradistinction 
to  such  perfection  as  is  not  full  and  absolute,  but  the  perfection 
of  this  or  that  species  or  kind  of  finite  beings,  suppose  a lion, 
horse,  or  tree.  But  to  be  fully  and  absolutely  perfect,  is  to  be, 

1 On  the  Parables , .pp.  164,  165. 

3 Cudwortb,  Intell.  Syst.,  b.  i.,  cli.  4,  sect.  4. 

3 Ibid,  sect.  8. 

19* 


v 


210 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


GOD— 

at  least,  as  perfect  as  the  apprehension  of  a man  can  conceive 
•without  a contradiction.”  1 

GOOD  (The  Chief)  . — An  inquiry  into  the  chief  good,  or  the 
siivimum  bonum,  is  an  inquiry  into  what  constitutes  the  perfec- 
tion of  human  nature  and  the  happiness  of  the  human  condit  ion. 
This  has  been  the  aim  of  all  religion  and  philosophy.  The 
answers  given  to  the  question  have  been  many.  Varro  enu- 
merated 288. 2 3 But  they  may  easily  be  reduced  to  a few. 
The  ends  aimed  at  by  human  action,  how  various  soever  they 
may  seem,  may  all  be  reduced  to  three,  viz.,  pleasure,  interest 
and  duty.  What  conduces  to  these  ends  we  call  good,  and 
seek  after ; what  is  contrary  to  these  ends  we  call  evil,  and 
shun.  But  the  highest  of  these  ends  is  duty,  and  the  chief 
good  of  man  lies  in  the  discharge  of  duty.  By  doing  so  ho 
perfects  his  nature,  and  may  at  the  same  time  enjoy  the 
highest  happiness. 

“ Scmita  ccrte 

Tranquilly  per  virtutem  patet  unica  vitae.” 

Juvenal,  lib.  iv.,  sat.  10. 

Cicero,  De  Finibus  Bonorum  et  Malornm ; L’Abbo  Anselme, 
Sur  le  Souverain  bien  des  anciens,  Mem.  d.  V Acad,  des  Inscript., 
et  Belles  Lettres?— Jouffroy,  Miscell. — V.  Bonum  (Summum). 

GRAMMAR  (Universal)  . — This  word  grammar  comes  to  us  from 
the  Greeks,  who  included  under  tix'1^  ypap  pat  tot  ixrj  the  art 
of  writing  and  reading  letters.  But  “grammar,”  says  B. 
Jonson,4  “ is  the  art  of  true  and  well  speaking  a language ; 
the  writing  is  but  an  accident.”  Language  is  the  expression 
of  thought — thought  is  the  operation  of  mind,  and  hence  lan- 
guage may  be  studied  as  a help  to  psychology.5 

Thought  assumes  the  form  of  ideas  or  of  judgments,  that  is, 
the  object  of  thought  is  either  simply  apprehended  or  conceived 
of,  or  something  is  affirmed  concerning  it.  Ideas  are  expressed 
in  words,  judgments  by  propositions  ; so  that  as  ideas  are  the 
elements  of  judgments,  words  are  the  elements  of  propositions. 

Every  judgment  involves  the  idea  of  a substance,  of  which 


1 II.  More,  Antidote  against  Atheism , ch.  2. 

a August.,  De  Civit.,  lib.  19,  cap.  1. 

3 1 ser.,  tom.  v. 

5 Keid,  Intell.  Pow.j  essay  i.,  chap.  5. 


4 English  Grammar , c.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


211 


GRAMMAR  — 

some  quality  is  affirmed  or  denied— so  that  language  must  hare 
the  substantive  or  noun,  the  adjective  or  quality,  and  the  verb 
connecting  or  disconnecting. 

If  the  objects  of  our  thoughts  existed  or  were  contemplated 
singly,  these  parts  of  speech  would  he  sufficient.  But  the 
relations  between  objects  and  the  connection  between  proposi- 
tions, render  other  parts  of  speech  necessary. 

It  is  because  we  have  ideas  that  are  general,  and  ideas  that 
are  individual,  that  we  have  also  nouns  common  and  proper; 
and  it  is  because  we  have  ideas  of  unity  and  plurality,  that  we 
have  numbers,  singular,  dual,  and  plural.  Tenses  and  moods 
arise  from  dividing  duration,  and  viewing  things  as  conditional 
or  positive.  Even  the  order  or  construction  of  language  is  to 
be  traced  to  the  calm  or  impassioned  state  of  mind  from  which 
it  proceeds. 

In  confirmation  of  the  connection  thus  indicated  between 
grammar  and  psychology,  it  may  be  noticed  that  those  who 
have  done  much  for  the  one  have  also  improved  the  other. 
Plato  has  given  his  views  of  language  in  the  Cratylus,  and 
Aristotle,  in  his  Interpretation  and  Analytics,  has  laid  the 
foundations  of  general  grammar.  And  so  in  later  times  the 
most  successful  cultivators  of  mental  philosophy  have  also  been 
attentive  to  the  theory  of  language. 

In  Greek,  the  same  word  {%6yo;)  means  reason  and  lan- 
guage. And  in  Latin,  reasoning  is  called  discursus — a mean- 
ing which  is  made  English  by  our  great  poet,  when  he  speaks 
of  “large  discourse  of  reason.”  In  all  this  the  connection  be- 
tween the  powers  of  the  mind  and  language  is  recognized. 

Montemont,* 1  Beattie,2  Monboddo.3 

GRANDEUR.  — “ The  emotion  raised  by  grand  objects  is  awful, 
solemn,  and  serious.” 

“ Of  all  objects  of  contemplation,  the  Supreme  Being  is  the 

most  grand The  emotion  which  this  grandest  of 

all  objects  raises  in  the  mind  is  what  we  call  devotion  — a 
serious  recollected  temper,  which  inspires  magnanimity,  and 
disposes  to  the  most  heroic  acts  of  virtue. 


1 Grammaire  General  ou  Philosophic  des  Langv.es,  2 tom.,  8vo,  Paris,  1815. 
a Dissertations,  Theory  of  Language,  part  ii.,  4to,  Lond.,  1783. 

1 On  the  Origin  and  Progress  of  Language,  3 vols. 


212 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


GRANDEUR  - 

“ The  emotion  produced  by  other  objects  which  may  be 
called  grand,  though  in  an  inferior  degree,  is,  in  its  nature 
and  in  its  effects,  similar  to  that  of  devotion.  It  disposes  to 
seriousness,  elevates  the  mind  above  its  usual  state  to  a kind 
of  enthusiasm,  and  inspires  magnanimity,  and  a contempt  of 
what  is  mean 

“ To  me  grandeur  in  objects  seems  nothing  else  but  such  a 
degree  of  excellence,  in  one  kind  or  another,  as  merits  our 
admiration.”1  — V.  Sublimity,  Beauty,  ASstiietics. 

GRATITUDE  is  one  of  the  affections  which  have  been  designated 
benevolent.  It  implies  a sense  of  kindness  done  or  intended, 
and  a desire  to  return  it.  It  is  sometimes  also  characterized 
as  a moral  affection,  because  the  party  cherishing  it  has  the 
idea  that  he  who  did  or  intended  kindness  to  him  has  done 
right  and  deserves  a return  ; just  as  the  party  who  has  received 
an  injury  has  not  merely  a sense  or  feeling  of  the  wrong  done, 
but  a sense  of  injustice  in  the  doing  of  it,  and  the  feeling  or 
conviction  that  he  who  did  it  deserves  punishment. 

See  Chalmers,2  Shaftesbury.3 

GYMNOSOPHIST  (yvgvot,  naked;  c rofoj,  wise).  — “Among  the 
Indians,  be  certain  philosophers,  whom  they  call  gymnosophists, 
who  from  sun  rising  to  the  setting  thereof  are  able  to  endure 
all  the  day  long,  looking  full  against  the  sun,  without  winking 
or  once  moving  their  eyes.”4 

The  Brahmins,  although  their  religion  and  philosophy  were 
but  little  known  to  the  ancients,  are  alluded  to  by  Cicero.6 
Arrian.6 

Colebrooke  and  others  in  modern  times  have  explained  the 
Indian  philosouhy. 


HABIT  {nit,  habitus). — “Habit,  or  state,  is  a constitution,  frame, 
or  disposition  of  parts,  by  which  everything  is  fitted  to  act  or 


1 Reid,  Intcll.  Pow.,  essay  viii.,  chap.  8. 

a Sketches  of  Mental  and  Moral  Philosophy,  chap.  8. 

3 Moralists,  pt.  iii.,  sect.  2.  4 Holland,  Pliny , b.  vii.,  c.  2. 

8 Tuscul lib.  v.,  c.  27.  6 Exped.  Alcxand .,  lib.  vii.,  c.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


213 


HABIT— 

suffer  in  a certain  way.” 1 By  Aristotle2  iftj  is  defined  to  be, 
in  one  sense,  the  same  with  SuxOtai j,  or  disposition.  His  com- 
mentators make  a distinction,  and  say  is  more  permanent. 
A similar  distinction  has  been  taken  in  English  between  habit 
and  disposition. 

Habits  have  been  distinguished  into  natural  and  super- 
natural, or  acquired  and  infused.  Natural  habits  are  those 
acquired  by  custom  or  repetition.  Supernatural  habits  are 
such  as  are  infused  at  once.  They  correspond  to  gifts  or 
graces,  and  the  consideration  of  them  belongs  to  theology. 

Acquired  habits  are  distinguished  into  intellectual  and  moral. 
From  habit  results  power  or  virtue,  and  the  intellectual  habits 
or  virtues  are  intellect,  wisdom,  prudence,  science,  and  art. 
“ These  may  be  subservient  to  quite  contrary  purposes,  and 
those  who  have  them  may  exercise  them  spontaneously  and 
agreeably  in  producing  directly  contrary  effects.  But  the 
moral  virtues,  like  the  different  habits  of  the  body,  are  deter- 
mined by  their  nature  to  one  specific  operation.  Thus,  a man 
in  health  acts  and  moves  in  a manner  conformable  to  his 
healthy  state  of  body,  and  never  otherwise,  when  his  motions 
are  natural  and  voluntary ; and  in  the  same  manner  the  habits 
of  justice  or  temperance  uniformly  determine  those  adorned 
by  them  to  act  justly  and  temperately.”3 

Habits  have  been  distinguished  as  active  or  passive.  The 
determinations  of  the  will,  efforts  of  attention,  and  the  use  of 
our  bodily  organs,  give  birth  to  active  habits  ; the  acts  of  the 
memory  and  the  affections  of  the  sensibility,  to  passive  habits. 

Aristotle4  proves  that  our  habits  are  voluntary,  as  being 
created  by  a series  of  voluntary  actions.  “But  it  may  be 
asked,  does  it  depend  merely  on  our  own  will  to  correct  and 
reform  our  bad  habits?  It  certainly  does  not ; neither  does  it 
depend  on  the  will  of  a patient,  who  has  despised  the  advice 
of  a physician,  to  recover  that  health  which  has  been  lost  by 
profligacy.  "When  we  have  thrown  a stone  we  cannot  restrain 
its  flight ; but  it  depended  entirely  on  ourselves  whether  we 
should  throw  it  or  not.” 


1 Monboddo,  Ancient  Metaphys.,  chap.  4. 

0 Metaphys.,  lib.  iv.,  cap.  20. 

3 Arist.,  Ethic.,  lib.  v.,  cap.  X. 


* Ibid.,  lib.  iii. 


214 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


HABIT— 

Actions,  according  to  Aristotle,  are  voluntary  throughout ; 
kabils  only  as  to  their  beginnings. 

Thurot'  calls  “ habit  the  memory  of  the  organs,  or  that 
which  gives  memory  to  the  organs.” 

Several  precepts  can  be  given  for  the  wise  regulation  of  the 
exercises  of  the  mind  as  well  as  of  the  body.  We  shall  enu- 
merate a few  of  them. 

“ The  first  is,  that  we  should,  from  the  very  commencement, 
be  on  our  guard  against  tasks  of  too  difficult  or  too  easy  a 
nature  ; for,  if  too  great  a burden  be  imposed,  in  the  diffident 
temper  you  will  check  the  buoyancy  of  hope,  in  the  self-confi- 
dent temper  you  will  excite  an  opinion  whereby  it  will  promise 
itself  more  than  it  can  accomplish,  the  consequence  of  which 
will  be  sloth.  But  in  both  dispositions  it  will  happen  that  the 
trial  will  not  answer  the  expectation,  a circumstance  which 
always  depresses  and  confounds  the  mind.  But  if  the  task  be 
of  too  trivial  a kind,  there  will  he  a serious  loss  on  the  total 
progress. 

“ The  second  is,  that  in  order  to  the  exercise  of  any  faculty 
for  the  acquirement  of  habit,  two  particular  times  should  be 
carefully  observed : the  one  when  the  mind  is  best  disposed, 
the  other,  when  worst  disposed  to  the  matter ; so  that,  by  the 
former,  we  may  make  most  progress  on  our  way ; by  the  latter, 
we  may,  by  laborious  effort,  wear  out  the  knots  and  obstruc- 
tions of  the  mind,  by  which  means  the  intermediate  times  shall 
pass  on  easily  and  smoothly. 

“The  third  precept  is  that  of  which  Aristotle  makes  inci- 
dental mention : — ‘ That  we  should,  with  all  our  strength  (yet 
not  running  into  a faulty  excess),  struggle  to  the  opposite  of 
that  to  which  we  are  by  nature  the  most  inclined as  when  we 
row  against  the  current,  or  bend  into  an  opposite  direction  a 
crooked  staff,  in  order  to  straighten  it. 

“The  fourth  precept  depends  on  a general  law,  of  undoubted 
truth,  namely,  that  the  mind  is  led  on  to  anything  more  suc- 
cessfully and  agreeably,  if  that  at  which  we  aim  be  not  the  chief 
object  in  the  agent’s  design,  but  is  accomplished,  as  it  were,  by 
doing  something  else;  since  the  bias  of  our  nature  is  such,  that 


1 De  VEntendmcnt,  tom.  i.,  p.  138. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


215 


HABIT  — 

it  usually  dislikes  constraint  and  rigorous  authority.  There 
are  several  other  rules  which  may  be  given  with  advantage  on 
the  government  of  habit;  for  habit,  if  wisely  and  skilfully 
formed,  becomes  truly  a second  nature  (as  the  common  saying 
is) ; but  unskilfully  and  unmethodically  directed,  it  will  be, 
as  it  were,  the  ape  of  nature,  which  imitates  nothing  to  the 
life,  but  only  clumsily  and  awkwardly.” 

Bacon,1  Maine  de  Biran,2  Dutrochet,3  M.  F.  Ravaisson,4 
Butler,5  Reid.6 — V.  Custom. 

HAPPINESS  “ is  not,  I think,  the  most  appropriate  term  for  a 
state,  the  perfection  of  which  consists  in  the  exclusion  of  all 
hap,  that  is,  chance. 

“ Felicity,  in  its  proper  sense,  is  but  another  word  for  for- 
tunateness, or  happiness ; and  I can  see  no  advantage  in  the 
improper  use  of  words,  when  proper  terms  are  to  be  found, 
but  on  the  contrary,  much  mischief.”7 

The  Greeks  called  the  sum  total  of  the  pleasure  which  is 
allotted  or  happens  to  a man  fvrv^ta,  that  is,  good  hap ; or, 
more  religiously,  tvScuuovi.a,  that  is,  favourable  providence.8 

To  live  well  and  to  act  well  is  synonymous  with  being 
happy.9 

Happiness  is  never  desired  but  for  its  own  sake  only. 
Honour,  pleasure,  intelligence,  and  every  virtue  are  desirable 
on  their  own  account,  but  they  are  also  desirable  as  means 
towards  happiness.  But  happiness  is  never  desirable  as  a 
means,  because  it  is  complete  and  all-sufficient  in  itself. 

“ Happiness  is  the  object  of  human  action  in  its  most  general 
form,  as  including  all  other  objects,  and  approved  by  reason. 
As  pleasure  is  the  aim  of  mere  desire,  and  interest  the  aim  of 
prudence,  so  happiness  is  the  aim  of  wisdom.  Happiness  is 
conceived  as  necessarily  an  ultimate  object  of  action.  To  be 
happy,  includes  or  supersedes  all  other  gratifications.  If  we 
are  happy,  we  do  not  miss  that  which  we  have  not ; if  we  are 


1 On  Advancement  of  Learning,  book  vii.  3 H Influence  de  Habitude. 

8 Theorie  de  V Habitude.  4 J)e  V Habitude. 

5 Analogy , pt.  i.,  ch.  5.  r 

6 Act.  Pow.,  essay  iii.,  pt.  i.,  ch.  3 ; Intell.  Pow.,  essay  iv.,  ch.  4. 

1 Coleridge,  Aids  to  Reflection,  vol.  i.,  pp.  31-2.  8 Ibid. 

8 Aristotle,  Ethic.,  lib.  i , c.  4. 


216 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


HAPPINESS  — 

not  happy,  we  want  something  more,  whatever  we  have.  The 
desire  of  happiness  is  the  supreme  desire.  All  other  desires 
of  pleasure,  wealth,  power,  fame,  are  included  in  this,  and  are 
subordinate  to  it.  AVe  may  make  other  objects  our  ultimate 
objects  ; but  we  can  do  so  only  by  identifying  them  with  this. 
Happiness  is  our  being’s  end  and  aim. 

“ Since  happiness  is  necessarily  the  supreme  object  of  our 
desires,  and  duty  the  supreme  rule  of  our  actions,  there  can 
be  no  harmony  in  our  being,  except  our  happiness  coincide 
with  our  duty.  That  which  we  contemplate  as  the  ultimate 
and  universal  object  of  desire,  must  be  identical  with  that 
which  we  contemplate  as  the  ultimate  and  supreme  guide  of 
our  intentions.  As  moral  beings,  our  happiness  must  be  found 
in  our  moral  progress,  and  in  the  consequences  of  our  moral 
progress  we  must  be  happy  by  being  virtuous.” 1 

See  Aristotle,2  Harris.3 — V.  Good  (Chief). 

HARMONY  (Pre-established).  — When  an  impression  is  made 
on  a bodily  organ  by  an  external  object,  the  mind  becomes 
percipient.  When  a volition  is  framed  by  the  will,  the  bodily 
organs  are  ready  to  execute  it.  How  is  this  brought  about  ? 
The  doctrine  of  a pre-established  harmony  has  reference  to  this 
question,  and  may  be  thus  stated. 

Before  creating  the  mind  and  the  body  of  man,  God  had  a 
perfect  knowledge  of  all  possible  minds  and  of  all  possible 
bodies.  Among  this  infinite  variety  of  minds  and  bodies,  it 
was  impossible  but  that  there  should  come  together  a mind  the 
sequence  of  whose  ideas  and  volitions  should  correspond  with 
the  movements  of  some  body : for,  in  an  infinite  number  of 
possible  minds  and  possible  bodies,  every  combination  or  union 
was  possible.  Let  us,  then,  suppose  a mind,  the  order  and 
succession  of  whose  modifications  corresponded  with  the  series 
of  movements  to  take  place  in  some  body,  God  would  unito 
the  two  and  make  of  them  a living  soul,  a man.  Here,  then, 
is  the  most  perfect  harmony  between  the  two  parts  of  which 
man  is  composed.  There  is  no  commerce  nor  communication, 
no  action  and  reaction.  The  mind  is  an  independent  force 


1 Whewell,  Morality , Nos.  544,  545. 

* Dialogue  on  Happiness. 


2 Ethic.,  lib.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


217 


HARMONY— 

which  passes  from  one  volition  or  perception  to  another,  in 
conformity  with  its  own  nature  ; and  would  have  done  so 
although  the  body  had  not  existed.  The  body,  in  like  man- 
ner, by  virtue  of  its  own  inherent  force,  and  by  the  single 
impression  of  external  objects,  goes  through  a series  of  move- 
ments ; and  would  have  done  so  although  it  had  not  been 
united  to  a rational  soul.  But  the  movements  of  the  body 
and  the  modifications  of  the  mind  correspond  to  each  other. 
In  short,  the  mind  is  a spiritual  automaton,  and  the  body  is  a 
material  automaton.  Like  two  pieces  of  clockwork,  they  are 
so  regulated  as  to  mark  the  same  time ; but  the  spring  which 
moves  the  one  is  not  the  spring  which  moves  the  other ; yet 
they  go  exactly  together.  The  harmony  between  them  existed 
before  the  mind  was  united  to  the  body.  Hence  this  is  called 
the  doctrine  of  pre-established  harmony. 

It  may  be  called  correspondence  or  parallelism,  but  not  har- 
mony between  mind  and  body  — for  there  is  no  unity  superior 
to  both,  and  containing  both,  which  is  the  cause  of  their  mu- 
tual penetration.  In  decomposing  human  personality  into  two 
substances,1  from  eternity  abandoned  each  to  its  proper  im- 
pulse, which  acknowledges  no  superior  law  in  man  to  direct 
and  control  them,  liberty  is  destroyed.2 

The  doctrine  of  pre-established  harmony  differs  from  that  of 
occasional  causes  “ only  in  this  respect,  that  by  the  former 
the  accordance  of  the  mental  and  the  bodily  phenomena  was 
supposed  to  be  pre-arranged,  once  for  all,  by  the  Divine  Power, 
while  by  the  latter  their  harmony  was  supposed  to  be  brought 
about  by  His  constant  interposition.”3  — F.  Causes  (Occa- 
sional). 

This  doctrine  was  first  advocated  by  Leibnitz  in  his  Theo- 
dicee  and  Monadologie. 

Bilfinger,  De  Harmonia  Prcestabilita.4 
HARMONY  (of  the  Spheres)  . — The  ancient  philosophers  sup- 
posed that  the  regular  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies 
throughout  space  formed  a kind  of  harmony,  which  they  called 
the  harmony  of  the  spheres. 


1 Soul  and  body,  however,  constitute  one  suppositum  or  person. 

2 Tiberghien,  Essai  des  Connais.  Hum.%  p.  394. 

8 Ferrier,  Inst,  of  Mdophys .,  p.  478. 

20 


* 4toP  Tubing.,  1740. 


218 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


HARMONY- 

fi  Look  how  the  floor  of  heaven 
Is  thick  iulaid  with  patinos  of  bright  gold; 

There’s  not  the  smallest  orb  which  thou  behold’st 
But  in  his  motion  like  an  angel  sings, 

Still  quiring  to  the  young-ey’d  cherubim: 

Such  harmony  is  in  immortal  souls; 

But,  whilst  this  muddy  vesture  of  decay 
Doth  grossly  close  it  in,  we  cannot  hear  it.” 

Merchant  of  Venice , Act  v.,  sc.  1. 

HATRED.  — V.  Love.'. 

HEDONISM  [rfioi’rj,  pleasure),  is  the  doctrine  that  the  chief  good 
of  man  lies  in  the  pursuit  of  pleasure.  This  was  the  doctrine 
of  Aristippus  and  the  Cyrenaic  school. 

HERMETIC  BOOKS.  — A collection  of  treatises  ascribed  to  the 
Egyptian  Thoth  or  Taaut,  and  also  to  the  Hermes  or  Mercury 
of  the  Greeks.  Different  opinions  have  been  entertained  as  to 
their  origin  and  author.  Marsilius  Ficiuus  has  collected  the 
quotations  made  from  the  Hermetic  books  scattered  throughout 
the  writings  of  the  Piatonicians  and  early  Christians ; of 
which  he  published  a Latin  translation  in  1471.  They  are  a 
miscellany  of  theosophy,  astrology,  and  alchemy  — partly 
Egyptian,  partly  Greek,  and  partly  Jewish  and  Christian.1 

HEURISTIC.  — V.  Ostensive. 

HOLINESS  suggests  the  idea,  not  of  perfect  virtue,  but  of  that 
peculiar  affection  wherewith  a being  of  perfect  virtue  regards 
moral  evil ; and  so  much  indeed  is  this  the  precise  and  charac- 
teristic import  of  the  term,  that,  had  there  been  no  evil  either 
actual  or  conceivable  in  the  universe,  there  would  have  been 
no  holiness.  There  would  have  been  perfect  truth  and  perfect 
righteousness,  yet  not  holiness ; for  this  is  a word  which 
denotes  neither  any  one  of  the  virtues  in  particular,  nor  the 
assemblage  of  them  all  put  together,  but  the  recoil  or  the 
repulsion  of  these  towards  the  opposite  vices  — a recoil  that 
never  would  have  been  felt,  if  vice  had  been  so  far  a nonentity 
as  to  be  neither  an  object  of  real  existence  nor  an  object  of 
thought.1'2 

HOMOLOGUE  (o/xos,  same  ; ?,oyos).  — “A  homologue  is  defined  as 
the  same  organ  in  different  animals,  under  every  variety  of 


1 Lenglet  du  Fresnoy,  Hist,  de  la  Philosoph.  Ilermctigue,  3 tom.,  12mo,  Paris,  1742. 

2 Chalmers,  Nat.  Theol. , vol.  ii.,  p.  380. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY.  219 

HOMOLOGUE  — 

form  and  function.  Thus,  the  arms  and  feet  of  man,  the  fore 
and  hind  feet  of  quadrupeds,  the  -wings  and  feet  of  birds,  and 
the  fins  of  fishes,  are  said  to  be  homologous.” 1 

“ The  corresponding  parts  in  different  animals  are  called 
homologues,  a term  first  applied  to  anatomy  by  the  philosophers 
of  Germany : and  this  term  Mr.  Owen  adopts  to  the  exclusion 
of  terms  more  loosely  denoting  identity  or  similarity.”2 
See  Owen,  On  the  Archetype  and  Homologies  of  the  Vertebrate 
Skeleton,  1848.  — V.  Analogue. 

HOMONYMOUS. — V.  Equivocal. 

HOMOTYPE  (6,1*05,  same;  -nirfos,  type). — “The  corresponding  or 
serially  repeated  parts  in  the  same  animal  are  called  homotypes. 
Thus,  the  fingers  and  toes  of  man,  indeed  the  fore  and  hind 
limbs  of  vertebrate  animals  generally,  are  said  to  be  homo - 
typal."3 

HUMOUE  (humor,  moisture). — As  the  state  of  the  mind  is  influ- 
enced by  the  state  of  the  fluids  of  the  body,  humour  has  come 
to  be  used  as  synonymous  with  temper  and  disposition.  But 
temper  and  disposition  denote  a more  settled  frame  of  mind 
than  that  denoted  by  the  word  humour.  It  is  a variable  mood 
of  the  temper  or  disposition.  A man  who  is  naturally  of  a good 
temper  or  kind  disposition  may  occasionally  be  in  bad  humour. 
— V.  Wit. 

HYLOZOISM  ('lAjp  matter;  and  life).  — The  doctrine  that 
life  and  matter  are  inseparable.  This  doctrine  has  been  held 
under  different  forms.  Straton  of  Lampsacus  held  that  the 
ultimate  particles  of  matter  were  each  and  all  of  them  possessed 
of  life.  The  Stoics,  on  the  other  hand,  while  they  did  not 
accord  activity  or  life  to  every  distinct  particle  of  matter,  held 
that  the  universe,  as  a whole,  was  a being  animated  by  a 
principle  which  gave  to  it  motion,  form,  and  life.  This  doc- 
trine appeared  among  the  followers  of  Plotinus,  who  held  that 
the  soul  of  the  universe  animated  the  least  particle  of  matter. 
Spinoza  asserted  that  all  things  were  alive  in  different  degrees. 
Omnia  qiiamvis  diversis  gradibus  animata  tamen  sunt. 

Under  all  these  forms  of  the  doctrine  there  is  a confounding 


1 M‘Cosh,  Typical  Forms , p.  25. 

3 Whewell.  Supplem.  FoZ.,  p.  142. 

3 M‘Co.sli,  Typical  Forms , p.  25. 


220 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


HYLOZOISM— 

of  life  with  force.  Matter,  according  to  Leibnitz  and  Bosco- 
vich,  and  others,  is  always  endowed  with  force.  Even  the  vis 
inertia;  ascribed  to  it  is  a force.  Attraction  and  repulsion,  and 
chemical  affinity,  all  indicate  activity  in  matter ; but  life  is  a 
force  always  connected  with  organization,  which  much  of  matter 
wants.  Spontaneous  motion,  growth,  nutrition,  separation  of 
parts,  generation,  are  phenomena  which  indicate  the  presence 
of  life  ; which  is  obviously  not  co-extensive  with  matter. 
HYPOSTASIS.  — V.  Subsistentia. 

HYPOTHESIS  (i>rto0faif,  suppositio,  supposition).  — In  Logic 
Aristotle  gave  the  name  eiais  to  every  proposition  which, 
without  being  an  axiom,  served  as  the  basis  of  demonstration, 
and  did  not  require  to  be  demonstrated  itself.  He  distinguished 
two  kinds  of  thesis,  the  one  which  expressed  the  essence  of  a 
thing,  and  the  other  which  expressed  its  existence  or  non- 
existence. The  first  is  the  opia^oj  or  definition  — the  second, 
the  vrtoBcai;. 

When  a phenomenon  that  is  new  to  us  cannot  be  explained 
by  any  known  cause,  we  are  uneasy  and  try  to  reconcile  it  to 
unity  by  assigning  it  ad  interim  to  some  cause  which  may 
appear  to  explain  it.  Before  framing  an  hypothesis,  we  must 
see  Jirst  that  the  phenomenon  really  exists.  Prove  ghosts 
before  explaining  them.  Put  the  question  an  sit?  before  cur 
sit  ? Second,  that  the  phenomenon  cannot  be  explained  by  any 
known  cause.  "When  the  necessity  of  an  hypothesis  has  been 
admitted,  a good  hypothesis  — First,  should  contain  nothing 
contradictory  between  its  own  constituent  parts  or  other  esta- 
blished truths.  The  Wernerians  suppose  water  once  to  have 
held  iu  solution  bodies  which  it  cannot  now  dissolve.  The 
Iluttonians  ascribe  no  effect  to  fire  but  what  it  can  now  pro- 
duce. Second,  it  should  fully  explain  the  phenomenon.  The 
Oopernican  system  is  more  satisfactory  than  that  of  Tycho 
Brahe.  Third,  it  should  simply  explain  the  phenomenon,  that 
is,  should  not  depend  on  any  other  hypothesis  to  help  it  out. 
The  Copernican  system  is  more  simple.  It  needs  only  gravi- 
tation to  carry  it  out — that  of  Tycho  Brahe  depends  on  several 
things. 

By  hypothesis  is  now  understood  the  supposing  of  something, 
the  existence  of  which  is  not  proved,  as  a cause  to  explain 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


221 


HYPOTHESIS  — 

phenomena  which  have  been  observed.  It  thus  differs  in 
signification  from  theory,  which  explains  phenomena  by  causes 
which  are  known  to  exist  and  to  operate.  “Hypothesis,”  says 
Dr.  Gregory,1  “ is  commonly  confounded  with  theory ; but  a 
hypothesis  properly  means  the  supposition  of  a principle,  of 
whose  existence  there  is  no  proof  from  experience,  but  which 
may  be  rendered  more  or  less  probable  by  facts  which 
are  neither  numerous  enough  nor  adequate  to  infer  its  exist- 
ence.” 

“In  some  instances,”  says  Boscovich,2  “observations  and 
experiments  at  once  reveal  to  us  all  we  know.  In  other  cases, 
we  avail  ourselves  of  the  aid  of  hypothesis ; by  u-hich  word, 
hozvever,  is  to  be  understood,  not  Jidions  altogether  arbitrary, 
but  suppositions  conformable  to  experience  or  analogy “ This,” 
says  Dr.  Brown,  “is  the  right  use  of  hypothesis — not  to  super- 
sede, but  to  direct  investigation  — not  as  telling  us  what  we 
are  to  believe,  but  as  pointing  out  to  us  what  we  are  to  ascer- 
tain.” And  it  has  been  said,3  that  “ the  history  of  all  dis- 
coveries that  have  been  arrived  at,  by  what  can  with  any  pro- 
priety be  called  philosophical  investigation  and  induction, 
attests  the  necessity  of  the  experimenter  proceeding  in  the 
institution  and  management  of  his  experiments  upon  a pre- 
vious idea  of  the  truth  to  be  evolved.  This  previous  idea  is 
what  is  properly  called  an  hypothesis,  which  means  something 
placed  under  as  a foundation  or  platform  on  which  to  institute 
and  carry  on  the  process  of  investigation.” 

Different  opinions  have  been  held  as  to  the  use  of  hypotheses 
in  philosophy.  The  sum  of  the  matter  seems  to  be,  that  hypo- 
theses are  admissible  and  may  be  useful  as  a means  of  stimu- 
lating, extending,  and  directing  inquiry.  But  they  ought  not 
to  be  hastily  framed,  nor  fondly  upheld  in  the  absence  of 
support  from  facts.  They  are  not  to  be  set  up  as  barriers  or 
stopping  places  in  the  path  of  knowledge,  but  as  way-posts  to 
guide  us  in  the  road  of  observation,  and  to  cheer  us  with  the 
prospect  of  speedily  arriving  at  a resting  place  — at  another 
stage  in  our  journey  towards  truth.  They  are  to  be  given 


1 Lectures  on  Duties  and  Qualifications  of  a Physician. 

2 De  Solis  ac  Lunce  Defectibus,  Lond.,  1776,  pp.  211,  212. 

3 Pursuit  of  Knowledge,  vol.  ii.,  p.  255,  weekly  vol.,  No.  31. 

20* 


222 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


HYPOTHESIS  — 

only  as  provisional  explanations  of  the  phenomena,  and  are  to 
be  cheerfully  abandoned  the  moment  that  a more  full  and 
satisfactory  explanation  presents  itself.1  — V.  Theory. 
HYPOTHETICAL. — V.  Proposition,  Syllogism. 


I. — V.  Ego,  Subject. 

IDEA  {ihta,  fJSo; , forma,  species,  image).  — “Plato  agreed  with 
the  rest  of  the  ancient  philosophers  in  this  — that  all  things 
consist  of  matter  and  form  ; and  that  the  matter  of  which  all 
things  were  made,  existed  from  eternity,  without  form ; but 
he  likewise  believed  that  there  are  eternal  forms  of  all  pos- 
sible things  which  exist,  without  matter ; and  to  those  eternal 
and  immaterial  forms  he  gave  the  name  of  ideas. 

“ In  the  Platonic  sense,  then,  ideas  were  the  patterns  accord- 
ing to  which  the  Deity  fashioned  the  phenomenal  or  ectypal 
world.”2 

The  word  is  used  in  this  sense  by  Milton  when  he  says : — 

iC  God  saw  his  works  were  good, 

Answering  his  fair  idea” 

And  Spenser  gives  its  meaning  in  the  following  passage: — 

“What  time  this  world’s  great  workmaister  did  cast, 

To  make  all  things  such  as  we  now  behold, 

It  seems  that  he  before  his  eyes  had  plast 
A goodly  patterne,  to  whose  perfect  mould 
lie  fashioned  them  as  comely  as  he  could, 

That  now  so  fair  and  seemly  they  appear, 

As  nought  may  bo  amended  anywhere. 

That  wondrous  patterne,  wheresoe’er  it  be, 

Whether  in  earth,  laid  up  in  secret  store, 

Or  else  in  heaven,  that  no  man  may  it  see 
WTith  sinful  eyes,  for  fear  it  to  deflore, 

Is  perfect  beauty.” 

We  are  accustomed  to  say  that  an  artificer  contemplating 
the  idea  of  anything,  as  of  a chair  or  bed,  makes  a chair  or 
bed.  But  he  does  not  make  the  idea  of  them.  “ These  forms 
of  things,”  said  Cicero,3  “ Plato  called  ideas,  and  denied  that 


3 Orat .,  c.  3. 


1 Reid,  InteU.  Pow.}  essay  i.,  chap.  3. 

2 Sir  William  Hamilton. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


223 


IDEA  — 

they  were  born,  but  were  always  contained  in  reason  and 
intelligence.” 1 

“ Idea  is  a bodiless  substance,  which  of  itself  hath  no  sub- 
sistence, but  giveth  form  and  figure  to  shapeless  matter,  and 
becometh  the  cause  that  bringetlr  them  into  show  and  evi- 
dence. Socrates  and  Plato  supposed  that  there  be  substances 
separate  and  distinct  from  matter,  howbeit  subsisting  in  the 
thoughts  and  imagination  of  God,  that  is  to  say,  of  mind  and 
understanding.  Aristotle  admitted  verily  these  forms  and 
ideas,  howbeit  not  separate  from  matter,  as  being  patterns  of 
all  that  God  hath  made.  The  Stoics,  such  at  least  as  were  of 
the  school  of  Zeno,  have  delivered  that  our  thoughts  and  con- 
ceits are  the  ideas.” 2 

“ Idem  sujit  principalcs  format  quccdam,  v el  rationes  rerum 
stabiles,  atque  incommutabiles,  quce  ipsce  formates  non  sunt,  ac 
per  hoc  cdcrncc  ac  semper  eodem  tnodo  sese  habentes,  quce  in 
dii'ina  inieUigentia  continentur : et  cum  ipsce  neque  oriantur, 
neque  inter eant ; secundum  eas  tamen  formari  dicitur,  quicquid 
oriri  et  interire  potest,  et  omne  quod  oritar  et  interit.”3 

“Tu  cuncta  superno 

Ducis  ab  cxemplo,  pulclirum  pulcherimus  ipse 
Mundum  mente  gerens,  similique  imagine  formens.”* 

Tiberghien6  has  said,  — “ Seneca  considered  ideas,  accord- 
ing to  Plato,  as  the  eternal  exemplars  of  things,  Cicero  as  their 
form,  Diogenes  Laertius  as  their  cause  and  principle,  Aristotle 
as  substances  ; and  in  the  middle  ages  and  in  our  day  they  are 
general  notions,  in  opposition  to  particular  or  individual  no- 
tions. The  ideas  of  Plato  embrace  all  these  meanings.  The 
terms  which  he  employs  are  i Sea  and  d5o$  to  designate  the 
Divine  image,  the  ideal  model  or  type  [tv7to;)  of  all  things 
and  beings.  lie  also  calls  them  rtapabsiygafa,  aixiai  dp^cu,  to 
denote  that  these  eternal  exemplars  are  the  principle  and 
cause  of  the  existence  and  development  of  all  that  is  in  nature. 
They  are  also  the  thoughts  of  God  (vorpaxa),  who  has  pro- 


1 Ilcusdc,  Init.  Philosoph.  riaton.,  tom.  ii.,  par?,  3. 

2 Plutarch,  Opinions  of  Philosophers,  ch.  10,  fol.  606  of  the  translation  by  Holland. 

3 Augustine,  lib.  lxxxiii.,  99,  46.  4 Boeth.,  De  Consol..  9. 

5 Essai  des  Connaiss.  Hum.,  p.  207. 


224 


VOCABULARY  03?  PHILOSOI'IIY. 


IDEA  — 

duced  all  things  according  to  the  type  of  these  ideas.  And 
the  terms  had ej,  fiovdScf,  indicate  the  affinity  between  the 
theory  of  Plato  and  the  numbers  of  Pythagoras.” 

In  another  passage1  the  same  author  has  said,  that,  “ac- 
cording to  the  Platonic  sense,  adopted  by  Kant  and  Cousin, 
ideas  are  as  it  were  the  essence  and  matter  of  our  intelli- 
gence. They  are  not  as  such,  a product  or  result  of  intelli- 
gence, they  are  its  primitive  elements,  and  at  the  same  time 

the  immediate  object  of  its  activity They  are  the 

primary  anticipations  which  the  mind  brings  to  all  its  cogni- 
tions, the  principles  and  laws  by  reason  of  which  it  conceives 
of  beings  and  things.  The  mind  docs  not  create  ideas,  it  cre- 
ates by  means  of  ideas There  are  two  great 

classes  of  ideas  — 1.  Those  which  are  related  in  some  sense  to 
experience ; as  the  principles  of  mathematics,  notions  of 
figure,  magnitude,  extension,  number,  time,  and  space.  2. 
Those  which  are  completely  independent  of  all  sensible  repre- 
sentation, as  the  ideas  of  good  and  evil,  just  and  unjust,  true 
or  false,  fair  or  deformed.”  — p.  208.  — V.  Notion. 

According  to  Plato,  ideas  were  the  only  objects  of  science  or 
true  knowledge.  Things  created  being  in  a state  of  continual 
flux,  there  can  be  no  real  knowledge  with  respect  to  them. 
But  the  divine  ideas  being  eternal  and  unchangeable,  are 
objects  of  science  properly  so  called.  According  to  Aristotle 
and  the  Peripatetics,  knowledge,  instead  of  originating  or 
consisting  in  the  contemplation  of  the  eternal  ideas,  types,  or 
forms,  according  to  which  all  things  were  created,  originated, 
and  consisted  in  the  contemplation  of  the  things  created,  and 
in  the  thoughts  and  the  operations  of  mind  to  which  that  con- 
templation gives  rise.  But  as  external  things  cannot  them- 
selves be  in  the  mind,  they  arc  made  known  to  it  by  means 
of  species,  images,  or  phantasms  ( q . v.)  ; so  that,  in  perception, 
we  are  not  directly  cognizant  of  the  object,  but  only  of  a 
representation  of  it.  In  like  manner,  in  imagination,  memory, 
and  the  operations  of  intellect,  what  is  directly  present  to  the 
mind  is  not  the  real  object  of  thought,  but  a representation 
of  it. 


1 Essaides  Connaiss.  Hum.,  pp.  33,  34. 


VOCABULARY  OB  PHILOSOPHY. 


225 


IDEA— 

Instead  of  employing  the  various  terms  image,  species,  phan- 
tasm, kc.,  of  the  Peripatetic  philosophy,  Descartes  adopted 
the  term  idea,  which  till  his  time  had  been  all  but  exclusively 
employed  in  its  Platonic  sense. 

By  Descartes  and  subsequent  philosophers  the  term  idea  was 
employed  to  signify  all  our  mental  representations,  all  the 
notions  which  the  mind  frames  of  things.  And  this,  in  con- 
tradistinction to  the  Platonic,  may  be  called  the  modern  use 
of  the  word.  Mr.  Locke,  for  example,  who  uses  the  word  idea 
so  frequently  as  to  think  it  necessary  to  make  an  apology  for 
doing  so,  says — “It  is  the  term  which,  I think,  serves  best  to 
stand  for  whatsoever  is  the  object  of  the  understanding,  when 
a man  thinks:  I have  used  it  to  express  whatever  is  meant  by 
phantasm,  notion,  species,  or  whatever  it  is  which  the  mind 
can  be  employed  about  in  thinking.” 

Against  this  modern  use  of  the  word  idea,  more  especially 
in  reference  to  the  doctrine  of  perception  ( q . ».),  Dr.  Reid 
most  vehemently  protested. — “Modern  philosophers,”  said  he,1 
“ as  well  as  the  Peripatetics  and  Epicureans  of  old,  have  con- 
ceived that  external  objects  cannot  be  the  immediate  objects 
of  our  thoughts ; that  there  must  be  some  image  of  them  in 
the  mind  itself,  in  which,  as  in  a mirror,  they  are  seen.  And 
the  name  idea,  in  the  philosophical  sense  of  it,  is  given  to 
those  internal  and  immediate  objects  of  our  thoughts.  The 
external  thing  is  the  remote  or  immediate  object;  but  the 
idea,  or  image  of  that  object  in  the  mind,  is  the  immediate 
object,  without  which  we  would  have  no  perception,  no  re- 
membrance, no  conception  of  the  mediate  object. 

“When,  therefore,  in  common  language,  we  speak  of  having 
an  idea  of  anything,  we  mean  no  more  by  that  expression  than 
thinking  of  it.  The  vulgar  allow  that  this  expression  implies 
a mind  that  thinks,  an  act  of  that  mind  which  we  call  think- 
ing, and  an  object  about  which  we  think.  But  besides  these 
three,  the  philosopher  conceives  that  there  is  a fourth  ; to  wit, 
the  idea  which  is  the  immediate  object.  The  idea  is  in  tho 
mind  itself,  and  can  have  no  existence  but  in  a mind  that 
thinks;  but  the  remote  or  mediate  object  may  be  something 
external,  as  the  sun  or  moon ; it  may  be  something  past  or 


1 lntell.  Pow.,  essay  i.,  chap.  1. 

Q 


226 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


IDEA— 

future ; it  may  be  something-  which  never  existed.  This  is 
the  philosophical  meaning  of  the  word  idea;  and  we  may 
observe  that  this  meaning  of  the  word  is  built  upon  a philo- 
sophical opinion ; for  if  philosophers  had  not  believed  that 
there  are  such  immediate  objects  of  all  our  thoughts  in  the 
mind,  they  would  never  have  used  the  word  idea  to  express 
them. 

“ I shall  only  add  that,  although  I may  have  occasion  to  use 
the  word  idea  in  this  philosophical  sense  in  explaining  the 
opinions  of  others,  I shall  have  no  occasion  to  use  it  in  ex- 
pressing my  own,  because  I believe  idea. t,  taken  in  this  sense, 
to  be  a mere  fiction  of  philosophers.  And  in  the  popular 
meaning  of  the  word,  there  is  the  less  occasion  to  use  it,  be- 
cause the  English  words  thought,,  notion,  apprehension,  answer 
the  purpose  as  well  as  the  Greek  word  idea;  with  this  advan- 
tage, that  they  are  less  ambiguous.” 

Now  it  may  be  doubted  whether  in  this  passage  Dr.  Reid 
has  correctly  understood  and  explained  the  meaning  of  the 
word  idea  as  employed  by  all  modern  philosophers,  from  the 
time  of  Descartes. 

Dr.  Reid  takes  idea  to  mean  something  interposed  between 
the  mind  and  the  object  of  its  thought — a tertium  quid,  or  a 
quantum  quid,  an  independent  entity  different  from  the  mind 
and  from  the  object  thought  of.  Now  this  has  been  the 
opinion  both  of  ancient  and  modern  philosophers ; but  it  is  not 
the  opinion  of  all.  There  are  many,  especially  among  modern 
philosophers,  who,  by  the  idea  of  a thing,  mean  the  thing  itself 
in  the  mind  as  an  object  of  thought.  Even  when  the  object 
thought  of  is  represented  to  the  mind,  the  representation  is  a 
modification  of  the  mind  itself,  and  the  act  of  representing  and 
the  act  of  knowing  the  object  thought  of,  are  one  and  the 
same  ; the  representation  and  cognition  are  indivisible.  But 
Dr.  Reid  does  not  admit  that  any  of  our  knowledge  is  repre- 
sentative. He  had  such  a horror  of  the  doctrine  of  ideas  as 
meaning  something  interposed  between  the  mind  and  the 
objects  of  its  knowledge,  that  he  calls  all  our  knowledge  im- 
mediate. Thus  he  speaks  of  an  immediate  knowledge  of  things 
past,  and  of  an  immediate  knowledge  of  things  future.  Now 
all  knowledge  is  present  knowledge,  that  is,  it  is  only  know- 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


227 


IDEA  — 

ledge  -when  we  have  it.  But  all  knowledge  is  not  imme- 
diate knowledge.  Things  that  are  past  are  not  actually 
present  to  the  mind  when  we  remember  them.  Things  that 
are  future  are  not  actually  present  when  we  anticipate  them, 
for  they  have  as  yet  no  actual  existence.  But  the  mind 
frames  to  itself  a representation  of  these  things  as  they  have 
been,  or  as  they  will  be,  and  in  thus  representing  them  has 
knowledge  of  them.  This  knowledge,  however,  cannot  be 
called  immediate.  In  memory  there  is  the  faculty,  and  there 
is  the  object  of  the  faculty  or  the  thing  remembered.  But 
the  object  or  the  thing  remembered  is  not  actually  present  to 
the  faculty.  It  is  reproduced  or  represented,  and  in  repre- 
senting the  object  to  the  faculty  we  have  knowledge  of  it  as 
a past  reality.  Memory,  therefore,  may  be  called  a repre- 
sentative faculty.  Now,  in  perception,  where  the  object  of 
the  faculty  is  also  present,  it  may  not  be  necessary  for  the 
mind  to  frame  to  itself  any  representation  or  image  of  the 
external  reality.  The  faculty  and  its  object  are  in  direct 
contact,  and  the  knowledge  or  perception  is  the  immediate 
result.  This  is  the  doctrine  of  Dr.  Reid,  and  if  he  had  ac- 
knowledged the  distinction,  he  might  have  called  perception  a 
presentative  faculty,  as  memory  is  a representative  faculty.* 
According  to  other  philosophers,  however,  there  is  a repre- 
sentation even  in  perception.  The  external  reality  is  not  in 
the  mind.  The  mind  merely  frames  to  itself  a representation 
or  image  of  what  the  external  reality  is,  and  in  this  way  has 
knowledge  of  it.  But  this  representation  or  image  is  not 
something  interposed  or  different  from  the  mind  and  the  exter- 
nal object.  It  is  a modification  of  the  mind  itself.  It  is  the 
external  object  in  the  mind  as  an  object  of  thought.  It  is  the 
idea  of  the  external  reality.  This  is  a theory  of  perception 
which  Dr.  Reid  did  not  clearly  distinguish  ; but  it  is  at  variance 
with  his  own,  and,  if  he  had  distinctly  apprehended  it,  he 
would  have  condemned  it.  In  like  manner  he  would  have 
condemned  the  use  of  the  word  idea  to  denote  a representative 
image,  even  although  that  representation  was  held  to  be 


1 See  Reid’s  Worlcs,  edited  by  Sir  William  Hamilton;  Note  B,  Of  Presentative  and 
Representative  Knowledge;  and  Note  c,  Of  the  Various  Theories  of  External  Per- 
ception. 


228 


VOCABULARY  OF  rHILOSOMY. 


IDEA  — 

merely  a modification  of  mind.  But  this  is  the  sense  in  which 
the  term  idea  is  used  by  Descartes,  and  other  philosophers,  in 
reference  to  the  doctrine  of  perception.  In  a general  sense  it 
means  anything  present  to  the  mind,  •whether  really  or  repre- 
sentatively, as  an  object  of  thought.1 

Ideas,  regarded  according  to  the  nature  and  diversity  of 
their  objects,  are  sensible,  intellectual,  or  moral;  according  to 
the  essential  characters  of  these  objects,  they  are  necessary 
and  absolute,  or  contingent  and  relative;  according  to  the  as- 
pect in  -which  they  represent  things,  they  are  simple  or  com- 
pound, abstract  or  concrete,  individual  or  general,  partitive  or 
collective;  according  to  their  origin  or  formation,  they  are  ad- 
ventitious, factitious,  or  innate;  according  to  their  quality  or 
fidelity,  they  are  true  or  false,  real  or  imaginary,  clear  or 
obscure,  distinct  or  confused,  complete  or  incomplete,  adequate 
or  inadequate.2 

As  to  the  origin  of  our  ideas,  the  opinions  of  metaphysicians 
may  be  divided  into  three  classes.  1.  Those  -who  deny  the 
senses  to  be  anything  more  than  instruments  conveying  objects 
to  the  mind,  perception  being  active  (Plato  and  others).  2. 
Those  -who  attribute  all  our  ideas  to  sense  (Hobbes,  Gassendi, 
Condillas,  the  ancient  Sophists).  3.  Those  who  admit  that 
the  earliest  notions  proceed  from  the  senses,  yet  maintain  that 
they  are  not  adequate  to  produce  the  whole  knowledge  pos- 
sessed by  the  human  understanding  (Aristotle,  Locke).3 4 — F. 
Innate. 

See  Trendlenburg,  Be  Ideis  Platonis;  Richter,  Be  Ideis 
Platonis;  Sir  William  Hamilton,  Biscussions  on  Philosophy ; 
Keid’s  Works;  Dugald  Stewart,  Pliilosoph.  Essays ;*  Adam 
Smith,  Essays  on  Philosoph.  Subjects .6 
IDEAL.  — “Though  ideas  are  widely  separated  from  sensible 
reality,  there  is  something,  if  possible,  still  more  widely  sepa- 
rated, and  that  is  the  ideal.  A few  examples  will  enable  you 
to  comprehend  the  difference  between  ideas  and  the  ideal: 

1 Dr.  Currie  once,  upon  being  bored  by  a foolish  blue,  to  tell  her  the  precise  meaning 
of  the  word  idea  (which  she  said  she  had  been  reading  about  in  some  metaphysical 

work,  but  could  not  understand),  answered,  at  last,  angrily,  “Idea,  madam,  is  the  femi- 
nine of  idiot,  and  means  a female  fool.”  — Moore,  Diary , vol.  iv..  p.  38. 

a Leibnitz,  Nauveaux  Essais , b.  ii.,  ch.  22.  3 I)r.  Mill,  Essays , 314,  321. 

4 Appendix  ii.  6 P.  119,  note. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


229 


IDEAL  — 

Perfection  is  an  idea;  humanity  in  all  its  perfection  is  an 
ideal ; human  virtue  and  wisdom  in  all  their  purity  are  ideas  ; 
the  wisdom  of  the  Stoics  is  an  ideal.  The  ideal,  then,  is  the 
intellectual  existence  of  a thing  which  has  no  other  charac- 
ters than  those  determined  by  the  idea  itself.  The  idea,  thus 
individualized,  so  to  speak,  serves  as  the  rule  of  our  actions; 
it  is  a model,  which  we  may  approach  in  a greater  or  lesser 
degree,  hut  from  which  we  are  nevertheless  infinitely  distant. 
We  compare,  for  example,  our  conduct  with  the  dictates  of 
the  monitor,  that  exists  within  us.  We  all  judge  and  correct 
ourselves  with  reference  to  this  ideal,  without  the  power  of 
ever  attaining  to  its  perfection.  These  ideas,  though  destitute 
of  any  objective  reality,  cannot  be  regarded  as  purely  chi- 
merical. They  furnish  a unit  of  measure  to  the  reason,  which 
requires  a conception  of  what  is  perfect  in  each  kind,  in  order 
to  appreciate  and  measure  the  various  degrees  of  imperfection. 
But  would  you  realize  the  ideal  in  experience  as  the  hero  of  a 
romance  ? It  is  impossible,  and  is,  besides,  a senseless  and 
useless  enterprise ; for  the  imperfection  of  our  nature,  which 
ever  belies  the  perfection  of  the  idea,  renders  all  illusion  im- 
possible, and  makes  the  good  itself,  as  contemplated  in  the 
idea,  resemble  a fiction.” 1 

“By  ideal  I understand  the  idea,  not  in  concreto  but  in 
individuo,  as  an  individual  thing,  determinable  or  determined 
by  the  idea  alone.  What  I have  termed  an  ideal,  was  in 
Plato’s  philosophy  an  idea  of  the  Divine  mind  — an  individual 
object  present  to  its  pure  intuition,  the  most  perfect  of  every 
kind  of  possible  beings,  and  the  archetype  of  all  phenomenal 
existences.” 2 

“We  call  attention,”  says  Cousin,3  “to  two  words  which 
continually  recur  in  this  discussion  — they  are,  on  the  one 
hand,  nature  or  experience ; on  the  other,  ideal.  Experience 
is  individual  or  collective ; but  the  collective  is  resolved  into 
the  individual ; the  ideal  is  opposed  to  the  individual  and  to 
collectiveness:  it  appears  as  an  original  conception  of  the 
mind.  Nature  or  experience  gives  me  the  occasion  for  con- 


1 nenderson,  The  Philosophy  of  Kant,  p.  119. 

4 Meiklejohn,  Translation  of  Kant’s  Crit.  of  Pure  Reason,  p.  351. 
* On  the  Beautiful. 

21 


230 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


IDEAL  — 

ceiviug  the  ideal,  but  the  ideal  is  something  entirely  different 
from  experience  or  nature ; so  that,  if  we  apply  it  to  natural, 
or  even  to  artificial  figures,  they  cannot  fill  up  the  condition 
of  the  ideal  conception,  and  we  are  obliged  to  imagine  them 
exact.  The  word  ideal  corresponds  to  an  absolute  and  inde- 
pendent idea,  and  not  to  a collective  one.” 

“ L’ideal,  voili  l’echelle  mysterieuse  qui  fait  monter  l’ame 
du  fini,  a l’infini.”  1 

When  the  word  ideal  is  used  as  a noun  and  qualified  by 
the  adjective  beau,  its  sense  is  critical  or  aesthetic,  and  has 
reference  to  the  fine  arts,  especially  to  statuary  and  painting. 
“ The  common  notion  of  the  ideal  as  exemplified  more  espe- 
cially in  the  painting  of  the  last  century,  degrades  it  into  a 
mere  abstraction.  It  was  assumed  that  to  raise  an  object  into 
an  ideal,  you  must  get  rid  of  everything  individual  about  it. 
Whereas  the  true  ideal  is  the  individual  freed  from  everything 
that  is  not  individual  in  it,  with  all  its  parts  pervaded,  and 
animated,  and  harmonized  by  the  spirit  of  life  which  flows 
from  the  centre.” 2 

The  ideal  is  to  be  attained  by  selecting  and  assembling  in 
one  whole  the  beauties  and  perfections  which  are  usually  seen 
in  different  individuals,  excluding  everything  defective  or  un- 
seemly, so  as  to  form  a type  or  model  of  the  species.  Thus, 
the  Apollo  Belvedere  is  the  ideal  of  the  beauty  and  propor- 
tion of  the  human  frame ; the  Farnese  Hercules  is  the  type 
of  manly  strength.  The  ideal  can  only  be  attained  by  follow- 
ing nature.  There  must  be  no  elements  nor  combinations  but 
such  as  nature  exhibits ; but  the  elements  of  beauty  and  per- 
fection must  be  disengaged  from  individuals,  and  embodied 
in  one  faultless  whole.  This  is  the  empirical  account  of  the 
ideal. 

According  to  Cicero,3  there  is  nothing  of  any  kind  so  fair 
that  there  may  not  be  a fairer  conceived  by  the  mind.  “ We 
can  conceive  of  statues  more  perfect  than  those  of  Phidias. 
Nor  did  the  artist,  when  he  made  the  statue  of  Jupiter  or  Mi- 
nerva, contemplate  any  one  individual  from  which  to  take  a 
likeness  ; but  there  was  in  his  mind  a form  of  beauty,  gazing 


1 Cousin,  Du  Yrai,  du  Beau,  et  du  Bun,  9me.  lejon,  p.  189. 

5 Guesses  at  Truth,  second  series,  p.  218.  3 Orator.,  e.  2,  3. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


231 


IDEAL  — 

on  which,  he  guided  his  hand  and  skill  in  imitation  of  it.” 
In  the  philosophy  of  Plato  this  form  was  called  TtapaSsey/jia. 
Seneca1  takes  the  distinction  between  iSia.  and  d8o;,  thus:  — 
when  a painter  paints  a likeness,  the  original  is  his  i8la — the 
likeness  is  the  rfSo;  or  image.  The  sl8o$  is  in  the  work  — the 
i8ea  is  out  of  the  work  and  before  the  work.  This  distinction 
is  commended  by  Heusde.2  And  he  refers  to  Cicero,3  who 
states  that  Zeuxis  had  five  of  the  most  beautiful  women  of 
Crotona,  as  models,  from  which  to  make  up  his  picture  of  a 
perfect  beauty,  as  illustrating  the  Platonic  sense  of  rcapaSnyya 
or  the  ideal.  According  to  this  view,  the  beau  ideal  is  a type 
of  hypothetical  perfection  contemplated  by  the  mind,  but 
which  may  never  have  been  realized,  how  nearly  soever 
it  may  have  been  approached  in  the  shape  of  an  actual  spe- 
cimen. 

IDEALISM  is  the  doctrine  that  in  external  perceptions  the 
objects  immediately  known  are  ideas.  It  has  been  held  under 
various  forms.  — See  Sir  W.  Hamilton;4  Berkeley,  Works; 
Sir  W.  Drummond,  Academic  Questions ; Reid,  Inquiry. 

Some  of  the  phases  of  modern  idealism  among  the  Germans, 
may  be  seen  in  the  following  passage  from  Lewes : 6 — “I  see  a 
tree.  The  common  psychologists  tell  me  that  there  are  three 
things  implied  in  this  one  fact  of  vision,  viz. : a tree,  an  image 
of  that  tree,  and  a mind  which  apprehends  that  image.  Fichte 
tells  me  that  it  is  I alone  who  exist.  The  tree  and  the  image 
of  it  are  one  thing,  and  that  is  a modification  of  my  mind. 
This  is  subjective  idealism.  Schelling  tells  me  that  both  the 
tree  and  my  ego  (or  self),  are  existences  equally  real  or  ideal; 
but  they  are  nothing  less  than  manifestations  of  the  abso- 
lute, the  infinite,  or  unconditioned.  This  is  objective  idealism. 
But  Hegel  tells  me  that  all  these  explanations  are  false.  The 
only  thing  really  existing  (in  this  one  fact  of  vision)  is  the 
idea,  the  relation.  The  ego  and  the  tree  are  but  two  terms  of 
the  relation,  and  owe  their  reality  to  it.  This  is  absolute 
idealism.  According  to  this  there  is  neither  mind  nor  matter, 
heaven  nor  earth,  God  nor  man.  — V.  Nihilism.  The  only 


1 Epist.,  lviii.,  sect.  15-1S.  3 lnit.  Phil.  Plat.,  yol.  ii.,  pars  3,  p.  105. 

3 X>e  Invent.,  ii.,  1.  4 Reids  Works,  note  0. 

* Eiograph.  Hist,  of  PhU.,  yol.  iv.,  p.  209. 


232 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


IDEALISM  — 

real  existences  are  certain  ideas  or  relations.  Everything 
else  that  has  name  or  being  derives  its  name  and  being 
from  its  constituting  one  or  other  of  the  two  related  terms, 
subject  and  object;  but  the  only  thing  that  is  true  or  real 
is  the  identity  of  their  contradiction,  that  is,  the  relation 
itself.” 

The  doctrine  opposed  to  idealism  is  realism — q.  v.  See  also 
Perception. 

IDEALIST.  — “In  England,  the  word  idealist  is  most  commonly 
restricted  to  such  as  (with  Berkeley)  reject  the  existence  of  a 
material  world.  Of  late  its  meaning  has  been  sometimes 
extended  (particularly  since  the  publication  of  Reid)  to  all 
those  who  retain  the  theory  of  Descartes  and  Locke,  concern- 
ing the  immediate  objects  of  our  perceptions  and  thoughts, 
whether  they  admit  or  reject  the  consequences  deduced  from 
this  theory  by  the  Berkeleian.  In  the  present  state  of  the 
science,  it  would  contribute  much  to  the  distinctness  of  our 
reasonings  were  it  to  be  used  in  this  last  sense  exclusively.”  1 
IDEATION  and  IDEATIONAL.  — “ The  term  sensation  has  a 
double  meaning.  It  signifies  not  only  an  individual  sensation, 
as,  when  I say,  I smell  this  rose,  or  I look  at  my  hand ; but 
it  also  signifies  the  general  faculty  of  sensation  ; that  is,  the 
complex  notion  of  all  the  phenomena  together,  as  a part  of 
our  nature.” 

“ The  word  idea  has  only  the  meaning  which  corresponds 
to  the  first  of  these  significations  ; it  denotes  an  individual 
idea ; and  we  have  not  a name  for  that  complex  notion  which 
embraces,  as  one  whole,  all  the  different  phenomena  to  which 
the  term  idea  relates.  As  we  say  sensation,  we  might  also 
say  ideation ; it  would  be  a very  useful  word  ; and  there  is  no 
objection  to  it,  except  the  pedantic  habit  of  decrying  a new 
term.  Sensation  would,  in  that  case,  be  the  general  name  for 
one  part  of  our  constitution  ; ideation  for  another.” 

Quoting  this  from  Mr.  James  Mill  as  his  authority,  Dr. 
Carpenter2  has  introduced  the  adjective  ideational  to  express 
a state  of  consciousness  which  is  excited  by  a sensation 
through  the  instrumentality  of  the  sensorium. 


1 Stewart,  Dissert .,  part  ii.,  166,  note. 


Frincip.  of  Hum.  Phys.,  p.  446. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


283 


IDEATION  — 

“ The  basement  convolutions  of  the  cerebrum  are  the  central 
organs  of  the  perceptive  consciousness,  the  portals  to  intel- 
lectual action,  where  sensory  impressions,  the  intuitions  of  the 
special  senses,  whether  sights,  sounds,  tastes,  smells,  or  feel- 
ings become  idealized  and  registered;  that  is,  perceived,  remem- 
bered, and  associated ; and  where,  too,  the  ideation  of  outward 
individualities  is  effected.  . . . Ideation  is  the  first  step 

in  the  intellectual  progress  of  man.  Ideas  are  the  pabula  of 
thought,  and  form  equally  a constituent  clement  in  the  com- 
' posite  nature  of  our  animal  propensities,  and  of  our  emotional 
and  moral  feelings.  Ideation  is  as  essential  to  the  very  exist- 
ence of  memory,  as  memory  is  to  the  operation  of  thought. 
For  what,  in  reality,  is  memory  but  the  fact  of  retained  ideal- 
ized impressions  in  the  mind  ? And  without  these  retained 
idealizations,  embodied  in  the  memory  as  representative  ideas, 
where  are  the  materials  of  thought  ? and  how  are  the  pro- 
cesses of  thought  to  be  effected  ?” 1 
IDENTICAL  PEGPOSITION.  — “ It  is  Locke,  I believe,  who 
introduced,  or  at  least  gave  currency  to  the  expression  iden- 
tical proposition,  in  philosophic  language.  It  signifies  a judg- 
ment, a proposition,  in  which  an  idea  is  affirmed  by  itself, 
or  in  which  we  affirm  of  a thing  .what  we  already  know  of 
it.”2 

We  must  distinguish  between  analytic  and  tautologous  judg- 
ments. Whilst  the  analytic  display  the  meaning  of  the  sub- 
ject, and  put  the  same  matter  in  a new  form,  the  tautologous 
only  repeat  the  subject,  and  give  us  the  same  matter,  in  the 
same  form,  as,  “ Whatever  is,  is.”3 

A proposition  is  called  identical  whenever  the  attribute  is 
contained  in  the  subject,  so  that  the  subject  cannot  be  con- 
ceived as  not  containing  the  attribute.  Thus,  when  you  say 
a body  is  solid,  I say  that  you  make  an  identical  proposition, 
because  it  is  impossible  to  have  the  idea  of  body  without  that 
of  solidity. 

IDENTISM  or  IDENTITY  ( idem , the  same),  or  the  doctrine 


1 Journal  of  Psychol.  Med.,  Jan.,  1S57,  pp.  139,  144. 

a Cousin,  Hist,  of  Mod.  Philosophy  lect.  xxiv. ; Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand ., 
Look  iv.,  chap.  8,  sect.  3. 

3 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought,  p.  196. 

21  * 


234 


VOCABULARY  OF  miLOSOPHY. ' 


IDENTISM  — 

of  absolute  identity,  teaches  that  the  two  elements  of  thought, 
objective  and  subjective,  are  absolutely  one;  that  matter  and 
mind  are  opposite  poles  of  the  same  infinite  substance ; and 
that  creation  and  the  Creator  are  one.  This  is  the  phi- 
losophy of  Schclling.  It  coincides  ultimately  with  Pan- 
theism — q.  v. 

“If  the  doctrine  of  identity  means  anything,  it  means  that 
thought  and  being  arc  essentially  one ; that  the  process  of 
thinking  is  virtually  the  same  as  the  process  of  creating ; that 
in  constructing  the  universe  by  logical  deduction,  we  do  vir- 
tually the  same  thing  as  Deity  accomplished  in  developing 
himself  in  all  the  forms  and  regions  of  creation ; that  every 
man’s  reason,  therefore,  is  really  God ; in  fine,  that  Deity  is 
the  whole  sum  of  consciousness  immanent  in  the  world.” 1 

IDENTITY  means  sameness.  Unity  is  opposed  to  division,  iden- 
tity to  distinction.  A thing  is  one  when  it  is  not  divided  into 
others.  A thing  is  the  same  when  it  is  not  distinguishable 
from  others,  whether  it  be  divided  from  them  or  not.  Unity 
denies  the  divisibleness  of  a thing  in  itself.  Identity  denies 
the  divisibleness  of  a thing  from  itself,  or  from  that  with 
which  it  is  said  to  be  the  same.  It  is  unity  with  persistence 
and  continuity  ; unity  perceived  even  in  plurality  ; in  multi- 
plicity and  succession,  in  diversity  and  change.  It  is  the 
essential  characteristic  of  all  substance  or  being,  that  it  is  one 
and  endures. 

Unorganized  matter  may  be  said  to  have  identity  in  the  per- 
sistence of  the  parts  or  molecules  of  which  it  consists.  Or- 
ganized bodies  have  identity  so  long  as  organization  and  life 
remain.  An  oak,  which  from  a small  plant  becomes  a great 
tree,  is  still  the  same  tree.2 

IDENTITY  (Personal).  — “What  is  called  personal  identity,  is 
our  being  the  same  persons  from  the  commencement  to  the 
end  of  life ; while  the  matter  of  the  body,  the  dispositions, 
habits,  and  thoughts  of  the  mind,  are  continually  changing. 
We  feel  and  know  that  we  are  the  same.  This  notion  or 
persuasion  of  personal  identity  results  from  memory.  If  a 


‘ Morcll,  Hist,  of  Phil.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  127. 

a Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand .,  book  ii.,  chap.  27,  sect.  3. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


235 


IDENTITY— 

man  loses  all  recollection  of  his  early  life,  he  continues, 
nevertheless,  actually  the  same  person.” 1 
Dr.  Brown2  changes  the  phrase  personal  identity  into  mental 
identity.  Locke3  says  — “To  find  wherein  personal  identity 
consists  we  must  consider  what  person  stands  for ; which,  I 
think,  is  a thinking  intelligent  being,  that  has  reason  and 
reflection,  and  can  consider  itself  as  itself,  the  same  thinking 
thing  in  different  times  and  places.” 

This  looks  like  confining  personal  identity  to  the  mind.  But 
Leibnitz4  called  it  a “ metaphysical  communication  by  which 
soul  and  body  make  up  one  supposition,  which  we  call  a per- 
son.” In  a Review  of  the  Doctrine  of  Personal  Identity ,5  it 
has  been  proposed  to  define  it  as  “the  continuation  of  the 
same  organization  of  animal  life  in  a human  creature  possess- 
ing an  intelligent  mind,  that  is,  one  endowed  with  the  ordi- 
nary faculties  of  reason  and  memory,  without  reference  to  the 
original  formation  or  constitution  of  that  mind,  whether  it  be 
material  or  immaterial,  or  whether  it  survives  or  perishes 
with  the  body.  Or,  more  shortly,  it  may  be  said  personal 
identity  consists  in  the  same  thinking  intelligent  substance 
united  to  the  same  human  body.  By  the  same  human  body, 
however,  is  not  meant  the  same  particles  of  matter,  but  of 
the  same  human  structure  and  form.” — V.  Personality. 

Locke6  makes  personal  identity  consist  in  consciousness. 
“ Consciousness  is  inseparable  from  thinking;  and  since  it  is 
so,  and  is  that  which  makes  every  one  to  be  what  he  calls  self 
and  thereby  distinguishes  himself  from  all  other  thinking 
beings,  in  this  alone  consists  personal  identity,  i.  e.,  the  same- 
ness of  a rational  being.  And  as  far  as  this  consciousness 
can  be  extended  backwards  to  any  past  action  or  thought,  so 
•far  reaches  the  identity  of  that  person.” 

But  it  has  been  remarked  that  “ Consciousness,  without  any 
regard  to  a sameness  of  the  thinking  intelligent  substance, 
cannot  constitute  personal  identity.  For,  then,  a disordered 


1 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought.  a Lecture  xi 

8 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  book  ii.,  ch,  27. 

4 Theodicee,  p.  172. 

8 P.  73,  8yo,  London,  1827. 

6 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  book  ii.,  ch.  27. 


236 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


IDENTITY— 

imagination  might  make  one  man  become  two,  or  even  twenty 
persons,  whose  actions  he  should  imagine  himself  to  have  per- 
formed. And  if  a man  forgets  and  loses  all  consciousness  of 
having  done  certain  actions,  he  will  then  not  be  the  same 
person  who  did  them.” 1 

Consciousness  merely  ascertains  or  indicates  personal  identity, 
but  does  not  constitute  it.  Consciousness  presupposes  personal 
identity  as  knowledge  presupposes  truth. 

See  Butler,  Dissertation  on  Personal  Identity ; Reid,  Intell. 
Pow. ; 2 Stewart,  Elements .* 3 

IDENTITY  (Principle  of)  . — It  is  usually  expressed  thus  — a 
thing  is  what  it  is,  and  not  another.  So  that  it  amounts  to 
the  same  as  the  principle  of  contradiction  — q.  v.  In  Logic  it 
is  expressed  thus — conceptions  which  agree  can  be  in  thought 
united,  or  affirmed  of  the  same  subject  at  the  same  time. 
IDEOLOGY  or  IDEALOGY. — The  analysis  of  the  human  mind 
by  Destutt  de  Tracy,  published  about  the  end  of  last  century, 
was  entitled  “Piemens  d’Ideoloyie,”  and  the  word  has  come  to 
be  applied  to  the  philosophy  of  the  sensational  school,  or  the 
followers  of  Condillac — as  Cabanis,  Garat,  and  Volney.  Of 
this  school,  De  Tracy  is  the  metaphysician;  Cabanis4  is  the 
physiologist;  and  Volney5  is  the  moralist.  The  followers  of 
this  school  were  leading  members  of  the  Academic  des  Sciences 
Morales  et  Pulitiques,  and  also  took  an  active  share  in  political 
assemblies.  Their  doctrines  and  movements  were  contrary  to 
the  views  of  Napoleon,  who  showed  his  dislike  by  suppressing 
the  Academic  des  Sciences  Morales  et  Politiques.  But  the 
members  of  the  school  kept  up  their  doctrines  and  their  meet- 
ings, and  it  was  on  the  motion  of  De  Tracy  that  the  Senate 
decreed  the  abdication  of  the  emperor  in  1814.6 

“ For  Locke  and  his  whole  school,  the  study  of  the  under- 
standing is  the  study  of  ideas ; hence  the  recent  and  celebrated 
expression  ideology,  to  designate  the  science  of  the  human 
understanding.  The  source  of  this  expression  is  in  the  Essay 


1 Whitehead,  On  Materialism , p.  79. 

a Essay  iii.,  ch.  6,  with  note.  3 Part  ii.,  ch.  1,  sect.  2. 

4 Rapports  du  Physique  est  de  Moral  de  V Homme. 

8 Catechism  du  Citoyen  Francais. 

0 Damiron,  Hist,  de  Philosoph.  en  France  au  19  sieclc. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


237 


IDEOLOGY— 

on  the  Hum.  Understanding,  and  the  ideological  school  is  the 
natural  offspring  of  Locke.” 1 

“ By  a double  blunder  in  philosophy  and  Greek,  ideologic 
(for  idealogie),  a word  which  could  only  properly  suggest  an  d 
priori  scheme,  deducing  our  knowledge  from  the  intellect,  has 
in  France  become  the  name  peculiarly  distinctive  of  that  phi- 
losophy of  mind  which  exclusively  derives  our  knowledge 
from  sensation.”2 

“Destutt  de  Tracy  has  distinguished  Condillac  by  the  title 
of  the  father  of  ideology."  3 

IDIOSYNCRASY  (iSioj,  proprius;  ovv,  con,  and  xpaai;,  mixtio), 
means  a peculiar  temperament  of  mind  or  of  body.  “ The  soul 
in  its  first  and  pure  nature  hath  no  idiosyncrasies,  that  is,  hath 
no  proper  natural  inclinations,  which  are  not  competent  to 
others  of  the  same  kind  and  condition.”4  It  is  seen,  however, 
that  different  persons  “ of  the  same  kind  and  condition”  may 
soon  manifest  different  inclinations — which  if  not  natural  are 
partly  so,  and  are  traced  to  some  peculiarity  in  their  tempera- 
ment, as  well  as  to  the  effect  of  circumstances. 

Sir  Thomas  Browne5  asks,  “Whether  quails  from  any  idio- 
syncrasy or  peculiarity  of  constitution  do  invariably  feed 
upon  hellebore,  or  rather  sometimes  but  medically  use  the 
same?”  In  like  manner  some  men  are  violently  affected  by 
honey  and  coffee,  which  have  no  such  effects  on  others.  This 
is  bodily  idiosyncrasy.  Sympathy  and  antipathy  — q.  v.,  when 
peculiar,  may  be  traced  to  idiosyncrasy. 

Mr.  Stewart  in  the  conclusion  of  part  second  of  his  Elements, 
says  he  uses  temperament  as  synonymous  with  idiosyncrasy. — 
V.  Temperament. 

IDOL  (t l8to%ov,  from  tlho;,  an  image). — Something  set  up  in  place 
of  the  true  and  the  real.  Hence  Lord  Bacon6  calls  those  false 
appearances  by  which  men  are  led  into  error,  idols.  “ I do 
find,  therefore,  in  this  enchanted  glass  four  idols,  or  false 
appearances,  of  several  distinct  sorts,  every  sort  comprehend- 
ing many  subdivisions : the  first  sort  I call  idols  of  the  nation 


1 Cousin,  Hist,  of  Mod.  Philosophy  lect.  16. 

a Sir  IV.  Hamilton,  Edin.  Rev.,  Oct.,  1S30,  p.  112. 

3 Stewart,  Philosoph.  Essays , essay  iii.  4 Glanvill,  Pre-existence  of  Souls,  c.  10. 

s Vulgar  En'ors,  book  iii.,  chap.  28.  c De  Augment.  Scient lib.  iv.,  cap.  5. 


238 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


IDOL— 

or  tribe  ; the  second,  idols  of  the  den  or  cave  ; the  third,  idols 
of  the  forum;  and  the  fourth,  idols  of  the  theatre.”1 — V. 
Prejudice. 

IGNORANCE,  in  morals  and  jurisprudence,  may  respect  the  law 
or  the  action,  and  is  distinguished  into  ignorantia  juris,  and 
ignorantia  facii. 

Ignorantia  facl i excusat.  Ignorance  of  what  is  done  excuses, 
as,  when  a contract  is  signed  under  a wrong  impression  as  to 
the  meaning  of  the  terms,  such  contract  is  voidable. 

Ignorantia  juris  quod  quisque  tenetur  scive  neminem  excusat. 
Every  man  is  supposed  to  know  the  laws  of  the  land  in  which 
he  lives ; and  if  he  transgress  any  of  them,  although  in  igno- 
rance, he  is  not  excused.  A merchant  continuing  to  deal  in 
goods  which  have  been  declared  contraband  is  liable  to  the 
penalty,  though  he  did  not  know  the  law. 

In  respect  of  an  action,  ignorance  is  called  efficacious  or  con- 
comitant, according  as  the  removal2  of  it  would,  or  would  not, 
prevent  the  action  from  being  done.  In  respect  of  the  agent, 
ignorance  is  said  to  be  vincible  or  invincible,  according  as  it 
can,  or  cannot,  be  removed  by  the  use  of  accessible  means  of 
knowledge. 

Vincible  ignorance  is  distinguished  into  affected  or  wilful,  by 
which  the  means  of  knowing  are  perversely  rejected;  and 
supine  or  crass,  by  which  the  means  of  knowing  are  indolently 
or  stupidly  neglected. 

Ignorance  is  said  to  be  invincible  in  two  ways — in  itself,  and 
also  in  its  cause,  as  when  a man  knows  not  what  he  does, 
through  disease  of  body  or  of  mind ; in  itself  but  not  in  its 
cause,  as  when  a man  knows  not  what  he  does,  through  in- 
toxication or  passion. 

ILLATION  ( illatum , from  infero,  to  bring  in),  or  11  inference 
consists  in  nothing  but  the  perception  of  the  connection  there 
is  between  the  ideas  in  each  step  of  the  deduction,  whereby 
the  mind  comes  to  see  either  the  certain  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of  any  two  ideas,  as  in  demonstration,  in  which  it  arrives 

1 De  Interpretations  Natures , sect.  39 ; Reid,  Intell.  Paw.,  essay  iv.,  chap.  8. 

2 Aristotle  (Ethic.,  lib.  iii.,  cap.  1)  takes  a difference  between  an  action  done  through 
ignorance  ( 6ia  ayvoiav),  and  an  action  done  ignorantly  (ayvdwv).  In  the  former  case 
the  ignorance  is  the  direct  cause  of  the  action,  in  the  latter  case  it  is  an  accident  or 
concomitant. 


VOCABULARY  OR  PHILOSOPHY. 


239 


ILLATION  - 

at  knowledge ; or  their  probable  connection  on  which  it  with- 
holds its  assent,  as  in  opinion.”1  — F.  Inference,  Induction. 

ILLUMINATI  {illumino,  to  enlighten).  — The  name  given  to  a 
secret  society  said  to  exist  in  Germany  and  other  countries  of 
Europe,  towards  the  close  of  the  last  century.  They  pro- 
fessed the  purest  principles  of  virtue ; but  their  real  design 
was  to  subvert  all  religion  and  all  government.  Doubts  have 
been  entertained  as  to  the  extent  and  influence  of  any  such 
society  ; and  some  have  even  denied  its  existence.2 

IMAGINATION.  — “ Nihil  aliud  est  imaginari  quam  rei  corporeae 
figuram  seu  imaginem  contemplari.”  3 

Mr.  Addison4 5  says,  “ The  pleasures  of  imagination  are  such 
as  arise  from  visible  objects,  since  it  is  the  sense  of  sight  that 
furnishes  the  imagination  with  its  ideas.”  Dr.  Reid  says, 
“ Imagination,  in  its  proper  sense,  signifies  a lively  conception 
of  objects  of  sight.  It  is  distinguished  from  conception,  as  a 
part  from  a whole.”  But  a much  wider  signification  has  been 
given  to  the  word  by  others. 

“By  imagination  we  mean,  in  a comprehensive  sense,  that 
operation  of  the  mind  by  which  it — (1)  receives,  (2)  retains, 
(3)  recalls,  and  (4)  combines,  according  to  higher  laws  the 
ideal  images  furnished  to  it  by  the  caenesthesis  and  by  the 
senses ; for  all  these  acts  are  manifestly  links  of  one  chain. 
At  the  first  step,  we  usuall}7  call  this  operation6  the  faculty  of 
conception  ; at  the  second,  memory  ; at  the  third,  reproductive 
fancy  ; and  at  the  fourth,  productive  fancy.”6 

“ In  the  language  of  modern  philosophy,  the  word  imagina- 
tion seems  to  denote — first,  the  power  of  apprehending  or  con- 
ceiving ideas,  simply  as  they  are  in  themselves,  without  any 
view  to  their  reality ; secondly,  the  power  of  combining  into 
new  forms  or  assemblages,  those  thoughts,  ideas,  or  notions, 
which  we  have  derived  from  experience  or  from  information. 


1 Locke,  Essay- on  Hum.  Understand.,  b.  iv.,  c.  17. 

a Robison,  Proofs  of  a Conspiracy , dec.  8 Descartes,  Medit.  Secunda. 

4 Spectator , No.  411. 

5 “ It  would  be  well,  if  instead  of  speaking  of  the  powers  of  the  mind  (which  causes 

a misunderstanding),  we  adhere  to  the  designation  of  the  several  operations  of  one 

mind;  which  most  psychologists  recommend,  but  in  the  sequel  forget.” 

8 Feuchtersleben,  Med.  Psychol .,  p.  120.  8yo,  1847. 


240 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


IMAGINATION  — 

Those  two  powers,  though  distinguishable,  are  not  essentially 
different.” 1 

“Imagination  as  reproductive,  stores  the  mind  with  ideal 
images,  constructed  through  the  medium  of  attention  and 
memory,  out  of  our  immediate  perceptions.  These  images, 
when  laid  up  in  the  mind,  form  types  with  which  we  can  com- 
pare any  new  phenomena  we  meet  with,  and  which  help  us  to 
begin  the  important  work  of  reducing  our  experience  to  some 
appreciable  degree  of  unity. 

“ To  understand  the  nature  of  productive  or  creative  imagina- 
tion, we  must  suppose  the  reproductive  process  to  be  already 
in  full  operation,  that  is,  we  must  suppose  a number  of  ideas 

to  be  already  formed  and  stored  up  within  the  mind 

They  may  now  be  combined  together  so  as  to  form  new  images, 
which,  though  composed  of  the  elements  given  in  the  original 
representations,  yet  are  now  purely  mental  creations  of  our 
own.  Thus,  I may  have  an  image  of  a rock  in  my  mind,  and 
another  image  of  a diamond.  I combine  these  two  together 
and  create  the  purely  ideal  representation  of  a diamond 
rock.”2 

IMAGINATION  and  FANCY.  — “A  man  has  imagination  in 
proportion  as  he  can  distinctly  copy  in  idea  the  impressions 
of  sense  ; it  is  the  faculty  which  images  within  the  mind  the 
phenomena  of  sensation.  A man  has  fancy  in  proportion  as 
he  can  call  up,  connect,  or  associate  at  pleasure,  these  internal 
images  (far-edfa,  is  to  cause  to  appear)  so  as  to  complete  ideal 
representations  of  absent  objects.  Imagination  is  the  power 
of  depicting,  and  fancy,  of  evoking  or  combining.  The  ima- 
gination is  formed  by  patient  observation ; the  fancy,  by  a 
voluntary  activity  in  shifting  the  scenery  of  the  mind.  The 
more  accurate  the  imagination,  the  more  safely  may  a painter, 
or  a poet,  undertake  a delineation  or  description,  without  the 
presence  of  the  objects  to  be  characterized.  The  more  versa- 
tile th a fancy,  the  more  original  and  striking  will  be  the  deco- 
rations produced.”3 

Wordsworth4  finds  fault  with  the  foregoing  discrimination, 

1 Beattie,  Dissert.,  Of  Imagination,  chap.  1. 

a Morell,  Psychol.,  pp.  175,  176.  8vo,  Load.,  1853.  3 Taylor,  Synonyms. 

4 Preface  to  his  Worlcs,  vol.  i.,  12mo,  Lond.,  1836. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


241 


IMAGINATION  — 

and  says,  “ It  is  not  easy  to  find  how  imagination  thus  ex- 
plained, differs  from  distinct  remembrance  of  images ; or 
fancy,  from  quick  and  vivid  recollection  of  them ; each  is 
nothing  more  than  a mode  of  memory.”  According  to  Words- 
worth, “ imagination , in  the  sense  of  the  poet,  has  no  reference 
to  images  that  are  merely  a faithful  copy,  existing  in  the  mind, 
of  absent  external  objects;  but  is  a word  of  higher  import, 
denoting  operations  of  the  mind  upon  these  objects,  and  pro- 
cesses of  creation  or  composition  governed  by  fixed  laws.” 

“ It  is  the  divine  attribute  of  the  imagination,  that  it  is  irre- 
pressible, unconfinable ; that  when  the  real  world  is  shut  out, 
it  can  create  a world  for  itself,  and  with  a necromantic  power, 
can  conjure  up  glorious  shapes  and  forms,  and  brilliant  visions 
to  make  solitude  populous,  and  irradiate  the  gloom  of  the 
dungeon.”  — W.  Irving. 1 

“And  as  imagination  bodies  forth 
The  form  of  things  unknown,  the  poet’s  pen 
Turns  them  to  shapes,  and  gives  to  nothing 
A local  habitation  and  a name.” 

To  imagine  in  this  high  and  true  sense  of  the  word,  is  to 
realize  the  ideal,  to  make  intelligible  truths  descend  into  the 
forms  of  sensible  nature,  to  represent  the  invisible  by  the 
visible,  the  infinite  by  the  finite.  In  this  view  of  it,  imagina- 
tion maybe  regarded  as  the  differentia  of  man — the  distinctive 
mark  which  separates  him  a grege  mutorum.  That  the  inferior 
animals  have  memory,  and  what  has  been  called  passive  ima- 
gination, is  proved  by  the  fact  that  they  dream  — and  that  in 
this  state  the  sensuous  impressions  made  on  them  during  their 
waking  hours,  are  reproduced.  But  they  show  no  trace  of  that 
higher  faculty  or  function  which  transcends  the  sphere  of 
sense,  and  which  out  of  elements  supplied  by  things  seen  and 
temporal,  can  create  new  objects,  the  contemplation  of  which 
lifts  us  to  the  infinite  and  the  unseen,  and  gives  us  thoughts 
which  wander  through  eternity.  High  art  is  highly  meta- 
physical, and  whether  it  be  in  poetry  or  music,  in  painting  or 
in  sculpture,  the  triumph  of  the  artist  lies  not  in  presenting  us 
with  an  exact  transcript  of  things  that  may  be  seen,  or  heard, 
or  handled  in  the  world  around  us,  but  in  carrying  us  across 
the  gulf  which  separates  the  phenomenal  from  the  real,  and 


22 


1 Sketch  Bonk. 
It 


242 


VOCABULARY  01’  PHILOSOPHY. 


IMAGINATION  — 

placing  us  in  the  presence  of  the  truly  beautiful,  and  surround- 
ing us  with  an  atmosphere  more  pure  than  that  which  the  sun 
enlightens.  , 

IMAGINATION  and  CONCEPTION.  — “ The  business  of  con- 
ception,”  says  Mr.  Stewart,1  “ is  to  present  us  with  an  exact 
transcript  of  what  we  have  felt  or  perceived.  But  we  have, 
moreover,  a power  of  modifying  our  conceptions,  by  combining 
the  parts  of  different  ones  together,  so  as  to  form  new  wholes 
of  our  own  creation.  I shall  employ  the  word  imagination  to 
express  this  power,  and  I apprehend  that  this  is  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word  ; if  imagination  be  the  power  which  gives 
birth  to  the  productions  of  the  poet  and  the  painter.  This  is 
not  a simple  faculty  of  the  mind.  It  presupposes  abstraction 
to  separate  from  each  other  qualities  and  circumstances  which 
have  been  perceived  in  conjunction  ; and  also  judgment  and 
taste  to  direct  us  in  forming  the  combinations.”  And  ho 
adds,2  “The  operations  of  imagination  are  by  no  means  con- 
fined to  the  materials  which  conception  furnishes,  but  may  be 
equally  employed  about  all  the  subjects  of  our  knowledge.” — 
V.  Conception,  Fancy. 

IMAGINATION  and  MEMORY. — “ Memory  retains  and  recalls 
the  past  in  the  form  which  it  assumed  when  it  was  previously 
before  the  mind.  Imagination  brings  up  the  past  in  new 
shapes  and  combinations.  Both  of  them  are  reflective  of 
objects;  but  the  one  maybe  compared  to  the  mirror  which 
reflects  whatever  has  been  before  it,  in  its  proper  form  and 
colour ; the  other  may  be  likened  to  the  kaleidoscope  which 
reflects  what  is  before  it  in  an  infinite  variety  of  new  forms 
and  dispositions.”3 

“ Music  when  soft  voices  die 
Yibratc9  in  the  memory; 

Odours,  when  sweet  violets  sicken, 

Live  within  the  sense  they  quicken.” — Shelley. 

See  Hunt,  Imagination  and  Fancy ; Wordsworth,  Preface  to 
Lyrical  Ballads;  Edin.  Review  for  April,  1842,  article  on 
Moore’s  Poems ; Akenside,  Pleasures  of  Imagination. 

IMITATION  ( imitor , quasi  mimiior,  from  Yossius.)  — 


1 Elements , chap.  3. 

3 M‘Cosh,  Typical  Foi'ms.  p.  450. 


3 Chap.  0. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


243 


IMITATION— 

“is  a facultie  to  expresse  livelie  and  perfitelie  that  example, 
which  ye  go  about  to  follow.” 1 

’As  a social  and  improvable  being,  man  has  been  endowed 
with  a propensity  to  do  as  he  sees  others  do.  This  propensity 
manifests  itself  in  the  first  instance  spontaneously  or  instinc- 
tively. Children  try  to  follow  the  gestures  and  movements 
of  others,  before  their  muscles  are  ready  to  obey,  and  to  imi- 
tate sounds  which  they  hear,  before  their  voice  is  able  to  do  so. 
Mr.  Stewart2  has  made  a distinction  between  the  propensity 
and  the  power  of  imitation.  Both  are  peculiarly  strong  and 
lively  in  children,  and  answer  the  most  important  purposes. 
But  the  propensity  to  imitate  what  others  do,  and  the  manner 
of  doing  it,  continues  throughout  life,  and  requires  to  be  care- 
fully watched  and  properly  directed. 

Alan  not  only  imitates  his  fellow-creatures,  but  tries  to  copy 
nature  in  all  her  departments.  In  the  fine  arts  he  imitates 
the  forms  which  strike  and  please  him.  And  the  germ  of 
some  of  the  highest  discoveries  in  science  has  been  found  in 
attempts  to  copy  the  movements  and  processes  of  nature.3 
IMMANENCE  implies  the  unity  of  the  intelligent  principle  in 
creation,  in  the  creation  itself,  and  of  course  includes  in  it 
every  genuine  form  of  pantheism.  Transcendence  implies  the 
existence  of  a separate  divine  intelligence,  and  of  another  and 
spiritual  state  of  being,  intended  to  perfectionate  our  own.”4 
IMMANENT  ( immaneo,  to  remain  in),  means  that  which  does 
not  pass  out  of  a certain  subject  or  certain  limits.  “ Logicians 
distinguish  two  kinds  of  operations  of  the  mind ; the  first  kind 
produces  no  effect  without  the  mind,  the  last  does.  The  first 
they  call  immanent  acts;  the  second  transitive.  All  intellec- 
tual operations  belong  to  the  first  class;  they  produce  no  effect 
upon  any  external  object.”5 

“Even  some  voluntary  acts,  as  attention,  deliberation,  pur- 
pose, are  also  immanent.”  6 

“Conceiving,  as  well  as  projecting  or  resolving,  are  what 

1 Ascham,  The  Schulemaster , b.  ii. 

a Elements , vol.  iii.,  chap.  2. 

8 Reid,  Act.  Powers,  essay  iii.,  part  i.,  chap.  2. 

4 J.  D.  Morell,  Manchester  Papers , No.  2,  pp.  10S-9. 

6 Reid,  Intell.  Pow..  essay  ii.,  chap.  14. 

6 Correspondence  of  Dr.  Reid,  p.  81. 


244 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


IMMANENT  — 

the  schoolmen  called  immanent  acts  of  the  mind,  which  pro- 
duce nothing  beyond  themselves.  But  painting  is  a transitive 
act,  which  produces  an  effect  distinct  from  the  operation,  and 
this  effect  is  the  picture.” 1 

The  logical  sense  assigned  to  this  word  by  Kant,  is  some- 
what different.  According  to  him  we  make  an  immanent  and 
valid  use  of  the  forms  of  the  understanding,  and  conceive  of 
the  matter,  furnished  by  the  senses,  according  to  our  notions, 
of  time  and  space.  But  when  we  try  to  lift  ourselves  above 
experience  and  phenomena,  and  to  conceive  of  things  as  they 
are  in  themselves,  we  are  making  a transcendent  and  illegiti- 
mate use  of  our  faculties. 

Theologians  say,  God  the  Father  generated  the  Son  by  an 
immanent  act,  but  he  created  the  world  by  a transient  act. 

The  doctrine  of  Spinoza2  is,  Dens  est  omnium  rerum  causa 
immanens,  non  vero  transiens, — that  is,  all  that  exists,  exists 
in  God ; and  there  is  no  difference  in  substance  between  the 
universe  and  God. 

“We  are  deceived,  when,  judging  the  infinite  essence  by  our 
narrow  selves,  we  ascribe  intellections , volitions,  decrees,  pur- 
poses, and  such  like  immanent  actions  to  that  nature  which  hath 
nothing  in  common  with  us,  as  being  infinitely  above  us.”3 
IMMATEEIALXSM  is  the  doctrine  of  Bishop  Berkeley,  that 
there  is  no  material  substance,  and  that  all  being  may  be  re- 
duced to  mind,  and  ideas  in  a mind. 

Swift,  in  a letter  to  Lord  Carteret,  of  date  3d  September, 
1724,  speaking  of  Berkeley,  says,  “Going  to  England  very 
young,  about  thirteen  years  ago,  he  became  founder  of  a sect 
there,  called  the  immaterialists,  by  the  force  of  a very  curious 
book  upon  that  subject.” 

“ In  the  early  part  of  his  own  life,  he  (Dr.  Reid)  informs  us 
that  he  was  actually  a convert  to  the  scheme  of  immaterialism  ; 
a scheme  which  he  probably  considered  as  of  a perfectly  in- 
offensive tendency,  so  long  as  he  conceived  the  existence  of 
the  material  world  to  be  the  only  point  in  dispute.”4 

A work  published  a few  years  ago  in  defence  of  Berkeley’s 


1 Reid,  Inlell.  Poiv .,  essay  iv.,  chap.  1. 

3 Glanvill,  Vanity  of  Dogmatizing,  edit.  1661,  p.  101. 

4 Reid,  Intell.  Dow.,  essay  ii.,  chap.  10. 


Ethic.,  pars  1,  pref.  18. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


245 


IMMATERIALISM— 

doctrine,  was  entitled  Immaterialism ; and  a prize  offered  to 
any  one  who  would  refute  the  reasoning  of  it.  • 

IMMATERIALITY  is  predicated  of  mind,  to  denote  that  as  a 
substance  it  is  different  from  matter.  Spirituality  is  the  posi- 
tive expression  of  the  same  idea.  Simplicity  is  also  used  in 
the  same  sense.  Matter  is  made  up  of  parts  into  which  it  can 
be  resolved.  Mind  is  simple  and  has  no  parts,  and  so  cannot 
be  dissolved.  The  materiality  of  the  soul  was  maintained  by 
Tertullian,  Arnobius,  and  others,  during  the  three  first  cen- 
turies. At  the  end  of  the  fourth,  the  immateriality  of  the 
soul  was  professed  by  Augustin,  Nemesius,  and  Mamertus 
Claudianus.1 

IMMORTALITY  (OE  THE  SOUL)  is  one  of  the  doctrines  of 
natural  religion.  At  death  the  body  dies,  and  is  dissolved 
into  its  elements.  The  soul  being  distinct  from  the  body,  is 
not  affected  by  the  dissolution  of  the  body.  How  long,  or  in 
what  state  it  may  survive  after  the  death  of  the  body,  is  not 
intimated  by  the  term  immortality.  But  the  arguments  to 
prove  that  the  soul  survives  the  body,  all  go  to  favour  the 
> belief  that  it  will  live  for  ever. 

See  Plato,  Plicedon;  Porteus,  Sermons;  Sherlock,  On  the 
Immortality  of  the  Soul;  "Watson,  Intimations  of  a Future 
Slate ; Bakewell,  Evidence  of  a Future  State;  Autenrieth,  On 
Man , and  his  Hope  of  Immortality,  Tubingen,  1815. 

IMMUTABILITY  is  the  absence  or  impossibility  of  change.  It 
is  applied  to  the  Supreme  Being  to  denote  that  there  can  be 
no  inconstancy  in  his  character  or  government.  It  was  argued 
for  by  the  heathens.  See  Bishop  Wilkins,  Natural  Religion. 

IMPENETRABILITY  is  one  of  the  primary  qualities  of  matter, 
in  virtue  of  which  the  same  portion  of  space  cannot  at  the 
same  time  be  occupied  by  more  than  one  portion  of  matter. 
It  is  extension,  or  the  quality  of  occupying  space.  A nail 
driven  into  a board  does  not  penetrate  the  wood ; it  merely 
separates  and  displaces  the  particles.  Things  are  penetrable, 
when  two  or  more  can  exist  in  the  same  space — as  two  angels ; 
impenetrable,  when  not — as  two  stones. 

IMPERATE.  — V.  Elicit,  Act. 

IMPERATIVE  ( imperativ ),  that  which  contains  a should  or  ought 


oo  * 


1 Guizot,  Hist,  of  Civiliz.,  yol.  i.,  p.  394. 


246 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


IMPERATIVE  - 

( sollen ).  It  is  the  formula  of  the  commandment  ( gebot ) of 
reason. 

IMPERATIVE  (CATEGORICAL,  THE),  is  the  phrase  em- 
ployed by  Kant,  to  denote  that  the  moral  law  is  absolute  and 
obligatory.  The  practical  reason  speaks  to  us  in  the  caierjorical 
imperative,  that  is,  in  seeing  an  action  to  be  right,  we  see,  at 
the  same  time,  that  we  ought  to  do  it.  And  this  sense  of 
obligation  springs  from  no  view  of  the  consequences  of  the 
action,  as  likely  to  be  beneficial,  but  is  a primitive  and  abso- 
lute idea  of  the  reason ; involving,  according  to  Kant,  the 
power  to  obey,  or  not  to  obey.  We  are  under  obligation, 
therefore  we  are  free.  Moral  obligation  implies  freedom. 
IMPOSSIBLE  (THE),  or  that  which  cannot  be,  has  been  distin- 
guished as  the  metaphysically  or  absolutely  impossible,  or  that 
which  implies  a contradiction,  as  to  make  a square  circle,  or 
two  straight  lines  to  enclose  a space ; the  physically  impossible, 
the  miraculous,  or  that  which  cannot  be  brought  about  by 
merely  physical  causes,  or  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  na- 
ture, as  the  death  of  the  soul ; and  the  ethically  impossible,  or 
that  which  cannot  be  done  without  going  against  the  dictates 
of  right  reason,  or  the  enactments  of  law,  or  the  feelings  of 
propriety.  That  which  is  morally  impossible,  is  that  against 
the  occurrence  of  which  there  is  the  highest  probable  evidence, 
as  that  the  dice  should  turn  up  the  same  number  a hundred 
successive  times.1 

“ It  may  be  as  really  impossible  for  a person  in  his  senses, 
and  without  any  motive  urging  him  to  it,  to  drink  poison,  as 
it  is  for  him  to  prevent  the  elfects  of  it  after  drinking  it ; but 
who  sees  not  these  impossibilities  to  be  totally  different  in 
their  foundation  and  meaning?  or  what  good  reason  can  there 
be  against  calling  the  one  a moral  and  the  other  a natural 
impossibility  ? ” 2 

IMPRESSION  ( imprimo , to  press  in,  or  on),  is  the  term  employed 
to  denote  the  change  on  the  nervous  system  arising  from  a 
communication  between  an  external  object  and  a bodily  organ. 
It  is  obviously  borrowed  from  the  effect  which  one  piece  of 
matter  which  is  hard  has,  if  pressed  upon  another  piece  of 
matter  which  is  softer;  as  the  seal  leaving  its  impression  or 


Whatoly,  Log.,  Append,  i. 


Price,  Review,  chap.  10,  p.  131. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


247 


IMPRESSION  - 

configuration  upon  the  wax.  It  is  not  intended,  however,  to 
convey  any  affirmation  as  to  the  nature  of  the  change  which 
is  effected  in  the  nervous  system,  or  as  to  the  nature  of  sensa- 
tion ; and  still  less  to  confound  this  preliminary  change  with 
the  sensation  itself.  The  term  impression  is  also  applied  to 
the  effects  produced  upon  the  higher  sensibility,  or  our  senti- 
ments. Thus,  we  speak  of  moral  impressions,  religious  im- 
pressions, impressions  of  sublimity  and  beauty. 

Ilume  divided  all  modifications  of  mind  into  impressions  and 
ideas.  Ideas  were  impressions  when  first  received ; and  became 
ideas  when  remembered  and  reflected  on.1 

“Mr.  Stewart2  seems  to  think  that  the  word  impression  ~wsls 
first  introduced  as  a technical  term,  into  the  philosophy  of 
mind,  by  Hume.  This  is  not  altogether  correct ; for,  besides 
the  instances  which  Mr.  Stewart  himself  adduces,  of  the  il- 
lustration attempted,  of  the  phenomena  of  memory  from  the 
analogy  of  an  impress  and  a trace,  words  corresponding  to 
impression  were  among  the  ancients  familiarly  applied  to  the 
processes  of  external  perception,  imagination,  &c.,  in  the 
Atomistic,  the  Platonic,  the  Aristotelian,  and  the  Stoical  phi- 
losophies ; while  among  modern  psychologists  (as  Descartes 
and  Gassendi),  the  term  was  likewise  in  common  use.”3 

Dr.  Reid4  distinguishes  the  impressions  made  on  the  or- 
gans of  sense  into  mediate  and  immediate.  The  impressions 
made  on  the  sense  of  touch  are  immediate,  the  external  body 
and  the  organ  being  in  contact.  The  impressions  made  on 
the  ear  by  sounding  bodies  are  mediate,  requiring  the  air 
and  the  vibrations  of  the  air  to  give  the  sensation  of  hearing. 
It  may  be  questioned  whether  this  distinction  is  well  or  deeply 
founded.5 

IMPULSE  and  IMPULSIVE  ( impello , to  drive  on),  are  used 
in  contradistinction  to  reason  and  rational,  to  denote  the  in- 
fluence of  appetite  and  passion  as  differing  from  the  authority 
of  reason  and  conscience.  “ It  may  happen,  that  when  pppe- 


1 See  Reid,  Inlcll.  Pow.,  essay  i.,  chap.  1. 

Q Elements , vol.  iii.,  Addenda  to  vol.  i , p.  43. 

3 Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  field's  Works,  p.  294,  note.  4 Intell.  row.,  essay  ii. 

6 See  Dr.  Young,  Intell.  Philosophy  p.  71;  Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  field's  Works,  p.  104. 


248 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


IMPULSE  — 

tite  draws  one  way,  it  may  be  opposed,  not  by  any  appetite  or 
passion,  but  by  some  cool  principle  of  action,  which  has  au- 
thority without  any  impulsive  force.1 

“Passion  often  gives  a violent  impulse  to  the  will,  and 
makes  a man  do  what  he  knows  he  shall  repent  as  long  as  he 
lives.”2 

IMPUTATION  ( imputo , to  ascribe,  to  charge),  is  a judgment  by 
which  a person  is  considered  the  author  of  an  action.  In  all 
moral  action  there  is  the  presence  of  knowledge  and  intention 
on  the  part  of  the  agent.  In  such  cases  he  is  held  to  be 
responsible,  and  the  action  is  imputed  to  him  or  set  down  to 
his  account. 

INCLINATION  ( inclino , to  lean  towards),  is  a form  or  degree  of 
natural  desire.  It  is  synonymous  with  propensity  or  with  the 
penchant  of  the  French.  It  is  more  allied  to  affection  than  to 
appetite.  “ It  does  not  appear  that  in  things  so  intimately 
connected  with  the  happiness  of  life,  as  marriage  and  tho 
choice  of  an  employment,  parents  have  any  right  to  force 
the  inclinations  of  their  children.”3  — V.  Disposition,  Ten- 
dency. 

INDEFINITE  ( in  and  dejinilum,  that  which  is  not  limited), 
means  that,  the  limits  of  which  are  not  determined,  or  at  least 
not  so  determined  as  to  be  apprehended  by  us.  The  definite  is 
that  of  which  the  form  and  limits  are  determined  and  appre- 
hended by  us.  That  of  which  we  know  not  the  limits,  comes 
to  be  regarded  as  having  none;  and  hence  indefinite  has  been 
confounded  with  the  infinite.  But  they  ought  to  be  carefully 
distinguished.  The  infinite  is  absolute  ; it  is  that  of  which  we 
not  only  know  not  the  limits,  but  which  has  and  can  have  no 
limit.  The  indefinite  is  that  of  which  there  is  no  limit  fixed. 
You  can  suppose  it  enlarged  or  diminished,  but  still  it  is  finite.4 
— F.  Infinite. 

INDIFFERENCE  (Liberty  of)  is  that  state  of  mind  in  which 
the  will  is  not  influenced  or  moved  to  choose  or  to  refuse  an 


1 Reid,  Act.  Pow .,  essay  iii.,  pt.  ii.,  chap.  1.  a Ibid.,  chap.  6. 

3 Beattie,  Mor.  Science , vol.  ii.,  part  ii. 

4 Leibnitz,  Discours  de  la  Conformity  de  la  Foi  et  de  la  Faison,  sect.  70;  Descartes, 
Princip.  Philosophy  pars  1,  c.  26,  et  27. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


249 


INDIFFERENCE  — 

object,  but  is  equally  ready  to  do  either.  It  is  also  called 
liberty  of  contrariety.  It  should  rather  be  called  liberty  of 
indetermination,  or  that  state  in  which  the  mind  is  when  it 
has  not  determined  to  do  one  of  two  or  more  things. — V. 
Liberty,  Will. 

INDIFFERENT.  — An  action  in  morals  is  said  to  be  indifferent , 
that  is,  neither  right  nor  wrong,  when,  considered  in  itself,  or 
in  specie,  it  is  neither  contrary  nor  conformable  to  any  moral 
law  or  rule ; as,  to  bow  the  head.  Such  an  action  becomes 
right  or  wrong,  when  the  end  for  which  it  is  done,  or  the  cir- 
cumstances in  which  it  is  done  are  considered.  It  is  then 
regarded  in  individuo ; as,  to  bow  the  head,  in  token  of 
respect,  or  in  a temple,  in  token  of  adoration. 
INDIFFERENTISM  or  IDENTISM  — q.  v.,  is  sometimes  em- 
ployed to  denote  the  philosophy  of  Schelling,  according  to 
which  there  is  no  difference  between  the  real  and  the  ideal,  or 
the  idea  and  the  reality,  or  rather  that  the  idea  is  the  reality. 

Indifferentism  is  also  used  to  signify  the  want  of  religious 
earnestness.  “ In  the  indifferentism  of  the  Lutheran  Church, 
we  see  a marked  descent  towards  the  rationalism  which  has 
overspread  the  states  of  Germany.”1 
INDISCERNIBLES  (Identity  of  ).  — It  is  a doctrine  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  Leibnitz,  that  no  two  things  can  be  exactly  alike. 
The  difference  between  them  is  always  more  than  a numerical 
difference.  We  may  not  always  be  able  to  discern  it,  but  still 
there  is  a difference^  Two  things  radically  indiscernible  the 
one  from  the  other,  that  is,  having  the  same  qualities,  and  of 
the  same  quantity,  would  not  be  two  things,  but  one.  For  the 
qualities  of  a thing  being  its  essence,  perfect  similitude  would 
be  identity.  But  Kant  objected  that  two  things  perfectly 
alike,  if  they  did  not  exist  in  the  same  place  at  the  same  time, 
would,  by  this  numerical  difference,  be  constituted  different 
individuals.2 

“ There  is  no  such  thing  as  two  individuals  indiscernible  from 
each  other.  An  ingenious  gentleman  of  my  acquaintance, 
discoursing  with  me,  in  the  presence  of  Her  Electoral  High- 
ness the  Princess  Sophia,  in  the  garden  of  Ilerenhausen, 


1 Dr.  Yaughan,  Essays , vol.  ii.,  p.  255. 

a Leibnitz,  Nouveaux  Essais,  AvantrPrapos. 


250 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


INDISCERNIBLES  — 

thought  he  could  find  two  leaves  perfectly  alike.  The  Prin- 
cess defied  him  to  do  it,  and  he  ran  all  over  the  garden  a long 
time  to  look  for  some,  but  it  was  to  no  purpose.  Two  drops 
of  water,  or  milk,  viewed  through  a microscope,  will  appear 
distinguishable  from  each  other.  This  is  an  argument  against 
atom's ; which  are  confuted,  as  well  as  a vacuum,  by  the  prin- 
ciples of  true  metaphysics. 

“ To  suppose  two  things  indiscernible,  is  to  suppose  the  same 
thing  under  two  names.”1 

“ From  the  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason  I infer  that 
there  cannot  be  in  nature  two  real  beings  absolutely  indiscern- 
ible; because  if  there  were,  God  and  nature  would  act  without 
reason,  in  treating  the  one  differently  from  the  other ; and 
thus  God  does  not  produce  two  portions  of  matter  perfectly 
equal  and  alike.” 2 

INDIVIDUAL,  INDIVIDUALISM,  INDIVIDUALITY,  IN- 
DIVIDUATION (from  in  and  divido,  to  divide). 

Individual  was  defined  by  Porphyry — Id  cujus  proprietates  alteri 
simul  convenire  non  possunt. 

“An  object  which  is,  in  the  strict  and  primary  sense,  one, 
and  cannot  be  logically  divided,  is  called  individual.”3 

An  individual  is  not  absolutely  indivisible,  but  that  which 
cannot  be  divided  without  losing  its  name  and  distinctive 
qualities,  that  which  cannot  be  parted  into  several  other  things 
of  the  same  nature,  is  an  individual  whole.  A stone  or  a 
piece  of  metal  may  be  separated  into  parts,  each  of  which  shall 
continue  to  have  the  same  qualities  as  the  whole.  But  a plant 
or  an  animal  when  separated  into  parts  loses  its  individuality  ; 
which  is  not  retained  by  any  of  the  parts.  We  do  not  ascribe 
individuality  to  brute  matter.  But  what  is  that  which  distin- 
guishes one  organized  being,  or  one  living  being,  or  one 
thinking  being  from  all  others  ? This  is  the  question  so  much 
agitated  by  the  schoolmen,  concerning  the  principle  of  indivi- 
duation. In  their  barbarous  Latin  it  was  called  llcecceictas, 
that  is,  that  in  virtue  of  which  they  say  this  and  not  that ; or 
Ecceietas,  that  of  which  we  say,  lo ! here,  and  not  anywhere 


1 Leibnitz,  Fourth  Paper  to  Clarice,  p.  95. 

2 Jbid.,  Fifth  Paper  to  Clarice. 

3 Whately,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  5,  g 5. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


251 


INDIVIDUAL  - 

else.  Peter,  as  an  individual,  possesses  many  properties  which 
are  quiddaiive,  or  common  to  him  with  others,  such  as  substan- 
tiaUtas,  corporeieias,  animalitas,  Humanilas.  But  he  has  also 
a reality,  which  may  he  called  Petreietas  or  Peterness,  which 
marks  all  the  others  with  a difference,  and  constitutes  him 
Peter.  It  is  the  Hcecceietas  which  constitutes  the  principle  of 
individuation.  It  was  divided  into  the  extrinsic  and  intrinsic. 

The  number  of  properties  which  constituted  an  individuum 
extrinsecum , are  enumerated  in  the  following  versicle  : — 

Forma,  figura,  locus,  tempus,  cum  nomine,  sanguis , 

Faina,  sunt  septem,  quce  non  habet  unum  et  alter. 

You  may  call  Socrates  a philosopher,  bald,  big-bellied,  the 
son  of  Sophroniscus,  an  Athenian,  the  husband  of  Xantippe, 
&c.,  any  one  of  which  properties  might  belong  to  another  man; 
but  the  congeries  of  all  these  is  not  to  be  found  but  in 
Socrates. 

The  intrinsic  principle  of  individuation,  is  the  ultimate 
reality  of  the  being — ipsa  rei  entitas.  In  physical  substances, 
the  intrinsic  principle  of  individuation  is  ipsa  materia  et  forma 
cum  unione. 

Hutcheson1  has  said,  “ Si  quceratur  de  causa  cur  res  sit  una, 
aut  de  Individuationii  principio  in  re  ipsa;  non  aliud  assig- 
nandum,  qnam  ipsa  rei  natura  existens.  Qucecunque  enim  causa 
rem  quamlibet  fecerat  aut  creaverat,  earn  unam  etiam  fecerat,  aut 
individuam,  quo  sensu  volunt  Metaphysici.” 

Leibnitz  has  a dissertation,  De  principio  Individuationis, 
which  has  been  thought  to  favour  nominalism.  Yet  he  main- 
tained that  individual  substances  have  a real  positive  exist- 
ence, independent  of  any  thinking  subject. 

Individuality,  like  personal  identity,  belongs  properly  to  intelli- 
gent and  responsible  beings.  Consciousness  reveals  it  to  us 
that  no  being  can  be  put  in  our  place,  nor  confound ed-witij. 
us,  nor  we  with  others.  We  are  one  and  indivisible. 

“ Individuality  \s  scarcely  to  be  found  among  the  inferior 
animals.  When  it  is,  it  has  been  acquired  or  taught.  Indivi- 
duality is  not  individualism.  The  latter  refers  everything  to 


1 Metaphys.,  pars  1,  chap.  3. 


252 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


INDIVIDUAL  — 

self,  and  secs  nothing  but  self  in  all  things.  Individuality  con- 
sists only  in  willing  to  be  self,  in  order  to  be  something.”1 

But  in  the  Elements  of  Individualism , 2 the  word  individual- 
ism is  used  in  the  sense  assigned  above  to  individuality. 
INDUCTION  (Method  or  Process  of)  [inayuyrj,  inductio). — “It 
has  been  said  that  Aristotle  attributed  the  discovery  of  induc- 
tion to  Socrates,  deriving  the  word  irtayuyri  from  the  Socratic 
accumulation  of  instances,  serving  as  antecedents  to  establish 
the  requisite  conclusion.”3 * * 

“ Inductio  est  argumentum  quo  ex plurium  singidarium  rccen- 
sione  aliquid  universale  concluditur.”* 

Inductio  est  argumentum  quo  prolatur  quid  verum  esse  de 
quopiam  generali,  ex  eo  quod  verum  sit  de pariicularibus  omnibus, 
saltern  de  tot  ut  sit  credible .B 

Induction  is  a kind  of  argument  which  infers,  respecting  a 
whole  class,  what  has  been  ascertained  respecting  one  or  more 
individuals  of  that  class.6 

“ Induction  is  that  operation  of  mind  by  which  we  infer 
that  what  we  know  to  be  true  in  a particular  case  or  cases, 
will  be  true  in  all  cases  which  resemble  the  former  in  certain 
assignable  respects.  In  other  words,  induction  is  the  process 
by  which  we  conclude  that  what  is  true  of  certain  individuals 
of  a class,  is  true  of  the  whole  class,  or  that  what  is  true  at 
certain  times  will  be  true  under  similar  circumstances  at  all 
times.7 

“ Induction  is  usually  defined  to  be  the  process  of  drawing 
a general  rule  from  a sufficient  number  of  particular  cases ; 
deduction  is  the  converse  process  of  proving  that  some  property 
belongs  to  the  particular  case  from  the  consideration  that  it 
belongs  to  the  whole  class  in  which  the  case  is  found.  That 
all  bodies  tend  to  fall  towards  the  earth  is  a truth  which  we 
have  obtained  from  examining  a number  of  bodies  coming  under 
our  notice,  by  induction;  if  from  this  general  principle  we 
- — f^-gue  that  the  stone  we  throw  from  our  hand  will  show  the 
same  tendency,  we  adopt  the  deductive  method 

1 Vinot,  Essais  de  Philosophy  Mor Paris,  1847,  p.  142. 

a By  William  Maccall,  8vo,  Lond.,  1847.  3 Devey,  Log.,  p.  151,  note. 

4 Le  Grand,  Inst.  Philosophy  p.  57,  edit.  1675. 

6 Wallis,  Inst.  Log.,  p.  198,  4th  edit. 

a Whately,  Log.,  book  ii.,  chap.  5,  § 5.  7 Mill,  Log.,  b.  iii.,  ch.2,  £TL 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


253 


INDUCTION— 

More  exactly,  we  may  define  the  inductive  method  as  the 
process  of  discovering  laws  and  rules  from  facts,  and  causes 
from  effects ; and  the  deductive,  as  the  method  of  deriving 
facts  from  laws  and  effects  from  their  causes.”  1 

According  to  Sir  William  Hamilton,2  “ Induction  has  been 
employed  to  designate  three  very  different  operations  — 1. 
The  objective  process  of  investigating  particular  facts,  as  pre- 
paratory to  induction,  which  is  not  a process  of  reasoning  of 
any  kind.  2.  A material  illation  of  the  universal  from  the 
singular,  as  warranted  either  by  the  general  analogy  of  na- 
ture, or  the  special  presumptions  afforded  by  the  object-mat- 
ter of  any  real  science.  3.  A formal  illation  of  the  universal 
from  the  individual,  as  legitimated  solely  by  the  laws  of 
thought,  and  abstract  from  the  conditions  of  this  or  that  ‘ par- 
ticular matter.’  The  second  of  these  is  the  inductive  method 
of  Bacon,  which  proceeds  by  way  of  rejections  and  conclu- 
sions, so  as  to  arrive  at  those  axioms  or  general  laws  from 
which  we  infer  by  way  of  synthesis  other  particulars  unknown 
to  us,  and  perhaps  placed  beyond  reach  of  direct  examination. 
Aristotle’s  definition  coincides  with  the  third,  and  ‘ induction 
is  an  inference  drawn  from  all  the  particulars.’3  The  second 
and  third  have  been  confounded.  But  the  second  is  not  a 
logical  process  at  all,  since  the  conclusion  is  not  necessarily 
inferrible  from  the  premiss,  for  the  some  of  the  antecedent 
does  not  necessarily  legitimate  the  all  of  the  conclusion,  not- 
withstanding that  the  procedure  may  be  warranted  by  the 
material  problem  of  the  science  or  the  fundamental  princi- 
ples of  the  human  understanding.  The  third  alone  is  pro- 
perly an  induction  of  Logic ; for  Logic  does  not  consider 
things,  but  the  general  forms  of  thought  under  which  the 
mind  conceives  them  ; and  the  logical  inference  is  not  deter- 
mined by  any  relation  of  casuality  between  the  premiss  and 
the  conclusion,  but  by  the  subjective  relation  of  reason  and 
consequence  as  involved  in  the  thought.” 

“ The  Baconian  or  Material  Induction  proceeds  on  the 
assumption  of  general  laws  in  the  relations  of  physical  phe- 
nomena, and  endeavours,  by  select  observations  and  experi- 


‘ Thomson,  Outline  of  the  Laws  of  Thought,  2d  edit.,  pp.  321,  323. 

3 Discussions,  p.  156.  3 Prior  Analyl.,  ii.,  c.  23. 

23 


254 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


INDUCTION— 

ments,  to  detect  the  law  in  any  particular  case.  This,  whatever 
be  its  value  as  a general  method  of  physical  investigation,  has 
no  place  in  Formal  Logic.  The  Aristotelian  or  Formal  Induc- 
tion proceeds  on  the  assumption  of  general  laws  of  thought, 
and  inquires  into  the  instances  in  which,  by  such  laws,  we 
are  necessitated  to  reason  from  an  accumulation  of  particular 
instances  to  an  universal  rule.”1 

On  the  difference  between  induction  as  known  and  prac- 
tised by  Aristotle,  and  as  recommended  by  Lord  Bacon,  see 
Stewart.2 

INDUCTION  (Principle  of). — By  the  principle  of  induction  is 
meant  the  ground  or  warrant  on  which  we  conclude  that  what 
has  happened  in  certain  cases,  which  have  been  observed,  will 
also  happen  in  other  cases,  which  have  not  been  observed. 
This  principle  is  involved  in  the  words  of  the  wise  man,3  “ The 
thing  that  hath  been,  it  is  that  which  shall  be : and  that 
which  is  done  is  that  which  shall  be  done.”  In  nature  there 
is  nothing  insulated.  All  things  exist  in  consequence  of  a 
sufficient  reason,  all  events  occur  according  to  the  efficacy  of 
proper  causes.  In  the  language  of  Newton,  EJfectuum  natu- 
ralium  ejusdem  generis  eccdetn  sunt  causce.  The  same  causes 
produce  the  same  effects.  The  principle  of  induction  is  an 
application  of  the  principle  of  casuality.  Phenomena  have 
their  proper  causes,  and  these  causes  operate  according  to  a 
fixed  law.  This  law  has  been  expressed  by  saying,  substance 
is  persistent.  Our  belief  in  the  established  order  of  nature 
is  a primitive  judgment,  according  to  Dr.  Reid  and  others, 
and  the  ground  of  all  the  knowledge  we  derive  from  experi- 
ence. According  to  others  this  belief  is  a result  or  inference 
derived  from  experience.  *On  the  different  views  as  to  this 
point  compare  Mill’s  Log.,*  with  Whewell’s  Philosophy  of 
Inductive  Sciences ,5  Also,  the  Quarterly  Review .6 

On  the  subject  of  induction  in  general,  see  Reid,  Intell. 
row.;1  Inquiry ;8  Stewart,  Elements;9  Philosoph.  Essays;10 
Royer  Collard,  GEuvres  de  Reid,  par  Mons.  Jouffroy.11 


1 Mansel,  Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  209.  3 Elements , part  ii.,  chap.  4,  sect.  2. 

3 Eccles.  i.  9.  4 B.  iii.,  ch.  3.  6 Book  i.,  cb.  6. 

6 Yol.  lxviii.  7 Essay  vi.,  ch.  5.  8 Cb.  vi.,  sect.  24. 

9 Vol.  i.,  ch.  4,  sect.  5.  10  P.  74.  11  Tom.  iv.,  p.  277. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


255 


INERTIA.  — That  property  of  matter  by  -which  it  would  always 
continue  in  the  same  state  of  rest  or  motion  in  which  it  was 
put,  unless  changed  by  some  external  force.  Resistance  to 
change  of  state.  The  quantity  of  matter  in  a body  is  deter- 
mined by  its  quantity  of  inertia  ; and  this  is  estimated  by  the 
quantity  of  force  required  to  put  it  in  motion  at  a given  rate. 
Kepler  conceiving  the  disposition  of  a body  to  maintain  its 
state  of  motion  as  indicating  an  exertion  of  power,  prefixed 
the  word  vis  to  inertia.  Leibnitz  maintained  that  matter  mani- 
fests force  in  maintaining  its  state  of  rest. 

“ The  vis  insita,  or  innate  force  of  matter,  is  a power  of 
resisting  by  which  every  body,  as  much  as  in  it  lies,  endea- 
vours to  persevere  in  its  present  state,  whether  it  be  of  rest  or 
of  moving  uniformly  forward  in  a straight  line.  This  force 
is  ever  proportional  to  the  body  whose  force  it  is;  and  differs 
nothing  from  the  inactivity  of  the  mass  but  in  our  manner  of 
conceiving  it.  A body,  from  the  inactivity  of  matter,  is  not 
without  difficulty  put  out  of  its  state  of  rest  or  motion.  Upon 
which  account  this  vis  insita  may,  by  a most  significant  name, 
be  called  vis  inertia;,  or  force  of  inactivity.” 1 
IN  ESSE ; IN  POSSE.  — Things  that  are  not,  but  which  may  be, 
are  said  to  be  in  posse ; things  actually  existing  are  said  to  be 
in  esse. 

INFERENCE  ( infero , to  bear,  or  bring  in),  is  of  the  same  deriva- 
tion as  illation  and  induction  — q.  v. 

“ To  infer  is  nothing  but  by  virtue  of  one  proposition  laid 
down  as  true,  to  draw  in  another  as  true ; i.  e.,  to  see,  or  sup- 
pose such  a connection  of  the  two  ideas  'of  the  inferred 
proposition.”  2 

“An  inference  is  a proposition  which  is  perceived  to  be  true, 
because  of  its  connection  with  some  known  fact.  There  are 
many  things  and  events  which  are  always  found  together ; or 
which  constantly  follow  each  other : therefore,  when  we 
observe  one  of  these  things  or  events,  we  infer  that  the  other 
also  exists,  or  has  existed,  or  will  soon  take  place.  If  we  see 
the  prints  of  human  feet  on  the  sands  of  an  unknown  coast, 
we  infer  that  the  country  is  inhabited  ; if  these  prints  appear 
to  be  fresh,  and  also  below  the  level  of  high  water,  we  infer 


1 Newton,  Princep defin.  3. 

3 Locke,  Essay  on  Uum.  Understand book  iv.,  ch.  17. 


256 


VOCABULARY  OIT  I’HILOSOPIIY. 


INFERENCE  — 

that  the  inhabitants  are  at  no  great  distance  ; if  the  prints 
are  those  of  naked  feet,  we  infer  that  these  inhabitants  are 
savages  ; or  if  they  are  the  prints  of  shoes,  we  infer  that  they 
are,  in  some  degree,  civilized.” 1 

“ We  ought  to  comprehend,  within  the  sphere  of  inference, 
all  processes  wherein  a truth,  involved  in  a thought  or 
thoughts  given  as  antecedent,  is  evolved  in  a thought  which 
is  found  as  consequent.” 2 

“We  infer  immediately,  either  by  contraposition,  by  subal- 
ternation,  by  opposition  (proper),  or  by  conversion.”3 
Mediate  inference  is  the  syllogistic. 

INFERENCE  and  PROOF. — “Reasoning  comprehends  inferring 
and  proving  ; which  are  not  two  different  things,  but  the  same 
thing  regarded  in  two  different  points  of  view;  like  the  road 
from  London  to  York,  and  the  road  from  York  to  London. 
Ho  who  infers,  proves;  and  he  who  proves,  infers;  but  the 
word  infer  fixes  the  mindyirsi  on  the  premiss  and  then  on  the 
conclusion ; the  word  prove,  on  the  contrary,  leads  the  mind 
from  the  conclusion  to  the  premiss.  Hence,  the  substantives 
derived  from  these  words  respectively,  are  often  used  to  ex- 
press that  which,  on  each  occasion,  is  last  in  the  mind  ; infer- 
ence being  often  used  to  signify  the  conclusion  ( i . e.,  proposi- 
tion inferred),  and  proof,  the  premiss.  To  infer,  is  the  business 
of  the  philosopher ; to  prove,  of  the  advocate.” 4 * 

Proving  is  the  assigning  a reason  (or  argument)  for  the 
support  of  a given  proposition  ; inferring  is  the  deduction  of  a 
conclusion  from  given  premisses.”  6 

“When  the  grounds  for  believing  anything  are  slight,  we 
term  the  mental  act  or  state  induced  a conjecture;  when  they 
are  strong,  we  term  it  an  inference  or  conclusion.  Increase 
the  evidence  for  a conjecture,  it  becomes  a conclusion ; diminish 
the  evidence  for  a conclusion,  it  passes  into  a conjecture.”6 — • 
V.  Fact. 

INFINITE  [in  and  finitum,  unlimited  or  rather  limitless). — 
In  geometry,  infinite  is  applied  to  quantity  which  is  greater 


1 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought.  3 Spalding.,  Log.,  p.  1. 

‘ Whately,  Log.,  b.  iv„  ch.  3,  § 1.  1 Whately,  ibid. 

6 S.  Bailey,  Theory  of  Reasoning,  pp.  31,  32,  8vo,  Lond.,  1851 


* Ibid.,  p.  160. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


257 


INFINITE  - 

than  any  assignable  magnitude.  But  strictly  speaking  it 
means  that  which  is  not  only  without  determinate  bounds,  but 
which  cannot  possibly  admit  of  bound  or  limit. 

“ The  infinite  expresses  the  entire  absence  of  all  limitation, 
and  is  applicable  to  the  one  infinite  Being  in  all  his  attributes. 
The  absolute  expresses  perfect  independence,  both  in  being 
and  in  action.  The  unconditioned  indicates  entire  freedom 
from  every  necessary  relation.  The  whole  three  unite  in 
expressing  the  entire  absence  of  all  restriction.  But  let  this 
be  particularly  observed,  they  do  not  imply  that  the  one 
infinite  Being  cannot  exist  in  relation , they  only  imply  that  He 
cannot  exist  in  a necessary  relation,  that  is,  if  He  exist  in 
relation,  that  relation  cannot  be  a necessary  condition  of  his 
existence.”1 — V.  Absolute,  Unconditioxed. 

As  to  our  idea  of  the  infinite  there  are  two  opposite 
opinions. 

According  to  some,  the  idea  is  purely  negative,  and  springs 
up  when  we  contemplate  the  ocean  or  the  sky,  or  some  ob- 
ject of  vast  extent  to  which  we  can  assign  no  limits.  Or,  if 
the  idea  has  anything  positive  in  it,  that  is  furnished  by 
the  imagination,  which  goes  on  enlarging  the  finite  without 
limit. 

On  the  other  hand  it  is  said  that  the  enlarging  of  the  finite 
can  never  furnish  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  but  only  of  the 
indefinite.  The  indefinite  is  merely  the  confused  apprehension 
of  what  may  or  may  not  exist.  But  the  idea  of  the  infinite 
is  the  idea  of  an  objective  reality,  and  is  implied  as  a necessary 
condition  of  every  other  idea.  We  cannot  think  of  body  but 
as  existing  in  space,  nor  of  an  event  but  as  occurring  in 
time ; and  space  and  duration  are  necessarily  thought  of  as 
infinite. 

But  have  we  or  can  we  have  knowledge  of  the  infinite? 
Boethius2  is  quoted  as  saying,  “ Infinitorum  nulla  cognitio  est; 
infinita  namque  animo  comprehendi  nequeunt ; quod  autem 
ratione  mentis  circumdari  non  potest,  nullius  scientiae  fine 
coneluditur  ; quare  infinitorum  scientia  nulla  est.” 

On  the  other  hand,  Cudworth3  has  said, — “ Since  infinite  is 

1 Calderwood,  Philosoph.  of  the  Infinite , p.  37. 

3 In  Prccd.}  p.  113,  edit.  Bas. 

23* 


s 


3 Intell.  System,  p.  449. 


258 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


INFINITE  — 

the  same  with  absolutely  perfect,  we  having  a notion  or  idea 
of  the  latter  must  needs  have  of  the  former.” 

But,  while  we  cannot  comprehend  the  infinite,  we  may  ap- 
prehend it  in  contrast  or  relation  with  the  finite.  And  this  is 
what  the  common  sense  of  men  leads  them  to  rest  satisfied 
with,  and,  without  attempting  the  metaphysical  difficulty  of 
reconciling  the  existence  of  the  infinite  with  that  of  the  finite, 
to  admit  the  existence  of  both. 

“ Truth  is  bigger  than  our  minds,  and  we  are  not  the  same 
with  it,  but  have  a lower  participation  only  of  the  intellectual 
nature,  and  are  rather  apprehenders  than  comprehenders  there- 
of. This  is  indeed  one  badge  of  our  creaturely  state,  that  we 
have  not  a perfectly  comprehensive  knowledge,  or  such  as 
is  adequate  and  commensurate  to  the  essence  of  things.”  — 
Cud  worth. 

Ancillon,  Essai  sur  I’lclee  et  le  Sentiment  de  Vlnfini;  Cousin, 
Cours  de  Philosophy  et  Hist,  de  la  Philosoph. ; Sir  ~W.  Hamil- 
ton, Discussions  on  Philosophy,  &c. ; L.  Velthuysen,  Dissertatio 
de  Finito  et  Iifinito;  Descartes,  Meditations. 

“ The  infinite  and  the  indefinite  may  be  thus  distinguished : 
the  former  implies  an  actual  conceiving  the  absence  of  limits; 
the  latter  is  a not  conceiving  the  presence  of  limits — processes 
as  different  as  searching  through  a house  and  discovering  that 
a certain  person  is  not  there,  as  from  shutting  our  eyes  and 
not  seeing  that  he  is  there.  Infinity  belongs  to  the  object  of 
thought;  indefiniteness  to  the  manner  of  thinking  of  it.”1 
INFLUX  (Physical)  ( influo , to  flow  in),  is  one  of  the  theories 
as  to  our  perception  of  external  objects.  — ” The  advocates  of 
this  scheme  maintained  that  real  things  are  the  efficient  causes 
of  our  perceptions,  the  word  efficient  being  employed  to 
signify  that  the  things  by  means  of  some  positive  power  or 
inherent  virtue  which  they  possess,  were  competent  to  transmit 

to  the  mind  a knowledge  of  themselves External 

objects  were  supposed  to  operate  on  the  nervous  system  by  the 
transmission  of  some  kind  of  influence,  the  nervous  system  was 
supposed  to  carry  on  the  process  by  the  transmission  of  certain 
images  or  representations,  and  thus  our  knowledge  of  external 


1 Mansel,  Led.  on  Philosoph.  of  Kant,  p.  29. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


259 


INFLUX  — 

things  was  supposed  to  be  brought  about.  The  representa- 
tions alone  came  before  the  mind ; the  things  by  which  they 
were  caused  remained  occult  and  unknown.”* 1  — V.  Causes 
.(Occasional). 

INJURY  ( injuria , from  in  and  jus,  neglect  or  violation  of  right), 
in  morals  and  jurisprudence  is  the  intentional  doing  of 
wrong.  We  may  bring  harm  or  evil  upon  others  without  in- 
tending it.  But  injury  implies  intention,  and  awakens  a sense 
of  injustice  and  indignation,  when  it  is  done.  It  is  on  this 
difference  in  the  meaning  of  harm  and  injury  that  Bishop 
Butler  founds  the  distinction  of  resentment  into  sudden  and 
deliberate.2 

INNATE  (IDEAS).  — Ideas,  as  to  their  origin,  have  been  distin- 
guished into  adventitious,  or  such  as  we  receive  from  the 
objects  of  external  nature,  as  the  idea  or  notion  of  a moun- 
tain, or  a tree ; factitious,  or  such  as  we  frame  out  of  ideas 
already  acquired,  as  of  a golden  mountain,  or  of  a tree  with 
golden  fruit ; and  innate,  or  such  as  are  inborn  and  belong  to 
the  mind  from  its  birth,  as  the  idea  of  God  or  of  immortality. 
Cicero,  in  various  passages  of  his  treatise  De  Natura  Deorum, 
speaks  of  the  idea  of  God  and  of  immortality  as  being  inserted, 
or  engraven,  or  inborn  in  the  mind.  “Ititelligi  necesse  est,  esse 
deos,  quoniam  insitas  eorum,  vel  potius  innatas  cognitiones  habe- 
mus.”3  In  like  manner,  Origen4  has  said,  “ That  men  would 
not  be  guilty  if  they  did  not  carry  in  their  mind  common 
notions  of  morality,  innate  and  written  in  divine  letters.”  It 
was  in  this  form  that  Locke5  attacked  the  doctrine  of  innate 
ideas.  It  has  been  questioned,  however,  whether  the  doctrine, 
as  represented  by  Locke,  was  really  held  by  the  ancient  phi- 
losophers. And  Dr.  Hutcheson6  has  the  following  passage : — 
“Chimes  autem  ideas,  apprehensiones,  etjudicia,  quae  de  rebus, 
duce  natura,  formamus,  quocunque  demum  tempore  hoc  fiat,  sive 
quee  naturae  nostree  viribus  quibuscunque,  necessario  fere,  atque 
universaliler1  reeipiuntur,  innata  quantum  memini,  dixerunt 

1 Ferrier,  Inst,  of  Mdaphys .,  p.  472.  2 Butler,  Sermons,  viii.  and  9. 

3 Lib.  i.,  sect.  17.  4 Adv.  Celsum,  lib  i.,  cap.  4. 

8 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand .,  book  i. 

6 Oratio  Inaugurates,  De  Naturali  hominum,  Socieiate . 

1 We  have  here,  in  1730,  the  two  marks  of  necessity  and  universality  which  subse- 

quently were  so  much  insisted  on  by  Kant  and  others  as  characterizing  all  our  a priori 

cognitions. 


260 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


INNATE - 

antiqui.”  Among  modern  philosophers  it  would  he  difficult 
to  name  any  who  held  the  doctrine  in  the  form  in  which  it  has 
been  attacked  by  Locke.  In  calling  some  of  our  ideas  innate 
they  seem  merely  to  have  used  this  word  as  synonymous  with 
natural,  and  applied  it,  as  Hutcheson  thinks  the  ancients  did, 
to  certain  ideas  which  men,  as  human  or  rational  beings, 
necessarily  and  universally  entertain.  — See  Natural  as  dis- 
tinguished from  Innate. 

“ There  arc  three  senses  in  which  an  idea  may  be  supposed 
to  be  innate;  one,  if  it  be  something  originally  superadded  to 
our  mental  constitution,  either  as  an  idea  in  the  first  instance 
fully  developed  ; or  as  one  undeveloped,  but  having  the  power 
of  self-development:  another,  if  the  idea  is  a subjective  con- 
dition of  any  other  ideas,  which  we  receive  independently  of 
the  previous  acquisition  of  this  idea,  and  is  thus  proved  to  be 
in  some  way  embodied  in,  or  interwoven  with,  the  powers  by 
which  the  mind  receives  those  ideas:  a third,  if,  without  being 
a subjective  condition  of  other  ideas,  there  be  any  faculty  or 
faculties  of  mind,  the  exercise  of  which  would  suffice,  inde- 
pendently of  any  knowledge  acquired  from  without,  spontane- 
ously to  produce  the  idea.  In  the  first  case,  the  idea  is  given 
us  at  our  first  creation,  without  its  bearing  any  special  rela- 
tion to  our  other  faculties ; in  the  second  case,  it  is  given  us 
as  a form,  either  of  thought  generally  or  of  some  particular 
species  of  thought,  and  is  therefore  embodied  in  mental  powers 
by  which  we  are  enabled  to  receive  the  thought;  in  the  third 
case,  it  is,  as  in  the  second,  interwoven  in  the  original  consti- 
tution of  some  mental  power  or  powers ; not,  however,  as  in 
the  preceding  case,  simply  as  a pre-requisite  to  their  exercise, 
but  by  their  being  so  formed  as  by  exercise  spontaneously  to 
produce  the  idea.”1 

The  first  of  these  three  is  the  form  in  which  the  doctrine  of 
innate  ideas  is  commonly  understood.  This  doctrine  was  at 
one  time  thought  essential  to  support  the  principles  of  natural 
religion  and  morality.  But  Locke  saw  that  these  principles 
were  safe  from  the  attacks  of  the  sceptic,  although  a belief  in 
God  and  immortality,  and  a sense  of  the  difference  between 


1 Dr.  Alliot,  Psychology  and  Theology , p.  93,  12mo,  Lond.,  1855. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOFHY. 


261 


INNATE  — 

right  and  wrong  were  not  implanted  or  inserted  in  the  mind ; 
if  it  could  he  shown  that  men  necessarily  and  universallij  came 
to  them  by  the  ordinary  use  of  their  faculties.  He  took  a 
distinction  between  an  innate  law,  and  a law  of  nature;'  and 
while  he  did  not  admit  that  there  was  a law  “ imprinted  on 
our  minds  in  their  very  original/'  contended  “ that  there  is  a 
law  knowable  by  the  light  of  nature.”  In  like  manner, 
Bishow  Law1 2  said,  “It  will  really  come  to  the  same  thing 
with  regard  to  the  usual  attributes  of  God,  and  the  nature  of 
virtue  and  vice,  whether  the  Deity  has  implanted  these  in- 
stincts and  affections  in  us,  or  has  framed  and  disposed  us  in 
such  a manner  — has  given  us  such  powers  and  placed  us  in 
such  circumstances,  that  we  must  necessarily  acquire  them.” 
V.  Nature  (Law  of). 

“ Though  it  appears  not  that  we  have  any  innate  ideas  or 
formed  notions  or  principles  laid  in  by  nature,  antecedently 
to  the  exercise  of  our  senses  and  understandings  ; yet  it  must 
be  granted  that  we  were  born  with  the  natural  faculty, 
whereby  we  actually  discern  the  agreement  or  disagreement 
of  some  notions,  so  soon  as  we  have  the  notions  themselves ; 
as,  that  we  can  or  do  think,  that  therefore  we  ourselves  are ; 
that  one  and  two  make  three,  that  gold  is  not  silver,  nor  ice 
formally  water ; that  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part,  &c., 
and  if  we  should  set  ourselves  to  do  it,  we  cannot  deliberately 
and  seriously  doubt  of  its  being  so.  This  we  may  call  intui- 
tive knowledge,  or  natural  certainty  wrought  into  our  very 
make  and  constitution.”3 

“ Some  writers  have  imagined,  that  no  conclusions  can  be 
drawn  from  the  state  of  the  passions  for  or  against  the  Divine 
Benevolence,  because  they  are  not  innate  but  acquired.  This 
is  frivolous.  If  we  are  so  framed  and  placed  in  such  circum- 
stances, that  all  these  various  passions  must  be  acquired  ; it 
is  just  the  same  thing  as  if  they  had  been  planted  in  us  ori- 
ginally.” 4 

“ Ni  nos  idees,  ni  nos  sentiments,  ne  sont  innes,  mais  ils 
sont  naturels,  fondes  sur  la  constitution  de  notre  esprit  et  de 

1 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  book  i.,  ch.  3. 

3 King’s  Essay  on  Origin  of  Evil,  p.  79,  note. 

3 Oldfield,  Essay  on  Reason,  p.  5,  8vo,  Lond.,  1707. 

* Balguy,  Divine  Benevolence,  p.  100,  note. 


262 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


INNATE  — 

notre  ame,  et  sur  nos  rapports  avec  tout  ce  qui  nous  envi- 
ronne.” — Turgot,* 1  quoted  by  Cousin.2 

“We  are  prepared  to  defend  the  following  propositions  in 
regard  to  innate  ideas,  or  constitutional  principles  of  the  mind. 
First, — Negatively,  that  there  are  no  innate  ideas  in  the  mind 
(1.)  as  images  or  mental  representations;  nor  (2.)  as  abstract 
or  general  notions;  nor  (3.)  as  principles  of  thought,  belief, 
or  action  before  the  mind  as  principles.  But,  Second, — Posi- 
tively (1.)  that  there  are  constitutional  principles  operating  in 
the  mind,  though  not  before  the  consciousness  as  principles  ; 
(2.)  that  these  come  forth  into  consciousness  as  individual 
(not  general)  cognitions  or  judgments;  and  (3.)  that  these 
individual  exercises,  when  carefully  inducted,  but  only  when 
so,  give  us  primitive  or  philosophic  truths.  It  follows  that, 
while  these  native  principles  operate  in  the  mind  spontane- 
ously, we  are  entitled  to  use  them  reflexly  in  philosophic  or 
theologic  speculations  only  after  having  determined  their 
nature  and  rule  by  abstraction  and  generalization.”3 

“ Though  man  does  not  receive  from  his  Maker  either  spe- 
culative or  moral  maxims,  as  rules  of  judgment  and  of  con- 
duct, like  so  many  perfect  innate  propositions  enforcing  assent 
in  his  very  infancy ; yet  he  has  received  that  constitution  of 
mind  which  enables  him  to  form  to  himself  the  general  rules 
or  first  principles  on  which  religion  and  science  must  be  built, 
when  he  allows  himself  these  advantages  of  cultivation  and 
exercise,  which  every  talent  he  possesses  absolutely  requires. 
And  this  is  all  that  is  pleaded  for ; and  it  is  sufficient  for  the 
end.  Nor  is  there  anything  either  mystical,  or  unphilosophi- 
cal,  or  unscriptural  in  the  notion.  For  if  the  proposition  be 
not  strictly  innate,  it  arises  from  an  innate  power,  which,  in  a 
sound  mind,  cannot  form  a proposition  in  any  other  way  that 
will  harmonize  with  enlightened  reason  and  purified  moral 
sentiment  than  in  that  to  which  the  natural  bias  of  the  mind 
leads.”4 

The  doctrine  of  innate  ideas  is  handled  by  Locke  in  his 
Essay  on  Hum.  Understand .,5  and  by  most  authors  who  treat 


1 (Euvres,  tom.  iv.,  p.  308.  3 CEuvres,  1 eerie,  tom.  iv.,  p.  202. 

* M‘Cosh,  Meth.  nf  Div.  Govern.,  p.  508,  5th  edit. 

1 Hancock,  On  Instinct,  p.  414.  * Book  i. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


263 


INNATE  — 

of  intellectual  philosophy. — See  also  Ellis,  Knowledge  of  Divine 
Things;  1 Sherlock,  On  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul.2 

INSTINCT  (eV  or  ivto;  and  intus  pungo),  signifies  an  inter- 
nal stimulus. 

In  its  widest  signification  it  has  been  applied  to  plants  as 
well  as  to  animals ; and  may  he  defined  to  be  “ the  power  or 
energy  by  which  all  organized  forms  are  preserved  in  the  in- 
dividual, or  continued  in  the  species.”  It  is  more  common, 
however,  to  consider  instinct  as  belonging  to  animals.  And 
in  this  view  of  it,  Dr.  Reid3  has  said:  — “By  instinct  I mean 
a natural  blind  impulse  to  certain  actions  without  having  any 
end  in  view,  without  deliberation,  and  very  often  without  any 
conception  of  what  we  do.”  An  instinct,  says  Paley,4  “ is  a 
propensity  prior  to  experience  and  independent  of  instruction.” 
“An  instinct,”  says  Dr.  Whately,5  “is  a blind  tendency  to 
some  mode  of  action  independent  of  any  consideration  on  the 
part  of  the  agent,  of  the  end  to  which  the  action  leads.” 
There  are  two  classes  of  actions,  which,  in  the  inferior 
animals,  have  been  referred  to  instinct  as  their  spring.  1. 
Those  which  have  reference  to  the  preservation  of  individuals 
— as  the  seeking  and  discerning  the  food  which  is  convenient 
for  them,  and  the  using  their  natural  organs  of  locomotion, 
and  their  natural  means  of  defence  and  attack.  2.  Those 
which  have  reference  to  the  continuation  of  the  species  — as 
the  bringing  forth  and  bringing  up  of  their  young. 

The  theories  which  have  been  proposed  to  explain  the 
instinctive  operations  of  the  inferior  animals  may  be  arranged 
in  three  classes. 

I.  According  to  the  physical  theories,  the  operations  of 
instinct  are  all  provided  for  in  the  structure  and  organization 
of  the  inferior  animals,  and  do  not  imply  any  mind  or  soul. 
The  principle  of  life  may  be  developed  — 

1.  By  the  mechanical  play  of  bodily  organs.  See  Descartes, 
Epistles;  Polignac,  Anti- Lucretius; 6 Norris,  Essay  towards 
the  Theory  of  an  Ideal  World d 


1 Pp.  59-86.  2 Chap.  2. 

8 Act.  Pow.,  essay  iii.,  part  1,  chap.  2. 

4 Nat.  Theol.j  chap.  18. 

8 Book  Ti. 


• Tract  on  Instinct , p.  21. 
1 Part  2,  ch.  2. 


264 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


INSTINCT  - 

2.  By  Irritability:  Badham,  Insect  Life ; Mason  Good,  Book 
of  Nature; 1 Virey,  lie  la  Physiologic  dans  ses  rapports,  avec 
la  Philosophic.2 

3.  By  Sensation:  Bushnan,  Philosophy  of  Instinct  and 
Peason;3  Barlow,  Connection  between  Physiology  and  Intellec- 
tual Philosophy ; Kirby,  Bridgewater  Treatise ,4 

II.  According  to  the  psychical  theories,  the  instinctive 
actions  of  the  inferior  animals  are  the  results  of  mental  powers 
or  faculties  possessed  by  them,  analogous  to  those  of  under- 
standing in  man. 

1.  Mr.  Coleridge5  calls  instinct  “ the  power  of  selecting  and 
adapting  means  to  a proximate  end.1'  But  he  thinks  “that 
when  instinct  adapts  itself,  as  it  sometimes  does,  to  varying 
circumstances,  there  is  manifested  by  the  inferior  animals,  an 
instinctive  intelligence,  which  is  not  different  in  kind  from 
understanding,  or  the  faculty  which  judges  according  to  sense 
in  man.” — Green,  Vital  Dynamics ,6 *  or  Coleridge’s  Works I 

2.  Dr.  Darwin8  contends,  that  what  have  been  called  the 
instinctive  actions  of  the  inferior  animals  are  to  be  referred  to 
experience  and  reasoning,  as  well  as  those  of  our  own  species; 
“ though  their  reasoning  is  from  fewer  ideas,  is  busied  about 
fewer  objects,  and  is  exerted  with  less  energy.” 

3.  Mr.  Smellie,9  instead  of  regarding  the  instinctive  actions 
of  the  inferior  animals  as  the  results  of  reasoning,  regards 
the  power  of  reasoning  as  itself  an  instinct.  He  holds 10  that 
“ all  animals  are,  in  some  measure,  rational  beings ; and  that 
the  dignity  and  superiority  of  the  human  intellect  are  neces- 
sary results  of  the  great  variety  of  instincts  which  nature  has 
been  pleased  to  confer  on  the  species.” 

III.  According  to  the  theories  which  may  be  called  hyper- 
psychical,  the  phenomena  of  instinct  are  the  results  of  an 
intelligence,  different  from  the  human,  which  emanates  upon 
the  inferior  animals  from  the  supreme  spirit  or  some  subordi- 
nate spirit. 

This  doctrine  is  wrapped  up  in  the  ancient  fable,  that  the 


* Vol.  ii.,  p.  132.  8 P.  394.  2 P.  178.  * Vol.  ii.,  p.  255. 

1 Aids  to  Reflection,  vol.  i.,  p.  193,  Cth  edit.  6 App.  F,  p.  88. 

’ Vol.  ii.,  App.  B,  5.  s Zoonomia,  vol.  i.,  4to,  p.  256-7. 

8 Philosophy  of  Aat.  Ilist.,  vol.  i.,  4to,  p.  155.  10  P.  159. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


265 


INSTINCT- 

gods,  when  pursued  by  the  Titans,  fled  into  Egypt,  and  took 
refuge  under  the  form  of  animals  of  different  kinds. 

Father  Bougeant,  in  a work  entitled,  A Philosophical 
Amusement  on  the  Language  of  Beasts,  contends  that  the  bodies 
of  the  inferior  animals  are  inhabited  by  fallen  and  reprobate 
spirits. 

Mr.  French1  holds  that  the  actions  of  the  inferior  animals 
are  produced  by  good  and  evil  spirits ; the  former  being  the 
cause  of  the  benevolent,  and  the  latter  of  the  ferocious  in- 
stincts. 

Others  have  referred  the  operations  of  instinct  to  the  direct 
agency  of  the  Creator  on  the  inferior  animals. — See  Newton, 
Optics  ; 2 Spectator  ; 3 Hancock,  Essay  on  Instinct. 

Dr.  Reid4 *  has  maintained,  that  in  the  human  being  many 
actions,  such  as  sucking  and  swallowing,  are  done  by  instinct; 
while  Dr.  Priestley6  regards  them  as  automatic  or  acquired. 
And  the  interpretation  of  natural  signs  and  other  acts  which 
Dr.  Reid  considers  to  be  instinctive,  Dr.  Priestley  refers  to 
association  and  experience. — V.  Appetite. 

INTELLECT  ( intelligo , to  choose  between,  to  perceive  a differ- 
ence).— Intellect,  sensitivity,  and  will,  are  the  three  heads  under 
which  the  powers  and  capacities  of  the  human  mind  are  now 
generally  arranged.  In  this  use  of  it,  the  term  intellect 
includes  all  those  powers  by  which  we  acquire,  retain,  and 
extend  our  knowledge,  as  perception,  memory,  imagination, 
judgment,  &c.  “It  is  by  those  powers  and  faculties  which 
compose  that  part  of  his  nature  commonly  called  his  intellect 
or  tinderstanding  that  man  acquires  his  knowledge  of  external 
objects;  that  he  investigates  truth  in  the  sciences;  that  he 
combines  means  in  order  to  attain  the  ends  he  has  in  view ; 
and  that  he  imparts  to  his  fellow-creatures  the  acquisitions 
he  has  made.”6 

The  intellectual  powers  are  commonly  distinguished  from 
the  moral  powers ; inasmuch  as  it  is  admitted  that  the 


1 Zoological  Journal , No.  1. 

a Book  iii.,  xx.,  query  subjoined.  3 No.  120. 

4 Act.  Pow.,  essay  iii.,  pt.  i.,  chap.  2. 

6 Examin.  of  Reid , &c.,  p.  70. 

6 Stewart,  Active  and  Moral  Powers , Introd. 

24 


266 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


INTELLECT— 

moral  powers  partake  partly  of  the  intellect  and  partly  of  the 
sensitivity,  and  imply  not  only  knowledge  but  feeling. 

And  when  the  moral  powers  are  designated  active,  it  is  not 
meant  to  assert  that  in  exercising  the  intellectual  powers  the 
mind  is  altogether  passive,  but  only  to  intimate  that  while 
the  function  of  the  intellectual  powers  is  to  give  knowledge, 
the  function  of  the  active  and  moral  powers  is  to  prompt  and 
regulate  actions. 

Lord  Monboddo1  reduces  the  gnostic  powers  to  two,  viz. — 
sense  and  intellect.  Under  sense  he  includes  the  phantasy 
and  also  the  comparing  faculty,  and  that  by  which  we  appre- 
hend ideas,  either  single  or  in  combination.  This  he  consi- 
ders to  be  partly  rational,  and  shared  by  us  with  the  brutes. 
But  intellect  or  vovs,  he  considers  peculiar  to  man  — it  is  the 
faculty  by  which  we  generalize  and  have  ideas  altogether 
independent  of  sense.  He  quotes  Ilierocles2  on  the  golden 
verses  of  Pythagoras,  as  representing  the  Xoyo$  or  4. vxrt  ’koyixrl, 
as  holding  a middle  place  betwixt  the  irrational  or  lowest 
part  of  our  nature  and  intellect,  which  is  the  highest. 

“The  term  intellect  is  derived  from  a verb  ( intelligere ), 
which  signifies  to  understand : but  the  term  itself  is  usually 
so  applied  as  to  imply  a faculty  which  recognizes  principles 
explicitly  as  well  as  implicitly ; and  abstract  as  well  as  ap- 
plied ; and  therefore  agrees  with  the  reason  rather  than  the 
understanding ; and  the  same  extent  of  signification  belongs 
to  the  adjective  intellectual.”3 

“ Understanding  is  Saxon  and  intellect  is  Latin  for  nearly 
the  same  idea:  perhaps  understanding  describes  rather  the 
power  of  inference,  a quickness  at  perceiving  that  which 
stands  under  the  object  of  contemplation:  perhaps  intellect 
describes  rather  the  power  of  judgment,  a quickness  at  choos- 
ing between  ( inter  and  legere ) the  objects  of  contemplation.”  4 
Intellect  and  Intellection.—"  The  mind  of  man  is,  by  its  native 
faculty,  able  to  discern  universal  propositions,  in  the  same 
manner  as  the  sense  does  particular  ones — that  is,  as  the  truth 


1 Ancient  Metaphysics , book  ii.,  chap.  7. 

Q P.  160,  edit.  Needhara. 

3 Whewell,  Elements  of  Morality , introd.  12. 

4 Taylor,  Synonyms. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


267 


INTELLECT  — 

of  these  propositions  — Socrates  exists,  An  eagle  flies,  Buce- 
phalus runs,  js  immediately  perceived  and  judged  of  by  the 
sense;  so  these  contradictory  propositions  cannot  be  both  true; 
What  begins  to  exist  has  its  rise  from  another ; Action  argues 
that  a thing  exists  (or,  as  it  is  vulgarly  expressed,  a thing  that 
is  not,  acts  not),  and  such-like  propositions,  which  the  mind 
directly  contemplates  and  finds  to  be  true  by  its  native  force, 
without  any  previous  notion  or  applied  reasoning ; which 
method  of  attaining  truth  is  by  a peculiar  name  styled  intel- 
lection, and  the  faculty  of  attaining  it  the  intellect.” 1 
Intellect  and  Intelligence.  — “ By  Aristotle,  vov;  is  used  to 
denote  — 

“ 1.  Our  higher  faculties  of  thought  and  knowledge. 

“2.  The  faculty,  habit,  or  place  of  principles,  that  is,  of 
self-evident  and  self-evidencing  notions  and  judgments. 

“ The  schoolmen,  following  Boethius,  translated  it  by  intel- 
Icctus  and  intelligentia ; and  some  of  them  appropriated  the 
former  of  these  terms  to  its  first  or  general  signification,  the 
latter  to  its  second  or  special.”2 

Intellect  and  intelligence  are  commonly  used  as  synonymous. 
But  Trusler  has  said,  “ It  seems  to  me  that  intellectus  ought 
to  describe  art  ox  power,  and  intelligentia  ought  to  describe  use 
or  habit  of  the  understanding  ; such  being  the  tendency  of  the 
inflections  in  which  the  words  terminate.  In  this  case  intellect 
or  understanding  power  is  a gift  of  nature  ; and  intelligence, 
or  understanding  habit,  an  accumulation  of  time.  So  discri- 
minated, intellect  is  inspired,  intelligence  is  acquired.  The 
Supreme  Intellect,  when  we  are  speaking  of  the  Wisdom,  the 
Supreme  Intelligence  when  we  are  speaking  of  the  Knowledge 
of  God.  Every  man  is  endowed  with  understanding ; but  it 
requires  reading  to  become  a man  of  intelligence.”  — V.  Rea- 
son, Understanding. 

Intellectus  Patiens,  and  Intellectus  Agens.  — Aristotle3  dis- 
tinguished between  the  intellectus  patiens  and  intellectus  agens. 
The  former,  perishing  with  the  body,  by  means  of  the  senses, 
imagination,  and  memory,  furnished  the  matter  of  knowledge ; 

1 Barrow,  Malhtm.  Lectures,  1734,  p.  72. 

a Sir  William  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works,  note  A,  sect.  5. 

s De  Anima,  cap.  5. 


268 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


INTELLECT  — 

the  latter,  separable  from  the  body,  and  eternal,  gave  that 
knowledge  form.  Under  the  impressions  of  the  senses  the 
mind  is  passive  ; but  while  external  things  rapidly  pass,  ima- 
gination doe3  not  allow  them  altogether  to  escape,  but  the 
knowledge  of  them  is  retained  by  the  memory.  But  this 
knowledge,  being  the  knowledge  of  singulars,  cannot  give 
universal  notions,  but  merely  generalized  ones.  The  intellectus 
agens,  however,  proceeding  upon  the  information  furnished  by 
the  senses,  actually  evolves  the  idea  which  the  intellectus 
paliens  potentially  possessed.  Ilis  illustration  is,  — as  light 
makes  colours  existing  potentially,  actually  to  be,  so  the  intel- 
lects agens  converts  into  actuality,  and  brings,  as  it  were,  to 
a new  life,  whatever  was  discovered  or  collected  by  the  intel- 
lectus patiens.  As  the  senses  receive  the  forms  of  things  ex- 
pressed in  matter,  the  intellect  comprehends  the  universal 
form,  which,  free  from  the  changes  of  matter,  is  really  prior 
to  it  and  underlies  the  production  of  it  as  cause.  The  common 
illustration  of  Aristotle  is  that  the  senses  perceive  the  form 
of  a thing,  as  it  is  to  olfxov  or  a height ; the  intellect  has  know- 
ledge of  it  as  resembling  fu  xoay,  a hollow,  out  of  which  the 
height  was  produced. 

Aristotle  has  often  been  said  to  reduce  all  knowledge  to 
experience.  But  although  he  maintained  that  we  could  not 
shut  our  eyes  and  frame  laws  and  causes  for  all  things,  yet  he 
maintained,  while  he  appealed  to  experience,  that  the  intellect 
was  the  ultimate  judge  of  what  is  true.1 

According  to  Thomas  Aquinas,2  “■Intellectus  noster  nihil  intel- 
ligit  sine  phantasmate.”  But  he  distinguished  between  the 
intellect  passive  and  the  intellect  active ; the  one  receiving  im- 
pressions from  the  senses,  and  the  other  reasoning  on  them. 
Sense  knows  the  individual,  intellect  the  universal.  You  see 
a triangle,  but  you  rise  to  the  idea  of  triangularity.  It  is  this 
power  of  generalizing  which  specializes  man  and  makes  him 
what  he  is,  intelligent. 

INTENT  or  INTENTION  ( in-tendo,  to  tend  to),  in  morals  and 
in  law,  means  that  act  of  the  mind  by  which  we  contemplate 


1 See  Hermann  Rassow,  Arisloklis  de  A'otionis  Definitions  Doclrina,  Berol.,  1343. 

a Adu.  Genks,  lib.  iii.,  cap.  41. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


2G9 


INTENT  - 

and  design  the  accomplishment  of  some  end.  It  is  followed 
by  the  adoption  and  use  of  suitable  means.  But  this  is  more 
directly  indicated  by  the  word  purpose.  “He  had  long  har- 
boured the  intention  of  taking  away  the  life  of  his  enemy,  and 
for  this  purpose  he  provided  himself  with  weapons.”  Purpose 
is  a step  nearer  action  than  intention.  But  both  in  law  and  in 
morals,  intention,  according  as  it  is  right  or  wrong,  good  or 
bad,  affects  the  nature  or  character  of  the  action  following. 
According  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Church  of  Rome,  intention 
may  altogether  change  the  nature  of  an  action.  Killing  may 
be  no  murder,  if  done  with  the  intention  of  freeing  the  church 
from  a persecutor,  and  society  from  a tyrant.  And  if  a priest 
administers  any  of  the  sacraments  without  the  intention  of 
exercising  his  priestly  functions,  these  sacraments  may  be 
rendered  void. — V.  Election. 

INTENTION  (Logical). 

Quoth  he,  whatever  others  deem  ye, 

I understand  your  metonymy,1 * 
Your  words  of  second-hand  intention , 

When  things  by  wrongful  names  you  mention. 

Butler,  Hudibras  .* 

Intention,  with  logicians,  has  the  same  meaning  as  notion; 
as  it  is  by  notions  the  mind  tends  towards  or  attends  to  objects. 
— V.  Notion. 

Intention  (First  and  Second). 

“Nouns  of  the  first  intention  are  those  which  are  imposed 
upon  things  as  such,  that  conception  alone  intervening,  by 
which  the  mind  is  carried  immediately  to  the  thing  itself. 
Such  are  man  and  stone.  But  nouns  of  the  second  intention 
are  those  which  are  imposed  upon  things  not  in  virtue  of  what 
they  are  in  themselves,  but  in  virtue  of  their  being  subject  to 
the  intention  which  the  mind  makes  concerning  them ; as, 
when  we  say  that  man  is  a species,  and  animal  a genus.”3 

Raoul  le  Breton,  Super  Lib.  Poster.  Analyt.  He  was  a 
Thomist. 


1 “The  transference  of  words  from  the  primary  to  a secondary  meaning,  is  what 

grammarians  call  metonymy.  Thus  a door  signifies  both  an  opening  in  the  wall  (more 
strictly  called  the  doorway)  and  a board  which  closes  it;  which  are  things  neither 
similar  nor  analogous.” — Wbately,  Log.,  b.  iii.,  § 10. 

3 Part  ii.,  canto  3,  1.  587.  3 Aquinas,  Opuscula , xlii.,  art.  12,  ad  init. 

24* 


270 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


INTENTION  - 

See  Tractutio  cle  Secundis  Intentionibus  secundum  docirinam 
Scoti.  By  Sarnanus,  4to,  Ursellis,  1622. 

Aj first  intention  may  be  defined  “ a conception  of  a thing  or 
things  formed  hy  the  mind  from  materials  existing  without 
itself.” 

A second  intention  is  “a  conception  of  another  conception 
or  conceptions  formed  by  the  mind  from  materials  existing  in 
itself.”  Thus  the  conceptions  “man,  animal,  whiteness,”  &c., 
are  framed  from  marks  presented  hy  natural  objects.  “The 
conceptions,  genus,  species,  accident,  &c.,  are  formed  from  the 
frst  intentions  themselves  viewed  in  certain  relations  to  each 
other.”  1 

INTERPRETATION  of  NATURE.— “ There  are,”  says  Bacon,2 
“ two  ways,  and  can  he  only  two,  of  seeking  and  finding 
truth.  One  springs  at  once  from  the  sense,  and  from  par- 
ticulars, to  the  most  general  axioms ; and  from  principles 
thus  obtained,  and  their  truth  assumed  as  a fixed  point,  judges 
and  invents  intermediate  axioms.  This  is  the  way  now  in 
use.  The  other  obtains  its  axioms  (that  is,  its  truths)  also 
from  the  sense  and  from  particulars,  by  a connected  and  gra- 
dual progress,  so  as  to  arrive,  in  the  last  place,  at  the  most 
general  truths.  This  is  the  true  way,  as  yet  untried.  The 
former  set  of  doctrines  we  call,”  he  says,3  “ for  the  sake  of 
clearness,  1 Anticipation  of  Nature,’  the  latter  the  ‘Interpreta- 
tion of  Nature.’  ” 

INTUITION  (from  intueor,  to  behold).  — “Sometimes  the  mind 
perceives  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas  imme- 
diately by  themselves,  without  the  intervention  of  any  other ; 
and  this,  I think,  we  may  call  intuitive  knowledge.  For  in 
this  the  mind  is  at  no  pains  of  proving  or  examining,  but 
perceives  the  truth  as  the  eye  doth  the  light,  only  by  being 
directed  towards  it.  Thus,  the  mind  perceives  that  white  is 
not  black,  that  a circle  is  not  a triangle,  that  three  are  more 
than  two,  and  equal  to  one  and  two.”4 

“ What  we  know  or  comprehend  as  soon  as  we  perceive  or 


1 Mansel,  Note  to  Aldrich , 1849,  pp.  16, 17.  See  Review  of  Whately's  Logic , No.  cxv., 
tldin.  Review. 

2 Nov.  Org .,  i , Aph.  10. 

4 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  (understand. , b.  iv.,  ch.  2. 


8 Aph.  26. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


271 


INTUITION— 

attend  to  it,  we  are  said  to  know  by  intuition:  things  which 
we  know  by  intuition,  cannot  be  made  more  certain  by  argu- 
ments, than  they  are  at  first.  We  know  by  intuition  that  all 
the  parts  of  a thing  together  are  equal  to  the  whole  of  it. 
Axioms  are  propositions  known  by  intuition.” 1 

“ Intuition  has  been  applied  by  Dr.  Beattie  and  others,  not 
only  to  the  power  by  which  we  perceive  the  truth  of  the 
axioms  of  geometry,  but  to  that  by  which  we  recognize  the 
authority  of  the  fundamental  laws  of  belief,  when  we  hear 
them  enunciated  in  language.  My  only  objection  to  this  use 
of  the  word  is,  that  it  is  a departure  from  common  practice ; 
according  to  which,  if  I be  not  mistaken,  the  proper  objects 
of  intuition  are  propositions  analogous  to  the  axioms  prefixed 
to  Euclid’s  Elements.  In  some  other  respects  this  innovation 
might  perhaps  be  regarded  as  an  improvement  on  the  very 
limited  and  imperfect  vocabulary  of  which  we  are  able  to 
avail  ourselves  in  our  present  discussions.”2 

“ Intuition  is  properly  attributed  and  should  be  carefully 
restricted,  to  those  instinctive  faculties  and  impulses,  external 
and  internal,  which  act  instantaneously  and  irresistibly,  which 
were  given  by  nature  as  the  first  inlets  of  all  knowledge,  and 
which  wc  have  called  the  Primary  Principles,  whilst  self- 
evidence may  be  justly  and  properly  attributed  to  axioms,  or 
the  Secondary  Principles  of  truth.”3 

On  the  difference  between  knowledge  as  intuitive,  immediate, 
or  presentative,  and  as  mediate,  or  representative,  see  Sir  W. 
Hamilton.4 

Intuition  is  used  in  the  extent  of  the  German  Anschauung, 
to  include  all  the  products  of  the  perceptive  (external  or  in- 
ternal) and  imaginative  faculties  ; every  act  of  consciousness, 
in  short,  of  which  the  immediate  object  is  an  individual, 
thing,  state,  or  act  of  mind,  presented  under  the  condition  of 
distinct  existence  in  space  or  time.”5 

“Besides  its  original  and  proper  meaning  (as  a visual 
perception),  it  has  been  employed  to  denote  a kind  of  appre- 


1 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

2 Stewart,  Elements , part  ii.,  ebap.  1,  sect.  2. 

a Tatham,  Chart  and  Scale  of  Truth , ch.  7,  lect.  1. 

4 Reid's  Works,  note  b.  * Mansel,  Prolcgom.  Log.,  p.  9. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


272 

INTUITION - 

hension  and  a kind  of  judgment.  Under  the  former  head  it 
has  been  used  to  denote,  1.  A perception  of  the  actual  and 
present,  in  opposition  to  the  abstractive  knowledge  which 
we  have  of  the  possible  in  imagination,  and  of  the  past  in 
memory.  2.  An  immediate  apprehension  of  a thing  in  itself, 
in  contrast  to  a representative,  vicarious  or  mediate,  appre- 
hension of  it,  in  or  through  something  else.  (Hence  by  Fichte, 
Schelling,  and  others,  intuition  is  employed  to  designate  the 
cognition  as  opposed  to  the  conception  of  the  absolute.)  3.  The 
knowledge,  which  we  can  adequately  represent  in  imagination, 
in  contradistinction  to  the  ‘ symbolical'  knowledge  which  we 
cannot  image,  but  only  think  or  conceive,  through  and  under 
a sign  or  word.  (Hence,  probably,  Kant’s  application  of  the 
term  to  the  forms  of  the  sensibility,  the  imaginations  of  Time 
and  Space,  in  contrast  to  the  forms  or  categories  of  the 
Understanding).  4.  Perception  proper  (the  objective),  in 
contrast  to  sensation  proper  (the  subjective),  in  our  sensitive 
consciousness.  5.  The  simple  apprehension  of  a notion,  in 
contradistinction  to  the  complex  apprehension  of  the  terms 
of  a proposition. 

“ Under  the  latter  head  it  has  only  a single  signification, 
viz.: — To  denote  the  immediate  affirmation  by  the  intellect, 
the  predicate  does  or  does  not  pertain  to  the  subject,  in  what 
are  called  self-evident  propositions.”  1 
INTUITION  and  CONCEPTION. — “ The  perceptions  of  sense 
are  immediate,  those  of  the  understanding  mediate  only ; sense 
refers  its  perceptions  directly  and  immediately  to  an  object. 
Hence  the  perception  is  singular,  incomplex,  and  immediate, 
i.  e.,  is  intuition.  When  I see  a star,  or  hear  the  tones  of  a 
harp,  the  perceptions  are  immediate,  incomplex,  and  intuitive. 
This  is  the  good  old  logical  meaning  of  the  word  intuition.  In 
our  philosophic  writings,  however,  intuitive  and  intuition  have 
come  to  be  applied  solely  to  propositions  ; it  is  here  extended 
to  the  first  elements  of  perception,  whence  such  propositions 
spring.  Again,  intuition,  in  English,  is  restricted  to  percep- 
tions d priori;  but  the  established  logical  use  and  wont  applies 
the  word  to  every  incomplex  representation  whatever ; and 


1 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works,  note  A,  sect.  5,  p.  759. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


273 


INTUITION— 

it  is  left  for  further  and  more  deep  inquiry  to  ascertain  what 
intuitions  are  founded  on  observation  and  experience,  and 
what  arise  from  a priori  sources.”  1 
INVENTION  ( invenio , to  come  in,  or  to  come  at)  is  the  creation 
or  construction  of  something  which  has  not  before  existed. 
Discovery  is  the  making  manifest  something  which  hitherto 
has  been  unknown.  We  discover  or  uncover  what  is  hidden. 
We  come  at  new  objects.  Galileo  invented  the  telescope. 
Harvey  discovered  the  circulation  of  the  blood. 

“We  speak  of  the  invention  of  printing,  the  discovery  of 
America.  Shift  these  words,  and  speak,  for  instance,  of  the 
invention  of  America,  you  feel  at  once  how  unsuitable  the  lan- 
guage is.  And  why '!  Because  Columbus  did  not  make  that 
to  be  which  before  him  had  not  been.  America  was  there 
before  he  revealed  it  to  European  eyes ; but  that  which  before 
was,  he  showed  to  be ; he  withdrew  the  veil  which  hitherto 
had  concealed  it,  he  discovered  it.”2 

Newton  discovered  the  law  of  gravitation,  but  Watt  invented 
the  steam  engine.  We  speak  with  a true  distinction,  of  the 
inventions  of  Art,  the  discoveries  of  Science. 

In  Locke  and  his  contemporaries,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
older  writers,  to  invent  is  currently  used  for  to  discover.  Thus 
Bacon3  says,  “Logic  does  not  pretend  to  invent  science,  or  the 
axioms  of  sciences,  but  passes  it  over  with  a cuique  in  sua  arte 
credendum.” 

IRONY  ( clpuvsLa,  dissimulation),  is  an  ignorance  purposely  af- 
fected to  provoke  or  confound  an  antagonist.  It  was  very 
much  employed  by  Socrates  against  the  Sophists.  In  modern 
times  it  was  adopted  by  Burke  in  his  Defence  of  Natural 
Society,  in  which,  assuming  the  person  of  Bolingbroke,  he 
proves,  according  to  the  principles  of  that  author,  that  the 
arguments  he  brought  against  ecclesiastical,  would  equally 
lie  against  civil,  institutions.  Sir  William  Drummond,  in  his 
(Edipus  Judaicus,  maintained  that  the  history  of  the  twelve 
patriarchs  is  a mythical  representation  of  the  signs  of  the 
Zodiac.  Dr.  Townsend,  in  his  (Edipus  Horn  anus,  attempts 
to  show  that  upon  the  same  principles  the  twelve  patriarchs 


1 Semple,  Introd.  to  Metaphys.  of  Ethics , p.  34. 

5 Trench,  On  Words . 3 Adv.  of  Learning. 


274 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOFIIY. 


IRONY  - 

were  prophecies  of  the  twelve  Caesars.  Dr.  Whately,  in  a 
pamphlet  entitled  Historic  Doubts,  attempted  to  show  that 
objections  similar  to  those  against  the  Scripture-history,  and 
much  more  plausible,  might  be  urged  against  all  the  received 
accounts  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte. 


JUDGMENT.  — “ A judgment  is  a combination  of  two  concepts, 
related  to  one  or  more  common  objects  of  possible  intuition.”1 

Our  judgments,  according  to  Aristotle,  are  either  proble- 
matical, assertive,  or  demonstrable;  or,  in  other  words,  the 
results  of  opinion,  of  belief,  or  of  science. 

“ The  problematical  judgment  is  neither  subjectively  nor 
objectively  true,  that  is,  it  is  neither  held  with  entire  certainty 
by  the  thinking  subject,  nor  can  we  show  that  it  truly  repre- 
sents the  object  about  which  we  judge.  It  is  a mere  opinion. 
It  may,  however,  be  the  expression  of  our  presentiment  of 
certainty ; and  what  was  held  as  mere  opinion  before  proof, 
may  afterwards  be  proved  to  demonstration.  Great  discoveries 
are  problems  at  first,  and  the  examination  of  them  leads  to  a 
conviction  of  their  truth,  as  it  has  done  to  the  abandonment 
of  many  false  opinions.  In  other  subjects,  we  cannot,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  advance  beyond  mere  opinion.  Whenever 
we  judge  about  variable  things,  as  the  future  actions  of  men, 
the  best  course  of  conduct  for  ourselves  under  doubtful  circum- 
stances, historical  facts  about  which  there  is  conflicting  testi- 
mony, we  can  but  form  a problematical  judgment,  and  must 
admit  the  possibility  of  error  at  the  moment  of  making  our 
decision. 

“ The  assertive  judgment  is  one  of  which  we  are  fully  per- 
suaded ourselves,  but  cannot  give  grounds  for  our  belief  that 
shall  compel  men  in  general  to  coincide  with  us.  It  is  there- 
fore subjectively,  but  not  objectively,  certain.  It  commends 
itself  to  our  moral  nature,  and  in  so  far  as  other  men  are  of 
the  same  disposition,  they  will  accept  it  likewise. 

“ The  demonstrative  judgment  is  both  subjectively  and  object- 
ively true.  It  may  either  be  certain  in  itself,  as  a mathematical 


1 Slansel,  rroltgom.  Log.,  p.  CO. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


275 


JUDGMENT  — 

axiom  is,  or  capable  of  proof  by  means  of  other  judgments, 
as  the  theories  of  mathematics  and  the  laws  of  physical 
science.”1 

Port  Royal  definition  : — “ Judgment  is  that  operation  of  the 
mind  through  which,  joining  different  ideas  together,  it  affirms 
or  denies  the  one  or  the  other  ; as  when,  for  instance,  having 
the  ideas  of  the  earth  and  roundness,  it  affirms  or  denies  that 
the  earth  is  round.” 

When  expressed  in  words  a judgment  is  called  a proposition. 
According  to  Mr.  Locke,  judgment  implies  the  comparison  of 
two  or  more  ideas.  But  Dr.  Reid2  says  he  applies  the  word 
judgment  to  every  determination  of  the  mind  concerning  what 
is  true  or  false,  and  shows  that  many  of  these  determinations 
are  simple  and  primitive  beliefs  (not  the  result  of  comparing 
two  or  more  ideas),  accompanying  the  exercise  of  all  our 
faculties,  judgments  of  nature,  the  spontaneous  product  of 
intelligence. 

“One  of  the  most  important  distinctions  of  our  judgments 
is,  that  some  of  them  are  intuitive,  others  grounded  on 
argument.” 

In  his  Inquiry ,3  he  shows  that  judgment  and  belief,  so  far 
from  arising  from  the  comparison  of  ideas,  in  some  cases  pre- 
cede. even  simple  apprehension. 

The  same  view  has  been  taken  by  Adolphe  Gamier,  in  his 
Traite  des  Facultes  de  I’ame.4 

Judgments,  Analytic,  Synthetic,  and  Tautologous. — “ Some 
judgments  are  merely  explanatory  of  their  subject,  having  for 
their  predicate  a conception  which  it  fairly  implies,  to  all  who 
know  and  can  define  its  nature.  They  are  called  analytic 
judgments  because  they  unfold  the  meaning  of  the  subject, 
without  determining  anything  new  concerning  it.  If  we  say 
that  ‘all  triangles  have  three  sides,’  the  judgment  is  analytic; 
because  having  three  sides  is  always  implied  in  a right  notion 
of  a triangle.  Such  judgments,  as  declaring  the  nature  or 
essence  of  the  subject,  have  been  called  ‘ essential  propositions/ 

“ Judgments  of  another  class  attribute  to  the  subject  some- 
thing not  directly  implied  in  it,  and  thus  increase  our  know- 

1 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought,  pp.  304-6. 

3 InUU.  Pow.,  essay  vi.,  chap.  1.  Chap.  4.  8 Chap.  2,  sect.  4. 

4 3 tom.,  Svo,  Paris,  1852. 


27G 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


JUDGMENT  — 

ledge.  They  are  called  synthetic,  from  placing  together  two 
notions  not  hitherto  associated.  ‘All  bodies  possess  power  of 
attraction  ’ is  a synthetic  judgment,  because  we  can  think  of 
bodies  without  thinking  of  attraction  as  one  of  their  imme- 
diate primary  attributes. 

“ We  must  distinguish  between  analytic  and  tautologous 
judgments.  Whilst  the  analytic  display  the  meaning  of  the 
subject,  and  put  the  same  matter  in  anew  form,  the  to.utologous 
only  repeat  the  subject,  and  give  us  the  same  matter  in  the 
same  form,  as  ‘ whatever  is,  is.’  ‘A  spirit  is  a spirit.’ 

“ It  is  a misnomer  to  call  analytic  judgments  identical  pro- 
positions.1 ‘ Every  man  is  a living  creature  ’ would  not  be  an 
identical  proposition  unless  ‘ living  creature  ’ denoted  the  same 
as  ‘man;’  whereas  it  is  far  more  extensive.  Locke2  under- 
stands by  identical  propositions  only  such  as  are  tautologous. 
— Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought ? 

JURISPRUDENCE  ( jurisprudent ia , the  science  of  rights). — 
Some  refer  the  Latin  word  jus  to  jussum,  the  supine  of  the 
verb  juheo,  to  order  or  enact.  Others  refer  it  to  justum,  that 
which  is  just  and  right.  But  as  right  is,  or  ought  to  be,  the 
foundation  of  positive  law,  a thing  is  jussum,  quia  justum  esi — 
made  law  because  it  was  antecedently  just  and  right. 

Jurisprudence  is  the  science  of  rights  in  accordance  with 
positive  law.  It  is  distinguished  into  universal  and  particular. 
“ The  former  relates  to  the  science  of  law  in  general,  and 
investigates  the  principles  which  are  common  to  all  positive 
systems  of  law,  apart  from  the  local,  partial,  and  accidental 
circumstances  and  peculiarities  by  which  these  systems  respec- 
tively are  distinguished  from  one  another.  Particular  juris- 
prudence treats  of  the  laws  of  particular  states  ; which  laws 
are,  or  at  least  profess  to  be,  the  rules  and  principles  of  uni- 
versal jurisprudence  itself,  specifically  developed  and  applied.” 
There  is  a close  connection  between  jurisprudence  and 
morality,  so  close  that  it  is  difficult  to  determine  precisely  the 
respective  limits  of  each.  Both  rest  upon  the  great  law  of 
right  and  wrong  as  made  known  by  the  light  of  nature.  But 
while  morality  enjoins  obedience  to  that  law  in  all  its  extent, 
jurisprudence  exacts  obedience  to  it  only  in  so  far  as  the  law 


1 Mill,  Lor/.,  b.  i.,  chap.  6. 


s B.  iv.,  ch.  8,  3. 


3 Pp.  194,  195. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


277 


JURISPRUDENCE  — 

of  nature  has  been  recognized  in  the  law  of  nations  or  the 
positive  institutions  of  society.  Morality  is,  therefore,  more 
extensive  than  jurisprudence.  Morality  has  equal  reference 
to  the  whole  of  human  duty.  Jurispntdence  has  special 
reference  to  social  duty.  All  social  duty  as  enjoined  by  the 
light  of  nature  — whether  included  under  justice  or  benevo- 
lence— belongs  to  morality.  Jurisprudence  treats  chiefly  or 
almost  exclusively  of  duties  of  justice,  which  have  been 
made  the  subject  of  positive  law;  which  duties  of  benevo- 
lence cannot  well  be.  The  rules  of  morality  as  such,  are  en- 
forced merely  by  the  law  within ; but  in  so  far  as  they 
have  been  adopted  by  jurisprudence,  they  can  be  enforced  by 
external  law.  The  moralist  appeals  to  our  sense  of  duty,  the 
jurist  to  a sense  of  authority  or  law.  “As  the  sense  of  duty 
is  the  sense  of  moral  necessity  simply,  and  excluding  the 
sense  of  physical  (or  external)  compulsion,  so  the  sense  of 
law  is  the  sense  of  the  same  necessity,  in  combination  with 
the  notion  of  physical  (or  external)  compulsion  in  aid  of  its 
requirements.”  1 

The  difference  between  morality  and  jurisprudence  as  to 
extent  of  range,  may  be  illustrated  by  the  difference  of  signi- 
fication between  the  word  right,  when  used  as  an  adjective, 
and  when  used  as  a substantive.  Morality  contemplates  all 
that  is  right  in  action  and  disposition.  Jurisprudence  con- 
templates only  that  which  one  man  has  a right  to  from 
another.  “The  adjective  right,”  says  Dr.  Whewell,2  “ has  a 
much  wider  signification  than  the  substantive  right.  Every- 
thing is  right  which  is  conformable  to  the  supreme  rule  of 
human  action  ; but  that  only  is  a right  which,  being  conform- 
able to  the  supreme  rule,  is  realized  in  society  and  vested  in  a 
particular  person.  Hence  the  two  words  may  often  be  pro- 
perly opposed.  We  may  say,  that  a poor  man  has  no  right  to 
relief ; but  it  is  right  he  should  have  it.  A rich  man  has  a 
right  to  destroy  the  harvest  of  his  fields  ; but  to  do  so  would  not 
he  right.”  So  that  the  sphere  of  morality  is  wider  than  that  of 
jurisprudence,  the  former  embracing  all  that  is  right,  the  latter 
only  particular  rights  realized  or  vested  in  particular  persons. 


25 


1 Foster,  Elements  of  Jurisprudence , p.  39. 

a Elements  of  Morality , No.  84. 


278 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


JURISPRUDENCE  - 

Morality  and  jurisprudence  differ  also  in  the  immediate 
ground  of  obligation.  Morality  enjoins  us  to  do  what  is  right, 
because  it  is  right.  Jurisprudence  enjoins  us  to  give  to  others 
their  right,  with  ultimate  reference,  no  doubt,  to  the  truth 
made  known  to  us  by  the  light  of  nature,  that  we  are  morally 
bound  to  do  so  ; but,  appealing  more  directly  to  the  fact,  that 
our  doing  so  can  be  demanded  by  our  neighbour,  and  that  his 
demand  will  be  enforced  by  the  authority  of  positive  law. 
And  this  difference  between  the  immediate  ground  of  obli- 
gation in  matters  of  morality  and  matters  of  jurisprudence, 
gives  rise  to  a difference  of  meaning  in  the  use  of  some  words 
which  are  generally  employed  as  synonymous.  For  example, 
if  regard  be  had  to  the  difference  between  morality  and  juris- 
prudence, duty  is  a word  of  wider  signification  than  obligation  ; 
just  as  right,  the  adjective,  is  of  wider  signification  than  right, 
the  substantive.  It  is  my  duty  to  do  what  is  right.  I am 
under  obligation  to  give  another  man  his  right.  A similar 
shade  of  difference  in  meaning  may  be  noticed  in  reference  to 
the  words  ought  and  obliged.  I ought  to  do  my  duty  ; I am 
obliged  to  give  a man  his  right.  I am  not  obliged  to  relieve  a 
distressed  person,  but  I ought  to  do  so. 

These  distinctions  are  sometimes  explained  by  saying,  that 
what  is  enjoined  by  jurisprudence  is  of  perfect  obligation,  and 
what  is  enjoined  only  by  morality  is  of  imperfect  obligation, — 
that  is,  that  we  may  or  may  not  do  what  our  conscience  dic- 
tates, but  that  we  can  be  compelled  to  do  what  positive  law 
demands.  But  these  phrases  of  perfect  and  imperfect  obli- 
gation are  objectionable,  in  so  far  as  they  tend  to  represent 
the  obligations  of  morality  as  inferior  to  those  of  jurisprttdence 
— the  dictates  of  conscience  as  of  less  authority  than  the 
enactments  of  law  — whereas  the  latter  rest  upon  the  former, 
and  the  law  of  nations  derives  its  binding  force  from  the  law 
of  nature. 

Grotius,  Be  Jure  Belli  et  Pads;  Puffendorff,  Be  Officio 
Hominis  et  Civis ; Leibnitz,  Jurisprudent ia;  Montesquieu, 
Spirit  of  Laws;  Burlamaqui,  Principles  of  Natural  Law; 
Rutherforth,  Institutes  of  Natural  Law;  Mackintosh,  Bis- 
course  of  the  Law  of  Nature  and  of  Nations;  Lerminier,  Sta- 
le Broit. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


279 


JUSTICE  (Sixaioavvrj,  justitia),  is  one  of  the  four  cardinal  virtues. 
It  consists,  according  to  Cicero,1  in  svo  cuique  iribuenclo,  in  ac- 
cording to  every  one  his  right.  By  the  Pythagoreans,  and 
also  by  Plato,  it  was  regarded  as  including  all  human  virtue 
or  duty.  The  word  righteousness  is  used  in  our  translation 
of  the  Scripture  in  a like  extensive  signification.  As  opposed 
to  equity,  justice  (ro  voyexov)  means  doing  merely  what  posi- 
tive law  requires,  while  equity  (ro  iaov)  means  doing  what  is 
fair  and  right  in  the  circumstances  of  every  particular  case. 
Justice  is  not  founded  in  law,  as  Hobbes  and  others  hold,  but 
in  our  idea  of  what  is  right.  And  laws  are  just  or  unjust  in 
so  far  as  they  do  or  do  not  conform  to  that  idea. 

“ To  say  that  there  is  nothing  just  nor  unjust  but  what  is 
commanded  or  prohibited  by  positive  laws,”  remarks  Montes- 
quieu,2 “ is  like  saying  that  the  radii  of  a circle  were  not  equal 
till  you  had  drawn  the  circumference.” 

Justice  may  be  distinguished  as  ethical,  economical,  and 
political.  The  first  consists  in  doing  justice  between  man  and 
man  as  men  ; the  second,  in  doing  justice  between  the  mem- 
bers of  a family  or  household  ; and  the  third,  in  doing  justice 
between  the  members  of  a community  or  commonwealth. 
These  distinctions  are  taken  by  More  in  his  Enchiridion  Ethi- 
cum,  and  are  adopted  by  Grove  in  his  Moral  Philosophy. 

Plato’s  Republic  contains  a delineation  of  justice. — Aristotle, 
Ethic.;3  Cicero,  De  Finibus. 

Horace4  gives  the  idea  of  a just  or  good  man.  — V.  Right, 
Duty,  Equity. 


KABALA  .—In  Hebrew  kabal  signifies  “ to  receive  ;”  masora  “ to 
hand  down.”  “ The  Kabalists  believe  that  God  has  expressly 
committed  his  mysteries  to  certain  chosen  persons,  and  that 
they  themselves  have  received  those  mysteries  in  trust,  still 
further  to  hand  them  down  to  worthy  recipients.”5 

The  origin  of  the  kabala  has  been  carried  back  to  Moses, 


1 Be  Finibus,  lib.  v.,  cap.  23. 

3 Spirit  of  Laws , book  i.,  chap.  1. 

3 Lib.  v. 

b Etheridge,  Heb.  Liter.,  p.  293. 


1 Epist.,  lib.  i.,  16,  40. 


280 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


KABALA  — 

and  even  to  Adam.  The  numerous  allusions  to  it  in  the 
Mishna  and  Gemara,  show,  that  under  the  Tanaim,  a certain 
philosophy,  or  religious  metaphysic,  was  secretly  taught,  and 
that  this  system  of  esoteric  teaching  related  especially  to  the 
Creation  and  the  Godhead.  So  early  as  a.  d.  189,  the  time  of 
the  Mishna  redaction,  it  was  recognized  as  an  established  theo- 
sophy, the  privilege  of  select  disciples.  Two  works  of  the 
Mishnaic  period  are  still  extant  in  authentic  and  complete  form, 
viz.,  Seplier  Tetsira  and  the  Zoliar.  The  A abala,  considered 
as  a constructed  science,  is  theoretical  and  practical.  The 
practical  department  comprises  a symbolical  apparatus,  and 
rules  for  the  use  of  it.  The  theoretical  consists  of  two  parts — 
the  cosmogonic,  relating  to  the  visible  universe,  and  the  theo- 
gonic  and  pneumatological,  relating  to  the  spiritual  world  and 
the  perfections  of  the  Divine  nature.  Pantheism  is  the  foun- 
dation of  both.  The  universe  is  a revelation  of  the  Infinite — 
an  immanent  effect  of  Ilis  ever  active  power  and  presence. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century  the  leabala  was 
adopted  by  several  Christian  mystics.  Raymond  Lully, 
Reuchlin,  Henry  More,  and  others  paid  much  attention  to  it. 

Reuchlin,  Be  Arte  Cabalistica ; 1 Be  Verbo  Mirijico; 2 Atha- 
nasius Kircher,  Qddipus  (Eggptiacus ; 3 Henry  More,  Cabbala  ;* 
Ad.  Franck,  La  Kabbale; 5 Etheridge,  Hebrew  Literature  ;6  Picus 
(J.  Paris.),  Cabalistaruni  Selectiora  Obscurioraque  Bogmata? 
KNOWLEDGE  (yrwcuj,  cognilio). 

. . . . “ Learning  dwells 
In  heads  replete  with  thoughts  of  other  men, 

Knowledge  in  minds  attentive  to  their  own” 

“ Knowledges  (or  cognitions),  in  common  use  with  Bacon 
and  our  English  philosophers,  till  after  the  time  of  Locke, 
ought  not  to  be  discarded.  It  is,  however,  unnoticed  by  any 
English  lexicographer.”8 

“ Knowledge  is  the  perception  of  the  connection  and  agree- 
ment, or  disagreement  and  repugnancy  of  any  of  our  ideas. 


• Fol.,  Ilagen,  1517.  2 Fol.,  Basil,  1194.  3 * Fol.,  Rom.,  1652. 

2 Fol , Bond.,  1502.  ‘ 8vo,  Baris,  1843. 

• Svo,  Bond.,  1850.  ’ 12mo,  Tenet.,  1569. 

• Sir  William  Hamilton,  Reid’s  Works,  note  A,  sect.  5,  p.  763. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


281 


KNOWLEDGE  — 

Where  this  perception  is,  there  is  knowledge;  and  where  it  is 
not,  then,  though  we  may  fancy,  guess,  or  believe,  yet  we 
always  come  short  of  knowledge.”  — Locke.1  And  in  chap. 
14,  he  says,  “ The  mind  has  two  faculties  conversant  about 
truth  and  falsehood.  First,  knowledge,  whereby  it  certainly 
perceives,  and  is  undoubtedly  satisfied  of  the  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  any  ideas.  Secondly,  judgment,  which  is  the 
putting  ideas  together,  or  separating  them  from  one  another 
in  the  mind,  when  their  certain  agreement  or  disagreement 
is  not  perceived,  but  presumed  to  be  so.”  Knowledge  is  here 
opposed  to  opinion.  But  judgment  is  the  faculty  by  which 
we  attain  to  certainty,  as  well  as  to  opinion.  “And,”  says 
Dr.  Reid,2  “ I know  no  authority,  besides  that  of  Mr.  Locke, 
for  calling  knowledge  a faculty,  any  more  than  for  calling 
opinion  a faculty.” 

“ Knowledge  implies  three  things,  — 1st,  Firm  Belief;  2d, 
cf  what  is  true;  3d,  On  sufficient  grounds.  If  any  one,  e.g., 
is  in  doubt  respecting  one  of  Euclid’s  demonstrations,  he  can- 
not be  said  to  knoio  the  proposition  proved  by  it ; if,  again,  he 
is  fully  convinced  of  anything  that  is  not  true,  he  is  mistaken 
in  supposing  himself  to  know  it ; lastly,  if  two  persons  are 
each  fully  confident,  one,  that  the  moon  is  inhabited,  and  the 
other,  that  it  is  not  (though  one  of  these  opinions  must  be 
true),  neither  of  them  could  properly  be  said  to  know  the 
truth,  since  he  cannot  have  sufficient  proof  of  it.”3 

Knowledge  supposes  three  terms : a being  who  knows,  an 
object  known,  and  a relation  determined  between  the  knowing 
being  and  the  known  object.  This  relation  properly  consti- 
tutes knowledge. 

But  this  relation  may  not  be  exact,  in  conformity  with  the 
nature  of  things ; knowledge  is  not  truth.  Knowledge  is  a sub- 
jective conception  — a relative  state  of  the  human  mind;  it 
resides  in  the  relation,  essentially  ideal,  of  our  thought  and 
its  object.  Truth,  on  the  contrary,  is  the  reality  itself,  the 
reality  ontological  and  absolute,  considered  in  their  absolute 
relations  with  intelligence,  and  independent  of  our  personal 


25* 


1 Essay  on  Ham.  Understand book  iv.,  chap.  1. 

3 Intdl.  Poiu .,  essay  iv.,  chap.  3. 

3 Wbately,  Log.,  book  iv.,  chap.  2,  g 2,  note. 


282 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOFHY. 


KNOWLEDGE  — 

conceptions.  Truth  has  its  source  in  God;  knowledge  prooeeds 
from  man.  Knowledge  is  true  and  perfect  from  the  moment 
that  our  conception  is  really  conformable  to  that  which  is  — 
from  the  moment  that  our  thought  has  seized  the  reality. 
And,  in  this  view,  truth  may  be  defined  to  be  the  conformity 
of  our  thought  with  the  nature  of  its  object. 

But  truth  is  not  yet  certitude.  It  may  exist  in  itself  without 
being  acquired  by  the  human  mind,  without  existing  actually 
for  us.  It  does  not  become  certain  to  us  till  we  have  acquired 
it  by  the  employment  of  method.  Certitude  is  thus  truth 
brought  methodically  to  the  human  intelligence,  — that  is, 
conducted  from  principle  to  principle,  to  a point  which  is 
evident  of  itself.  If  such  a point  exist,  it  is  plain  that  we 
can  attain  to  all  the  truths  which  attach  themselves  to  it 
directly  or  indirectly ; and  that  we  may  have  of  these  truths, 
howsoever  remote,  a certainty  as  complete  as  that  of  the  point 
of  departure. 

Certitude,  then,  in  its  last  analysis,  is  the  relation  of  truth 
to  knowledge,  the  relation  of  man  to  God,  of  ontology  to 
psychology.  When  the  human  intelligence,  making  its  spring, 
has  seized  divine  truth,  in  identifying  itself  with  the  reality, 
it  ought  then,  in  order  to  finish  its  work,  to  return  upon  itself, 
to  individualize  the  truth  in  us  ; and  from  this  individualiza- 
tion results  the  certitude  which  becomes,  in  some  sort,  per- 
sonal, as  knowledge ; all  the  while  preserving  the  impersonal 
nature  of  truth. 

Certitude  then  reposes  upon  two  points  of  support,  the  one 
sidjective — man  or  the  human  consciousness;  the  other  objective 
and  absolute  — the  Supreme  Being.  God  and  consciousness 
are  the  two  arbiters  of  certitude.1 

“ The  schoolmen  divided  all  human  knowledge  into  two 
species,  cognitio  intuitiva,  and  eognitio  abstraction.  By  intui- 
tive knowledge  they  signified  that  which  we  gain  by  an  im- 
mediate presentation  of  the  real  individual  object;  by  abstrac- 
tive, that  which  we  gain  and  hold  through  the  medium  of  a 
general  term ; the  one  being,  in  modern  language,  a percep- 
tion, the  other  a concept.”'1 — V.  Abstractive. 


1 Tiberghicn,  Essai  des  Connais.  Hum.,  p.  34. 
* Morell,  Psychology , p.  158. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


283 


KNOWLEDGE  — 

Leibnitz  took  a distinction  between  knowledge  as  intuitive  or 
symbolical.  When  I behold  a triangle  actually  delineated, 
and  think  of  it  as  a figure  with  three  sides  and  three  angles, 
&c.,  according  to  the  idea  of  it  in  my  mind,  my  knowledge  is 
intuitive.  But  when  I use  the  word  triangle,  and  know  what 
it  means  without  explicating  all  that  is  contained  in  the  idea 
of  it,  my  knowledge  is  blind  or  symbolical.1 
Knowledge  as  Immediate  and  Presentative  or  Intuitive  — 
and  as  Mediate  and  Representative  or  Remote. 

“A  thing  is  known  immediately  or  proximately,  when  we 
cognize  it  in  itself;  mediately  or  remotely,  when  we  cognize  it 
in  or  through  something  numerically  different  from  itself.  Im- 
mediate cognition,  thus  the  knowledge  of  a thing  in  itself, 
involves  the  fact  of  its  existence  ; mediate  cognition,  thus  the 
knowledge  of  a thing  in  or  through  something  not  itself, 
involves  only  the  possibility  of  its  existence. 

“An  immediate  cognition,  inasmuch  as  the  thing  known  is 
itself  presented  to  observation,  may  be  called  a presentative ; 
and  inasmuch  as  the  thing  presented  is,  as  it  were,  viewed  by 
the  mind  face  to  face,  may  be  called  an  intuitive  cognition. 
A mediate  cognition,  inasmuch  as  the  thing  known  is  held  up 
or  mirrored  to  the  mind  in  a vicarious  representation,  may  be 
called  a representative  cognition. 

“A  thing  known  is  an  object  of  knowledge. 

“In  a presentative  or  immediate  cognition  there  is  one  sole 
object ; the  thing  (immediately)  known  and  the  thing  existing 
being  one  and  the  same.  In  a representative  or  mediate  cog- 
nition there  may  be  discriminated  two  objects ; the  thing  (im- 
mediately) known  and  the  thing  existing  being  numerically 
different. 

“A  thing  known  in  itself  is  the  (sole)  presentative  or  intui- 
tive object  of  knowledge,  or  the  (sole)  object  of  a presentative 
or  intuitive  knowledge.  A thing  known  in  and  through  some- 
thing else  is  the  primary,  mediate,  remote,  real,  existent  or  repre- 
sented object  of  (mediate)  knowledge  — objectum  quod;  and  a 
thing  through  which  something  else  is  known  is  the  secondary, 
immediate,  proximate,  ideal,  vicarious,  or  representative  object 


1 Leibnitz,  Ve  Cognition?,  &.c. ; Wolf,  Psychol.  Empir.,  sect.  286,  2S9. 


284 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


KNOWLEDGE  — 

of  (mediate)  knowledge  — objecfum  quo  or  per  quod.  The 
former  may  likewise  be  styled  — objection  entitativum.” 1 

Knowledge,  in  respect  of  the  mode  in  which  it  is  obtained, 
is  intuitive  or  discursive  — intuitive  when  things  are  seen  in 
themselves  by  the  mind,  or  when  objects  are  so  clearly  ex- 
hibited that  there  is  no  need  of  reasoning  to  perceive  them  — 
as,  a whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts  — discursive  when 
objects  are  perceived  by  means  of  reasoning,  as,  the  sum  of 
the  angles  of  a triangle  is  equal  to  two  right  angles.  In 
respect  of  its  strength,  knowledge  is  certain  or  probable.  If  we 
attend  to  the  degrees  or  ends  of  knowledge,  it  is  either  science, 
or  art,  or  experience,  or  opinion,  or  belief — q.  v. 

“Knowledge  is  not  a couch  whereon  to  rest  a searching  and 
reckless  spirit,  or  a terrace  for  a wandering  and  variable  mind 
to  walk  up  and  down  with  a fair  prospect,  or  a tower  of  state 
for  a proud  mind  to  raise  itself  upon,  or  a fort  or  commanding 
ground  for  strife  and  contention,  or  a shop  for  profit  or  sale  ; 
but  a rich  storehouse  for  the  glory  of  the  Creator,  and  the 
relief  of  man’s  estate.” 2 — V.  Certainty,  Truth,  Wisdom. 


LANGUAGE.  — “ The  ends  of  language  in  our  discourse  with 
others  are  chiefly  these  three : first,  to  make  known  one  man’s 
thoughts  or  ideas  to  another ; secondly,  to  do  it  with  as  much 
ease  and  quickness  as  is  possible ; and  thirdly,  thereby  to 
convey  knowledge  of  things.”3 

Language  has  been  thus  divided  by  Mons.  Duval-Jouve  :4 


Languages  are 


( Natural 


f Absolute — Cries  and  Gestures. 
\ Conventional  — Speech. 


Artificial 


f Absolute  — Pain  liny.  Sculpture. 
-{Conventional  — Emblems , Telegraphic  Signs , 
( Hieroglyphics , Writing. 


Reid,  Inquiry .6  — V.  Signs. 

LAUGHTER  is  the  act  of  expressing  our  sense  of  the  ridiculous. 
This  act,  or  rather  the  sense  of  the  ridiculous  which  prompts 


1 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Reid’s  Works , note  b,  sect.  1. 

8 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand .,  book  iii.,  ck.  10. 
* Chap,  ii , sect.  2. 


a Bacon. 

4 Logic , p.  201. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


285 


LAUGHTER  — 

it,  has  been  thought  peculiar  to  man,  as  that  -which  distin- 
guishes him  from  the  inferior  animals.' — Hutcheson,  Essay  on 
Laughter ; Beattie,  Essay  on  Laughter  and  Ludicrous  Com- 
position; Akenside,  Pleasures  of  Imagin.; 1  2 Spectator ,3 4 * 
LAW  comes  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  verb  signifying  “to  lay  down.” 

“All  things  that  are  have  some  operation  not  violent  or 
casual.  That  which  doth  assign  unto  each  thing  the  kind, 
that  which  doth  moderate  the  force  and  power,  that  which 
doth  appoint  the  form  and  measure  of  working,  the  same  we 
term  a law.”* 

“Laws  in  their  most  extended  signification  are  the  necessary 
relations  arising  from  the  nature  of  things ; and,  in  this  sense, 
all  beings  have  their  laws,  the  Deity  has  his  laws,  the  material 
world  has  its  laws,  superior  intelligences  have  their  laws,  the 
beasts  have  their  laws,  and  man  has  his  laws.”6 

Thus  understood,  the  word  comprehends  the  laws  of  the 
physical,  metaphysical,  and  moral  universe.  Its  primary  signi- 
fication was  that  of  a command  or  a prohibition,  addressed  by 
one  having  authority  to  those  who  had  power  to  do  or  not  to 
do.  There  are  in  this  sense  laivs  of  society,  laws  of  morality, 
and  laws  of  religion — each  resting  upon  their  proper  authority. 
But  the  word  has  been  transferred  into  the  whole  philosophy 
of  being  and  knowing.  And  when  a fact  frequently  observed 
recurs  invariably  under  the  same  circumstances,  we  compare 
it  to  an  act  which  has  been  prescribed,  to  an  order  which  has 
been  established,  and  say  it  recurs  according  to  a law.  On 
the  analogy  between  political  laws  or  laws  proper,  and  those 
which  are  called  metaphorically  laws  of  nature,  see  Lindley, 
Introduction  to  Jurisprudence.6 

Austin,  Province  of  Jurisprudence  Determined,  p.  186. 

Law  and  Cause. 

The  word  law  expresses  the  constant  and  regular  order 
according  to  which  an  energy  or  agent  operates.  It  may  thus 


1 The  ludicrous  pranks  of  the  puppy  and  the  kitten  make  this  doubtful ; and  Mon- 

taigne said  he  was  not  sure  whether  his  favourite  cat  might  not  sometimes  be  laughing 
as  much  at  him  as  with  him. 

a Book  iii.  3 Nos.  47  and  249. 

4 Ilooker,  JEccles.  Pol.,  book  i.,  sect.  2. 

6 Montesquieu,  Spirit  of  Laws , book  i.,  ch.  1. 


9 -App.,  p.  1. 


286 


VOCABULARY  OB  PHILOSOPHY. 


LAW- 

be  distinguished  from  cause — the  latter  denoting  efficiency,  the 
former  denoting  the  mode  according  to  which  efficiency  is  de- 
veloped. “It  is  a perversion  of  language,”  says  Paley,1  “to 
assign  any  law,  as  the  efficient,  operative  cause  of  anything. 
A law  presupposes  an  agent ; this  is  only  the  mode,  accord- 
ing to  which  an  agent  proceeds  ; it  implies  a power  ; for  it  is 
the  order  according  to  which  that  power  acts.  Without  this 
agent,  without  this  power,  which  are  both  distinct  from  itself, 
the  law  does  nothing,  is  nothing.”  To  the  same  purpose  Dr. 
Reid  has  said,  “ The  laws  of  nature  are  the  rules  according 
to  which  effects  are  produced ; but  there  must  be  a cause 
which  operates  according  to  these  rules.  The  rules  of  navi- 
gation never  steered  a ship,  nor  the  law  of  gravity  never 
moved  a planet.” 

“ Those  who  go  about  to  attribute  the  origination  of  man- 
kind (or  any  other  effect)  to  a bare  order  or  law  of  nature,  as 
the  primitive  effecter  thereof,  speak  that  which  is  perfectly 
irrational  and  unintelligible ; for  although  a law  or  rule  is  the 
method  and  order  by  which  an  intelligent  being  may  act,  yet 
a law,  or  rule,  or  order,  is  a dead,  unactive,  uneffective,  thing 
of  itself,  without  an  agent  that  useth  it,  and  exerciseth  it  as 
his  rule  and  method  of  action.  What  would  a law  signify  in 
a kingdom  or  state,  unless  there  were  some  person  or  society 
of  men  that  did  exercise  and  execute,  and  judge,  and  deter- 
mine, and  act  by  it,  or  according  to  it?”2 

To  maintain  that  the  world  is  governed  by  laws,  without 
ascending  to  the  superior  reason  of  these  laws — not  to  recog- 
nize that  every  law  implies  a legislator  and  executor,  an  agent 
to  put  it  in  force,  is  to  stop  half-way ; it  is  to  hypostatize 
these  laws,  to  make  beings  of  them,  and  to  imagine  fabulous 
divinities  in  ignoring  the  only  God  who  is  the  source  of  all 
laws,  and  who  governs  by  them  all  that  lives  in  the  universe.3 

“A  law  supposes  an  agent  and  a power;  for  it  is  the  mode, 
according  to  which  the  agent  proceeds,  the  order  according  to 
which  the  power  acts.  Without  the  presence  of  such  an  agent, 
of  such  a power,  conscious  of  the  relations  on  which  the  law 


1 Nat.  Thiol.,  ch.  1.  a Hale,  Prim.  Origin.,  chap.  7,  sect.  4. 

8 See  Tiberghien,  Essai  des  Connais.  Hum.,  p.  743. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


287 


LAW  — 

depends,  producing  the  effects  which  the  laic  prescribes,  the 
law  can  have  no  efficacy,  no  existence.  Hence  we  infer,  that 
the  intelligence  by  which  the  laic  is  ordained,  the  power  by 
which  it  is  put  into  action,  must  be  present  at  all  times  and 
in  all  places,  where  the  effects  of  the  law  occur  ; that  thus  the 
knowledge  and  the  agency  of  the  Divine  Being  pervade  every 
portion  of  the  universe,  producing  all  action  and  passion,  all 
permanence  and  change.  The  laws  of  matter  are  the  laics 
which  he,  in  his  wisdom,  prescribes  to  his  own  acts ; his 
universal  presence  is  the  necessary  condition  of  any  course  of 
events ; his  universal  agency,  the  only  organ  of  any  efficient 
force.”  1 * 

Law,  Physical,  Mental,  Moral,  Political. 

Laws  may  acquire  different  names  from  the  difference  in 
the  agents  or  energies  which  operate  according  to  them.  A 
stone  when  thrown  up  into  the  air  rises  to  a height  pro- 
portional to  the  force  with  which  it  is  thrown,  and  then 
falls  to  the  ground  by  its  own  gravity.  This  takes  place 
according  to  physical  laws,  or  what  are  commonly  called  laws 
of  nature.'1 

“ Those  principles  and  faculties  are  the  general  laws  of  our 
constitution,  and  hold  the  same  place  in  the  philosophy  of 
mind  that  the  general  laws  we  investigate  in  physics  hold  in 
that  branch  of  science.”3  When  an  impression  has  been  made 
upon  a bodily  organ  a state  of  sensation  follows  in  the  mind. 
And  when  a state  of  sensation  has  been  long  continued  or 
often  repeated  it  comes  to  be  less  sensibly  felt.  These  are 
mental  laws.  We  have  a faculty  of  memory  by  which  the 
objects  of  former  consciousness  are  recalled ; and  this  faculty 
operates  according  to  the  laws  of  association. 

Moral  laws  are  derived  from  the  nature  and  will  of  God, 
and  the  character  and  condition  of  man,  and  may  be  under- 
stood and  adopted  by  man,  as  a being  endowed  with  intelli- 
gence and  will,  to  be  the  rules  by  which  to  regulate  his  actions. 
It  is  right  to  speak  the  truth.  Gratitude  should  be  cherished. 
These  things  are  in  accordance  with  the  nature  and  condition 

1 Whewell,  Astronomy,  p.  361. 

Q See  M‘Cosh,  JUeth.  of  Div.  Govern b.  ii.,  chap.  1. 

3 Stewart,  Elements , part  i.,  Introd. 


288 


VOCABULARY  OP  nilLOSOPIIY. 


LAW  — 

of  man,  and  with  the  will  of  God — that  is,  they  arc  in  accord- 
ance with  the  moral  law  of  conscience  and  of  revelation. 

Political  laws  are  prohibitions  or  injunctions  promulgated 
by  those  having  authority  to  do  so,  and  may  be  obeyed  or 
disobeyed ; but  the  disobedience  of  them  implies  punish- 
ment. 

“ The  intent  or  purpose  of  a law  is  wholly  different  from 
the  motives  or  grounds  of  the  law.  The  former  is  its  practi- 
cal end  or  effect ; the  latter,  the  pre-existing  circumstances 
which  suggested  and  caused  its  enactment.1  For  example, 
the  existence  of  a famine  in  a country  may  tend  to  the  enact- 
ment of  a poor  law.  In  this  case  the  famine  is  the  motive  or 
ground  of  the  law;  and  the  relief  of  the  poor  its  intent  or 
purpose.  The  one  is  its  positive  cause,  the  latter  its  desired 
effect.”2 

In  reference  to  the  moral  law,  Hobbes  and  his  followers 
have  overlooked  the  difference  between  a law  and  the  principle 
of  the  law.  An  action  is  not  right  merely  in  consequence  of 
a law  declaring  it  to  be  so.  But  the  declaration  of  the  law 
proceeds  upon  the  antecedent  rightness  of  the  action. 

Law  and  Form,  “though  correlative  terms,  must  not,  in  strict 
accuracy,  be  used  as  synonymous.  The  former  is  used  pro- 
perly with  reference  to  an  operation;  the  latter  with  reference 
to  its  product.  Coticeiving,  judging,  reasoning,  are  subject  to 
certain  laws;  concepts,  judgments,  sijllogisms,  exhibit  certain 
forms.”3 

LAW  (Empirical).—"  Scientific  inquirers  give  the  name  of  empi- 
rical laws  to  those  uniformities  which  observation  or  experi- 
ment has  shown  to  exist,  but  on  which  they  hesitate  to  rely 
in  cases  varying  much  from  those  which  have  been  actually 
observed,  for  want  of  seeing  any  reason  wlnj  such  a law  should 


1 Suarez  ( De  Legibus , iii.,  20,  sect.  2)  says,  “Sine  dubio  in  animo  legislators  haec  duo 
distincta  sunt,  scilicet  voluntas  seu  intentio  ejus,  secundum  quam  vult  prascipere,  et 
ratio,  ob  quam  movetur  ” 

The  ratio  legis  and  the  mens  legis  are  distinguished  by  Grotius  (J.  B.  et  P.,  ii.,  16, 
sect.  8)  with  Barbeyrac’s  notes;  and  by  Puffendorff  (v.,  12,  sect.  10).  The  purpose  of  a 
law  and  its  motive  have  often  been  confounded  under  the  general  term  ratio  legis. — See 
Savigny,  System  dcs  Rechts,  vol.  i.,  pp.  216-224. 

0 Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  Method  of  Obsci'v.  in  Politics,  ch.  12,  sect.  6. 

* Manscl,  Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  240. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


289 


LAW  — 

exist.  It  is  implied,  therefore,  in  the  notion  of  an  empirical 
laic,  that  it  is  not  an  ultimate  law ; that  if  true  at  all,  its 
truth  is  capable  of  being,  and  requires  to  be,  accounted  for. 
It  is  a derivative  law,  the  derivation  of  which  is  not  yet  known. 
To  state  the  explanation,  the  why  of  the  empirical  laic,  would 
be  to  state  the  laws  from  which  it  is  derived ; the  ultimate 
causes  on  which  it  is  contingent.  And  if  we  knew  these,  we 
should  also  know  what  are  its  limits ; under  what  conditions 
it  would  cease  to  be  fulfilled.” 1 

As  instances  of  empirical  laws  he  gives  the  local  laws  of  the 
flux  and  reflux  of  the  tides  in  different  places ; the  succession 
of  certain  kinds  of  weather  to  certain  appearances  of  the  sky, 
&c.  But  these  do  not  deserved  to  be  called  laws. 

LEMMA  (from  tniA&dtw,  to  take  for  granted,  to  assume).  — This 
term  is  used  to  denote  a preliminary  proposition,  which,  while 
it  has  no  direct  relation  to  the  point  to  be  proved,  yet  serves 
to  pave  the  way  for  the  proof.  In  Logic,  a premiss  taken  for 
granted  is  sometimes  called  a lemma.  To  prove  some  proposi- 
tion in  mechanics,  some  of  the  propositions  in  geometry  may 
be  taken  as  lemmata. 

LIBERTARIAN.  — “ I believe  he  (Dr.  Crombie,  that  is)  may 
claim  the  merit  of  adding  the  word  Libertarian  to  the  English 
language,  as  Priestley  added  that  of  Necessarian." 2 

Both  words  have  reference  to  the  questions  concerning 
liberty  and  necessity,  in  moral  agency. 

LIBERTY  of  the  WILL  or  LIBERTY  of  a MORAL  AGENT. 

“ The  idea  of  liberty  is  the  idea  of  a power  in  any  agent  to 
do  or  forbear  any  particular  action,  according  to  the  determi- 
nation or  thought  of  the  mind,  whereby  either  of  them  is  pre- 
ferred to  the  other.”3 

“ By  the  liberty  of  a moral  agent,  I understand  a power  over 
the  determinations  of  his  own  will.  If,  in  any  action,  he  had 
power  to  will  what  he  did,  or  not  to  will  it,  in  that  action  he 
is  free.  But  if,  in  every  voluntary  action,  the  determination 
of  his  will  be  the  necessary  consequence  of  something  involun- 
tary in  the  state  of  his  mind,  or  of  something  in  his  external 


1 Mill,  Log.,  b.  iii.,  chap.  16. 

* Correspondence  of  Dr.  Reid,  p.  88. 

8 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  b.  ii.,  cli.  21,  sect.  8. 
U 


26 


290 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


LIBERTY— 

circumstances,  be  is  not  free  ; he  has  not  what  I call  the  liberty 
of  a moral  agent,  but  is  subject  to  necessity.”1 

It  has  been  common  to  distinguish  liberty  into  freedom  from 
co-action,  and  freedom  f rom  necessity. 

Freedom  from  co-action  implies,  on  the  one  hand,  the  absence 
of  all  impediment  or  restraint,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
absence  of  all  compulsion  or  violence.  If  we  are  prevented 
from  doing  what  is  in  our  power,  when  we  desire  and  will  to 
do  it,  or,  if  we  are  compelled  to  do  it,  when  we  desire  and  will 
not  to  do  it,  we  are  not  free  from  co-action.  This  general 
explanation  of  freedom  agrees  equally  with  bodily  freedom, 
mental  freedom,  aud  moral  freedom.  Indeed,  although  it  is 
common  to  make  a distinction  between  these,  there  is  no  dif- 
ference, except  what  is  denoted  by  the  different- epithets  intro- 
duced. We  have  bodily  freedom,  when  our  bod}r  is  not  sub- 
jected to  restraint  or  compulsion  — mental  freedom,  when  no 
impediment  or  violence  prevents  us  from  duly  exercising  our 
powers  of  mind  — and  moral  freedom,  when  our  moral  princi- 
ples and  feelings  are  allowed  to  operate  within  the  sphere 
which  has  been  assigned  to  them.  Now  it  is  with  freedom 
regarded  as  moral  that  we  have  here  to  do — it  is  with  freedom 
as  the  attribute  of  a being  who  possesses  a moral  nature,  and 
who  exerts  the  active  power  which  belongs  to  him,  in  the  light 
of  reason,  and  under  a sense  of  responsibility.  Liberty  of 
this  kind  is  called  freedom  from  necessity. 

Freedom  from  necessity  is  also  called  liberty  of  election,  or 
power  to  choose,  and  implies  freedom  from  anything  invincibly 
determining  a moral  agent.  It  has  been  distinguished  into 
liberty  of  contrariety,  or  the  power  of  determining  to  do  either 
of  two  actions  which  are  contrary,  as  right  or  wrong,  good  or 
evil ; and  liberty  of  contradiction,  or  the  power  of  determining 
to  do  either  of  two  actions  which  are  contradictory,  as  to  walk 
or  to  sit  still,  to  walk  in  one  direction  or  in  another. 

Freedom  from  necessity  is  sometimes  also  called  liberty  of 
indifference,  because,  before  he  makes  his  election,  the  agent 
has  not  determined  in  favour  of  one  action  more  than  another. 
Liberty  of  indifference,  however,  does  not  mean,  as  some  would 
have  it,  liberty  of  equilibrium,  or  that  the  agent  has  no  more 


1 Reid,  Act.  Pow.}  essay  iv.,  ch.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


291 


LIBEETY  — 

inclination  towards  one  action  or  one  mode  of  action  than 
towards  another ; for  although  he  may  have  motives  prompting 
more  urgently  to  one  action  or  course  of  action,  he  still  has 
liberty  of  election,  if  he  has  the  power  of  determining  in  favour 
of  another  action  or  another  course  of  action.  Still  less  can  the 
phrase  liberty  of  indifference  be  understood  as  denoting  a power 
to  determine  in  opposition  to  all  motives,  or  in  absence  of  any 
motive.  A being  with  liberty  of  indifference  in  the  former  of 
these  senses  would  not  be  a reasonable  being ; and  an  action 
done  without  a motive  is  an  action  done  without  an  end  in 
view,  that  is,  without  intention  or  design,  and,  in  that  respect, 
could  not  be  called  a moral  action,  though  done  by  a moral 
agent. 

Liberty  of  will  may  be  viewed,  1st,  in  respect  to  the  object, 
and  2d,  in  respect  of  the  action.  In  both  respects  it  may  be 
liberty  of,  1st,  contrariety,  or  2d,  of  contradiction. 

Liberty  of  contrariety  in  respect  of  the  object  is  when  the  will 
is  indifferent  to  any  object  and  to  its  opposite  or  contrary — as 
when  a man  is  free,  for  the  sake  of  health,  to  take  hot  water 
or  cold  water.  Liberty  of  contradiction  is  when  the  will  is  in- 
different to  any.  object,  and  to  its  opposite  or  contradictory  — 
as  walking  and  not  walking. 

In  respect  of  the  act  of  will,  there  is  liberty  of  contrariety, 
when  the  will  is  indifferent  as  to  contrary  actions  concerning 
the  same  particular  object, — as  to  choose  or  reject  some  parti- 
cular good.  There  is  liberty  of  contradiction,  when  the  will  is 
free  not  to  contrary  action,  but  to  act  or  not  to  act,  that  is,  to 
will  or  not  to  will,  to  exercise  or  suspend  volition. 

Liberty  has  also  been  distinguished  into,  1st,  liberty  of  spe- 
cification, and  2d,  liberty  of  exercise.  The  former  may  be  said 
to  coincide  with  liberty  of  contrariety,  and  the  latter  with 
liberty  of  contradiction.1 

LIFE  belongs  to  organized  bodies,  that  is,  animals  and  vegetables. 
Birth  and  development,  decay  and  death,  are  peculiar  to  living 
bodies.  Is  there  a vital  principle,  distinct  on  the  one  hand 
from  matter  and  its  forces,  and  on  the  other,  from  mind  and 
its  energies  ? According  to  Descartes,  Borelli,  Boerhaave,  and 
others,  the  phenomena  of  living  bodies  may  be  explained  by 


1 Baroniu?,  Mdaphys.,  p.  96. 


292 


VOCABULARY  OR  IHlLOSOrilY. 


LIFE  — 

the  mechanical  and  chemical  forces  belonging  to  matter. 
According  to  Bichat,  there  is  nothing  in  common — but  rather 
an  antagonism  — between  the  forces  of  dead  matter  and  the 
phenomena  of  life,  which  he  defines  to  be  “the  sum  of  func- 
tions which  resist  death.’'  Bichat  and  his  followers  are  called 
Organicists.  Barthez  and  others  hold  that  there  is  a vital 
principle  distinct  from  the  organization  of  living  bodies,  which 
directs  all  their  acts  and  functions  which  are  only  vital,  that 
is,  without  feeling  or  thought.  Their  doctrine  is  Vitalism. 
The  older  doctrine  of  Stahl  was  called  Animism,  according  to 
which  the  soul,  or  anima  mundi,  presides  not  only  over  the 
functions  of  the  sensibility  and  thought  but  over  all  the  func- 
tions and  actions  of  the  living  economy. 

Are  life  and  sensibility  two  things  essentially  distinct,  or  two 
things  essentially  united? 

Irritability  and  Excitability  are  terms  applied  to  the  sensi- 
bility which  vegetables  manifest  to  external  influences,  such 
as  light,  heat,  &c.  Bichat  ascribed  the  functions  of  absorp- 
tion, secretion,  circulation,  &c.,  which  are  not  accompanied 
with  feeling,  to  what  he  called  organic  sensibility. 

The  characteristics  of  the  several  kingdoms  of  nature  given 
by  Linnaeus  are  the  following: — Lapides  crescunt;  vegetabilia 
crescunt  et  vivunt;  animalia  crescunt  vivunt  et  sentinnt. 

The  theories  of  life  and  its  connection  with  the  phenomena 
of  mind  are  thus  classified  by  Morell.' 

“ 1.  The  chemical  theory.  This  was  represented  by  Sylvius 
in  the  seventeenth  century,  who  reduced  all  the  phenomena 
of  vital  action  and  organization  to  chemical  processes.  2.  The 
mechanical  theory.  This  falls  to  the  time  when  Harvey  dis- 
covered the  circulation  of  the  blood,  and  Boerhaave  represented 
the  human  frame  as  one  great  hydraulic  machine.  3.  The 
dynamical  theory.  Here  we  have  the  phenomena  of  mind 
and  of  life  drawn  closely  together.  The  writings  of  Stahl 
especially  show  this  point  of  view.  He  regarded  the  whole 
man  as  being  the  product  of  certain  organic  powers,  which 
evolve  all  the  various  manifestations  of  human  life,  from  the 
lowest  physical  processes  to  the  highest  intellectual.  4.  The 
theory  of  irritation.  This  we  find  more  especially  amongst  the 


1 Psychology , p.  77,  note. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


293 


LIFE— 

French  physiologists,  such  as  Bichat,  Majendie,  and  others,  who 
regard  life  as  being  the  product  of  a mere  organism,  acted 
on  by  physical  stimuli  from  the  world  without.  5.  The  theory 
of  evolution.  Schultz  and  others  of  the  German  writers  of 
the  same  school,  regard  life  as  a regular  evolution,  created  by 
opposing  powers  in  the  universe  of  existence,  from  the  lowest 
forms  of  the  vital  functions  to  the  highest  spheres  of  thought 
and  activity.  To  these  speculators  nature  is  not  a fixed 
reality,  but  a relation.  It  is  perpetual  movement,  an  unceas- 
ing becoming,  a passing  from  death  to  life,  and  from  life  to 
death.  And  just  as  physical  life  consists  in  the  tension  of  the 
lower  powers  of  nature,  so  does  mental  life  consist  in  that  of 
its  higher  powers.  6.  The  theory  of  the  Divine  ideal.  Here, 
Carus,  prompted  by  Schelling’s  philosophy,  has  seized  the 
ideal  side  of  nature,  as  well  as  the  real,  and  united  them 
together  in  his  theory  of  the  genesis  of  the  soul,  and  thus 
connected  the  whole  dynamics  of  nature  with  their  Divine 
original.” 

Plato,  Timceus : Aristotle,  De  Anima;1  Descartes,  CEuvres, 
par  Cousin ; 2 Barthez,  Bichat,  Cabanis,  and  Berard ; Cole- 
ridge, Posthumous  Essay:  Hints  toicards  the  Formation  of  a 
more  Comprehensive  Theory  of  Life. 

LOGIC  (xoytx^,  Xoyof,  reason,  reasoning,  language).  — The  word 
logica  was  early  used  in  Latin ; while  rj  "Koyixri  and  to 
Xoytxdr  were  late  in  coming  into  use  in  Greek.  Aristotle 
did  not  use  either  of  them.  His  writings  which  treat  of  the 
syllogism  and  of  demonstration  were  entitled  Analytics  ( q . v.) 
The  name  organon  was  not  given  to  the  collected  series  of 
his  writings  upon  logic  till  after  the  invention  of  printing. 
The  reason  of  the  name  is,  that  logic  was  regarded  as  not 
so  much  a science  in  itself  as  the  instrument  of  all  science. 
The  Epicureans  called  it  xuvovixy,  the  rule  by  which  true 
and  false  are  to  be  tried.  Plato  in  the  Phaedrus,  has  called 
it  a part  (ylpos),  and  in  the  Parmenides  the  organ  (opyaror) 
of  philosophy.3  An  old  division  of  philosophy  was  into  logic, 
ethics,  and  physics.  But  excluding  physics,  philosophy  may 


1 Lib.  ii.,  cap.  10.  2 Tom.  iv. 

3 See  Trendelenburg,  Elementa  Log.  Arist.,  8to,  Basil,  1842,  pp.  48,  49. 
26 


294 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


LOGIC  — 

be  regarded  as  consisting  of  four  parts — viz.,  psychology, 
logic,  ethics,  and  metaphysics  properly  so  called. 

“ Logic  is  derived  from  the  word  (^oyof),  which  signifies 
communication  of  thought  usually  by  speech.  It  is  the  name 
which  is  generally  given  to  the  branch  of  inquiry  (be  it 
called  science  or  art)  in  which  the  act  of  the  mind  in  reason- 
ing is  considered,  particularly  with  reference  to  the  connec- 
tion of  thought  and  language.”  1 

“We  divide  logicians  into  three  schools,  according  as  they 
hold  words,  things,  or  conceptions,  to  be  the  subject  of  logic ; 
and  entitle  them  respectively,  the  verbal,  the  phenomenal,  and 
the  concept ional.”2 

“When  we  attend  to  the  procedure  of  the  human  intellect 
we  soon  perceive  that  it  is  subject  to  certain  supreme  laws 
which  are  independent  of  the  variable  matter  of  our  ideas, 
and  which  posited  in  their  abstract  generality,  express  the 
absolute  and  fixed  rules  not  only  of  the  human  intellect,  but 
of  all  thought,  whatever  be  the  subject  which  frames  it  or 
the  object  which  it  concerns.  To  determine  those  universal 
laws  of  thought  in  general,  in  order  that  the  human  mind  in 
particular  may  find  in  all  its  researches  a means  of  control, 
and  an  infallible  criterion  of  the  legitimacy  of  its  procedure, 
is  the  object  of  logic.  At  the  beginning  of  the  prior  analytics, 
Aristotle  has  laid  it  down  that  ‘the  object  of  logic  is  demon- 
stration.’ 

“ Logic  is  the  science  of  the  laws  of  thought  as  thought — 
that  is,  of  the  necessary  conditions  to  which  thought,  consi- 
dered in  itself,  is  subject.”3 4 

“‘ Logic  is  the  science  of  the  laws  of  thought.’  It  is  a 
science  rather  than  an  art.  As  the  science  of  the  necessary 
laws  of  thought  it  is  pure.  It  only  gives  those  principles 
which  constitute  thought ; and  pre-supposes  the  operation  of 
those  principles  by  which  we  gain  the  materials  for  thinking. 
And  it  is  the  science  of  the  form  or  formal  laws  of  thinking, 
and  not  of  the  matter.”* — V.  Intention,  Notion. 

Others  define  logic  to  be  the  science  of  the  laws  of  reason- 


1 De  Morgan,  Formal  Logic , ch.  2.  7 Chretien,  Logical  Method , p.  95. 

3 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works , p.  698,  note. 

4 Thomson,  Outline  of  the  Laics  of  Thought. 


VOCABULARY  OB  PHILOSOPHY. 


295 


LOGIC  - 

mg.  Dr.  Whately  has  said,  “ Logic  in  its  most  extensive 
application,  is  the  science  as  well  as  the  art  of  reasoning.  So 
far  as  it  institutes  an  analysis  of  the  process  of  the  mind  in 
reasoning,  it  is  strictly  a science;  while  so  far  as  it  investigates 
the  principles  on  which  argumentation  is  conducted,  and 
furnishes  rules  to  secure  the  mind  from  error  in  its  deduc- 
tions, it  may  be  called  the  art  of  reasoning.” 

Ivirwan1  has  said,  “Logic  is  both  a science  and  an  art;  it  is 
a science  inasmuch  as,  by  analyzing  the  elements,  principles, 
and  structure  of  arguments,  it  teaches  us  how  to  discover 
their  truth  or  detect  their  fallacies,  and  point  out  the  sources 
of  such  errors.  It  is  an  art,  inasmuch  as  it  teaches  us  how 
to  arrange  arguments  in  such  manner  that  their  truth  may  be 
most  readily  perceived  or  their  falsehood  detected.”  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton2  thinks  that  Dr.  Wliatcly  had  this  passage  in 
view  when  he  constructed  his  own  definition ; but  he  adds, 
“ Not  a single  reason  has  been  alleged  to  induce  us  to  waver 
in  our  belief,  that  the  laws  of  thought,  and  not  the  lazes  of 
reasoning,  constitute  the  adequate  object  of  the  science.” 
According  to  the  significations  attached  to  the  terms  art  and 
science,  and  according  to  the  point  of  view  in  which  it  is 
regarded,  logic  may  be  called  a science  or  an  art,  or  both,  that 
is,  a scientific  art. 

Thought  may  manifest  itself  in  framing  concepts,  or  judg- 
ments, or  reasonings ; and  logic  treats  of  these  under  three 
corresponding  heads.  Method,  which  is  the  scientific  arrange- 
ment of  thoughts,  is  frequently  added  as  a fourth  head.  But 
to  some  it  appears  that  method  belongs  more  properly  to  psy- 
chology than  to  logic.  Barthelemy  St.  Hilaire,3  who  takes  this 
view,  has  said,  “ In  logic  considered  as  a science  there  are 
necessarily  four  essential  parts,  which  proceed  from  the  simple 
to  the  compound,  and  in  the  following  order,  which  cannot  be 
changed:  1,  A theory  of  the  elements  of  a proposition;  2,  A 
theory  of  propositions ; 3,  A general  theory  of  reasoning 
formed  of  propositions  connected  with  one  another  according 
to  certain  laws;  and,  lastly,  a theory  of  that  special  and 
supreme  kind  of  reasoning  which  is  called  demonstration,  and 

1 Logic , vol.  i.,  p.  1.  2 Discussions , pp.  131-4. 

3 Did.  des  Sciences  Philosophy  art.  Logique.” 


296 


VOCABULARY  OF  I>HILOSOPIIY. 


LOGIC  — 

gives  assurance  to  the  mind  of  man  of  the  forms  of  truth,  if 
it  be  not  truth  itself." 

LOVE  and  HATRED  arc  the  two  genetic  or  mother  passions  or 
affections  of  mind,  from  which  all  the  others  take  their  rise. 
The  former  is  awakened  by  the  contemplation  of  something 
which  is  regarded  as  good  ; and  the  latter  by  the  contempla- 
tion of  something  which  is  regarded  as  evil.  Hence  springs 
a desire  to  seek  the  one,  and  a desire  to  shun  the  other ; and 
desire,  under  its  various  forms  and  modifications,  may  be 
found  as  an  element  in  all  the  manifestations  of  the  sensi- 
tivity. 


MACROCOSM  and  MICROCOSM  (fwxpo;,  large  ; fuxpdf,  small ; 

xoafios,  world). 

“As  for  Paracelsus,  certainly  he  is  injurious  to  man,  if  (as 
some  eminent  chemists  expound  him)  he  calls  a man  a micro- 
cosm, because  his  body  is  really  made  up  of  all  the  several 
kinds  of  creatures  the  macrocosm  or  greater  world  consists  of, 
and  so  is  but  a model  or  epitome  of  the  universe." 1 

Many  ancient  philosophers  regarded  the  world  as  an  ani- 
mal, consisting  like  man  of  a soul  and  a body.  This  opinion, 
exaggerated  by  the  mystics,  became  the  theory  of  the  macro- 
cosm and  the  microcosm,  according  to  which  man  was  an 
epitome  of  creation,  and  the  universe  was  a man  on  a grand 
scale.  The  same  principles  and  powers  which  were  perceived 
in  the  one  were  attributed  to  the  other,  and  while  man  was 
believed  to  have  a supernatural  power  over  the  laws  of  the 
universe,  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  had  an  influence  on 
the  actions  and  destiny  of  man.  Hence  arose  Alchemy  and 
Astrology,  which  were  united  in  the  Hermetic  medicine.  Such 
views  are  fundamentally  pantheistic,  leading  to  the  belief  that 
there  is  only  one  substance,  manifesting  itself  in  the  universe 
by  an  infinite  variety,  and  concentrated  in  man  as  in  an  epi- 
tome. Van  Helmont,  Paracelsus,  Robert  Fludd,  and  others 
held  some  of  these  views. 


1 Boyle,  J Vorks,  vol.  ii.,  p.  54. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


297 


MACROCOSM  — 

Dr.  Reid1  has  said,  “Man  has  not,  'without  reason,  been 
called  an  epitome  of  the  universe.  His  body,  by  which  his 
mind  is  greatly  affected,  being  a part  of  the  material  system,  is 
subject  to  all  the  laws  of  inanimate  matter.  During  some  part 
of  his  existence,  his  state  is  very  like  that  of  a vegetable.  He 
rises,  by  imperceptible  degrees,  to  the  animal,  and,  at  last,  to 
the  rational  life,  and  has  the  principles  that  belong  to  all.” 
“Man  is  not  only  a microcosm,  in  the  structure  of  his  body, 
but  in  the  system,  too,  of  his  impulses,  including  all  of  them 
within  him,  from  the  basest  to  the  most  sublime.”2 
“ Man  is  a living  synthesis  of  the  universe.”3 
Cousin4  has  given  an  analysis  of  a MS.  work  by  Bernard  de 
Chartres,  entitled  Megacosmns  et  Microcosmus. 

MAGIC  (fiayiia,  from  judyof,  a Magian).  — “It  is  confessed  by  all 
of  understanding  that  a magician  (according  to  the  Persian 
word)  is  no  other  than  a studious  observer  and  expounder  of 
divine  things.”5 

But  while  magic  was  used  primarily  to  denote  the  study  of 
the  more  sublime  parts  of  knowledge,  it  came  at  length  to  sig- 
nify a science  of  which  the  cultivators,  by  the  help  of  demons 
or  departed  souls,  could  perform  things  miraculous. 

“ Natural  magic  is  no  other  than  the  absolute  perfection  of 
natural  philosophy.”6  Baptista  Porta  has  a treatise  on  it, 
which  was  published  in  1589  and  1591.  It  is  characterized 
by  Bacon7 8  as  full  of  credulous  and  superstitious  observations 
and  traditions  on  the  sympathies  and  antipathies  and  the 
occult  and  specific  qualities  of  things.  Sir  D.  Brewster  has  a 
treatise  under  the  same  title,  but  of  very  different  character 
and  contents,  and  answering  to  the  definition  of  Raleigh. 
Campanella,  De  Sensa  Rerum  et  Magia;s  Longinus,  Trinon 
Magi cum. 9 

MAGNANIMITY  and  EQUANIMITY (magnus,  great;  aeguus , 
even;  animus,  mind),  are  two  words  which  were  much  used 
by  Cicero  and  other  ancient  ethical  writers. 

1 Active  Pow.,  essay  iii.,  part  i.,  chap.  1. 

a Harris,  Philosoph.  Arrange .,  cap.  17.  - 3 Tiberghien. 

4 Introd.  aux  (Euvres  Inedites  d' Abelard,  p.  127. 

6 Raleigh,  Hist,  of  the  World,  b.  i.,  c.  11,  s.  3. 

u Ibid.,  Hist,  of  the  World , b.  i.,  c.  11,  s.  2. 

8 4to,  Par.,  1637. 


1 De  Av.gm.,  lib.  ill. 

0 12mo,  Francf.,  1616. 


298 


VOCABULARY  OF  FHIlMsOPHY. 


MAGNANIMITY  — 

Magnanimity  was  described  as  lifting  us  above  the  good  and 
evil  of  this  life — so  that  while  the  former  was  not  necessary  to 
our  happiness,  the  latter  could  not  make  us  miserable.  The 
favourite  example  of  magnanimity,  among  the  Romans,  was 
Fabius  Maximus,  who,  amidst  the  provocation  of  the  enemy 
and  the  impatience  of  his  countrymen,  delayed  to  give  battle 
till  he  saw  how  he  could  do  so  succesfully. 

Equanimity  supposes  change  of  state  or  fortune,  and  means 
the  preservation  of  an  even  mind  in  the  midst  of  vicissi- 
tude— neither  elated  unduly  by  prosperity  nor  depressed 
unduly  by  adversity.  Equanimity  springs  from  Magnanimity. 
Indeed  both  these  words  denote  frames  or  states  of  mind 
from  which  special  acts  of  virtue  spring  — rather  than  any 
particular  virtue.  They  correspond  to  the  active  and  passive 
fortitude  of  modern  moralists. 

“Aequam  memento  rebus  in  arduis 
Servare  mentem,  non  secus  in  bonis 
A insolenti  temperatam 
Lsetitia,  moriture  Delli.” — Hor. 

“Est  hie, 

Est  ubi  vis,  animus  si  te  non  deficit  sequus.” — Hor. 

“True  happiness  is  to  no  spot  confined; 

If  you  preserve  a firm  and  equal  mind, 

’Tis  here,  ’tis  there,  ’tis  everywhere.” 

MANICHEISM  (so  called  from  Manes,  a Persian  philosopher, 
who  flourished  about  the  beginning  of  the  third  century),  is 
the  doctrine  that  there  are  two  eternal  principles  or  powers, 
the  one  good  and  the  other  evil,  to  which  the  happiness  and 
misery  of  all  beings  may  be  traced.  It  has  been  questioned 
whether  this  doctrine  was  ever  maintained  to  the  extent  of 
denying  the  Divine  unity,  or  that  the  system  of  things  had 
not  an  ultimate  tendency  to  good.  It  is  said  that  the  Persians, 
before  Manes,  maintained  dualism  so  as  to  give  the  supremacy 
to  the  good  principle;  and  that  Manes  maintained  both  to  be 
equally  eternal  and  absolute. 

The  doctrine  of  manicheism  was  ingrafted  upon  Christianity 
about  the  middle  of  the  third  century.  The  Cathari  or  Albi- 
genses  who  appeared  in  the  twelfth  century  are  said  also  to 
have  held  the  doctrine  of  dualism  or  ditheism  — q.  v. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


299 


MANTCHEISM  — 

To  refute  it  ve  have  only  to  say  that  if  the  two  opposing 
principles  were  equal,  they  would  neutralize  each  other  — if 
they  were  unequal,  the  stronger  would  prevail,  so  that  there 
would  be  nothing  but  evil,  or  nothing  but  good  in  the  world  ; 
which  is  contrary  to  fact. 

Matter,  Hist.  Criiiq.  du  Gnosticism Beausobre,  Hist,  du 
Manicheisme. 

MATERIALISM.  — “The  materialists  maintain  that  man  consists 
of  one  uniform  substance,  the  object  of  the  senses;  and  that 
perception,  wTith  its  modes,  is  the  result,  necessary  or  other- 
wise, of  the  organization  of  the  brain.”1 2  The  doctrine 
opposed  to  this  is  spiritualism,  or  the  doctrine  that  there  is  a 
spirit  in  man,  and  that  he  has  a soul  as  well  as  a body.  In 
like  manner  he  who  maintains  that  there  is  but  one  substance 
(unisubstancisme) , and  that  that  substance  is  matter,  is  a ma- 
terialist. And  he  who  holds  that  above  and  beyond  the  mate- 
rial frame  of  the  universe  there  is  a spirit  sustaining  and 
directing  it,  is  a spiritualist.  The  philosopher  who  admits 
that  there  is  a spirit  in  man,  and  a spirit  in  the  universe,  is  a 
perfect  spiritualist.  He  who  denies  spirit  in  man  or  in  the 
universe,  is  a perfect  materialist.  But  some  have  been  incon- 
sistent enough  to  admit  a spirit  in  man  and  deny  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  while  others  have  admitted  the  existence  of 
God  and  denied  the  soul  of  man  to  be  spiritual. — V.  Imma- 
teriality. 

Baxter  and  Drew  have  both  written  on  the  immateriality  of 
the  soul.  Belsham  and  Priestly  have  defended  materialism 
without  denying  the  existence  of  God. 

Priestley,  Disquisitions  on  Matter  and  Spirit;  Three  Dis- 
sertations on  the  Doctrine  of  Materialism  and  Philosophical 
Necessity;  Price,  Letters  on  Materialism  and  Philosophical 
Necessity. 

MATHEMATICS  (yadtjyaftxrj  [sc.  IrtLafrpf  fa  ya.9rpo.fa),  ac- 
cording to  Descartes,3  treat  of  order  and  measures.  “ Ilia  om- 
nia tantum,  in  quibus  ordo  vel  mensura  examinaiur,  ad  mathesim 
referri,  nec  interesse  utrum  in  numeris  vel  fguris,  vel  astris,  vel 
sonis,  aliove  quovis  objecto  talis  mensura  qucerenda  est.” 


1 3 tom.,  Paris,  1S43. 

a Reg.  ad  Direct.  Ingenii,  Reg.  4. 


a Belsham,  Moral  Philosophy,  chap,  xi.,  sect.  1. 


300 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


MATHEMATICS  — 

Mathematics  are  cither  Pure  or  Mixed.  Arithmetic,  Geo- 
metry, Algebra,  and  the  Differential  and  Integral  Calculus 
belong  to  Pure  Mathematics.  Mixed  Mathematics  is  the  appli- 
cation of  Pure  Mathematics  to  physical  science  in  its  various 
departments:  Mechanics,  Hydrodynamics,  Optics,  Astronomy, 
Acoustics,  Electricity,  Magnetism,  &c.,  are  physico-mathemati- 
cal  sciences.  Among  philosophers,  Anaximander  of  Miletus, 
and  Pythagoras  are  called  mathematicians. 

MATTER,  as  opposed  to  mind  or  spirit  (q.  v.),  is  that  vrhich 
occupies  space,  and  with  which  we  become  acquainted  by 
means  of  our  bodily  senses  or  organs.  Everything  of  which 
we  have  any  knowledge  is  either  matter  or  mind,  i.  e.,  spirit. 
Mind  is  that  which  knows  and  thinks.  Matter  is  that  which 
makes  itself  known  by  means  of  the  bodily  senses. 

“The  first  form  which  matter  assumes  is  extension,  or  length, 
breadth,  and  thickness — it  then  becomes  body.  If  body  were 
infinite  there  could  be  no  figure,  which  is  body  bounded.  But 
body  is  not  physical  body,  unless  it  partake  of  or  is  constituted 
of  one  or  more  of  the  elements,  fire,  air,  earth,  or  water.”  1 

According  to  Descartes  the  essence  of  mind  is  thought,  and 
the  essence  of  matter  is  extension.  He  said,  Give  me  extension 
and  motion,  and  I shall  make  the  world.  Leibnitz  said  the 
essence  of  all  being,  whether  mind  or  matter,  is  force.  Matter 
is  an  assemblage  of  simple  forces  or  monads.  His  system  of 
physics  may  be  called  dynamical,  in  opposition  to  that  of 
Newton,  which  may  be  called  mechanical ; because  Leibnitz 
held  that  the  monads  possessed  a vital  or  living  energy.  We 
may  explain  the  phenomena  of  matter  by  the  movements  of 
ether,  by  gravity  and  electricity ; but  the  ultimate  reason  of 
all  movement  is  a force  primitively  communicated  at  creation, 
a force  which  is  everywhere,  but  which  while  it  is  present  in 
all  bodies  is  differently  limited  ; and  this  force,  this  virtue  or 
power  of  action  is  inherent  in  all  substances  material  and 
spiritual.  Created  substances  received  from  the  creative  sub- 
stance not  only  the  faculty  to  act,  but  also  to  exercise  their 
activity  each  after  its  own  manner.  See  Leibnitz,  De  Primes 
Philosophies  Emendatione  et  de  Notions  Substantice,  or  Nouveau 


1 Monboddo,  Ancient  Metaphys.,  b.  ii.,  e.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


301 


MATTER  — 

Systeme  de  la  Nature  et  de  la  Communication  clcs  Substances, 
in  the  Journal  des  Savans,  1G95.  On  the  various  hypotheses 
to  explain  the  activity  of  matter,  see  Stewart.1 

The  properties  which  have  been  predicated  as  essential  to 
matter  are  impenetrability,  extension,  divisibility,  inertia, 
weight.  To  the  senses  it  manifests  colour,  sound,  smell,  taste, 
heat,  and  motion:  and  by  observation  it  is  discovered  to 
possess  elasticity,  electricity,  magnetism,  &c. 

Metaphysicians  have  distinguished  the  qualities  of  matter 
into  primary  and  secondary,  and  have  said  that  our  knowledge 
of  the  former,  as  of  impenetrability  and  extension,  is  clear  and 
absolute — while  our  knowledge  of  the  latter,  as  of  sound  and 
smell,  is  obscure  and  relative.  This  distinction  taken  by 
Descartes,  adopted  by  Locke  and  also  by  Reid  and  Stewart, 
was  rejected  by  Kant,  according  to  whom,  indeed,  all  our 
knowledge  is  relative.  And  others  who  do  not  doubt  the 
objective  reality  of  matter,  hold  that  our  knowledge  of  all  its 
qualities  is  the  same  in  kind.  See  the  distinctions  precisely 
stated  and  strenuously  upheld  by  Sir  William  Hamilton  ;2  and 
ingeniously  controverted  by  Mons.  Emilie  Saisset.3 
Matter  and  Form. 

Natter  as  opposed  to  form  ( q . v.)  is  that  elementary  consti- 
tuent in  composite  substances,  which  appertains  in  common 
to  them  all  without  distinguishing  them  from  one  another. 
Everything  generated  or  made,  whether  by  nature  or  art,  is 
generated  or  made  out  of  something  else  ; and  this  something 
else  is  called  its  subject  or  matter.  Such  is  iron  to  the  boat, 
such  is  timber  to  the  boat.  Matter  void  of  form  was  called  vXb 
rtpw rtj,  or,  prima  materia — means  wood. — V.  IIylozo- 
ism).  Form  when  united  to  matter  makes  it  determinate  and 
constitutes  body  — q.  v. 

“ The  term  matter  is  usually  applied  to  whatever  is  given  to 
the  artist,  and  consequently,  as  given,  does  not  come  within 
the  province  of  the  art  itself  to  supply.  The  form  is  that  which 
is  given  in  and  through  the  proper  operation  of  the  art.  In 
sculpture,  the  matter  is  the  marble  in  its  rough  state  as  given 


1 Outlines,  part  ii.,  ch.  2,  sect.  1,  and  Act.  and  Mor.  Pow last  edit,,  yol.  ii.,  note  a. 

2 Reid's  Works , note  d. 

8 In  Diet,  des  Sciences  Philosophy  art,  “ Matiere,” 

27 


302 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


MATTER  - 

to  the  sculptor ; the  form  is  that  ■which  the  sculptor  in  the 
exercise  of  his  art  communicates  to  it.  The  distinction  between 
matter  and  form  in  any  mental  operation  is  analogous  to  this. 
The  former  includes  all  that  is  given  to,  the  latter  all  that  is 
given  by,  the  operation.  In  the  division  of  notions,  for  ex- 
ample, the  generic  notion  is  that  given  to  be  divided ; the 
addition  of  the  difference  in  the  art  of  division  constitutes  the 
species.  And  accordingly,  Genus  is  frequently  designated  by 
logicians  the  material,  Difference,  the  formal  part  of  the 
species.” *  1 

Harris,  Philosoph.  Arrange. ;2  Monboddo,  Ancient  Meta- 
phys.;3  Reid,  Intel l.  Poiv.‘> — V.  Action,  Proposition. 

MAXIM  ( maxima  propositio,  a proposition  of  the  greatest  weight), 
is  used  by  Boethius  as  synonymous  with  axiom,  or  a self- 
evident  truth.5  It  is  used  in  the  same  way  by  Locke.6 
“ There  are  a sort  of  propositions,  which,  under  the  name  of 
maxims  and  axioms,  have  passed  for  principles  of  science.” 
“By  Ivant,  maxim  was  employed  to  designate  a subjective 
principle,  theoretical  or  practical,  i.  e.,  one  not  of  objective 
validity,  being  exclusively  relative  to  some  interest  of  the  sub- 
ject. Maxim  and  regulative  principle  are,  in  the  critical  phi- 
losophy, opposed  to  law  and  constitutive  principle.” 

In  Morals,  we  have  Rocliefoucald’s  Maxims. 

In  Theology,  Fenelon  wrote  Maxims  of  the  Saints,  and 
Rollin  made  a collection  of  Maxims  drawn  from  holy  writ. 

MEMORY  (from  memini , preterite  of  the  obsolete  from  memo  or 
meno,  from  the  Greek  plvuv,  manere,  to  stay  or  remain.  From 
the  contracted  form  prouo  comes  yrrptj,  the  memory  in  which 
things  remain.  Lennep).  — “The  great  Keeper,  or  Master 
of  the  Rolls  of  the  soul,  a power  that  can  make  amends  for 
the  speed  of  time,  in  causing  him  to  leave  behind  him  those 
things  which  else  he  would  so  carry  away  as  if  they  had  not 


Consciousness  testifies  that  when  a thought  has  once  been 
present  to  the  mind,  it  may  again  become  present  to  it,  with 


been.”'' 


1 Mansel,  Prolegnm.  Log.,  p.  226. 

3 Book  ii.,  chap.  1. 

6 Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Held's  Works,  note  A,  sect.  5. 
6 Essay  on  Hum . Understand.,  b.  iv.,  chap.  7. 

1 Bishop  Hall,  Righteous  Mammon. 


0 Chap.  iv. 

4 Essay  ii.,  chap.  19. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


303 


MEMORY- 

the  additional  consciousness  that  it  has  formerly  been  present 
to  it.  When  this  takes  place  we  are  said  to  remember , and  the 
faculty  of  which  remembrance  is  the  act  is  memory. 

Memory  implies, — 1.  A mode  of  consciousness  experienced. 
2.  The  retaining  or  remaining  of  that  mode  of  consciousness 
so  that  it  may  subsequently  be  revived  without  the  presence 
of  its  object.  3.  The  actual  revival  of  that  mode  of  conscious- 
ness ; and  4.  The  recognizing  that  mode  of  consciousness  as 
having  formerly  been  experienced. 

“ The  word  memory  is  not  employed  uniformly  in  the  same 
precise  sense ; but  it  always  expresses  some  modification  of 
that  faculty,  which  enables  us  to  treasure  up,  and  preserve  for 
future  use,  the  knowledge  we  acquire ; a faculty  which  is 
obviously  the  great  foundation  of  all  intellectual  improvement, 
and  without  which  no  advantage  could  be  derived  from  the 
most  enlarged  experience.  This  faculty  implies  two  things ; a 
capacity  of  retaining  knowledge,  and  a power  of  recalling  it  to 
our  thoughts  when  we  have  occasion  to  apply  it  to  use.  The 
word  memory  is  sometimes  employed  to  express  the  capacity, 
and  sometimes  the  power.  When  we  speak  of  a retentive 
memory,  we  use  it  in  the  former  sense ; when  of  a ready 
memory,  in  the  latter.”  1 

Memory  has,  and  must  have,  an  object;  for  he  that  remem- 
bers must  remember  something,  and  that  which  he  remembers 
is  the  object  of  memory.  It  is  neither  a decaying  sense,  as 
Hobbes  would  make  it,  nor  a transformed  sensation,  as  Con- 
dillac would  have  it  to  be ; but  a distinct  and  original  faculty, 
the  phenomena  of  which  cannot  be  included  under  those  of 
any  other  power.  The  objects  of  memory  may  be  things 
external  to  us,  or  internal  states  and  modes  of  consciousness ; 
and  we  may  remember  what  we  have  seen,  touched,  or  tasted ; 
or  we  may  remember  a feeling  of  joy  or  sorrow  which  we 
formerly  experienced,  or  a resolution  or  purpose  which  we 
previously  formed. 

Hobbes  would  confine  memory  to  objects  of  sense.  He 
says,2  “By  the  senses,  which  are  numbered  according  to  the 
organs  to  be  five,  we  take  notice  of  the  objects  without  us, 


1 Stewart,  Plu'losoph.  of  Ham.  Mind,  chap.  6. 
3 Hum.  Nature , ch.  3,  sect.  G. 


304 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


MEMORY— 

and  that  notice  is  our  conception  thereof:  but  wc  take  notice 
also,  some  way  or  other,  of  our  conception,  for  when  the 
conception  of  the  same  thing  cometh  again,  we  take  notice 
that  it  is  again,  that  is  to  say,  that  we  have  had  the  same 
conception  before,  which  is  as  much  as  to  imagine  a thing 
past,  which  is  impossible  to  the  sense  which  is  only  of  things 
present ; this,  therefore,  may  be  accounted  a sixth  sense,  but 
internal ; not  external  as  the  rest,  and  is  commonly  called 
remembrance.” 

Mr.  Stewart  holds  that  memory  involves  “ a power  of 
recognizing,  as  former  objects  of  attention,  the  thoughts 
that  from  timh  to  time  occur  to  us : a power  which  is  not 
implied  in  that  law  of  our  nature  which  is  called  the  asso- 
ciation of  ideas.”  But  the  distinction  thus  taken  between 
memory  and  association  is  not  very  consistent  with  a further 
distinction  which  he  takes  between  the  memory  of  things  and 
the  memory  of  events “ In  the  former  case,  thoughts  which 
have  been  previously  in  the  mind,  may  recur  to  us  without 
suggesting  the  idea  of  the  past,  or  of  any  modification  of 
time  whatever ; as  when  I repeat  over  a poem  which  I have 
got  by  heart,  or  when  I think  of  the  features  of  an  absent 
friend.  In  this  last  instance,  indeed,  philosophers  distin- 
guish the  act  of  the  mind  by  the  name  of  conception;  but 
in  ordinary  discourse,  and  frequently  even  in  philosophical 
writing,  it  is  considered  as  an  exertion  of  memory.  In  these 
and  similar  cases,  it  is  obvious  that  the  operations  of  this 
faculty  do  not  necessarily  involve  the  idea  of  the  past.  The 
case  is  different  with  respect  to  the  memory  of  events.  When 
I think  of  these,  I not  only  recall  to  the  mind  the  former 
objects  of  its  thoughts,  but  I refer  the  event  to  a particular 
point  of  time ; so  that,  of  every  such  act  of  memory,  the 
idea  of  the  past  is  a necessary  concomitant.”  Mr.  Stewart 
therefore  supposes  “that  the  remembrance  of  a past  event  is 
not  a simple  act  of  the  mind ; but  that  the  mind  first  forms  a 
conception  of  the  event,  and  then  judges  from  circumstances, 
of  the  period  of  time  to  which  it  is  to  be  referred.  But  the 
remembrance  of  a thing  is  not  a simple  act  of  the  mind,  any 
more  than  the  remembrance  of  an  event.  The  truth  seems  to 


1 Elements , chap.  6. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


805 


MEMORY— 

be  that  things  and  events  recur  to  the  mind  equally  unclothed 
or  unconnected  with  the  notion  of  pastness.1  And  it  is  not 
till  they  are  recognized  as  objects  of  former  consciousness  that 
they  can  be  said  to  be  remembered.  But  the  recognition  is 
the  act  of  the  judging  faculty.  Thoughts  which  have  for- 
merly been  present  to  the  mind  may  again  become  present  to 
it  without  being  recognized.  Nay,  they  may  be  entertained 
for  a time  as  new  thoughts,  but  it  is  not  till  they  have  been 
recognized  as  objects  of  former  consciousness  that  they  can 
be  regarded  as  remembered  thoughts,2  so  that  an  act  of 
memory,  whether  of  things  or  events,  is  by  no  means  a simple 
act  of  the  mind.  Indeed,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  in  any 
mental  operation  we  can  detect  any  single  faculty  acting  in- 
dependently of  others.  What  we  mean  by  calling  them  dis- 
tinct faculties  is,  that  each  has  a separate  or  peculiar  func- 
tion ; not  that  that  function  is  exercised  independently  of 
other  faculties.  — V.  Faculty. 

Mr.  Locke3  treats  of  retention.  “ The  next  faculty  of  the 
mind  (after  perception),  whereby  it  makes  a further  progress 
towards  knowledge,  is  that  which  I call  retention,  or  the 
keeping  of  those  simple  ideas,  which  from  sensation  or  reflec- 
tion it  hath  received.  This  is  done  two  ways:  first,  by  keep- 
ing the  idea  which  is  brought  into  it  for  some  time  actually 
in  view;  which  is  called  contemplation.  The  other  way  of 
retention,  is  the  power  to  revive  again  in  our  minds  those  ideas 
which,  after  imprinting,  have  disappeared,  or  have  been  as  it 
were  laid  aside  out  of  sight ; and  thus  we  do,  when  we  con- 
ceive heat  or  light,  yellow  or  sweet,  — the  object  being  re- 
moved. This  is  memory,  which  is  as  it  were  the  storehouse 
of  our  ideas.”  — V.  Retention. 

The  circumstances  which  have  a tendency  to  facilitate  or 
insure  the  retention  or  the  recurrence  of  anything  by  the 
memory,  are  chiefly  — Vividness,  Repetition,  and  Attention. 
When  an  object  affects  us  in  a pleasant  or  in  a disagreeable 


1 See  Younjr,  Intellect.  Philosophy  lect.  xvi. 

a Aristotle  ( De  Memoria  el  Peminiscentia,  cap.  1),  has  said  that  memory  is  always 
accompanied  with  the  notion  of  time,  and  that  only  those  animals  that  have  the  notion 
of  time  have  memory. 

*s  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand b.  ii.,  c.  10. 


306 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


MEMORY— 

manner — when  it  is  frequently  or  familiarly  observed  — or 
■when  it  is  examined  with  attention  and  interest,  it  is  more 
easily  and  surely  remembered. 

“ The  things  which  are  best  preserved  by  the  memory,”  said 
Lord  Herbert,'  “ are  the  things  which  please  or  terrify — which 
are  great  or  new — to  which  much  attention  has  been  paid — or 
which  have  been  oft  repealed,  — which  are  apt  to  the  circum- 
stances— or  which  have  many  things  related  to  them.” 

The  qualities  of  a good  memory  arc  susceptibility,  retentive - 
ness,  and  readiness. 

The  common  saying  that  memory  and  judgment  are  not 
often  found  in  the  same  individual,  in  a high  degree,  must  be 
received  with  qualification. 

Memory  in  all  its  manifestations  is  very  much  influenced, 
and  guided  by  what  have  been  called  the  laws  of  associa- 
tion— q.  v. 

In  its  first  manifestations,  memory  operates  spontaneously, 
and  thoughts  are  allowed  to  come  and  go  through  the  mind 
without  direction  or  control.  But  it  comes  subsequently  to  be 
exercised  with  intention  and  will ; some  thoughts  being  sought 
and  invited,  and  others  being  shunned  and  as  far  as  possible 
excluded.  Spontaneous  memory  is  remembrance.  Intentional 
memory  is  recollection  or  reminiscence. 

The  former  in  Greek  is  Mipyy,  and  the  latter  ’Avdyvyaii. 
In  both  forms,  but  especially  in  the  latter,  we  are  sensible  of 
the  influence  which  association  has  in  regulating  the  exercise 
of  this  faculty. 

By  memory,  we  not  only  retain  and  recall  former  knowledge, 
but  we  also  acquire  new  knowledge.  It  is  by  means  of  memory 
that  we  have  the  notion  of  continued  existence  or  duration ; 
and  also  the  persuasion  of  our  personal  identity,  amidst  all 
the  changes  of  our  bodily  frame,  and  all  the  alterations  of 
our  temper  and  habits. 

Memory,  in  its  spontaneous  or  passive  manifestation,  is  com- 
mon to  man  with  the  inferior  animals.  But  Aristotle  denied 
that  they  are  capable  of  recollection  or  reminiscence,  which  is  a 
kind  of  reasoning  by  which  we  ascend  from  a present  conscious- 


1 De  Ycritate,  p.  156. 


ArOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


307 


MEMORY— 

ness  to  a former,  and  from  that  to  a more  remote,  till  the 
■whole  facts  of  some  case  are  brought  again  back  to  us.  And 
Dr.  Reid  has  remarked  that  the  inferior  animals  do  not  mea- 
sure time  nor  possess  any  distinct  knowledge  of  intervals  of 
time.  In  man  memory  is  the  condition  of  all  experience,  and 
consequently  of  all  progress. 

Memory  in  its  exercises  is  very  dependent  upon  bodily 
organs,  particularly  the  brain.  In  persons  under  fever,  or  in 
danger  of  drowning,  the  brain  is  preternaturally  excited  ; and 
in  such  cases  it  has  been  observed  that  memory  becomes  more 
remote  and  far-reaching  in  its  exercise  than  under  ordinary 
and  healthy  circumstances.  Several  authentic  cases  of  this 
kind  are  on  record.1  And  hence  the  question  has  been  sug- 
gested, whether  thought  be  not  absolutely  imperishable,  or 
whether  every  object  of  former  consciousness  may  not,  under 
peculiar  circumstances,  be  liable  to  be  recalled  ? 2 
MEMORIA  TECHNICA,  or  MNEMONICS.— These  terms  are 
applied  to  artificial  methods  which  have  been  devised  to  assist 
the  memory.  They  all  rest  on  the  association  of  ideas.  The 
relations  by  which  ideas  are  most  easily  and  firmly  associated 
are  those  of  contiguity  in  place  and  resemblance.  On  these 
two  relations  the  principal  methods  of  assisting  the  memory 
have  been  founded.  The  methods  of  localization,  or  local 
memory,  associate  the  object  which  it  is  wished  to  remember 
with  some  place  or  building,  all  the  parts  of  which  are  well 
known.  The  methods  of  resemblance  or  symbolization,  esta- 
blish some  resemblance  either  between  the  things  or  the  words 
which  it  is  wished  to  remember,  and  some  object  more  familiar 
to  the  mind.  Rhythm  and  rhyme  giving  aid  to  the  memory, 
technical  verses  have  been  framed  for  that  purpose  in  various 
departments  of  study. 

The  topical  or  local  memory  has  been  traced  back  to  Simo- 
nides, who  lived  in  the  sixth  century,  b.  c.  Cicero3  describes 
a local  memory  or  gives  a Topology.  Quintilian 4 and  Pliny 
the  naturalist5  also  describe  this  art. 

1 See  Coleridge,  Biographia  Literaria ; De  Quincey,  Confessions  of  an  English  Opium- 
Eater  ; and  Sir  John  Barrow,  Autobiography , p.  398. 

a Aristotle,  De  Memoria  et  Reminiscentia  ; Beattie,  Dissertations ; Reid,  Inlell.  row., 
essay  iii.;  Stewart,  Elements , chap.  6. 

3 De  Oratore,  ii.  S6.  4 xi.,  2. 


5 vii.  24. 


308 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOniY. 


MEMORIA  TECHNICA— 

In  modern  times  may  be  mentioned,  Gray1  and  Fei- 
nagle.2 

MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.  — The  adjective  mental  comes  to  us 
from  the  Latin  mens , or  from  the  Greek  jutVoj,  or  these  may  be 
referred  to  the  German  meinen,  to  mean,  to  mark.  If  the 
adjective  mental  be  regarded  as  coming  from  the  Latin  mens, 
then  mental  philosophy  will  be  the  philosophy  of  the  human 
mind,  and  will  correspond  with  psychology.  If  the  adjective 
mental  be  regarded  as  coming  from  the  German  meinen,  to 
mean  or  to  mark,  then  the  phrase  mental  philosophy  may  be 
restricted  to  the  philosophy  of  the  mind  in  its  intellectual 
energies,  or  those  faculties  by  which  it  marks  or  knows,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  those  faculties  by  which  it  feels  or  wills.  It 
would  appear  that  it  is  often  used  in  this  restricted  significa- 
tion to  denote  the  philosophy  of  the  intellect,  or  of  the  intel- 
lectual powers,  as  contradistinguished  from  the  active  powers, 
exclusive  of  the  phenomena  of  the  sensitivity  and  the  will.3 

MERIT  ( mcritum , from  fit'poj,  a part  or  portion  of  labour  or  re- 
ward), means  good  desert;  having  done  something  worthy  of 
praise  or  reward. 

“Fear  not  the  anger  of  the  wise  to  raise; 

Those  best  can  bear  reproof,  who  merit  praise.” 

Pope,  Essay  on  Criticism. 

In  seeing  a thing  to  be  right,  we  see  at  the  same  time  that 
we  ought  to  do  it ; and  when  we  have  done  it  we  experience  a 
feeling  of  conscious  satisfaction  or  self-approbation.  We  thus 
come  by  the  idea  of  merit  or  good  desert.  The  approbation  of 
our  own  mind  is  an  indication  that  God  approves  of  our  con- 
duct ; and  the  religious  sentiment  strengthens  the  moral  one. 
We  have  the  same  sentiments  towards  others.  When  we  see 
another  do  what  is  right,  we  applaud  him.  When  we  see  him 
do  what  is  right  in  the  midst  of  temptation  and  difficulty,  we 
say  he  has  much  merit.  Such  conduct  appears  to  be  deserv- 
ing of  reward.  Virtue  and  happiness  ought  to  go  together. 
We  are  satisfied  that  under  the  government  of  God  they  will 
do  so. 


1 Memoria  Technica , 1730.  3 New  Art  of  Memory,  1812. 

3 See  Chalmers,  Sketches  of  Moral  and  Mental  Philosophy , c.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


309 


MERIT  - 

The  idea  of  merit  then  is  a primary  and  natural  idea  to  the 
mind  of  man.  It  is  not  an  after  thought  to  praise  the  doing 
of  what  is  right  from  seeing  that  it  is  beneficial,  but  a sponta- 
neous sentiment  indissolubly  connected  with  our  idea  of  what 
is  right,  a sentiment  guaranteed  as  to  its  truthfulness  by  the 
structure  of  the  human  mind  and  the  character  of  God.1 

The  scholastic  distinction  between  merit  of  congruity  and 
merit  of  condignity  is  thus  stated  by  Hobbes:2 — “God  Al- 
mighty having  promised  paradise  to  'those  that  can  walk 
through  this  world  according  to  the  limits  and  precepts  pre- 
scribed by  Him ; they  say,  he  that  shall  so  walk,  shall  merit 
paradise  ex  congruo.  But  because  no  man  can  demand  a right 
to  it  by  his  own  righteousness,  or  any  other  power  in  himself, 
but  by  the  free  grace  of  God  only  ; they  say,  no  man  can  merit 
paradise  ex  condigno.” — Y.  Virtue. 

METAPHOR  (uffa^opEu,  to  transfer).  — “A  metaphor  is  the 
transferring  of  a word  from  its  usual  meaning,  to  an  analogous 
meaning,  and  then  the  employing  it  agreeably  to  such  trans- 
fer.’'3 For  example:  the  usual  meaning  of  evening  is  the 
conclusion  of  the  day.  But  age  too  is  a conclusion,  the  con- 
clusion of  human  life.  Now  there  being  an  analogy  in  all 
conclusions,  we  arrange  in  order  the  two  we  have  alleged,  and 
say,  that  “ as  evening  is  to  the  day,  so  is  age  to  human  life.” 
Hence  by  an  easy  permutation  (which  furnishes  at  once  two 
metaphors ) we  say  alternately,  that  “ evening  is  the  age  of  the 
day,”  and  that  “ age  is  the  evening  of  life.”4 

“ Sweet  is  primarily  and  properly  applied  to  tastes ; second- 
arily and  improperly  ( i . e.,  by  analogy)  to  sounds. 

“When  the  secondary  meaning  of  a word  is  founded  on 
some  fanciful  analogy,  and  especially  when  it  is  introduced 
for  ornament’s  sake,  we  call  this  a metaphor,  as  when  we  speak 
of  a ship’s  ploughing  the  deep  ; the  turning  up  of  the  surface 
being  essential  indeed  to  the  plough,  but  accidental  only  to 
the  ship.”5 

METAPHOR  and  SIMILE.  — “A  metaphor  differs  from  a 
simile  in  form  only,  not  in  substance.  In  a simile,  the  two 


* See  Price,  Review,  ch.  4. 

8 Arist.,  Poet.,  cap.  21. 

5 Whately,  Log.,  b.  iii.,  J 10. 


8 Of  Man,  pt.  i.,  ch.  14. 

4 Harris,  Philosoph,  Arrange.,  p.  441. 


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VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


METAPHOR  — 

subjects  are  kept  distinct  in  the  expression,  as  well  as  in 
the  thought ; in  a metaphor  they  are  kept  distinct  in  the 
thought,  but  not  in  the  expression.  A hero  resembles  a lion  ; 
and  upon  that  resemblance  many  similies  have  been  founded 
by  Homer  and  other  poets.  But  let  us  invoke  the  aid  of  the 
imagination,  and  figure  the  hero  to  be  a lion,  instead  of  only 
resembling  one  ; by  that  variation  the  simile  is  converted  into 
a metaphor,  which  is  supported  by  describing  all  the  qualities 
of  the  lion  that  resemble  those  of  the  hero.1  "When  I say  of 
some  great  minister,  that  ‘he  upholds  the  state  like  a pillar 
which  supports  the  weight  of  a whole  edifice,’  I evidently 
frame  a comparison ; but  when  I say  of  the  same  minister, 
that  ‘ he  is  a pillar  of  the  state,’  this  is  not  a comparison  but 
a metaphor.  The  comparison  between  the  minister  and  the 
pillar  is  instituted  in  the  mind,  but  without  the  aid  of  words 
which  denote  comparison.  The  comparison  is  only  insinuated, 
not  expressed;  the  one  object  is  supposed  to  be  so  like  the 
other,  that,  without  formally  drawing  the  comparison,  the 
name  of  the  one  may  be  substituted  for  that  of  the  other.” 2 — 
V.  Analogy,  Allegory. 

METAPHYSICS.  — This  word  is  commonly  said  to  have  originated 
in  the  fact  that  Tyrannion  or  Andronicus,  the  collectors  and 
conservers  of  the  works  of  Aristotle,  inscribed  upon  a portion 
of  them  the  words  Ta  jusrd  fa  6v tu-xa.  But  a late  French 
critic,  Mons.  Ravaisson,3  says  he  has  found  earlier  traces  of 
this  phrase,  and  thinks  it  probable  that,  although  not  em- 
ployed by  Aristotle  himself,  it  was  applied  to  this  portion  of 
his  writings  by  some  of  his  immediate  disciples.  Whether  the 
phrase  was  intended  merely  to  indicate  that  this  portion  should 
stand,  or  that  it  should  be  studied,  after  the  physics,  in  the  col- 
lected works  of  Aristotle,  are  the  two  views  which  have  been 
taken.  In  point  of  fact,  this  portion  does  usually  stand  after 
the  physics.  But  in  the  order  of  science  or  study,  Aristotle 
said,  that  after  physics  should  come  mathematics.  And  Dero- 
don4  has  given  reasons  why  metaphysics  should  be  studied  after 
logic,  and  before  physics  and  other  parts  of  philosophy.  But  the 

1 Arist.,  j Rhet.,  lib.  iii..  cap.  4. 

3 Irving,  English  Composition , p.  172. 

3 Essai  sur  la  Metaphysique , tom.  i.,  p.  40. 

4 Proem.  Metaphys . 


VOCABULARY  OR  PHILOSOPHY. 


311 


METAPHYSICS  — 

truth  is  that  the  preposition  /. u-ta  means  along  with  as  well  as 
after,  and  might  even  be  translated  above.  In  Latin  mcta- 
physica  is  synonymous  with  super naiar alia.  And  in  English 
Shakspeare  has  used  metaphysical  as  synonymous  with  super- 
natural. 

. . . “ Pate  and  metaphysical  aid  doth  seem 
To  have  thee  crowned.” 

Macbeth,  Act  i.,  scene  3. 

Clemens  Alexandrinus1  considered  metaphysical  as  equiva- 
lent to  supernatural;  and  is  supported  by  an  anonymous 
Greek  commentator,  whom  Patricius  has  translated  into 
Latin,  and  styles  Philoponus. 

But  if  ,u£vd  be  interpreted,  as  it  may,  to  mean  along  with, 
then  metaphysics  or  metaphysical  philosophy  will  be  that  phi- 
losophy which  we  should  take  along  with  us  into  physics,  and 
into  every  other  philosophy  — that  knowledge  of  causes  and 
principles  which  we  should  carry  with  us  into  every  depart- 
ment of  inquiry.  Aristotle  called  it  the  governing  philosophy, 
which  gives  laws  to  all,  but  receives  laws  from  none.2  Lord 
Bacon3  has  limited  its  sphere,  when  he  says,  “The  one  part 
(of  philosophy)  which  is  physics  enquireth  and  handleth  the 
material  and  efficient  causes ; and  the  other  which  is  meta- 
physic handleth  the  formal  and  final  cause.”  But  all  causes 
are  considered  by  Aristotle  in  his  writings  which  have  been 
entitled  metaphysics.  The  inquiry  into  causes  was  called  by 
him  the  first  philosophy  — science  of  truth,  science  of  being. 
It  has  for  its  obj  ect  — not  those  things  which  are  seen  and 
temporal  — phenomenal  and  passing,  but  things  not  seen  and 
eternal,  things  supersensuous  and  stable.  It  investigates  the 


1 Strom,  i.  a Metaphys .,  lib.  i.,  cap.  2. 

8 Advancement  of  Learning , book  ii.  In  another  passage,  however,  Bacon  admits 
the  advantage,  if  not  the  validity,  of  a higher  metaphysic  than  this.  “ Because  the 
distributions  and  partitions  of  knowledge  are  not  like  several  lines  that  meet  in  one 
angle,  and  so  touch  but  in  a point,  but  are  like  branches  of  a tree  that  meet  in  a stem, 
which  hath  a dimension  and  quantity  of  entireness  and.  continuance,  before  it  come  to 
discontinue  and  break  itself  into  arms  and  boughs;  therefore,  it  is  good  to  erect  and 
constitute  one  universal  science  by  the  name  of 4 philosophia prima,1  primitive  or  sum- 
mary philosophy,  as  the  main  and  common  way,  before  we  come  where  the  ways  part 
and  divide  themselves;  which  science,  whether  I should  report  deficient  or  no,  I stand 
doubtful.”  Except  in  so  far  as  it  proceeded  by  observation  rather  than  by  speculation 
d priori,  even  this  science  would  have  been  but  lightly  esteemed  by  Bacon. 


312 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


METAPHYSICS  — 

first  principles  of  nature  and  of  thought,  the  ultimate  causes 
of  existence  and  of  knowledge.  It  considers  things  in  their 
essence,  independently  of  the  particular  properties  or  deter- 
mined modes  which  make  a difference  between  one  thing  and 
another.  In  short,  it  is  ontology  or  the  science  of  being  as 
being,  that  is,  not  the  science  of  any  particular  being  or 
beings,  such  as  animals  or  vegetables,  lines  or  numbers,  but 
the  science  of  being  in  its  general  and  common  attributes. 
There  is  a science  of  matter  and  there  is  a science  of  mind. 
But  metaphysics  is  the  science  of  being  as  common  to  both. 

“The  subject  of  metaphysics  is  the  whole  of  things.  This 
cannot  be  otherways  known  than  in  its  principles  and  causes. 
Now  these  must  necessarily  be  what  is  most  general  in  nature ; 
for  it  is  from  generals  that  particulars  are  derived,  which  can- 
not exist  without  the  generals;  whereas  the  generals  may  exist 
without  the  particulars.  Thus,  the  species,  man,  cannot  exist 
without  the  genus,  animal ; but  animal  may  be  without  man. 
And  this  holds  universally  of  all  genuses  and  specieses.  The 
subject  therefore  of  metaphysics,  is  what  is  principal  in  nature, 
and  first,  if  not  in  priority  of  time,  in  dignity  and  excellence, 
and  in  order  likewise,  as  being  the  causes  of  everything  in  the 
universe.  Leaving,  therefore,  particular  subjects,  and  their 
several  properties,  to  particular  sciences,  this  universal  science 
compares  these  subjects  together;  considers  wherein  they 
differ  and  w'herein  they  agree  : and  that  which  they  have  in 
common,  but  belongs  not,  in  particular,  to  any  one  science,  is 
the  proper  object  of  metaphysics.”  1 

Metaphysics  is  the  knowledge  of  the  one  and  the  real  in 
opposition  to  the  many  and  the  apparent.2  Matter,  as  per- 
ceived by  the  senses,  is  a combination  of  distinct  and  hetero- 
geneous qualities,  discernible,  some  by  sight,  some  by  smell, 
&c.  What  is  the  thing  itself,  the  subject  and  owner  of  these 
several  qualities,  and  yet  not  identical  with  any  one  of 
them?  What  is  it  by  virtue  of  wliich  those  several  attri- 
butes constitute  or  belong  to  one  and  the  same  thing  ? Mind 
presents  to  consciousness  so  many  distinct  states,  and  ope- 
rations, and  feelings.  What  is  the  nature  of  that  one  mind, 


1 Monboddo,  Ancient  Metaphys book  iii.,  chap.  4. 

Q Arist.,  Mdaphys.,  lib.  iii.,  c.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


313 


METAPHYSICS  - 

of  which  all  these  are  so  many  modifications?  The  inquiry 
may  be  carried  higher  still,  can  we  attain  to  any  single  con- 
ception of  being  in  general,  to  which  both  mind  and  matter 
are  subordinate,  and  from  which  the  essence  of  both  may  be 
deduced  ? 1 

“ Aristotle  said  every  science  must  have  for  investigation  a 
determined  province  and  separate  form  of  being,  but  none  of 
these  sciences  reaches  the  conception  of  being  itself.  Hence 
there  is  needed  a science  which  should  investigate  that  which 
the  other  sciences  take  up  hypothetically,  or  through  experience. 
This  is  done  by  the  first  philosophy,  which  has  to  do  with 
being  as  such,  while  the  other  sciences  relate  only  to  deter- 
mined and  concrete  being.  The  metaphysics,  which  is  this 
science  of  being  and  its  primitive  grounds,  is  the  first 
philosophy,  since  it  is  pre-supposed  by  every  other  discipline. 
Thus,  says  Aristotle,  if  there  were  only  a physical  substance, 
then  would  physics  be  the  first  and  the  only  philosophy  ; but 
if  there  be  an  immaterial  and  unmoved  essence  which  is  the 
ground  of  all  being,  then  must  there  be  also  an  antecedent, 
and  because  it  is  antecedent,  a universal  philosophy.  The  first 
ground  of  all  being  is  God,  whence  Aristotle  occasionally  gives 
to  the  first  philosophy  the  name  of  theology.2 

Metaphysics  was  formerly  distinguished  into  general  and 
special.  The  former  was  called  Ontology — [q.  v.),  or  the  science 
of  being  in  general,  whether  infinite  or  finite,  spiritual  or 
material ; and  explained  therefore  the  most  universal  notions 
and  attributes  common  to  all  beings  — such  as  entity,  non- 
entity, essence,  existence,  unity,  identity,  diversity,  &c.  This 
is  metaphysics  properly  so  called.  Special  metaphysics  was 
sometimes  called  Pneumatology  — ( q . v.),  and  included  — 1. 
Natural  Theology,  or  Theodicy;  2.  Rational  Cosmology,  or 
the  science  of  the  origin  and  order  of  the  world ; and  3. 
Rational  Psychology,  which  treated  of  the  nature,  faculties, 
and  destiny  of  the  human  mind. 

The  three  objects  of  special  metaphysics,  viz.,  God,  the 
world,  and  the  human  mind,  correspond  to  Kant’s  three  ideas 


1 Wolf,  Philosoph.  Ration.  Disc.  Prelim sect.  73;  Mansel,  Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  277. 

a Schwegler,  Hist,  of  Philos.,  p.  112. 

28 


314 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


METAPHYSICS  - 

of  the  pure  reason.  According  to  him,  a systematic  exposi- 
tion of  those  notions  and  truths,  the  knowledge  of  which  is 
altogether  independent  of  experience,  constitutes  the  science 
of  metaphysics. 

“Time  was,”  says  Kant,1  “ when  metaphysics  Avas  the  queen 
of  all  the  sciences ; and  if  we  take  the  will  for  the  deed,  she 
certainly  deserves,  so  far  as  regards  the  high  importance  of 
her  object  matter,  this  title  of  honour.  Now,  it  is  the  fashion 
of  the  time  to  heap  contempt  and  scorn  upon  her ; and  the 
matron  mourns,  forlorn  and  forsaken,  like  Hecuba  — 

‘Modo,  maxima  rerum, 

Tot  generis,  natisque  potens, 

Nunc  trahor  exul,  inops.”, 

According-  to  D’Alembert,2  the  aim  of  ?netap7iysics  is  to  ex- 
amine the  generation  of  our  ideas,  and  to  show  that  they  all 
come  from  sensations.  This  is  the  ideology  of  Condillac  and 
De  Tracy. 

Mr.  Stewart3  has  said  that  “ Metaphysics  was  a word  formerly 
appropriated  to  the  ontology  and  pneumatology  of  the  schools, 
but  now  understood  as  equally  applicable  to  all  those  inqui- 
ries which  have  for  their  object,  to  trace  the  various  branches 
of  human  knowledge  to  their  first  principles  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  human  mind.”  And4 5  he  has  said  that  by  meta- 
physics he  understands  the  “inductive  philosophy  of  the 
human  mind.”  In  this  sense  the  word  is  now  popularly  em- 
ployed to  denote,  not  the  rational  psychology  of  the  schools, 
but  psychology,  or  the  philosophy  of  the  human  mind  prose- 
cuted according  to  the  inductive  method.  In  consequence  of 
the  subtle  and  insoluble  questions  prosecuted  by  the  school- 
men, under  the  head  of  metaphysics,  the  word  and  the  inqui- 
ries which  it  includes  have  been  exposed  to  ridicule.6 

1 Preface  to  the  first  edition  of  the  Crit.  of  Pure  Reason. 

a Melanges , tom.  iv.,  p.  143.  8 Dissert. , part  ii.,  p.  475. 

4 In  the  Preface  to  the  Dissert. 

5 The  word  metaphysics  was  handled  by  Rev.  Sydney  Smith  ( Elementary  Sketches 
of  Moral  Philosophy , chap.  1,  p.  3,)  with  as  much  caution  as  if  had  been  a hand- 
grenade. 

“ There  is  a word,”  he  exclaimed,  when  lecturing,  with  his  deep,  sonorous,  warning 
voice,  “of  dire  sound  and  horrible  import,  which  I would  fain  have  kept  concealed  if  I 
possibly  could,  but  as  this  is  not  feasible,  I shall  even  meet  the  danger  at  once,  and  get 


VOCABULARY  OB  PHILOSOPHY. 


315 


METAPHYSICS  — 

But  there  is  and  must  be  a science  of  being,  other-wise  there 
is  and  can  be  no  science  of  knowing. 

“If  by  metaphysics  we  mean  those  truths  of  the  pure  reason 
which  always  transcend,  and  not  seldom  appear  to  contradict 
the  understanding,  or  (in  the  words  of  the  great  apostle) 
spiritual  verities  which  can  only  be  spiritually  discerned,  and 
this  is  the  true  and  legitimate  meaning  of  metaphysics,  gc-cd  id 
fyvaixu,  then  I affirm,  that  this  very  controversy  between  the 
Arminians  and  the  Calvinists  (as  to  grace),  in  which  both  are 
partially  right  in  what  they  affirm,  and  both  wholly  wrong  in 
what  they  deny,  is  a proof  that  without  metaphysics  there  can 
be  no  light  of  faith.” *  1 

In  French  the  word  metaphysique  is  used  as  synonymous  with 
philosophic,  to  denote  the  first  principles,  or  an  inquiry  into 
the  first  principles  of  any  science.  La  Metaphysique  du  Droit, 
La  Metaphysique  du  Moral,  &c.  It  is  the  same  in  German. 
METEMPSYCHOSIS  {gad,  beyond;  ig^v%ou>,  to  animate),  is 
the  transmigration  or  passage  of  the  soul  from  one  body  to 
another.  “We  read  in  Plato,  that  from  the  opinion  of  metem- 
psychosis, or  transmigration  of  the  souls  of  men  into  the  bodies 
of  beasts  most  suitable  unto  their  human  condition,  after  his 
death,  Orpheus  the  musician  became  a swan.”2 

This  doctrine  implies  a belief  in  the  pre-existence  and  im- 
mortality of  the  soul.  And^  according  to  Herodotus,3  the 
Egyptians  were  the  first  to  espouse  both  doctrines.  They 
believed  that  the  soul  at  death  entered  into  some  animal 


out  of  it  as  well  as  I can.  The  word  to  which  I allude  is  that  very  tremendous  one  of 

1 metaphysics ,’  which  in  a lecture  on  moral  philosophy,  seems  likely  to  produce  as  much 
alarm  as  the  cry  of  ‘fire’  in  a crowded  playhouse;  when  Belvidera  is  left  to  cry  by 
herself,  and  every  one  saves  himself  in  the  best  manner  he  can.  I must  beg  of  my 
audience,  however,  to  sit  quiet,  and  in  the  meantime  to  make  use  of  the  language^ which 
the  manager  would  probably  adopt  on  such  an  occasion : I can  assure  ladies  and  gen- 
tlemen there  is  not  the  smallest  degree  of  danger.” 

The  blacksmith  of  Glamis*  description  of  metaphysics  was — “Twa  folk  disputin’  thc- 
gither;  he  that’s  listenin’  disna  ken  what  he  that’s  speakin’  means,  and  he  that’s 
speakin’  disna  ken  what  he  means  himsel’  — that's  metaphysics .” 

Another  said— “God  forbid  that  I should  say  a word  against  metaphysics , only,  if  a 
man  should  try  to  see  down  his  own  throat,  with  a lighted  candle  in  his  hand,  let  him 
take  care  lest  he  set  his  head  on  fire.” 

1 Coleridge,  Notes  on  Eng.  Div .,  vol.  i.,  p.  340. 
a Browne,  Vulgar  Errors,  b.  iii.,  c.  27. 

3 Lib.  ii.,  sect.  123. 


316 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


METEMPSYCHOSIS  — 

created  at  the  moment ; and  that  after  having  inhabited  the 
forms  of  all  animals  on  earth,  in  the  water,  or  in  the  air,  it 
returned  at  the  end  of  three  thousand  years  into  a human  body, 
to  begin  anew  a similar  course  of  transmigration.  (Among  the 
inhabitants  of  India  the  transmigration  of  the  soul  was  more 
nearly  allied  to  the  doctrine  of  emanation — q.  v.)  The  common 
opinion  is,  that  the  doctrine  of  transmigration  passed  from 
Egypt  into  Greece.  But,  before  any  communication  between 
the  two  countries,  it  had  a place  in  the  Orphic  mysteries. 
Pythagoras  may  have  given  more  precision  to  the  doctrine.  It 
was  adopted  by  Plato  and  his  followers,  and  was  secretly  taught 
among  the  early  Christians,  according  to  one  of  St.  Jerome’s 
letters.  The  doctrine,  when  believed,  should  lead  to  abstaining 
from  flesh,  fish,  or  fowl,  and  this,  accordingly,  was  one  of  the 
fundamental  injunctions  in  the  religion  of  Brahma,  and  in  the 
philosophy  of  Pythagoras. 

METHOD  [/xiQobos,  fxe-td  and  o5oj),  means  the  way  or  path  by 
which  we  proceed  to  the  attainment  of  some  object  or  aim.  In 
its  widest  acceptation,  it  denotes  the  means  employed  to  obtain 
some  end.  Every  art  and  every  handicraft  has  its  method. 
Cicero1  translates  yidoSos  by  via,  and  couples  it  with  ars. 

Scientific  or  philosophical  method  is  the  march  which  the 
mind  follows  in  ascertaining  or  communicating  truth.  It  is 
the  putting  of  our  thoughts  in  a certain  order  with  a view  to 
improve  our  knowledge  or  to  convey  it  to  others. 

Method  may  be  called,  in  general,  the  art  of  disposing  well  a 
series  of  many  thoughts,  either  for  the  discovering  truth  when  we 
are  ignorant  of  it,  or  for  proving  it  to  others  when  it  is  already 
known.  Thus  there  are  two  kinds  of  method,  one  for  discover- 
ing truth,  which  is  called  analysis,  or  the  method  of  resolution, 
and  which  may  also  be  called  the  method  of  invention ; and 
the  other  for  explaining  it  to  others  when  we  have  found  it, 
which  is  called  synthesis,  or  the  method  of  composition,  and 
which  may  also  be  called  the  method  of  doctrine.'1 

“■Method,  which  is  usually  described  as  the  fourth  part  of 
Logic,  is  rather  a complete  practical  Logic.  It  is  rather  a 


1 Brutus , c.  12.  Compare  Be  Finibus , ii.,  1,  and  also  Be  Orat.,  i.,  19. 
3 Fort  Roy . Logic , part  iv.,  ch.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


317 


METHOD  — 

power  or  spirit  of  the  intellect,  pervading  all  that  it  does, 
than  its  tangible  product.” 1 

Every  department  of  philosophy  has  its  own  proper  method; 
hut  there  is  a universal  method  or  science  of  method.  This 
was  called  by  Plato,2  dialectic ; and  represented  as  leading  to 
the  true  and  the  real.  It  has  been  said  that  the  word  /.dOoSo;, 
as  it  occurs  in  Aristotle’s  Ethics,  should  be  translated  “sys- 
tems,” rather  than  “method.”3  But  the  construction  of  a 
system  implies  method.  And  no  one  was  more  thoroughly 
aware  of  the  importance  of  a right  method  than  Aristotle.  Ho 
has  said,4  “that  we  ought  to  see  well  what  demonstration  (or 
proof)  suits  each  particular  subject;  for  it  would  be  absurd 
to  mis  together  the  research  of  science  and  that  of  method ; 
two  things,  the  acquisition  of  which  offers  great  difficulty.” 
The  deductive  method  of  philosophy  came  at  once  finished  from 
his  hand.  And  the  inductive  method  was  more  extensively 
and  successfully  followed  out  by  him  than  has  been  generally 
thought, 

James  Acontius,  or  Concio,  as  he  is  sometimes  called,  was 
born  at  Trent,  and  came  to  England  in  15G7.  He  published 
a work,  Be  Methodo,  of  which  Mons.  Degerando5  has  given 
an  analysis.  According  to  him  all  knowledge  deduced  from 
a process  of  reasoning  presupposes  some  primitive  truths, 
founded  in  the  nature  of  man,  and  admitted  as  soon  as  an- 
nounced ; and  the  great  aim  of  method  should  be  to  bring 
these  primitive  truths  to  light,  that  by  their  light  we  may 
have  more  light.  Truths  obtained  by  the  senses,  and  by 
repeated  experience,  become  at  length  positive  and  certain 
knowledge. 

Descartes  has  a discourse  on  Method.  He  has  reduced  it  to 
four  general  rules. 

I.  To  admit  nothing  as  true  of  which  wo  have  not  a clear 
and  distinct  idea.  We  have  a clear  and  distinct  idea  of  our 
own  existence.  And  in  proportion  as  our  idea  of  anything 
else  approaches  to,  or  recedes  from,  the  clearness  of  this  idea, 
it  ought  to  be  received  or  rejected. 


1 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought,  sect.  119.  3 Repub.,  lib.  vii. 

3 Paul,  Analysis  of  AristotUts  Ethics,  p.  1.  4 ilctaphys.,  lib.  ii. 

4 Hist.  Compar.  dcs  Systcmes  dt  Philosophic,  part  ii.,  tom.  ii.,  p.  3. 

2S* 


318 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


METHOD  — 

II.  To  divide  every  object  inquired  into  as  much  as  possi- 
ble into  its  parts.  Nothing  is  more  simple  than  the  ego,  or 
self-consciousness.  In  proportion  as  the  object  of  inquiry  is 
simplified,  the  evidence  comes  to  be  nearer  that  of  self-con- 
sciousness. 

III.  To  ascend  from  simple  ideas  or  cognitions  to  those  that 
are  more  complex.  The  real  is  often  complex : and  to  arrive 
at  the  knowledge  of  it  as  a reality,  we  must  by  synthesis 
reunite  the  parts  which  were  previously  separated. 

IY.  By  careful  and  repeated  enumeration  to  see  that  all  the 
parts  are  reunited.  For  the  synthesis  will  bo  deceitful  and 
incomplete  if  it  do  not  reunite  the  whole,  and  thus  give  the 
reality. 

This  method  begins  with  provisory  doubt,  proceeds  by  ana- 
lysis and  synthesis,  and  ends  by  accepting  evidence  in  propor- 
tion as  it  resembles  the  evidence  of  self-consciousness. 

These  rules  are  useful  in  all  departments  of  philosophy. 
But  different  sciences  have  different  methods  suited  to  their 
objects  and  to  the  end  in  view. 

In  prosecuting  science  with  the  view  of  extending  our 
knowledge  of  it,  or  the  limits  of  it,  we  are  said  to  follow 
the  method  of  investigation  or  inquiry,  and  our  procedure 
will  be  chiefly  in  the  way  of  analysis.  But  in  communicating 
what  is  already  known,  we  follow  the  method  of  exposition 
or  doctrine,  and  our  procedure  will  be  chiefly  in  the  way  of 
synthesis. 

In  some  sciences  the  principles  or  laws  are  given,  and  the 
object  of  the  science  is  to  discover  the  possible  application  of 
them.  In  these  sciences  the  method  is  deductive,  as  in  geome- 
try. In  other  sciences,  the  facts  or  phenomena  are  given,  and 
the  object  of  the  science  is  to  discover  the  principles  or  laws. 
In  these  sciences  the  proper  method  is  inductive,  proceeding  by 
observation  or  experiment,  as  in  psychology  and  physics.  The 
method  opposed  to  this,  and  which  was  long  followed,  was  the 
constructive  method;  which,  instead  of  discovering  causes  by 
induction,  imagined  or  assigned  them  a priori,  or  ex  hypothesi, 
and  afterwards  tried  to  verify  them.  This  method  is  seductive 
and  bold  but  dangerous  and  insecure,  and  should  be  resorted 
to  with  great  caution.  — V.  Hypothesis. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


319 


METHOD  — 

The  use  of  method , both  in  obtaining  and  applying  know- 
ledge for  ourselves,  and  in  conveying  and  communicating  it 
to  others,  is  great  and  obvious.  “ Currenti  extra  viam,  quo 
habilior  sil  el  velocior,  eo  majorem  contingere  aberrationcm.”  1 
“ Une  bonne  methode  donne  a l’esprit  une  telle  puissance 
qu’elle  peut  en  quelque  sorte  remplacer  le  talent.  C’est  un 
levier  qui  donne  a Thomme  faible,  qui  l’employe,  une  force 
que  ne  sauvait  posseder  Thomme  le  plus  fort  qui  serait  prive 
d’un  semblable  moyen.”2 *  La  Place  has  said, — “La  connais- 
sance  de  la  methode  qui  a guide  Thomme  de  genie,  n’est  pas 
moins  utile  au  progres  de  la  science,  et  memo  a sa  propre 
glorie,  que  ses  decouvertes.” 

“ Marshal  thy  notions  into  a handsome  method.  One  will 
carry  twice  as  much  weight,  trussed  and  packed  up  in  bundles, 
than  when  it  lies  untoward,  flapping  and  hanging  about  his 
shoulders.”  3 — V.  System. 

METHODOLOGY  ( Meihodenlchre ) is  the  transcendental  doctrine 
of  method.4  The  elementary  doctrine  has  been  called  by 
some  Elementology , or  the  science  treating  of  the  form  of  a 
metaphysical  system. 

METONOMY.—  V.  Intention. 

MICROCOSM.—  V.  Macrocosm. 

MIHD  is  that  which  moves,  body  is  that  which  is  moved.5 

“ By  mind  we  mean  something  which,  when  it  acts,  knows 
what  it  is  going  to  do;  something  stored  with  ideas  of  its 
intended  works,  agreeably  to  which  ideas  those  works  are 
fashioned.”6 

“Mind,  that  which  perceives,  feels,  thinks,  and  wills.”7 

“Among  metaphysicians,  mind  is  becoming  a generic, 
and  soul  an  individual  designation.  Mind  is  opposed  to 
matter ; soul  to  body.  Mind  is  soul  without  regard  to  per- 


1 Nov.  Org .,  i.,  61.  2 Comte,  Traiti  de  V Legislation,  lib.  i.,  c.  1. 

2 Pleasures  of  Literature,  12mo,  Lond.,  1851,  p.  104.  See  Descartes,  On  Method; 

Coleridge,  On  Method , Introd.  to  Encydop.  Metropol. ; Friend , vol.  iii. 

4 See  Kant,  Cni.  of  Pure  Reason,  p.  541,  Haywood’s  translation. 

1 Monboddo.  Ancient  Metaphys.,  book  ii.,  chap.  3.  See  his  remarks  on  the  definition 
of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  chap.  4. 

6 Harris,  Hermes , p.  227. 

1 Taylor,  Elements  of  T bought. 


320 


VOCABULARY  OF  rHILOSOPIIY. 


MIND  — 

sonaiity ; soul  is  the  appropriate  mind  of  the  being  under 
notice.  Etymologically,  mind  is  the  principle  of  volition, 
and  soul  the  principle  of  animation.  “I  mean  to  go”  was 
originally  “ I mind  to  go.”  Soul,  at  first  identical  with  self, 
is  from  sellan,  to  say,  the  faculty  of  speech  being  its  charac- 
teristic. 

“Dumb,  and  without  a Foul,  beside  6uch  beauty, 

Ho  has  no  muid  to  marry.”1 

— V.  Soul. 

MIRACLE  {minor,  to  wonder).  — “A  miracle  I take  to  be  a sen- 
sible operation,  which  being  above  the  comprehension  of  the 
spectator,  and,  in  his  opinion,  contrary  to  the  established 
course  of  nature,  is  taken  by  men  to  be  divine.”2 

‘‘A  miracle,”  says  Mr.  Hume,3  “ is  a violation  of  the  laws 
of  nature ; and  as  a firm  and  unalterable  experience  has  es- 
tablished these  laws,  the  proof  against  a miracle,  from  the 
very  nature  of  the  fact,  is  as  complete  as  any  argument  from 
experience  can  possibly  be  imagined  ; and  if  so,  it  is  an  un- 
deniable consequence,  that  it  cannot  be  surmounted  by  any 
proof  whatever  derived  from  human  testimony.” 

Mr.  Hume  says  the  first  hint  of  that  argument  occurred 
to  him  in  a conversation  with  a Jesuit  in  the  College  of  La 
Fleche.  It  has  been  replied  to  by  Dr.  Adams,4  Dr.  Campbell,5 6 * 
Bp.  Douglas.8 

MNEMONICS.—  V.  Mejioria  Technica. 

MODALITY  is  the  term  employed  to  denote  the  most  general 
points  of  view  under  which  the  different  objects  of  thought 
present  themselves  to  our  mind.  Now  all  that  we  think  of 
we  think  of  as  possible,  or  contingent,  or  impossible,  or  neces- 
sary. The  possible  is  that  which  may  equally  be  or  not  be, 
which  is  not  yet,  but  which  may  be  ; the  contingent  is  that 
which  already  is,  but  which  might  not  have  been  ; the  neces- 
sary is  that  which  always  is  ; and  the  impossible  is  that  which 
never  is.  These  are  the  modalities  of  being,  which  neces- 
sarily find  a place  in  thought,  and  in  the  expression  of  it  in 

1 Taylor,  Synonyms.  a Locke,  A Discourse  of  Miracles. 

3 Essay  on  Miracles.  4 Essay  in  Answer , <fcc. 

6 Dissert  on  Miracles. 

0 Criterion  of  Miracles.  See  alj-o  Lcmoinc.  A Treatise  on  Miracles , Svo,  Lond.,  1747. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


321 


MODALITY  — 

judgments  and  in  propositions.  Hence  arise  the  four  modal 
propositions  which  Aristotle1  has  defined  and  opposed.  He 
did  not  use  the  term  modality,  but  it  is  to  be  found  among  his 
commentators  and  the  scholastic  philosophers.  In  the  phi- 
losophy of  Kant,  our  judgments  are  reduced  under  the  four 
heads  of  quantity,  quality,  relation,  and  modality.  In  refer- 
ence to  modality  they  are  either  problematic,  or  assertory,  or 
apodeictical.  And  hence  the  category  of  modality  includes 
possibility  and  impossibility,  existence  and  non-existence, 
necessity  or  contingency.  But  existence  and  non-existence 
should  have  no  place ; the  contingent  and  the  necessary  are 
not  different  from  being.2 

MODE.  — “ The  manner  in  which  a thing  exists  is  called  a mode  or 
affection ; shape  and  colour  are  modes  of  matter,  memory  and 
joy  are  modes  of  mind.”3 

“Modes,  I call  such  complex  ideas,  which,  however  com- 
pounded, contain  not  in  them  the  supposition  of  subsisting  by 
themselves,  but  are  considered  as  dependencies  on,  or  affec- 
tions of,  substances.”4 

“ There  are  some  modes  which  may  be  called  internal,  be- 
cause they  are  conceived  to  be  in  the  substance,  as  round, 
square  ; and  others  which  may  be  called  external,  because  they 
are  taken  from  something  which  is  not  in  the  substance,  as 
loved,  seen,  desired,  which  are  names  taken  from  the  action  of 
another;  and  this  is  what  is  called  in  the  schools  an  external 
denomination."  5 

“ Modes  or  modifications  of  mind,  in  the  Cartesian  school, 
mean  merely  what  some  recent  philosophers  express  by  states 
of  mind;  and  include  both  the  active  and  passive  phenomena 
of  the  conscious  subject.  The  terms  were  used  by  Descartes 
as  well  as  by  his  disciples.’’6 

Mode  is  the  manner  in  which  a substance  exists ; thus  wax 
may  be  round  or  square,  solid  or  fluid.  Modes  are  secondary 
or  subsidiary,  as  they  could  not  be  without  substance,  which 


1 n£pi  ipprjvtia;,  c.  12-1L  3 Did . dcs  Sciences  Philosnph. 

3 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

4 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum . Understand .,  b.  ii.,  chap.  12,  sect.  4. 

8 Poi't  Roy.  Logic , part  i.,  chap.  2. 

8 Sir  William  Hamilton,  Reid's  WorJcs,  p.  295,  note. 


322 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


MODE  — 

exists  by  itself.  Substances  are  not  confined  to  any  mode , but 
must  exist  in  some.  Modes  are  all  variable  conditions,  and 
though  some  one  is  necessary  to  every  substance,  the  particu- 
lar ones  are  all  accidental.  Modification  is  properly  the  bring- 
ing of  a thing  into  a mode,  but  is  sometimes  used  to  denote 
the  mode  of  existence  itself.  State  is  a nearly  synonymous 
but  a more  extended  term  than  mode. 

A mode  is  a variable  and  determinate  affection  of  a sub- 
stance, a quality  which  it  may  have  or  not,  without  affecting 
its  essence  or  existence.  A body  may  be  at  rest  or  in  motion, 
a mind  may  affirm  or  deny,  without  ceasing  to  be.  They  are 
not  accidents,  because  they  arise  directly  from  the  nature  of 
the  substance  which  experiences  them.  Nor  should  they  be 
called  phenomena,  which  may  have  or  not  have  their  cause  in 
the  object  which  exhibits  them.  But  modes  arise  from  the 
nature  of  the  substance  affected  by  them.  It  is  true  that  one 
substance  modifies  another,  and  in  this  view  modes  may  some- 
times be  the  effect  of  causes  out  of  the  substance  in  which 
they  appear.  They  are  then  called  modifications.  Fire  melts 
wax  ; the  liquidity  of  wax  in  this  view  is  a modification. 

All  beings  which  constitute  the  universe  modify  one  another ; 
but  a soul  endowed  with  liberty  is  the  only  being  that  modi- 
fies itself,  or  which  can  be  altogether  and  in  the  same  mode, 
cause  and  substance,  active  and  passive.1 

“ That  quality  which  distinguishes  one  genus,  one  species,  or 
even  one  individual,  from  another,  is  termed  a modification; 
then  the  same  particular  that  is  termed  a,  property  or  quality, 
when  considered  as  belonging  to  an  individual,  or  a class  of 
individuals,  is  termed  a modification  when  considered  as  dis- 
tinguishing the  individual  or  the  class  from  another ; a black 
skin  and  soft  curled  hair,  arc  properties  of  a negro ; the  same 
circumstances  considered  as  marks  that  distinguish  a negro 
from  a man  of  different  species,  are  denominated  modifications.”2 
MOLECULE  ( molecula , a little  mass),  is  the  smallest  portion  of 
matter  cognizable  by  any  of  our  senses.  It  is  something  real, 
and  thus  differs  from  atom,  which  is  notyjerceived  but  conceived. 


Diet,  dcs  Sciences  Philo  soph. 

KamcSj  Elements  of  Criticism , App. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


323 


MOLECULE  — 

It  is  the  smallest  portion  of  matter  which  we  can  reach  by  our 
means  of  dividing,  while  atom  is  the  last  possible  term  of  all 
division.  When  molecules  are  of  simple  homogeneous  elements, 
as  of  gold  or  silver,  they  are  called  integrant ; when  they  are 
of  compound  or  heterogeneous  elements,  as  salts  and  acids, 
they  are  called  constituent. 

MONAD,  M0NAD0L0GY  (/tova'j,  unity,  one).  — According  to 
Leibnitz,  the  elementary  particles  of  matter  are  vital  forces  not 
acting  mechanically,  but  from  an  internal  principle.  They  are 
incorporeal  or  spiritual  atoms,  inaccessible  to  all  change  from 
without,  but  subject  to  internal  movement.  This  hypothesis 
he  explains  in  a treatise  entitled  Monadologie.  He  thought 
inert  matter  insufficient  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  body, 
and  had  recourse  to  the  entelecliies  of  Aristotle,  or  the  substan- 
tial forms  of  the  scholastic  philosophy,  conceiving  of  them  as 
primitive  forces,  constituting  the  substance  of  matter,  atoms 
of  substance  but  not  of  matter,  real  and  absolute  unities, 
metaphysical  points,  full  of  vitality,  exact  as  mathematical 
points,  and  real  as  physical  points.  These  substantial  unities 
which  constitute  matter  are  of  a nature  inferior  to  spirit  and 
soul,  but  they  are  imperishable,  although  they  may  undergo 
transformation.  ** 

“Leibnitz  conceived  the  whole  up.!  orse,  bodies  as  well  as 
minds,  to  be  made  up  of  monads,  that  is,  simple  substances, 
each  of  which  is,  by  the  Creator,  in  the  beginning  of  its  exist- 
ence, endowed  with  certain  active  and  perceptive  powers.  A 
monad,  therefore,  is  an  active  substance,  simple,  without  parts 
or  figure,  which  has  within  itself  the  power  to  produce  all  the 
changes  it  undergoes  from  the  beginning  of  its  existence  to 
eternity.  The  changes  which  the  monad  undergoes,  of  what 
kind  soever,  though  they  may  seem  to  us  the  effect  of  causes 
operating  from  without,  are  only  the  gradual  and  successive 
evolutions  of  its  own  internal  powers,  which  would  have  pro- 
duced all  the  same  changes  and  motions,  although  there  had 
been  no  other  being  in  the  universe.” 1 

Mr.  Stewart2  has  said, — “After  studying,  with  all  possible 
diligence,  what  Leibnitz  has  said  of  his  monads  in  different 


1 Reid,  Iiitell.  Pow.,  essay  ii.,  ch.  15. 
3 Dissert.,  part  ii.,  note  1,  p.  219. 


324 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


MONAD  — 

parts  of  his  works,  I find  myself  quite  incompetent  to  annex 
any  precise  idea  to  the  word  as  ho  has  employed  it.”  The 
most  intelligible  passage  which  he  quotes  is  the  following:1 — 
“A  monad  is  not  a material  but  a formal  atom,  it  being  im- 
possible for  a thing  to  be  at  once  material,  and  possessed  of  a 
real  unity  and  indivisibility.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to 
revive  the  obsolete  doctrine  of  substantial  forms  (the  essence 
of  which  consists  in  force),  separating  it,  however,  from  the 
various  abuses  to  which  it  is  liable.” 

“ Monadolngy  rests  upon  this  axiom — Every  substance  is  at 
the  same  time  a cause,  and  every  substance  being  a cause,  has 
therefore  in  itself  the  principle  of  its  own  development : such 
is  the  monad ; it  is  a simple  force.  Each  monad  has  relation 
to  all  others  ; it  corresponds  with  the  plan  of  the  universe  ; it 
is  the  universe  abridged ; it  is,  as  Leibnitz  says,  a living 
mirror  which  reflects  the  entire  universe  under  its  own  point 
of  view.  But  every  monad  being  simple,  there  is  no  imme- 
diate action  of  one  monad  upon  another ; there  is,  however,  a 
natural  relation  of  their  respective  development,  which  makes 
their  apparent  communication ; this  natural  relation,  this 
harmony  which  has  its  reason  in  the  wisdom  of  the  supreme 
director,  is  pre-established  harmony.”  2 

MONOGAMY  (yoro;,  ydyo;,  one  marriage),  is  the  doctrine  that 
one  man  should  have  only  one  wife,  and  a wife  only  one  hus- 
band. It  has  also  been  interpreted  to  mean  that  a man  or 
woman  should  not  marry  more  than  once. — V.  Polygamy. 
MONOTHEISM  {yovo$,  9 to;,  one  God),  is  the  belief  in  one  God 
only. 

“The  general  propensity  to  the  worship  of  idols  was  totally 
subdued,  and  the  Jews  became  monotheists,  in  the  strictest  sense 
of  the  term.”3  — V.  Theism,  Polytheism. 

MOOD.  — V.  Syllogism. 

MORAL ( moralis,  from  mos,  manner),  is  used  in  several  senses  in 
philosophy. 

In  reasoning,  the  word  moral  is  opposed  to  demonstrative, 


1 Tom.  ii.,  p.  50. 

a Cousin,  Hist.  Mod.  Philosophy  vol.  ii.,  p.  86. 

3 Cogan,  Discourse  on  Jewish  Dispensation , c.  2,  s.  7. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


325 


MORAL  — 

and  means  probable.  Sometimes  it  is  opposed  to  material,  and 
in  this  sense  it  means  mental,  or  that  the  object  to  which  it  is 
applied  belongs  to  mind  and  not  to  matter.  Thus  we  speak  of 
moral  science  as  distinguished  from  physical  science. 

It  is  also  opposed  to  intellectual  and  to  aesthetic.  Thus  we 
distinguish  between  a moral  liahit  and  an  intellectual  habit, 
between  that  which  is  morally  becoming  and  that  which 
pleases  the  powers  of  taste. 

Moral  is  opposed  to  positive.  “Moral  precepts  are  precepts, 
the  reasons  of  which  we  see ; positive  precepts  are  precepts, 
the  reasons  of  which  we  do  not  see.  Moral  duties  arise  out  of 
the  nature  of  the  case  itself,  prior  to  external  command  ; posi- 
tive duties  do  not  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  case,  but  from 
external  command ; nor  would  they  be  duties  at  all,  were  it 
not  for  such  command  received  from  Him  whose  creatures  and 
subjects  we  are.” 1 

“A. positive  precept  concerns  a thing  that  is  right  because 
commanded ; a moral  precept  respects  a thing  commanded 
because  it  is  right.  A Jew,  for  instance,  was  bound  both  to 
honour  his  parents,  and  also  to  worship  at  Jerusalem  ; but  the 
former  was  commanded  because  it  was  right,  and  the  latter 
was  right  because  it  was  commanded.” 2 
MORAL  FACULTY.  — V.  Conscience. 

MORALITY.  — “ To  lay  down,  in  their  universal  form,  the  laws 
according  to  which  the  conduct  of  a free  agent  ought  to  be 
regulated,  and  to  apply  them  to  the  different  situations  of 
human  life,  is  the  end  of  morality.” 

“A  body  of  moral  truths,  definitely  expressed,  and  arranged 
according  to  their  rational  connection,”  is  the  definition  of  a 
“system  of  morality”  by  Dr.  Whewell.3 

“ The  doctrine  which  treats  of  actions  as  right  or  wrong  is 
morality.”  4 

“ There  are  in  the  world  two  classes  of  objects,  persons  and 
things.  And  these  are  mutually  related  to  each  other.  There 
are  relations  between  persons  and  persons,  and  between  things 
and  things.  And  the  peculiar  distinctions  of  moral  actions, 


1 Butler,  Analogy,  part  ii.,  ch.  1.  3 Whately,  Lessons  on  Morals. 

* On  Systematic  Morality,  lect.  i,  4 Whewell,  Morality,  sect.  76. 

29 


026 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


MORALITY— 

moral  characters,  moral  principles,  moral  habits,  as  contrasted 
with  the  intellect  and  other  parts  of  man’s  nature,  lies  in  this, 
that  they  always  imply  a relation  between  two  persons,  not  be- 
tween two  things.”  1 

“Morality  commences  with,  and  begins  in,  the  sacred  dis- 
tinction between  thing  and  person.  On  this  distinction  all 
law,  human  and  divine,  is  grounded.” 2 

“ What  the  duties  of  morality  are,  the  apostle  instructs  the 
believer  in  full,  comprising  them  under  the  two  heads  of 
negative  and  positive ; negative,  to  keep  himself  pure  from  the 
world ; and  positive,  beneficence  from  loving-kindness,  that  is, 
love  of  his  fellow-men  (his  kind)  as  himself.  Last  and  highest 
come  the  spiritual,  comprising  all  the  truths,  acts,  and  duties, 
that  have  an  especial  reference  to  the  timeless,  the  permanent, 
the  eternal,  to  the  sincere  love  of  the  true  as  truth,  of  the 
good  as  good,  and  of  God  as  both  in  one.  It  comprehends 
the  whole  ascent  from  uprightness  (morality,  virtue,  inward 
rectitude)  to  godlikeness,  with  all  the  acts,  exercises,  and  dis- 
ciplines of  mind,  will,  and  atfections,  that  arc  requisite  or  con- 
ducive to  the  great  design  of  our  redemption  from  the  form 
of  the  evil  one,  and  of  our  second  creation  or  birth  in  the 
divine  image. 

“ It  may  be  an  additional  aid  to  reflection,  to  distinguish 
the  three  kinds  severally,  according  to  the  faculty  to  which 
each  corresponds,  the  part  of  our  human  nature  which  is  more 
particularly  its  organ.  Thus,  the  prudential  corresponds  to 
the  sense  and  the  understanding ; the  moral  to  the  heart  and 
the  conscience;  the  spiritual  to  the  will  and  the  reason,  that 
is,  to  the  finite  will  reduced  to  harmony  with,  and  in  subordi- 
nation to,  the  reason,  as  a ray  from  that  true  light  which  is 
both  reason  and  will,  universal  reason  and  will  absolute.” 
How  nearly  this  scriptural  division  coincides  with  the  Pla- 
tonic, see  Prudence.3 

MORAL  PHILOSOPHY  is  the  science  of  human  duty.  The 
knowledge  of  human  duty  implies  a knowledge  of  human 
nature.  To  understand  what  man  ought  to  do,  it  is  necessary 


* Sewell,  Christ.  Morals,  p.  339. 
a Coleridge,  Aids  to  Reflection,  vol.  i.,  p.  205. 


3 Ibid.,  vol.  i.,  pp.  22,  23. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOFIIY. 


327 


MORAL  — 

to  know  what  man  is.  Not  that  the  moral  philosopher,  before 
entering  upon  those  inquiries  which  peculiarly  belong  to  him, 
must  go  over  the  science  of  human  nature  in  all  its  extent. 
But  it  is  necessary  to  examine  those  elements  of  human 
nature  which  have  a direct  bearing  upon  human  conduct.  A 
full  course  of  moral  philosophy  should  consist,  therefore,  of  two 
parts — the  first  containing  an  analysis  and  illustration  of  those 
powers  and  principles  by  which  man  is  prompted  to  act,  and 
by  the  possession  of  which,  he  is  capable  of  acting  under  a 
sense  of  duty ; the  second,  containing  an  arrangement  and 
exposition  of  the  duties  incumbent  upon  him  as  the  possessor 
of  an  active  and  moral  nature.  As  exhibiting  the  facts  and 
phenomena  presented  by  an  examination  of  the  active  and 
moral  nature  of  man,  the  first  part  may  be  characterized  as 
ptstjchological ; and  as  laying  down  the  duties  arising  from  the 
various  relations  in  which  man,  as  a moral  agent,  has  been 
placed,  the  second  part  may  be  designated  as  deontological. 

“ The  moral  philosopher  has  to  investigate  the  principles 
according  to  which  men  act  — the  motives  which  influence 
them  in  fact  — the  objects  at  which  they  commonly  aim  — the 
passions,  desires,  characters,  manners,  tastes,  which  appear  in 
the  world  around  him,  and  in  his  own  constitution.  Further, 
as  in  all  moral  actions,  the  intellectual  principles  are  impli- 
cated with  the  feelings,  he  must  extend  his  inquiry  to  the 
phenomena  of  the  mental  powers,  and  know  both  what  they 
are  in  themselves,  and  how  they  are  combined  in  actions  with 
the  feelings.”  1 — V.  Eraics. 

MORAL  SENSE.  — F.  Sexses  (Reflex). 

MORPHOLOGY  (yopfyr.,  form;  Xoyoj). — “The  branch  of  botani- 
cal science  which  treats  of  the  forms  of  plants  is  called  mor- 
phology, and  is  now  regarded  as  the  fundamental  department 
of  botany.”  2 

“ The  subject  of  animal  morphology  has  recently  been  ex- 
panded into  a form,  strikingly  comprehensive  and  systematic, 
by  Mr.  Owen.”3  So  that  morphology  treats  of  the  forms  of 
plants  and  animals,  or  organized  beings. 

1 Hampden,  Inlrod.  to  Mor.  Phil.,  lect.  yi.,  p.  187. 

3 MCosh,  Typical  Forms , p.  23. 

3 WhcwelJj  Supplem.  yol«  p.  140. 


828 


VOCABULARY  OF  rillLOSOl'HY. 


MOTION  (xCvtjais)  is  the  continued  change  of  place  of  a body,  or 
of  any  parts  of  a body  ; for  in  the  cases  of  a globe  turning  on 
its  axis,  and  of  a wheel  revolving  on  a pivot,  the  parts  of  these 
bodies  change  their  places,  while  the  bodies  themselves  remain 
stationary. 

Motion  is  either  physical,  that  is,  obvious  to  the  senses,  or 
not  physical,  that  is,  knowable  by  the  rational  faculty. 

Aristotle  has  noticed  several  kinds  of  physical  motion. 
Change  of  place,  as  when  a body  moves  from  one  place  to 
another,  remaining  the  same.  Alteration  or  aliation,  as  when 
a body  from  being  round,  becomes  square.  Augmentation  or 
diminution,  as  when  a body  becomes  larger  or  smaller.  All 
these  are  changes  from  one  attribute  to  another,  while  the 
substance  remains  the  same. 

But  body  only  moves  because  it  is  moved.  And  Aristotle 
traced  all  motion  to  impulses  in  the  nature  of  things,  rising 
from  the  spontaneous  impulse  of  life,  appetite,  and  desire,  up 
to  the  intelligent  contemplation  of  what  is  good. 

As  Heraclitus  held  that  all  things  are  continually  changing, 
so  Parmenides  and  Zeno  denied  the  possibility  of  motion.  The 
best  reply  to  their  subtle  sophisms,  was  that  given  by  Diogenes 
the  Cynic,  who  walked  into  the  presence  of  Zeno  in  refuta- 
tion of  them. 

The  notion  of  movement  or  motion,  like  that  of  extension,  is 
acquired  in  connection  with  the  exercise  of  the  senses  of  sight 
and  touch. 

MOTIVE.  — “ The  deliberate  preference  by  which  we  are  moved 
to  act,  and  not  the  object  for  the  sake  of  which  we  act,  is  the 
principle  of  action ; and  desire  and  reason,  which  is  for  the 
sake  of  something,  is  the  origin  of  deliberate  preference.” 1 

Kant  distinguishes  between  the  subjective  principle  of  appe- 
tition  which  he  calls  the  mobile  or  spring  (die  Triebfeder), 
and  the  objective  principle  of  the  will,  which  he  calls  motive 
or  determining  reason  (beweggrund) ; hence  the  difference  be- 
tween subjective  ends  to  which  we  arc  pushed  by  natural  dis- 
position, and  objective  ends  which  are  common  to  us  with  all 
beings  endowed  with  reason.2 


1 Aristotle,  Ethic.,  lib.  vi.,  cap.  2. 

2 Willm,  Hist,  de  la i Philosoph.  Allcmande,  tom.  i.,  p.  G57. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


329 


MOTIVE  - 

This  seems  to  be  the  difference  expressed  in  French  be- 
tween mobile  and  viotif. 

“A  motive  is  an  object  so  operating  upon  the  mind  as  to 
produce  either  desire  or  aversion.” ' 

“ By  motive ,”  said  Edwards,2  “ I mean  the  whole  of  that 
which  moves,  excites,  or  invites  the  mind  to  volition,  whe- 
ther that  be  one  thing  singly,  or  many  things  conjunctly. 
Many  particular  things  may  concur  and  unite  their  strength 
to  induce  the  mind ; and  when  it  is  so,  all  together  are,  as  it 

were,  one  complex  motive Whatever  is  a 

motive,  in  this  sense,  must  be  something  that  is  extant  in  the 
view  or  apprehension  of  the  understanding,  or  perceiving 
faculty.  Nothing  can  induce  or  invite  the  mind  to  will  or  act 
anything,  any  further  than  it  is  perceived,  or  is  in  some  way 
or  other  in  the  mind’s  view  ; for  what  is  wholly  unperceived, 
and  perfectly  out  of  the  mind’s  view,  cannot  affect  the  mind 
at  all.” 

Hence  it  has  been  common  to  distinguish  motives  as  external 
or  objective,  and  as  internal  or  subjective.  Regarded  objectively, 
motives  are  those  external  objects  or  circumstances,  which, 
when  contemplated,  give  rise  to  views  or  feelings  which 
prompt  or  influence  the  will.  Regarded  subjectively , motives 
are  those  internal  views  or  feelings  which  arise  on  the  con- 
templation of  external  objects  or  circumstances.  In  common 
language,  the  term  motive  is  applied  indifferently  to  the  exter- 
nal object,  and  to  the  state  of  mind,  to  which  the  apprehen- 
sion or  contemplation  of  it  may  give  rise.  The  explanation 
of  Edwards  includes  both.  Dr.  Reid3 4  said,  that  he  “ under- 
stood a motive,  when  applied  to  a human  being,  to  be  that  for 
the  sake  of  which  he  acts,  and  therefore  that  what  he  never 
was  conscious  of,  can  no  more  be  a motive  to  determine  his 
will,  than  it  can  be  an  argument  to  determine  his  judgment.”1 


1 Lord  Karnes,  Essay  on  Liberty  and.  Necessity. 

2 Inquiry,  part  i..  sect.  2. 

3 Correspondence  prefixed  to  his  Woi'ks,  p.  87. 

4 •*  This  is  Aristotle’s  definition  (rd  ’ivina  ov ) of  end  or  final  cause ; and  as  a synonym 
for  end  or  final  cause  the  term  motive  had  been  long  exclusively  employed.”  — Sir  Will. 
Hamilton. 

29  * 


330 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


MOTIVE  — 

In  his  Essays  on  the  Active  Powers,'  he  said,  “ Everything  that 
can  be  called  a motive  is  addressed  either  to  the  animal  or  to 
the  rational  part  of  our  nature.”  Here  the  word  motive  is 
applied  objectively  to  those  external  things,  which,  when  con- 
templated, affect  our  intelligence  or  our  sensitivity.  But,  in 
the  very  next  sentence,  he  has  said,  “ motives  of  the  former 
kind  are  common  to  us  with  the  brutes.”  Here  the  word 
motive  is  applied  subjectively  to  those  internal  principles  of  our 
nature,  such  as  appetite,  desire,  passion,  &c.,  which  are  ex- 
cited by  the  contemplation  of  external  objects,  adapted  and 
addressed  to  them. 

But,  in  order  to  a more  precise  use  of  the  term  motive,  let  it 
be  noted,  that,  in  regard  to  it,  there  are  three  things  clearly 
distinguishable,  although  it  may  not  be  common,  nor  easy, 
always  to  speak  of  them  distinctively.  These  are,  the  external 
object,  the  internal  principle,  and  the  state  or  affection  of  mind 
resulting  from  the  one  being  addressed  to  the  other.  For 
example,  bread  or  food  of  any  kind,  is  the  external  object, 
which  is  adapted  to  an  internal  principle  which  is  called 
appetite,  and  hunger  or  the  desire  for  food  is  the  internal 
feeling,  which  is  excited  or  allayed  as  the  circumstances  may 
be,  by  the  presentment  of  the  external  object  to  the  internal 
principle.  In  popular  language,  the  term  motive  might  be 
applied  to  any  one  of  these  three  ; and,  it  might  be  said,  that 
the  motive  for  such  an  action  was  bread,  or  appetite,  or  hunger. 
But,  strictly  speaking,  the  feeling  of  hunger  was  the  motive:  it 
was  that,  in  the  preceding  state  of  mind,  which  disposed  or 
inclined  the  agent  to  act  in  one  way  rather  than  in  any  other. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  motives  of  every  kind.  In  every  case 
there  may  be  observed  the  external  object,  the  internal 
principle,  and  the  resultant  state  or  affection  of  mind  ; and  the 
term  motive  may  be  applied,  separately  and  successively,  to 
any  one  of  them  ; but  speaking  strictly  it  should  be  applied  to 
the  terminating  state  or  affection  of  mind  which  arises  from  a 
principle  of  human  nature  having  been  addressed  by  an  object 
adapted  to  it ; because,  it  is  this  state  or  affection  of  mind 
which  prompts  to  action.  The  motive  of  an  agent,  in  some 
particular  action,  may  be  said  to  have  been  injury,  or  resent- 


1 Ep^ay  iv..  chap.  4. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


331 


MOTIVE  — 

ment,  or  anger  — meaning  by  the  first  of  these  words,  the 
wrongous  behaviour  of  another  ; by  the  second,  the  principle 
in  human  nature  affected  by  such  behaviour ; and  by  the 
third,  the  resultant  state  of  mind  in  the  agent.  When  it  is 
said  that  a man  acted  prudently,  it  may  intimate  that  his  con- 
duct was  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  propriety  and  pru- 
dence ; or,  that  he  adopted  it,  after  careful  consideration  and 
forethought,  or,  from  a sense  of  the  benefit  and  advantage  to 
be  derived  from  it.  In  like  manner,  when  it  is  said  that  a 
man  acted  conscientiously,  it  may  mean,  that  the  particular 
action  was  regarded  not  as  a matter  of  interest,  but  of  duty, 
or,  that  his  moral  faculty  approved  of  it  as  right,  or,  that  he 
felt  himself  under  a sense  of  obligation  to  do  it.  In  all  these 
cases,  the  term  motive  is  strictly  applicable  to  the  terminating 
state  or  affection  of  mind,  which  immediately  precedes  the 
volition  or  determination  to  act. 

To  the  question,  therefore,  whether  motive  means  something 
in  the  mind  or  out  of  it,  it  is  replied,  that  what  moves  the  will 
is  something  in  the  preceding  state  of  mind.  The  state  of 
mind  may  have  reference  to  something  out  of  the  mind.  But 
what  is  out  of  the  mind  must  be  apprehended  or  contemplated 
— must  be  brought  within  the  view  of  the  mind,  before  it  can 
in  any  way  affect  it.  It  is  only  in  a secondary  or  remote 
sense,  therefore,  that  external  objects  or  circumstances  can  be 
called  motives,  or  be  said  to  move  the  will.  Motives  are, 
strictly  speaking,  subjective  — as  they  are  internal  states  or 
affections  of  mind  in  the  agent. 

And  motives  may  be  called  subjective,  not  only  in  contradis- 
tinction to  the  external  objects  and  circumstances  which  may 
be  the  occasion  of  them,  but  also  in  regard  to  the  different 
effect  which  the  same  objects  and  circumstances  may  have, 
not  only  upon  different  individuals,  but  even  upon  the  same 
individuals,  at  different  times. 

A man  of  slow  and  narrow  intellect  is  unable  to  perceive 
the  value  or  importance  of  an  object  when  presented  to  him, 
or  the  propriety  and  advantage  of  a course  of  conduct  that 
may  be  pointed  out  to  him,  so  clearly  or  so  quickly  as  a man 
of  large  and  vigorous  intellect.  The  consequence  will  be,  that 
with  the  same  motives  ( objectively  considered)  presented  to 


332 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


MOTIVE  — 

them,  the  one  may  remain  indifferent  and  indolent  in  refer- 
ence to  the  advantage  held  out,  while  the  other  will  at  once 
apprehend  and  pursue  it.  A man  of  cold  and  dull  affections 
will  contemplate  a spectacle  of  pain  or  want,  without  feeling 
any  desire  or  making  any  exertion  to  relieve  it;  while  he 
whose  sensibilities  are  more  acute  and  lively,  will  instantly 
be  moved  to  the  most  active  and  generous  efforts.  An  injury 
done  to  one  man  will  rouse  him  at  once  to  a phrenzy  of  indig- 
nation, which  will  prompt  him  to  the  most  extravagant  mea- 
sures of  retaliation  or  revenge ; while,  in  another  man,  it  will 
only  give  rise  to  a moderate  feeling  of  resentment.  An  action 
which  will  be  contemplated  with  horror  by  a man  of  tender 
conscience,  will  be  done  without  compunction  by  him  whose 
moral  sense  has  not  been  sufficiently  exercised  to  discern 
between  good  and  evil.  In  short,  anything  external  to  the 
mind  will  be  modified  in  its  effect,  according  to  the  constitu- 
tion and  training  of  the  different  minds  within  the  view  of 
which  it  may  be  brought. 

And  not  only  may  the  same  objects  differently  affect  dif- 
ferent minds,  but  also  the  same  minds,  at  different  times,  or 
under  different  circumstances.  He  who  is  suffering  the  pain 
of  hunger  may  be  tempted  to  steal  in  order  to  satisfy  his 
hunger ; but  he  who  has  bread  enough  and  to  spare,  is  under 
no  such  temptation.  A sum  of  money  which  might  be  suffi- 
cient to  bribe  one  man,  would  be  no  trial  to  the  honesty  of 
another.  Under  the  impulse  of  any  violent  passion,  con- 
siderations of  prudence  and  propriety  have  not  the  same 
weight  as  in  calmer  moments.  The  young  are  not  so  cautious, 
in  circumstances  of  danger  and  difficulty,  as  those  who  have 
attained  to  greater  age  and  experience.  Objects  appear  to  us 
in  very  different  colours,  in  health  and  in  sickness,  in  pros- 
perity and  in  adversity,  in  society  and  in  solitude,  in  prospect 
and  in  possession. 

It  would  thus  appear  that  motives  are  in  their  naturj 
subjective , in  their  influence  individual,  and  in  their  issue 
variable. 

MYSTICISM  and  MYSTERY  have  been  derived  from  yw,  to 
shut  up  ; hence  yva-f^,  one  who  shuts  up. 

“ The  epithet  sublime  is  strongly  and  happily  descriptive 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


MYSTICISM  — 

of  the  feelings  inspired  by  the  genius  of  Plato,  by  the  lofty 
mysticism  of  his  philosophy,  and  even  by  the  remote  origin 
of  the  theological  fables  which  are  said  to  have  descended 
to  him  from  Orpheus.”  1 

Mysticism  in  philosophy  is  the  belief  that  God  may  be  known 
face  to  face,  without  anything  intermediate.  It  is  a yielding 
to  the  sentiment  awakened  by  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  and  a 
running  up  of  all  knowledge  and  all  duty  to  the  contem- 
plation and  love  of  Him.2 

Mysticism  despairs  of  the  regular  process  of  science ; it 
believes  that  we  may  attain  directly,  without  the  aid  of  the 
senses  or  reason,  and  by  an  immediate  intuition,  the  real  and 
absolute  principle  of  all  truth,  God.  It  finds  God  either  in 
nature,  and  hence  a, physical  and  naturalistic  mysticism;  or  in 
the  soul,  and  hence  a moral  and  metaphysical  mysticism.  It 
has  also  its  historical  views ; and  in  history  it  considers  espe- 
cially that  which  represents  mysticism  in  full,  and  under  its 
most  regular  form,  that  is  religious ; and  it  is  not  to  the  letter 
of  religions,  but  to  their  spirit,  that  it  clings ; hence  an 
allegorical  and  symbolical  mysticism.  Yan  Helmont,  Ames, 
and  Pordage,  are  naturalistic  mystics;  Poiret  is  moral,  and 
Bourignon  and  Fenelon  are  Divine  mystics.  Swedenborg’s 
mysticism  includes  them  all. 

‘ ‘ Whether  in  the  Yedas,  in  the  Platonists,  or  in  the  Hegelians, 
mysticism  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  ascribing  objective 
existence  to  the  subjective  creations  of  our  own  faculties,  to 
ideas  or  feelings  of  the  mind;  and  believing  that  by  watching 
and  contemplating  these  ideas  of  its  own  making,  it  can  read 
in  them  what  takes  place  in  the  world  without.”3 

The  Germans  have  two  words  for  mysticism ; mystik  and 
mysticismus.  The  former  they  use  in  a favourable,  the  latter 
in  an  unfavourable  sense.  Just  as  we  say  piety  and  pietism, 
or  rationality  and  rationalism ; keeping  the  first  of  each  pair 
for  use,  the  second  for  abuse.4 


1 Stewart,  PhiXosnph.  Essays , ii.,  chap.  5. 

0 Cousin,  Hist,  de  la  Philosoph.  Mod.,  premiere  s£rie,  tom.  ii..  le^on  9, 10. 

8 Mill,  Log.,  b.  v.,  chap,  iii.,  § 5. 

4 Vaughan,  Hours  with  the  Mystics,  yol.  i.,  p.  23. 


334 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


MYSTICISM  — 

Cousin,1  Schmidt  (Car.).2 

MYTH  and  MYTHOLOGY  («0<Jo5,  a tale;  a.oyos). — “I  use  this 
term  ( myth ) as  synonymous  with  ‘ invention,’  having  no  his- 
torical basis.”3 * 

The  early  history  and  the  early  religion  of  all  nations  are 
full  of  fables.  Hence  it  is  that  myths  have  been  divided  into 
the  traditional  and  the  theological , or  the  historical  and  the 
religious 

A myth  is  a narrative  framed  for  the  purpose  of  expressing 
some  general  truth,  a law  of  nature,  a moral  phenomenon,  or 
a religious  idea,  the  different  phases  of  which  correspond  to 
the  turn  of  the  narrative.  An  allegory  agrees  with  it  in 
expressing  some  general  idea,  but  differs  from  it  in  this, — that 
in  the  allegory  the  idea  was  developed  before  the  form,  which 
was  invented  and  adapted  to  it.  The  allegory  is  a reflective 
and  artificial  process,  the  myth  springs  up  spontaneously  and 
by  a kind  of  inspiration.  A symbol  is  a silent  myth,  which 
impresses  the  truths  which  it  conveys  not  by  successive  stages, 
but  at  once  ( avv , j3dM.w)  throws  together  significant  images  of 
some  truth. 

Plato  has  introduced  the  myth  into  some  of  his  writings  in 
a subordinate  way,  as  in  the  Gorgias,  the  Republic,  and  the 
Timceus. 

Blackwell,5  Iluttner,6  Bacon,7  Muller.8 

On  the  philosophic  value  of  myths,  see  Cousin,9  and  the 
Argument  of  his  translation  of  Plato. 

Some  good  remarks  on  the  difference  between  the  parable, 
the  fable,  the  myth,  &c.,  will  be  found  in  Trench.10 


1 Hist,  of  Mod.  Philosophy  vol.  ii.,  pp.  94-7. 

a Essai  sur  les  Mystiques  du  Quatorzieme  siecle.  Strasburg,  1836. 

3 Pococke,  India  in  Greece , p.  2,  note. 

* Among  the  early  nations,  every  truth  a little  remote  from  common  apprehension 

was  embodied  in  their  religious  creed;  so  that  this  second  class  would  contain  myths 
concerning  Deity,  morals,  physics,  astronomy,  and  metaphysics.  These  last  are  pro- 
perly called  philosophemes. 

6 Letters  Concerning  Mythology , 8vo,  Lond.,  1748. 

B De  Mythis  Plalonis,  4to,  Lcipsic,  1788. 

7 On  the  Wisdom  of  the  Ancients. 

• Mythology : Translated  by  Leitch,  1844. 

0 Cours,  182S;  1 and  15  lemons. 

10  On  the  Parables , In  trod. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


335 


MYTH  - 

On  the  different  views  taken  of  Greek  mythology,  see 
Creuzer  and  Godfrey  Hermann. 

See  an  Essay  on  Comparative  Mythology ,’  Grote.s 


NATURA. — V.  Nature. 

NATURAL,  as  distinguished  from  Supernatural  or  Miraculous. 

— “ The  only  distinct  meaning  of  the  word  natural  is  stated, 
fixed,  or  settled;  since  what  is  natural  as  much  requires  and 
presupposes  an  intelligent  agent  to  render  it  so,  that  is,  to 
affect  it  continually  or  at  stated  times,  as  what  is  supernatural 
or  miraculous  does  to  effect  it  for  once.”3 
Natural,  as  distinguished  from  Innate  or  Instinctive. 

“ There  is  a great  deal  of  difference,”  said  Mr.  Locke,4 
“ between  an  innate  law,  and  a law  ofi  nature;  between  some- 
thing imprinted  on  our  minds  in  their  very  original,  and 
something  that  we  being  ignorant  of,  may  attain  to  the  know- 
ledge of  by  the  use  and  application  of  our  natural  faculties. 
And  I think  they  equally  forsake  the  truth  who,  running  into 
contrary  extremes,  either  affirm  an  innate  law,  or  deny  that 
there  is  a law  knowable  by  the  light  ofi  nature,  without  the 
help  of  positive  revelation.” 

“ Of  the  various  powers  and  faculties  we  possess,  there  are 
some  which  nature  seems  both  to  have  planted  and  reared,  so 
as  to  have  left  nothing  to  human  industry.  Such  are  the  powers 
which  we  have  in  common  with  the  brutes,  and  which  are 
necessary  to  the  preservation  of  the  individual,  or  to  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  kind.  There  are  other  powers,  of  which  nature 
hath  only  planted  the  seeds  in  our  minds,  but  hath  left  the 
rearing  of  them  to  human  culture.5 6  It  is  by  the  proper  cul- 
ture of  these  that  we  are  capable  of  all  those  improvements  in 
intellectuals,  in  tastes,  and  in  morals,  which  exalt  and  dignify 
human  nature ; while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  neglect  or  per- 
version of  them  makes  its  degeneracy  and  corruption.”0 


1 In  the  Oxford  Essays  for  1856.  2 Hist,  of  Greece , vol.  i.,  p.  400. 

3 Butler,  Analogy 3 part  i.,  chap.  1.  4 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand .,  hook  i.,  ch.  3. 

• Yet  Dr.  Reid,  when  speaking  of  natural  rights  {Act.  Pow.3  essay  y.,  ch.  5)  uses  in* 

nate  as  synonymous  with  natural. 

6 Reid,  Inquiry , ch.  1.  sect.  2. 


oo/» 

OOl) 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


NATURAL  - 

“ "Whatever  ideas,  whatever  principles  we  are  necessarily  led 
to  acquire  by  the  circumstances  in  which  we  are  placed,  and 
by  the  exercise  of  those  faculties  which  are  essential  to  our 
preservation,  are  to  be  considered  as  parts  of  human  nature, 
no  less  than  those  which  are  implanted  in  the  mind  at  its  first 
formation.”  1 

“ Acquired  perceptions  and  sentiments  may  be  termed  na- 
tural, as  much  as  those  which  are  commonly  so  called,  if  they 
are  as  rarely  found  wanting.”2 

NATURALISM  is  the  name  given  to  those  systems  of  the  philo- 
sophy of  nature  which  explain  the  phenomena  by  a blind  force 
acting  necessarily.  This  doctrine  is  to  be  found  in  Lucretius,3 
and  was  held  by  Leucippus  and  Epicurus.  The  Systeme  de  la 
Nature  of  D’Holbach,  the  Traite  de  la  Nature  of  Kobinet,  and 
the  Philosophic  de  la  Nature  of  Delisle  de  Sales,  also  contain  it. 

Naturalism  in  the  fine  arts  is  opposed  to  idealism.  Of 
Albert  Durer  it  is  said  that  “ he  united  to  the  brilliant  deli- 
cacies of  Flemish  naturalism  the  most  elevated  and  varied  of 
Italian  idealism.’’ 4 

NATURE  ( nascor , to  be  born).  — According  to  its  derivation, 
nature  should  mean  that  which  is  produced  or  born ; but  it 
also  means  that  which  produces  or  causes  to  be  born.  The 
word  has  been  used  with  various  shades  of  meaning,  but  they 
may  all  be  brought  under  two  heads,  Natura  Naturans,  and 
Nalura  Naturata. 

I.  Natura  Naturans.  — a.  The  Author  of  nature,  the  un- 
created Being  who  gave  birth  to  everything  that  is.  b.  The 
plastic  nature  or  energy  subordinate  to  that  of  the  Deity,  by 
which  all  things  are  conserved  and  directed  to  their  ends  and 
uses.  c.  The  course  of  nature,  or  the  established  order  ac- 
cording to  which  the  universe  is  regulated. 

Alii  naturam  censent  esse  vim  quondam  sine  Eatione,  cientem 
molus  in  corporibus  necessarios ; alii  auiem  vim  participem 
ordinis,  tanquam  via  progredientem .5 

II.  Nalura  Naturata. — a.  1.  The  works  of  nature,  both  mind 


1 Stewart,  Act.  and  Mor,  Pow.,  voj,  i.,  p.  351, 

0 Mackintosh,  Prclvmin.  Dissert „ p,  G7, 

4 Labarte,  Handbook  of  the  Middle.  Ages. 

8 Cicero,  De  Nat.  Deoi’um , lib.  ii. 


3 De  Derum  Natura. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


337 


MATURE — 

and  matter.  3.  The  visible  or  material  creation,  as  distinct 
from  God  and  the  soul,  which  is  the  object  of  natural  science. 

“ The  term  nature  is  used  sometimes  in  a wider,  sometimes 
in  a narrower  extension.  When  employed  in  its  most  exten- 
sive meaning,  it  embraces  the  two  worlds  of  mind  and  matter. 
When  employed  in  its  more  restricted  signification,  it  is  a 
synonym  for  the  latter  only,  and  is  then  used  in  contradistinc- 
tion to  the  former.  In  the  Greek  philosophy,  the  word  $vat( 
was  general  in  its  meaning ; and  the  great  branch  of  philoso- 
phy, styled  ‘physical  or  physiological,’  included  under  it  not 
only  the  sciences  of  matter,  but  also  those  of  mind.  With  us, 
the  term  nature  is  more  vaguely  extensive  than  the  terms 
phy sics,  physical,  physiology,  physiological,  or  even  than  the 
adjective,  natural;  whereas,  in  the  philosophy  of  Germany, 
natur  and  its  correlatives,  whether  of  Greek  or  Latin  deriva- 
tion, are,  in  general,  expressive  of  the  world  of  matter  in  con- 
trast to  the  world  of  intelligence.” 1 

b.  Nature  as  opposed  to  art,  all  physical  causes,  all  the 
forces  which  belong  to  physical  beings,  organic  or  inorganic, 
c.  The  nature  or  essence  of  any  particular  being  or  class  of 
beings,  that  which  makes  it  what  it  is. 

“The  word  nature  has  been  used  in  two  senses,  — viz., 
actively  and  passively ; energetic  (= forma  f ormans),  and 
material  (=  forma  formaia).  In  the  first  it  signifies  the  in- 
ward principle  of  whatever  is  requisite  for  the  reality  of  a 
thing  as  existent ; while  the  essence,  or  essential  property,  sig- 
nifies the  inner  principle  of  all  that  appertains  to  the  possi- 
bility of  a thing.  Hence,  in  accurate  language,  we  say  the 
essence  of  a mathematical  circle  or  geometrical  figure,  not  the 
nature,  because  in  the  conception  of  forms,  purely  geometrical, 
there  is  no  expression  or  implication  of  their  real  existence. 
In  the  second  or  material  sense  of  the  word  nature,  we  mean 
by  it  the  sum  total  of  all  things,  as  far  as  they  are  objects  of 
our  senses,  and  consequently  of  possible  experience  — the 
aggregate  of  phenomena,  whether  existing  for  our  outer 
senses,  or  for  our  inner  sense.  The  doctrine  concerning  na- 
ture, would  therefore  (the  word  physiology  being  both  am- 


1 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  JReid’s  Works,  p.  216,  note. 
X 


30 


838 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


NATURE  - 

biguous  in  itself,  ancl  already  other-wise  appropriated)  be  more 
property  entitled  phenomenology,  distinguished  into  its  two 
grand  divisions,  somatology1  and  psychology.” 2 
NATURE  (Course  or  Power  of).  — “ There  is  no  such  thing  as 
what  men  commonly  call  the  course  of  nature,  or  the  power  of 
nature.  The  course  of  nature,  truly  and  property  speaking,  is 
nothing  else  but  the  ivill  of  God  producing  certain  effects  in  a 
continued,  regular,  constant,  and  uniform  manner ; which 
course  or  manner  of  acting,  being  in  every  movement  per- 
fectly arbitrary,  is  as  easy  to  be  altered  at  any  time  as  to  be 
preserved.  And  if  (as  seems  most  probable),  this  continual 
acting  upon  matter  be  performed  by  the  subserviency  of  cre- 
ated intelligences  appointed  for  that  purpose  by  the  Supreme 
Creator,  then  it  is  easy  for  any  of  them,  and  as  much  within 
their  natural  power  (by  the  permission  of  God),  to  alter  the 
course  of  nature  at  any  time,  or  in  any  respect,  as  it  is  to  pre- 
serve or  continue  it.”3 

“All  things  are  artificial,”  said  Sir  Thomas  Browne,  “ for 
nature  is  the  art  of  God.”  The  antithesis  of  nature  and  art  is 
a celebrated  doctrine  in  the  peripatetic  philosophy.  Natural 
things  are  distinguished  from  artificial,  inasmuch  as  they  have, 
what  the  latter  are  without,  an  intrinsic  principle  of  forma- 
tion.”4 

“Nature,”  said  Dr.  Reid,5  “ is  the  name  we  give  to  the  efficient 
cause  of  innumerable  effects  which  fall  daily  under  observation. 
But  if  it  be  asked  what  nature  is  ? whether  the  first  universal 
cause6  or  a subordinate  one  ? whether  one  or  many  ? whether 
intelligent  or  unintelligent?— upon  these  points  we  find  various 
conjectures  and  theories,  but  no  solid  ground  upon  which  we 
can  rest.  And  I apprehend  the  wisest  men  are  they  who  are 
sensible  that  they  know  nothing  of  the  matter.” 

The  Hon.  Robert  Boyle  wrote  an  Enquiry  into  the  vulgarly 


1 Both  these  are  included  in  the  title  of  a work  which  appeared  more  than  thirty 

years  ago,  — viz.,  Somatopsychonologia. 

3 Coleridge,  Friend , p.  410. 

3 Clarke,  Evidences  of  Nat.  and  Revealed  Religion , p.  300,  4th  edit. 

4 Arist.,  De  Gen.,  Anim.  ii.,  c.  1.  * Act.  row.,  essay  i.,  ch.  5. 

® Nalura  est  principium  et  causas  efficiens  omnium  rcrum  naturalium,  quo  sensu  a 

vetcribus  pliilosophus  cum  Deo  confundcbatur.  — Cicero,  Dc  Nat.  Dear.,  lib.  i.,  c.  8,  and 
lib.  ii.,  c.  22,  32. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


339 


NATURE  - 

received  notion  of  Nature,  in  which  he  attempted  to  show  the 
absurdity  of  interposing  any  subordinate  energy  between  the 
Creator  and  Ilis  works.1 

Nature  or  Force  (Plastic)  (rtxdaoa,  to  form),  was  the  name 
given  by  ancient  physiologists  to  a power  to  which  they  attri- 
buted the  formation  of  the  germs  and  tissues  of  organized  and 
living  beings.  In  opposition  to  the  doctrine  of  Democritus, 
who  explained  all  the  phenomena  of  nature  by  means  of  matter 
and  motion,  and  in  opposition  to  the  doctrine  of  Strato,  who 
taught  that  matter  was  the  only  substance,  but  in  itself  a 
living  and  active  force,  Cudworth  maintained  that  there  is  a 
jdastic  nature,  a spiritual  energy,  intermediate  between  the 
Creator  and  Ilis  works,  by  which  the  phenomena  of  nature  are 
produced.  To  ascribe  these  phenomena  to  the  immediate 
agency  of  Deity  would  be,  he  thought,  to  make  the  course  of 
nature  miraculous ; and  he  could  not  suppose  the  agency  of 
the  Deity  to  be  exerted  directly,  and  yet  monstrosities  and 
defects  to  be  found  in  the  works  of  nature.  How  far  the  facts 
warrant  such  an  hypothesis,  or  how  far  such  an  hypothesis 
explains  the  facts,  may  be  doubted.  But  the  hypothesis  is  not 
much  different  from  that  of  the  anitna  mundi,  or  soul  of  mat- 
ter, which  had  the  countenance  of  Pythagoras  and  Plato,  as 
well  as  of  the  school  of  Alexandria,  and  later  philosophers. — 
F.  Anisia  Mundi. 

Nature  (Philosophy  of).  — The  philosophy  of  nature  includes 
all  the  attempts  which  have  been  made  to  account  for  the  ori- 
gin and  on-goings  of  the  physical  universe.  Some  of  these 
have  been  noticed  under  Matter — q.  v.  And  for  an  account  of 
the  various  Philosophies  of  nature,  see  T.  II.  Martin,2  J.  B. 
Stallo,  A.  M.3 

NATURE  (Law  of). — By  the  law  of  Nature  is  meant  that  law  of 
justice  and  benevolence  which  is  written  on  the  heart  of  every 
man,  and  which  teaches  him  to  do  to  others  as  he  would  wish 
that  they  should  do  unto  him.  It  was  long  called  the  law  of 
nature  and  of  nations,  because  it  is  natural  to  men  of  all  nations.4 

1 12mo,  Lond.,  1785. 

a Philosophic  Sjiiritualistc  de  la  Nature , 2 tom..  Taris.  1849. 

3 General  Principles  of  Philosoph.  of  Nature,  Lond.,  1848. 

4 Quod  naturalis  ratio  inter  omnes  homines  coustituit , id  apud  omnes  populos  pereeque 
custoditur,  vocaturque  jus  gentium ; quasi  quo  jure  omnes  gentes  utuntur. — Gaius. 


340 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


NATURE  — 

But  by  the  phrase  law  of  nations  is  now  meant  international 
law,  and  by  the  laic  of  nature,  natural  law.  It  is  not  meant 
by  the  phrase  that  there  is  a regular  system  or  code  of  laws 
made  known  by  the  light  of  nature  in  which  all  men  every- 
where acquiesce,  but  that  there  are  certain  great  principles 
universally  acknowledged,  and  in  accordance  with  which  men 
feel  themselves  bound  to  regulate  their  conduct. 

“ Why  seek  the  law  or  rule  in  the  world  ? What  would  you 
answer  when  it  is  alleged  to  be  within  you,  if  you  would  only 
listen  to  it?  You  are  like  a dishonest  debtor  who  asks  for  the 
bill  against  him  when  he  has  it  himself.  Quod  petis  intus 
habes.  All  the  tables  of  the  law,  the  two  tables  of  Moses,  the 
twelve  tables  of  the  Romans,  and  all  the  good  laws  in  the 
world,  are  but  copies  and  extracts,  which  will  be  produced  in 
judgment  against  thee  who  hidest  the  original  and  pre- 
tendcst  not  to  know  what  it  is,  stifling  as  much  as  possible 
that  light  which  shines  within  thee,  but  which  would  never 
have  been  without  and  humanly  published  but  that  that  which 
was  within,  all  celestial  and  divine,  had  been  contemned  and 
forgotten.” *  1 

According  to  Grotius,  “Jus  naturale  est  dictatum  rectos  ra- 
tionis,  indicans,  actui  alicui,  ex  ejus  convenientia,  vel  di sconce- 
nientia  cum  ipsa  natura  rationali,  inesse  moralem  turpiludinem, 
aut  necessitatem  moralem ; et  consequenter  ab  authore  naturae, 
ipso  Deo,  talem  actum  aut  vetari  aut  pracipi.” 

“ Jus  gentium  is  used  to  denote,  not  international  law,  but 
positive  or  instituted  law,  so  far  as  it  is  common  to  all 
nations.  When  the  Romans  spoke  of  international  law,  they 
termed  it  Jus  Feciale,  the  law  of  heralds,  or  international 
envoys.”2 

Selden,3  Grotius,4  Puffendorff,5  Sanderson,6  Tyrell,7  Cul- 
verwell.8 

NATURE  (of  Things).  — The  following  may  be  given  as  an  outline 
of  the  views  of  those  philosophers,  Cudworth,  Clarke,  Price, 

1 Charron,  De.  la  Sagesse , liv.  ii.,  chap.  3,  No.  4. 

a Whewell,  Morality,  No.  1139.  3 De  Jure  Niturali , lib.  i.,  c.  3. 

4 De  Jure  Belli  et  Pads,  Prolegom.,  sect.  5,  6,  lib.  i.,  cap.  1,  sect.  10. 

6 De  Oficio  Ilominis  ct  Civis,  lib.  iii.,  c.  3. 

c De  Oblig.  Consdenlicc , Prselect.  Quarta,  sect.  20-21. 

1 On  Law  of  Nature.  8 Discourse  of  the  Light  of  Nature. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


341 


MATURE - 

and  others,  who  place  the  foundation  of  virtue  in  the  nature, 
reason,  and  fitness  of  things  : — 

“Everything  is  what  it  is,  by  having  a nature.  As  all 
things  have  not  the  same  nature,  there  must  be  different 
relations,  respects,  or  proportions,  of  some  things  towards  others, 
and  a consequent^/F/aess  or  unfitness,  in  the  application  of  dif- 
ferent things,  or  different  relations,  to  one  another.  It  is  the 
same  with  persons.  There  is  a.  fitness,  or  suitableness  of  certain 
circumstances  to  certain  persons,  and  an  unsuitableness  of  others. 
And  from  the  different  relations  of  different  persons  to  one 
another,  there  necessarily  arises  a fitness  or  unfitness  of  certain 
manners  of  behaviour  of  some  persons  towards  others,  as  well 
as  in  respect  to  the  things  and  circumstances  with  which  they 
are  surrounded.  Now,  we  stand  in  various  relations  to  God, 
as  our  Creator,  our  Preserver,  our  Benefactor,  our  Governor, 
and  our  Judge.  We  cannot  contemplate  these  relations,  with- 
out seeing  or  feeling  a Rectitude  or  Rightness  in  cherishing 
certain  affections  and  discharging  certain  services  towards  Him, 
and  a Wrongness  in  neglecting  to  do  so,  or  in  manifesting  a 
different  disposition,  or  following  a different  course  of  action. 
We  stand,  also,  in  various  relations  to  our  fellow-creatures; 
some  of  them  inseparable  from  our  nature  and  condition  as 
human  beings,  such  as  the  relations  of  parent  and  child, 
brother  and  friend ; and  others  which  may  be  voluntarily 
established,  such  as  the  relations  of  husband  and  wife,  master 
and  servant.  And  we  cannot  conceive  of  these  relations 
without  at  the  same  time  seeing  a Rectitude  or  Rightness  in 
cherishing  suitable  affections  and  following  a suitable  course 
of  action.  Not  to  do  so  we  see  and  feel  to  be  Wrong.  We 
may  even  be  said  to  stand  in  various  relations  to  the  objects 
around  us  in  the  world ; and,  when  we  contemplate  our 
nature  and  condition,  we  cannot  fail  to  see,  in  certain  manners 
of  behaviour,  a suitableness  or  unsuitableness  to  the  circum- 
stances in  which  we  have  been  placed.  Now,  Rectitude  or 
conformity  with  those  relations  which  arise  from  the  nature 
and  condition  of  man,  is  nothing  arbitrary  or  fictitious.  It  is 
founded  in  the  nature  of  things.  God  was  under  no  necessity 
to  create  human  beings.  But,  in  calling  them  into  existence, 
he  must  have  given  them  a nature,  and  thus  have  constituted 
30* 


342 


VOCABULARY  OF  rHILOSOPIIY. 


NATURE  — 

the  relations  in  which  they  stand  to  Ilim  and  to  other  hcings. 
There  is  a suitableness  or  congruity,  between  these  relations 
and  certain  manners  of  behaviour.  Reason,  or  the  Moral 
Faculty,  perceives  and  approves  of  this  suitableness  or  con- 
gruity. The  Divine  mind  must  do  the  same,  for  the  relations 
were  constituted  by  God  ; and  conformity  to  them  must  be  in 
accordance  with  llis  will.  So  that  Conscience,  when  truly 
enlightened,  is  a ray  from  the  Divine  Reason  ; and  the  moral 
law,  which  it  reveals  to  us,  is  Eternal  and  Immutable  as  the 
nature  of  God  and  the  nature  of  things.”  1 
NATURE  (Human).  — As  to  the  different  senses  in  which  nature 
may  be  understood,  and  the  proper  meaning  of  the  maxim, 
Follow  nature,  — see  Butler.2 

NECESSITY  ( ne  and  cesso,  that  which  cannot  cease).  — “I  have 
one  thing  to  observe  of  the  several  kinds  of  necessity,  that  the 
idea  of  some  sort  of  firm  connection  runs  through  them  all : — 
and  that  is  the  proper  general  import  of  the  name  necessity. 
Connection  of  mental  or  verbal  propositions,  or  of  their 
respective  parts,  makes  up  the  idea  of  logical  necessity,  — 
connection  of  end  and  means  makes  up  the  idea  of  moral 
necessity,  — connection  of  causes  and  effects  is  physical  neces- 
sity,— and  connection  of  existence  and  essence  is  metaphysical 
necessity.”3 

Logical  necessity  is  that  which,  according  to  the  terms  of 
the  proposition,  cannot  but  be.  Thus  it  is  necessary  that  man 
be  a rational  animal,  because  these  are  the  terms  in  which  he 
is  defined. 

Moral  necessity  is  that  without  which  the  effect  cannot  well 
be,  although,  absolutely  speaking  it  may.  A man  who  is  lame 
is  under  a moral  necessity  to  use  some  help,  but  absolutely  he 
may  not. 

“ The  phrase  moral  necessity  is  used  variously  ; sometimes  it 
is  used  for  necessity  of  moral  obligation.  So  we  say  a man  is 
under  necessity,  when  he  is  under  bonds  of  duty  and  conscience 
from  which  he  cannot  be  discharged.  Sometimes  by  moral 
necessity  is  meant  that  sure  connection  of  things  that  is  a 

1 Manual  of  Mor.  Phil.,  p.  1ST. 

* Three  Sermons  on  Hum.  Nature. 

3 Waterland,  Works,  vol.  iv.,  p.  432. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


343 


NECESSITY— 

foundation  for  infallible  certainty.  In  this  sense  moral  neces- 
sity signifies  much  the  same  as  that  high  degree  of  probability, 
which  is  ordinarily  sufficient  to  satisfy  mankind  in  their  con- 
duct and  behaviour  in  the  -world.  Sometimes  by  moral  neces- 
sity is  meant  that  necessity  of  connection  and  consequence 
which  arises  from  such  moral  causes  as  the  strength  of  incli- 
nation or  motives,  and  the  connection  which  there  is  in  many 
cases  between  them,  and  such  certain  volitions  and  actions. 
It  is  in  this  sense  that  I use  the  phrase  moral  necessity  in  the 
following  discourse.” 1 

“ By  natural  (or  physical ) necessity , as  applied  to  men,  I 
mean  such  necessity  as  men  are  under  through  the  force  of 
natural  causes.  Thus  men  placed  in  certain  circumstances, 
are  the  subjects  of  particular  sensations  by  necessity ; they 
feel  pain  when  their  bodies  are  wounded;  they  see  the  objects 
placed  before  them  in  a clear  light,  when  their  eyes  are  opened: 
so  they  assent  to  the  truths  of  certain  propositions  as  soon  as 
the  terms  are  understood ; as  . that  two  and  two  make  four, 
that  black  is  not  white,  that  two  parallel  lines  can  never  cross 
one  another;  so  by  a natural  (a  physical)  necessity  men’s 
bodies  move  downwards  when  there  is  nothing  to  support 
them.” 2 

Necessity  is  characteristic  of  ideas  and  of  actions.  A neces- 
sary idea  is  one  the  contrary  of  which  cannot  be  entertained 
by  the  human  mind ; as  every  change  implies  a cause.  Neces- 
sity and  universality  are  the  marks  of  certain  ideas  which  are 
native  to  the  human  mind,  and  not  derived  from  experience. 
A necessary  action  is  one  the  contrary  of  which  is  impossible. 
Necessity  is  opposed  to  freedom,  or  to  free-will.  — V.  Liberty. 

NECESSITY  (Doctrine  of). 

“ There  are  two  schemes  of  necessity, — the  nccessitation  by 
efficient — the  nccessitation  by  final  causes.  The  former  is  brute 
or  blind  fate  ; the  latter  rational  determinism.  Though  their 
practical  results  be  the  same,  they  ought  to  be  carefully  dis- 
tinguished.”3 

Leibnitz4  distinguishes  between  — 

1.  Hypothetical  necessity,  as  opposed  to  absolute  necessity,  as 

1 Edwards,  Works,  vol.  i.,  p.  116.  ' a Ibid,  vol.  i.,  p.  116. 

3 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Reid’s  Works , p.  87,  note. 

4 In  his  Filth  Paper  to  Dr.  Clarke,  p.  157. 


344 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


NECESSITY— 

that  -which  the  supposition  or  the  hypothesis  of  God’s  foresight 
and  preordination  lays  upon  future  contingents. 

2.  Logical,  metaphysical,  or  mathematical  necessity,  which 
takes  place  because  the  opposite  implies  a contradiction;  and 

3.  Moral  necessity,  whereby  a wise  being  chooses  the  best, 
and  every  mind  follows  the  strongest  inclination. 

Dr.  Clarke1  replies,  “Necessity,  in  philosophical  questions, 
always  signifies  absolute  necessity.  Hypothetical  necessity  and 
moral  necessity  arc  only  figurative  ways  of  speaking,  and  in 
philosoqdiical  strictness  of  truth,  are  no  necessity  at  all.  The 
question  is  not,  whether  a thing  must  be,  when  it  is  supposed 
that  it  is,  or  that  it  is  to  be  (which  is  hypothetical  necessity). 
Neither  is  the  question  whether  it  be  true,  that  a good  being, 
continuing  to  be  good,  cannot  do  evil ; or  a wise  being,  con- 
tinuing to  be  wise,  cannot  act  unwisely;  or  a veracious  person, 
continuing  to  be  veracious,  cannot  tell  a lie  (which  is  moral 
necessity).  But  the  true  and  only  question  in  philosophy  con- 
cerning liberty,  is,  whether  the  immediate  physical  cause,  or 
principle  of  action  be  indeed  in  him  whom  we  call  the  agent ; 
or  whether  it  be  some  other  reason,  which  is  the  real  cause  by 
operating  upon  the  agent,  and  making  him  to  be  not  indeed 
an  agent,  but  a mere  patient.” 

NECESSITY  (Logical). 

“ The  scholastic  philosophers  have  denominated  one  species 
of  necessity — necessitas  cousequ entice,  and  another  — necessitas 
consequentis.  The  former  is  an  ideal  or  formal  necessity  ; the 
inevitable  dependence  of  one  thought  upon  another,  by  reason 
of  our  intelligent  nature.  The  latter  is  a real  or  material 
necessity ; the  inevitable  dependence  of  one  thing  upon  another 
because  of  its  own  nature.  The  former  is  a logical  necessity, 
common  to  all  legitimate  consequence,  whatever  be  the  material 
modality  of  its  objects.  The  latter  is  an  extra-logical  necessity, 
over  and  above  the  syllogistic  inference,  and  wholly  dependent 
upon  the  modality  of  the  consequent.  This  ancient  distinction 
modern  philosophers  have  not  only  overlooked  but  confounded. 
(See  contrasted  the  doctrines  of  the  Aphrodisian,  and  of  Mr. 
Dugald  Stewart.2)  — Sir  William  Hamilton.3 

» P.  2S7.  3 In  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  701,  note. 

3 Discussions,  p.  lit. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


845 


NEGATION  ( nego , to  deny),  is  the  absence  ofthatwhich  does  not 
naturally  belong  to  the  thing  we  are  speaking  of,  or  which  has 
no  right,  obligation,  or  necessity  to  he  present  with  it;  as  when 
we  say  — A stone  is  inanimate,  or  blind,  or  deaf,  that  is,  has 
no  life,  nor  sight,  nor  hearing  ; or  when  we  say — A carpenter 
or  fisherman  is  unlearned ; these  are  mere  negations  } 

According  to  Thomas  Aquinas,2  simple  negation  denies  to 
a thing  some  certain  realities  which  do  not  belong  to  the 
nature  of  the  same.  Privation,  on  the  contrary,  is  deficiency 
in  some  reality  which  belongs  to  the  notion  of  the  being.—  V. 
Privation. 

In  simple  apprehension  there  is  no  affirmation  or  denial, 
so  that,  strictly  speaking,  there  are  no  negative  ideas,  notions, 
or  conceptions.  In  truth,  some  that  are  so  called  represent 
the  most  positive  realities  ; as  infinity,  immensity,  immortality, 
&c.  But  in  some  ideas,  as  in  that  of  blindness,  deafness,  in- 
sensibility, there  is,  as  it  were,  a taking  away  of  something 
from  the  object  of  which  these  ideas  are  entertained.  But  this 
is  privation  (e-ripycn;)  rather  than  negation  (arfwpacus).  And 
in  general  it  may  be  said  that  negation  implies  some  anterior 
conception  of  the  object  of  which  the  negation  is  made.  Ab- 
solute negation  is  impossible.  We  have  no  idea  of  nothing. 
It  is  but  a word.3 

NIHILISM  (n  ihil,  nihilum,  nothing),  is  scepticism  carried  to  the 
denial  of  all  existence. 

“ The  sum  total,”  says  Fichte,  “ is  this.  There  is  absolutely 
nothing  permanent  either  without  me  or  within  me,  but  only 
an  unceasing  change.  I know  absolutely  nothing  of  any  ex- 
istence, not  even  of  my  own.  I myself  know  nothing,  and  am 
nothing.  Images  ( Bilder ) there  are;  they  constitute  all  that 
apparently  exists,  and  what  they  know  of  themselves  is  after 
the  manner  of  images ; images  that  pass  and  vanish  without 
there  being  aught  to  witness  their  transition  ; that  consist  in 
fact  of  the  images  of  images,  without  significance  and  without 
an  aim.  I myself  am  one  of  these  images ; nay,  I am  not  even 
thus  much,  but  only  a confused  image  of  images.  All  reality 
is  converted  into  a marvellous  dream  without  a life  to  dream  of, 


1 Watts,  Log .,  part  i.,  chap.  2,  sect.  6. 

3 Summa , p.  i.,  qu.  48,  art.  5. 

8 Diet,  des  Sciences  Philosoph. 


346 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


NIHILISM  — 

and  without  a mind  to  dream ; into  a dream  made  up  only  of 
a dream  itself.  Perception  is  a dream ; thought,  the  source 
of  all  the  existence  and  all  the  reality  which  I imagine  to  my- 
self of  my  existence,  of  my  power,  of  my  destination — is  the 
dream  of  that  dream.”  1 

In  like  manner,  Mr.  Hume  resolved  the  phenomena  of 
consciousness  into  impressions  and  ideas.  And  as  according 
to  Berkeley,  sensitive  impressions  were  no  proof  of  external 
realities,  so  according  to  Hume,  ideas  do  not  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  mind  — so  that  there  is  neither  matter  nor  mind,  for 
anything  that  we  can  prove. 

NIHILUM  or  NOTHING  “is  that  of  which  everything  can 
truly  he  denied,  and  nothing  can  he  truly  affirmed.  So  that 
the  idea  of  nothing  (if  I may  so  speak)  is  absolutely  the  nega- 
tion of  all  ideas.  The  idea,  therefore,  either  of  a finite  or 
infinite  nothing,  is  a contradiction  in  terms.”2 

Nothing,  taken  positively,  is  what  does  not  hut  may  exist, 
as  a river  of  milk — taken  negatively,  it  is  that  which  does  not 
and  cannot  exist,  as  a square  circle,  a mountain  without  a 
valley.  Nothing  positively  is  ens  potentiate.  Nothing  nega- 
tively is  non  ens. 

NOMINALISM  ( nomen,  a name),  is  the  doctrine  that  general 
notions,  such  as  the  notion  of  a tree,  have  no  realities  cor- 
responding to  them,  and  have  no  existence  hut  as  names 
or  words.  The  doctrine  directly  opposed  to  it  is  realism. 
To  the  intermediate  doctrine  of  conceptualism,  nominalism  is 
closely  allied.  It  may  be  called  the  envelope  of  conceptualism, 
while  conceptualism  is  the  letter  or  substance  of  nominalism. 
“If  nominalism  sets  out  from  conceptualism,  conceptualism 
should  terminate  in  nominalism,”  says  Mons.  Cousin.3 

Universalia  ante  rem,  is  the  watchword  of  the  Realists; 
Universalia  in  re,  of  the  Conceptualists  ; Universalia  post  rem, 
of  the  Nominalists.  The  Nominalists  were  called  Terminists 
about  the  time  of  the  Reformation.4 

“ The  Terminists,  among  whom  I was,  are  so  called  he- 


1 Sir  William  Hamilton,  Reid's  Winds,  p.  129,  note. 

a Clarke,  Answer  to  Seventh  Letter,  note. 

3 Introd.  aux  ouvrages  inedits  d'Ahailaird,  4to,  Paris,  1836,  p.  181. 

4 Ballantyne,  Examin.  of  Hum.  Mind , chap.  3,  sect.  4. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOniY. 


347 


NOMINALISM  - 

cause  they  speak  of  a thing  in  its  own  proper  words,  and  do 
not  apply  them  after  a strange  sort.  They  are  also  called 
Occamisis,  from  Ockham  their  founder.  He  was  an  able  and 
a sensible  man.” 1 

In  asserting  that  universals  existed,  but  only  in  the  mind, 
Ockham  agreed  exactly  with  the  modern  Conceptualists. — V. 
Universals. 

NON  SEQ/UITUE,  (it  does  not  follow  ; the  inference  is  not  neces- 
sary.) — It  is  sometimes  used  as  a substantive  ; and  an  incon- 
clusive inference  is  called  a non  sequitur. 

N00G0NIE  ( rov$,  mind;  yoio;,  birth,  or  generation).  — “Leib- 
nitz has  intellectualized  sensations,  Locke  has  sensualized 
notions,  in  that  system  which  I might  call  a noogonie,  in  place 
of  admitting  two  different  sources  of  our  representations, 
which  are  objectively  valid  only  in  their  connection.”2 

NOOLOGY  ( vovj,  mind ; xdyoj),  is  a term  proposed  by  Mons. 
Paffe,3  to  denote  the  science  of  intellectual  facts,  or  the  facts 
of  intellect;  and  pathology  ( psychological ),  to  denote  the 
science  of  the  phenomenes  affedifs,  or  feeling,  or  sensibility. 

The  use  of  the  term  is  noticed  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton4  as  the 
title  given  to  Treatises  on  the  doctrine  of  First  Principles,  by 
Calovius,  in  1651;  Mejerus,  in  1662;  AVagnerus,  in  1670;  and 
Zeidlerus,  in  1680  — and  he  has  said,  “The  correlatives  noetic 
and  dia noetic  would  afford  the  best  philosophical  designations, 
the  former  for  an  intuitive  principle,  or  truth  at  first  hand  ; 
the  latter  for  a demonstrative  proposition,  or  truth  at  second 
hand.  Neology  or  noological,  dianoialogy  and  dianoialogical, 
would  be  also  technical  terms  of  much  convenience  in  various 
departments  of  philosophy.” 

Mons.  Ampfere  proposed  to  designate  the  sciences  which 
treat  of  the  human  mind  Les  sciences  Noologiques. 

“ If,  instead  of  considering  the  objects  of  our  knowledge,  we 
consider  its  origin , it  may  be  said  that  it  is  either  derived  from 
experience  alone,  or  from  reason  alone  ; hence  empirical  phi- 
losophers and  those  which  Kant  calls  noologisls:  at  their  head 


1 Luther,  Table  Talk , p.  5-A0-2. 

a Kant,  Crit.  de  la  Raison  Pure , pp.  320,  327. 

3 Sur  la  Sensibilite , p.  30. 

4 Reid's  Works , note  a,  sect.  5,  p.  770. 


848 


VOCABULARY  OF  rHILOSOrilY. 


N00L0GY  — 

arc  Aristotle  and  Tlato  among  tlic  ancients,  and  Locke  and 
Leibnitz  among  the  moderns.”  1 

NORM  ( norma,  from  yi/wpijttoj,  a square  or  rule  of  builders),  is  used 
as  synonymous  with  law.  Anything  not  in  accordance  with 
the  law  is  said  to  be  abnormal. 

“ There  is  no  uniformity,  no  norma,  principle,  or  rule,  per- 
ceivable in  the  distribution  of  the  primeval  natural  agents 
through  the  universe.”2 

NOTION  ( nosco,  to  know). — Bolingbroke3  says,  “I  distinguish 
here  between  ideas  and  notions,  for  it  seems  to  me,  that,  as  we 
compound  simple  into  complex  ideas,  so  the  composition  we 
make  of  simple  and  complex  ideas  may  be  called,  more  pro- 
perly, and  with  less  confusion  and  ambiguity,  notions.” 

Mr.  Locke4  says,  “The  mind  being  once  furnished  with 
simple  ideas,  it  can  put  them  together  in  several  compositions, 
and  so  make  variety  of  complex  ideas,  without  examining 
whether  they  exist  so  together  in  nature,  and  hence  I think 
it  is  that  these  ideas  are  called  notions,  as  they  had  their  origi- 
nal and  constant  existence  more  in  the  thoughts  of  men  than 
in  the  reality  of  things.” 

“ The  distinction  of  ideas,  strictly  so  called,  and  notions,  is 
one  of  the  most  common  and  important  in  the  philosophy  of 
mind.  Nor  do  we  owe  it,  as  has  been  asserted,  to  Berkeley. 
It  was  virtually  taken  by  Descartes  and  the  Cartesians,  in  their 
discrimination  of  ideas  of  imagination,  and  ideas  of  intelligence ; 
it  was  in  terms  vindicated  against  Locke,  by  Serjeant,  Stilling- 
fleet,  Norris,  Z . Mayne,  Bishpp  Brown,  and  others.  Bonnet 
signalized  it ; and  under  the  contrast  of  Anschauungen  and 
Begriffe,  it  has  long  been  an  established  and  classical  discrimi- 
nation with  the  philosophers  of  Germany.  Nay,  Reid  himself 
suggests  it  in  the  distinction  he  requires  between  imagination 
and  conception, — a distinction  which  he  unfortunately  did  not 
carry  out,  and  which  Mr.  Stewart  still  more  unhappily  per- 
verted. The  terms  notion  and  conception  (or  more  correctly 
concept  in  this  sense),  should  be  reserved  to  express  what  we 
comprehend  but  cannot  picture  in  imagination,  such  as  a rela- 

1 Henderson,  Philosoph . of  Kant , p.  172. 

a Mill,  Log .,  b.  iii.,  ch.  1C,  § 3. 

3 Essay  i.,  On  Human  Knowledge , sect.  2. 

4 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  book  ii..  ch.  22, 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


849 


NOTION— 

tion,  a general  term,  &c.  The  word  idea,  as  one  prostituted  to 
all  meanings,  it  were  better  to  discard.  As  for  the  represen- 
tations of  imagination  or  phantasy,  I would  employ  the  term 
image  or  phantasm,  it  being  distinctly  understood  that  these 
terms  are  applied  to  denote  the  representations  not  of  our 
visible  perceptions  merely,  as  the  term  taken  literally  would 
indicate,  but  of  our  sensible  perceptions  in  general.1 

Notion  is  more  general  in  its  signification  than  idea.  Idea 
is  merely  a conception,  or  at  most  a necessary  and  universal 
conception.  Notion  implies  all  this  and  more, — a judgment  or 
series  of  judgments,  and  a certain  degree  of  knowledge  of  the 
object.  Thus  we  speak  of  having  no  notion  or  knowledge  of  a 
thing,  and  of  having  some  notion  or  knowledge.  It  began  to 
be  used  by  Descartes,2  and  soon  came  into  current  use  among 
French  philosophers.  It  enables  us  to  steer  clear  of  the  ideas 
of  Plato,  of  the  species  of  the  scholastics,  and  of  the  images  of 
the  empirical  school.  Hence  Dr.  Reid  tells  us  that  he  used  it 
in  preference.3 

Des  Maistre4  uses  the  French  word  notion  as  synonymous 
with  pure  idea,  or  innate  idea,  underived  from  sense. 

Chalybseus,  in  a letter  to  Mr.  Eddersheim  (the  translator  of 
his  work),  says,  “In  English  as  in  French,  the  word  idea, 
idee,  is  applied,  without  distinction,  to  a representation,  to  a 
notion,  in  short  to  every  mental  conception ; while  in  Ger- 
man, in  scientific  language,  a very  careful  distinction  is  made 
between  sensuous  ‘ vorstellung’  (representation),  abstract  ‘ver- 
standes-begriff’  (intellectual  notion),  and  ‘ideen’  (ideas),  of 
reason.” 

Notions  or  concepts  are  clear  and  distinct,  or  obscure  and 
indistinct.  “A  concept  is  said  to  be  clear  when  the  degree  of 
consciousness  is  such  as  enables  us  to  distinguish  it  as  a whole 
from  others,  and  obscure  when  the  degree  of  consciousness  is 
insufficient  to  accomplish  this.  A concept  is  said  to  be  distinct 
when  the  amount  of  consciousness  is  such  as  enables  us  to  dis- 
criminate from  each  other  the  several  characters  or  constituent 
parts  of  which  the  concept  is  the  sum,  and  indistinct  or  con- 


1 Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Reid’s  Works , p.  *291,  note. 

a In  his  Regulce  ad  Directionem  Ingcnii.  8 Did.  des  Sciences  Philosoph. 

4 Soirees  de  St.  Peter sbourgh , p.  164. 

31 


850 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


NOTION  — 

fused  when  the  amount  of  consciousness  requisite  for  this  is 
•wanting.”  In  the  darkness  of  night  there  is  no  perception  of 
objects,  this  is  obscurity.  As  light  dawns  we  begin  to  see 
objects,  this  is  indistinctness.  As  morning  advances  we  make 
a distinction  between  trees  and  houses,  and  fields  and  rivers, 
as  wholes  differing  from  one  another,  this  is  clearness.  At 
length  when  day  approaches  noon,  we  see  the  parts  which 
make  up  the  wholes,  and  have  a distinct  view  of  everything 
before  us. 

We  have  a clear  notion  of  colours,  smells,  and  tastes;  for 
we  can  discriminate  red  from  white,  bitter  from  sweet.  But 
we  have  not  a distinct  notion  of  them,  for  we  are  not  acquainted 
with  the  qualities  which  form  the  difference ; neither  can  we 
describe  them  to  such  as  cannot  see,  smell,  and  taste.  We 
have  a clear  notion  of  a triangle  when  we  discriminate  it  from 
other  figures.  We  have  a distinct  notion  of  it  when  we  think 
of  it  as  a portion  of  space  bounded  by  three  straight  lines,  as 
a figure  whose  three  angles  taken  together  are  equal  to  two 
right  angles. 

First  Notions  and  Second  Notions. 

The  distinction  (which  we  owe  to  the  Arabians)  of  first  and 
second  notions  ( notiones , conceptus,  inientiones,  intellecta  prima 

et  sccunda)  is  a highly  philosophical  determination.' 

A frst  notion  is  the  concept  of  a thing  as  it  exists  o f itself,  and 
independent  of  any  operation  of  thought;  as  man,  John, 
animal,  &c.  A second  notion  is  the  concept,  not  of  an  object 
as  it  is  in  reality,  but  of  the  mode  under  which  it  is  thought  by 
the  mind;  as  individual,  species,  genus,  &c.  The  former  is 
the  concept  of  a thing,  real,  immediate,  direct:  the  latter  the 
concept  of  a concept,  formal,  mediate,  ref  ex.”1  2 

“■Notions  are  of  two  kinds  ; they  either  have  regard  to  things 
as  they  are,  as  horse,  ship,  tree,  and  are  called  first  notions; 
or  to  things  as  they  are  understood,  as  notions  of  genus,  species, 
attribute,  subject,  and  in  this  respect  are  called  second  notions, 
which,  however,  are  based  upon  the  first,  and  cannot  be  con- 

1 The  Americans  call  a cargo  of  fashionable  goods,  trinkets,  &c.,  being  “ laden  with 
notions ,”  and  on  being  hailed  by  our  ships,  a fellow  (without  an  idea  perhaps  in  his 
head)  will  answer  through  a speaking  trumpet  that  he  is  “laden  with  notions — Moore 
Diary , p.  219. 

a Sir  William  Hamilton,  Discussions,  p.  137. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


351 


NOTION— 

ceived  without  them.  Now  logic  is  not  so  much  employed 
upon  first  notions  of  things  as  upon  second  ; that  is,  it  is  not 
occupied  so  much  with  things  as  they  exist  in  nature,  but  with 
the  way  in  which  the  mind  conceives  them.  A logician  has 
nothing  to  do  with  ascertaining  whether  a horse,  or  a ship, 
or  a tree  exists,  but  whether  one  of  these  things  can  be  re- 
garded as  a genus  or  species,  whether  it  can  be  called  a sub- 
ject or  an  attribute,  whether  from  the  conjunction  of  many 
second  notions  a proposition,  a definition,  or  a syllogism  can 
he  formed.  The^rsi!  intention  of  every  word  is  its  real  mean- 
ing ; the  second  intention , its  logical  value  according  to  the 
function  of  thought  to  which  it  belongs.”1  — Thomson.2  — V. 
Intention. 

Notions,  Intuitive  and  Symbolical. 

Leibnitz  was  the  first  to  employ  intuitive  and  intuition  to 
denote  our  direct  ostensive  cognitions  of  an  individual  object 
either  in  sense  or  imagination,  and  in  opposition  to  our  in- 
direct and  symbolical  cognitions  acquired  through  the  use  of 
signs  or  language  in  the  understanding. 

“When  our  notion  of  any  object  or  objects  consists -of  a 
clear  insight  into  all  its  attributes,  or  at  least  the  essential 
ones,  he  would  call  it  intuitive.  But  where  the  notion  is  com- 
plex and  its  properties  numerous,  we  do  not  commonly  realize 
all  that  it  conveys ; the  powers  of  thinking  would  be  need- 
lessly retarded  by  such  a review.  We  think  more  compen- 
diously by  putting  a symbol  in  the  place  of  all  the  properties 
of  our  notion,  and  this  naturally  is  the  term  by  which  we  are 
accustomed  to  convey  the  notion  to  others.  A name,  then, 
employed  in  thought  is  called  a symbolical  cognition;  and  the 
names  we  employ  in  speech  are  not  always  symbols  to  another 
of  what  is  explicitly  understood  by  us,  but  quite  as  often  are 
symbols  both  to  speaker  and  hearer,  the  full  and  exact  mean- 
ing of  which  neither  of  them  stop  to  unfold,  any  more  than 
they  regularly  reflect  that  every  sovereign  which  passes 

1 “See  Buhle  (Arist.,  1,  p.  432).  whose  words  I haTe  followed.  See  also  Cracanthorp 
(Leg.  Proem.),  and  Sir  W.  Hamilton  (Edin.  Per  , No.  115,  p.  210).  There  is  no  authority 
whatever  for  Aldrich’s  view,  which  makes  second  intenliou  mean,  apparently,  ‘a  term 
defined  for  scientific  use;’  though  with  the  tenacious  vitality  of  error,  it  still  lingers 
in  some  quarters,  after  wounds  that  should  have  been  mortal.”  — V.  Intention. 

a Outline  of  the  Laws  of  Thought,  2d  ed.,  pp.  39,  40. 


852 


VOCABULARY  01’  PHILOSOPHY. 


NOTION  — 

through  their  hands  is  equivalent  to  240  pence.  Such  words 
as  the  State,  Happiness,  Liberty,  Creation,  are  too  pregnant 
with  meaning  for  us  to  suppose  that  we  realize  their  full 
sense  every  time  we  read  or  pronounce  them.  If  we  attend 
to  the  working  of  our  minds,  we  shall  find  that  each  word 
may  be  used,  and  in  its  proper  place  and  sense,  though  per- 
haps few  or  none  of  its  attributes  are  present  to  us  at  the 
moment.  A very  simple  notion  is  always  intuitive  ; we  cannot 
make  our  notion  of  brown  or  red  simpler  than  it  is  by  any 
symbol.  On  the  other  hand,  a highly  complex  notion,  like 
those  named  above,  is  seldom  fully  realized  — seldom  other 
than  a ■i/mbolical.”  1 

NOTIONES  COMMUNES,  also  called  preenotiones,  anticipa- 
tiones,  communes  notitice,  rtpox-/;4ft.s,  xoivai  fWoitw — first  truths, 
natural  judgments,  principles  of  common  sense,  are  phrases  em- 
ployed to  denote  certain  notions  or  cognitions  which  are  native 
to  the  human  mind,  which  are  intuitively  discerned,  being  clear 
and  manifest  in  their  own  light,  and  needing  no  proof,  but 
forming  the  ground  of  proof  and  evidence  as  to  other  truths. 
— F.  Anticipation,  Truths  (First). 

NOUMENON  (to  voovfxsvov),  in  the  philosophy  of  Kant  (an  object 
as  conceived  by  the  understanding,  or  thought  of  by  the  rea- 
son, j'ovj),  is  opposed  to  phenomenon  (an  object  such  as  we 
represent  it  to  ourselves  by  the  impression  which  it  makes  on 
our  senses).  Noumenon  is  an  object  in  itself,  not  relatively  to 
us.  But  we  have,  according  to  Kant,  no  such  knowledge  of 
things  in  themselves.  For  besides  the  impressions  which 
things  make  on  us,  there  is  nothing  in  us  but  the  forms  of  the 
sensibility  and  the  categories  of  the  understanding,  according 
to  which,  and  not  according  to  the  nature  of  things  in  them- 
selves, it  may  bo,  are  our  conceptions  of  them. 

Things  sensible  considered  as  in  themselves  and  not  as  they 
appear  to  us,  Kant  calls  negative  noumena;  and  reserves  the  de- 
signation of  positive  noumena,  to  intelligibles  properly  so  called, 
which  are  the  objects  of  an  intuition  purely  intellectual.2 

The  two  kinds  of  noumena  taken  together  are  opposed  to 
phenomena,  and  form  the  intelligible  world.  This  world  wo 


1 Thomson,  Outline  of  the  Laws  of  Thought,  p.  47. 

2 TVillm,  Hist,  de  la  Philo  soph.  Allemande , tom.  i.,  p.  200. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


353 


NQUMEN- 

admit  as  possible,  but  unknown.  Kantism  thus  trends  to- 
wards scepticism. 

“ The  word  phenomenon  has  no  meaning  except  as  opposed 
to  something  intelligible — to  a noiimenon,  as  Kant  says.  Now, 
either  we  understand  by  the  latter  word  a thing  which  cannot 
be  the  object  of  a sensuous  intuition,  without  determining  the 
mode  in  which  it  is  perceived,  and  in  this  case  we  take  it  in 
a negative  sense;  or  we  understand  it  as  the  object  of  a real 
intuition,  though  not  a sensuous  one,  an  intellectual  one,  and 
then  we  take  it  in  a positive  sense.  Which  of  these  two  is 
truth  ? It  cannot  unquestionably  be  affirmed  d priori  that  the 
only  possible  manner  of  perception  is  sensuous  intuition,  and 
it  implies  no  contradiction  to  suppose  that  an  object  may  be 
known  to  us  otherwise  than  by  the  senses.  But,  says  Kant, 
this  is  only  a possibility.  To  justify  us  in  affirming  that  there 
really  is  any  other  mode  of  perception  than  sensuous  intuition, 
any  intellectual  intuition,  it  must  come  within  the  range  of  our 
knowledge  ; and  in  fact  we  have  no  idea  of  any  such  faculty. 
We,  therefore,  cannot  adopt  the  word  noumenon  in  any  positive 
sense ; it  expresses  but  an  indeterminate  object,  not  of  an 
intuition,  but  of  a conception — in  other  words  a hypothesis  of 
the  understanding.”  1 — F.  Phenomenon. 

NOVELTY  [novas,  new),  “ is  not  merely  a sensation  in  the  mind 
of  him  to  whom  the  thing  is  new ; it  is  a real  relation  which 
the  thing  has  to  his  knowledge  at  that  time.  But  we  are  so 
constituted,  that  what  is  new  to  us  commonly  gives  pleasure 
upon  that  account,  if  it  be  not  in  itself  disagreeable.  It  rouses 
our  attention,  and  occasions  an  agreeable  exertion  of  our  facul- 
ties  Curiosity  is  a capital  principle  in  the  human 

constitution,  and  its  food  must  be  what  is  in  some  respect 

new Into  this  part  of  the  human  constitution,  I 

think,  we  may  resolve  the  pleasure  we  have  from  novelty  in 
objects.”1 2 

Any  new  or  strange  object,  whether  in  nature  or  in  art, 
when  contemplated  gives  rise  to  feelings  of  a pleasing  kind, 
the  consideration  of  which  belongs  to  ^Esthetics  — or  that  de- 
partment of  philosophy  which  treats  of  the  Powers  of  Taste. 

1 Henderson,  Philosophy  of  Kant,  p.  76. 

2 Keid,  Inidl.  Pow.,  essay  viii.,  chap.  2. 


31* 


v 


354 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


NUMBER  was  held  by  Pythagoras  to  he  the  ultimate  principle 
of  being.  Ilis  views  were  adopted  to  a certain  extent  by 
riato,  and  attacked  by  Aristotle.  In  the  Middle  Ages,  num- 
bers and  the  proportions  subsisting  between  them,  were  em- 
ployed in  the  systems  of  the  alchemists  and  cabalists.  But 
in  proportion  as  the  true  spirit  of  philosophy  prevailed,  num- 
bers were  banished  from  metaphysics,  and  the  consideration 
of  them  was  allotted  to  a separate  science  — arithmetic  and 
algebra. 


OATH. -An  oath  is  a solemn  appeal  to  God,  as  the  author  of 
all  that  is  true  and  right,  and  a solemn  promise  to  speak  the 
truth  and  to  do  what  is  right;  renouncing  the  divine  favour 
and  imprecating  the  divine  vengeance,  should  we  fail  to  do  so. 
Oaths  have  been  distinguished  as  — 1.  The  assertory,  or  oath 
of  evidence,  and  2.  The  promissory,  or  oath  of  office — the  for- 
mer referring  to  the  past,  and  the  latter  to  the  future.  But 
both  refer  to  the  future,  inasmuch  as  both  are  confirmatory 
of  a promise,  to  give  true  evidence,  or  to  do  faithful  service. 
— V.  Affirmation. 

OBJECTIVE  ( objicio , to  throw  against),  is  now  used  to  describe 
the  absolute  independent  state  of  a thing ; but  by  the  elder 
metaphysicians  it  was  applied  to  the  aspect  of  things  as  objects 
of  sense  or  understanding.  So  Berkeley,  “ Natural  pheno- 
mena are  only  natural  appearances.  They  are,  therefore,  such 
as  we  see  and  perceive  them.  Their  real  and  objective  natures 
are,  therefore,  one  and  the  same.”  Sir  is,  sect.  292,  where 
real  and  objective  are  expressly  distinguished.  The  modern 
nomenclature  appears  to  me  very  inconvenient.1 

With  Aristotle  vHoxilpivov  signified  the  subject  of  a pro- 
position, and  also  substance.  The  Latins  translated  it  subjec- 
tum.  In  Greek  object  is  avtixcif. nvov,  translated  oppositum. 
In  the  Middle  Ages  subject  meant  substance,  and  has  this 
sense  in  Descartes  and  Spinoza;  sometimes  also  in  Reid. 
Subjective  is  used  by  Will.  Occam  to  denote  that  which  exists 
independent  of  mind,  objective  that  which  the  mind  feigned. 
This  shows  what  is  meant  by  realitas  objectiva  in  Descartes,2 


Fitzgerald,  Notes  to  Aristotle , p.  191. 


2 Med.  3. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


355 


OBJECTIVE  — 

Kant  and  Fichte  hare  inverted  the  meanings : subject  is  the 
mind  "which  knows  — object  that  which  is  known.  Subjective 
the  varying  conditions  of  the  knowing  mind  — objective  that 
which  is  in  the  constant  nature  of  the  thing  known.1 

By  objective  reality  Descartes2  meant  the  reality  of  the  object 
in  so  far  as  represented  by  the  idea  or  thought  of  it  — by 
formal,  or  actual  reality  the  reality  of  the  object  as  conform 
to  our  idea  of  it.  Thus  the  sun  was  objectively  in  our  thought 
or  idea  of  it  — actually  or  formally  in  the  heavens.  He  had 
also  a third  form  of  reality  which  he  called  eminent  — that  is, 
an  existence  superior  at  once  to  the  idea  and  the  object,  and 
which  contained  in  posse  what  both  these  had  in  esse. 

“ In  philosophical  language,  it  were  to  be  wished  that  the 
word  subject  should  be  reserved  for  the  subject  of  inhesion  — 
the  materia  in  qua;  and  the  term  object  exclusively  applied  to 
the  subject  of  operation  — the  materia  circa  quam.  If  this  be 
not  done,  the  grand  distinction  of  subjective  and  objective,  in 
philosophy,  is  confounded.  But  if  the  employment  of  subject 
for  object  is  to  be  deprecated,  the  employment  of  object  for 
purpose  or  final  cause  (in  the  French  and  English  languages) 
is  to  be  absolutely  condemned,  as  a recent  and  irrational  con- 
fusion of  notions  which  should  be  carefully  distinguished.”3 
. — V.  Subject. 

OBLIGATION  ( obligo , to  bind),  is  legal  or  moral. 

“ Obligation , as  used  in  moral  inquiry,  is  derived  from  the 
doctrine  of  justification  in  the  scholastic  ages.  In  consequence 
of  original  sin  man  comes  into  the  world  a debtor  to  divine 
justice.  He  is  under  an  obligation  to  punishment,  on  account 
of  his  deficiency  from  that  form  of  original  justice  in  which  he 
rendered  to  God  all  that  service  of  love  which  the  great  good- 
ness of  God  demanded.  Hence  our  terms  due  and  duty,  to 
express  right  conduct.”4 

Obligation  (Moral)  has  been  distinguished  as  internal  and  ex- 
ternal; according  as  the  reason  for  acting  arises  in  the  mind 
of  the  agent,  or  from  the  will  of  another. 

1 Trendelenburg,  Notes  to  Ai'istotle's  Logic. 

2 Response  a la  Stconde  Objection. 

3 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Reid’s  Works , p.  97,  and  App.,  note  B. 

4 Hampden,  Bampton  Ltd.,  vi.,  p.  296. 


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VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


OBLIGATION  — 

In  seeing  a thing  to  be  right  we  are  under  obligation  to  do 
it.  This  is  internal  obligation,  or  that  reason  for  acting  which 
arises  in  the  mind  of  the  agent  along  with  the  perception  of 
the  rightness  of  the  action.  It  is  also  called  rational,  obliga- 
tion. Dr.  Adams'  has  said,  “ Right  implies  duty  in  its  idea. 
To  perceive  that  an  action  is  right,  is  to  see  a reason  for  doing 
it  in  the  action  itself,  abstracted  from  all  other  considerations 
whatever.  Now,  this  perception,  this  acknowledged  rectitudo 
in  the  action,  is  the  very  essence  of  obligation  ; that  which 
commands  the  approbation  of  choice,  and  binds  the  conscience 
of  every  rational  being.”  And  Mr.  Stewart2  has  said,  “ The 
very  notion  of  virtue  implies  the  notion  of  obligation." 

External  obligation  is  a reason  for  acting  which  arises 
from  the  will  of  another,  having  authority  to  impose  a law. 
It  is  also  called  authoritative  obligation.  Bishop  Warburton3 4 
has  contended  that  all  obligation  necessarily  implies  an  obli- 
ger  different  from  the  party  obliged  ; and  moral  obligation, 
being  the  obligation  of  a free  agent,  implies  a law ; and  a 
law  implies  a lawgiver.  The  will  of  God,  therefore,  is  the 
true  ground  of  all  obligation,  strictly  and  properly  so  called. 
The  perception  of  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong 
can  be  said  to  oblige  only  as  an  indication  of  the  will  of 
God. 

There  is  no  incompatibility  between  these  two  grounds  of 
obligation.1 

By  some  philosophers,  however,  this  stream  of  living  waters 
has  been  parted.  They  have  grounded  obligation  altogether 
on  the  will  of  God,  and  have  overlooked  or  made  light  of 
the  obligation  which  arises  from  our  perception  of  rectitude. 
Language  to  this  effect  has  been  ascribed  to  Mr.  Locke.5 
And  both  Warburton  and  Horsley,  as  well  as  Paley  and  his 
followers,  have  given  too  much,  if  not  an  exclusive,  promi- 
nence to  the  rewards  and  punishments  of  a future  life,  as 
prompting  to  the  practice  of  virtue.  But,  although  God,  in 

1 Sermon  on  the  Nature  and  Obligation  of  Virtue. 

* Act.  and  Mor.  Pow.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  294. 

3 Div.  Leg .,  book  i.,  sect.  4. 

4 See  Whewell,  Sermons  on  the  Foundation  of  Morals,  pp.  26-76.  And  Dr.  Chalmers, 
Bridgewater  Treatise , vol.  i.,  p.  78. 

* Life  by  Lord  King , vol.  ii.,  p.  129. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


357 


OBLIGATION  - 

accommodation  to  the  weakness  of  our  nature  and  the  perils 
of  our  condition,  has  condescended  to  quicken  us,  in  the  dis- 
charge of  our  duty,  by  appealing  to  our  hopes  and  fears, 
both  in  regard  to  the  life  that  now  is  and  that  which  is  to 
come,  it  does  not  follow  that  self-love,  or  a concern  for  our 
own  happiness,  should  be  the  only,  or  even  the  chief  spring, 
of  our  obedience.  On  the  contrary,  obedience  to  the  divine 
will  may  spring  from  veneration  and  love  to  the  divine 
character,  arising  from  the  most  thorough  conviction  of  the 
rectitude,  wisdom,  and  goodness  of  the  divine  arrangements. 
And  that  this,  more  than  a regard  to  the  rewards  of  ever- 
lasting life,  is  the  proper  spring  of  virtuous  conduct,  is  as 
plain  as  it  is  important  to  remark.  To  do  what  is  right,  even 
for  the  sake  of  everlasting  life,  is  evidently  acting  from  a 
motive  far  inferior,  in  purity  and  power,  to  love  and  vene- 
ration for  the  character  and  commands  of  Him  who  is  just 
and  good,  in  a sense  and  to  an  extent  to  which  our  most  ele- 
vated conceptions  are  inadequate.  That  which  should  bind 
us  to  the  throne  of  the  Eternal  is  not  the  iron  chain  of  selfish- 
ness, but  Hie  golden  links  of  a love  to  all  that  is  right ; and 
our  aspirations  to  the  realms  of  bliss  should  be  breathings 
after  the  prevalence  of  universal  purity,  rather  than  desires 
of  our  own  individual  happiness.  Self  and  its  little  circle  is 
too  narrow  to  hold  the  heart  of  man,  when  it  is  touched  with  a 
sense  of  its  true  dignity,  and  enlightened  with  the  knowledge 
of  its  lofty  destination.  It  swells  with  generous  admiration 
of  all  that  is  right  and  good ; and  expands  with  a love  which 
refuses  to  acknowledge  any  limits  but  the  limits  of  life  and 
the  capacities  of  enjoyment.  In  the  nature  and  will  of  Him 
from  whom  all  being  and  all  happiness  proceed,  it  acknow- 
ledges the  only  proper  object  of  its  adoration  and  submission; 
and  in  surrendering  itself  to  His  authority  is  purified  from  all 
the  dross  of  selfishness,  and  cheered  by  the  light  of  a calm 
and  unquenchable  love  to  all  that  is  right  and  good.1  — V. 
Right,  Sanction. 


1 See  Sanderson,  De  Juramenti  Obligation e,  praslec.  i.,  sect.  11 ; De  Obligations  Con - 
scienti-ce,  prmlec.  v. ; lYhewell,  Moi'ality , book  i.,  chap.  4,  pp.  84r-S9;  King,  Essay  on  Evil, 
Prelim.  Dissert.,  sect. 


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VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


OBSERVATION.  — “ The  difference  between  experiment  and  ob- 
servation, consists  merely  in  the  comparative  rapidity  with 
which  they  accomplish  their  discoveries ; or  rather  in  the  com- 
parative command  we  possess  over  them,  as  instruments  for 
the  investigation  of  truth.”  1 

Mr.  Stewart2  has  said,  that  according  to  Dr.  Reid,  “Atten- 
tion to  external  things  is  observation,  and  attention  to  the  sub- 
jects of  our  own  consciousness  is  reflection.  Yet  Dr.  Reid3 
has  said,  that  “ reflection,  in  its  common  and  proper  meaning, 
is  equally  applicable  to  objects  of  sense  and  to  objects  of  con- 
sciousness— and  has  censured  Locke  for  restricting  it  to  that 
reflection  which  is  employed  about  the  operations  of  our  minds. 
In  like  manner  we  may  observe  the  operations  of  our  own 
minds  as  well  as  external  phenomena.  Observation  is  better 
characterized  by  Sir  John  Herschell  as  passive  experience. — 
V.  Experience. 

It  is  the  great  instrument  of  discovery  in  mind  and  matter. 
According  to  some,4  experiment  can  be  applied  to  matter,  but 
only  observation  to  mind.  But  to  a certain  extent  the  study 
of  mind  admits  experiment.5 

“We  can  scarcely  be  said  to  make  experiments  on  the 
minds  of  others.  It  is  necessary  to  an  experiment,  that  the 
observer  should  know  accurately  the  state  of  the  thing  ob- 
served before  the  experiment,  and  its  state  immediately  after 
it.  But  when  the  minds  of  other  men  are  the  subject,  we  can 
know  but  little  of  either  the  one  state  or  of  the  other.  We  are 
forced,  therefore,  to  rely  not  on  experiment,  but  on  experi- 
ence ; that  is  to  say,  not  on  combinations  of  known  elements 
effected  for  the  purpose  of  testing  the  result  of  each  different 
combination ; but  on  our  observation  of  actual  occurrences, 
the  results  of  the  combination  of  numerous  elements,  only  a 
few  of  which  are  within  our  knowledge.  And  the  consequence 
is,  that  we  frequently  connect  facts  which  are  really  independ- 
ent of  one  another,  and  not  unfrequently  mistake  obstacles 
for  causes 


1 Stewart,  Philosoph.  Essays,  Prelim.  Dissert.,  chap.  2. 

a Elements,  vol.  i.,  p.  106,  note. 

8 Intell.  Pow.,  essay  vi.,  chap  1. 

4 Edin.  Pev.,  vol.  iii.,  p.  269. 

8 See  Hampden,  Introd.  to  Mor.  Phil.,  sect,  ii.,  p.  51;  and  Mr.  Stewart,  Philosoph . 
Essays,  Prelim.  Dissert.,  chap.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


359 


OBSERVATION  — 

“ When  we  direct  our  attention  to  the  workings  of  our  own 
minds ; that  is  to  say,  when  we  search  for  premises  by  means 
of  consciousness  instead  of  by  means  of  observation,  our  powers 
of  trying  experiments  are  much  greater.  To  a considerable 
degree  we  command  our  own  faculties,  and  though  these  are 
few,  perhaps  none  which  we  can  use  separately,  we  can  at 
will  exercise  one  more  vigorously  than  the  others.  We  can 
call,  for  instance,  into  peculiar  activity,  the  judgment,  the 
memory,  or  the  imagination,  and  note  the  differences  in  our 
mental  condition  as  the  one  faculty  or  the  other  is  more  active. 
And  this  is  an  experiment.  Over  our  mental  sensations  we 
have  less  power.  We  cannot  at  will  feel  angry,  or  anxious, 
or  frightened ; but  we  can  sometimes,  though  rarely,  put  our- 
selves really  into  situations  by  which  certain  emotions  will  be 
excited.  And  when,  as  is  usually  the  case,  this  is  impossible 
or  objectionable,  we  can  fancy  ourselves  in  such  situations. 
The  first  is  an  actual  experiment.  We  can  approach  the 
brink  of  an  unprotected  precipice  and  look  down  — we  can 
interpose  between  our  bodies  and  that  brink  a low  parapet, 
and  look  over  it,  and  if  we  find  that  our  condition  in  the  two 
cases  differ,  that  though  there  is  no  real  danger  in  either  case, 
though  in  both  our  judgment  equally  tells  us  that  we  are  safe, 
yet  that  the  apparent  danger  in  the  one  produces  fear,  while 
we  feel  secure  in  the  other,  we  infer  that  the  imagination  can 
excite  fear  for  which  the  judgment  affirms  that  there  is  no 
adequate  cause.  The  second  is  the  resemblance  of  an  expe- 
riment, and  which  when  tried  by  a person  with  the  vivid 
imagination  of  Shakspeare  or  Homer,  may  serve  for  one ; but 
with  ordinary  minds  it  is  a fallacious  expedient.  Few  men, 
when  they  picture  themselves  in  an  imaginary  situation,  take 
into  account  all  the  incidents  necessary  to  that  situation ; and 
those  which  they  neglect  may  be  the  most  important.” 1 

“ Instead  of  contrasting  observation  and  experiment,  we 
should  contrast  spontaneous  and  experimental  phenomena 
as  alike  subjects  of  observation.  Facts  furnished  by  artificial 
contrivances  require  to  be  observed  just  in  the  same  way  as 
those  which  are  presented  by  nature  without  our  interference ; 


‘ Senior,  Four  Lectures  on  Pol.  Scon.,  1852,  p.  31. 


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VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


OBSERVATION  — 

and  yet  philosophers  are  nearly  unanimous  in  confining 
observation  to  the  latter  phenomena,  and  speaking  of  it  as  of 
something  which  ceases  where  experiment  begins  ; while  in 
simple  truth,  the  business  of  experiment  is  to  extend  the 
sphere  of  observation,  and  not  to  take  up  a subject  where 
observation  lays  it  down.”1 

All  men  are  apt  to  notice  likenesses  in  the  facts  that  come 
before  them,  and  to  group  similar  facts  together.  The  faculty 
by  which  such  similarities  are  apprehended  is  called  observa- 
tion; the  act  of  grouping  them  together  under  a general 
statement,  as  when  we  say,  “All  seeds  grow  — all  bodies 
fall,”  has  been  described  as  generalization.  — V.  Generaliza- 
tion. 

According  to  M.  Comte2  there  are  three  modes  of  observa- 
tion:— 1.  Observation,  properly  so  called,  or  the  direct  exami- 
nation of  the  phenomenon  as  it  presents  itself  naturally.  2. 
Experiment,  or  the  contemplation  of  the  phenomenon,  so  modi- 
fied more  or  less  by  artificial  circumstances  introduced  inten- 
tionally by  ourselves,  with  a view  to  its  more  complete  inves- 
tigation. 3.  Comparison,  or  the  successive  consideration  of 
a series  of  analogous  cases,  in  which  the  phenomenon  becomes 
more  and  more  simple.  The  third  head  (as  to  which  see  tom. 
iii.,  p.  343)  seems  not  so  much  a species  of  observation,  as  a 
mode  of  arranging  observations,  with  a view  to  a proper  in- 
vestigation of  the  phenomena.3 

According  to  Humboldt4  there  are  three  stages  of  the  in- 
vestigation of  nature — passive  observation,  active  observation, 
and  experiment. 

The  difference  between  active  and  passive  observation  is 
marked  in  Bacon.5  The  former  is  when  Experientia  lege  certa 
procedit,  seriatim  et  coniinenter. 

“ This  word  experimental  has  the  defect  of  not  appearing  to 
comprehend  the  knowledge  which  flows  from  observation,  as 
well  as  that  which  is  obtained  by  experiment.  The  German 


1 S.  Bailey.,  Theory  of  Reasoning , pp.  114-15,  8vo,  Lond.f  1851. 

a Cours  de  P/nlosoph.  Positive , tom.  ii.,  p.  19. 

8 Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  Meth.  of  Observ.  in  Politics , chap.  5,  note. 

4 Cosmos , vol.  ii.,  p.  212. 

8 Nov.  Org.il , Aphor.  100. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


361 


OBSERVATION  - 

word  empirical  is  applied  to  all  the  information  which  expe- 
rience affords;  but  it  is  in  our  language  degraded  by  another 
application.  I therefore  must  use  experimental  in  a larger 
sense  than  its  etymology  warrants.”  — Sir  J.  Mackintosh.1 

Experiential  has  been  proposed  as  equivalent  to  empirical. 

OCCASION. — Cicero2  says: — Occasio  est  pars  temporis,  habeas  in 
se  alicujus  rei  idoneam  faciendi  opportuniiatem.  Tempus  autem 
action  is  opportunum,  Greece,  Evxoupi'a ; Latine,  appellatur  occasio.3 
The  watchman  falling  asleep  gives  occasion  to  thieves  to  break 
into  the  house  and  steal. 

“ There  is  much  difference  between  an  occasion  and  a proper 
cause:  these  two  are  heedfully  to  be  distinguished.  Critical 
and  exact  historians,  as  Polybius  and  Tacitus,  distinguish 
betwixt  the  dp xq  and  the  atria,  the  beginning  occasions  and 
the  real  causes,  of  a war.”  — Flavell.4 * 

“ What  is  caused  seems  to  follow  naturally ; what  is  occa- 
sioned follows  incidentally,  and  what  is  created  receives  its 
existence  arbitrarily.  A wound  causes  pain,  accidents  occa- 
sion delay,  scandal  creates  mischief. 

“Between  the  real  cause  and  the  occasion  of  any  phenome- 
non, there  is  a wide  diversity.  The  one  implies  the  pro- 
ducing power,  the  other  only  some  condition  upon  which  this 
power  comes  into  exercise.  If  I cast  a grain  of  corn  into  the 
earth,  the  occasion  of  its  springing  up  and  producing  plant, 
ear,  and  grain,  is  the  warmth  and  moisture  of  the  soil  in  which 
it  is  buried ; but  this  is  by  no  means  the  cause.  The  cause 
lies  in  the  mysterious  vital  power  which  the  seed  contains 
within  itself ; the  other  is  but  the  condition  upon  which  this 
cause  produces  the  effect.”6 
OCCASIONAL  CAUSES  (Doctrine  of).— V.  Cause. 

OCCULT  QUALITIES. — V.  Quality. 

ONE.  — V.  Unity. 

ONEIROMANCY.  —V.  Dreaming. 


1 On  Bacon  and  Locke,  Works , vol.  i.,  p.  333. 

1.  Be  Inventione.  a Be  Offic.,  lib.  i. 

4 Discourse  of  the  Occasions,  Causes , Nature , Rise,  Growth , and  Remedies  of  Mental 

Errors. 

6 Morell,  Specul.  Phil.,  vol.  i,  p.  99. 


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VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


ONTOLOGY  ( ov  and  Xoyo;,  the  science  of  being).  — “ Ontology 
is  a discourse  of  being  in  general,  and  the  various  or  most 
universal  modes  or  affections,  as  well  as  the  several  kinds  or 
divisions  of  it.  The  word  being  here  includes  not  only  what- 
soever actually  is,  but  whatsoever  can  be.” 1 

Ontology  is  the  same  as  metaphysics.  Neither  the  one  name 
nor  the  other  was  used  by  Aristotle.  lie  called  the  science 
now  designated  by  them  philosophia  prima,  and  defined  it 
as  Irtiatrpy  tov  orroj  ft  orroj — Scientia  Eniis  Quatenvs  Entis, 
that  is,  the  science  of  the  essence  of  things ; the  science  of 
the  attributes  and  conditions  of  being  in  general,  not  of  being 
in  any  given  circumstances,  not  as  physical  or  mathematical, 
but  as  being.  The  name  ontology  seems  to  have  been  first 
made  current  in  philosophy  by  Wolf.  He  divided  metaphysics 
into  four  parts — ontology,  psychology,  rational  cosmology,  and 
theology.  It  was  chiefly  occupied  with  abstract  inquiries  into 
possibility,  necessity,  and  contingency,  substance,  accident, 
cause,  &c.,  without  reference  to  the  laws  of  our  intellect  by 
which  we  are  constrained  to  believe  in  them.  Kant  denied 
that  we  had  any  knowledge  of  substance  or  cause  as  really 
existing.  But  there  is  a science  of  principles  and  causes,  of 
the  principles  of  being  and  knowing.  In  this  view  of  it, 
ontology  corresponds  with  metaphysics  — q.  v. 

“ Ontology  may  be  treated  of  in  two  different  methods, 
according  as  its  exponent  is  a believer  in  to  oV,  or  in  to. 
onto.,  in  one  or  in  many  fundamental  principles  of  things.  In 
the  former,  all  objects  whatever  are  regarded  as  phenomenal 
modifications  of  one  and  the  same  substance,  or  as  self- 
determined  effects  of  one  and  the  same  cause.  The  necessary 
result  of  this  method  is  to  reduce  all  metaphysical  philosophy 
to  a Rational  Theology,  the  one  substance  or  Cause  being 
identified  with  the  Absolute  or  the  Deity.  According  to  the 
latter  method,  which  professes  to  treat  of  different  classes  of 
beings  independently,  metaphysics  will  contain  three  co-ordi- 
nate branches  of  inquiry,  Rational  Cosmology,  Rational  Psy- 
chology, and  Rational  Theology.  The  first  aims  at  a know- 
ledge of  the  real  essence,  as  distinguished  from  the  phenomena 
of  the  material  world ; the  second  discusses  the  nature  and 


1 Watts,  On  Ontology,  c.  2.  — Sco  also  Smith,  Wealth  of  Nations,  book  v.,  c.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


363 


ONTOLOGY— 

origin,  as  distinguished  from  the  faculties  and  affections,  of 
the  human  soul  and  of  other  finite  spirits ; the  third  aspires 
to  comprehend  God  himself,  as  cognizable  a priori  in  his 
essential  nature,  apart  from  the  indirect  and  relative  indica- 
tions furnished  by  his  works,  as  in  Natural  Theology,  or  by 
his  Word,  as  in  Revealed  Religion. 

“These  three  objects  of  metaphysical  inquiry,  God,  the 
W orld,  the  Mind,  correspond  to  Kant’s  three  ideas  of  the  Pure 
Reason ; and  the  object  of  his  Critique  is  to  show  that  in 
relation  to  all  these,  the  attainment  of  a system  of  speculative 
philosophy  is  impossible.”  1 

“ The  science  of  ontology  comprehends  investigations  of 
every  real  existence,  either  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  present 
world,  or  in  any  other  way  incapable  of  being  the  direct  ob- 
ject of  consciousness,  which  can  be  deduced  immediately  from 
the  possession  of  certain  feelings  or  principles  and  faculties 
of  the  human  soul.”2 

OPERATIONS  (of  the  Mind). — “By  the  operations  of  the  mind,  ”3 
says  Dr.  Reid,4  “we  understand  every  mode  of  thinking  of 
which  we  are  conscious. 

“ It  deserves  our  notice,  that  the  various  modes  of  thinking 
have  always  and  in  all  language,  as  far  as  we  know,  been 
called  by  the  name  of  operations  of  the  mind,  or  by  names  of 
the  same  import.  To  body,  we  ascribe  various  properties,  but 
not  operations,  properly  so  called : it  is  extended,  divisible, 
movable,  inert ; it  continues  in  any  state  in  which  it  is  put ; 
every  change  of  its  state  is  the  effect  of  some  force  impressed 
upon  it,  and  is  exactly  proportional  to  the  force  impressed,  and 
in  the  precise  direction  of  that  force.  These  are  the  general 
properties  of  matter,  and  these  are  not  operations ; on  the  con- 
trary, they  all  imply  its  being  a dead,  inactive  thing,  which 
moves  only  as  it  is  moved,  and  acts  only  by  being  acted  upon. 
But  the  mind  is,  from  its  very  nature,  a living  and  active 
being.  Everything  we  know  of  it  implies  life  and  active 
energy;  and  the  reason  why  all  its  modes  of  thinking  are 

1 Mansel,  Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  277. 

a Archer  Butler,  Lectures  on  Ancient  Philosophy. 

3 Operation,  act,  and  energy,  are  nearly  convertible  terms;  and  are  opposed  to  faculty, 
as  the  actual  to  the  potential.  — Sir  Will-  Hamilton. 

4 Intell.  Pow.j  essay  i.,  chap.  1. 


364 


VOCABULARY  OB  PHILOSOPHY. 


OPERATIONS  — 

called  its  operations,  is  that  in  all,  or  in  most  of  them,  it  is  not 
merely  passive  as  body  is,  but  is  really  and  properly  active." 
— V.  States  of  Mind. 

OPINION  [opinor,  to  think).  — “The  essential  idea  of  opinion 
seems  to  be  that  it  is  a matter  about  which  doubt  can  reason- 
ably exist,  as  to  which  two  persons  can  without  absurdity 

think  differently Any  proposition,  the  contrary 

of  which  can  be  maintained  with  probability,  is  matter  of 
opinion.”  1 

According  to  the  last  of  these  definitions,  matter  of  opinion 
is  opposed  not  to  matter  of  fact,  but  to  matter  of  certainty. 
Thus,  the  death  of  Charles  I.  is  a fact — his  authorship  of  Icon 
B as ililce,  an  opinion.  It  is  also  used,  however,  to  denote  know- 
ledge acquired  by  inference,  as  opposed  to  that  acquired  by 
perception.  Thus,  that  the  moon  gives  light,  is  matter  of 
fact;  that  it  is  inhabited  or  uninhabited,  is  matter  of  opinion. 

It  has  been  proposed2  to  discard  from  philosophical  use 
these  ambiguous  expressions,  and  to  divide  knowledge,  accord- 
ing to  its  sources,  into  matter  of  perception  and  matter  of 
inference;  and,  as  a cross  division  as  to  our  conviction,  into 
matter  of  certainty  and  matter  of  doubt. 

Holding  for  true,  or  the  subjective  validity  of  a judgment 
in  relation  to  conviction  (which  is,  at  the  same  time,  objec- 
tively valid),  has  the  three  following  degrees : — opinion,  belief, 
and  knowledge.  Opinion  is  a consciously  insufficient  judgment, 
subjectively  as  well  as  objectively.  Belief  is  subjectively 
sufficient,  but  is  recognized  as  being  objectively  insufficient. 
Knowledge  is  both  subjectively  and  objectively  sufficient.  Sub- 
jective sufficiency  is  termed  conviction  (for  myself) ; objective 
sufficiency  is  termed  certainty  (for  all).3  — V.  Belief,  Know- 
ledge, Certainty,  Fact,  Judgment. 

OPPOSED,  OPPOSITION  (ro  avtixtlfuvov,  that  which  lies  over 
against). — Aristotle  has  said,  that  “one  thing  may  be  opposed 
to  another  in  four  ways ; by  relation,  by  contrariety,  or  as 
privation  is  to  possession,  affirmation  to  negation.  Thus,  there 
is  the  opposition  of  relation  between  the  double  and  the  half; 

x Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  Essay  on  Opinion , p.  i.,  iv. 

9 Edin.  Rev.,  April,  1850,  p.  311. 

3 Meiklojohn,  Transl.  of  CHI.  of  Eure  Reason,  p.  498. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


365 


OPPOSED  — 

of  contrariety  between  good  and  evil ; blindness  and  seeing 
are  opposed  in  the  way  of  privation  and  possession  ; the  pro- 
positions, he  sits,  and  he  does  not  sit,  in  the  way  of  negation 
and  affirmation.”  — V.  Contrary,  Privation,  Term. 

OPPOSITION  (in  Logic).  — “Two  propositions  are  said  to  be 
opposed  to  each  other,  when,  having  the  same  subject  and 
predicate,  they  differ  in  quantity,  or  quality,  or  both.  It  is 
evident,  that  with  any  given  subject  and  predicate,  you  may 
state  four  distinct  propositions,  viz.,  A,  E,  I,  and  0 ; any  two 
of  which  are  said  to  be  opposed;  hence  there  are  four  different 
kinds  of  opposition,  viz.,  1st,  the  two  universals  (A  and  E), 
are  called  contraries  to  each  other ; 2d,  the  two  particular 
(I  and  0),  subcontraries ; 3d,  A and  I,  or  E and  0,  subalterns ; 
4th,  A and  0,  or  E and  I,  contradictories.”  1 

The  opposition  of  propositions  may  be  thus  exhibited  : — 


j Contraries  — may  be  both  false,  but  cannot  both  be  true. 

J-  Subcontraries  — may  both  be  true,  but  cannot  both  be  false. 
| Contradictories  — one  must  be  true  and  the  other  false. 

| Also  Contradictories. 


All  A is  B. 

No  A is  B. 

Some  A is  B. 

Some  A is  not  B 

All  A is  B. 

Some  A is  not  B 
No  A is  B. 

Some  A is  B. 

All  A.sB.  1 ana  $ A is  B.  1 Respectively  subaltemate. 

Some  A is  B.  J C Some  A is  not  B.  I 


“ Of  two  subalternate  propositions  the  truth  of  the  universal 
proves  the  truth  of  the  particular,  and  the  falsity  of  the 
particular  proves  the  falsity  of  the  universal,  but  not  vice 
versa.” 2 

OPTIMISM  ( optimum , the  superlative  of  bonum,  good),  is  the 
doctrine,  that  the  universe,  being  the  work  of  an  infinitely 
perfect  Being,  is  the  best  that  could  be  created. 

This  doctrine  under  various  forms  appeared  in  all  the  great 
philosophical  schools  of  antiquity.  During  the  Middle  Ages 
it  was  advocated  by  St.  Anselm  and  St.  Thomas.  In  times 
comparatively  modern,  it  was  embraced  by  Descartes  and 
Malebranche.  But  the  doctrine  has  been  developed  in  its 
highest  form  by  Leibnitz. 


1 Wbatelv,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  cli.  2.  J 3. 


Mill,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  1. 


366 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


OPTIMISM  — 

According  to  him,  God,  being  infinitely  perfect,  could  neither 
•will  nor  produce  evil.  And  as  a less  good  compared  with  a 
greater  is  evil,  the  creation  of  God  must  not  only  be  good,  but 
the  best  that  could  possibly  be.  Before  creation,  all  beings  and 
all  possible  conditions  of  things  were  present  to  the  Divine 
Mind  in  idea,  and  composed  an  infinite  number  of  worlds, 
from  among  which  infinite  wisdom  chose  the  best.  Creation 
was  the  giving  existence  to  the  most  perfect  state  of  things 
which  had  been  ideally  contemplated  by  the  Divine  Mind. 

The  optimism  of  Leibnitz  has  been  misunderstood  and  mis- 
represented by  Voltaire  and  others.  But  the  doctrine  which 
Leibnitz  advocated  is  not  that  the  present  state  of  things  is 
the  best  possible  in  reference  to  individuals,  nor  to  classes  of 
beings,  nor  even  to  this  world  as  a whole,  but  in  reference  to 
all  worlds,  or  to  the  universe  as  a whole — and  not  even  to  the 
universe  in  its  present  state,  but  in  reference  to  that  indefinite 
progress  of  which  it  may  contain  the  germs.’ 

According  to  Mr.  Stewart,1 2  under  the  title  of  optim  ists,  are 
comprehended  those  who  admit  and  those  who  deny  the  free- 
dom of  human  actions,  and  the  accountableness  of  man  as  a 
moral  agent. 

ORDER  means  rank,  series  means  succession ; hence  there  is  in 
order  something  of  voluntary  arrangement,  and  in  series  some- 
thing of  unconscious  catenation.  The  order  of  a procession. 
The  series  of  ages.  A series  of  figures  in  uniform  — soldiers 
in  order  of  battle.3 

Order  is  the  intelligent  arrangement  of  means  to  accomplish 
an  end,  the  harmonious  relation  established  between  the  parts 
for  the  good  of  the  whole.  The  primitive  belief  that  there  is 
order  in  nature,  is  the  ground  of  all  experience.  In  this 
belief  we  confidently  anticipate  that  the  same  causes,  opera- 
ting in  the  same  circumstances,  will  produce  the  same  effects. 
This  may  be  resolved  into  a higher  belief  in  the  wisdom  of  an 
infinitely  perfect  being,  who  orders  all  things. 

Order  has  been  regarded  as  the  higher  idea  into  which 
moral  rectitude  may  be  resolved.  Every  being  has  an  end 
to  answer,  and  every  being  attains  its  perfection  in  accom- 


1 Leibnitz,  Essais  cZe  Thcodicee ; Malebranche,  Entreticns  Metaphysiques. 

a Act.  and  Mor.  Poiv.,  b.  iii.,  ch.  3,  sect  1.  8 Taylor,  Synonyms. 


VOCABULARY  OR  PHILOSOPHY. 


367 


OEDEE  — 

plishing  that  end.  But  -while  other  beings  tend  blindly  to- 
wards it,  man  knows  the  end  of  his  being,  and  the  place  he 
holds  in  the  scheme  of  the  universe,  and  can  freely  and  intel- 
ligently endeavour  to  realize  that  universal  order  of  which 
he  is  an  element  or  constituent.  In  doing  so  he  does  what 
is  right. 

“ There  is  one  parent  virtue,  the  universal  virtue,  the  virtue 
which  renders  us  just  and  perfect,  the  virtue  which  will  one 
day  render  us  happy.  It  is  the  only  virtue.  It  is  the  love 
of  the  universal  order  as  it  eternally  existed  in  the  Divine 
Reason,  where  every  created  reason  contemplates  it.  The 
love  of  order  is  the  whole  of  virtue,  and  conformity  to  order 
constitutes  the  morality  of  actions.” 1 

Such  is  the  theory  of  Malebranche,  and  more  recently  of 
Jouffroy.  In  like  manner,  science,  in  all  its  discoveries,  tends 
to  the  discovery  of  universal  order.  And  art,  in  its  highest 
attainments,  is  only  realizing  the  truth  of  nature  ; so  that  the 
true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good,  ultimately  resolve  them- 
selves into  the  idea  of  order. 

OEGAN.  — An  organ  is  a part  of  the  body  fitted  to  perform  a par- 
ticular action,  which,  or  rather  the  performance  of  which 
action,  is  denominated  its  function. 

“ By  the  term  organ,”  says  Gall,2  “ I mean  the  material 
condition  which  renders  possible  the  manifestation  of  a 
faculty.  The  muscles  and  the  bones  are  the  material  con- 
dition of  movement,  but  are  not  the  faculty  which  causes 
movement ; the  whole  organization  of  the  eye  is  the  material 
condition  of  sight,  but  it  is  not  the  faculty  of  seeing.  By  the 
term  ‘ organ  of  the  soul,’  I mean  a material  condition  which 
renders  possible  the  manifestation  of  a moral  quality,  or  an 
intellectual  faculty.  I say  that  man  in  this  life  thinks  and 
wills  by  means  of  the  brain ; but  if  one  concludes  that  the 
brain  is  the  thing  that  thinks  and  wills,  it  is  as  if  one  should 
say  that  the  muscles  are  the  faculty  of  moving ; that  the  organ 
of  sight  and  the  faculty  of  seeing  are  the  same  thing.  In 
each  case  it  would  be  to  confound  the  facility  with  the  organ, 
and  the  organ  with  the.  faculty.” 


1 Traits  de  Morale,  Rott,  1634. 


3 Vol.  i„  p.  22S. 


S68 


VOCABULARY  OF  BIIILOSOBIIY. 


ORGAN  — 

“An  organ  of  sense  is  an  instrument  composed  of  a pecu- 
liar arrangement  of  organised  matter,  by  which  it  is  adapted 
to  receive  from  specific  agents  definite  impressions.  Between 
the  agent  that  produces  and  the  organ  that  receives  the  im- 
pressions, the  adaptation  is  such,  that  the  result  of  their 
mutual  action  is,  in  the  first  place,  the  production  of  sensa- 
tion ; and,  in  the  second  place,  of  pleasure.”1 

According  to  phrenological  writers,  particular  parts  of  the 
brain  are  fitted  to  serve  as  instruments  for  particular  faculties 
of  the  mind.  This  is  organology.  It  is  further  maintained, 
that  the  figure  and  extent  of  these  parts  of  the  brain  can  be 
discerned  externally.  This  is  organoscopy.  Some  who  be- 
lieve in  the  former,  do  not  believe  in  the  latter. 

ORGANON  or  QRGANUM  (opyai’or,  an  instrument),  is  the  name 
often  applied  to  a collection  of  Aristotle’s  treatises  on  logic ; 
because,  by  the  Peripatetics,  logic  was  regarded  as  the  instru- 
ment of  science  rather  than  a science  or  part  of  science  in 
itself.  In  the  sixth  century,  Ammonius  and  Simplicius  ar- 
ranged the  works  of  Aristotle  in  classes,  one  of  which  they 
called  logical  or  organical.  But  it  was  not  till  the  fifteenth 
century  that  the  name  Orgamnn  came  into  common  use.2 
Bacon  gave  the  name  of  Novum  Organum  to  the  second  part 
■of  his  Instauratio  Magna.  And  the  German  philosopher, 
Lambert,  in  1763,  published  a logical  work  under  the  title, 
Das  Neve  Organon. 

Poste,  in  his  translation  of  the  Posterior  Analytics,  gives  a 
sketch  of  the  Organum  of  Aristotle,  which  he  divides  into 
four  parts,  — viz.,  General  Logic,  the  Logic  of  Deduction,  the 
Logic  of  Induction,  and  the  Logic  of  Opinion;  the  third,  in- 
deed, not  sufficiently  articulated  and  disengaged  from  the 
fourth,  and  hence  the  necessity  of  a Novum  Organum. 

“ The  Organon  of  Aristotle,  and  the  Organon  of  Bacon 
stand  in  relation,  but  the  relation  of  contrariety  ; the  one  con- 
siders the  laws  under  which  the  subject  thinks,  the  other  the 
laws  under  which  the  object  is  to  be  known.  To  compare 
them  together,  is  therefore  to  compare  together  qualities  of 
different  species.  Each  proposes  a different  end ; both  in 


1 Dr.  Soutliwood  Smith. 

2 Barthclemy  St.  Iiilaire,  Dc  la  Lngiquc  d’Aristoie,  tom.  i.,  p.  19. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


369 


ORGANON— 

different  ways  are  useful;  and  both  ought  to  be  assiduously 
studied.”  1 

ORIGIN  ( origo ) may  be  taken  in  two  senses,  essentially  different 
from  each  other.  It  may  mean  the  cause  of  anything  being 
produced,  or  it  may  imply  simply  the  occasion  of  its  produc- 
tion.2 

ORIGINATE,  ORIGINATION.  — These  words  and  their  con- 
jugates are  coming  to  be  used  in  the  question  concerning 
liberty  and  necessity.  Does  man  originate  his  own  actions  ? 
Is  man  a principle  of  origination  ? are  forms  of  expression 
equivalent  to  the  question,  Is  man  a free  agent  ? 

“ To  deny  all  originating  power  of  the  will,  must  be  to  place 
the  primordial  and  necessary  causes  of  all  things  in  the  Divine 

nature Whether  as  a matter  of  fact  an  originating 

power  reside  in  man,  may  be  matter  of  inquiry;  but  to  main- 
tain it  to  be  an  impossibility,  is,  to  deny  the  possibility  of  crea- 
tion.”3 “Will,  they  hold  to  be  a free  cause,  a cause  which  is 
not  an  effect ; in  other  words,  they  attribute  to  it  a power  of 
absolute  origination.” 4 * 

OSTENSIVE  ( ostendo , to  show).  — “An  ostensive  conception 
indicates  how  an  object  is  constituted.  It  is  opposed  to  the 
heuristic  ( heuretic ) conception  which  indicates  how,  under  its 
guidance,  the  quality  and  connection  of  objects  of  experience 
in  general  are  to  be  sought.  The  conception  of  a man,  a 
house,  &c.,  is  an  ostensive  one;  the  conception  of  the  supreme 
intelligence  (for  theoretic  reason)  is  an  heuristic  conception.”6 * 
OTJGHTNESS. — V.  Duty. 

GUTNESS.— “ The  word  outness,  which  has  been  of  late  revived 
by  some  of  Kant’s  admirers  in  this  country,  was  long  ago  used 
by  Berkeley  in  his  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge ;6  and  at 
a still  earlier  period  of  his  life,  in  his  Essay  towards  a New 
Theory  of  Vision.'1  I mention  this  as  I have  more  than  once 
heard  the  term  spoken  of  as  a fortunate  innovation.”8  — V. 
Externality. 


1 Sir  Will.  Ilamilion,  Reid’s  Worlcs,  p.  712,  note. 

a Morell,  Specid.  Phil.,  vol.  i.,  p.  99.  3 Thomson,  Christ.  Theism,  hook  i , chap.  6. 

4 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Discussions , p.  595.  See  also  Cairns,  On  Moral  Freedom. 

* Haywood,  Explanation  of  Terms  in  the  Crit.  of  Pure  Reason. 

6 Sect.  43.  1 Sect.  46.  8 Stewart,  Philosoph.  Essays,  part  i.,  essay  2. 

Z 


370 


VOCABULARY  OR  miLOSOPIIY. 


PACT.  — r.  Contract,  Promise. 

PANTHEISM  (rtixj,  all;  (ho;,  God).  — “It  supposes  God  and 
nature,  or  God  and  ihe  whole  universe,  to  be  one  and  the 
same  substance  — one  universal  being;  insomuch  that  men’s 
souls  are  only  modifications  of  the  Divine  substance.”  1 

Pantheislce  qni  contendunt  unicam  esse  subslaniiam,  cujus 
paries  sunt  omnia  end  a quev  exisiunt ,2 

Pantheism , when  explained  to  mean  the  absorption  of  God 
in  nature,  is  atheism ; and  the  doctrine  of  Spinoza  has  been  so 
regarded  by  many.  When  explained  to  mean  the  absorption 
of  nature  in  God  — of  the  finite  in  the  infinite  — it  amounts  to 
an  exaggeration  of  theism.  Hut  pantheism , strictly  speaking, 
is  the  doctrine  of  the  necessary  and  eternal  co-existence  of  the 
finite  and  the  infinite  — of  the  absolute  consubstantiality  of 
God  and  nature  — considered  as  two  different  but  inseparable 
aspects  of  universal  existence ; and  the  confutation  of  it  is  to 
be  found  in  the  consciousness  which  every  one  has  of  his 
personality  and  responsibility,  which  pantheism  destroys. 

PARABLE  (rtapaj3o?.}j,  from  rtapafiaTCKio,  to  put  or  set  beside),  has 
been  defined  to  be  a “ fictitious  but  probable  narrative  taken 
from  the  affairs  of  ordinary  life  to  illustrate  some  higher  and 
less  known  truth.”  “It  differs  from  the  Fable,  moving,  as  it 
does,  in  a spiritual  world,  and  never  transgressing  the  actual 
order  of  things  natural ; from  the  Myth,  there  being  in  the  lat- 
ter an  unconscious  blending  of  the  deeper  meaning  with  the 
outward  symbol,  the  two  remaining  separate,  and  separable 
in  the  Parable;  from  the  Proverb,  inasmuch  as  it  is  longer 
carried  out,  and  not  merely  accidentally  and  occasionally, 
but  necessarily  figurative ; from  the  Allegory,  comparing,  as 
it  does,  one  thing  with  another,  at  the  same  time  preserving 
them  apart  as  an  inner  and  an  outer,  not  transferring,  as  does 
the  Allegory,  the  properties,  and  qualities  and  relations  of 
one  to  the  other.”3 

PARADOX  (rfapd  Sol; a,  beyond,  or  contrary  to  appearance),  is  a 
proposition  which  seems  not  to  be  true,  but  which  turns  out  to 
be  true.  Cicero  wrote  “ Paradoxa,”  and  the  Hon.  Robert 


1 Water-land,  Works*  vol.  viii.,  p.  81. 

3 Lacoudre,  Inst.  Philosophy  tom.  ii.,  p.  120. 

3 Trench,  On  the  Parables. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  371 

PARADOX— 

Boyle  published,  in  1666,  Hydrostatical  Paradoxes,  made  out 
by  new  experiments. 

PARALOGISM  (rtapaXoyi.cr,udj,  from  rtapatoyt^opai,  to  reason  wrong), 
is  a formal  fallacy  or  pseudo-syllogism,  in  which  the  conclu- 
sion does  not  follow  from  the  premises.  We  may  be  deceived 
ourselves  by  a paralogism ; when  we  endeavour  to  deceive 
others  by  it,  it  is  a sophism  — q.  v. 

Paralogism  of  Pure  Reason.  — “The  logical  paralogism  con- 
sists in  the  erroneousness  of  a syllogism,  according  to  form, 
whatever  besides  its  content  may  be.  But  a transcendental 
paralogism  has  a transcendental  foundation  of  concluding 
falsely,  according  to  the  form.  In  such  a way,  a like  false 
conclusion  will  have  its  foundation  in  the  nature  of  human 
reason,  and  will  carry  along  with  itself  an  inevitable,  although 
not  an  insoluble  illusion.”  1 

PARCIM0I7Y  (Law  of)  ( parcimonia , sparingness).  — “That 
substances  are  not  to  be  multiplied  without  necessity in 
other  words,  “ that  a plurality  of  principles  are  not  to  be  as- 
sumed, when  the  phenomena  can  possibly  be  explained  by 
one.”  This  regulative  principle  may  be  called  the  law  or 
maxim  of  parcimony.2 

Entia  non  sunt  multplicanda  prater  necessitatem.  Frustra 
fit  per  plura  quod  fieri  potest  per  pauciora.  These  are  expres- 
sions of  this  principle. 

PARONYMOUS. — V.  Conjugate. 

PART  {filpos,  pars,  part,  or  portion).  — “Part,  in  one  sense,  is 
applied  to  anything  divisible  in  quantity.  For  that  which  you 
take  from  a quantity,  in  so  far  as  it  is  quantity,  is  a part  of 
that  quantity.  Thus  two  is  a part  of  three.  In  another  sense, 
you  only  give  the  name  of  part  to  what  is  an  exact  measure 
of  quantity;  so  that,  in  one  point  of  view,  two  will  be  a part 
of  three,  in  another  not.  That  into  which  you  can  divide  a 
genus,  animal,  for  example,  otherwise  than  by  quantity,  is 
still  a part  of  the  genus.  In  this  sense  species  are  parts  of  the 
genus.  Part  is  also  applied  to  that  into  which  an  object  can 
be  divided,  whether  matter  or  form.  Iron  is  part  of  a globe, 
or  cube  of  iron ; it  is  the  matter  which  receives  the  form.  An 


1 Kant.  Crit.  of  Pure  Reason , p.  299. 

2 Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Reid’s  Works , p.  751,  note  a. 


372 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PART— 

angle  is  also  apart.  Lastly,  the  elements  of  the  definition  of 
every  particular  being  are  parts  of  the  whole  ; so  that,  in  this 
point  of  view,  the  genus  may  be  considered  as  part  of  the 
species  ; in  another,  on  the  contrary,  the  species  is  part  of  the 
genus.”  1 

“ Of  things  which  exist  by  parts,  there  are  three  kinds.  The 
first  is  of  things,  the  parts  of  which  are  not  co-existent,  but 
successive ; such  as  time  or  motion,  no  two  parts  of  which  can 
exist  together. 

“The  next  kind  of  things  consisting  of  parts,  is  such  where 
parts  are  co-existent  and  contiguous.  Things  of  this  kind  are 
said  to  be  extended ; for  extension  is  nothing  else  but  co-exist- 
ence and  junction  of  parts. 

“The  third  kind  of  things  existing  by  parts  is,  when  the 
parts  are  co-existent,  yet  not  contiguous  or  joined,  but  separate 
and  disjoined.  Of  this  kind  is  number,  the  of  which  are 
separated  by  nature,  and  only  united  by  the  operation  of  the 
mind.”2 

PASSION  ( passio , Ttac to  suffer),  is  the  contrary  of  action. 
“A  passive  state  is  the  state  of  a thing  while  it  is  operated 
upon  by  some  cause.  Everything  and  every  being  but  God, 
is  liable  to  be  in  this  state.  He  is  pure  energy — always  active, 
but  never  acted  upon  ; while  everything  else  is  liable  to  suffer 
change.”3 

PASSIONS  (The).  — This  phrase  is  sometimes  employed  in  a wide 
sense  to  denote  all  the  states  or  manifestations  of  the  sensi- 
bility— every  form  and  degree  of  feeling.  In  a more  restricted 
psychological  sense,  it  is  confined  to  those  states  of  the  sensi- 
bility which  are  turbulent,  and  weaken  our  power  of  self-com- 
mand. This  is  also  the  popular  use  of  the  phrase,  in  which 
passion  is  opposed  to  reason. 

Plato  arranged  the  passions  in  two  classes, — the  concupisci- 
ble  and  irascible,  truOv/xia.  and  Oi^os,  the  former  springing  from 
the  body  and  perishing  with  it,  the  latter  connected  with  the 
rational  and  immortal  part  of  our  nature,  and  stimulating  to 
the  pursuit  of  good  and  the  avoiding  of  excess  and  evil. 


1 Aristotle,  Metaphys lib.  iv.,  cap.  25. 

9 Monboildo,  Ancient  Metaphys .,  book  ii.,  chap.  13. 

* See  Harris,  Dialogue  concerning  Happiness,  p.  86,  note. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


373 


PASSIONS  — 

Aristotle  included  all  our  active  principles  under  one  gene- 
ral designation  of  oretic,  and  distinguished  them  into  the 
appetite  irascible,  the  appetite  concupiscible,  which  had  their 
origin  in  the  body,  and  the  appetite  rational  (j3oux^atf),  which 
is  the  will,  under  the  guidance  of  reason. 

Descartes  and  Malebranche  have  each  given  a theory  and 
classification  of  the  passions;  also,  Dr.  Isaac  Watts,  Dr.  Cogan, 
and  Dr.  Hutcheson. 

PERCEPTION  ( capio , to  take;  per,  by  means  of),  apprehension 
by  means  of  the  organs  of  sense. 

Descartes'  says,  “ 0 nines  modi  cogiiandi,  quos  in  nobis  expe- 
rimur,  ad  duos  generales  referri  possuni : quorum  units  est  per- 
ceptio,  siue  operatio  inteliectus  ; alias  vero,  volitio,  sive  operaiio 
voluntatis.  Nam  sentire,  imaginari,  et  pure  intelligere,  sunt 
tantum  diversi  modi  percipiendi ; ut  et  cvpere,  aversari,  affir- 
mare,  negare,  dubitare,  sunt  diversi  modi  volendi.” 

Locke2  says,  “The  two  principal  actions  of  the  mind  are 
these  two;  perception  or  thinking,  and  volition  or  willing.  The 
power  of  thinking  is  called  the  understanding,  and  the  power 
of  volition  the  will;  and  these  two  powers  or  abilities  of  the 
mind  are  called  faculties.” 

Dr.  Reid  thought  that  “perception  is  most  properly  applied 
to  the  evidence  which  we  have  of  external  objects  by  our 
senses.”  He  says,3  “ The  perception  of  external  objects  by 
our  senses,  is  an  operation  of  the  mind  of  a peculiar  nature, 
and  ought  to  have  a name  appropriated  to  it.  It  has  so  in  all 
languages.  And,  in  English,  I know  no  word  more  proper  to 
express  this  act  of  the  mind  than  perception.  Seeing,  hearing, 
smelling,  tasting,  and  touching  or  feeling,  are  words  that  ex- 
press the  operations  proper  to  each  sense;  perceiving  expresses 
that  which  is  common  to  them  all.” 

The  restriction  thus  imposed  upon  the  word  by  Reid,  is  to 
be  found  in  the  philosophy  of  Kant ; and,  as  convenient,  has 
been  generally  acquiesced  in. 

Sir  Will.  Hamilton4  notices  the  following  meanings  of  per- 
ception, as  applied  to  different  faculties,  acts,  and  objects:  — 


1 Princip.  Philosophy  para  1,  sect.  32. 
a Essay  on  Hum.  Understand book  ii.,  chap.  6. 

8 InteU.  Pow.,  essay  i.,  chap.  1.  4 In  note  D*  to  Reid's  Works,  p.  876. 

33 


374 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PERCEPTION  — 

1.  Perceptio,  in  its  primary  philosophical  signification,  as  in 
the  mouths  of  Cicero  and  Quintilian,  is  vaguely  equivalent  to 
comprehension,  notion,  cognition  in  general. 

2.  An  apprehension,  a becoming  aware  of,  consciousness. 
Perception,  the  Cartesians  really  identified  with  idea,  and 
allowed  them  only  a logical  distinction  ; the  same  representa- 
tive act  being  called  idea,  inasmuch  as  we  regard  it  as  a 
representation  ; and  perception,  inasmuch  as  we  regard  it  as  a 
consciousness  of  such  representation. 

3.  Perception  is  limited  to  the  apprehension  of  sense  alone. 
This  limitation  was  first  formally  imposed  by  Reid,  and  there- 
after by  Kant. 

4.  A still  more  restricted  meaning,  through  the  authority  of 
Reid,  is  perception  (proper),  in  contrast  to  sensation  (proper). 

He  defines  sensitive  perception,  or  perception  simply  as  that 
act  of  consciousness  whereby  we  apprehend  in  our  body, 

a.  Certain  special  affections,  whereof,  as  an  animated  organ- 
ism, it  is  contingently  susceptible  ; and 

b.  Those  general  relations  of  extension,  under  which,  as  a 
material  organism,  it  necessarily  exists. 

Of  these  perceptions,  the  former,  which  is  thus  conversant 
about  a subject-object,  is  sensation  proper ; the  latter,  which  is 
thus  conversant  about  an  object-object,  is  perception  proper. 

PERCEPTIONS  (Obscure),  or  latent  modifications  of  mind. 

Every  moment  the  light  reflected  from  innumerable  objects, 
smells  and  sounds  of^  every  kind,  and  contact  of  different 
bodies  are  affecting  us.  But  we  pay  no  heed  to  them.  These 
are  what  Leibnitz  1 calls  obscure  perceptions — and  what  Thurot2 
proposes  to  call  impressions.  But  this  word  is  already  appro- 
priated to  the  changes  produced  by  communication  between 
an  external  object  and  a bodily  organ. 

The  sum  of  these  obscure  perceptions  and  latent  feelings, 
which  never  come  clearly  into  the  field  of  consciousness,  is 
what  makes  us  at  any  time  well  or  ill  at  ease.  And  as  the 
amount  in  general  is  agreeable  it  forms  the  charm  which 
attaches  us  to  life  — even  when  our  more  defined  perceptions 
and  feelings  are  painful. 


1 Avant  Propos  de  ses  Nouv.  Essais. 

c Dc  V Entendemcnt,  &o.,  tom.  i.,  p.  11. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


375 


PERCEPTIONS  — 

The  following  account  of  Leibnitz’s  philosophy  as  to  (c£- 
scure)  perceptions  is  translated  from  Tiberghien  : 1 — 

“ Cun fused  or  insensible  perceptions  are  without  consciousness 
or  memory.  It  is  difficult  enough  to  seize  them  in  themselves, 
but  they  must  be,  because  the  mind  always  thinks.  A sub- 
stance cannot  be  without  action,  a body  without  movement,  a 
mind  without  thought.  There  are  a thousand  marks  which 
make  us  judge  that  there  is,  every  moment,  in  us  an  infinity 
of  perceptions ; but  the  habit  in  which  we  are  of  perceiving 
them,  by  depriving  them  of  the  attraction  of  novelty,  turns 
away  our  attention  and  prevents  them  from  fixing  themselves 
in  our  memory.  How  could  we  form  a clear  perception  without 
the  insensible  perceptions,  which  constitute  it  ? To  hear  the 
noise  of  the  sea,  for  example,  it  is  necessary  that  we  hear  the 
parts  which  compose  the  whole,  that  is,  the  noise  of  each  wave, 
though  each  of  these  little  noises  does  not  make  itself  known 
but  in  the  confused  assemblage  of  all  the  others  together  with 
it.  A hundred  thousand  nothings  cannot  make  anything. 
And  sleep,  on  the  other  hand,  is  never  so  sound  that  we  have 
not  some  feeble  and  confused  feeling ; one  would  not  be 
wakened  by  the  greatest  noise  in  the  world,  if  one  had  not 
some  perception  of  its  commencement,  which  is  small. 

“ It  is  important  to  remark  how  Leibnitz  attaches  the 
greatest  questions  of  philosophy  to  these  insensible  perceptions, 
in  so  far  as  they  imply  the  law  of  continuity.  It  is  by  means 
of  these  we  can  say  that  the  present  ‘ is  full  of  the  past  and 
big  with  the  future,’  and  that  in'-the  least  of  substances  may 
be  read  the  whole  consequences  of  the  things  of  the  universe. 
They  often  determine  us  without  our  knowing  it,  and  they 
deceive  the  vulgar  by  the  appearance  of  an  indifference  of 
equilibrium.  They  supply  the  action  of  substances  upon  one 
another,  and  explain  the  pre-established  harmony  of  soul  and 
body.  It  is  in  virtue  of  these  insensible  variations  that  no  two 
things  can  ever  be  perfectly  alike  (the  principle  of  indiscern- 
ibles),  and  that  their  difference  is  always  more  than  numerical, 
which  destroys  the  doctrine  of  the  tablets  of  the  mind  being 
empty,  of  a soul  without  thought,  a substance  without  action, 


1 Essai  dts  Connaiss.  Hum.,  p.  566. 


376 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PERCEPTIONS  — 

a vacuum  in  space,  and  the  atoms  of  matter.  There  is  another 
consequence — that  souls,  being  simple  substances,  are  always 
united  to  a body,  and  that  there  is  no  soul  entirely  separated 
from  one.  This  dogma  resolves  all  the  difficulties  as  to  the 
immortality  of  souls,  the  difference  of  their  states  being  never 
anything  but  that  of  more  or  less  perfect,  which  renders  their 
state  past  or  future  as  explicable  as  their  present.  It  also 
supplies  the  means  of  recovering  memory,  by  the  periodic 
developments  which  may  one  day  arrive.” 

“Obscure  ideas,  or  more  properl  j,  sensations  with  dormant 
consciousness,  are  numerous.  It  is  through  them,  so  far  as 
they  proceed  from  the  nervous  system  of  vegetative  life,  and 
thus  accompany  all  its  functions,  digestion,  secretion,  &c., 
that  the  soul,  according  to  Stahl,  secretly  governs  the  body. 

1 Animus  est  instar  oceani,’  says  Leibnitz,  ‘in  quo  infnita 
multitudo  percept  iot&mi  obscurissimarum  adest , et  disiinctoe 
ideas  instar  insularum  sunt,  quee  ex  oceano  emergunt.’  It  is 
they  which  are  active  throughout  the  whole  progress  of  the 
formation  of  thought ; for  this  goes  on,  though  we  are  uncon- 
scious of  it,  and  gives  us  only  the  perfect  results,  viz.,  ideas 
and  notions.  It  is  they  which  in  the  habitual  voluntary  mo- 
tions, for  instance,  in  playing  on  the  piano,  dancing,  &c.,  set 
the  proper  muscles  in  motion  through  the  appropriate  motor 
nerves,,  though  the  mind  does  not  direct  to  them  the  attention 
of  consciousness.  It  is  they  which  in  sleep  and  in  disorders 
of  mind  act  a most  important  part.  It  is  their  totality  which 
forms  what  plays  so  prominent  a part  in  life  under  the  name 
of  disposition  or  temper.” 1 

Lord  Jeffrey  had  a fancy,  or  said  he  had  it,  that  though  he 
went  to  bed  with  his  head  stuffed  and  confused  with  the  names 
and  dates  and  other  details,  of  various  causes,  they  were  all  in : 
order  in  the  morning ; which  he  accounted  for  by  saying,  that 
during  sleep  “they  all  crystallized  round  tlieir  proper  centres.”  2 
PERFECT,  PERFECTION  (perficio;  perfecium,  made  out, 
complete).  — To  be  perfect  is  to  want  nothing.  Perfection  is 
relative  or  absolute.  A being  possessed  of  all  the  qualities 


1 Feuchtersleben,  Med.  Psychology , 1S47,  p.  169. 
3 Cockburn,  Life  of  Jeffrey , vol.  i.,  p.  243,  note. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


377 


PERFECT  — 

belonging  to  its  species  in  the  highest  degree  may  be  called 
perfect  in  a relative  sense.  But  absolute  perfection  can  only  be 
ascribed  to  the  Supreme  Being.  We  have  the  idea  of  a Being 
infinitely  perfect — and  from  this  Descartes  reasoned  that  such 
a being  really  exists. 

The  perfections  of  God  are  those  qualities  -which  he  has 
communicated  to  his  rational  creatures,  and  which  are  in  Him 
in  an  infinitely  perfect  degree.  They  have  been  distinguished 
as  natural  and  moral  — the  former  belonging  to  Deity  as  the 
great  first  cause — such  as  independent  and  necessary  existence 

— the  latter  as  manifested  in  the  creation  and  government  of 
the  universe — such  as  goodness,  justice,  &c.  But  they  are  all 
natural  in  the  sense  of  being  essential.  It  has  been  proposed 
to  call  the  former  attributes,  and  the  latter  perfections.  But 
this  distinctive  use  of  the  terms  has  not  prevailed ; indeed  it 
is  not  well  founded.  In  God  there  are  nothing  but  attributes 

— because  in  Him  everything  is  absolute  and  involved  in  the 
substance  and  unity  of  a perfect  being. 

PERFECTIBILITY  (The  Doctrine  of)  is,  that  men,  as  indi- 
viduals, and  as  communities,  have  not  attained  to  that  happi- 
ness and  development  of  which  their  nature  and  condition  are 
capable,  but  that  they  are  in  a continual  progress  to  a state 
of  perfection,  even  in  this  life.  That  men  as  a race  are  capable 
of  progress  and  improvement  is  a fact  attested  by  experience 
and  history.  But  that  this  improvement  may  be  carried  into 
their  whole  nature — and  to  an  indefinite  extent — that  all  the 
evils  which  affect  the  body  or  the  mind  maybe  removed — can- 
not be  maintained.  Bacon  had  faith  in  the  intellectual  pro- 
gress of  men  when  he  entitled  his  work  “ Of  the  Advancement 
of  Learning.”  Pascal  has  articulately  expressed  this  faith  in 
a preface  to  his  “Treatise  of  a Vacuum.”  “Not  only  indi- 
vidual men  advance  from  day  to  day  in  knowledge,  but  men 
as  a race  make  continual  progress  in  proportion  as  the  world 
grows  older,  because  the  same  thing  happens  in  a succession 
of  men  as  in  the  different  periods  of  the  life  of  an  individual ; 
so  that  the  succession  of  men  during  a course  of  so  many 
ages,  ought  to  be  considered  as  the  same  man  always  living 
and  always  learning.  From  this  may  be  seen  the  injustice  of 
the  reverence  paid  to  antiquity  in  philosophy : for  as  old  age 
33* 


378 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOrilY. 


PERFECTIBILITY— 

is  the  period  of  life  most  distant  from  infancy,  who  does  not 
see  that  the  old  age  of  the  universal  man  is  not  to  be  sought 
for  in  the  period  nearest  his  birth,  but  in  that  most  remote 
from  it.”  Malcbranchc1  expressed  a similar  opinion;  and 
the  saying  of  a great  modern  reformer  is  well  known,  “ If  you 
talk  of  the  wisdom  of  the  ancients,  we  are  the  ancients.”  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  in  arts  and  sciences,  and  the  accommo- 
dations of  social  life,  and  the  extension  of  social  freedom,  the 
administration  of  justice,  the  abolition  of  slavery,  and  many 
other  respects,  men  have  improved,  and  are  improving,  and 
may  long  continue  to  improve.  But  human  nature  has  limits 
beyond  which  it  cannot  be  carried.  Its  life  here  cannot  be 
indefinitely  prolonged,  its  liability  to  pain  cannot  be  removed, 
its  reason  cannot  be  made  superior  to  error,  and  all  the  ar- 
rangements for  its  happiness  are  liable  to  go  wrong. 

Leibnitz,  in  accordance  with  his  doctrine  that  the  universe 
is  composed  of  monads  essentially  active,  thought  it  possible 
that  the  human  race  might  reach  a perfection  of  which  we 
cannot  well  conceive.  Charles  Bonnet  advocated  the  doctrine 
of  a palingenesia,  or  transformation  of  all  things  into  a better 
state.  In  the  last  century  the  great  advocates  of  social  pro- 
gress are  Fontenelle,  Turgot,  and  Condorcet,  in  France;  Les- 
sing, Kant,  and  Schiller,  in  Germany ; Price  and  Priestley, 
in  England.  Owen’s  views  are  also  well  known.2 
PERIPATETIC  (rtfptrtar^rcxof,  ambulator,  from  rtf  pirtaffto,  to 
walk  about),  is  applied  to  Aristotle  and  his  followers,  who 
seem  to  have  carried  on  their  philosophical  discussions  while 
walking  about  in  the  halls  or  promenades  of  the  Lyceum. 

PERSON,  PERSONALITY.  — Persona,  in  Latin,  meant  the  mask 
worn  by  an  actor  on  the  stage,  within  which  the  sounds  of  the 
voice  were  concentrated,  and  through  which  ( personuit ) he 
made  himself  heard  by  the  immense  audience.  From  being 
applied  to  the  mask  it  came  next  to  be  applied  to  the  actor, 
then  to  the  character  acted,  then  to  any  assumed  character, 
and  lastly,  to  any  one  having  any  character  or  station.  Mar- 
tinius  gives  as  its  composition  — per  se  ana,  an  individual. 


1 Search  after  Truth,  Look  ii.,  part  ii.,  eliap.  4. 

2 Merrier,  Dc  la  Perfectibilite  Uumaine , 8vo,  Faris,  1842. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


379 


PERSON— 

“Person,”  says  Locke,1  “stands  for  a thinking  intelligent 
being,  that  has  reason  and  reflection,  and  can  consider  itself 
as  itself,  the  same  thinking  thing  in  different  times  and  places  ; 
which  it  does  only  by  that  consciousness  which  is  inseparable 
from  thinking,  and  as  it  seems  to  me  essential  to  it : it  being 
impossible  for  any  one  to  perceive  without  perceiving  that 
he  does  perceive.”  “We  attribute  personality,”  says  Mons. 
Ahrens,2  “ to  every  being  which  exists,  not  solely  for  others, 
but  which  is  in  the  relation  of  unity  with  itself  in  existing, 
or  for  itself.  Thus  we  refuse  personality  to  a mineral  or  a 
stone,  because  these  things  exist  for  others,  but  not  for  them- 
selves. An  animal,  on  the  contrary,  which  exists  for  itself, 
and  stands  in  relation  to  itself,  possesses  a degree  of  person- 
ality. But  man  exists  for  himself  in  all  his  essence,  in  a 
manner  more  intimate  and  more  extensive ; that  which  he  is, 
he  is  for  himself,  he  has  consciousness  of  it.  But  God  alone 
exists  for  himself  in  a manner  infinite  and  absolute.  God  is 
entirely  in  relation  to  himself ; for  there  are  no  beings  out  of 
him  to  whom  he  could  have  relation.  His  whole  essence  is 
for  himself,  and  this  relation  is  altogether  internal : and  it  is 
this  intimate  and  entire  relation  of  God  to  himself  in  all  his 
essence,  which  constitutes  the  divine  personality.” 

“ The  seat  of  intellect,”  says  Palcy,  “ is  & person.” 

A being  intelligent  and  free,  every  spiritual  and  moral 
agent,  every  cause  which  is  in  possession  of  responsibility  and 
consciousness,  is  a person.  In  this  sense,  God  considered  as  a 
creating  cause,  distinct  from  the  universe,  is  a person. 

According  to  Boethius,  Persona  est  rationalis  naturae  indi- 
vidua  substantia. 

“ Whatever  derives  its  powers  of  motion  from  without,  from 
some  other  being,  is  a thing.  Whatever  possesses  a spontane- 
ous action  within  itself,  is  a person,  or,  as  Aristotle3  defines  it, 
an  apxy  rtpa'lfw;.”4 

“ Personality  is  individuality  existing  in  itself,  but  with  a 
nature  as  its  ground.”5 

“ If  the  substance  be  unintelligent  in  which  the  quality 

1 Essay  on  Hum.  Understajid .,  book  ii.,  chap.  27.  * 

2 Cours  de  Psychologic , tom.  ii.,  p.  272. 

4 JYicom.  Eth .,  lib.  iii.  4 Sewell,  Christ.  Hor.,  p.  152. 

3 Coleridge,  Xotes  on  Eng.  Div..  vol.  i , p.  43. 


380 


VOCABULARY  OF  nilLOSOl'IIY. 


PERSON  — 

exists,  we  call  it  a thing  or  substance,  but  if'  it  be  intelligent, 
we  call  it  a person,  meaning  by  the  word  person  to  distinguish 
a thing  or  substance  that  is  intelligent,  from  a thing  or  sub- 
stance that  is  not  intelligent.  By  the  word  person,  we  therefore 
mean  a thing  or  substance  that  is  intelligent,  or  a conscious 
being ; including  in  the  word  the  idea  both  of  the  substance 
and  its  properties  together.”  1 * 

“A  subsisting  substance  or  suppositum  endued  with  reason 
as  man  is,  that  is,  capable  of  religion,  is  a person.”'1 

“Person,  as  applied  to  Deity,  expresses  the  definite  and 
certain  truth  that  God  is  a living  being,  and  not  a dead  mate- 
rial energy.  Whether  spoken  of  the  Creator  or  tire  creature, 
the  word  may  signify  either  the  unknown  but  abiding  sub- 
stance of  the  attributes  by  which  he  is  known  to  us ; or  the 
unity  of  these  attributes  considered  in  themselves.”3 — V. 
Identity  (Personal),  Reason,  Subsistentia. 

Personality,  in  jurisprudence,  denotes  the  capacity  of  rights 
and  obligations  which  belong  to  an  intelligent  will.4 

PETITIO  PRINCIPII  (or  petit io  queesili,  begging  the  question). 
— V.  Fallacy. 

PHANTASM.  — V.  Idea,  Perception. 

PHENOMENOLOGY.  — V.  Nature. 

PHENOMENON  (faivoycror,  from  tfaivoyai,  to  appear),  i3  that 
which  has  appeared.  It  is  generally  applied  to  some  sensible 
appearance,  some  occurrence  in  the  course  of  nature.  But  in 
mental  philosophy  it  is  applied  to  the  various  and  changing 
states  of  mind.  “ How  pitiful  and  ridiculous  are  the  grounds 
upon  which  such  men  pretend  to  account  for  the  very  lowest 
and  commonest  phenomena  of  nature,  without  recurring  to  a 
God  and  Providence  !”5 

“Among  the  various  phenomena  which  the  human  mind 
presents  to  our  view,  there  is  none  more  calculated  to  ex- 
cite our  curiosity  and  our  wonder,  than  the  communication 
which  is  carried  on  between  the  sentient,  thinking,  and  active 


1 Henry  Taylor,  Apology  of  Ben  Mordecai,  letter  i.,  p.  85. 

a OldGeld,  Essay  on  Reason , p.  319. 

3 R.  A.  Thompson,  Christian  Theism , book  ii.,  chap.  7. 

4 Jouffroy,  Droit.  Nat.,  p.  19.  * South,  yol.  iv.,  Serm.  ix. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOFHY. 


381 


PHENOMENON  — 

principle  within  us,  and  the  material  objects  with  which  we 
are  surrounded.”1 

In  the  philosophy  of  Kant,  phenomenon  means  an  object 
such  as  we  represent  it  to  ourselves  or  conceive  of  it,  in  oppo- 
sition to  noumenon,  or  a thing  as  it  is  in  itself. 

“According  to  Kant,  the  facts  of  consciousness,  in  their 
subjective  character,  are  produced  partly  from  the  nature  of 
the  things  of  which  it  is  conscious ; and  hence,  in  their  objec- 
tive character,  they  are  phenomena,  or  objects  as  they  appear 
in  relation  to  us,  not  things  in  themselves,  noumena,  or  reali- 
ties in  their  absolute  nature,  as  they  may  be  out  of  relation 
to  the  mind.  The  subjective  elements  which  the  mind  itself 
contributes  to  the  consciousness  of  every  object  are  to  be 
found,  as  regards  intuition,  in  the  forms  of  space  and  time ; 
and  as  regards  thought,  in  the  categories,  unity,  plurality,  and 
the  rest.2  To  perceive  a thing  in  itself  would  be  to  perceive  it 
neither  in  space  nor  in  time ; for  these  are  furnished  by  the 
constitution  of  our  perceptive  faculties,  and  constitute  an  ele- 
ment of  the  phenomenal  object  of  intuition  only.  To  think  of 
a thing  in  itself  would  be  to  think  of  it  neither  as  one  nor  as 
many,  nor  under  any  other  category  ; for  these,  again,  depend 
upon  the  constitution  of  our  understanding,  and  constitute  an 
element  of  the  phenomenal  object  of  thought.  The  phenome- 
nal is  the  product  of  the  inherent  laws  of  our  own  mental  con- 
stitution, and,  as  such,  is  the  sum  and  limit  of  all  the  know- 
ledge to  which  we  can  attain.”3 

The  definition  of  phenomenon  is,  “that  which  can  be  known 
only  along  with  something  else.”4  — V.  Noumenon. 
PHILANTHROPY  (^ikcu’tfpurtia,  from  q>ihaiv9pu7tivu,  to  be  a 
friend  to  mankind).  — “They  thought  themselves  not  much 


1 Stewart,  Elements , c.  1,  sect.  1. 
a I.  Categories  of  Quantity. 

Unity. 

Plurality 

Totality. 

III.  Categories  of  Relation. 

Inherence  and  Subsistence. 

Casuality  and  Dependence. 
Community,  or  Reciprocal  Action. 

3 Mansel,  Led.  on  Phil,  of  Kant,  pp.  21,  22. 


II.  Categories  of  Quality. 

Reality. 

Negation. 

Limitation. 

IV.  Categories  of  Modality. 

Possibility,  or  Impossibility. 
Existence,  or  Non-Existence. 
Necessity  or  Contingence. 

4 Ferrier,  Inst,  of  Mdaphys.,  p.  319. 


382 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PHILANTHROPY— 

concerned  to  acquire  that  God-like  excellency,  a,  philanthropy 
and  love  to  all  mankind.” 1 

This  state  or  affection  of  mind  does  not  differ  essentially 
from  charity  or  brotherly  love.  Both  spring  from  benevolence 
or  a desire  for  the  well-being  of  others.  When  our  benevo- 
lence is  purified  and  directed  by  the  doctrines  and  precepts  of 
religion,  it  becomes  charity  or  brotherly  love.  When  sus- 
tained by  large  and  sound  views  of  human  nature  and  the 
human  condition,  it  seeks  to  mitigate  social  evils  and  increase 
and  multiply  social  comforts,  it  takes  the  name  of  philan- 
thropy. But  there  is  no  incompatibility  between  the  two.  It 
is  only  when  philanthropy  proceeds  on  false  views  of  human 
nature  and  wrong  views  of  human  happiness,  that  it  can  be 
at  variance  with  true  charity  or  brotherly  love. 

Philanthropy,  or  a vague  desire  and  speculation  as  to  im- 
proving the  condition  of  the  whole  human  race,  is  sometimes 
opposed  to  nationality  or  patriotism.  But  true  charity  or  be- 
nevolence, while  it  begins  with  loving  and  benefiting  those 
nearest  to  us  by  various  relations,  will  expand  according  to 
the  means  and  opportunities  afforded  of  doing  good.  And 
while  we  are  duly  attentive  to  the  stronger  claims  of  intimate 
connection,  as  the  waves  on  the  bosom  of  the  waters  spread 
wider  and  wider,  so  we  are  to  extend  our  regards  beyond  the 
distinctions  of  friendship,  of  family,  and  of  society,  and  grasp 
in  one  benevolent  embrace  the  universe  of  human  beings. 
God  hath  made  of  one  blobd  all  nations  of  men  that  dwell  upon 
the  face  of  the  earth  ; and  although  the  sympathies  of  friend- 
ship and  the  charities  of  patriotism  demand  a more  early  and 
warm  acknowledgment,  we  are  never  to  forget  those  great  and 
general  relations  which  bind  together  the  kindreds  of  mankind 
— who  are  all  children  of  one  common  parent,  heirs  of  the  same 
frail  nature,  and  sharers  in  the  same  unbounded  goodness : — 

“ Friends,  parents,  neighbours,  first  it  will  embrace, 

Our  country  next,  and  next  all  human  race. 

Wide  and  more  wide,  the  o’erflowing  of  the  mind, 

Takes  every  creature  in  of  every  kind. 

Earth  smiles  around,  in  boundless  beauty  dressed, 

And  heaven  reflects  its  image  in  her  breast.”  — Pope. 


Bp.  Taylor,  vol.  iii.,  Serm.  i. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


383 


PHILOSOPHY  (tyihoaopla,  fifa'a,  octyla,  the  love  of  ■wisdom). — 
The  origin  of  the  word  is  traced  back  to  Pythagoras,  who  did 
not  call  himself  uo^oj,  like  the  wise  men  of  Greece,  but  merely 
declared  himself  to  be  a lover  of  wisdom,  co<j>Jaj.  Philo- 
sophy is  not  so  much  the  love  of  wisdom,  as  the  love  of  wisdom 
may  be  said  to  be  its  spring.  The  desire  of  knowledge  is 
natural  to  man.  Ignorance  is  painful ; knowledge  is  agree- 
able. Surrounded  with  ever-changing  phenomena,  he  seeks 
to  know  their  causes,  and  tries  to  bring  their  multiplicity  to 
something  like  unity,  and  to  reduce  their  variety  to  law  and 
rule.  "When  so  employed  he  is  prosecuting  philosophy.  It 
was  defined  by  Cicero,1  Rerum  divinarum  et  humanarum ,2 
causarumque  quibus  hoe  res  conlineniur,  scientia.  But  what 
man  can  attain  or  aspire  to  such  knowledge,  or  even  to  the 
knowledge  of  one  of  the  several  departments  into  which  philo- 
sophy may  be  divided?  “In  philosophy,”  says  Lord  Bacon,3 
“ the  contemplations  of  man  do  either  penetrate  unto  God,  or 
are  circumferred  to  nature,  or  are  reflected  or  reverted  upon 
himself.  Out  of  which  several  inquiries  there  do  arise  three 
knowledges,  Divine  philosophy,  natural  philosophy,  and  human 
philosophy,  or  humanity.”  Now  the  object-matter  of  philo- 
sophy may  be  distinguished  as  God,  or  nature,  or  man.  But, 
underlying  all  our  inquiries  into  any  of  these  departments, 
there  is  ajirst  pthilosophy,  which  seeks  to  ascertain  the  grounds 
or  principles  of  knowledge,  and  the  causes  of  all  things.  Hence 
philosophy  has  been  defined  to  be  the  science  of  causes  and 
principles.  It  is  the  investigation  of  those  principles  on  which 
all  knowledge  and  all  being  ultimately  rest.  It  is  the  exer- 
cise of  reason  to  solve  the  most  elevated  problems  which  the 
human  mind  can  conceive.  How  do  we  know  ? and  what  do 
we  know?  It  examines  the  grounds  of  human  certitude,  and 
verifies  the  trustworthiness  of  human  knowledge.  It  inquires 
into  the  causes  of  all  beings,  and  ascertains  the  nature  of  all 
existences  by  reducing  them  to  unity.  It  is  not  peculiar  to 
any  department,  but  common  to  all  departments  of  knowledge. 
Or  if  each  department  of  knowledge  may  be  said  to  have  its 

1 De  Officiis , lib.  ii.,  c.  2. 

3 According  to  Lord  Monboddo  ( Ancient  Metaphys.,  book  i.,  chap.  5),  the  Romans  had 
only  the  word  sapientia  for  philosophy,  till  about  the  time  of  Cicero,  when  they  adopted 
the  Greek  word  philosophia. 

3 Of  the  Advancement  of  Learning,  book  ii. 


384 


VOCABULARY  OF  rniLOSOPIIY. 


PHILOSOPHY— 

philosophy,  it  is  because  it  rests  upon  that  knowledge  of  prin- 
ciples and  causes  which  is  common  to  them  all.  Man  first 
examines  phenomena,  but  he  is  not  satisfied  till  he  has  reduced 
them  to  their  causes,  and  when  he  has  done  so  he  asks  to  de- 
termine the  value  of  the  knowledge  to  which  he  has  attained. 
This  is  philosophy  properly  so  called, — the  mother  and  govern- 
ing science  — the  science  of  sciences. 

“ ‘ Philosophy  is  the  science  of  first  principles,’  that,  namely, 
which  investigates  the  primary  grounds,  and  determines  the 
fundamental  certainty,  of  human  knowledge  generally.”  1 

Peemans3  proposes  the  following  definition: — “Philosophia 
est  scientia  rerum  per  causas  primas,  redo  rationis  usu  com- 
parata.” 

By  this  definition  it  is  distinguished  from  other  kinds  of 
knowledge.  1.  Prom  simple  intelligence,  which  is  intuitive, 
whil g philosophical  knowledge  is  discursive.  2.  From  natural 
sciences,  which  do  not  always  reach  to  first  causes.  3.  From 
arts,  which  do  not  proceed  by  causes  or  principles,  but  by  rule. 
4.  Fromyhi7/i  or  belief  which  rests  not  on  evidence  but  autho- 
rity. 5.  From  opinion,  which  is  not  certain  knowledge.  And 
from  the  common  love  of  knowledge  and  truth,  which  does 
not  prosecute  and  acquire  it  scientifcally . 

“ Philosophy  is  the  attainment  of  truth  by  the  way  of 
reason.”3 

PHRENOLOGY  [typr^,  mind ; Xoyo$,  discourse). — This  word  ought 
to  mean  Psychology,  or  mental  philosophy,  but  has  been 
appropriated  by  Craniologists,  on  account  of  the  light  which 
their  observations  of  the  convolutions  of  the  brain  and  corre- 
sponding elevations  of  the  skull  are  supposed  to  throw  on  the 
nature  and  province  of  our  different  faculties.  According  to 
Dr.  Gall,  the  foundor  of  Craniology,  “ its  end  is  to  determine 
the  functions  of  the  brain  in  general,  and  of  its  different  parts 
in  particular,  and  to  prove  that  you  may  recognize  different 
dispositions  and  inclinations  by  the  protuberances  and  depres- 
sions to  be  found  on  the  cranium.  The  cranium  being  exactly 


1 Morell,  Philosoph,  Tendencies  of  the  Age,  8vo,  Lond.,  1848,  p.  13. 
* Introd.  ad  Philosophy  12mo,  Lovan.,  1840,  soot.  107. 

8 Ferrier,  Inst,  of  Melaphys,,  p,  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


335- 


PHKEN  OLOGY — 

moulded  upon  the  mass  of  the  brain,  every  portion  of  its  sur- 
face will  present  dimensions  and  developments  according  to  the 
corresponding  portion  of  the  brain.  But  individuals  in  whom 
such  or  such  a portion  of  the  brain  is  largely  developed,  have 
been  observed  by  phrenologists  to  be  remarkable  for  such  or 
such  a faculty,  talent,  or  virtue,  or  vice ; and  the  conclusion 
is,  that  the  portion  of  the  cranium  corresponding  to  that  de- 
velopment of  the  cranium  is  the  seat  of  that  faculty,  or  virtue, 
or  vice  — is  its  special  organ.” — See  writings  of  Gall,  Spurz- 
heim,  and  Combe. 

“ If  it  be  true  that  the  multitudinous  cerebral  fibres  act 
always  in  the  same  specific  fasciculi,  or  in  the  same  combina- 
tion of  specific  fasciculi,  in  order  to  produce  the  same  faculty 
in  the  same  process  of  ratiocination,  then  phrenology  is  so  far 
true  ; and  if  the  action  of  these  fasciculi  has  the  effect  of  elon- 
gating them,  so  as  to  produce  pressure  on  the  corresponding 
internal  surface  of  the  cranium,  and  if  the  bony  case  make  a 
corresponding  concession  of  space  to  the  elongation  of  these 
specific  fasciculi,  then  cranioscopy  is  true  also  ; but  there  are 
so  many  arbitrary  assumptions  in  arriving  at  such  a result, 
that  a vastly  greater  mass  of  evidence  must  be  brought  for- 
ward before  phrenologists  and  cranioscopists  have  a right  to 
claim  general  assent  to  their  doctrine.” 1 2 

The  British  Association,  established  several  years  ago,  re- 
fused to  admit  phrenology  as  a section  of  their  society. 

PHYSIOGNOMY  (fyvets,  nature;  yinjyuv,  an  index)  is  defined 
by  Lavater  to  be  the  “ art  of  discovering  the  interior  of  man 
from  his  exterior.”  In  common  language  it  signifies  the  judg- 
ing of  disposition  and  character  by  the  features  of  the  face. 
In  the  Middle  Ages , physiognomy  meant  the  knowledge  of  the 
internal  properties  of  any  corporeal  existence  from  external 
appearances. 

They  found  i’  the  physiognomies 

Of  the  planets,  all  men’s  destinies.” — Hudibras. 

It  does  not  appear  that  among  the  ancients  physiognomy 
was  extended  beyond  man,  or  at  least  beyond  animated  nature. 
The  treatise  on  this  subject  ascribed  to  Aristotle  is  thought  to 


34 


1 Wigan,  Duality  of  Mind,  p.  162. 

2 A 


386 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PHYSIOGNOMY— 

be  spurious.  But  all  men,  in  the  ordinary  business  of  life, 
seem  to  be  influenced  by  the  belief  that  the  disposition  and 
character  may  in  some  measure  be  indicated  by  the  form  of 
the  body,  and  especially  by  the  features  of  the  face. 

“ Every  one  is  in  some  degree  a master  of  that  art  which  is 
generally  distinguished  by  the  name  of  Physiognomy,  and 
naturally  forms  to  himself  the  character  or  fortune  of  a stranger 
from  the  features  and  lineaments  of  his  face.  We  are  no 
sooner  presented  to  any  one  we  never  saw  before,  but  we  are 
immediately  struck  with  the  idea  of  a proud,  a reserved,  an 
affable,  or  a good-natured  man ; and  upon  our  first  going  into 
a company  of  strangers,  our  benevolence  or  aversion,  awe  or 
contempt,  rises  naturally  towards  several  particular  persons 
before  we  have  heard  them  speak  a single  word,  or  so  much  as 
know  who  they  are.  For  my  own  part,  I am  so  apt  to  frame 
a notion  of  every  man’s  humour  or  circumstances  by  his  looks, 
that  I have  sometimes  employed  myself  from  Charing  Cross  to 
the  Royal  Exchange  in  drawing  the  characters  of  those  who 
have  passed  by  me.  When  I see  a man  with  a sour,  rivelled 
face,  I cannot  forbear  pitying  his  wife  ; and  when  I meet  with 
an  open,  ingenuous  countenance,  I think  of  the  happiness  of 
his  friends,  his  family,  and  his  relations.  I cannot  recollect 
the  author  of  a famous  saying  to  a stranger  who  stood  silent 
in  his  company,  — ‘ Speak  that  I may  see  thee.’  But  with 
submission  I think  we  may  be  better  known  by  our  looks  than 
by  our  words,  and  that  a man’s  speech  is  much  more  easily 
disguised  than  his  countenance.”  1 

Young  children  are  physiognomists  — and  they  very  early 
take  likings  and  dislikings  founded  on  the  judgments  which 
they  intuitively  form  of  the  aspects  of  those  around  them.. 
The  inferior  animals,  even,  especially  such  of  them  as  have 
been  domesticated,  are  affected  by  the  natural  or  assumed 
expression  of  the  human  countenance.  As  to  their  taking 
likings  or  dislikings  to  particular  persons,  this  is  probably  to 
be  ascribed  to  the  great  acuteness  not  of  the  sense  of  sight, 
but  of  scent. 

The  taking  a prejudice  against  a person  for  his  looks  is 


1 Addison,  Spectator,  No.  86. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


387 


PHYSIOGNOMY— 

reckoned  among  the  smaller  vices  in  morality,  and  is  called 
by  More,  in  his  Enchiridion  Elhicum,  Prosopolepsia.' 

PHYSIOLOGY  and  PHYSICS  were  formerly  used  as  synony- 
mous. The  former  now  denotes  the.  laws  of  organized  bodies, 
the  latter  of  unorganized.  The  former  is  distinguished  into 
animal  and  vegetable.  Both  imply  the  necessity  of  nature  as 
opposed  to  liberty  of  intelligence , and  neither  can  be  appro- 
priately applied  to  mind.  Dr.  Brown,  however,  entitled  the 
first  part  of  one  of  his  works,  the  Physiology  of  mind.  — V. 
Psychology. 

Physiology  determines  the  matter  and  the  form  of  living 
beings.  It  describes  their  structure  and  operations,  and  then 
ascends  from  phenomena  to  laws;  from  the  knowledge  of 
organs  and  their  actions,  it  concludes  their  functions  and  their 
end  or  purpose ; and  from  among  the  various  manifestations  it 
seeks  to  seize  that  mysterious  principle  which  animates  the 
matter  of  their  organization,  which  maintains  the  nearly  con- 
stant form  of  the  compound  by  the  continual  renewal  of  the 
component  molecules,  and  which  at  death,  leaving  this  matter, 
surrenders  it  to  the  common  laws,  from  the  empire  of  which 
it  was  for  a season  withdrawn. 

. . . The  facts  which  belong  to  it  are  such  as  we  can 

touch  and  see  — matter  and  its  modifications.1 2 

PICTURESQUE  “properly  means  what  is  done  in  the  style  and 
with  the  spirit  of  a painter,  and  it  was  thus,  if  I am  not 
much  mistaken,  that  the  word  was  commonly  employed  when 
it  was  first  adopted  in  England.  . . . But  it  has  been 

frequently  employed  to  denote  those  combinations  or  groups 
or  attitudes  of  objects  that  are  fitted  for  the  purposes  of  the 
painter.”3 

“ Picturesque  is  a word  applied  to  every  object,  and  every 
kind  of  scenery,  which  has  been  or  might  be  represented  with 
good  effect  in  painting — just  as  the  word  beautiful,  when  we 
speak  of  visible  nature,  is  applied  to  everyobject  and  every 
kind  of  scenery  that  in  any  way  give  pleasure  to  the  eye — and 


1 See  Lavater,  Spurzlieim.  J.  Cross,  Attempt  to  Establish  Physiogiiomy  upon  Scientijlc 

Principles , Glasg.,  1817. 

3 Did.  cles  Sciences  Philosoph. 

3 Stewart,  Philosoph.  Essays,  part  i.,  chap.  5. 


388 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PICTURESQUE  — 

these  seem  to  be  the  significations  of  both  words,  taken  in  their 
most  extended  and  popular  sense.'’ — Sir  Uvedale  Price.1 

“ The  two  qualities  of  roughness  and  of  sudden  variation, 
joined  to  that  of  irregularity,  are  the  most  efficient  causes  of 
the  picturesque.” 2 — Ibid. 

“ Beauty  and  picturesqueness  are  founded  on  opposite  quali- 
ties ; the  one  on  smoothness,  the  other  on  roughness  ; the  one 
on  grandeur,  the  other  on  sudden  variation ; the  one  on  ideas 
of  youth  and  freshness,  the  other  on  those  of  age,  and  even 
of  decay.”3 

PNEUMATICS  is  now  applied  to  physical  science,  and  means 
that  department  of  it  which  treats  of  the  mechanical  proper- 
ties of  air  and  other  elastic  fluids.  It  was  formerly  used  as 
synonymous  with  pneumatology . 

PNEUMATOLOGY  (rfr  svya,  spirit;  "kayo;,  discourse).  — The 
branch  of  philosophy  which  treats  of  the  nature  and  opera- 
tions of  mind,  has  by  some  been  called  pneumatology.  Philo- 
sophy gives  ground  for  belief  in  the  existence  of  our  own  mind 
and  of  the  Supreme  mind,  but  furnishes  no  evidence  for  the 
existence  of  orders  of  minds  intermediate.  Popular  opinion 
is  in  favour  of  the  belief.  But  philosophy  has  sometimes 
admitted  and  sometimes  rejected  it.  It  has  found  a place, 
however,  in  all  religions.  There  may  thus  be  said  to  be  a 
religious  pneumatology,  and  & philosophical  pneumatology.  In 
religious  pneumatology,  in  the  East,  there  is  the  doctrine  of 
two  antagonistic  and  equal  spirits  of  good  and  evil.  In  the 
doctrines  of  Christianity  there  is  acknowledged  the  existence 
of  spirits  intermediate  between  God  and  man,  some  of  whom 
have  fallen  into  a state  of  evil,  while  others  have  kept  their 
first  estate. 

Philosophy  in  its  early  stages  is  partly  religious.  Socrates 
had  communication  with  a demon  or  spirit.  Plato  did  not 
discountenance  the  doctrine,  and  the  Neo-Platonicians  of  Alex- 
andria carried  pneumatology  to  a great  length,  and  adopted 


1 On  the  Picturesque , ch.  3. 

a “A  picturesque  object  may  be  defined  as  that  which,  from  the  greater  facilities  which 
it  possesses  for  readily  and  more  effectually  enabling  an  artist  to  display  his  art,  is,  as 
it  were,  a provocation  to  painting.”  — Sir  Tlios.  L.  Dick,  note  to  above  chap. 

3 Chap.  4. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


389 


PNETJMATOLOGY— 

the  cabalistic  traditions  of  the  Jews.  In  the  scholastic  ages, 
the  belief  in  return  from  the  dead,  apparitions  and  spirits,  was 
universal.  And  Jacob  Boehm,  in  Saxon j,  Emanuel  Sweden- 
borg, in  Sweden,  and  in  France,  Martinez  Pasqualis  and  his 
disciple  Saint  Martin,  have  all  given  accounts  of  orders  of 
spiritual  beings  who  held  communication  with  the  living. 
And  in  the  present  day  a belief  in  spirit  rapping  is  prevalent 
in  America. 

Bp.  Berkeley 1 admits  the  existence  of  orders  of  spirits. 

Considered  as  the  science  of  mind  or  spirit,  pneumatoloyy 
consisted  of  three  parts,  treating  of  the  Divine  mind,  Theology 
— the  angelic  mind,  Angelology,  and  the  human  mind.  This 
last  is  now  called  Psychology,  “a  term  to  which  no  competent 
objection  can  be  made,  and  which  affords  us,  what  the  various 
clumsy  periphrases  in  use  do  not,  a convenient  adjective  — 
psychological.” 2 

POETRY  or  POESY.  — “However  critics  may  differ  as  to  the 
definition  of  poetry,  all  competent  to  offer  an  opinion  on  the 
subject  will  agree  that  occasionally,  in  prose,  as  well  as  in 
verse,  we  meet  with  a passage  to  which  we  feel  that  the  term 
poetry  could  be  applied,  with  great  propriety,  by  a figure  of 
speech.  In  the  other  arts  also  wo  find,  now  and  then,  what 
we  feel  prompted  from  within  to  call  the  poetry  of  painting, 
of  statuary,  of  music,  or  of  whatever  art  it  may  be.  The  fact 
that  books  have  been  written  under  such  figurative  titles,  and 
favourably  received,  proves  that  the  popular  mind  conceives 
of  something  in  poetry  besides  versification — of  some  spiritual 
excellence,  most  properly  belonging  to  compositions  in  verse, 
but  which  is  also  found  elsewhere.  When  Byron  said  that 
few  poems  of  his  day  were  half  poetry,  he  evidently  meant  by 
poetry  something  distinguishable  from  rhythm  and  rhyme. 
True,  such  may  be  only  a figurative  use  of  the  word  ; but  the 
public  accept  that  figurative  use  as  corresponding  to  some 
actual  conception  which  they  entertain  of  poetry  in  its  best 
degrees.  And  when  they  speak  of  the  poetry  of  any  other 
art,  it  is  evident  from  the  use  of  the  same  word  that  they 
believe  themselves  perceiving  the  same  or  similar  qualities. 


1 Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  sect.  81,  and  throughout. 

2 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  ReuVs  Works , p.  219,  note. 

34* 


390 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


POETRY— 

To  such  conceptions,  then,  without  regard  to  whence  they 
spring,  I think,  with  Coleridge,  that  it  would  be  expedient  to 
appropriate  the  word  poesy,  thereby  avoiding  the  ambiguity 
which  now  exists  in  the  use  of  the  word  poetry ; though  popu- 
lar choice,  which  always  prefers  a figurative  application  of  a 
common  word,  has  not  adopted  the  suggestion."  1 * 

POLLICITATION.  — V.  Promise. 

POLYGAMY  (rtoxfs,  many ; ydyos,  marriage)  means  a plurality 
of  wives  or  husbands.  It  has  prevailed  under  various  forms  in 
all  ages  of  the  world.  It  can  be  shown,  however,  to  bo  con- 
trary to  the  light  of  nature ; and  has  been  condemned  and 
punished  by  the  laws  of  many  nations.  About  the  middle  of 
the  sixteenth  century,  Bernardus  Ochinus,  general  of  the 
order  of  Capuchins,  and  afterwards  a Protestant,  published 
Dialogues  in  favour  of  polygamy,  to  which  Theodore  Beza 
wrote  a reply.  In  1082,  a work  entitled  Polygamia  Triumpha- 
Irix  appeared  under  the  name  of  Thcophilus  Aletheus.  The 
true  name  of  the  author  was  Lyserus,  a native  of  Saxony.  In 
1780,  Martin  Madan  published  Tliehgplithora,  or  a Treatise  on 
Female  llain,  in  which  he  defended  polygamy,  on  the  part  of 
the  male.  See  some  sensible  remarks  on  this  subject  in 
Paley’s  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy  * 

POLYTHEISM  (rtoXiij,  many;  9sos,  god).  — “To  believe  no  one 
supreme  designing  principle  or  mind,  but  rather  two,  three, 
or  more  (though  in  their  nature  good),  is  to  be  a polytheist.”3 
Three  forms  of  polytheism  may  be  distinguished.  1.  Idola- 
try, or  the  worship  of  idols  and  false  gods,  which  prevailed  in 
Greece  and  Rome.  2.  Sabaism,  or  the  worship  of  the  stars  and 
of  fire,  which  prevailed  in  Arabia  and  in  Chaldea.  3.  Fetich- 
ism,  or  the  worship  of  anything  that  strikes  the  imagination 
and  gives  the  notion  of  great  power,  which  prevails  in  Africa 
and  among  savage  nations  in  general. 

POSITIVE.  — F.  Moral,  Term. 

POSITIVISM. — “One  man  affirms  that  to  him  the  principle  of  all 
certitude  is  the  testimony  of  the  senses ; this  is  positivism.” i 
Of  late  years  the  name  positivism  has  been  appropriated  to 


1 Moffat,  Study  of  ^Esthetics,  p.  221. 

3 Shaftesbury , b.  i.,  pt.  1,  sect.  2. 


2 Book  iii.,  cb.  6. 

4 Morell,  Philosoph.  Taiden p.  15. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


391 


POSITIVISM  — 

the  peculiar  principles  advocated  by  M.  Auguste  Comte.’ 
This  philosophy  is  thus  described  by  an  admirer:2 — “ This  is 
the  mission  of  positivism,  to  generalize  science,  and  to  systema- 
tize sociality ; in  other  words,  it  aims  at  creating  a philosophy 
of  the  sciences,  as  a basis  for  a new  social  faith.  A social  doc- 
trine is  the  aim  of  positivism,  a scientific  doctrine  the  means  ; 
just  as  in  a man,  intelligence  is  the  minister  and  interpreter 
of  life. 

“The  leading  conception  of  M.  Comte  is: — There  are  but 
three  phases  of  intellectual  evolution  — the  theological  (super- 
natural), the  metaphysical,  and  th o positive.  In  the  supernatu- 
ral phase,  the  mind  seeks  causes,  unusual  phenomena  are  in- 
terpreted as  the  signs  of  the  pleasure  or  displeasure  of  some 
god.  In  the  metaphysical  phase,  the  supernatural  agents  are 
set  aside  for  abstract  forces  inherent  in  substances.  In  the 
positive  phase,  the  mind  restricts  itself  to  the  discovery  of  the 
laws  of  phenomena.” 

POSSIBLE  ( possum , to  be  able).  — That  which  may  or  can  be. 
“ 'Tis  possible  to  infinite  power  to  endue  a creature  with  the 
power  of  beginning  motion.”3 

Possibililas  est  consensio  inter  sc,  sen  non  repugnantia  partium 
vel  atlributorum  quibus  res  seu  ens  constituaiur. 

A thing  is  said  to  be  possible  when,  though  not  actually  in 
existence,  all  the  conditions  necessary  for  realizing  its  exist- 
ence are  given.  Thus  we  say  it  is  possible  that  a plant  or  ani- 
mal may  be  born,  because  there  are  in  nature  causes  by  which 
this  may  be  brought  about.  But  as  everything  which  is  born 
dies,  we  say  it  is  impossible  that  a plant  or  animal  should  live 
for  ever.  A thing  is  possible,  when  there  is  no  contradiction 
between  the  idea  or  conception  of  it  and  the  realization  of  it ; 
and  a thing  is  impossible  when  the  conception  of  its  realiza- 
tion or  existence  implies  absurdity  or  contradiction. 

We  apply  the  terms  possible  and  impossible  both  to  beings 
and  events,  chiefly  on  the  ground  of  experience.  In  propor- 
tion as  our  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  nature  increases,  we  say 
it  is  possible  that  such  things  may  be  produced ; and  in  pro- 


1 In  his  Cours  dc  Philosophic  Positive. 
a G.  II.  Lewes,  Comte’s  Philosoph.  of  Sciences,  1853,  sect.  1. 
8 Clarke,  On  Attributes,  prop.  10. 


392 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


POSSIBLE  — 

portion  as  our  knowledge  of  human  nature  is  enlarged,  we  say 
it  is  possible  that  such  events  may  happen.  But  it  is  safer  to 
say  what  is  possible  than  what  is  impossible,  because  our  know- 
ledge of  causes  is  increasing. 

There  are  three  ways  in  which  what  is  possible  may  be 
brought  about ; super  naturally,  naturally,  and  morally.  The 
resurrection  of  the  dead  is  supernaturally  possible,  since  it  can 
only  be  realized  by  the  power  of  God.  The  burning  of  wood 
is  naturally  or  physically  possible,  because  fire  has  the  power 
to  do  so.  It  is  morally  possible  that  he  who  has  often  done 
wrong  should  yet  in  some  particular  instance  do  right.  These 
epithets  apply  to  the  causes  by  which  the  possible  existence  or 
event  is  realized. 

“Possible  relates  sometimes  to  contingency,  sometimes  to 
power  or  liberty,  and  these  senses  are  frequently  confounded. 
In  the  first  sense  we  say,  e.g.,  ‘ It  is  possible  this  patient  may 
recover,’  not  meaning  that  it  depends  on  his  choice,  but  that 
tve  are  not  sure  whether  the  event  will  not  be  such.  In  the 
other  sense  it  is  ‘possible’  to  the  best  man  to  violate  every  rule 
of  morality ; since  if  it  were  out  of  his  power  to  act  so  if  he 
. chose  it,  there  would  be  no  moral  goodness  in  the  case,  though 
we  are  quite  sure  that  such  never  will  be  his  choice.”1 
POSTULATE  (al'tqya,  poslulatinn,  that  which  is  asked  or  assumed 
in  order  to  prove  something  else).- — -“According  to  some,  the 
difference  between  axioms  and  postulates  is  analogous  to  that 
between  theorems  and  problems ; the  former  expressing  truths 
which  are  self-evident,  and  from  which  other  propositions  may 
be  deduced ; the  latter  operations  which  may  be  easily  per- 
formed, and  by  the  help  of  which  more  difficult  constructions 
may  be  effected.”2 

There  is  a difference  between  a postulate  and  a hypothesis. 
When  you  lay  down  something  which  may  be,  although  you 
have  not  proved  it,  and  which  is  admitted  by  the  learner  or  the 
disputant,  you  make  a hypothesis.  The  postulate  not  being  as- 
sented to,  may  be  contested  during  the  discussion,  and  is  only 
established  by  its  conformity  with  all  other  ideas  on  the  subject. 

In  the  philosophy  of  Kant,  a postulate  is  neither  a hypothesis 


1 Wbately,  Log .,  Appendix  i. 

3 Stewart,  Elements , vol.  ii.,  chap.  2,  sect.  3.  From  Wallis. 


393 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

POSTULATE  — 

nor  a corollary,  but  a proposition  of  the  same  binding  certainty, 
or  whose  certainty  is  incorporated  with  that  of  another,  so  that 
you  must  reject  that  other,  all  evident  as  it  is  in  self,  or  admit 
at  the  same  time  what  it  necessarily  supposes.  He  has  three 
postulates. 

1.  I am  under  obligation,  therefore  I am  free. 

2.  Practical  reason  tends  necessarily  to  the  sovereign  good, 
which  supposes  an  absolute  conformity  with  the  moral  law  ; 
such  conformity  is  holiness  ; a perfection  which  man  can  only 
attain  by  an  indefinite  continuity  of  effort  and  of  progress. 
This  progress  supposes  continuity  of  existence,  personal  and 
identical,  therefore  the  soul  is  immortal,  or  the  sovereign  good 
is  a chimera. 

3.  On  the  other  hand,  the  sovereign  good  supposes  felicity, 
but  this  results  from  the  conformity  of  things  with  a will,  and 
has  for  its  condition,  obedience  to  the  moral  law ; there  must 
then  bo  a harmony  possible  between  morality  and  felicity,  and 
this  necessarily  supposes  a cause  of  the  universe  distinct  from 
nature,  — an  intelligent  cause,  who  is  at  the  same  time  the 
Author  of  the  moral  law,  and  guarantee  of  this  harmony  of 
virtue  and  happiness,  from  which  results  the  sovereign  good ; 
then  God  exists,  and  is  himself  the  primitive  sovereign  good, 
the  source  of  all  good.  Kant’s  postulates  of  the  practical 
reason  are  thus  freedom,  immortality,  and  God.1 

POTENTIAL  is  opposed  to  actual — q.  v.  This  antithesis  is  a fun- 
damental doctrine  of  the  Peripatetic  philosophy.  “Aristotle 
saith,  that  divided  they  (i.e.,  bodies)  be  in  infinitum  poten- 
tially, but  actually  not.”2 

“Anaximander’s  infinite  was  nothing  else  but  an  infinite 
chaos  of  matter,  in  which  were  either  actually  or  potentially 
contained  all  manner  of  qualities.”3 
POTENTIALITY  (Svra^).-V.  Capacity. 

POWER  ( possum,  to  be  able  ; in  Greek,  Sihoyu$),  says  Mr.  Locke,4 
“ may  be  considered  as  twofold,  viz.,  as  able  to  make,  or  able 
to  receive,  any  change : the  one  may  be  called  active,  and  the 
other  passive  power.”  Dr.  Reid,5  in  reference  to  this  distinc- 


1 Willm,  Hist,  de  la  Philosoph.  Allemande,  tom.  i.,  p.  420. 

* Holland,  Plutarch , p.  667.  s Cudworth,  Intcll.  System , p.  128. 

4 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  21.  5 Act.  Pow.,  essay  i.,  chap.  3. 


394 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


POWER  — 

tion,  says,  “ Whereas  ho  distinguishes  power  into  active  and 
passive,  I conceive  passive  power  to  be  no  power  at  all.  He 
means  by  it  the  possibility  of  being  changed.  To  call  this 
power  seems  to  be  a misapplication  of  the  word.  I do  not 
remember  to  have  met  with  the  phrase  passive  power  in  any 
other  good  author.  Mr.  Locke  seems  to  have  been  unlucky  in 
inventing  it ; and  it  deserves  not  to  be  retained  in  our  lan- 
guage.” “This  paragraph,”  says  Sir  W.  Hamilton,'  “is 
erroneous  in  almost  all  its  statements.”  The  distinction  be- 
tween power  as  active  and  passive,  is  clearly  taken  by  Aristo- 
tle. But  he  says  that  in  one  point  of  view  they  are  but  one 
power,1 2  while  in  another  they  are  two.3  He  also  distinguishes 
2)owers  into  rational  and  irrational  — into  those  which  we 
have  by  nature,  and  those  which  we  acquire  by  repetition 
of  acts.  These  distinctions  have  been  generally  admitted  by 
subsequent  philosophers.  Dr.  Iteid,  however,  only  used  the 
word  power  to  signify  active  power.  That  we  have  the  idea 
of  power,  and  how  we  come  by  it,  he  shows  in  opposition  to 
Hume.4 

According  to  Mr.  Hume,  we  have  no  proper  notion  of  power. 
It  is  a mere  relation  which  the  mind  conceives  to  exist  between 
one  thing  going  before,  and  another  thing  coming  after.  All 
that  we  observe  is  merely  antecedent  and  consequent.  Neither 
sensation  nor  reflection  furnishes  us  with  any  idea  of  power  or 
efficacy  in  the  antecedent  to  produce  the  consequent.  The 
views  of  Dr.  Brown  are  somewhat  similar.  It  is  when  the 
succession  is  constant  — when  the  antecedent  is  uniformly  fol- 
lowed by  the  consequent,  that  we  call  the  one  cause,  and  the 
other  effect ; but  we  have  no  ground  for  believing  that  there 
is  any  other  relation  between  them  or  any  virtue  in  the  one  to 
originate  or  produce  the  other,  that  is,  that  we  have  no  pro- 
per idea  of  power.  Now,  that  our  idea  of  power  cannot  be 
explained  by  the  philosophy  which  derives  all  our  ideas  from 
sensation  and  reflection,  is  true.  Power  is  not  an  object  of 
sense.  All  that  we  observe  is  succession.  But  when  we  see 
one  thing  invariably  succeeded  by  another,  wo  not  only  con- 
nect the  one  as  effect  and  the  other  as  cause,  and  view  them 


1 Reid's  I Yorks,  p.  519,  note. 

3 Ibid.,  lib.  ix.,  cap.  1. 


3 Mdaphys lib.  v.,  cap.  12. 

4 Act.  Poiu.,  essay  i.,  chap.  2,  4. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  395 

POWER— 

under  that  relation,  but  we  frame  the  idea  of  power,  and  con- 
clude that  there  is  a virtue,  an  efficacy,  a force,  in  the  one 
thing  to  originate  or  produce  the  other ; and  that  the  connec- 
tion between  them  is  not  only  uniform  and  unvaried,  but  uni- 
versal and  necessary.  This  is  the  common  idea  of  power,  and 
that  there  is  such  an  idea  framed  and  entertained  by  the 
human  mind  cannot  be  denied.  The  legitimacy  and  validity 
of  the  idea  can  be  fully  vindicated. 

“ In  the  strict  sense,  power  and  agency  are  attributes  of 
mind  only ; and  I think  that  mind  only  can  be  a cause  in  the 
strict  sense.  This  power,  indeed,  may  be  where  it  is  not 
exerted,  and  so  may  be  without  agency  or  causation ; but 
there  can  be  no  agency  or  causation  without  power  to  act  and 
to  produce  the  effect.  As  far  as  I can  judge,  to  everything 
we  call  a cause  we  ascribe  power  to  produce  the  effect.  In 
intelligent  causes,  the  power  may  be  without  being  exerted  ; 
so  I have  power  to  run  when  I sit  still  or  walk.  But  in  inani- 
mate causes  we  conceive  no  power  but  what  is  exerted,  and, 
therefore,  measure  the  power  of  the  cause  by  the  effect  which 
it  actually  produces.  The  power  of  an  acid  to  dissolve  iron  is 
measured  by  what  it  actually  dissolves.  We  get  the  notion  of 
active  power,  as  well  as  of  cause  and  effect,  as  I think,  from 
what  we  feel  in  ourselves.  W e feel  in  ourselves  a power  to 
move  our  limbs,  and  to  produce  certain  effects  when  we  choose. 
Hence  we  get  the  notion  of  power,  agency,  and  causation,  in 
the  strict  and  philosophical  sense ; and  this  I take  to  be  our 
first  notion  of  these  three  things.”  1 

“ The  liability  of  a thing  to  be  influenced  by  a cause  is 
called  passive  power,  or  more  properly  susceptibility ; while 
the  efficacy  of  the  cause  is  called  active  power.  Heat  has  the 
power  of  melting  wax ; and  in  the  language  of  some,  ice  has 
the  power  of  being  melted.”2 — V.  Cause. 

It  is  usual  to  speak  of  a power  of  resistance  in  matter  ; and 
of  a power  of  endurance  in  mind.  Both  these  are  passive 
power.  Active  power  is  the  principle  of  action,  whether  im- 
manent or  transient.  Passive  power  is  the  principle  of  bearing 
or  receiving. 


1 Dr.  Reid,  Correspondence,  pp.  77,  78. 
3 Day,  On  the  Will , p.  S3. 


396 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOI>HY. 


POWER  — 

Aristotle,  Melaphys. ; ' Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand. ; 2 
Hobbes,  Opera? 

PRACTICAL  (German,  praldiscli).  — The  strict  meaning  of  this 
word  in  the  philosophy  of  Kant,  is  immediate  will-deter- 
mining, and  the  Critick  of  Practical  Reason  is  nothing  else 
hut  the  critick  of  that  faculty  of  reason  which  immediately 
determines  the  will.4 


PREDICATE,  PREDICABLE,  and  PREDICAMENT,  are 

all  derived  from  prcedico,  to  affirm.  A prcedicaie  is  that  which 
is  actually  affirmed  of  any  one,  as  wisdom  of  Peter.  A predi- 
cabte  is  that  which  may  be  affirmed  of  many,  as  sun  may  be 
affirmed  of  other  suns  besides  that  of  our  system.  A predica- 
ment is  a series,  order,  or  arrangement  of  p>redicales  a,nd  predi- 
cables in  some  summum  genus,  as  substance,  or  quality. 

What  is  affirmed  or  denied  is  called  the  predicate ; and  that 
of  which  it  is  affirmed  or  denied  is  called  the  subject?  — V. 
Attribute,  Category,  Universal. 

Prse dicables.  — “Whatever  term  can  be  affirmed  of  several 
things,  must  express  either  their  whole  essence,  which  is  called 
the  species ; or  a part  of  their  essence  (viz.,  either  the  material 
part,  which  is  called  the  genus,  or  the  formal  and  distinguish- 
ing part,  which  is  called  differentia,  or  in  common  discourse, 
characteristic),  or  something  joined  to  the  essence;  whether 
necessarily  (i.e.,  to  the  whole  species,  or  in  other  words,  univer- 
sally, to  every  individual  of  it),  which  is  called  a property ; 
or  contingently  ( i . e.,  to  some  individuals  only  of  the  species), 
which  is  an  accident. 

Every  Prmdicable  expresses  either 


The  whole  essence  of  its 
subject,  viz.,  Species. 


Or  part  of  its  essence. 


Or  something  joined 
to  its  essence. 


Genus,  differentia. 


Property. 


Accident. 


Universal  but  Peculiar  but  Universal  and 
not  Peculiar.  not  Universal.  Peculiar. 


Inseparable,  Separable. 


1 Lib.  viii.,  cap.  1.  a 13.  ii.,  chap.  21.  3 Tom.  i.,  p.  113,  edit,  by  Molesworth. 

4 Haywood,  Critick  of  Pure  Reason , p.  401. 

6 Monboddo,  Ancient  Melaphys .,  vol.  v.,  p.  152. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


397 


PREDICATE  — 

“Genus,  species,  differentia,  proprium,  accidens,  might, -with 
more  propriety,  perhaps,  have  been  called  the  fi ve  classes  of 
predicates  ; but  use  has  determined  them  to  be  called  the  five 
predicables.” *  1 

Predicament. — -These  most  comprehensive  signs  of  things  (the 
categories),  are  called  in  Latin  the  predicaments , because  they 
can  be  said  or  predicated  in  the  same  sense  of  all  other  terms, 
as  well  as  of  all  the  objects  denoted  by  them,  whereas  no  other 
term  can  be  correctly  said  of  them,  because  no  other  is  em- 
ployed to  express  the  full  extent  of  their  meaning.” 2 
Prse-praedicamenta  and  Post-praedicamenta.  — “The  Greek 
Logicians  divided  their  speculations  on  this  subject  into  three 
sections,  calling  the  first  section  to  rtpo  tH>v  xatriyopiuv ; the 
second,  to  rtepi  avtUiv  xatrj yopiuv  ; the  third,  to  p sta  tai 
xatrjyopia j.3  The  Latins  adhering  to  the  same  division,  coin 
new  names : ante-prcedicamenta,  or  prce-predicamenta,  prcedi- 
camenta  and  post-prcedicamenta.”  4 
PREJUDICE  ( prcejudico , to  judge  before  inquiry). — A prejudice 
is  a pre-judging,  that  is  forming  or  adopting  an  opinion  con- 
cerning anything,  before  the  grounds  of  it  have  been  fairly  or 
fully  considered.  The  opinion  may  be  true  or  false,  but  in  so 
far  as  the  grounds  of  it  have  not  been  examined,  it  is  errone- 
ous or  without  proper  evidence.  “ In  most  cases  prejudices 
are  opinions  which,  on  some  account,  men  are  pleased  with, 
independently  of  any  conviction  of  their  truth ; and  which, 
therefore,  they  are  afraid  to  examine,  lest  they  should  find 
them  to  be  false.  Prejudices,  then,  are  unreasonable  judg- 
ments, formed  or  held  under  the  influence  of  some  other 
motive  than  the  love  of  truth.  They  may  therefore  be  classed 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  motives  from  which  they  result. 
These  motives  are,  either,  1,  Pleasurable,  innocent,  and  social ; 
or,  2,  They  are  malignant.”5 

Dr.  Reid6  has  treated  of  prejudices  or  the  causes  of  error, 
according  to  the  classification  given  of  them  by  Lord  Bacon, 
under  the  name  of  idols — q.  v.  Mr.  Locke7  has  treated  of  the 


1 Reid,  Account  of  Aristotle’s  Logic.  Q Gillies,  Analysis  of  Aristotle,  c.  2. 

8 Ammon,  in  Prcedic.,  p.  146.  4 SandersoD,  pp.  22,  51,  55,  ed.  Oxon.,  1672. 

* Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought.  6 Intcll.  Pnu .,  essay  vi.,  chap.  8. 

1 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand,,  bool;  iv..  chap.  20. 

35 


398 


VOCABULARY  OF  MILOSOPIIY. 


PREJUDICE  — 

causes  of  error.  And  some  excellent  observations  on  the  pre- 
judices peculiar  to  men  of  study,  may  be  seen  in  Malebranche, 
Search  after  Truth.1 

PREMISS  {propos  it  tones  prcemissce,  propositions  which  go  before 
the  conclusion,  and  from  which  it  is  inferred).  — A regular 
syllogism  consists  of  two  premisses  and  a conclusion.  The  two 
premisses  are  sometimes  called  the  antecedent,  and  the  conclu- 
sion the  consequent. 

PRESCIENCE  ( prcescio , to  know  before  it  happens).  — “The 
prescience  of  God  is  so  vast  and  exceeding  the  comprehension 
of  our  thoughts,  that  all  that  can  be  safely  said  of  it  is  this, 
that  this  knowledge  is  most  exquisite  and  perfect,  accurately 
representing  the  natures,  powers,  and  properties  of  the  thing 
it  does  foreknow.”  — More.2 

The  prescience  of  God  may  be  argued  from  the  perfection  of 
his  nature.  It  is  difficult  or  rather  impossible  for  us  to  con- 
ceive of  it,  because  we  have  no  analogous  faculty.  Our  ob- 
scure and  inferential  knowledge  of  what  is  future,  is  not  to  be 
likened  to  his  clear  and  direct3  beholding  of  all  things.  Many 
attempts  have  been  made  to  reconcile  the  prescience  of  God 
with  the  liberty  of  man.  Each  truth  must  rest  upon  its  own 
proper  evidence.  — St.  Augustin,  On  the  Spirit  and  the  Letter  ; 
Bossuet,  Traiti  clu  Libre  Arhitre ; Leibnitz,  Theodicde ; Fene- 
lon,  Existence  de  Dieu. 

PRESENTATIVE.  — V.  Knowledge. 

PRIMARY  ( primus , first)  is  opposed  to  secondary.  “Those 
qualities  or  properties,  without  which  we  cannot  even  imagine 
a thing  to  exist,  are  called  primary  qualities.  Extension  and 
solidity  are  called  primary  qualities  of  matter — colour,  taste, 
smell,  are  called  secondary  qualities  of  matter.”4 


1 Book  ii.,  part  2.  a Immortality  of  Soul,  b.  ii.,  cb.  4. 

3 When  the  late  Sir  James  Mackintosh  was  visiting  the  school  for  the  deaf  and  dumb 

at  Paris,  then  under  the  care  of  the  Abbe  Sicard.  he  is  said  to  have  addressed  this  ques- 
tion in  writing  to  one  of  the  pupils, — “Doth  God  reason?”  The  pupil  for  a short  time 
appeared  to  be  distressed  and  confused,  but  presently  wrote  on  his  slate,  the  following 
answer: — “To  reason  is  to  hesitate,  to  doubt,  to  inquire:  it  is  the  highest  attribute  of 
a limited  intelligence.  God  sees  all  things,  foresees  all  things,  knows  all  things:  there- 
fore God  doth  not  reason.”  — Gurney,  On  Habit  and  Discipline , p.  138. 

4 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


399 


PRIMARY— 

Descartes,  Locke,  Reid,  Stewart,1  Sir  W.  Hamilton.2 — V. 
Matter. 

PRINCIPIA  ESSENDI  or  PRINCIPLES  OF  BEING  are 

distinguished  into  the  principle  of  origination  and  the  princi- 
ple of  dependence. 

The  only  proper  principle  of  origination  is  God,  who  gives 
essence  and  existence  to  all  beings. 

The  principle  of  dependence  is  distinguished  into  that  of 
causality  and  that  of  inherence,  or  effective  dependence,  as  the 
effect  depends  upon  its  cause,  and  subjective  dependence,  as  the 
quality  inheres  or  depends  on  its  subject  or  substance. 

PRINCIPLE  ( principium , dp xf  a beginning).  — “A  principle  is 
that  which  being  derived  from  nothing,  can  hold  of  nothing. 
‘Principio  autem  nulla  est  origo,’  said  Cicero,  ‘nam  ex  principio 
oriuntur  omnia:  ipsum  autem  nulla  ex  re;  nec  enim  id  esset 
principium  quod  gigneretur  aliunde.’  ” 3 

Aristotle4  has  noticed  several  meanings  of  apz'q,  which  is 
translated  principle,  and  has  added — “ What  is  common  to  all 
first  principles  is  that  they  are  the  primary  source  from  which 
anything  is,  becomes,  or  is  known.” 

The  word  is  applied  equally  to  thought  and  to  being ; and 
hence  principles  have  been  divided  into  those  of  being  and 
those  of  knowledge,  or  principia  essendi  and  principia  cogno- 
scendi,  or,  according  to  the  language  of  German  philosophers, 
principles  formal  and  principles  real.  Principia  essendi  may 
also  be  principia  cognoscendi,  for  the  fact  that  things  exist  is 
the  ground  or  reason  of  their  being  known.  But  the  converse 
does  not  hold ; for  the  existence  of  things  is  in  no  way  depend- 
ent upon  our  knowledge  of  them. 

Ancient  philosophy  was  almost  exclusively  occupied  with 
principles  of  being,  investigating  the  origin  and  elements  of 
all  things,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  modern  philosophy  has 
been  chiefly  devoted  to  principles  of  knowledge,  ascertaining 
the  laws  and  elements  of  thought,  and  determining  their  valid- 
ity in  reference  to  the  knowledge  which  they  give. 
PRINCIPLES  OF  KNOWLEDGE  are  those  truths  by  means  of 


* Phil.  Essays , ii..  chap.  2. 

3 Sir  Will.  Drummond,  Acad.  Quest.,  p.  5. 

34  2a 


3 Reid's  Works,  note  D. 

4 Nctaphys.,  lib.  iv.,  cap.  1. 


400 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PRINCIPLES  — 

which  other  truths  are  known.  They  have  been  distinguished 
into  simple  and  complex,  that  is,  they  may  be  found  in  the  form 
of  ideas,  as  substance,  cause  — or  in  the  form  of  propositions, 
as  in  the  affirmation  that  every  change  implies  the  operation 
of  a cause,  or  in  the  negation  that  qualities  do  not  exist  with- 
out a substance.  Complex  principles  have  been  arranged  in 
three  classes,  viz.,  hypotheses,  definitions,  and  axioms.  Hypo- 
theses and  definitions  have  been  called  detexa,  that  is,  conven- 
tional principles  or  truths  assumed  or  agreed  on  for  the  pur- 
pose of  disputation  or  teaching,  and  are  confined  to  the  depart- 
ment of  knowledge  to  which  they  peculiarly  belong.  Axioms 
are  principles  true  in  themselves,  and  extending  to  all  depart- 
ments of  knowledge.  These  were  called  fvoixa  or  ijmpvfa,  and 
are  such  as  the  mind  of  man  naturally  and  at  once  accepts  as 
true.  They  correspond  with  the  first  truths,  primitive  beliefs, 
or  principles  of  common  sense  of  the  Scottish  philosophy.  — 
V.  Common  Sense,  Axiom. 

“The  word  principle,”  says  Mr.  Stewart,1  “in  its  proper 
acceptation,  seems  to  me  to  denote  an  assumption  (whether 
resting  on  fact  or  on  hypothesis)  upon  which,  as  a datum,  a 
train  of  reasoning  proceeds ; and  for  the  falsity  or  incorrect- 
ness of  which  no  logical  rigour  in  the  subsequent  process  can 
compensate.  Tlius  the  gravity  and  the  elasticity  of  the  air 
are, principles  of  reasoning,  in  our  speculations  about  the  baro- 
meter. The  equality  of  the  angles  of  incidence  and  reflection ; 
the  proportionality  of  the  sines  of  incidence  and  refraction, 
are  principles  of  reasoning  in  catoptrics  and  in  dioptrics.  In 
a sense  perfectly  analogous  to  this,  the  definitions  of  geometry 
(all  of  which  are  merely  hypothetical ) are  the  first  principles 
of  reasoning  in  the  subsequent  demonstration,  and  the  basis 
on  which  the  whole  fabric  of  the  science  rests.” 

Lord  Herbert,  De  Veritatc;  Buffier,  Treatise  of  First  Truths; 
Reid,  Intell.  Fowd 

Principles  as  Express  or  as  Operative  correspond  to  principles 
of  knowing  and  of  being.  An  express  principle  asserts  a pro- 
position ; as,  truth  is  to  be  spoken.  An  operative  principle 
prompts  to  action  or  produces  change,  as  when  a man  takes 


1 Elements,  vol.  i.,  chap.  1,  sect.  2. 


Essay  vi. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


401 


PRINCIPLES  — 

food  to  satisfy  hunger.  An  express  principle  asserts  an  origi- 
nal law  and  is  regulative.  An  operative  principle  is  an  original 
element  and  is  constitutive. 

PRINCIPLES  OF  ACTION  may  either  mean  those  express  prin- 
ciples which  regulate  or  ought  to  regulate  human  actions,  or 
those  operating  or  motive  principles  which  prompt  human 
action.  The  latter,  which  is  the  common  application  of  the 
phrase,  is  its  psychological  meaning. 

When  applied  to  human  action  psychologically,  the  word 
principle  is  used  in  the  sense  of  the  principle  of  dependence; 
and  to  denote  that  the  action  depends  upon  the  agent  for  its 
being  produced.  It  may  signify  the  dependence  of  causality, 
that  is,  that  the  action  depends  for  its  production  on  the  agent, 
as  its  efficient  cause ; or  it  may  signify  the  dependence  of 
inherence,  that  is,  that  the  action  depends  for  its  production  on 
some  power  or  energy  which  inheres  in  the  agent  as  its  sub- 
ject. Hence  it  has  been  said  that  a principle  of  action  is  two- 
fold— the  principium  quod,  and  the  principium  quo.  Thus, 
man  as  an  active  being  is  the  principium  quod  or  efficient  cause 
of  an  action  being  produced  ; his  will,  or  the  power  by  which 
he  determines  to  act,  is  the  principium  quo. 

But  the  will  itself  is  stimulated  or  moved  to  exert  itself; 
and  in  this  view  may  be  regarded  as  the  principium  quod, 
while  that  which  moves  or  stimulates  it,  may  be  regarded  as 
the  principium  quo.  Before  we  act,  we  deliberate,  that  is,  we 
contemplate  the  action  in  its  nature  and  consequences ; we 
then  resolve  or  determine  to  do  it  or  not  to  do  it,  and  the  per- 
formance or  omission  follows.  Volition,  then,  or  an  exercise 
of  will  is  the  immediate  antecedent  of  action.  But  the  will  is 
called  into  exercise  by  certain  influences  which  are  brought  to 
bear  upon  it.  Some  object  of  sense  or  of  thought  is  contem- 
plated. We  are  affected  with  pleasure  or  pain.  Feelings  of 
complacency  or  displacency,  of  liking  or  disliking,  of  satisfac- 
tion or  disgust,  are  awakened.  Sentiments  of  approbation  or 
disapprobation  are  experienced.  We  pronounce  some  things 
to  be  good,  and  others  to  be  evil,  and  feel  corresponding  incli- 
nation or  aversion ; and  under  the  influence  of  these  states 
and  affections  of  mind,  the  will  is  moved  to  activity.  The 
forms  which  these  feelings  of  pleasure  or  pain,  of  inclination 
35  * 2 b 


402 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PRINCIPLES  — 

or  tendency  to  or  from  an  object,  may  assume,  are  many  and 
various  ; arising  partly  from  the  nature  of  the  objects  contem- 
plated, and  partly  from  the  original  constitution  and  acquired 
habits  of  the  mind  contemplating.  But  they  are  all  denomi- 
nated, in  a general  way,  principles  of  action. 

PRIVATION  (ffffp) privatio). — “A privation  is  the  absence  of 
what  does  naturally  belong  to  the  thing  we  are  speaking  of,  or 
which  ought  to  be  present  with  it ; as  when  a man  or  a horse 
is  deaf,  or  blind,  or  dead,  or  if  a physician  or  a divine  be 
unlearned,  these  are  called  privations.” 1 

The  principles  of  all  natural  bodies  are  matter  and  form. 
“ To  these  Aristotle  has  added  a third  which  he  calls  atfptjaif 
or  privation,  an  addition  that  he  has  thought  proper  to  make 
to  the  Pythagorean  and  Platonic  philosophy,  in  order  to  give 
his  system  the  appearance  of  novelty ; but  without  any  neces- 
sity, as  I apprehend ; for  it  is  not  a cause,  as  he  himself  ad- 
mits, such  as  matter  and  form,  but  is  only  that  without  which 
the  first  matter  could  not  receive  the  impression  of  any  form  ; 
for  it  must  be  clear  of  every  form,  which  is  what  he  calls  pri- 
vation, before  it  can  admit  of  any. 

“Now,  this  is  necessarily  implied  in  the  notion  of  matter ; 
for  as  it  has  the  capacity  of  aliform,  so  it  has  the  privation  of 
all  form.  In  this  way,  Aristotle2  himself  has  explained  the 
nature  of  matter.  And  Plato,  in  the  Timceus,  has  very  much 
insisted  upon  this  quality  of  matter  as  absolutely  necessary, 
in  order  to  fit  it  to  receive  all  forms ; and  he  illustrates  his 
meaning  by  a comparison : — Those,  says  he,  who  make  un- 
guents or  perfumes,  prepare  the  liquid  so,  to  which  they  are 
to  give  the  perfume,  that  it  may  have  no  odour  of  its  own. 
And,  in  like  manner,  those  who  take  off  an  impression  of 
anything  upon  any  soft  matter,  clear  that  matter  of  every 
other  impression,  making  it  as  smooth  as  possible,  in  order 
that  it  may  better  receive  the  figure  or  image  intended.  In 
like  manner,  he  says,  matter,  in  order  to  receive  the  specieses 
of  all  things,  must  in  itself  have  the  species  of  nothing.”3 


1 Watts,  Log.,  pt.  i.,  c.  2. 

2 Physic , lib.  i.,  cap.  8. 

0 Monboddo,  Ancient  Metaphys.,  book  ii.}  chap.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


403 


PRIVATION  — 

Hence  privation  was  defined — Negatio  formce  in  subjedo  apto 
ad  habendam  talem  formam. 

According  to  Plato,  privation,  in  the  sense  of  limitation, 
imperfection,  is  the  inherent  condition  of  all  finite  existence, 
and  the  necessary  cause  of  evil.  — Leibnitz,1  after  Augustin, 
Aquinas,  and  others,  held  similar  views.  — V.  Negation. 

PROBABILITY.  — V.  Chances. 

PROBABLE  ( probabilis , provable). — That  which  does  not  admit 
of  demonstration  and  does  not  involve  absurdity  or  contradic- 
tion, is  probable,  or  admits  of  proof.  “As  demonstration  is  the 
showing  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas,  by  the 
intervention  of  one  or  more  proofs,  which  have  a constant, 
immutable,  and  visible  connection  one  with  another ; so  pro- 
bability is  nothing  but  the  appearance  of  such  an  agreement  or 
disagreement,  by  the  intervention  of  proofs,  whose  connection 
is  not  constant  and  immutable,  or  at  least  is  not  perceived  to 
be  so,  but  is,  or  appears  for  the  most  part  to  be  so,  and  is 
enough  to  induce  the  mind  to  judge  the  proposition  to  be  true 
or  false,  rather  than  the  contrary The  entertain- 

ment the  mind  gives  this  sort  of  propositions,  is  called  belief, 
assent,  or  opinion,  which  is  admitting  or  receiving  any  pro- 
position for  true,  upon  arguments  or  proofs  that  are  found  to 
persuade  us  to  receive  it  as  true,  without  certain  knowledge 
that  it  is  so.  And  herein  lies  the  difference  between  probabi- 
lity and  certainty,  faith  and  knowledge,  that  in  all  the  parts  of 
knowledge  there  is  intuition ; each  immediate  idea,  each  step, 
has  its  visible  and  certain  connection  ; in  belief,  not  so.  That 
which  makes  us  believe,  is  something  extraneous  to  the  thing 
I believe;  something  not  evidently  joined  on  both  sides  to,  and 
so  not  manifestly  showing  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of, 
those  ideas  that  are  under  consideration. 

“ The  grounds  of  probability  are  first,  the  conformity  of 
anything  with  our  own  knowledge,  observation,  and  experi- 
ence. Second,  the  testimony  of  others,  touching  their  obser- 
vation and  experience.” — Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.2 
Reid,  Intell.  Pow.3 

1 Causa  Dei , sect.  69, 72.  Essais  Sur  la  Bonle  dc  Dieu}  1,  partie,  sect.  29. 31 ; 3,  partie, 

sect.  378. 

a Book  iv.,  chap.  15- 


Essay  vii.,  cliap.  3. 


404 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PROBABLE  — 

“ The  word  probable”  says  Mr.  Stewart,1  “ does  not  imply 
any  deficiency  in  the  proof,  but  only  marks  the  particular  na- 
ture of  that  proof,  as  contradistinguished  from  another  species 
of  evidence.  It  is  opposed  not  to  what  is  certain,  but  to  what 
admits  of  being  demonstrated  after  the  manner  of  the  mathe- 
maticians. This  differs  widely  from  the  meaning  annexed  to 
the  same  word  in  popular  discourse ; according  to  which,  what- 
ever event  is  said  to  be  pirobable,  is  understood  to  be  expected 
with  some  degree  of  doubt But  although,  in  philo- 

sophical language,  the  epithet  probable  be  applied  to  events 
which  are  acknowledged  to  be  certain,  it  is  also  applied  to 
events  which  are  called  probable  by  the  vulgar.  The  philo- 
sophical meaning  of  the  word,  therefore,  is  more  comprehensive 
than  the  popular ; the  former  denoting  that  particular  species 
of  evidence  of  which  contingent  truths  admit;  the  latter  being 
confined  to  such  degrees  of  this  evidence  as  fall  short  of  the 
highest.  These  different  degrees  of  probability  the  philoso- 
pher considers  as  a series,  beginning  with  bare  possibility, 
and  terminating  in  that  apprehended  infallibility , with  which 
the  phrase  moral  certainty  is  synonymous.  To  this  last  term 
of  the  series,  the  word  probable  is,  in  its  ordinary  acceptation, 
plainly  inapplicable.” 

PROBLEM  (rtp6/3Xtjya,  from  rtpoj3aA?uo,  to  throw  down,  to  put  in 
question).  — Any  point  attended  with  doubt  or  difficulty,  any 
proposition  which  may  be  attacked  or  defended  by  probable 
arguments,  may  be  called  a problem.  Every  department  of 
inquiry  has  questions,  the  answers  to  which  are  problematical. 
So  that,  according  to  the  branch  of  knowledge  to  which  they 
belong,  problems  may  be  called  Physical,  Metaphysical,  Logi- 
cal, Moral,  Mathematical,  Historical,  Literary,  &c.  Aristotle 
distinguished  three  classes, — the  moral  or  practical,  which  may 
influence  our  conduct ; as  whether  pleasure  is  the  chief  good : 
the  speculative  or  scientific,  which  merely  add  to  our  knowledge ; 
as,  whether  the  world  is  eternal : and  the  auxiliary,  or  those 
questions  which  we  seek  to  solve  with  a view  to  other  questions. 

PROGRESS.  — V.  Perfectibility. 

PROMISE  and  POLLICITATION.  Promittimus  rogati — polli 
cemur  ultro.  — A pollicitation  is  a spontaneous  expression  of 


1 Elements,  part  ii.,  chap.  2.  sect.  4. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


405 


PROMISE  — 

our  intention  to  do  something  in  favour  of  another.  It  does 
not  necessarily  imply  the  presence  of  the  party  in  reference  to 
whom  it  is  made  ; and  it  does  not  confer  upon  him  a right  to 
exact  its  performance.  But  in  so  far  as  it  has  become  known 
to  him,  and  has  awakened  expectations  of  its  being  performed, 
we  may  be  brought  under  a moral  obligation  to  perform  it, 
especially  if  its  performance  is  seen  to  be  highly  beneficial  to 
him,  and  in  no  way  prejudicial  to  ourselves. 

A promise  is  made  in  consequence  of  a request  preferred  to 
us.  It  implies  the  presence  of  the  party  preferring  the  re- 
quest, or  of  some  one  for  him,  and  confers  upon  him  a perfect 
moral  right  to  have  it  fulfilled,  and  brings  us  under  a moral 
obligation  to  fulfil  it.  In  order  to  constitute  a promise,  three 
things  are  necessary.  1.  The  voluntary  consent  or  intention 
of  the  promiser.  2.  The  expression  or  outward  signification 
of  that  intention.  3.  The  acceptance  of  the  promise  by  the 
party  to  whom  it  is  made. 

A promise  implies  two  parties  at  least — the  promiser  and  the 
promisee.  A pact  implies  two  or  more.  In  this  it  agrees  with 
a contract  — q.  v. 

It  is  a dictate  of  the  law  of  nature,  that  promises  should  be 
fulfilled, — not  because  it  is  expedient  to  do  so,  but  because  it 
is  right  to  do  so. 

The  various  questions  concerning  the  parties  competent  to 
give  a valid  promise,  the  interpretation  of  the  terms  in  which 
it  may  be  given,  and  the  cases  in  which  the  obligation  to  fulfil 
it  may  be  relaxed  or  dissolved,  belong  to  what  may  be  called 
the  Casuistry  of  Ethics,  and  Natural  Jurisprudence. — V.  Con- 
tract. 

PROOF.  — “ To  conform  our  language  more  to  common  use,  we 
ought  to  divide  arguments  into  demonstrations,  proofs,  and 
probabilities.  By  proofs,  meaning  such  arguments  from  ex- 
perience as  leave  no  room  for  doubt  or  opposition.” 1 Whately 
says  that  proving  may  be  defined  “the  assigning  of  a reason 
or  argument  for  the  support  of  a given  proposition,”  and  in- 
ferring “the  deduction  of  a conclusion  from  given  premises. 
In  the  one  case  our  conclusion  is  given,  and  we  have  to  seek 


1 Hume,  On  the  Understand.,  sect.  6,  note. 


406 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PROOF  — 

for  arguments ; in  the  other  our  premises  are  given,  and  we 
have  to  seek  for  a conclusion.  Proving  may  be  compared  to 
the  act  of  putting  away  any  article  into  the  proper  receptacle 
of  goods  of  that  description,  inferring  to  that  of  bringing  out 
the  article  when  needed.”  — See  Evidence,  Inference. 
PROPERTY  may  be  distinguished  from  quality  or  attribute,  and 
also  from  faculty. 

Qualities  are  primary  or  secondary,  essential  or  non-essen- 
tial. The  former  are  called  attributes,  and  the  latter  proper- 
ties. Extension  is  the  attribute  of  matter,  taste  and  smell 
are  properties  of  body. 

Faculty  implies  understanding  and  will,  and  so  is  applicable 
only  to  mind.  We  speak  of  the  properties  of  bodies,  but  not 
of  their  faculties.  Of  mind  we  may  say  will  is  a faculty  or 
property;  so  that  while  all  faculties  are  properties,  a\\  proper- 
ties are  not  faculties. 

PROPERTY  (Generic)  is  the  properly  of  a subaltern  genus, 
and  which  may  be  predicated  of  all  the  subordinate  species. 
“Voluntary  motion”  is  the  generic  property  of  “animal.” 
PROPERTY  (Specific)  is  the  property  of  an  infima  species,  and 
which  may  be  predicated  of  all  the  individuals  contained 
under  it.  “Risibility”  is  the  specif  c property  of  “ man.” 
PROPOSITION.  — A judgment  of  the  mind  expressed  in  words 
is  a,  piroposition. 

“ A proposition,  according  to  Aristotle,  is  a speech  wherein 
one  thing  is  affirmed  or  denied  of  another.  Hence  it  is  easy 
to  distinguish  the  thing  affirmed  or  denied,  which  is  called  the 
predicate,  from  the  thing  of  which  it  is  affirmed  or  denied, 
which  is  called  the  subject;  and  these  two  are  called  the  terms 
of  the  proposition.”  1 

As  to  their  substance,  propositions  are  Categorical  (sub- 
divided into  pure  and  modal),  and  Hypothetical  (subdivided 
into  conditional  and  disjunctive) . 

A Categorical  proposition  declares  a thing  absolutely,  as,  “I 
love,”  or  “ Man  is  not  infallible.”  These  are  pure  categoricals, 
asserting  simply  the  agreement  and  disagreement  of  sub- 
ject and  predicate.  Modal  categoricals  assert  the  manner  of 


1 Heid,  Account  of  Aristotle's  Logic,  chap.  2,  sect.  6. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


407 


PROPOSITION-  — 

agreement  and  disagreement  between  subject  and  predicate; 
as,  “ The  wisest  man  may  possibly  be  mistaken.”  “A  preju- 
diced historian  will  probably  misrepresent  the  matter.” 

A Hypothetical  proposition  asserts,  not  absolutely,  but  under 
a hypothesis.  Such  propositions  are  denoted  by  the  conjunc- 
tions used  in  stating  them.  “ If  man  is  fallible,  he  is  imper- 
fect.” This  is  called  a conditional  proposition,  denoted  by  the 
conj  unction  “ if.”  “It  is  either  day  or  night.”  This  is  a 
disjunctive  hypothetical,  and  is  denoted  by  the  disjunctive 
conjunction  “either.” 

As  to  their  quality,  propositions  are  either  affirmative  or 
negative,  according  as  the  predicate  is  said  to  agree  or  not  to 
agree  with  the  subject.  “Man  ‘is'  an  animal.”  “Man  ‘is 
not’  perfect.”  As  to  their  quantity,  propositions  are  universal 
or  particular,  according  as  the  predicate  is  affirmed  or  denied 
of  the  whole  of  the  subject,  or  only  of  part  of  the  subject. 
“All  tyrants  are  miserable.”  “ No  miser  is  rich.”  “ Some 
islands  are  fertile.”  “ Most  men  are  fond  of  novelty.” 

Another  division  of  propositions  having  reference  to  their 
quantity  is  into  singular  and  indefinite.  A singular  proposition 
is  one  of  which  the  subject  is  an  individual  (either  a proper 
name,  a singular  pronoun,  or  a common  noun  with  a singular 
sign).  “ Caesar  overcame  Pompey.”  “I  am  the  person.” 
“ This  fable  is  instructive.”  But  as  these  propositions  predi- 
cate of  the  whole  of  the  subject,  they  fall  under  the  rules  that 
govern  universals.  An  indefinite  or  indesignate  proposition  is 
one  that  has  no  sign  of  universality  or  particularity  affixed  to 
it,  and  its  quantity  must  be  ascertained  by  the  matter  of  it, 
that  is,  by  the  nature  of  the  connection  between  the  extremes. 

As  to  their  matter,  propositions  are  either  necessary,  or  im- 
possible, or  contingent.  In  necessary  and  in  impossible  matter, 
an  indefinite  is  understood  as  a universal;  as,  “Birds  have 
wings;”  i.e.,  all.  “Birds  are  not  quadrupeds  ; ” i.e.,none. 
In  contingent  matter,  that  is,  where  the  terms  sometimes 
agree  and  sometimes  not,  an  indefinite  is  understood  as  parti- 
cular; as,  “Food  is  necessary  to  life;”  i.  e.,  some  kind  of  food. 
“Birds  sing;”  i.  e.,  some  birds  sing.  “Birds  are  not  carnivo- 
rous;” i.  e.,  some  birds  are  not;  or,  all  are  not. — V.  Judgment. 
Opposition. 


408 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PROPRIETY  (• (6  rtpcrcov,  that  which  is  fit  or  congruous  to  the 
agent,  and  the  relations  in  which  he  is  placed). — This,  accord- 
ing to  some,  is  that  which  characterizes  an  action  as  right, 
and  an  agent  as  virtuous.  “According  to  Plato,  to  Aristotle, 
and  to  Zeno,  virtue  consists  in  the  'propriety  of  conduct,  or  in 
the  suitableness  of  the  affection  from  which  we  act,  to  the 
object  which  excites  it.” 

Adam  Smith1  treats  of  those  systems  which  make  virtue 
consist  in  propriety. 

PROPRIUM  (The)  or  Property  is  a predicable  which  denotes 
something  essentially  conjoined  to  the  essence  of  the  species.2 3 

Proprium  is  applied,  — 1.  To  what  belongs  to  some  one  but 
not  to  all,  as  to  be  a philosopher  in  respect  of  man.  2.  To 
what  belongs  to  a species,  but  not  to  it  only,  as  blackness  in 
respect  of  a crow.  3.  To  what  belongs  to  all  of  the  species, 
and  to  that  only,  but  not  always,  as  to  grow  hoary  in  respect 
of  man.  4.  To  what  belongs  to  species,  to  all  of  it,  to  it  only, 
and  always,  as  laughter  in  respect  of  man.  This  last  is  truly 
the  proprium.  Quod  speciei  toil,  soli  et  semper  convenit? 

“ There  is  a proprium  which  belongs  to  the  whole  species, 
but  not  to  the  sole  species,  as  sleeping  belongs  to  man.  There 
is  a proprium  which  belongs  to  the  sole  species,  but  not  to  the 
. whole  species,  as  to  be  a magistrate.  There  is  a proprium 
which  belongs  to  the  whole  species,  and  to  the  sole  species, 
but  not  always,  as  laughing ; and  there  is  a proprium  which 
always  belongs  to  it,  as  to  be  risible,  that  is,  to  have  the 
faculty  of  laughing.  Can  one  forbear  laughing  when  he  repe- 
sents  to  himself  these  poor  things,  uttered  with  a mouth  made 
venerable  by  a long  beard,  or  repeated  by  a trembling  and 
respectful  disciple?”4 
PROSYLLOGISM.  — V.  Epicheirema. 

PROVERB. — The  Editor  of  the  fourth  edition  of  Ray’s  Proverbs 
says,  “A  proverb  is  usually  defined,  an  instructive  sentence, 
or  common  and  pithy  saying,  in  which  more  is  generally 
designed  than  expressed ; famous  for  its  peculiarity  and 
elegance,  and  therefore  adopted  by  the  learned  as  well  as 

1 Theory  of  Mor.  Sent.,  part  vii.,  sect.  2,  chap.  1. 

2 Whately,  Log.,  book  ii.,  chap.  5,  sect.  3. 

3 Derodon,  Log.,  p.  37. 

4 Crousaz,  Art  of  Thinking,  paxt  i.,  sect.  3,  chap.  5. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


409 


PROVERB  — 

tho  vulgar,  by  which  it  is  distinguished  from  counterfeits, 
which  want  such  authority.” 

Lord  John  Russell’s  definition  of  a j proverb  is,  “ the  wit  of 
one,  the  wisdom  of  many.”  1 

Proverbs  embody  the  current  and  practical  philosophy  of  an 
age  or  nation.  Collections  of  them  have  been  made  from  the 
earliest  times.  The  book  of  Scripture  called  the  Proverbs 
of  Solomon,  contains  more  than  one  collection.  They  have 
always  been  common  in  the  East.  Burckhardt  made  a collec- 
tion of  Arabian  proverbs,  which  was  published  at  London  in 
1830.  Seiler  published  at  Augsburg,  in  1816,  The  Wisdom 
of  the  Streets,  or,  the  Meaning  and  Use  of  German  Proverbs. 
Ray’s  Proverbs,  Allan  Ramsay’s  Proverbs,  Henderson’s  Pro- 
verbs, have  been  published  among  ourselves. 

Backer  (Geo.  de)  has  Le  Dictionnaire  de  Proverbes  Francois, 2 
rare  and  curious.  Panckouke  published  his  Dictionnaire  des 
Proverbes  in  imitation  of  it. 

PROVIDENCE.  — “What  in  opposition  to  Fate,”  said  Jacobi, 
“constitutes  the  ruling  principle  of  the  universe  into  a true 
God,  is  Providence.” 

Providence  is  a word  which  leads  us  to  think  of  conservation 
and  superintending,  or  upholding  and  governing.  Whatever 
is  created  can  have  no  necessary  nor  independent  existence  ; 
the  same  power  which  called  it  into  being  must  continue  to 
uphold  it  in  being.  And  if  the  beauty  and  order  which  appear 
in  the  works  of  nature  prove  them  to  be  the  effects  of  an  intel- 
ligent designing  cause,  the  continuance  of  that  beauty  and 
order  argues  the  continued  operation  of  that  cause.  So  that 
the  same  arguments  which  prove  the  existence  of  God  imply 
his  providence.  With  regard  to  the  extent  of  providence,  some 
have  regarded  it  as  general,  and  reaching  only  to  things  re- 
garded as  a whole,  and  to  great  and  important  results,  while 
others  regard  it  as  particular,  and  as  embracing  every  indivi- 
dual and  every  event.  But  the  same  arguments  which  prove 
that  there  is  & providence,  prove  that  it  must  be  particular ; or 
rather,  when  properly  understood,  there  is  no  inconsistency 
between  the  two  views.  The  providence  of  God  can  only  be 


1 Moore,  Diary,  yol.  yii..  p.  204. 

36 


a 8 to,  1710. 


410 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PROVIDENCE  — 

called  general  from  its  reaching  to  every  object  and  event,  and 
this  is  the  sense  in  •which  we  are  to  understand  a particular 
providence.  But  while  the  providence  of  God  extends  to  every 
particular,  it  proceeds  according  to  general  laws.  And  while 
these  laws  are  fixed  and  stable,  they  may  be  so  fixed  as  to 
admit  of  what  we  think  deviations  ; so  that  both  what  we  call 
the  law,  and  what  we  call  the  deviation  from  the  law,  may  be 
embraced  in  the  plan  of  providence.  As  to  the  way  in  which 
this  plan  is  carried  forward,  some  have  had  recourse  to  the 
supposition  of  a plastic  nature,  intermediate  between  the  Crea- 
tor and  the  creature, — others  to  an  energy  communicated  from 
the  Creator  to  the  creature.  But  the  true  view  is  to  regard  all 
things  and  all  events  as  upheld  and  governed  by  the  continual 
presence  and  power  of  God.  There  is  a difficulty  in  recon- 
ciling this  view  with  the  freedom  and  responsibility  of  man, 
but  it  is  not  impossible  to  do  so. 1 

PRUDENCE  ( prudeniia , contracted  for  procidentia , foresight  or 
forethought)  is  one  of  the  virtues  which  were  called  cardinal 
by  the  ancient  ethical  writers.  It  may  be  described  as  the 
habit  of  acting  at  all  times  with  deliberation  and  forethought. 
It  is  equally  removed  from  rashness  on  the  one  hand,  and 
timidity  or  irresolution  on  the  other.  It  consists  in  choosing 
the  best  ends,  and  prosecuting  them  by  the  most  suitable 
means.  It  is  not  only  a virtue  in  itself,  but  necessary  to  give 
lustre  to  all  the  other  virtues. 

“ The  rules  of  prudence  in  general,  like  the  laws  of  the  stone 
tables,  are  for  the  most  part  prohibitive.  Thou  shall  not  is 
their  characteristic  formula : and  it  is  an  especial  part  of 
Christian  prudence  that  it  should  be  so.  Nor  would  it  be  diffi- 
cult to  bring  under  this  head  all  the  social  obligations  that 
arise  out  of  the  relations  of  the  present  life,  which  the  sensual 
understanding  (to  tppovqixa  tij;  eapxos,  Rom.  viii.  C)  is  of  itself 
able  to  discover,  and  the  performance  of  which,  under  favour- 
able cii’cumstances,  the  merest  worldly  self-interest,  without 
love  or  faith,  is  sufficient  to  enforce  ; but  which  Christian  pru- 
dence enlivens  by  a higher  principle  and  renders  symbolic  and 
sacramental  (Ephes.  v.  32). ” 


1 Sherlock,  On  Providence,;  M-Cosh,  Mdh.  of  Div.  Govern b.  ii.,  ch.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


411 


PRUDENCE  — 

“ Morality  may  be  compared  to  the  consonant;  prudence  to 
the  vowel.  The  former  cannot  be  uttered  (reduced  to  prac- 
tice) but  by  means  of  the  latter. 

“ The  Platonic  division  of  the  duties  of  morality  commences 
with  the  prudential  or  the  habit  of  act  and  puqiose  proceeding 
from  enlightened  self-interest  ( qui  animi  imperio,  corporis  ser- 
vitio,  rerum  auxilio,  in  proprium  sui  commodum  et  sibi  prooidus 
utilur,  hunc  esse  prudentem  statuimus ) ; ascends  to  the  moral, 
that  is,  to  the  purifying  and  remedial  virtues ; and  seeks  its 
summit  in  the  imitation  of  the  divine  nature.  In  this  last 
division,  answering  to  that  which  we  have  called  the  spiritual, 
Plato  includes  all  those  inward  acts  and  aspirations,  waitings, 
and  watchings,  which  have  a growth  in  godlikeness  for  their 
immediate  purpose,  and  the  union  of  the  human  soul  with  the 
supreme  good  as  their  ultimate  object."1  — V.  Morality. 

PSYCHISM  (from  soul)  is  the  word  chosen  by  Mons. 

Quesne2  to  denote  the  doctrine  that  there  is  a fluid,  diffused 
throughout  all  nature,  animating  equally  all  living  and  or- 
ganized beings,  and  that  the  difference  which  appears  in  their 
actions  comes  of  their  particular  organization.  The  fluid  is 
general,  the  organization  is  individual. 

This  opinion  differs  from  that  of  Pythagoras,  who  held  that 
the  soul  of  a man  passed  individually  into  the  body  of  a brute. 
Ho  (Mons.  Quesne)  holds  that  while  the  body  dies  the  soul 
does  not ; the  organization  perishes,  but  not  the  psychal  or 
psychical  fluid. 

PSYCHOLOGY  (4* *#»?>  the  soul;  Xoyoj,  discourse.) — The  name 
may  be  new,  but  the  study  is  old.  It  is  recommended  in  the 
saying  ascribed  to  Socrates — Know  thyself.  The  recommen- 
dation is  renewed  in  the  Cogito  ergo  sum  of  Descartes ; and 
in  the  writings  of  Malebranche,  Arnauld,  Leibnitz,  Locke, 
Berkeley,  and  Hume,  psychological  inquiries  held  a prominent 
place.  Still  further  prominence  was  given  to  them  by  the 
followers  of  Kant  and  Reid,  and  psychology , instead  of  being 
partially  treated  as  an  introduction  to  Logic,  to  Ethics,  and  to 
Metaphysics,  which  all  rest  on  it,  is  now  treated  as  a separate 


1 Coleridge,  Aids  to  Reflection,  vol.  i.,  pp.  13,  21,  22. 

* Lettrcs  sur  Ic  Psychismc,  8vo,  Paris,  1852. 


412 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PSYCHOLOGY  — 

department  of  science.  It  is  that  knowledge  of  the  mind  and 
its  faculties  which  we  derive  from  a careful  examination  of 
the  facts  of  consciousness.  Life  and  the  functions  of  our  or- 
ganized body  belong  to  physiology;  and,  although  there  is  a 
close  connection  between  soul  and  body,  and  mutual  action 
and  reaction  between  them,  that  is  no  reason  why  the  two 
departments  of  inquiry  should  be  confounded,  unless  to  those 
who  think  the  soul  to  be  the  product  or  result  of  bodily  orga- 
nization. Broussais  said,  he  could  not  understand  those  phi- 
losophers who  shut  their  eyes  and  their  ears  in  order  to  hear 
themselves  think.  But  if  the  capacity  of  thinking  be  ante- 
rior to,  and  independent  of,  sense  and  bodily  organs,  then  the 
soul  which  thinks,  and  its  faculties  or  powers  of  thinking, 
deserve  a separate  consideration.1 

Mr.  Stewart2  objects  to  the  use  of  the  term  psychology, 
though  it  is  sanctioned  by  Dr.  Campbell  and  Dr.  Boattie,  as 
implying  a hypothesis  concerning  the  nature  or  essence  of  the 
sentient  or  thinking  principle,  altogether  unconnected  with 
our  conclusions  concerning  its  phenomena  and  general  laws. 
The  hypothesis  implied  is  that  the  sentient  or  thinking  prin- 
ciple is  different  in  its  nature  or  essence  from  matter.  But 
this  hypothesis  is  not  altogether  unconnected  with  its  pheno- 
mena. On  the  contrary,  it  is  on  a difference  of  the  pheno- 
mena which  they  present  that  we  ground  the  distinction  be- 
tween mind  and  matter.  It  is  true  that  the  reality  of  the 
distinction  may  be  disputed.  There  are  philosophers  who 
maintain  that  there  is  but  one  substance— call  it  either  matter 
or  mind.  And  the  question,  when  pushed  to  this  extremity, 
cannot  be  solved  by  the  human  intellect.  God  only  knows 
whether  the  two  substances  which  we  call  matter  and  mind 
have  not  something  which  is  common  to  both.  But  the  phe- 
nomena which  they  exhibit  are  so  different  as  to  lead  us  to 
infer  a difference  in  the  cause.  And  all  that  is  implied  in 
using  the  term  psychology  is,  that  the  phenomena  of  the  sen- 
tient or  thinking  principle  are  different  from  the  phenomena 


1 See  Memoire,  pur  Mons.  Jouflroy,  De  la  Legitimite  et  de  la  Distinction  dc  la  Psycho- 
logic et  de  la  Physiologic  (published  in  liis  Nouvcaux  Melanges,  and  also  in  the  11th 
vol,  of  Mcmoircs  dc  V Acad,  dcs  Sciences  Morales  ct  Politiques). 

a Prelim.  Diss.  to  Philosnph.  Essays,  p.  24. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


413 


PSYCHOLOGY  — 

of  matter.  And,  notwithstanding  the  objection  of  Mr.  Stew- 
art, the  term  is  now  current,  especially  on  the  continent  — to 
denote  the  science  of  the  human  mind  as  manifested  by  con- 
sciousness. 

Dr.  Priestley  at  one  time  maintained  the  materiality  of 
mind,  and  at  another  the  spirituality  of  matter.  The  apostle 
speaks  of  a spiritual  body.  A body  which  is  spirit  sounds  to 
us  contradictory. 

Coleridge,  in  his  Treatise  upon  Method,  employs  the  word 
psychological,  and  apologizes  for  using  an  insolens . verbum. 
“ Goclenius  is  remarkable  as  the  author  of  a work,  the  title  of 
which  is  •^vxo’Koyia  (Marburg,  1597).  This  I think  the  first 
appearance  of  psychology,  under  its  own  name,  in  modern 
philosophy.  Goclenius  had,  as  a pupil,  Otto  Casmann,  who 
wrote  Psychologic/,  Anthropologica,  sive  animee  humance  docirina 
(Hanau,  1594).” 1 

Psychology  has  been  divided  into  two  parts — 1.  The  empiri- 
cal, having  for  its  object  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  and 
the  faculties  by  which  they  are  produced.  2.  The  rational, 
having  for  its  object  the  nature  or  substance  of  the  soul,  its 
spirituality,  immutability,  &c. 

Rational  psychology,  which  had  been  chiefly  prosecuted  be- 
fore his  day,  was  assailed  by  Kant,  who  maintained  that  apart 
from  experience  we  can  know  nothing  of  the  soul.  But  even 
admitting  that  psychology  rests  chiefly  on  observation  and 
experience,  we  cannot  well  separate  between  phenomena  and 
their  cause,  nor  consider  the  cause  apart  from  the  phenomena. 
There  are,  however,  three  things  to  which  the  psychologist 
may  successively  attend.  1.  To  the  phenomena  of  conscious- 
ness. 2.  To  the  faculties  to  which  they  may  be  referred. 
3.  To  the  Ego,  that  is,  the  soul  or  mind  in  its  unity,  individu- 
ality, and  personality.  These  three  things  are  inseparable ; 
and  the  consideration  of  them  belongs  to  psychology.  Sub- 
sidiary to  it  are  inquiries  concerning  the  mutual  action  and 
reaction  of  soul  and  body,  the  effect  of  organization,  tempera- 
ment, age,  health,  disease,  country,  climate,  &c. 

Nemesius,  De  Natura  Ilominis ; Buchanan  (David),  Historia 


1 Cousin,  Hist,  nf  Mod.  rhilos.,  translated  by  Wright,  vol.  ii.,  p.  45. 

36* 


414 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


PSYCHOLOGY  — 

Animal  Humana-;  Casmannus,  Psychologia ; Carus,  History 
of  Psychology in  German. 

PSY CHOPANN  YCHISM  (4r^,  soul ; and  rtdv,  all ; ni|,  night 
— the  sleep  of  the  soul)  is  the  doctrine  to  which  Luther 
among  divines,  and  Formey,  among  philosophers,  were  in- 
clined— that  at  death  the  soul  falls  asleep  and  does  not  awake 
till  the  resurrection  of  the  body. 

PYRRHONISM.  — V.  Scepticism,  Academics. 


QUADRIVIUM.  — V.  Tritium. 

QUALITY  {nolo f,  rtoio-rys,  qualis  qualitas,  suchness)  is  the  differ- 
ence which  distinguishes  substances. 

“ There  may  be  substances  devoid  of  quantity,  such  as  the 
intellective  and  immaterial ; but  that  there  should  be  sub- 
stances devoid  of  quality,  is  a thing  hardly  credible,  because 
they  could  not  then  be  characterized  and  distinguished  from 
one  another.” 2 

“ Whatsoever  the  mind  perceives  in  itself,  or  is  the  imme- 
diate object  of  perception,  thought,  or  understanding,  that  I 
call  idea;  and  the  power  to  produce  any  idea  in  our  mind  I 
call  the  quality  of  the  subject  wherein  that  power  is.”3 

“ We  understand  by  a quality  that  which  truly  constitutes 
the  nature  of  a thing  — what  it  is  — what  belongs  to  it  per- 
manentl}-,  as  an  individual,  or  in  common  with  others  like  it 
— not  that  which  passes,  which  vanishes,  and  answers  to  no 
lasting  judgment.  A body  falls:  it  is  a fact,  an  accident:  it 
is  heavy,  that  is  a quality.  Every  fact,  every  accident,  every 
phenomenon,  supposes  a quality  by  which  it  is  produced,  or 
by  which  it  is  undergone  : and  reciprocally  every  quality  of 
things  which  we  know  by  experience  manifests  itself  by  cer- 
tain modes  or  certain  phenomena ; for  it  is  precisely  in  this 
way  that  things  discover  themselves  to  us.”4 

Descartes5  says, — “ Et  hie  quidem  per  modos  plane  idem  in- 


1 8vo,  Leipsig,  1808.  3 Harris,  Phil.  Arrange.,  chap.  8. 

3 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  hook  ii.,  chap.  8,  sect.  8. 

* Diet,  des  Sciences  Philosoph. 

1 Princip.  Philosoph.,  pars  prima,  sect.  5G. 


VOCAEULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


415 


QUALITY— 

telligimus , quod  alibi  per  attributa  vcl  qualitates.  Sed  cum  con- 
sideramus  substantiam  ab  illis  affici,  vel  variari,  vocamus  modes ; 
cum  ab  ista  variations  talem  posse  denominare,  vocamus  quali- 
tates ; ac  denique,  cum  generalius  spedamus  tantum  ea  substantial 
inesse,  vocamus  attributa.  Ideoque  in  Deo  non  proprie  modos 
ant  qualitates  sed  attributa  tantum  esse  dicimus,  quia  nulla  in  eo 
variatio  est  intelligenda.  Et  etiani  in  rebus  creatis,  ea  quee  nun- 
quam  in  iis  diverso  modo  se  liabent,  ut  cxistentia  et  duratio  in  re 
existente  et  durante,  non  qualitates  aut  modi,  sed  attributa  did 
debent.” 

“As  qualities  help  to  distinguish  not  only  one  soul  from  an- 
other soul,  and  one  body  from  another -body,  but  (in  a more 
general  way)  every  soul  from  every  body,  it  follows  that  quali- 
ties, by  having  this  common  reference  to  both,  are  naturally 
divided  into  corporeal  and  incorporeal.”  1 

Hutcheson  also2  reduces  all  qualities  to  two  genera.  Thought, 
— proper  to  mind.  Motion,  — proper  to  matter. 

Qualities  are  distinguished  as  essential,  or  such  as  are  inse- 
parable from  the  substance — as  thought  from  mind,  or  exten- 
sion from  matter;  and  non-essential,  or  such  as  we  can  separate 
in  conception  from  the  substance  — as  passionateness  or  mild- 
ness from  mind,  or  heat  or  cold  from  matter. 

“ With  respect  to  all  kinds  of  qualities,  there  is  one  thing 
. to  be  observed,  that  "some  degree  of  permanence  is  always 
requisite ; else  they  are  not  so  properly  qualities  as  incidental 
affections.  Thus  we  call  not  a man  passionate,  because  he  has 
occasionally  been  angered,  but  because  he  is  prone  to  frequent 
anger ; nor  do  we  say  a man  is  of  a pallid  or  a ruddy  com- 
plexion, because  he  is  red  by  immediate  exercise  or  pale  by 
sudden  fear,  but  when  that  paleness  or  redness  may  be  called 
constitutional.'’3 

On  the  question,  historical  and  critical,  as  to  the  distinction 
of  the  qualities  of  matter  as  primary  or  secondary,  see  Reid’s 
Works,  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton.4 

“Another  division  of  qualities  is  into  natural  and  acquired. 
Thus  in  the  mind,  docility  may  be  called  a natural  quality ; 
science  an  acquired  one  : in  the  human  body,  beauty  may  be 

3 Metaphys.,  part,  i.,  cap.  5. 

4 Note  d. 


1 Harris,  Phil.  Arrange .,  chap.  8. 
3 Harris,  Phil.  Arrange.,  chap.  8. 


416 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


QUALITY  — 

called  a natural  quality ; gentility  (good  carriage)  an  acquired 
one.  This  distinction  descends  even  to  bodies  inanimate.  To 
transmit  objects  of  vision  is  a quality  natural  to  crystal ; but  to 
enlarge  them  while  transmitted,  is  a character  adventitious. 
Even  the  same  quality  may  be  natural  in  one  substance,  as 
attraction  in  the  magnet;  and  acquired  in  another,  as  the  same 
attraction  in  the  magnetic  bar.”  1 — V.  Attribute,  Proposition. 

Quality  (Occult).  — “It  was  usual  with  the  Peripatetics,  when 
the  cause  of  any  phenomena  was  demanded,  to  have  recourse 
to  their  facidties  or  occult  qualities,  and  to  say,  for  instance, 
that  bread  nourished  by  its  nutritive  faculty  { quality ) ; and 
senna  purged  by-  its  purgative.”1  2 

“Were  I to  make  a division  of  the  qualities  of  bodies  as  they 
appear  to  our  senses,  I would  divide  them  first  into  those  that 
are  manifest,  and  those  that  are  occult.  The  manifest  qualities 
are  those  which  Mr.  Locke  calls  primary;  such  as  Extension, 
Figure,  Divisibility,  Motion,  Hardness,  Softness,  Fluidity. 
The  nature  of  these  is  manifest  even  to  sense ; and  the  busi- 
ness of  the  philosopher  with  regard  to  them  is  not  to  find  out 
their  nature,  which  is  well  known,  but  to  discover  the  effects 
produced  by  their  various  combinations ; and,  with  regard  to 
those  of  them  which  are  not  essential  to  matter,  to  discover 
their  causes  as  far  as  he  is  able. 

“ The  second  class  consists  of  occult  qualities,  which  may  be 
subdivided  into  various  kinds;  as  first,  the  secondary  qualities ; 
secondly,  the  disorders  we  feel  in  our  own  bodies;  and  thirdly, 
all  the  qualities  which  we  call  powers  of  bodies,  whether  me- 
chanical, chemical,  medical,  animal,  or  vegetable : or  if  there 
be  any  other  powers  not  comprehended  under  these  heads. 
Of  all  these  the  existence  is  manifest  to  sense,  but  the  nature 
is  occult;  and  here  the  philosopher  has  an  ample  field.”3 
QUANTITY  (rioaov,  quantum,  how  much)  is  defined  by  mathe- 
maticians to  be  “that  which  admits  of  more  or  less.” 

“Mathematics  contain  properly  the  doctrine  of  measure ; 
and  the  object  of  this  science  is  commonly  said  to  be  quantity; 


1 Harris,  lyhil.  Arrange chap.  8. 

‘2  Ilumc,  Dial,  on  Nat.  Rclig part  iv. 

3 Reid,  Inidl.  Dow .,  essay  ii.,  chap.  18 ; Sir  W.  Hamilton;  Discussions , p.  611. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


417 


QUANTITY  — 

therefore,  quantity  ought  to  be  defined,  what  may  he  measured. 
Those  who  have  defined  quantity  to  be  whatever  is  capable  of 
more  or  less,  have  given  too  wide  a notion  of  it,  which,  it  is 
apprehended,  has  led  some  persons  to  apply  mathematical  rea- 
soning to  subjects  that  do  not  admit  of  it.  Pain  and  pleasure 
admit  of  various  degrees,  but  who  can  pretend  to  measure 
them  ?” 1 

“According  to  the  common  definition,  quantity  is  that  which 
is  susceptible  of  augmentation  or  diminution.  But  many 
things  susceptible  of  augmentation  or  diminution,  and  that 
even  in  a continuous  manner,  are  not  quantities.  A sensation, 
painful  or  pleasing,  augments  or  diminishes,  and  runs  through 
different  phases  of  intensity.  But  there  is  nothing  in  common 
between  a sensation  and  quantity.”2 

“There  are  some  quantities  which  may  be  called  proper, 

and  others  improper That  properly  is  quantity 

which  is  measured  by  its  own  kind;  or  which,  of  its  own  nature, 
is  capable  of  being  doubled  or  tripled,  without  taking  in  any 
quantity  of  a different  kind  as  a measure  of  it.  Improper  quan- 
tity is  that  which  cannot  be  measured  by  its  oivn  kind;  but  to 
which  we  assign  a measure  by  the  mean6  of  some  proper 
quantity,  that  is  related  to  it.  Thus  velocity  of  motion,  when 
we  consider  it  by  itself,  cannot  be  measured.”  "We  measure 
it  by  the  space  passed  in  a given  time.3 
Quantity  (Discrete  and  Continuous).  — “In  magnitude  and 
multitude  we  behold  the  two  primary,  the  two  grand  and  com- 
prehensive species,  into  which  the  genus  of  quantity  is  divided ; 
magnitude,  from  its  union,  being  called  quantity  continuous ; 
multitude,  from  its  separation,  quantity  discrete.  Of  the  con- 
tinuous kind  is  every  solid  ; also  the  bound  of  every  solid  : that 
is,  a superficies  ; and  the  bound  of  every  superficies,  that  is,  a 
line ; to  which  may  be  added  those  two  concomitants  of  every 
body,  namely,  time  and  place.  Of  the  discrete  kind  are 
fleets  and  armies,  herds,  flocks,  the  syllables  of  sounds  articu- 
late, &c.”4 

“ Discrete  quantity  is  that  of  which  the  parts  have  no  con- 
tinuity, as  in  number.  The  number,  e.  g.,  of  inches  in  a foot- 


2c 


1 Reid,  Essay  on  Quantity. 
b Reid,  Essay  on  Quantity. 


3 Diet,  dcs  Sciences  Philosnph. 

4 Harris,  Phil.  Arrange .,  chap.  9. 


418 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


QUANTITY  — 

rule,  is  the  same  whether  the  solid  inches  remain  continuous, 
or  are  cut  asunder  and  flung  about  the  world  ; but  they  do  not 
constitute  a foot  length  (which  is  a continuous  quantity ),  un- 
less they  are  so  joined  together  that  the  bounding  lines  of  one 
coincide  with  those  of  another.  Of  continuous  quantities  there 
are  two  kinds;  one,  of  which  the  parts  are  co-cxistcnt,  as  in 
extension ; another,  in  which  the  parts  are  successive,  as  iu 
duration.  Discrete  and  continuous  quantities  are  sometimes 
calied  multitude  and  magnitude.”1 

According  to  Derodon2  quantity  is  either  — 1.  Permanent, 
when  its  parts  are  together  ; or  2.  Successive,  when  they  exist 
some  after  others.  Time  and  motion  are  quantity  successive. 
Permanent  quantity  is  — 1.  Continuous,  as  a line  which  is 
length;  superfeies,  which  is  length  and  breadth;  and  mathe- 
matical hody,  which  is  length,  breadth,  and  depth.  2.  Pis- 
crele,  as  number  and  speech. 

Hutcheson3  notices  magnitude,  time,  and  number,  as  three 
genera  of  quantity. 

Quantity  is  called  discrete  when  the  parts  are  not  connected, 
as  number;  continuous,  when  they  are  connected,  and  then  it 
is  either  successive,  as  time,  motion ; or  permanent,  which  is 
what  is  otherwise  called  space  or  extension,  in  length,  breadth, 
and  depth  ; length  alone  constitutes  lines  ; length  and  breadth, 
surfaces;  and  the  three  together,  solids.4  — F.  Proposition. 
QUIDDITY  or  QUIDITY  (qu  idditas,  from  quid,  what).  — This 
term  was  employed  in  scholastic  philosophy  as  equivalent  to 
the  to  ti  ai'cu  of  Aristotle,  and  denotes  what  was  subse- 
quently called  the  substantial  form.  It  is  the  answer  to  the 
question,  What  is  it?  quid  est?  It  is  that  which  distinguishes 
a thing  from  other  things,  and  makes  it  what  it  is,  and  not 
another.  It  is  synonymous  with  essence,  and  comprehends 
both  the  substance  and  qualities.  For  qualities  belong  to  sub- 
stance, and  by  qualities  substance  manifests  itself.  It  is  the 
known  essence  of  a thing ; or  the  complement  of  all  that 
makes  us  conceive  of  anything  as  we  conceive  of  it,  as  dif- 
ferent from  any  or  every  other  thing. 


1 Fitzgerald,  Notes  to  Aristotle's  Ethics , Syo,  Publin,  1850,  p.  151.  — See  Aristotle  in 

Categor .,  c.  6. 

* Phys.,  pars  1,  cap.  5.  3 Mctaphys part  i.,  cap.  5. 

4 Port  Roy.  Log.,  part  i.,  eh.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


419 


QUIETISM  {<piies,  rest)  “is  the  doctrine  that  the  highest  charac- 
ter of  virtue  consists  in  the  perpetual  contemplation  and  love 
of  supreme  excellence.”  1 * 

The  two  following  propositions  from  Fenelon’s  Maxims  of  ihe 
Saints,  were  condemned  by  Innocent  XII.  in  1699.  1.  There 

is  attainable  in  this  life  a state  of  perfection  in  which  the  ex- 
pectation of  reward  and  the  fear  of  punishment  have  no  place. 
2.  Souls  may  be  so  inflamed  with  love  to  God,  and  so  resigned 
to  his  will,  that  if  they  believed  that  God  had  condemned  them 
to  eternal  pain,  they  would  absolutely  sacrifice  their  salvation. 

Madame  Guyon  thought  she  had  learned  a method  by  which 
souls  might  be  carried  to  such  a state  of  perfection,  that  a con- 
tinual act  of  contemplation  and  love  might  be  substituted  for 
all  other  acts  of  religion. 

A controversy  was  carried  on  by  Fenelon  and  Bossuet  on 
the  subject.  See  a dissertation  by  M.  Bonnel,  De  la  Contro- 
t wse  de  Bossuet  et  Fenelon,  sur  le  Quiitisme; 2 Upham,  Life  of 
Madame*  Guyon. 


RACE.  — Y.  Species. 

RATIO  . — When  two  subjects  admit  of  comparison  with  reference 
to  some  quality  which  they  possess  in  common,  and  which  may 
be  measured,  this  measure  is  their  ratio,  or  the  rate  in  which 
the  one  exceeds  the  other.  With  this  term  is  connected  that 
of  proportion,  which  denotes  the  portions,  or  parts  of  one  mag- 
nitude which  are  contained  in  another.  In  mathematics,  the 
term  ratio  is  used  for  proportion  ; thus,  instead  of  the  propor- 
tion which  one  thing  bears  to  another,  we  say,  the  ratio  which 
one  bears  to  the  other,  meaning  its  comparative  magnitude. 

In  the  following  passage  ratio  is  used  for  reason  or  cause. 
“ In  this  consists  the  ratio  and  essential  ground  of  the  gospel 
doctrine.”3 — V.  Reason. 

RATIOCINATION”.  — “The  conjunction  of  images  with  affirma- 
tions and  negations,  which  make  up  propositions,  and  the 
conjunction  of  propositions  one  to  another,  and  illation  of  con- 
clusions upon  them,  is  ratiocination  or  discourse. 


1 Sumner,  Records  of  Creation,  vol.  ii.,  p.  239. 

a 8vo,  Macon,  1S50.  3 Watcrland,  Worlcs,  vol.  iv,  serin,  i. 


420 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


RATIOCINATION  — 

“ Some  consecutions  arc  so  intimately  and  evidently  con- 
nexed  to,  or  found  in,  the  premises,  that  the  conclusion  is  at- 
tained quasi  per  saltum,  and  without  anything  of  ratiocinutive 
process,  and  as  the  eye  sees  its  objects  immediately  and  with- 
out any  previous  discourse.”  1 

“ The  schoolmen  make  a third  act  of  the  mind  which  they 
call  ratiocination,  and  we  may  style  it  the  generation  of  a 
judgment  from  others  actually  in  our  understanding.” 2 
“ When  from  a general  proposition,  by  combining  it  with 
other  propositions,  we  infer  a proposition  of  the  same  degree 
of  generality  with  itself,  or  a less  general  proposition,  or  a 
proposition  merely  individual,  the  process  is  ratiocination  (or 
syllogism).”3  — F.  Reasoning. 

RATIONALE.  — “ The  chairs  of  theology  and  philosophy  (during 
the  scholastic  ages)  were  the  oracular  seats  from  which  the 
doctrines  of  Aristotle  were  expounded,  as  the  rationale  of 
theological  and  moral  truth.”4 * 

“ There  cannot  be  a body  of  rules  without  a rationale,  and 
this  rationale  constitutes  the  science.  There  were  poets  before 
there  were  rules  of  poetical  composition  ; but  before  Aristotle, 
or  Horace,  or  Boileau,  or  Pope  could  write  their  arts  of  poetry 
and  criticism,  they  had  considered  the  reasons  on  which  their 
precepts  rested,  they  had  conceived  in  their  own  minds  a 
theory  of  the  art.  In  like  manner  there  were  navigators 
before  there  was  an  art  of  navigation ; but  before  the  art  of 
navigation  could  teach  the  methods  of  finding  the  ship’s  place 
by  observations  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  the  science  of  astro- 
nomy must  have  explained  the  system  of  the  world.”6 

Anthony  Sparrow,  bishop  of  Exeter,  is  the  author  of  a work 
entitled,  A Ilationale  vpon  the  Book  of  Common  Prayer. 6 — F. 
Science,  Art. 

RATIONALISM,  in  philosophy,  is  opposed  to  sensualism,  sen- 
suism,  or  sensism,  according  to  all  which,  all  our  knowledge  is 
derived  from  sense.  It  is  also  opposed  to  empiricism,  which 


1 Ilale,  Prim.  Orig.  of  ManJdnd,  pp.  50,  51. 

2 Tucker,  Light  of  Nature , vol.  i.,  part  i.,  c.  11,  sect.  13. 

* Mill,  Log.,  2d  edit.,  vol.  i.,  p.  223. 

4 Hampden,  On  Scholastic  Philosophy , lect.  i.,  p.  9. 

8 Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  Method  of  Ohscrv.  in  Politics , cliap.  19,  sect.  2. 

6 12mo,  Lond.,  1C08. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


421 


RATIONALISM  — 

refers  all  our  knowledge  to  sensation  and  reflection,  or  expe- 
rience. According  to  rationalism,  reason  furnishes  certain 
elements,  without  which  experience  is  not  possible.  The  phi- 
losophy of  Condillac  is  of  the  former  kind,  — that  of  Royer 
Collard  of  the  latter.  The  philosophy  of  Locke  and  Reid  have 
been  contrasted  in  the  same  manner,  but  not  quite  correctly. 
— V.  Sensism,  Sensuism,  Sensualism. 

RATIONALISM,  in  religion,  as  opposed  to  supernaluralism, 
means  the  adoption  of  reason  as  our  sufficient  and  only  guide, 
exclusive  of  tradition  and  revelation.  Spinoza,  in  his  Trac- 
tatus  Theologico-Politicus,  tried  to  explain  all  that  is  super- 
natural in  religion  by  reason.  And  Strauss  and  others  in 
modern  Germany  have  carried  this  line  of  speculation  much 
farther. 

RATIONALISTS.  — “The  empirical  philosophers  are  like  pis- 
mires ; they  only  lay  up  and  use  their  store.  The  rationalists 
are  like  the  spiders ; they  spin  all  out  of  their  own  bowels. 
But  give  me  a philosopher,  who,  like  the  bee,  hath  a middle 
faculty,  gathering  from  abroad,  but  digesting  that  which  is 
gathered  by  his  own  virtue." 1 

REAL  (The).— “ There  is  no  arguing  from  ideal  to  real  existence, 
unless  it  could  first  be  shown,  that  such  ideas  must  have  their 
objective  realities,  and  cannot  be  accounted  for,  as  they  pass 
within,  except  it  be  by  supposing  such  and  such  real  exist- 
ences, ad  extra,  to  answer  them.”2 

The  term  real  always  imports  the  existent.  It  is  used  — 

1.  As  denoting  the  existent,  as  opposed  to  the  non-existent, 
something,  as  opposed  to  nothing. 

2.  As  opposed  to  the  nominal  or  verbal,  the  thing  to  the 
name. 

3.  As  synonymous  with  actual,  and  thus  opposed  — 1.  To 
potential,  and  2.  To  possible,  existence. 

4.  As  denoting  the  absolute  in  opposition  to  th & phenomenal, 
things  in  themselves  in  opposition  to  things  as  they  appear  to 
us,  relatively  to  our  faculties. 

5.  As  indicating  a subsistence  in  nature  in  opposition  to  a 
representation  in  thought,  ens  reale,  as  opposed  to  ens  rationis. 


* Bacon,  Apophthegms. 

37 


a Waterland,  Works,  yol.  iv.,  p.  435. 


422 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


REAL  — 

(3.  As  opposed  to  logical  or  rational,  a thing  -which  in  itself, 
or  really,  re,  is  one,  may  logically,  ratione,  he  considered  as 
diverse  or  plural,  and  vice  versa.'  — V.  Virtual. 

REALISM,  as  opposed  to  idealism,  is  the  doctrine  that  in  per- 
ception there  is  an  immediate  or  intuitive  cognition  of  the 
external  object,  while  according  to  idealism  our  knowledge  of 
an  external  world  is  mediate  and  representative,  i.e.,  by  means 
of  ideas.  — V.  Idea,  and  Idealism.1 2 
REALISM,  as  opposed  to  nominalism,  is  the  doctrine  that  genus 
and  species  are  real  things,  existing  independently  of  our  con- 
ceptions and  expressions  ; and  that  as  in  the  case  of  singular 
terms,  there  is  some  real  individual  corresponding  to  each,  so, 
in  common  terms  also,  there  is  something  corresponding  to 
each;  which  is  the  object  of  our  thoughts,  when  we  employ 
the  term.3 

Cousin  has  said  that  the  Middle  Age  is  but  a development 
of  a phrase  of  Porphyry,4 * *  which  has  been  thus  translated  by 
Boethius — Mox  dc  generibus  et  speciebus  Mud  quidem  sive  sub- 
sistant,  sive  in  solis  nudis  intellectibus  posita  sint,  sive  subsistan- 
iia  corporalia  sint  an  incorporalia,  et  utrum  separata  a sensibi- 
libus  an  in  sensibilibus  posita  et  citra  hcec  consistentia,  dicere 
recusabo.  — V.  Conceptualism,  Nominalism.  — See  Chretien, 
Log.  Meth.f  Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought ,° 
REASON  [Ratio,  from  reor,  to  think). — “ The  word  reason  in  the 
English  language  has  different  significations ; sometimes  it  is 
taken  for  true  and  clear  principles ; sometimes  for  clear  and 
fair  deductions  from  these  principles ; and  sometimes  for  the 
cause,  and  particularly  the  final  cause.  But  the  consideration 
I shall  have  of  it  here  is  in  a signification  different  from  all 
these; Land  that  is,  as  it  stands  for  a faculty  in  man,  that 
faculty  whereby  man  is  supposed  to  be  distinguished  from 
beasts,7  and  wherein  it  is  evident  he  much  surpasses  them.”8 

1 Sir  William  Hamilton,  Reid’s  Works , note  b. 

a Ibid.,  note  c;  Edin.  Rev.,  vol.  lii.,  pp.  175-181. 

3 Whately,  Log,,  book  iv.,  ch.  5,  § 1.  4 Isagoge,  cb.  1. 

8 Ch.  3.  . 0 Part  i.,  sect.  23. 

1 La  liaison,  dans  sa  definition  la  plus  simple,  est  1ft  faculty  de  comprendre,  qu’il  ne 

faut  pas  a confoudre  avec  la  faculty  de  connaitre.  En  effet  les  animaux  connaissent  ils 

ne  paraissent  pas  comprendre,  et  c'est  la  qui  les  distingue  do  Ihomrae. — Jouffroy,  Droit. 
Nat .,  tom.  i.,  p.  38. 

8 Locke,  Essay  on  Ilim.  Understand .,  book  Iv.,  chap.  17. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


423 


REASON  — 

“All  the  operations  of  the  mind  when  it  thinks  of  the 
qualities  of  things  separately  from  the  things  to  -which  they 
belong ; or  -when  it  forms  general  notions,  and  employs  gene- 
ral terms;  or  -when  it  judges  of  the  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of  different  things ; or  -when  it  dra-ws  inferences  ; are 
comprehended  under  the  term  reason.  Reason  seems  chiefly 
to  consist  in  the  po-wer  to  keep  such  or  such  thoughts  in  the 
mind  ; and  to  change  them  at  pleasure  ; instead  of  their  fiow- 
ing  through  the  mind  as  in  dreams : also  in  the  power  to  see 
the  difference  between  one  thought  and  another,  and  so  com- 
pare, separate,  or  join  them  together  afresh.  Though  animals 
seem  to  have  some  little  power  to  perform  these  operations, 
man  has  so  much  more  of  it,  that  he  alone  is  said  to  be  en- 
dowed with  reason."  1 

“ This  word  is  used  to  signify — 1.  All  the  intellectual  powers 
collectively.  2.  Those  intellectual  powers  exclusively  in  which 
man  differs  from  brutes.  3.  The  faculty  of  carrying  on  the 
operation  of  reasoning.  4.  The  premiss  or  premises  of  an 
argument,  especially  the  minor  premiss  ; and  it  is  from  reason 
in  this  sense  that  the  word  reasoning  is  derived.  5.  A cause, 
as  when  we  say  that  the  reason  of  an  eclipse  of  the  sun  is,2 
that  the  moon  is  interposed  between  it  and  the  earth.”3 4 

“ In  common  and  popular  discourse,  reason  denotes  that 
power  by  which  we  distinguish  truth  from  falsehood,  and  right 
from  wrong ; and  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  combine  means 
for  the  attainment  of  particular  ends.”-1 

“ Reason  is  used  sometimes  to  express  the  whole  of  those 
powers  which  elevate  man  above  the  brutes,  and  constitute 
his  rational  nature,  more  especially,  perhaps,  his  intellectual 
powers;  sometimes  to  express  the  power  of  deduction  or  argu- 
mentation.”5 

Considering  it  as  a word  denoting  a faculty  or  complement 

1 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

a The  idea  of  the  reason  is  higher  than  that  of  cause.  The  ground  or  reason  of  all 
existence,  actual  or  possible,  is  the  existence  of  God.  Had  He  not  existed,  npthing  could 
ever  have  existed.  But  God  is  the  cause  only  of  such  things  as  he  has  created  in  time ; 
while  he  is  the  ground  or  reason  of  everything  possible. 

8 "Whateiy,  Log .,  Appendix  i. 

4 Stewart,  Elements , vol.  ii.,  chap.  1. 

c Ibid.,  Outlines,  part  ii.,  chap.  1,  sect.  G. 


424 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


REASON  — 

of  faculties,  Sir  W.  Hamilton1  says,  “Reason  has  been  em- 
ployed to  denote  — 

“ 1.  Our  intelligent  nature  in  general,  as  distinguished  from 
the  lower  cognitive  faculties,  as  sense,  imagination,  and  me- 
mory ; and  in  contrast  to  the  feelings  and  desires,  including 
— 1.  Conception;  2.  Judgment;  3.  Reasoning;  4.  Intelli- 
gence ; iW'j. 

“ 2.  The  right  and  regular  use  of  our  rational  faculties. 

“ 3.  The  dianoetic  and  noetic  functions  of  reason,  as  by 
Reid.2 

“ The  dianoetic  function  or  ratiocination,  as  by  Reid  in  his 
Inquiry ,3 

“ 5.  The  noetic  function  or  common  sense.  And  by  Kant 
and  others  opposed  to  the  understanding  as  comprehending 
the  other  functions  of  thought.” 

REASON  (Spontaneity  of).  — “I  call  spontaneity  of  reason,  the 
development  of  reason  anterior  to  reflection,  the  power  which 
reason  has  to  seize  at  first  upon  truth,  to  comprehend  it  and 
to  admit  it,  without  demanding  and  rendering  to  itself  an 
account  of  it.”4 

REASON  AND  UNDERSTANDING.  — “ Pure  reason  or  intui- 
tion holds  a similar  relation  to  the  understanding  that  percep- 
tion holds  to  sensation.  As  sensation  reveals  only  subjective 
facts,  while  perception  involves  a direct  intuition  of  the 
objective  world  around  us ; so  with  regard  to  higher  truths 
and  laws,  the  understanding  furnishes  merely  the  subjective 
forms  in  which  they  may  be  logically  stated,  while  intuition 
brings  us  face  to  face  with  the  actual  matter,  or  reality  of 
truth  itself.”5 

“ The  faculty  of  thought  manifests  itself  both  as  understand- 
ing and  reason.  By  the  understanding  we  inquire  after  and 
investigate  the  grounds,  causes,  and  conditions  of  our  repre- 
sentations, feelings,  and  desires,  and  of  those  objects  standing 
in  immediate  connection  with  them  ; by  reason  we  inquire 


1 Reid's  Works , note  A,  sect.  5. 

2 Intell.  Pow.,  essay  vi.,  chap.  2. 

3 Introd.,  sect.  3,  chnp.  2,  sect.  5 and  7. 

4 Cousin,  Hist,  of  Mod.  Philos .,  vol.  i.,  p.  113. 

* Morally  Philos,  of  Relit/.,  p.  19. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


425 


REASON  — 

after  ultimaie  grounds,  causes,  and  conditions.  By  the  under- 
standing we  evolve  rules  for  the  regulation  of  our  desiring 
faculty;  by  reason  we  subordinate  these  rules  to  a higher  law, 
to  a law  which  determines  the  unconditioned  form,  the  highest 
end  of  acting.  Through  the  power  of  thought,  therefore,  our 
knowledge,  both  theoretical  and  practical,  is  comprehended  in 
unity,  connection,  and  in  being.”1 

“ By  the  understanding , I mean  the  faculty  of  thinking  and 
forming  judgments  on  the  notices  furnished  by  the  sense,  ac- 
cording to  certain  rules  existing  in  itself,  which  rules  consti- 
tute its  distinct  nature.  By  the  pure  reason,  I mean  the  power 
by  which  we  become  possessed  of  principles  (the  eternal  veri- 
ties of  Plato  and  Descartes)  and  of  ideas  (?i.  b.,  not  images), 
as  the  ideas  of  a point,  a line,  a circle,  in  mathematics ; and 
of  justice,  holiness,  free-will,  &c.,  in  morals.  Hence  in  works 
of  pure  science,  the  definitions  of  necessity  precede  the  reason- 
ing; in  other  works  they  more  aptly  form  the  conclusion.” 2 
“ The  definition  and  proper  character  of  man — that,  namely, 
which  should  contradistinguish  him  from  other  animals,  is  to 
betaken  from  his  reason  rather  than  his  understanding;  in 
regard  that  in  other  creatures  there  may  be  something  of 
understanding,  but  there  is  nothing  of  reason.”3 

In  the  philosophy  of  Kant  the  understanding  is  distinguished 
from  the  reason  — 

1.  By  the  sphere  of  their  action.  The  sphere  of  the  under- 
standing is  coincident  with  the  sensible  world,  and  cannot 
transcend  it ; but  the  reason  ascends  to  the  super-sensuous. 

2.  By  the  objects  and  results  of  their  exercise.  The  under- 
standing deals  with  conceptions,  the  reason  with  ideas.  The 
knowledge  obtained  by  the  understanding  is  particular  and 
contingent,  the  product  of  the  reason  is  necessary  and  univer- 
sal knowledge  or  truth.4 

- “ The  faculty  which  combines  the  simple  perceptions,  and 
so  gives  the  knowledge  of  the  complex  objects,  has  been  called 
the  understanding.  It  is  an  energy  of  the  mind  as  intelligent. 

1 Tenneman,  Grundriss,  sect.  41.  3 Coleridge,  Friend,  pp.  150,  151. 

3 Harrington,  quoted  in  Aids  to  Reflection,  vol.  i.,  p.  162. 

* Crit.  of  Pure  Reason,  see  English  translat.,  pp.  7,  20,  57,  268,  7,  277,  Prolegomena, 
sect.  59.  See  also  Morell,  Philos,  of  Relig.,  chap.  2;  and  Philos.  Tendencies,  p.  71;  Cole- 
ridge, Aids  to  Reflection. 

37* 


426 


VOCABULARY  01'  PHILOSOPHY. 


REASON  — 

It  is  an  ultimate  fact  of  knowledge,  that  the  mind  is  conscious 
of  itself  as  unity,  of  the  world  as  diversity.  The  outward 
world  is  seen  as  diverse  through  the  various  sensations,  hut  is 
bound  in  certain  relations  — those  of  space — which  are  inde- 
pendent of  the  perceiving  subject.  The  mind  requires  a cause 
external  to  itself,  of  the  constant  representation  of  unity  in 
diversity,  no  less  than  of  the  representation  of  different  quali- 
ties. The  reason,  therefore,  in  virtue  of  its  causal  principle, 
refers  these  relations  to  the  object.  Precisely  as  the  intelli- 
gence refers  the  single  perception  to  an  external  cause,  so  it 
refers  the  combination  of  perceptions  to  one  object.  The 
understanding  is  thus  the  same  faculty  with  the  reason,  but  in 
certain  particular  applications.”  1 

“ The  assertion  of  a faculty  of  the  mind  by  which  it  appre- 
hends truth,  which  faculty  is  higher  than  the  discursive  rea- 
son, as  the  truth  apprehended  by  it  is  higher  than  mere  demon- 
strative truth,  agrees  with  the  doctrine  taught  and  insisted  on 
by  the  late  Samuel  Taylor  Coleridge.  And  so  far  as  he  was 
the  means  of  inculcating  this  doctrine,  which  is  the  doctrine  of 
Plato,  and,  I might  add,  of  Aristotle,  and  of  many  other  philo- 
sophers, let  him  have  due  honour.  But  in  his  desire  to  impress 
the  doctrine  upon  men’s  minds,  he  combined  it  with  several 
other  tenets,  which  will  not  bear  examination.  He  held  that 
the  two  faculties  by  which  these  two  kinds  of  truth  are  appre- 
hended, and  which  our  philosophical  writers  call  the  intuitive 
reason,  and  the  discursive  reason,  may  be  called,  and  ought  to 
be  called  respectively,  the  reason  and  the  understanding  ; and 
that  the  second  of  these  is  of  the  nature  of  the  instinct  of 
animals,  so  as  to  be  something  intermediate  between  reason 
and  instinct.  These  opinions,  I may  venture  to  say,  are  alto- 
gether erroneous.  The  intuitive  reason  and  the  discursive 
reason  are  not,  by  any  English  writers,  called  the  reason  and 
the  understanding ; and  accordingly,  Coleridge  has  had  to  alter 
all  the  passages,  viz.,  those  taken  from  Leighton,  Harrington, 
and  Bacon,  from  which  his  exposition  proceeds.  The  under- 
standing is  so  far  from  being  especially  the  discursive  or  rea- 
soning faculty,  that  it  is,  in  universal  usage,  and  by  our  best 
writers,  opposed  to  the  discursive  or  reasoning  faculty.  Thus 


1 R.  A.  Thomson,  Christian  Theism,  book  i.,  chap.  3. 


VOCABULABY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


427 


REASON  — 

this  is  expressly  declared  by  Sir  John  Davies  in  his  poem 
‘ On  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul.’  He  says  of  the  soul : — 

‘When  she  rales  things,  and  moves  from  ground  to  ground, 

The  name  of  reason  {ratio)  she  acquires  from  this; 

But  when  by  reason  she  the  truth  hath  found, 

And  standeth  fixt,  she  understanding  is.’ 

“Instead  of  the  reason  being  fixed,  and  the  understanding 
discursive,  as  Mr.  Coleridge  says,  the  reason  is  distinctively 
discursive ; that  is,  it  obtains  conclusions  by  running  from  one 
point  to  another.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  discursus ; or 
taking  the  full  term,  discursus  rationis,  discourse  of  reason. 
Understanding  is  fixed,  that  is,  it  dwells  upon  one  view  of  a 
subject,  and  not  upon  the  steps  by  which  that  view  is  obtained. 
The  verb  to  reason  implies  the  substantive,  the  reason,  though 
it  is  not  co-extensive  with  it ; for,  as  I have  said,  there  is  the 
intuitive  reason  as  well  as  the  discursive  reason.  But  it  is 
by  the  faculty  of  reason  that  we  are  capable  of  reasoning ; 
though  undoubtedly  the  practice  or  the  pretence  of  reasoning 
may  be  carried  so  far  as  to  seem  at  variance  with  reason  in  the 
more  familiar  sense  of  the  term ; as  is  the  case  also  in  French. 
. . Molifere’s  Crisale  says  (in  the  Femmes  Savantes)  — 

‘Raisonncr  est  l’emploi  de  toute  ma  maison 
Et  le  raisonnement  en  bannit  la  Raison 

“If  Mr.  Coleridge’s  assertion  were  true  that  the  understand- 
ing is  the  discursive  and  the  reason  the  fixed  faculty,  we 
should  be  justified  in  saying  that  the  understanding  is  the 
faculty  by  which  we  reason,  and  the  reason  is  the  faculty  by 
which  we  understand.  But  this  is  not  so.  . . . 

“Mr.  Coleridge’s  object  in  his  speculations  is  nearly  the 
same  as  Plato’s,  viz.,  to  declare  that  there  is  a truth  of  a higher 
kind  than  can  be  obtained  by  mere  reasoning ; and  also  to 
claim,  as  portions  of  this  higher  truth,  certain  fundamental 
doctrines  of  morality.  Among  these  Mr.  Coleridge  places  the 
authority  of  conscience,  and  Plato  the  supreme  good.  Mr. 
Coleridge  also  holds,  as  Plato  held,  that  the  reason  of  man  in 
its  highest  and  most  comprehensive  form,  is  a portion  of  a 
supreme  and  universal  reason  ; and  leads  to  truth,  not  in  virtue 
of  its  special  attributes  in  each  person,  but  by  its  own  nature. 


428 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


REASON  — 

“ The  view  thus  given  of  that  higher  kind  of  knowledge 
which  Plato  and  Aristotle  place  above  ordinary  science,  as 
being  the  knowledge  of  and  faculty  of  learning  first  principles, 
will  enable  us  to  explain  some  expressions  which  might  other- 
wise be  misunderstood.  Socrates,  in  the  concluding  part  of 
the  Sixth  Book  of  the  Republic,  says,  that  this  kind  of  know- 
ledge is  ‘that  of  which  the  reason  (xoyo;)  takes  hold,1  in  virtue 
of  its  power  of  reasoning.’  Here  we  are  plainly  not  to  under- 
stand that  we  arrive  at  first  principles  by  reasoning ; for  the 
very  opposite  is  true,  and  is  here  taught,  viz.,  that  first  prin- 
ciples are  not  what  we  reason  to,  but  what  we  reason  from. 
The  meaning  of  this  passage  plainly  is,  that  first  principles 
are  those  of  which  the  reason  takes  hold  in  virtue  of  its  power 
of  reasoning;  they  are  the  conditions  which  must  exist  in 
order  to  make  any  reasoning  possible ; they  are  the  proposi- 
tions which -the  reason  must  involve  implicitly,  in  order  that 
we  may  reason  explicitly ; they  are  the  intuitive  roots  of  the 
dialectical  power. 

“ Plato’s  views  may  be  thus  exhibited : — 


Intelligible  World,  vonrdv. 

■ — 

Visible  World,  hpardv. 

Object 

Ideas. 

Ideal. 

Conceptions. 

Sidvoia. 

Things. 

£<2a, 

Images. 

cUdites. 

Process.... 

Intuition. 

Demonstration. 

Belief. 

Conjecture. 

vdrjais. 

im<TTrjprj. 

TTiartg. 

eUuoia. 

Faculties. 

Intuitive 

Reason. 

vovs. 

Discursive 

Reason. 

\6yos. 

Sensation. 

a'iaOrjois. 

From  a paper  by  Dr.  Whewell,  On  the  Intellectual  Rowers 
according  to  Plato.'1 — V.  Understanding. 

Reason  (Impersonal). — Reason,  according  to  Cousin  and  other 
French  philosophers,  is  the  faculty  by  which  we  have  know- 
ledge of  the  infinite  and  the  absolute,  and  is  impersonal. 

“ Licet  cnim  intellectus  meus  sit  individuus  et  separalus  ab 


1 Trj  mu  SiaXiytadiu  6vvd/iti. 
a Iii  the  Cambridge  Philos.  Trans.,  1855. 


VOCABULARY  OB  PHILOSOPHY. 


429 


REASON— 

intellectu  tuo,  iamen  secundum,  quod  est  individmts  non  habet 
universale  in  ipso,  et  ideo  non  individuatur  id  quod  est  in  intel- 
lectu. . . . Sic  igitur  universale  ut  universale  est  ubique  et 

semper  idem  omnino  et  idem  in  animabus  omnium,  non  recipiens 
individuationem  ab  anima.” 

These  words  are  quoted  from  Averhdes,  by  Mons.  Haureau,1 
who  exclaims,  “ Yoila  la  th&se  de  l’intelligence  ou  de  la  raison 
impersonellel”  But  the  truth  is,  that  the  root  and  germ  of 
this  doctrine  may  be  found  in  the  doctrine  of  Plato,  that 
human  reason  is  a ray  of  the  Divine  reason. 

11  He  the  great  Father!  kindled  at  one  flame 
The  world  as  rational  — one  spirit  pour’d 
From  spirit’s  awful  fountain,  poured  Himself 
Through  all  their  souls,  hut  not  in  equal  stream: 

Profuse  or  frugal  of  the  inspiring  God, 

As  His  wise  plan  demanded;  and  when  past 
Their  various  trials  in  their  common  spheres 
(If  they  continue  rational  as  made) 

Resorbs  them  all  into  himself  again, 

His  throne  their  centre,  and  His  smile  their  crown.” — Young. 

“In  truth,”  observes  Eenelon,2  “my  reason  is  in  myself,  for 
it  is  necessary  that  I should  continually  turn  inward  upon  my- 
self in  order  to  find  it ; but  the  higher  reason  which  corrects 
me  when  I need  it,  and  which  I consult,  is  not  my  own,  it  does 
not  specially  make  a part  of  myself.  Thus,  that  which  may 
seem  most  our  own,  and  to  be  the  foundation  of  our  being,  I 
mean  our  reason,  is  that  which  we  are  to  believe  most  bor- 
rowed. We  receive  at  every  moment  a reason  superior  to  our 
own,  just  as  we  breathe  an  air  which  is  not  ourselves.  There 
is  an  internal  school,  where  man  receives  what  he  can  neither 
acquire  outwardly  for  himself,  nor  learn  of  other  men  who 
live  by  alms  like  himself.” 

“While  we  reflect  on  our  own  idea  of  reason,  we  know  that 
our  souls  are  not  it,  but  only  partake  of  it ; and  that  we  have 
it  seat'd  nlds^iv,  and  not  xara  ovalqv.  Neither  can  it  be  called 
a faculty,  but  rather  a light,  which  we  enjoy,  but  the  source 
of  which  is  not  in  ourselves,  nor  rightly  by  any  individual  to 
be  denominated  mine.”3 

1 In  his  Examen  de  la  Philos.  Scolastique,  tom.  i.,  p.  69. 

a Existence  of  God , chap,  iv.,  sect.  3. 

3 John  Smith,  Posthumous  Tracts , 1660.  See  Coleridge,  Liter.  Rem.,  vol.  iii.,  p.  464. 


430 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


REASON  — 

“ Reason  is  impersonal  in  its  nature,”  says  Cousin,1  “ it  is 
not  -we  who  make  it.  It  is  so  far  from  being  individual,  that 
its  peculiar  characteristics  are  the  opposite  of  individuality, 
viz.,  universality  and  necessity  ; since  it  is  to  reason  that  we 
owe  the  knowledge  of  universal  and  necessary  truths,  of  prin- 
ciples which  we  all  obey  and  cannot  hut  obey.”  ....  “It 
descends  from  God  and  approaches  man  ; it  makes  its  appear- 
ance in  the  consciousness  as  a guest  who  brings  intelligence  of 
an  unknown  world,  of  which  it  at  once  presents  the  idea  and 
awakens  the  want.  If  reason  were  personal  It  would  have  no 
value,  no  authority  beyond  the  limits  of  the  individual  subject. 
. . . . Reason  is  a revelation,  a necessary  and  universal 

revelation  which  is  wanting  to  no  man,  and  which  enlightens 
every  man  on  his  coming  into  the  world.  Reason  is  the  neces- 
sary mediator  between  God  and  man,  the  ?.oyo$  of  Pythagoras 
and  Plato,  the  Word  made  flesh,  which  serves  as  the  interpre- 
ter of  God,  and  the  teacher  of  man,  divine  and  human  at  the 
same  time.  It  is  not,  indeed,  the  absolute  God  in  his  majestic 
individuality,  but  his  manifestation  in  spirit  and  in  truth  ; it 
is  not  the  Being  of  beings,  but  it  is  the  revealed  God  of  the 
human  race.” 2 

“ Reason  or  intelligence  is  not  individual,  is  not  ours,  is  not 
even  human ; it  is  absolute,  it  is  divine.  What  is  personal  to 
us  is  our  free  and  voluntary  activity ; what  is  not  free  and  not 
voluntary  is  adventitious  to  man,  and  does  not  constitute  an 
integrant  part  of  his  individuality.  Intelligence  is  conversant 
with  truth ; truth  as  necessary  and  universal  is  not  the  crea- 
ture of  my  volition  ; and  reason,  which,  as  the  subject  of  truth 
is  also  universal  and  necessary,  is  consequently  impersonal. 
We  see,  therefore,  by  a light  which  is  not  ours ; and  reason  is 
a revelation  of  God  in  man.  The  ideas  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious belong  not  to  us,  but  to  absolute  intelligence.”  — Sir 
Will.  Hamilton,3  giving  the  views  of  Cousin. 

This  doctrine  of  the  impersonal  reason  is  regarded  by  Bouil- 
lier4  and  others  as  the  true  ground  of  all  certainty.  Admit 
the  personality  of  reason  and  man  becomes  the  measure  of  all 


1 Expos,  of  Eclecticism,  translated  by  Ripley,  p.  69. 

3 Discussions,  &c.,  8vo,  Lond.,  1852,  p.  8. 

4 Theorie  dc  la  Raison  impersonellc,SYO,  Paris,  1816. 


3 Ibid.,  p.  79. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


431 


REASON  — 

things  — truth  is  individual.  But  the  truths  of  reason  are 
universal.  No  one,  says  Malebranche,  can  feel  the  pain  which 
I feel ; hut  any  one  or  every  one  can  contemplate  the  truth 
which  I know.  The  scepticism  of  Kant,  as  to  the  relative 
nature  of  our  knowledge,  is  thus  demolished. 

REASON  (Determining  or  Sufficient).  — “ There  are  two  great 
principles  of  reasoning  : the  one  is  the  principle  of  contradic- 
tion, which  means  that  of  two  contradictory  propositions,  the 
one  is  true,  the  other  false:  the  other  is  the  principle  of 
raison  determinants,  which  is  that  nothing  happens  without  a 
cause,  or  at  least  a reason  determining,  that  is,  something 
which  may  serve  to  render  a reason  a priori,  why  that  thing 
is  as  it  is  rather  than  otherwise.”  1 

“Nothing  is  done  without  a sufficient  reason,  that  is,  nothing 
happens  without  its  being  possible  to  him  who  knew  things 
sufficiently  to  render  a reason  which  is  sufficient  to  determine 
why  it  is  so,  and  not  otherwise.”2 — V.  Sufficient  Reason. 

REASONING,  “ in  one  of  its  acceptations,  means  syllogising, 
or  the  mode  of  inference  which  may  be  called  concluding  from 
generals  to  particulars.  In  another  of  its  senses,  to  reason  is 
simply  to  infer  any  assertion,  from  assertions  already  ad- 
mitted : and  in  this  sense  induction  is  as  much  entitled  to  be 
called  reasoning  as  the  demonstrations  of  geometry.  Writers 
on  Logic  have  generally  preferred  the  former  acceptation  of 
the  term  ; the  latter  and  more  extensive  signification  is  that  in 
which  I mean  to  use  it.”3 

“ Reasoning  is  that  operation  of  the  mind  through  which  it 
forms  one  judgment  from  many  others  ; as  when,  for  instance, 
having  judged  that  true  virtue  ought  to  be  referred  to  God, 
and  that  the  virtue  of  the  heathens  was  not  referred  to  him, 
we  thence  conclude  that  the  virtue  of  the  heathens  was  not 
true  virtue.”4 

“Some  appear  to  include  under  the  title  of  reasoning  every 
case  in  which  a person  believes  one  thing  in  consequence  of 
his  believing  another  thing,  however  far  he  may  be  from 
having  any  grounds  to  warrant  the  inference ; and  they  ac- 


1 Leibnitz.  Theodicee , partie  1,  sect.  44. 
a Ibid.,  Principles  de  la  Nat.  et  de  la  Grace , sect.  7. 

8 Mill,  Log.,  2d  edit.,  vol.  i.,  p.  3.  4 Port  Roy.  Log. 


432 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


REASONING  — 

cordingly  include  those  processes  which  take  place  in  the 
minds  of  infants  and  of  brutes;  which  are  apt  to  associate  with 
the  appearance  of  an  object  before  them  the  remembered  im- 
pression of  something  that  formerly  accompanied  it.  Such  a 
process  is  attended  to  in  the  familiar  proverbs  that  ‘ a burnt 
child  dreads  the  fire or,  as  it  is  expressed  in  another  form, 
‘ the  scalded  cat  fears  cold  water or  again  in  the  Hebrew 
proverb,  ‘ he  who  has  been  bitten  by  a serpent  is  afraid  of  a 
rope.’  Most  logical  writers,  however,  have  confined  the  name 
of  reasoning  to  valid  argument;  which  cannot  exist  without  a 
universal  premiss,  implied,  if  not  expressed.”1 

Mr.  Stewart  says  that  to  adapt  means  to  a proximate  end  is 
to  reason. 

RECOLLECTION.  — V.  Remembrance. 

RECTITUDE.—1  1 Rectitude  of  conduct  is  intended  to  express  the 
term  xa-topOaacs,  which  Cicero  translates  recta  effectio : xa-rop- 
dco/xa  he  translates  rectum  factum.'1  Now  the  definition  of 
xaropOu/xa  was  vofxov  rtpoarayfxa,  ‘A  thing  commanded  by  law7 
(that  is,  by  the  law  of  nature,  the  universal  law).  Antoninus, 
speaking  of  the  reasoning  faculty,  how,  without  looking  far- 
ther, it  rests  contented  in  its  own  energies,  adds,  ‘ for  which 
reason  are  all  actions  of  this  species  called  rectitudes  (xowop- 
Ouh jfij,  xatd  op8os,  right  onwards),  as  denoting  the  directness 
of  their  progression  right  onwards.7’ 5 

“Goodness  in  actions  is  like  unto  straightness;  wherefore 
that  which  is  done  well  we  term  right,  for  as  the  straight  way 
is  most  acceptable  to  him  that  travelleth,  because  by  it  he 
cometh  soonest  to  his  journey’s  end:  so  in  action,  that  which 
doth  lye  the  evenest  between  us  and  the  end  we  desire,  must 
needs  be  the  fittest  for  our  use.”* 3 4 

If  a term  is  to  be  selected  to  denote  that  in  action  and  in 
disposition  of  which  the  Moral  Faculty  approves,  perhaps  the 
most  precise  and  appropriate  is  rectitude  or  rightness.  Dr. 
Adams5  has  remarked,  “ The  man  who  acts  virtuously  is  said 
to  act  rightly.  This  appears  more  proper  than  to  say  that  he 
acts  according  to  truth ; and  more  clear  and  distinct  than  to 

1 Whately,  Log Introd.  4.  a De  Fin.,  lib.  iii.,  cap.  4. 

3 Harris,  Dialogue  on  Happiness,  p.  73,  note.  4 Hooker,  Eccles.  Pol.,  b.  i.,  s.  8. 

8 Sermon  on  the  Nature  and  Obligation  of  Virtue. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOrriY. 


433 


RECTITUDE  — 

say  that  ho  acts  according  to  the  nature  and  reason  of  things  ; 
the  meaning  of  which  will,  in  all  cases,  be  found  to  be  only 
this  — that  he  acts  according  to  what  reason,  in  the  present 
circumstances  of  the  agent,  and  the  relation  he  stands  in  to 
the  objects  before  him,  pronounces  to  be  right.”  In  like 
manner,  Dr.  Reid1  has  said,  “Prudence  is  a virtue,  benevo- 
lence is  a virtue  ; but  the  essence  and  formal  nature  of  virtue 
must  lie  in  something  that  is  common  to  all  these,  and  to  every 
other  virtue.  And  this,  I conceive,  can  be  nothing  else  but  the 
rectitude  of  suck  conduct  and  turpitude  of  the  contrary,  which 
is  discerned  by  a good  man.  And  so  far  only  he  is  virtuous 
as  he  pursues  the  former  and  avoids  the  latter.”  Rectitude, 
then,  is  that  in  action  and  in  disposition  of  which  the  moral 
faculty  approves.  The  contrary  of  what  is  right  is  wrong. 
Rightness  and  wrongness,  then,  are  the  characteristics  of  action 
and  disposition,  as  contemplated  by  the  moralist.  So  that  the 
foundation  of  morals,  the  ground  upon  which  moral  distinc- 
tions are  taken,  is  in  the  essential  difference  between  what  is 
right  and  what  is  wrong. 

“ There  are  other  phrases  which  have  been  used,  which  I 
see  no  reason  for  adopting,  such  as,  acting  contrary  to  the  rela- 
tions of  things — contrary  to  the  reason  of  things — to  the  fitness 
of  things  — to  the  truth  of  things  — to  absolute  fitness.  These 
phrases  have  not  the  authority  of  common  use,  which,  in  mat- 
ters of  language,  is  great.  They  seem  to  have  been  invented 
by  some  authors  with  a view  to  explain  the  nature  of  vice ; 
but  I do  not  think  they  answer  that  end.  If  intended  as  defi- 
nitions of  vice,  they  aro  improper ; because,  in  the  most  favour- 
able sense  they  can  bear,  they  extend  to  every  kind  of  foolish 
and  absurd  conduct,  as  well  as  to  that  which  is  vicious.” 2 

But  what  is  rectitude  or  rightness  as  the  characteristic  of  an 
action  ? According  to  Price  and  others,  this  term  denotes  a 
simple  and  primitive  idea,  and  cannot  be  explained.  It  might 
as  well  be  asked,  what  is  truth,  as  the  characteristic  of  a pro- 
position ? It  is  a capacity  of  our  rational  nature  to  see  and 
acknowledge  truth  ; but  we  cannot  define  what  truth  is.  W e 
call  it  the  conformity  of  our  thoughts  with  the  reality  of  things. 


‘ Act.  Pow.,  essay  v.,  chap.  5. 

38 


2n 


a Ibid.,  essay  v..  ch.  7. 


434 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


RECTITUDE  — 

But  it  may  be  doubted  how  far  this  explanation  makes  tho 
nature  of  truth  more  intelligible.  In  like  manner,  some 
explain  rectitude  by  saying  that  it  consists  in  a congruity  be- 
tween an  action  and  the  relations  of  tho  agent.  It  is  the 
idea  we  form  of  an  action,  when  it  is,  in  every  way,  conform- 
able to  tho  relations  of  the  agent  and  tho  circumstances  in 
which  he  is  placed.  On  contemplating  such  an  action,  we 
approve  of  it,  and  feel  that  if  we  were  placed  in  such  circum- 
stances, and  in  such  relations,  we  should  be  under  an  obliga- 
tion to  perform  it.  Now  the  circumstances  and  relations  in 
which  man  is  placed  arise  from  his  nature  and  from  the 
nature  of  things  in  general : and  hence  it  has  been  said,  that 
rectitude  is  founded  in  Ilia  nature  and  fitness  of  things ; that  is, 
an  action  is  right  when  it  is  fit  or  suitable  to  all  the  rela- 
tions and  circumstances  of  the  agent  ; and  of  this  fitness 
conscience  or  reason  is  the  judge.  Conscience  or  reason 
does  not  constitute  the  relations ; these  must  arise  from  the 
nature  of  man  and  the  nature  of  things ; but  conscience  or 
reason  judges  and  determines  as  to  the  conformity  of  actions 
to  these  relations;  and  these  relations  arising  necessarily  from 
the  very  nature  of  things,  the  conformity  with  them  which 
constitutes  rectitude,  is  said  to  he  eternal  and  immutable.  — V. 
Right. 

REDINTEGRATION. — V.  Train  of  Thought. 

REDUCTION  IN  LOGIC. — The  first  figure  of  syllogism  is  called 
perfect ; because,  1.  It  proceeds  directly  on  the  Dictum,  and, 
2.  It  arranges  the  terms  in  the  most  natural  order.  All  argu- 
ments may  be,  in  one  way  or  other,  brought  into  some  one  of 
the  four  moods  in  the  first  figure : and  a syllogism  is,  in  that 
case,  said  to  be  reduced  (i.e.,  to  the  first  figure).  These  four 
are  called  the  perfect  moods,  and  all  the  rest  imperfect.  The 
mood  to  be  reduced  is  called  the  reducend,  and  that  to  which 
it  is  reduced  the  reduct.  Reduction  is  of  two  kinds.  1.  Direct 
or  ostensive,  which  consists  in  bringing  the  premisses  of  the 
reducend  to  a corresponding  mood  in  the  first  figure,  by  trans- 
position or  conversion  of  the  premisses,  and  from  the  premisses 
thus  changed  deducing  either  the  original  conclusion,  or  one 
from  which  it  follows  by  conversion.  2.  Indirect,  or  reduclio 
per  impossibile  or  ad  absurdam,  by  which  we  prove  (in  the  first 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


435 


REDUCTION  — 

figure)  not,  directly,  that  the  original  conclusion  is  true,  but 
that  it  cannot  be  false;  i.e.,  that  an  absurdity  would  follow 
from  the  supposition  of  its  being  false.1 

REFLECTION  ( re-flecto , to  bend  back). — “ By  reflection  I would 
be  understood  to  mean  that  notice  which  the  mind  takes  of  its 
own  operations,  and  the  manner  of  them  ; by  reason  whereof 
there  come  to  be  ideas  of  these  operations  in  the  understand- 
ing. Those  two,  viz., — external  material  things,  as  the  objects 
of  sensation ; and  the  operations  of  our  own  minds  within,  as 
the  objects  of  reflection,  are  to  me  the  only  originals  faun 
whence  all  our  ideas  take  their  beginnings.  The  term  opera- 
tions here  I use  in  a large  sense,  as  comprehending  not  barely 
the  actions  of  the  mind  about  its  ideas,  but  some  sort  of  pas- 
sions arising  sometimes  from  them,  such  as  in  the  satisfaction 
or  uneasiness  arising  from  any  thought.” 2 

“When  we  make  our  own  thoughts  and  passions,  and  the 
various  operations  of  our  minds,  the  objects  of  our  atten- 
tion, either  while  they  are  present,  or  when  they  are  recent 
and  fresh  in  our  memory,  this  act  of  the  mind  is  called  reflec- 
tion”3 

lie4  gives  a more  extensive  (but  less  proper)  signification  to 
reflection. 

Attention  is  the  energy  of  the  mind  directed  towards  things 
present.  Reflection  has  to  do  with  things  past  and  the  ideas 
of  them.  Attention  may  employ  the  organs  of  the  body.  Re- 
flection is  purely  a mental  operation.  It  is  not  a simple  act. 
In  reflection  we  may  analyze  and  compound,  abstract  and 
generalize.  These  operations  of  mind  so  arranged  as  to  gain 
some  end,  constitute  a method.  And  a method  is  just  the  act 
of  reflecting  or  properly  employing  the  energies  of  the  mind 
on  the  objects  of  its  knowledge. 

“ Reflection  creates  nothing — can  create  nothing;  everything 
exists  previous  to  reflection  in  the  consciousness,  but  every- 
thing pre-exists  there  in  confusion  and  obscurity ; it  is  the 


1 Whately,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  3,  $3  5,  C. 

0 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  book  ii.,  chap.  1. 

3 Reid,  Intell.  Pow , essay  i.,  chap.  2.  Also  chap.  5,  and  essay  Yi. 

4 Ibid.,  essay  iii.,  chap.  5.  Also  essay  vi.,  chap.  1. 


436 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


REFLECTION  — 

work  of  reflection  in  adding  itself  to  consciousness,  to  illumi- 
nate that  which  was  obscure,  to  develop  that  which  was  en- 
veloped. Reflection  is  for  consciousness  what  the  microscope 
and  the  telescope  are  for  the  natural  sight : neither  of  these 
instruments  makes  or  changes  the  objects  ; but  in  examining 
them  on  every  side,  in  penetrating  to  their  centre,  these  instru- 
ments illuminate  them,  and  discover  to  us  their  characters 
and  their  laws."1  — V.  Observation,  Speculation. 

REFLEX  SENSES.  — V.  Sense,  Idea. 

REGULATIVE  (German,  llegulativ)  does  not  & priori  determine 
how  something  must  be  or  is  to  be,  but  how  something  must 
be  sought.  — V.  Constitutive. 

RELATION  ( re-fero , relatum,  to  bear  back).  — “When  the  mind 
so  considers  one  thing  that  it  does  as  it  were  bring  it  to  and 
set  it  by  another,  and  carries  its  view  from  one  to  the  other, 
this  is,  as  the  words  import,  relation  and  respect;  and  the  de- 
nominations given  to  positive  things,  intimating  that  respect, 
and  serving  as  marks  to  lead  the  thoughts  beyond  the  subject 
itself  denominated  to  something  distinct  from  it,  are  what  we 
call  relatives;  and  the  things  so  brought  together  related. 
Thus,  when  the  mind  considers  Caius  as  such  a positive  being, 
it  takes  nothing  into  that  idea  but  wliat  really  exists  in  Caius  ; 
v.  g.,  when  I consider  him  as  a man,  I have  nothing  in  my 
mind  but  the  complex  idea  of  the  species  man.  So,  likewise, 
when  I say  Caius  is  a white  man,  I have  nothing  but  the  bare 
consideration  of  a man  who  hath  that  white  colour.  But  when 
I give  Caius  the  name  husband,  I intimate  some  other  per- 
son ; and  when  I give  him  the  name  whiter,  I intimate  some 
other  thing ; in  both  cases  my  thought  is  led  to  something 
beyond  Caius,  and  there  are  two  things  brought  into  consider- 
ation." 2 The  two  things  thus  brought  into  consideration  are 
called  relatives  or  correllatives,  as  father  and  son,  husband  and 
wife. 

“ In  all  relation  there  must  bo  a subject  whence  it  com- 
mences, as  snow;  another  where  it  terminates,  as  a swan;  the 
relation  itself,  similitude ; and  lastly,  the  source  of  that  rcla- 


1 Cousin,  Hist,  of  Mod.  Phil.,  vol.  i.,  p.  275. 

* Locke,  Essay  on  Ilum.  Understand book  ii.,  chap.  25. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


437 


RELATION  — 

tion,  whiteness;  the  swan  is  related  to  the  show  by  both  of 
them  being  white.”  1 

This  is  called  prcdicamental  relation,  and  forms  one  of  the 
categories  (rtpos  ti)  of  Aristotle. 

“Any  sort  of  connection  which  is  perceived  or  imagined 
between  two  or  more  things ; or  any  comparison  which  is 
made  by  the  mind,  is  a relation.  "When  we  look  at  these  two 
lines  ~~  we  do  not  merely  think  of  them  separately, 

as  this  straight  line  and  that  straight  line  ; but  they  are  im- 
mediately connected  together  by  a comparison  which  takes 
place  in  the  mind  as  soon  as  they  meet  the  eye.  We  perceive 
that  these  two  lines  are  alike  ; they  are  both  straight ; and  we 
call  the  notion  that  is  formed  by  the  comparison,  the  relation 
of  sameness.  We  may  then  think  of  them  as  the  same  in 
length;  this  comparison  gives  us  the  notion  which  we  call  the 
relation  of  equality.  We  think  of  them  again  as  equally  dis- 
tant from  each  other,  from  end  to  end,  and  then  we  say  they 
are  parallel  lines  ; this  word  parallel  represents  nothing  exist- 
ing in  the  lines  themselves,  but  only  the  notion  formed  by 
measuring  the  distance  between  them.  All  these  notions 
spring  up  in  the  mind  from  the  comparison  of  the  two  objects; 
they  belong  entirely  to  the  mind,  and  do  not  exist  in  the  things 
themselves.”2 

“Another  way,”  says  Dr.  Reid,3  “ in  which  we  get  the  no- 
tion of  relations  (which  seems  not  to  have  occurred  to  Mr. 
Locke),  is  when,  by  attention  to  one  of  the  related  objects,  we 
perceive  or  judge  that  it  must,  from  its  nature,  have  a certain 
relation  to  something  else,  which  before,  perhaps,  we  never 
thought  of;  and  thus  our  attention  to  one  of  the  related  objects 
produces  the  notion  of  a correlate,  and  of  a certain  relation 
between  them.  Thus,  when  I attend  to  colour,  figure,  weight, 
I cannot  help  judging  these  to  be  qualities  which  cannot  exist 
without  a substance ; that  is,  something  which  is  coloured, 
figured,  heavy.  If  I had  not  perceived  such  things  to  be  quali- 
ties, I should  never  have  had  any  notion  of  their  subject,  or 
of  their  relation  to  it.  By  attending  to  the  operations  of 
thinking,  memory,  reasoning,  we  perceive  or  judge  that  there 

1 Harris,  Phil.  Arrange .,  chap.  16. 

3 Intel!.  Pow.,  essay  vi.,  chap.  2. 

38* 


2 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 


438 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


RELATION  — 

must  be  something  -which  thinks,  remembers,  and  reasons, 
which  we  call  the  mind.  When  we  attend  to  any  change  that 
happens  in  nature,  judgment  informs  us  that  there  must  be  a 
cause  of  this  change  which  had  power  to  produce  it ; and  thus 
we  get  the  notions  of  cause  and  effect,  and  of  the  relation  be- 
tween them.  When  we  attend  to  body,  we  perceive  that  it 
cannot  exist  without  space  ; hence  we  got  the  notion  of  space 
(which  is  neither  an  object  of  sense  nor  of  consciousness),  and 
of  the  relation  which  bodies  have  to  a certain  portion  of  un- 
limited space,  as  their  place.” — See  also  Reid.1  Buffer  calls 
relation,  in  this  view,  Occasio  quam  praebet  objectum  cogitandi 
de  alio. — V.  Suggestion. 

Although  relations  are  not  real  entities,  but  merely  mental 
modes  of  viewing  things,  let  it  be  observed  that  our  ideas  of 
relation  are  not  vague  nor  arbitrary,  but  are  determined  by  the 
known  qualities  of  the  related  objects.  We  cannot  at  will  see 
relations  for  which  there  is  no  foundation  in  the  nature  of  the 
related  objects.  Of  all  relations,  the  relations  of  number  are 
the  clearest  and  most  accurately  appreciated. 

RELATIVE  is  opposed  to  absolute  — q.v.  — V.  Term. 

RELIGION  ( relego , religo). — This  word,  according  to  Cicero,2  is 
derived  from,  or  rather  compounded  of,  re  and  legere,  to  read 
over  again,  to  reflect  upon  or  to  study  the  sacred  books  in 
which  religion,  is  delivered.  According  to  Lactantius,3  it  comes 
from  re-ligare,  to  bind  back  — because  religion  is  that  which 
furnishes  the  true  ground  of  obligation.  St.  Augustine4  gives 
the  same  derivation  of  the  word.  But  he  gives  another  origin 
of  it,5  where  he  says,  “Deum,  qui  fons  est  nostree  beatitudinis, 
et  omnis  desiderii  nostri  finis,  eligentes,  imrno  potius  religentes, 
amiseramus  enim  negligentes ; hunc,  inquam,  religentes,  unde 
et  religio  dicta  est,  ad  eum  dilectione  tendamus,  ut  perveniendo 
quiescamus.” 

“As  it  is  natural  for  man  to  review  the  train  of  his  past  ac- 
tions, it  is  not  incredible  that  the  word  religion  is  derived  from 
relegere;  and  that  its  primary  reference  is  to  that  activity  of  con- 
science -which  leads  us  to  review  the  past  actions  of  our  lives.”6 


1 Inquiry , chap.  1,  sect.  7. 

3 Div.  Instil .,  4. 

8 De  Civit.  Dei,  lib.  x.,  c.  3. 


0 De  Nat.  Deorum , ii , 28. 

4 De  Vera.  Rclig c.  55. 
c Gellius,  Noel.  Attic.,  No.  9. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


439 


RELIGION - 

“Relligio,  according  to  its  primary  signification,  is  perpetu- 
ally thoughtful,  save  in  regard  to  some  object  affecting  the 
conscience.”  1 

Miiller,  Professor  of  Theology  at  Bale,  published  a Disserta- 
tion on  this  word  in  1834. 

Religion  is  distinguished  into  natural  and  revealed,  or  that 
knowledge  of  God  and  of  our  duty  which  is  derived  from  the 
light  of  nature  or  reason — and  that  knowledge  of  God  and  of 
our  duty  which  comes  to  us  from  positive  revelation. 

The  epithet  natural  (or  physical)  has  been  objected  to  as 
applied  to  religion,  inasmuch  as  all  knowledge  of  God  is  super- 
sensuous. — V.  Theology. 

In  all  forms  of  religion  there  is  one  part,  which  may  be 
called  the  doctrine  or  dogma,  which  is  to  be  received  by  faith  ; 
and  the  culfus,  or  worship,  which  is  the  outward  expression  or 
mode  of  manifesting  the  religious  sentiment. 

REMEMBRANCE,  REMINISCENCE,  RECOLLECTION  [re- 

colligo,  to  gather  together  again  ; or  reminiscor,  to  remember). 
— “The  perception  which  actually  accompanies,  and  is  an- 
nexed to  any  impression  on  the  body,  made  by  an  external 
object,  furnishes  the  mind  with  a distinct  idea,  which  we  call 
sensation  ; which  is,  as  it  were,  the  actual  entrance  of  any  idea 
into  the  understanding  by  the  senses.  The  same  idea,  when 
it  again  recurs  withou!  the  operation  of  the  like  object  on  the 
external  sensory,  is  remembrance  ; if  it  be  sought  after  by  the 
mind,  and  with  pain  and  endeavour  found  and  brought  again 
into  view,  it  is  recollection ; if  it  be  held  there  long  under 
attentive  consideration,  it  is  contemplation.” 2 

“ In  other  cases,  the  various  particulars  which  compose  our 
stock  of  knowledge  are  recalled  in  consequence  of  an  effort  of 
our  will.  This  latter  operation,  too,  is  often  called  by  the 
same  name  (memory),  but  is  more  properly  distinguished  by 
the  word  recollection.”  3 

“Reminiscence  is  the  act  of  recovering,  and  recollection  the 
act  of  combining  remembrances.  Those  eminences  to  which 
we  attach  the  subordinate  parts  of  an  object  come  first  into 


1 DonaldsoD,  Varronianus , p.  407,  2d  edit. 

,J  Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand .,  book  ii.,  chap.  19. 

3 Stewart,  Elements,  chap.  6,  6ect.  1. 


440 


VOCABULARY  OF  I>HILOSOriIY. 


REMEMBRANCE  — 

reminiscence;  when  the  intervening  portions  present  them- 
selves in  order,  the  recollection  is  complete.”1 
REMINISCENCE. — Memory  is  knowledge  of  some  former  con- 
sciousness. Reminiscence  is  the  act  by  which  we  endeavour 
to  recall  and  reunite  former  states  of  consciousness.  It  is  a 
kind  of  reasoning  by  which  we  ascend  from  a present  con- 
sciousness to  a former,  and  from  that  to  a more  remote,  till  the 
whole  facts  of  some  case  are  brought  again  back  to  us.  It  is 
peculiar  to  man,  while  memory,  as  spontaneous,  is  shared  by 
the  brutes.  “When  we  have  a reminiscence,”  said  Aristotle,2 
“ we  reason  to  the  elfect  that  we  formerly  experienced  some 
impression  of  such  or  such  a kind,  so  that  in  having  a remi- 
niscence we  syllogise.” 

“There  is  yet  another  kind  of  discussion,  beginning  with 
the  appetite  to  recover  something  lost,  proceeding  from  the 
present  backward,  from  thought  of  the  place  where  we  miss  at, 
to  the  thought  of  the  place  from  whence  we  came  last ; and 
from  the  thought  of  that  to  the  thought  of  a place  before,  till 
we  have  in  our  mind  some  place,  wherein  we  had  the  thing  we 
miss:  and  this  is  called  reminiscence.” 3 — V.  Coxtemplatiox, 
Memory,  Retextiox. 

REMINISCENCE  according  to  Plato. 

“ Plato  imagined,  after  more  ancient  philosophers,  that 
every  man  is  born  with  a certain  reminiscence,  and  that  when 
we  seem  to  be  taught  we  are  only  put  in  mind  of  what  we 
knew  in  a former  state.”'1 

The  term  employed  by  Plato  was  dvduvtjat,;,  which  may  bo 
translated  “knowing  up.”  He  did  not  apply  it  to  every  kind 
or  degree  of  knowledge,  but  to  that  spontaneous  movement  of 
the  mind  by  which  it  ascended  from  mere  opinion  (5o|a)  to 
science  (ijaa-tr^ri) . On  such  occasions  the  appearances  of 
truth  and  beauty  suggested  or  evolved  the  ideas  of  the  true 
and  the  beautiful ; which  seemed  to  belong  to  the  soul  and  to 
have  been  formerly  known.  There  was  a stirring  up  or  calling 
into  act  what  was  in  the  soul  potentially.  That  they  had  been 
known  in  that  former  state  of  existence  which  Plato,  in  a 

1 Taylor.  Synonyms.  a De  Mem.  ct  Rcminiscentia,  c.  2. 

s Hobbes,  Uum.  iV at.,  chap.  4. 

4 Bolingbrokc,  essay  ii.,  Presumption  of  Philosophers. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


441 


REMINISCENCE  — 

myth,  represented  the  soul  to  have  enjoyed,  and  were  now 
merely  recalled  or  remembered,  is  the  view  commonly  giyen.1 
But  what  Plato  meant  more  specially  to  intimate  by  the 
use  of  this  word  was,  that  all  science  or  certainty  is  intui- 
tive, and  belongs  to  the  reason,  which  gives  knowledge  in 
the  last  and  highest  degree.  Conjecture  (sixaaia),  belief 
(rtia- as),  which,  when  conjoined,  give  opinion  (5o| a),  and  rea- 
soning (Siavoia,),  which  are  the  other  degrees  of  knowledge, 
according  to  Plato,  being  unable  to  give  ground  for  science  or 
certainty.”2 

Olympiodorus,  in  a Commentary  on  the  Phcedo  of  Plato, 
quoted  by  Harris,3  says : — “ Inasmuch  as  the  soul,  by  contain- 
ing the  principles  of  all  beings,  is  a sort  of  omniform  repre- 
sentation or  exemplar;  when  it  is  roused  by  objects  of  sense 
it  recollects  those  principles  which  it  contains  within,  and 
brings  them  forth.” 

“Plato,  it  is  believed,  proposed  his  theory  of  reminiscence 
as  a sort  of  allegory,  signifying  the  power  which  the  mind  has 
to  draw  from  itself,  on  occasion  of  perceptions,  universal  ideas, 
and  the  manner  in  which  it  rises  to  them  resembling  the 
manner  in  which  is  awakened  all  at  once  within  us  the  re- 
membrance of  what  we  have  dreamed.”4 

It  was  in  the  same  sense  that  Socrates  called  himself  a mid- 
wife of  the  mind.  lie  assisted  in  bringing  to  the  birth  truths 
with  which  the  mind  was  big  and  in  labour.  He  unfolded 
what  was  infolded. 

Boethius5  saj's,  the  mind  by  teaching  is  only  excited  to 
know.  And  Aquinas,  De  Magistro,  says,  “Omnis  disciplina 
Jit  ex pre-existenti  cognitione.  . . , Ex  homine  docente  cer- 

titudinem  scientice  non  acciperemus,  nisi  inessei  nobis  certitudo 
prineipiorum.” 

According  to  Mons.  Chastel,6  Thomas  Aquinas  in  his  trea- 
tise, De  Magistro,  maintains  the  following  points : — 

1.  To  the  acquisition  of  science  you  must  admit  as  pre- 

1 Cicero,  Tuscid.,  i.,  24. 

a Ileusde,  Init.  Philosophy  Platon 8to,  1S27,  tom.  i.,  pp.  33,  34. 

3 Hermes,  p.  2S2. 

4 Manuel  de  Philosophie , 8vo,  Paris,  1846,  p.  139. 

6 De  Consol. 

R Les  Rationalistcs  et  les  Traditionalistes , 12mo,  Paris,  1850,  p.  150. 


442 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOFIIY. 


REMINISCENCE  — 

existent  in  us  the  knowledge  of  general  principles,  evident  of 
themselves,  and  all  those  notions  which  the  mind  frames 
immediately  to  itself  by  the  aid  of  the  first  sensations ; for 
all  teaching  supposes,  in  him  who  learns,  some  anterior  know- 
ledge. 

2.  But  these  first-truths,  conditions  pre-requisite  for  all 
teaching,  these  general  principles,  these  principles  which  are 
native  and  not  taught,  are  known  to  us  by  that  light  of  reason 
which  God  hath  put  in  us  as  the  image  of  that  uncreated  truth 
which  is  reflected  in  our  mind.  They  are  given  to  us  by 
nature  as  the  germ  of  all  the  cognitions  to  which  we  ulti- 
mately attain. 

There  are  certain  notions  of  which  it  is  impossible  for  a man 
to  be  ignorant. 

3.  It  is  from  these  principles,  known  in  advance,  that  he 
who  teaches  should  set  out  with  us,  to  teach  us  other  truths 
connected  with  these.  His  teaching  consists  in  showing  us 
this  connection.  Properly  speaking,  it  is  the  knowledge  of 
these  principles  and  not  teaching  which  gives  us  secondary 
knowledge,  although  teaching  is  the  mediate  cause.  It  would 
be  impossible  for  us  to  learn  of  a man  the  knowledge  which  he 
wishes  to  teach  us,  if  there  were  not  in  us  beforehand  those 
principles  to  which  he  connects  his  knowledge ; and  all  the 
certainty  of  that  knowledge  comes  to  us  from  the  certainty  of 
those  principles,  and  ultimately  from  God,  who  has  given  us 
the  light  of  reason  to  know  them. 

4.  Thus  the  knowledge  of  first  principles  is  not  from  teach- 
ing, although  teaching  may  give  secondary  truths  connected 
with  them. 

5.  But  these  secondary  truths  we  receive  or  reject  accord- 
ing to  their  conformity  with  the  truth  that  is  in  us. 

C.  Of  these  secondary  truths  which  teaching  gives,  there 
are  many  which  the  mind  may  discover  by  its  own  force,  as 
there  are  many  diseases  which  cure  themselves. 

Augustine  also  has  a treatise,  De  Magistro,  in  which,  from 
a different  point  of  view,  he  comes  to  conclusions  substantially 
the  same.  “ The  certainty  of  science  comes  to  us  from  God, 
who  has  given  to  us  the  light  of  reason.  For  it  is  by  this  light 
that  we  know  principles,  and  it  is  from  principles  that  we 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


443 


REMINISCENCE  — 

derive  the  certainty  of  science.  And  yet  it  is  true,  in  a certain 
sense,  that  man  produces  in  us  knowledge.  The  pupil,  if 
interrogated  before  teaching,  could  answer  as  to  those  princi- 
ples by  aid  of  which  all  teaching  proceeds  ; but  he  could  not 
answer  upon  those  things  which  are  taught,  which  are  the 
consequences  of  those  principles.  So  that  he  does  not  learn 
principles  but  only  the  consequences  of  them. 

D’Alembert,  as  quoted  by  Mr.  Stewart,1  says,  “It  should 
seem  that  everything  we  learn  from  a good  metaphysical 
book  is  only  a sort  of  reminiscence  of  what  the  mind  previously 
knew. 

Sir  Walter  Scott  and  others  have  alluded  to  a mental  affec- 
tion which  they  designate  the  sense  of  pre-existence.  When 
the  mind  is  in  this  state  the  scenes  and  events  which  are  pre- 
sent and  passing  appear  to  have  formerly  been  objects  of  con- 
sciousness.2 

On  the  Reminiscence  of  Plato,  see  Piccolomineus.3 
REPRESENTATIVE.— V.  Knowledge. 

RESERVATION  or  RESTRICTION  (as  it  is  called  by  casuists) 
has  reference  to  the  duty  of  speaking  what  is  true;  and  is 
distinguished  as  real  and  mental. 

Real  Restriction  takes  place  when  the  words  used  are  not  true 
if  strictly  interpreted,  but  there  is  no  deviation  from  truth  if 
the  circumstances  be  considered.  One  man  asks  another,  Have 
you  dined?  and  the  answer  given  is,  No.  The  party  giving 
this  answer  has  dined,  times  without  number.  But  his  answer 
is  restricted  by  the  circumstances  to  to-day ; and  in  that  sense 
is  true.' 

Mental  Restriction  or  Reservation  consists  in  saying  so  far 
what  is  true,  and  to  be  believed,  but  adding  mentally  some 
qualification  which  makes  it  not  to  be  true.  A debtor  asked  by 
his  creditor  for  payment  of  his  debt,  says, — “I  will  certainly 
pay  you  to-morrow”  adding  to  himself — “in  part,”  whereas 
the  words  audibly  uttered  referred  to  the  whole  amount. 

There  was  published  in  12mo,  Bond.,  1851,  A Treatise  of 

1 Yol.  ii.,  p.  23. 

a See  quotations  and  references  on  this  curious  phenomenon  in  Notes  and  Queries , 
17th  January,  1857,  p.  50. 

3 Philosoph.  De  Moinbus,  Francof.,  1583,  p.  450. 


444 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


RESERVATION  — 

Equivocation,  from  a MS.  in  the  Bodleian  Library,  written 
about  1000.  It  was  referred  to  in  the  trials  on  the  Gunpow- 
der Plot. 

The  following  occurs  at  p.  17:  — “A  farmer  hath  come  to 
sell  corn.  He  selleth  all  that  he  can  sell,  because  he  reserveth 
the  rest  for  his  own  necessary  use.  Then  comcth  one  and 
desireth  to  buy  corn.  He  may  truly  say,  and  swear  (if  it  be 
needful)  that  he  hath  none  ; for  the  circumstance  of  the  person 
interpreteth  the  meaning  to  be  that  lie  hath  none  to  sell.”  — 
This  is  Reservation  or  Restriction,  rather  than  Equivocation. 

At  p.  29:  — “ If  I be  asked  whether  such  a one  be  in  my 
house,  who  is  there  indeed,  I may  answer  in  Latin,  ‘ Non  est 
hie,’  meaning  he  doth  not  eat  in  my  house.” — This  is  Equivo- 
cation— q.  v. 

RETENTION  ( retineo , to  keep  hold  of). 

“ The  power  of  reproduction  (into  consciousness)  supposes 
a power  of  retention  (out  of  consciousness).  To  this  conser- 
vative power  I confine  exclusively  the  term  Memory.”  1 

“ There  seems  good  reason  for  confining  the  appellation  of 
memory  to  the  simple  power  of  retention,  which  undoubtedly 
must  be  considered  as  an  original  aptitude  of  mind,  irresolva- 
ble into  any  other.  The  power  of  recalling  the  preserved 
impressions  seems  on  the  other  hand  rightly  held  to  be  only  a 
modified  exercise  of  the  suggestive  or  reproductive  faculty.”2 
— V.  Memory. 

RIGHT.  — “ Right  and  duty  arc  things  very  different,  and  have 
even  a kind  of  opposition  ; yet  they  are  so  related  that  the  one 
cannot  even  be  conceived  without  the  other;  and  he  that 
understands  the  one  must  understand  the  other.  They  have 
the  same  relation  which  credit  has  to  debt.  As  all  credit  sup- 
poses an  equivalent  debt,  so  all  rigid  supposes  a corresponding 
duty.  There  can  be  no  credit  in  one  party  without  an  equi- 
valent debt  in  another  party ; and  there  can  be  no  right  in 
one  party,  without  a corresponding  duty  in  another  party. 
The  sum  of  credit  shows  the  sum  of  debt ; and  the  sum  of 
men’s  rights  shows,  in  like  manner,  the  sum  of  their  duty  to 
one  another. 


* Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works,  p.  912. 


5 Dr.  Tullocb,  Theism,  p.  206. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


445 


RIGHT— 

“ The  -word  right  has  a very  different  meaning,  according 
as  it  is  applied  to  actions  or  to  persons.  A right  action 
[rectum)  is  an  action  agreeable  to  our  duty.  But  when  we 
speak  of  the  rights  of  men  [jus),  the  word  has  a very  different, 
and  a more  artificial  meaning.  It  is  a term  of  art  in  law,  and 
signifies  all  that  a man  may  lawfully  do,  all  that  he  may  law- 
fully possess  and  use,  and  all  that  he  may  lawfully  claim  of 
any  other  person. 

“We  can  be  at  no  loss  to  perceive  the  duties  corresponding 
to  the  several  kinds  of  rights.  What  I have  a right  to  do,  it 
is  the  duty  of  all  men  not  to  hinder  me  from  doing.  What 
is  my  property  or  real  right,  no  man  ought  to  take  from  me  ; 
or  to  molest  me  in  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  it.  And  what  I 
have  a right  to  demand  of  any  man,  it  is  his  duty  to  perform. 
Between  the  right  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  duty  on  the  other, 
there  is  not  only  a necessary  connection,  but,  in  reality,  they 
are  only  different  expressions  of  the  same  meaning,  just  as  it 
is  the  same  thing  to  say,  I am  your  debtor,  and  to  say,  you  are 
my  creditor ; or  as  it  is  the  same  thing  to  say,  I am  your 
father,  and  to  say,  you  are  my  son.” 

“As  there  is  a strict  notion  of  justice,  in  which  it  is  distin- 
guished from  humanity  and  charity,  so  there  is  a more  exten- 
sive signification  of  it,  in  which  it  includes  those  virtues.  The 
ancient  moralists,  both  Greek  and  Roman,  under  the  cardinal 
virtue  of  Justice,  included  Beneficence  ; and  in  this  extensive 
sense,  it  is  often  used  in  common  language.  The  like  may  be 
said  of  right,  which  in  a sense  not  uncommon,  is  extended  to 
evex-y  proper  claim  of  humanity  and  charity,  as  well  as  to  the 
claims  of  strict  justice.  But,  as  it  is  proper  to  distinguish 
these  two  kinds  of  claims  by  different  names,  writers  in  natu- 
ral jurisprudence  have  given  the  name  of  perfect  rights  to  the 
claims  of  strict  justice,  and  that  of  imperfect  rights  to  the 
claims  of  charity  and  humanity.  Thus  all  the  duties  of 
humanity  have  imperfect  rights  corresponding  to  them,  as 
those  of  strict  justice  have  perfect  rights.”  1 

“The  adjective  right  has  a much  wider  signification  than 
the  substantive  right.  Everything  is  right  which  is  conform- 


S9 


1 Reid,  Act.  Pow.,  essay  v.,  chap.  3. 


446 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


RIGHT  — 

able  to  the  supreme  rule  of  human  action ; but  that  only  is  a 
right  which,  being  conformable  to  the  supreme  rule,  is  realized 
in  society  and  vested  in  a particular  person.  Ilcnce  the  two 
words  may  often  be  properly  opposed.  We  may  say  that  a 
poor  man  has  no  right  to  relief,  but  it  is  right  he  should  have 
it.  A rich  man  has  a right  to  destroy  the  harvest  of  his  fields, 
but  to  do  so  would  not  be  right. 

“ To  a right,  on  one  side,  corresponds  an  obligation  on  the 
other.  If  a man  has  a right  to  my  horse,  I have  an  obligation 
to  let  him  have  it.  If  a man  has  a right  to  the  fruit  of  a 
certain  tree,  all  other  persons  are  under  an  obligation  to 
abstain  from  appropriating  it.  Men  are  obliged  to  respect 
each  others’  rights. 

“ My  obligation  is  to  give  another  man  his  right ; my  duty 
is  to  do  what  is  right.  Hence  duty  is  a wider  term  than 
obligation  ; just  as  right,  the  adjective,  is  wider  than  right  the 
substantive. 

“Duty  has  no  correlative,  as  obligation  has  the  correlative 
right.  What  it  is  our  duty  to  do,  we  must  do,  because  it  is 
right,  not  because  any  one  can  demand  it  of  us.  We  may, 
however,  speak  of  those  who  are  particularly  benefited  by  the 
discharge  of  our  duties,  as  having  a moral  claim  upon  us.  A 
distressed  man  has  a moral  claim  to  be  relieved,  in  cases  in 
which  it  is  our  duty  to  relieve  him. 

“ The  distinctions  just  explained  are  sometimes  expressed 
by  using  the  terms  perfect  obligation  and  imperfect  obligation 
for  obligation  and  duly  respectively ; and  the  terms  perfect 
right  and  imperfect  right  for  right  and  moral  claim  respectively. 
But  these  phrases  have  the  inconvenience  of  making  it  seem  as 
if  our  duties  arose  from  the  rights  of  others ; and  as  if  duties 
were  only  legal  obligations,  with  an  inferior  degree  of  binding 
force.”1  — V.  Jurisprudence,  Rectitude. 

ROSICRUCXAHS,  a name  assumed  by  a sect  of  Hermetical  phi- 
losophers, who  came  into  notice  in  Germany  towards  the  close 
of  the  fourteenth  century.  Christian  Rosenkreuz,  from  whom, 
according  to  some,  the  name  is  derived,  was  born  in  1378, 
travelled  to  the  East,  and  after  keeping  company  with  magi- 


1 IVhewcll,  Elements  of  Morality,  book  i.,  § 84-89. 


VOCABULARY  OF  FI1ILOSOPHY. 


447 


ROSICRUCIARS- 

cians  and  cabalists,  returned  to  Germany  with  their  secrets, 
which  he  communicated  to  three  of  his  friends,  or  sons,  and 
shutting  himself  up  in  a cave,  died  at  the  age  of  106  in  1484. 
The  secrets  of  the  fraternity  of  the  Rosy  Cross,  which  gradually 
increased  in  numbers,  had  reference  to  four  points — the  trans- 
mutation of  metals,  the  prolongation  of  life,  the  knowledge  of 
what  is  passing  in  distant  places,  and  the  application  of  the 
Cabala  and  the  science  of  numbers  to  discover  the  most  hidden 
things.  They  assumed  the  signature  F.R.C.,  or  Fratres  Foris 
Cocti,  it  being  pretended  that  the  matter  of  the  philosopher’s 
stone  was  dew  concocted.  Or,  according  to  Mosheim,  the 
name  is  compounded  of  Fos,  dew ; and  crux , the  cross.  In 
the  language  of  alchemy,  the  figure  of  the  cross  signifies  light, 
and  dew  was  reckoned  the  most  powerful  dissolvent  of  gold  ; 
so  that  a Fosicrucian  meant  one  who,  by  the  assistance  of 
dew,  sought  for  light  or  the  philosopher’s  stone.1 

RULE.— “ Rectitude  is  a law,  as  well  as  a rule  to  us ; it  not  only 
directs,  but  binds  all,  as  far  as  it  is  perceived.”2 

A rule  prescribes  means  to  attain  some  end.  But  the  end 
may  not  be  one  which  all  men  are  to  aim  at;  and  the  rule  may 
not  be  followed  by  all.  A law  enjoins  something  to  be  done, 
and  is  binding  upon  all  to  whom  it  is  made  known. 

“A  ride,  in  its  proper  signification,  is  an  instrument,  by 
means  of  which  we  draw  the  shortest  line  from  one  point  to 
another,  which  for  this  very  reason  is  called  a straight  line. 

“In  a figurative  and  moral  sense,  a rule  imports  nothing 
else  but  a principle  or  maxim,  which  furnishes  man  with  a sure 
and  concise  method  of  attaining  to  the  end  he  proposes.”3 


SABAISM  (from  ^3"^,  signifying  a host,  or  from  tsaba,  in  Syriac, 
to  adore  ; or  from  Saba  the  son  of  Cush,  and  grandson  of  Seth) 
means  the  worship  of  the  stars,  or  host  of  heaven,  which 

x Mosheim,  Eccles.  Hist.,  vol.  iv. ; Louis  Figuier,  V Alcliimie  et  Les  Alchimistes.  Par., 
1856. 

a Price,  Rev.  of  Morals , chap.  6. 

3 Burlamaqui,  Principles  of  NaX.  Laiv , part  i.,  chap.  5. 


448 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SABAISM- 

prevailed  from  an  early  period  in  the  East,  especially  in  Syria, 
Arabia,  Chaldea,  and  Persia.  The  Sabmans  are  not  mentioned 
by  the  Greek  or  Roman  writers,  and  by  the  Arabian  authors 
they  are  called  Nabatheans,  as  if  descendants  from  Nebaioth, 
son  of  Islimael.  .Their  doctrines  arc  expounded  by  Moses 
Maimonides  in  the  third  part  of  his  work,  l)e  More  Nevochim. 
There  was  a popular  and  a philosophic  creed  with  them.  Ac- 
cording to  the  former  the  stars  were  worshipped  ; and  the  sun, 
as  supreme  God,  ruled  over  heaven  and  earth,  and  the  other 
heavenly  bodies  were  but  the  ministers  of  his  will.  According 
to  the  philosophic  creed,  the  stars  consisted  of  matter  and 
mind.  God  is  not  the  matter  of  the  universe,  but  the  spirit 
which  animates  it.  But  both  are  eternal,  and  will  externally 
exist,  for  the  one  cannot  pass  into,  or  absorb  the  other. 

Pocock,  Specimen  Hist.  Arab.;'  Hyde,  Veterum  Pcrsarnm 
Ilistoria;* *  Spencer,  De  Lcgibns  Hebraeorum? 

SAME,  in  its  primary  sense,  denotes  identity  — q.  v. 

In  a secondary  sense  it  denotes  great  similarity,  and  in 
popular  usage  admits  of  degrees,  as  when  we  speak  of  two 
things  being  nearly  the  same.  To  this  ambiguity,  Whately 
refers  much  of  the  error  of  realism;  of  Plato’s  theory  of 
ideas;  of  the  personification  and  deification  in  poetical  my- 
thology, &c.4 

SANCTION  ( sancio , to  ratify  or  confirm).  — “I  shall  declare  the 
sanction  of  this  law  of  nature,  viz.,  those  rewards  which  God 
hath  ordained  for  the  observation  of  it,  and  those  punishments 
He  hath  appointed  for  its  breach  or  transgression.”5 

“ The  sanctions  of  rewards  and  punishments  which  God  has 
annexed  to  his  laws  have  not,  in  any  proper  sense,  the  nature 
of  obligation.  They  are  only  motives  to  virtue,  adapted  to  the 
state  and  condition,  the  weakness  and  insensibility  of  man. 
They  do  not  make  or  constitute  duty,  but  presuppose  it.”6 
The  consequences  which  naturally  attend  virtue  and  vice  are 
the  sanction  of  duty,  or  of  doing  what  is  right,  as  they  are 
intended  to  encourage  us  to  the  discharge  of  it,  and  to  deter 


1 4 to,  Oxf.,  1G49,  p.  3 33.  2 8v0,  Oxf.,  17G6. 

• 2 vols.,  fel,  Camb.,  1724.  4 Whately,  Log.,  App.  i. 

i Tyrull,  On  the  Law  of  Nature , p.  125. 

0 Adams,  Sn'mon  on  Nature  and  Obligation  of  Virtue. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


449 


SANCTION  - 

us  from  the  breach  or  neglect  of  it.  And  these  natural  con- 
sequences of  virtue  and  vice  are  also  a declaration,  on  the  part 
of  God,  that  He  is  in  favour  of  the  one  and  against  the  other, 
and  are  intimations,  that  Ilis  love  of  the  one  and  Ilis  hatred  of 
the  other  may  be  more  fully  manifested  hereafter.  By  Locke, 
Paley,  and  Bentham,  the  term  sanction,  or  enforcement  of 
obedience,  is  applied  to  reward  as  well  as  to  punishment.  But 
Mr.  Austin'  confines  it  to  the  latter ; perhaps,  because  human 
laws  only  punish,  and  do  not  reward. 

SAVAGE  and  BARBAKQTTS.—  Ferguson2  states  that  the  his- 
tory of  mankind,  in  their  rudest  state,  may  be  considered 
under  two  heads,  viz.,  that  of  the  savage,  who  is  not  yet  ac- 
quainted with  property,  and  that  of  the  barbarian,  to  whom 
it  is,  although  not  ascertained  by  laws,  a principal  object  of 
care  and  desire. 

The  distinction  here  made  between  the  savage  and  the  bar- 
barous states  of  society,  resolves  itself  into  the  absence  or 
presence  of  political  government;  for  without  political  govern- 
ment, property  cannot  exist.  The  distinction  is  an  important 
one  ; and  it  would  be  convenient  to  apply  the  term  savage  to 
communities  which  are  permanently  in  a state  of  anarchy,  which 
ordinarily  exist  without  government,  and  to  apply  the  term 
barbarous  to  communities,  which,  though  in  a rude  state  as 
regards  the  ai-ts  of  life,  are  nevertheless  subject  to  a govern- 
ment. In  this  sense,  the  North  American  Indians  would  be 
in  a savage,  while  the  Arab  tribes,  and  most  of  the  Asiatic 
nations,  would  be  in  a barbarous  state.  Montesquieu’s3  dis- 
tinction between  savages  and  barbarians,  is  different  in  form, 
but  in  substance  it  is  founded  on  the  same  principle.  Hugh 
Murray4  lays  it  down  that  the  savage  form  of  society  is  with- 
out government. 

According  to  many  ancient  and  modern  philosophers,  the 
savage  state  was  the  primitive  state  of  the  human  race.  But 
others,  especially  Bonald  and  De  Maistre,  having  maintained 
that  the  nations  now  found  in  a savage  state  have  accidentally 


1 Province  of  Jurispr.  Determined , p.  10. 

a Essay  on  Hist,  of  Civ.  Soc .,  part  ii.,  sect.  2.  3 Esprit  des  Lois , xviii.  11. 

4 Enquiries  respecting  the  Character  of  Nations , and  the  Progress  of  Society , Edin., 

1808,  p.  280. 

39* 


2e 


450 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SAVAGE  — 

degenerated  from  the  primitive  state,  which  was  a state  of 
knowledge  and  civilization. 

SCEPTICISM  (oxErf-fo/mi,  to  look,  to  seek)  is  used  as  synony- 
mous with  doubt — q.  v.  But  doubt  may  be  removed  by  evidence, 
and  give  way  to  conviction  or  belief.  The  characteristic  of 
scepticism  is  to  come  to  no  conclusion  for  or  against — irioxr}, 
holding  off,  and  consequent  tranquillity — arapa^ia.  Absolute 
objective  certainty  being  unattainable,  scepticism  holds  that  in 
the  contradictions  of  the  reason,  truth  is  as  much  on  one  side 
as  on  the  other — ovbcv  pd%%ov.  It  was  first  taught  by  Pyrrho, 
who  flourished  in  Greece  about  340  b.c.  Hence  it  is  some- 
times called  Pyrrhonism.  The  word  is  generally  used  in  a 
bad  sense,  as  equivalent  to  infidelity  or  unbelief.  But  in  the 
following  passages  it  means,  more  correctly,  the  absence  of 
determination. 

“We  shall  not  ourselves  venture  to  determine  anything,  in 
so  great  a point ; but  sceptically  leave  it  undecided.” 1 

“ That  all  his  arguments  (Bp.  Berkeley’s)  are,  in  reality, 
merely  sceptical,  appears  from  this,  that  they  admit  of  no 
answer  and  produce  no  conviction.  Their  only  effect  is  to 
cause  that  momentary  amazement,  and  irresolution,  and  con- 
fusion, which  is  the  result  of  scepticism.” 2 

Scepticism  is  opposed  to  dogmatism  — q.  v. 

“ The  writings  of  the  best  authors  among  the  ancients  being 
full  and  solid,  tempt  and  carry  me  which  way  almost  they 
will.  He  that  I am  reading  seems  always  to  have  the  most 
force  ; and  I find  that  every  one  in  turn  has  reason,  though 
they  contradict  one  another.” 

This  is  said  by  Montaigne,3  in  the  true  spirit  of  scepticism. 

11  Quc  scais-je ? wa«  the  motto  of  Montaigne, 

As  also  of  the  first  academicians; 

That  all  is  dubious  which  man  may  attain, 

Was  one  of  their  most  favourite  positions. 

There’s  no  such  thing  as  certainty,  that’s  plain 
As  any  of  mutality’s  conditions; 

So  little  do  we  know  what  we’re  about  in 
This  world,  I doubt  if  doubt  itself  be  doubting.” 

Byron.4 


1 Cud  worth,  Intdl.  Si/st.,  p.  806. 

a Hume,  Assays  note,  p.  369,  4to  edit. 

3 Book  ii.,  chap.  12. 


4 Don  Juan,  Canto  ix.,  xvii. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


451 


SCEPTICISM  — 

Glanvill  (-Joseph)  has  a work  which  he  entitled  Scepsis 
Scientifca,  or  the  Folly  of  Dogmatising ; Staudlin  wrote  the 
History  and  Spirit  of  Scepticism ; 1 Sanchez  (Fr.)  or  Sanctius 
wrote  a Tractatus  de  multum  nobili  et  prima  universali  scieniia, 
quod  nihil  scitur ; 2 Crousaz  has  Examen  du  Pyrrhonisme  An- 
cienne  et  Hoderne. 

SCHEMA  (s^aci,  shape),  “termed  by  Mr.  Semple  efigiaiion , is 
the  representation  of  a universal  proceeding  of  the  imagination 
to  procure  for  a conception  its  image.  To  all  conceptions  an 
object  must  be  given,  and  objects  are  given  to  us  only  through 
the  modification  of  the  sensibility.  Pure  conceptions  d priori 
must  contain  d priori  formal  conditions  of  the  sensibility  (of 
the  internal  sense  especially),  under  which  alone  the  pure 
understanding-conception  a priori  can  be  applied  to  any  object 
d priori.  This  formal  and  pure  condition  of  sensibility,  and 
to  which  the  pure  understanding-conception  is  restricted  in  its 
use,  is  termed  by  Kant  the  transcendental  schema  of  this  under- 
standing-conception.  The  procedure  with  these  schemata,  or 
the  sensible  conditions  under  which  pure  understanding  alone 
can  be  used,  he  also  termed  the  schematismus  of  the  pure 
understanding.  The  schema  is  only  in  itself  a product  of  the 
imagination,  but  it  is  still  to  be  distinguished  from  an  image 
in  this  respect,  that  it  is  a single  intuition.  Five  dots  in  a line, 
for  example,  are  an  image  of  the  number  five ; but  the  schema 
of  a conception,  for  instance,  of  a number  in  general,  is  more 
the  representation  of  a method  of  representing  a multitude 
according  to  a certain  conception,  for  instance  a thousand,  in 
an  image,  than  this  image  itself.”* 3 
SCHOLASTIC  . — Scholasticus,  as  a Latin  word,  was  first  used  by 
Petronius.  Quintilian  subsequently  applied  it  to  the  rhetori- 
cians in  his  day:  and  we  read  in  Jerome,  that  Serapion,  having 
acquired  great  fame,  received  as  a title  of  honour  the  surname 
Scholasticus.  When  the  schools  of  the  Middle  Ages  were  opened, 
it  was  applied  to  those  charged  with  the  education  of  youth. 

“We  see  the  original  sense  of  the  word  scholastic,”  says  Dr. 
Hampden,4  “in  the  following  passage: — Omnes  enim  in  scrip- 

1 2 vols.,  Lcipsic,  1701-5.  a 4to.,  Lyons,  1581. 

s Haywood,  Explan,  of  Terms  in  Crit.  of  Pure  Reason. 

4 Hampton  Lest.,  i..  p.  7. 


452 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SCHOLASTIC  — 

tis  suis  causas  tantum  egerunt  suas ; et  propriis  magis  laudibiis 
quam  aliorum  uiilitatibus  considentcs,  non  id  face?- e adnisi  sun  t 
ut  salubres  et  salutiferi,  sed  ut  scholastici  ac  diserti  haberentur." 
— Salvianus.1 

Scholastic  Philosophy.  — This  phrase  denotes  a period  rather 
than  a system  of  philosophy.  It  is  the  philosophy  that  was 
taught  in  the  schools  during  the  Middle  Ages.  The  Middle 
Ages  extend  from  the  commencement  of  the  ninth  to  the  six- 
teenth century.  What  has  been  called  the  Classic  Age  of  the 
scholastic  philosophy,  includes  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth 
centuries.  It  begins  when  the  metaphysics  of  Aristotle  were 
introduced  into  France  by  Latin  translations,  and  terminates 
with  the  Council  of  Florence  and  the  taking  of  Constantinople. 
The  only  philosophy  that  was  taught  during  that  period,  was 
taught  by  the  clergy ; and  was  therefore  very  much  mixed  up 
with  theology.  The  only  way  of  teaching  was  by  lectures  or 
dictates  ; and  hence  the  phrase,  legere  in  qohilosophia.  There 
was  no  one  system  uniformly  taught ; but  different  and  con- 
flicting opinions  were  held  and  promulgated  by  different  doc- 
tors. The  method  was  that  of  interpretation.  Grammar  was 
taught  by  praslections  on  Donatus  and  Priscian,  and  rhetoric 
by  projections  on  some  parts  of  Cicero  or  Boethius.  But  logic 
shared  most  of  their  attention,  and  was  taught  by  praelections 
on  such  of  the  works  of  Aristotle  as  were  best  known.  The 
Timceus  of  Plato  also  occupied  much  of  their  attention  ; and 
they  laboured  to  reconcile  the  doctrines  of  the  one  philosopher 
with  those  of  the  other. 

Mr.  Morell2  says,  “It  has  been  usual  to  divide  the  vsdiole 
scholastic  periods  into  three  eras.3 — -1.  That  which  was  marked 
by  the  absolute  subordination  of  philosophy  to  theology,  that 
is,  authority.  2.  That  which  was  marked  by  the  friendly  alli- 
ance of  philosophy  with  dogmatic  theology.  3.  The  commence- 
ment of  a separation  between  the  two,  or  the  dawn  of  the 
entire  independence  of  philosophy. 

The  first  years  of  scholastic  philosophy  were  marked  by 
authority.  In  the  ninth  century,  Joannes  Scotus  Erigena 


* De  Gubern.  Dei , Prcefat.  2 Phil,  of  Religion , p.  369. 

3 Tenneman  makes  four  periods  of  scholastic  philosophy , according  to  the  prevalence 
of  Realism  or  Nominalism. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


458 


SCHOLASTIC  — 

attempted  to  assert  the  claims  of  reason.  Two  hundred  years 
after,  the  first  era  was  brought  to  a close  by  Abelard.  The 
second  is  marked  by  Albertus  Magnus,  Thomas  Aquinas,  and 
Duns  Scotus.  Raymond  Lully,  Roger  Bacon,  followed  by 
Occam  and  the  Nominalists,  represent  the  third  and  declining 
era. 

The  taking  of  Constantinople  by  the  Turks,  the  invention 
of  printing,  and  the  progress  of  the  Reformation,  put  an  end 
to  the  scholastic  philosophy.  Philosophy  was  no  longer  con- 
fined to  the  schools  and  to  preelections.  The  press  became  a 
most  extensive  lecturer,  and  many  embraced  the  opportunities 
offered  of  extending  knowledge. 

In  addition  to  general  histories  of  philosophy,  see  Rousse- 
lot,  Etudes  sur  la  Philosophic  dans  le  Moyen  Age;1  Haureau, 
De  la  Philosophic  Scholastique;2  Cousin,  Fragmens  Philoso- 
phiques .3  Also  his  Introduction  to  CEuvres  inedites  d’ Abelard. 

SCIENCE  ( scieniia ) means  knowledge,  emphatically  so  called, 
that  is,  knowledge  of  principles  and  causes. 

Science  (s7Uarrpt;)  has  its  name  from  bringing  us  (srtt 
a-idaiv)  to  some  stop  and  boundary  of  things,  taking  us  away 
from  the  unbounded  nature  and  mutability  of  particulars;  for 
it  is  conversant  about  subjects  that  are  general  and  invariable. 
This  etymology  given  by  Nicephorus  (Blemmida),  and  long 
before  him  adopted  by  the  Peripatetics,  came  originally  from 
Plato,  as  may  be  seen  in  his  Cratylus. 

“"O-n  scientice  fundamentum  est,  Sion  fastigium.” 4 
“ Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  in  his  Lectures  on  Logic,  defined 
science  as  a ‘ complement  of  cognitions,  having,  in  point  of 
form,  the  character  of  logical  perfection,  and  in  point  of  mat- 
ter, the  character  of  real  truth.’  ”5 

Science  is  knowledge  evident  and  certain  in  itself,  or  by  the 
principle  from  which  it  is  deduced,  or  with  which  it  is  cer- 
tainly connected.  It  is  subjective  as  existing  in  a mind  — ob- 
jective, as  embodied  in  truths  — speculative,  as  resting  in  at- 
tainment of  truths,  as  in  physical  science  — practical,  as  lead- 
ing to  do  something,  as  in  ethical  science. 


1 3 tom.,  8vo,  Paris,  1S40-2. 

“ Tom.  iii.,  Paris,  1840. 

8 Dove,  1’olitical  Science,  p.  76. 


2 2 tom.,  8vo,  Paris,  1S50. 

* Trendelenburg,  Elementa  Log.  Arist.,  p.  76. 


454 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SCIENCE  — 

Science,  art,  and  empiricism,  are  defined  by  Sopater,*  as 
follows : — 

Science  consists  in  an  infallible  and  unchanging  knowledge 
of  phenomena. 

Art  is  a system  formed  from  observation,  and  directed  to  a 
useful  end. 

Empiricism  is  an  unreasoning  and  instinctive  imitation  of 
previous  practice. 

Art  is  of  three  kinds  — theoretic,  practical,  and  mixed. 

“No  art,  however,  is  purely  theoretic  or  contemplative. 
The  examples  given  are  of  science,  not  art.  It  is  a part  of 
grammatical  science  to  say  that  all  words  with  a certain  termi- 
nation have  a certain  accent.  When  this  is  converted  into  a 
rule,  it  becomes  part  of  an  art.”1 2 

“ In  science,  scimus  lit  sciamus;  in  art,  scimus  nt  produca- 
mus.  And,  therefore,  science  and  art  may  be  said  to  be  inves- 
tigations of  truth:3  but  one,  science,  inquires  for  the  sake  of 
knowledge : the  other,  art,  for  the  sake  of  production : 4 and 
hence  science  is  more  concerned  with  the  higher  truths,  art 
with  the  lower:  and  science  never  is  engaged  as  art  is  in  pro- 
ductive application.5  And  the  most  perfect  state  of  science, 
therefore,  will  be  the  most  high  and  accurate  inquiry ; the 
perfection  of  art  will  be  the  most  apt  and  efficient  system  of 
rules:  art  always  throwing  itself  into  the  form  of  rules.”6  — 
Karslake.7 

“Science  and  art  differ  from  one  another,  as  the  understand- 
ing differs  from  the  will,  or  as  the  indicative  mood  in  grammar 
differs  from  the  imperative.  The  one  deals  in  facts,  the  other 
in  precepts.  Science  is  a collection  of  truths  ; art  a body  of 
rules,  or  directions  for  conduct.  The  language  of  science  is, 
This  is,  or,  This  is  not ; This  does,  or  does  not  happen.  The 
language  of  art  is,  Do  this,  Avoid  that.  Science  takes  cogniz- 


1 On  Hermogenes,  apud  Rliet.  Gr.,  vol.  v.,  pp.  3-5,  ed.  Walz. 

3 Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  On  Methods  of  Observ.  in  Politics , chap.  19,  sect.  2. 

3 This  is,  speaking  logically,  “the  Genus”  of  the  two. 

4 These  are  their  differentia , or  distinctive  characteristics. 

6 These  are  their  specific  properties. 

6 This  distinction  of  science  and  art  is  given  in  Aristotle.  — See  Poster.  Analyt .,  i., 
194,  ii.,  13. 

1 Aids  to  Log.y  b.  i.,  p.  24. 


/ 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  455 


SCIENCE  — 

ance  of  a phenomenon,  and  endeavours  to  discover  its  law;  art 
proposes  to  itself  an  end,  and  looks  out  for  means  to  effect  it.” 1 
— V.  Art,  Demonstration. 

SCIENCES  (The  Occult)  are  so  called  (from  occidto,  to  hide  or 
conceal)  because  they  have  reference  to  qualities  or  powers 
which  arc  not  such  as  are  common  or  commonly  known.  The 
belief  in  beings  having  superhuman  powers,  as  fairies,  familiars, 
daemons,  &c.,  in  augury,  oracles,  witchcraft,  &c.,  in  dreams  and 
visions,  &c.,  in  divination  and  astrology,  <tc.,  and  in  talismans 
and  amulets,  &c.,  leads  to  the  prosecution  of  what  has  been 
called  the  Occult  Sciences. — See  a vol.  under  this  title  in  the 
cabinet  edition  of  the  Encyclopcedia  Metropolitana. 
SCIENTIA  (Media).  — “According  to  Molina,  the  objects  of  the 
divine  knowledge  are  the  possible,  the  actual,  and  the  condi- 
tional. The  knowledge  of  the  possible  is  simple  intelligence  ; 
of  the  actual,  scientia  visionis  ; and  of  the  conditional,  scienlia 
media,  intermediate  between  that  of  intelligence  and  vision. 
An  example  of  scientia  media  is  that  of  David  asking  the 
oracle  if  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  of  Keilah,  in  which  he 
meant  to  take  refuge,  would  deliver  it  up  to  Saul  if  he  laid 
siege  to  it.  The  answer  was  in  the  affirmative,  whereupon 
David  took  a different  course.” 2 

Leibnitz3  has  said,  “ Scientia  media  might  rather  he  under- 
stood to  mean  the  science  not  only  of  future  conditionals,  but 
universally  of  all  future  contingents.  Then  science  of  simple 
intelligence  would  be  restricted  to  the  knowledge  of  truths 
possible  and  necessary  ; scienlia  visionis  to  that  of  truths  con- 
tingent and  actual.  Scientia  media  would  thus  have  it  in 
common  with  the  first  that  it  concerned  truths  possible;  and 
with  the  second,  that  it  applied  to  truths  contingent.”  4 
SCIOLIST  ( sciolus , one  who  thinks  he  knows  much  and  knows 
but  little).  — “ Some  have  the  hap  to  be  termed  learned  men, 
though  they  have  gathered  up  but  the  scraps  of  knowledge  here 
and  there,  though  they  be  but  smatterers  and  mere  sciolists.” 5 
SCIOMACHY  (extd,  a shadow;  and  yaxy,  a fight). — “But  pray, 

1 J.  S.  Mill,  Essays  on  Pol.  Econ. 

3 Leibnitz,  Sur  la  Bonte  de  Dieu,  partie  1,  sect.  40. 

3 In  La  Cause  de  Dieu,  &c.,  sec.  17. 

4 See  Reid,  Act,  Pow.,  essay  iy.,  chap.  11.  - * Ilowell,  Letters,  b.  iii.,  let.  8. 


456 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SCIOMACHY  — 

countryman,  to  avoid  this  sciomachy,  or  imaginary  combat  with 
words,  let  me  know,  sir,  what  you  mean  by  the  name  of  tyrant.” 1 

SECULARISM  is  the  Latin  for  ihis-world-ism,  and  means,  “attend 
to  the  world  that  you  are  now  in,  and  let  the  next  alone.”2 
Its  capital  principles  are  — 1.  That  attention  to  temporal 
things  should  take  precedence  of  considerations  relating  to  a 
future  existence.  2.  That  science  is  the  providence  of  life, 
and  that  spiritual  dependency  in  human  affairs  may  be  at- 
tended with  material  destruction.  3.  That  there  exist,  inde- 
pendently of  scriptural  religion,  guarantees  of  morality  in 
human  nature,  intelligence,  and  utility. 

The  aim  of  secularism  is  to  aggrandize  the  present  life.  For 
eternity,  it  substitutes  time ; for  providence,  science ; for 
fidelity  to  the  Omniscient,  usefulness  to  man.  Its  great  advo- 
cate is  Mr.  Ilolyoake. 

SECUNDUM  QUID  (to  xaO  6)  is  opposed  to  Secundum  ipsum  (to 
xa 9 av  to)  as  the  relative  to  the  non-relative  or  the  limited  to 
the  unlimited.  Mr.  Maurice  illustrates  Secundum  quid  by  a 
passage  from  “As  you  like  it:”  “In  respect  that  it  is  of  tlio 
country  it  is  a good  life,  but  in  respect  it  is  not  of  the  court  it 
is  a vile  life.”3— F.  Fallacy. 

SELE-CONSCIOUSNESS.  — F Apperception. 

SELFISHNESS  “consists  not  in  the  indulging  of  this  or  that 
particular  propensity,  but  in  disregarding,  for  the  sake  of  any 
kind  of  personal  gratification  or  advantage,  the  rights  or  the 
feelings  of  other  men.  It  is,  therefore,  a negative  quality; 
that  is,  it  consists  in  not  considering  what  is  due  to  one’s  neigh- 
bours, through  a deficiency  of  justice  or  benevolence.  And 
selfishness,  accordingly,  will  show  itself  in  as  many  different 
shapes  as  there  are  different  dispositions  in  men. 

“You  may  see  these  differences  even  in  very  young  children. 
One  selfish  child,  who  is  greedy,  will  seek  to  keep  all  the  cakes 
and  sweetmeats  to  himself;  another,  who  is  idle,  will  not  care 
what  trouble  he  causes  to  others,  so  ho  can  save  his  own ; an- 
other, who  is  vain,  will  seek  to  obtain  the  credit  which  is  due 
to  others ; one  who  is  covetous,  will  seek  to  gain  at  another’s 


1 Cowley,  On  the  Government  of  Oliver  Ci’omwcll. 

a Arnot,  Must,  of  Proverbs , p.  368. 

3 Arist.,  Mciaphys.,  lib.  iv.,  c.  20. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


457 


SELFISHNESS  — 

expense,  &c.  In  short,  each  person  ‘ has  a self  of  his  own.’ 
And,  consequently,  though  you  may  be  of  a character  very 
unlike  that  of  some  selfish  person,  you  may  yet  be,  in  your 
own  way,  quite  as  selfish  as  he.  And  it  is  possible  to  be  sel- 
fish in  the  highest  degree,  without  being  at  all  too  much  ac- 
tuated by  self-love,  but  unduly  neglectful  of  others  when  your 
own  gratification,  of  whatever  kind,  is  concerned.” 1 

Selfishness  exists  only  in  reference  to  others,  and  could  have 
on  place  in  one  who  lived  alone  on  a desert  island,  though  he 
might  have,  of  course,  every  degree  of  self-love;  for  selfish- 
ness is  not  an  excess  of  self-love,  and  consists  not  in  an  ovei-- 
desire  of  happiness,  but  in  placing  your  happiness  in  some- 
thing which  interferes  with,  or  leaves  you  regardless  of  that 
of  others.  Nor  are  we  to  suppose  that  selfishness  and  want 
of  feeling  are  either  the  same  or  inseparable.  For,  on  the 
one  hand,  I have  known  such  as  have  had  very  little  feeling, 
but  felt  for  others  as  much  nearly  as  for  themselves,  and  were, 
therefore,  far  from  selfish  ; and,  on  the  other  hand,  some,  of 
very  acute  feelings,  feel  for  no  one  but  themselves,  and,  in- 
deed, are  sometimes  among  the  most  cruel.”2 
SELF-LOVE  is  sometimes  used  in  a general  sense  to  denote  all 
those  principles  of  our  nature  which  prompt  us  to  seek  our  own 
good,  just  as  those  principles  which  lead  us  to  seek  the  good 
of  others  are  all  comprehended  under  the  name  of  benevolence. 
All  our  desires  tend  towards  the  attainment  of  some  good  or 
the  averting  of  some  evil — having  reference  either  to  ourselves 
or  others,  and  may  therefore  be  brought  under  the  two  heads 
of  benevolence  and  self-love. 

But  besides  this  general  sense  of  the  word  to  denote  all 
those  desires  which  have  a regard  to  our  own  gratification  or 
good,  self-love  is  more  strictly  used  to  signify  “the  desire  for 
our  own  welfare  as  such.”  In  this  sense,  “it  is  quite  distinct 
from  all  our  other  desires  and  propensities,”  says  Dr.  Whately,3 
“though  it  may  often  tend  in  the  same  direction  with  some 
of  them.  One  person,  for  instance,  may  drink  some  water 
because  he  is  thirsty;  and  another  may,  without  thirst,  drink 
— suppose  from  a mineral  spring,  because  he  believes  it  will 

I Whatelv,  Lessons  on  Morals , p.  143. 

II  Whately,  On  Bacon,  p.  221. 

40 


a Lessons  on  Morals,  p.  142. 


458 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


SELF-LOVE  - 

be  good  for  his  health.  This  latter  is  impelled  by  self-love , but 
not  the  other. 

“ So  again,  one  person  may  pursue  some  course  of  study  in 
order  to  qualify  himself  for  some  profession  by  which  he  may 
advance  in  life,  and  another  from  having  a taste  for  that  study, 
and  a desire  for  that  branch  of  knowledge.  This  latter,  though 
he  may  perhaps  be,  in  fact,  promoting  his  own  welfare,  is  not 
acting  from  self-love.  For  as  the  object  of  thirst  is  not  hap- 
piness, but  drink,  so  the  object  of  curiosity  is  not  happiness, 
but  knowledge.  And  so  of  the  rest.” 

Self-love  may,  like  any  other  of  our  tendencies,  be  cherished 
and  indulged  to  excess,  or  it  may  be  ill-directed.  But  within 
due  bounds  it  is  allowable  and  right,  and  by  no  means  incom- 
patible with  benevolence,  or  a desire  to  promote  the  happiness 
of  others.  And  Dr.  Hutcheson,  who  maintains  that  kind  af- 
fection is  what  constitutes  an  agent  virtuous,  has  said,  that 
he  who  cherishes  kind  affection  towards  all,  may  also  love  him- 
self ; may  love  himself  as  a part  of  the  whole  system  of  ra- 
tional and  sentient  beings ; may  promote  his  own  happiness 
in  preference  to  that  of  another  who  is  not  more  deserving  of 
his  love ; and  may  be  innocently  solicitous  about  himself, 
while  he  is  wisely  benevolent  towards  all.1 

The  error  of  Hobbes,  and  the  school  of  philosophers  who 
maintained  that  in  doing  good  to  others  our  ultimate  aim  is 
to  do  good  to  ourselves,  lay  in  supposing  that  there  is  any  an- 
tagonism between  benevolence  and  self-love.  So  long  as  self- 
love  does  not  degenerate  into  selfshness,  it  is  quite  compatible 
with  true  benevolence. 

In  opposition  to  the  views  of  Hobbes  and  the  selfish  school 
of  philosophers,  see  Butler,  Sermons ;2  Turnbull,  Nature  and 
Origin  of  Laws;3  Hume,  On  General  Principles  of  Morals ;4 
Hutcheson,  Inquiry  concerning  Moral  Good  and  Evil;3  Ilaz- 
litt,  Essay  on  Principles  of  Hum.  Action ;6  Mackintosh,  View 
of  Ethical  Philosophy ,7 

SEMATOLOGY  [ayjya,  a sign ; and  %oyo;,  discourse),  the  doctrine 
of  signs  — q.  v. 

1 Inquiry  concerning  Mcn'al  Good  and  Evil , sett.  iii. 

Q On  Hum.  Nat on  Compassion , &c.  8 Vol.  ii.,  p.  258. 

4 Sect.  2.  * Sect.  2.  c P.  239.  1 P.  192. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PIIILOSOI^HY. 


459 


SENSATION.  — “ The  earliest  sign  by  which  the  Ego  becomes 
perceptible  is  corporeal  sensation. 

“ Without  this  general  innate  sensation  we  should  not 
possess  the  certainty  that  our  body  is  our  body ; for  it  is 
as  much  an  object  for  the  other  senses  as  anything  else  that 
we  can  see,  hear,  taste,  or  feel.  This  original  general  in- 
nate sensation  is  necessary  to  the  existence  of  all  other  parti- 
cular sensations,  and  may  exist  independently  of  the  nervous 
system.  Polypi,  animals  of  the  simplest  structure,  with- 
out a nervous  system  distinct  from  the  rest  of  the  organic 
mass,  show  traces  of  innate  sensation.  The  light  by  means 
of  which  we  see,  acts  not  only  on  the  visual  nerves,  but  also 
on  the  fluids  of  the  eye,  and  the  sensations  of  sight  partly  de- 
pend on  the  structure  of  the  eye.  This  sensibility,  therefore, 
appears  to  be  a necessary  attribute  of  animated  organic  matter 
itself. 

“All  the  perceptions  of  sense  are  rooted  in  the  general 
sensation.  The  child  must  be  conscious  of  his  senses  before 
he  applies  them.  This  sensation,  however,  is  very  obscure ; 
even  pain  is  not  clearly  felt  by  it  at  the  place  where  it  exists. 
Equally  obscure  is  the  notion  which  it  entertains  of  an  object. 
Though  Brach,  therefore,  is  right  in  ascribing  something  ob- 
jective, even  to  the  general  sensation,  since  conditions  cannot 
communicate  themselves,  without  communicating  (though 
ever  so  obscurely)  something  of  that  which  produces  the  con- 
dition— nay,  strictly  speaking,  as  even  in  the  idea  ‘ subject,’ 
that  of  an  ‘ object’  is  involved,  yet  it  is  advisable  to  abide  by 
the  distinction  founded  by  Kant,  according  to  which,  by  in- 
nate sensation,  we  especially  perceive  our  own  personality 
(subject),  and  by  the  senses  we  specially  perceive  objects,  and 
thus  in  the  ascending  line,  feeling,  taste,  smell,  hearing,  and 
sight. 

“ The  next  step  from  this  obscure  original  innate  sensation 
is  particular  sensation  through  the  medium  of  the  nervous 
system,  which,  in  its  more  profound,  and  yet  more  obscure 
sphere,  produces  common  sensation  (Ccenesthesis),  and  in  a 
higher  manifestation,  the  perceptions  of  the  senses.  Ccenes- 
thesis, or  common  feeling,  is  referred  to  the  ganglionic  nerves. 
It  may  be  called  subjective,  inasmuch  as  the  body  itself  gives 


460 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SENSATION— 

the  excitement  to  the  nerve  concerned.1  By  the  Coenesthesis, 
states  of  our  body  are  revealed  to  us  which  have  their  seat  in 
the  sphere  of  the  vegetative  life.  These  states  are  — 

“1.  General: — corporeal  heaviness  and  buoyancy,  atony, 
toniety. 

“2.  Special: — hunger,  thirst,  sexual  instinct,  &c. 

“ The  sensations  of  pain,  titillation,  itching,  &c.,  which  are 
generally  cited  here,  belong,  in  their  more  common  accepta- 
tion, to  the  general  corporeal  feeling;  in  their  more  local 
limitation,  with  distinct  perception  of  the  object  exciting,  to 
the  sense  of  touch ; but  when  they  arise  from  the  nervous 
system  allotted  to  the  vegetative  sphere  of  the  body,  they 
certainly  belong  to  the  Coenesthesis  in  the  more  limited  sense 
of  the  word. 

“ To  this  class  belongs  especially  the  anxiety  arising  from 
impediment  in  respiration,  and  from  nausea. 

“ In  the  analysis  of  the  psycho-physical  processes  proceed- 
ing outwards  from  sensation  to  perception,  we  encounter 
after  the  organs  of  the  Coenesthesis,  the  organs  of  sense.”2 
Sensation  and  Perception.  — “A  conscious  presentation,  if  it 
refers  exclusively  to  the  subject,  as  a modification  of  our  own 
being,  is  — sensation.  The  same  if  it  refers  to  an  object,  is 
= perception.”  3 

Rousseau  distinguished  sensations  as  affectives,  or  giving 
pleasure  or  pain  ; and  representatives,  or  giving  knowledge  of 
objects  external. 

Paffe4  distinguishes  the  element  affectif  and  the  element 
instructif. 

In  like  manner  Dr.  Reid  regards  sensation  not  only  as  a 
state  of  feeling,  but  a sign  of  that  which  occasions  it. 

Bozelli 5 calls  sensations,  in  so  far  as  they  are  representative, 


1 However  subjective  this  sensation  is,  there  is  always  in  it  the  indication  of  an  object, 

as  Brach  shows:  hence  illustrating  the  instinct  of  animals.  Presentiment,  too,  chiefty 
belongs  to  this  system. 

3 Feuchtersleben,  Med.  Psychology , 1847,  p.  83. 

3 Coleridge,  Church  and  Slate  — quoted  by  Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought , 
p.  104. 

4 Sur  la  Sensibilite. 

6 De  V Union  de  la i Philosoph.  avec  la  Morale. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


461 


SENSATION  — 

in  their  philosophical  form,  in  so  far  as  they  give  pleasure  or 
pain,  in  their  moral  form  or  character. 

“ To  sensation  I owe  all  the  certainty  I have  of  my  exist- 
ence as  a sentient  being,  to  perception  a certainty  not  less 
absolute,  that  there  are  other  beings  besides  me.”  1 

Sensation  properly  expresses  that  change  in  the  state  of  the 
mind  which  is  produced  by  an  impression  upon  an  organ  of 
sense  (of  which  change  we  can  conceive  the  mind  to  be  con- 
scious, without  any  knowledge  of  external  objects) : perception, 
on  the  other  hand,  expresses  the  knowledge  or  the  intimations 
we  obtain,  by  means  of  our  sensations,  concerning  the  qualities 
of  matter ; and  consequently  involves,  in  every  instance,  the 
notion  of  externality  or  outness,  which  it  is  necessary  to  exclude 
in  order  to  seize  the  precise  import  of  the  word  sensation. 

Sensation  has  been  employed  to  denote  — 

1.  The  process  of  sensitive  apprehension,  both  in  its  subjec- 
tive and  its  objective  relations ; like  the  Greek  ess  thesis. 

2.  It  was  limited  first  in  the  Cartesian  school,  and  there- 
after in  that  of  Reid,  to  the  subjective  phasis  of  our  sensitive 
cognitions.2 

“ Sensation  proper,  is  not  purely  a passive  state,  but  implies 
a certain  amount  of  mental  activity.  It  may  be  described,  on 
the  psychological  side,  as  resulting  directly  from  the  attention 
which  the  mind  gives  to  the  affections  of  its  own  organism. 
This  description  may  at  first  sight  appear  to  be  at  variance 
with  the  facts  of  the  case,  inasmuch  as  every  severe  affection 
of  the  body  produces  pain,  quite  independently  of  any  know- 
ledge we  may  possess  of  the  cause  or  of  any  operation  of  the 
will  being  directed  towards  it.  Facts,  however,  rightly 
analyzed,  show  us,  that  if  the  attention  of  the  mind  be 
absorbed  in  other  things,  no  impulse,  though  it  amount  to 
the  laceration  of  the  nerves,  can  produce  in  us  the  slightest 
feeling.  Extreme  enthusiasm,  or  powerful  emotion  of  any 
kind,  can  make  us  altogether  insensible  even  to  physical 
injury.  For  this  reason  it  is  that  the  soldier  on  the  field  of 
battle  is  often  wounded  during  the  heat  of  the  combat,  without 
discovering  it  till  exhausted  by  loss  of  blood.  Numerous  facts 


1 Thurot,  De  V Entendevient,  &c.,  tom.  i.,  p.  43. 

2 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works,  note  D*. 

40* 


462 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY, 


SENSATION  — 

of  a similar  kind  prove  demonstrately,  that  a certain  applica- 
tion and  exercise  of  mind,  on  one  side,  is  as  necessary  to  the 
existence  of  sensation,  as  the  occurrence  of  physical  impulse, 
on  the  other.” — Morell,  Psychology Stewart,  Phil.  Essays ; - 
see  also  Outlines ;3  Reid,  Essays,  Intell.  Poiv . ;4  Morell,  Phil, 
of  Religion ,5 

SENSE,  in  psychology,  is  employed  ambiguously  — 1,  For  the 
faculty  of  sensitive  apprehension.  2.  For  its  act.  3.  For  its 
organ. 

Sense  and  Idea. — In  the  following  passage  from  Shaftesbury,® 
sense  is  used  as  equivalent  to  idea;  “ Nothing  surely  is  more 
strongly  imprinted  on  our  minds,  or  more  closely  interwoven 
■with  our  souls  than  the  idea  or  sense  of  order  and  proportion.” 
In  like  manner  Dr.  Hutcheson  has  said,  “ There  is  a natu- 
ral and  immediate  determination  to  approve  certain  affections 
and  actions  consequent  upon  them  ; or  a natural  sense  of  im- 
mediate excellence  in  them,  not  referred  to  any  other  quality 
perceivable  by  our  senses  or  by  reasoning.”  We  speak  of  a 
determination  of  blood  to  the  head.  This  is  a physical  deter- 
mination or  tendency.  Now,  there  may  be  a mental  ten- 
dency, and  this,  in  Dr.  Hutcheson’s  philosophy,  is  called  de- 
termination or  sense.  He  defined  a sense  in  this  application 
of  it  “ a determination  to  receive  ideas,  independent  of  our 
will,”  and  he  enumerates  several  such  tendencies  or  determi- 
nations, which  he  calls  ref  ex  senses. 

SENSES  (REFLEX).  — Dr.  Hutcheson  seems  to  have  been  in 
some  measure  sensible  of  the  inadequacy  of  Mr.  Locke’s 
account  of  the  origin  of  our  ideas,  and  maintained,  that  in 
addition  to  those  which  we  have  by  means  of  sensation  and 
reflection,  we  also  acquire  ideas  by  means  of  certain  powers 
of  perception,  which  he  called  internal  and  refex  senses. 
According  to  his  psj'chology,  our  powers  of  perception  may 
be  called  direct  or  antecedent,  and  consequent  or  reflex.  We 
hear  a sound,  or  see  colour,  by  means  of  senses  which  operate 
directly  on  their  objects  ; and  do  not  suppose  any  antecedent 
perception.  But  we  perceive  the  harmony  of  sound,  and  the 


1 P.  107. 

4 Essay  i.,  chap.  1. 


a Note  f (it  is  G in  last  edit.) 
5 P.  7. 


3 Sect.  14. 

Moralists,  part  iii.,  sect.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


463 


SENSES - 

beauty  of  colour,  by  means  of  faculties  which  operate  reflexly, 
or  in  consequence  of  some  preceding  perception.  And  the 
moral  sense  was  regarded  by  him  as  a faculty  of  this  kind. 
Reflection,  from  which,  according  to  Mr.  Locke,  we  derive  tho 
simple  ideas  of  the  passions  and  affections  of  mind,  was  con- 
sidered by  Hutcheson  as  an  internal  sense  or  faculty,  operating 
directly.  But  that  faculty  by  which  we  perceive  the  beauty 
or  deformity,  the  virtue  or  vice,  of  these  passions  and  affec- 
tions, was  called  by  Hutcheson,  a reflex,  internal  sense. — Illus- 
trations of  the  Moral  Sense ; 1 Inquiry  concerning  Moral  Good 
and  Evil;2  Mor.  Phil.3 

SENSIBILITY  or  SENSITIVITY  (to  aiaOy-nxov)  is  now  used 
as  a general  term  to  denote  the  capacity  of  feeling,  as  distin- 
guished from  intellect  and  will.  It  includes  sensations  both 
external  and  internal,  whether  derived  from  contemplating 
outward  and  material  objects,  or  relations  and  ideas,  desires, 
affections,  passions.  It  also  includes  the  sentiments  of  the 
sublime  and  beautiful,  the  moral  sentiment  and  the  religious 
sentiment ; and,  in  short,  every  modification  of  feeling  of 
which  we  are  susceptible.  By  the  ancient  philosophers  the 
sensibility  under  the  name  of  appetite  was  confounded  with  the 
will.  The  Scotchrphilosophers  have  analyzed  the  various  forms 
of  the  sensibility  under  the  name  of  active  principles;  but  they 
have  not  gathered  them  under  one  head,  and  have  sometimes 
treated  of  them  in  connection  with  things  very  different. 
SENSIBLES,  COMMON  and  PROPER  [sensile  or  sensibile,  that 
which  is  capable  of  affecting  some  sense ; that  which  is  the 
object  of  sense). 

Aristotle4 5  distinguished  sensibles  into  common  and  proper. 
The  common,  those  perceived  by  all  or  by  a plurality  of  senses, 
were  magnitude,  figure,  motion,  rest,  number.  To  these  five, 
some  of  the  schoolmen  (but  out  of  Aristotle)  added  place,  dis- 
tance, position,  and  continuity.6  Aristotle®  admitted,  how- 
ever, that  the  common  sensibles  are  not  properly  objects  of 


1 Sect.  1.  * Sect.  1. 

3 Book  i.,  chap.  4,  sect.  4,  and  also  sect.  5. 

4 De  Anima,  lib.  ii.,  c.  2;  lib.  iii.,  c.  1.  De  Sensu  et  Sensili,  c.  1. 

5 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works,  p 124,  note. 

c De  Anima,  lib.  iii.,  chaps.  1.  4. 


464 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SENSIBLES- 

sense ; but  merely  con-comitants  or  con-sequents  of  the  per- 
ception of  the  proper  sensiblcs.  This  is  noticed  by  Hutcheson, 1 
commended  by  Price,2  by  Mr.  Stewart,3  and  by  Royer  Col- 
lard.4 * 6 

“Sensibile  commune  dicitur  quod  vel  percipitur  pluribus  sen- 
sibus,  vel  ad  quod  cognoscendum , ab  intellectu  vel  imaginationc 
desumitur  occasio,  ex  variis  sensibvs ; ut  sunt  jigura,  motus, 
ubicatio,  duratio,  magnitudo,  distantia,  numerus,” 6 &c. 

The  proper  sensibles  are  those  objects  of  sense  which  are 
peculiar  to  one  sense ; as  colour  to  the  eye,  sound  to  the  ear, 
taste  to  the  palate,  and  touch  to  the  body. 

SENSISM,  SENSUALISM,  or  SENSUISM,  is  the  doctrine 

that  all  our  knowledge  is  derived  originally  from  sense. 

It  is  not  the  same  as  empiricism,  though  sometimes  con- 
founded with  it.  Empiricism  rests  exclusively  on  experience, 
and  rejects  all  ideas  which  are  d priori.  But  all  experience 
is  not  that  of  sense.  Empiricism  admits  facts  and  nothing 
but  facts,  but  all  facts  which  have  been  observed.  Sensism 
gives  the  single  fact  of  sensation  as  sufficient  to  explain  all 
mental  phenomena.  Locke  is  empirical,  Condillac  is  sensual. 

Sensuism,  “in  the  emphatic  language  of  Fichte,  is  called 
‘the  dirt-philosophy.’  ” 6 — V.  Empiricism,  Ideology. 

SENSORIUM  (alaSrjtripiov) , is  the  organ  by  which,  or  place  in 
which,  the  sensations  of  the  several  senses  are  reduced  to  the 
unity  of  consciousness.  According  to  Aristotle  it  was  in  all 
warm-blooded  animals  the  heart,  and  therefore  so  in  man. 
According  to  modem  philosophers  the  central  organ  is  the 
brain,  the  pineal  gland  according  to  Descartes,  the  ventricles 
or  the  corpus  callosum  according  to  others. 

Sensorium  signifies  not  so  properly  the  organ  as  the  place 
of  sensation.  The  eye,  the  ear,  &c.,  are  organs  ; but  they  are 
not  sensoria.  Sir  Isaac  Newton  does  not  say  that  space  is  a 
sensorium;  but  that  it  is  (by  way  of  comparison),  so  to  say, 
the  sensorium,  &c.7 


1 Mor.  Phil.,  book  i.,  chap.  1.  a Review,  p.  56,  first  edit. 

3 Philosoph.  Essays,  pp.  31,  46.  551,  4to.  4 (Euvres  de  Reid,  tom.  iii.,  p.  431. 

8 Compton  Carleton,  Phil.  Univ.  De  Anima,  diss.  16,  lect.  ii.,  sect.  1. 

6 Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Discussions,  p.  38,  see  also  p.  2. 

T Clarke,  Second  Reply  to  Leibnitz. 


VOCABULARY  OS'  PHILOSOPHY. 


465 


SENSORIUM — 

Leibnitz  ’ adopted  and  defended  the  explanation  of  Rudol- 
phus  Goclenius,  who,  in  his  Lexicon  Philosophicum,  under 
Sensitorium , says,  “Barbarum  scholasticorum,  qui  interdum 
sunt  simise  Grmcorum.  Hi  dicunt  Atofb/r^ptoi/.  Ex  quo  illi 
fecerunt  sensitorium  pro  sensorio,  id  est,  organum  sensationis.” 


SENSUS  COMMUNIS  [xoLvr\  at  averts).  — This  latter  phrase  was 
employed  by  Aristotle  and  the  Peripatetics  “to  denote  the 
faculty  in  which  the  various  reports  of  the  several  senses  are 
reduced  to  the  unity  of  a common  apperception.” 1  2 

This  faculty  had  an  organ  which  was  called  Sensorium  Com- 
mune— q.  v. 

Mr.  Stewart3  says : — The  sensus  communis  of  the  school- 
men denotes  the  power  whereby  the  mind  is  enabled  to  repre- 
sent to  itself  any  absent  object  of  perception,  or  any  sensa- 
tion which  it  has  formerly  experienced.  Its  seat  was  sup- 
posed to  be  that  part  of  the  brain  (hence  called  the  sensorium 
or  sensorium  commune ) where  the  nerves  from  all  the  organs 
of  perception  terminate.  Of  the  peculiar  function  allotted  to 
- it  in  the  scale  of  our  intellectual  faculties,  the  following  ac- 
count is  given  by  Hobbes: — “Some  say  the  senses  receive 
the  species  of  things  and  deliver  them  to  the  common  sense ; 
and  the  common  sense  delivers  them  over  to  the  fancy ; and 
the  fancy  to  the  memory;  and  the  memory  to  the  judgment 
— like  handling  of  things  from  one  to  another,  with  many 
words  making  nothing  understood.”4 

Mr.  Stewart  says  the  sensus  communis  is  perfectly  syno- 
nymous with  the  word  conception,  that  is,  the  power  by 
which  we  represent  an  object  of  sense,  whether  present  or 
absent.  But  it  is  doubtful  whether  sensus  communis  was  ap- 
plied by  the  schoolmen  to  the  reproduction  of  absent  objects 
of  sense. 

SENTIMENT  implies  an  idea  (or  judgment),  because  the  will  is 
not  moved  nor  the  sensibility  affected  without  knowing.  But 
an  idea  or  judgment  does  not  infer  feeling  or  sentiment .5 


1 Answer  to  the  Second  Reply  of  Clarice. 

2 Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works , p.  757,  note. 

a Note  d,  to  part  ii.  of  Elements . 

4 Of  Man , part  i.,  chap.  2. 

6 Buffier,  Log.  ii.,  art.  9. 


466 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SENTIMENT  — 

“ The  word  sentiment , in  the  English  language,  never,  as  I 
conceive,  signifies  mere  feeling,  but  judgment  accompanied  with 
feeling It  was  wont  to  signify  opinion  or  judgment  of  any 
kind,  but,  of  late,  is  appropriated  to  signify  an  opinion  or 
judgment  that  strikes,  and  produces  some  agreeable  or  un- 
easy emotion.  So  we  speak  of  sentiments  of  respect,  of  es- 
teem, of  gratitude ; but  I never  heard  the  pain  of  the  gout, 
or  any  other  severe  fooling,  called  a sentiment"1  2 

“ Mr.  Hume  sometimes  employs  (after  the  manner  of  the 
French  metaphysicians)  sentiment  as  synonymous  with  feel- 
ing ; a use  of  the  word  quite  unprecedented  in  our  tongue.”3 4 

“ There  are  two  sensibilities — the  one  turned  towards  nature 
and  transmitting  the  impressions  received  from  it,  the  other 
hid  in  the  depths  of  our  organization  and  receiving  the  im- 
pression of  all  that  passes  in  the  soul.  Have  we  discovered 
truth  — we  experience  a sentiment.  Have  we  done  a good 
deed — we  experience  a sentiment.  A sentiment  is  but  the  echo 
of  reason,  but  is  sometimes  better  heard  than  reason  itself. 
Sentiment,  which  accompanies  the  intelligence  in  all  its  move- 
ments, has,  like  the  intelligence,  a spontaneous  and  a reflec- 
tive movement.  By  itself  it  is  a source  of  emotion,  not  of 
knowledge.  Knowledge  or  judgment  is  invariable,  whatever 
be  our  health  or  spirits.  Sentiment  varies  with  health  and 
spirits.  I always  judge  the  Apollo  Belvidere  to  be  beautiful, 
but  I do  not  always  feel  the  sentiment  of  his  beauty.  A bright 
or  gloomy  day,  sadness  or  serenity  of  mind,  affect  my  senti- 
ments, but  not  my  judgment. 

“ Mysticism  would  suppress  reason  and  expand  senti- 
ment.”* 

Those  pleasures  and  pains  which  spring  up  in  connection 
with  a modification  of  our  organism  or  the  perceptions  of  tho 
senses,  are  called  sensations.  But  the  state  of  our  mind,  the 
exercise  of  thought,  conceptions  purely  intellectual,  are  the 
occasion  to  us  of  high  enjoyment  or  lively  suffering;  for  these 


1 “This  is  too  unqualified  an  assertion.  The  term  sentiment  is  in  English  applied  to 
the  higher  feelings .” — Sir  William  Hamilton. 

2 Reid,  Act.  Pow.,  essay  v.,  chap.  7. 

3 Stewart,  Philosoph.  Essays , last  ed.,  noto  E. 

4 See  Cousin,  Qluvi’cs,  tom.  ii.,  p.  96. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


467 


SENTIMENT  — 

pleasures  and  pains  of  a different  kind  is  reserved  the  name 
of  sentiments .* 

“ The  word  sentiment,  agreeably  to  the  use  made  of  it  by 
our  best  English  writers,  expresses,  in  my  opinion,  very  hap- 
pily those  complex  determinations  of  the  mind  which  result 
from  the  co-operation  of  our  rational  powers  and  our  moral 
feelings.  We  do  not  speak  of  a man’s  sentiments  concerning 
a mechanical  contrivance,  or  a physical  hypothesis,  or  con- 
cerning any  speculative  question  whatever,  by  which  the  feel- 
ings are  not  liable  to  be  roused  or  the  heart  affected. 

“ This  account  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  corresponds,  I 
think,  exactly  with  the  use  made  of  it  by  Mr.  Smith  in  the 
title  of  his  Theory  [of  Moral  Sentiments).”* 2 
Sentiment  and  Opinion. — Dr.  Beattie3  has  said,  “that  the  true 
and  the  old  English  sense  of  the  word  sentiment , is  a formed 
opinion,  notion,  or  principle.”  Dr.  Reid,  in  his  Essays  on  the 
Intell.  Powers,  speaks  of  the  sentiments  of  Mr.  Locke  concern- 
ing perception ; and  of  the  sentiments  of  Arnauld,  Berkeley, 
and  Hume  concerning  ideas. 

The  title  of  chap.  7,  essay  ii.,  of  Reid  on  Intell.  Powers,  is 
Sentiments  of  Philosophers,  &c.,  on  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton’s 
note,4  is,  “Sentiment,  as  here  and  elsewhere  employed  by 
Reid,  in  the  meaning  of  opinion  ( senteniia ),  is  not  to  be 
imitated.” 

“ By  means  of  our  sensations  we  feel,  by  means  of  our  ideas 
we  think:  now  a sentiment  (from  sentire ) is  properly  a judg- 
ment concerning  sensations,  and  an  opinion  (from  opinari ) is  a 
judgment  concerning  ideas : our  sentiments  appreciate  external, 
and  our  opinions,  internal,  phenomena.  On  questions  of  feel- 
ing, taste,  observation,  or  report,  we  define  our  sentiments. 
On  questions  of  science,  argument,  or  metaphysical  abstrac- 
tion, we  define  our  opinions.  The  sentiments  of  the  heart. 
The  opinions  of  the  mind.  It  is  my  sentiment  that  the  wine 
of  Burgundy  is  the  best  in  the  world.  It  is  my  opinion  that 
the  religion  of  Jesus  Christ  is  the  best  in  the  world.  There  is 
more  of  instinct  in  sentiment,  and  more  of  definition  in  opinion. 


‘ Manuel  de  Philosophie,  Svo,  Pari?,  1S46,  p.  142. 

3 Stewart,  Pliilosoph.  Essays,  note  D. 

3 Essay  mi  Truth,  part  ii.,  chap.  1,  sec.  1. 


4 P.  269. 


468 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SENTIMENT  — 

The  admiration  of  a work  of  art  which  results  from  first  im- 
pressions, is  classed  with  our  sentiments ; and  when  we  have 
accounted  to  ourselves  for  the  approbation,  it  is  classed  with 
our  opinions."  1 

SIGN  ( signum , a mark). — The  definition  of  a sign  is  “ that  which 
represents  anything  to  the  cognitive  faculty.”  We  have  know- 
ledge by  sense  and  by  intellect,  and  a sign  may  bo  addressed 
to  either  or  to  both  — as  smoke,  which  to  the  eye  and  to  the 
intellect  indicates  or  signifies  fire ; so  that  a sign  has  a twofold 
relation  — to  the  thing  signified  and  to  the  cognitive  faculty. 

“ Signs  are  either  to  represent  or  resemble  things,  or  only 
to  intimate  and  suggest  them  to  the  mind.  And  our  ideas 
being  the  signs  of  what  is  intended  or  supposed  therein,  are 
in  such  sort  and  so  far  right,  as  they  do  either  represent  or 
resemble  the  object  of  thought,  or  as  they  do  at  least  intimate 
it  to  the  mind,  by  virtue  of  some  natural  connection  or  proper 
appointment.” 2 

Signs  are  divided  into  natural  and  conventional.  A natural 
sign  has  the  powev  of  signifying  from  its  own  nature,  so  that 
at  all  times,  in  all  places,  and  with  all  people  it  signifies  the 
same  thing,  as  smoke  is  the  sign  of  fire.  A conventional  sign 
has  not  the  power  of  signifying  in  its  own  nature,  but  sup- 
poses the  knowledge  and  remembrance  of  what  is  signified  in 
him  to  whom  it  is  addressed,  as  three  balls  are  the  conven- 
tionally understood  sign  of  a pawnbroker’s  shop. 

In  his  philosophy  Dr.  Reid  makes  great  use  of  the  doctrine 
of  natural  signs.  He  arranges  them  in  three  classes,  — 1. 
Those  whose  connection  with  the  thing  signified  is  established 
by  nature,  but  discovered  only  by  experience,  as  natural  causes 
are  signs  of  their  effects ; and  hence  philosophy  is  called  an 
interpretation  of  nature.  2.  Those  wherein  the  connection 
between  the  sign  and  thing  signified  is  not  only  established  by 
nature,  but  discovered  to  us  by  a natural  principle  without 
reasoning  or  experience.  Of  this  class  are  the  natural  signs  of 
human  thoughts,  purposes,  and  desires,  such  as  modulations  of 
the  voice,  gestures  of  the  body,  and  features  of  the  face,  which 
may  be  called  natural  language,  in  opposition  to  that  which  is 


* Taylor,  Synonyms. 


3 Oldfield,  Essay  on  liaison,  p.  184. 


/ 


VOCABULARY  01'  PHILOSOPHY. 


469 


SIGN  — 


spoken  or  written.  3.  A third  class  of  natural  signs  compre- 
hends those  which,  though  we  never  before  had  any  notion  or 
conception  of  the  thing  signified,  do  suggest  it  and  at  once 
give  us  a conception  and  create  a belief  of  it.  In  this  way 
consciousness,  in  all  its  modifications,  gives  the  conception 
and  belief  of  a being  who  thinks  — Cogito  ergo  sum. 

“ As  the  first  class  of  natural  signs  is  the  foundation  of  true 
philosophy,  so  the  second  is  the  foundation  of  the  fine  arts  or 
of  taste,  and  the  last  is  the  foundation  of  common  sense.”  1 

The  doctrine  or  science  of  signs  has  been  called  Sematologg. 
And  as  the  signs  which  the  mind  makes  use  of  in  order  to 
obtain  and  to  communicate  knowledge  are  words  ; the  proper 
and  skilful  use  of  words  is  in  different  ways  the  object  of — 1. 
Grammar ; 2.  Logic;  and  3.  Rhetoric.2 

See  Berkeley,  Minute  Phil.;3  Mew  Theory  of  Vision ;4 
Theory  of  Vision  Vindicated ,5  Hutcheson,  Synopsis  Meta- 
phys. ; 6 Mor.  Phil.1  De  Gerando,  Des  Signes  et  de  l’ Art  de 
Penser;  Adam  Smith,  On  the  Formation  of  Language. 
SIMILE. — V.  Metaphor. 

SIN.  — V.  Evil. 

SINCERITY  implies  singleness  and  honesty.  — The  Latin  word 
sincerum  signifies  what  is  without  mixture,  and  has  been 
thought  to  be  compounded  of  sine  cera,  without  was,  as  pure 
honey  is. 

“Sincerity  and  sincere  have  a twofold  meaning  of  great 
moral  importance.  Sincerity  is  often  used  to  denote  ‘ mere 
reality  of  conviction that  a man  actually  believes  what  he 
professes  to  believe.  Sometimes,  again,  it  is  used  to  denote 
‘ unbiassed  conviction,’  or,  at  least,  an  earnest  endeavour  to 
shake  off  all  prejudices,  and  all  undue  influence  of  wishes  and 
passions  on  the  judgment,  and  to  decide  impartially.” 8 
SINGULAR.—  V.  Term. 

SOCIALISM,  — In  the  various  forms  under  which  society  has 


1 Reid,  Inquiry,  cliap.  5,  see.  3. 

2 Smart,  Semalology,  Svo,  Lond.,  1S39. 

3 Dial,  iv , sect.  7,  II,  12. 

■ Sect.  38-43. 

’ B.  i.,  ch.  1,  p.  5. 


4 Sect.  144, 147. 

6 Part  ii.,  chap.  1. 

* Whately,  Lag.,  Append,  i. 


41 


470 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY'. 


SOCIALISM  — 

existed,  private  property,  individual  industry  and  enterprise, 
and  the  rights  of  marriage  and  of  the  family,  have  been  re- 
cognized. Of  late  years  several  schemes  of  social  arrange- 
ment have  been  proposed,  in  which  one  or  all  of  these  prin- 
ciples have  been  abandoned  or  modified.  These  schemes  may 
be  comprehended  under  the  general  term  of  socialism.  The 
motto  of  them  all  is  solidariie. 

Communism  demands  a community  of  goods  or  property. 
Fourierism  or  Phalansterism  would  deliver  men  over  to  the 
guidance  of  their  passions  and  instincts,  and  destroy  all  do- 
mestic and  moral  discipline.  Saint  Simonism  or  Humciniia- 
rianism  holds  that  human  nature  has  three  great  functions, 
that  of  the  priesthood,  science,  and  industry.  Each  of  these 
is  represented  in  a College,  above  which  is  the  father  or  head, 
spiritual  and  temporal,  whose  will  is  the  supreme  and  living 
law  of  the  society.  Its  religion  is  pantheism,  its  morality 
materialism  or  epicurism,  and  its  politics  despotism.1 

SOCIETY  (Desire  of).  — “ God  having  designed  man  for  a soci- 
able creature,  made  him  not  only  with  an  inclination,  and 
under  a necessity  to  have  fellowship  with  those  of  his  own 
kind,  but  furnished  him  also  with  language,  which  was  to  be 
the  great  instrument  and  common  tie  of  society." 2 

That  the  desire  of  society  is  natural  to  man,  is  argued  by 
Plato  in  the  Second  Book  of  his  Republic.  It  is  also  hinted  at 
in  his  dialogue  entitled  Protagoras.  The  argument  is  unfolded 
by  Harris  in  his  Dialogue  Concerning  Happiness ,3  Aristotle 
has  said  at  the  beginning  of  his  Politics, — “ The  tendency  to 
the  social  state  is  in  all  men  by  nature.”  The  argument  in 
favour  of  society  from  our  being  possessed  of  speech  is  in- 
sisted on  by  him.4  Also  by  Cicero.5 

In  modern  times,  Hobbes  argued  that  man  is  naturally 
an  enemy  to  his  fellow-men,  and  that  society  is  a device  to 
defend  men  from  the  evils  which  they  would  bring  on  one 
another.  Hutcheson  wrote  his  inaugural  oration  when 


1 Diet,  ties  Sciences  Philosoph. 

3 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand took  iii.,  chap.  1. 

8 Sect.  12.  4 Polity  lib.  5.,  cap.  2. 

8 De  Lerjibus , lib.  i.,  cap.  9;  De  OJJiciis,  lib.  i.,  cap.  16;  De  Nat.  Dcorum,  lib.  ii., 
cap.  59. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


471 


SOCIETY— 

admitted  Professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  at  Glasgow,  in  oppo- 
sition to  Hobbes.1 

Man  is  a social  animal,  according  to  Seneca.2  Lactantius 
says  that  he  is  a social  animal  by  nature,3  in  which  he  follows 
Cicero.4 *  “ Mankind  have  always  wandered  or  settled,  agreed 
or  quarrelled,  in  troops  and  companies.”6  “La  nature  de 
l’homme  le  porte  il  vivre  en  societe.  Quelle  qu’en  soit  la 
cause,  le  fait  se  manifeste  en  toute  occasion.  Partout  oh.  l’on 
a rencontre  dcs  homines,  ils  vivaient  en  troupes,  en  herdes,  en 
corps  de  nation.  Peut-etre  est  ce  afin  d’unir  leur  forces  pour 
leur  shrete  commune ; peut-etre  afin  de  pourvoir  plus  aisement 
h leur  besoins ; toujours  il  est  vrai  qu’il  est  dans  la  nature  de 
rhomme  de  se  reunir  en  societe,  comme  font  les  abeilles  et 
plusieurs  espkees  d’animaux ; on  remarque  des  traits  communs 
dans  toutes  ces  reunions  d’hommes,  en  quelque  parti  du  monde 
qu’ils  habitent.”6 

This  gregarious  propensity  is  different  from  the  political 
capacity , which  has  been  laid  down  as  the  characteristic  of  man. 

Society  (Political,  Capacity  of).  — Command  and  obedience, 
which  are  essential  to  government,  are  peculiar  to  mankind. 
Man  is  singular  in  commanding  not  only  the  inferior  animals, 
but  his  own  species.  Hence  men  alone  form  a political  com- 
munity. It  has  been  laid  down  by  Aristotle7  and  others,  that 
this  difference  is  owing  to  the  exclusive  possession  of  reason 
and  speech  by  man,  and  to  his  power  of  discriminating  be- 
tween justice  and  injustice.  Animals,  says  Cicero,8  are  un- 
fitted for  political  society,  as  being  “ rationis  et  orationis  ex- 
pertes.”  Separat  hcec  nos  a grege  mulorum? 

SOMATOLOGY.  — V.  Nature. 

SOPHISM,  S0PHI3TER,  SOPHISTICAL  (So^ta,  from 

wisdom).  — “ They  were  called  sophisters,  as  who  would  say, 
Counterfeit  wise  men.”  10 


1 De  Naturali  Hominum  Socialitatc,  4to,  Glasg.,  Typis  Academ.,  1730. 

3 De  Clem .,  i.,  3.  3 Div.  Inst.,  vi.,  10.  4 De  Offic i.,  14. 

5 Ferguson,  Essay  on  Hist,  of  Civ.  Soc..  p.  26.  See  also  Lord  Kames,  Hist,  of  Man , 

book  ii.,  sketch  1 ; Filangieri,  Scienza  della  Lrgislazione,  lib.  i.,  c.  1. 

6 Say,  Cours  cTEcon.  Folit.,  tom.  vi.  Compare  Comte,  ibid,  tom.  iv.,  p.  54. 

T Folit.,  i.,  2.  8 De  Offic.,  i.,  16. 

8 Juvenal,  xv.,  142-153.  10  North,  Plutarch , p.  96. 


472 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SOPHISM  — 

“For  lyke  wyse  as  though  a Sophyster  -would e with  a fonde 
argumente,  prove  unto  a symple  soule,  that  two  egges  were 
three,  because  that  ther  is  one,  and  that  ther  be  twayne,  and 
one  and  twayne  make  three ; yt  symple  unlearned  man,  though 
he  lacke  learnying  to  soyle  hys  fonde  argument,  hath  yet  wit 
ynough  to  laugh  thereat,  and  to  eat  the  two  egges  himself, 
and  byd  the  Sophyster  tak  and  eat  the  thyrde.”  * 

“ Sophism  is  a false  argument.  This  word  is  not  usually 
applied  to  mere  errors  in  reasoning ; but  only  to  those  erro- 
neous reasonings  of  the  fallacy  of  which  the  person  who 
maintains  them  is,  in  some  degree,  conscious ; and  which  he 
endeavours  to  conceal  from  examination  by  subtilty,  and  by 
some  ambiguity,  or  other  unfairness  in  the  use  of  words.” 2 

According  to  Aristotle,  the  sophism  is  a syllogismus  conten- 
tiosus,  a syllogism  framed  not  for  enouncing  or  proving  the 
truth,  but  for  disputation.  It  is  constructed  so  as  to  seem  to 
warrant  the  conclusion,  but  does  not,  and  is  faulty  either  in 
form  or  argument.3 4 

See  Reid,  Account  of  Aristotle's  Logic.'1 

On  the  difference  of  meaning  between  paosofo;  and  ooftafys, 
see  Sheppard,  Characters  of  Theophrastus.6  See  also  Grote, 
IJist.  of  Greece ,6  and  the  Cambridge  Journal  of  Philosophy? — • 
V.  Fallacy.  . 

SORITES  (aiopdy,  a heap)  is  an  argument  composed  of  an  inde- 
terminate number  of  propositions,  so  arranged  that  the  predi- 
cate of  the  first  becomes  the  subject  of  the  second,  the  predi- 
cate of  the  second  the  subject  of  the  third,  and  so  on  till  you 
come  to  a conclusion  which  unites  the  subject  of  the  first  with 
the  predicate  of  the  last.  A is  B,  B is  C,  C is  D,  D is  E, 
therefore  A is  E. 

This  is  the  Direct  or  Common  form  of  the  Sorites.  The 
Reversed  form  is  also  called  the  Goclenian,  from  Goclenius  of 
Marburg,  who  first  analyzed  it  about  the  end  of  the  sixteenth 
century.  It  differs  from  the  common  form  in  two  respects. 


1 Sir  T.  More,  Woi'Jcs,  p.  475. 

a Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought. 

3 Trendelenburg,  Lineamenta  Log.  Arist.,  sect.  33,  8vo.,  Bcrol.,  1842. 

4 Chap.  5,  sect.  3.  5 8vo.,  Lond.,  1852,  p.  81,  and  p.  269. 

6 Vol.  Tiii.,  pp.  434-486.  , 7 No.  2. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


473 


SORITES  — 

1.  Its  premises  are  reversed ; and,  2.  It  begins  with  the 
premise  containing  the  two  terms  which  have  the  greatest 
extension,  while  the  common  form  starts  with  the  premise 
containing  the  terms  which  have  the  greatest  comprehen- 
sion. Thus  — D is  E,  C is  D,  B is  C,  A is  B,  therefore  A 
is  E. 

SOUL  (4-v*)",  anima,  soul). 

This  word  had  formerly  a wider  signification  than  now. 
In  the  Second  Book  of  his  Treatise  ILpi)  ^vx>js,  Aristotle 
has  given  two  definitions  of  it.  In  the  first  of  these  he  calls 
it  “ the  Entelechy,  or  first  form  of  an  organized  body  which 
has  potential  life."  The  word  ’EvtttextLO;  which  Dr.  Reid 
begged  to  be  excused  from  translating,  because  he  did  not 
know  the  meaning  of  it,  is  compounded  of  Xvt perfect ; 
exslv>  to  have ; and  r Aoj,  an  end.  Its  use  was  revived  by 
Leibnitz,  who  designated  by  it  that  which  possesses  in  itself 
the  principle  of  its  own  activity,  and  tends  towards  its  end. 
According  to  his  philosophy,  the  universe  is  made  up  of 
monads  or  forces,  each  active  in  itself,  and  tending  by  its 
activity  to  accomplish  its  proper  end.  In  the  philosophy  of 
Aristotle,  the  word  Entelechy,  or  first  form,  had  a similar 
meaning,  and  denoted  that  which  in  virtue  of  an  end  consti- 
tuted the  essence  of  things,  and  gave*  movement  to  matter. 
When  the  soul  then  is  called  the  Entelechy  of  an  organized 
body  having  potential  life,  the  meaning  is,  that  it  is  that  force 
or  power  by  which  life  develops  itself  in  bodies  destined  to 
receive  it. 

Aristotle  distinguished  several  forms  of  sotd,  viz.,  the  nutri- 
tive or  vegetative  soul,  by  which  plants  and  animals  had 
growth  and  reproduction.  The  sensitive,  which  was  the  cause 
of  sensation  and  feeling.  The  motive,  of  locomotion.  The 
appetitive,  which  was  the  source  of  desire  and  will ; and  the 
raiional  or  reasonable,  which  was  the  seat  of  reason  or  in- 
tellect. These  powers  or  energies  of  soul  exist  all  in  some 
beings ; some  of  them  only  in  other  beings ; and  in  some 
beings  only  one  of  them.  That  is  to  say,  man  possesses  all ; 
brutes  possess  some  ; plants  one  only.  In  the  scholastic  phi- 
losophy, desire  and  locomotion  were  not  regarded  as  simple 
powers  or  energies  — and  only  the  nutritive  or  vegetative  soul, 
41* 


474 


VOCABULARY  01’  PHILOSOPHY. 


SOUL— 

the  sensitive  or  animal,  and  the  rational  or  human  were  recog- 
nized. 

In  the  system  of  Plato,  three  forms  or  energies  of  soul 
were  assigned  to  man.  The  rational,  which  had  its  seat  in  the 
head  and  survived  the  dissolution  of  the  body  — the  irascible, 
which  had  its  seat  in  the  heart  and  was  the  spring  of  acti- 
vity and  movement,  and  the  appetitive  or  concupiscible,  which 
was  the  source  of  the  grosser  passions  and  physical  instincts, 
and  which  died  with  the  bodily  organs  with  which  it  was 
united.  A similar  distinction  between  the  forms  or  energies 
of  the  soul  has  been  ascribed  to  Pythagoras,  and  traces  of  it 
are  to  be  found  in  several  of  the  philosophical  systems  of  the 
East. 

Among  modern  philosophers  in  Germany,  a distinction  is 
taken  between  ^vx^i  (Seele)  and  y.mvua  (Geist),  or  soul  and 
spirit.  According  to  G.  II.  Schubert,  professor  at  Munich, 
and  a follower  of  Schelling,  the  soicl  is  the  inferior  part  of  our 
intellectual  nature— that  which  shows  itself  in  the  phenomena 
of  dreaming,  and  which  is  connected  with  the  state  of  the  brain. 
The  spirit  is  that  part  of  our  nature  which  tends  to  the  purely 
rational,  the  lofty,  and  divine.  The  doctrine  of  the  natural  and 
the  spiritual  man,  which  wc  find  in  the  writings  of  St.  Paul, 
may,  it  has  been  thought,  have  formed  the  basis  upon  which  this 
mental  dualism  has  been  founded.  Indeed  it  has  been  main- 
tained that  the  dualism  of  the  thinking  principle  is  distinctly 
indicated  by  the  apostle  when  he  says  of  the  Word  of  God  that 
it  is  able  to  “ divide  asunder  soul  and  spirit.”  The  words  in 
the  original  are  ^vxrj  and  rtve  i/xa,  and  it  is  contended  that  by  tlio 
former  is  meant  the  sentient  or  animal  soul,  and  by  the  latter 
the  higher  or  rational  sold.  A similar  distinction  has  been 
traced  in  the  language  of  the  Old  Testament  Scriptures,  where 
one  word  is  employed  to  denote  the  life  that  is  common  to  man 
with  the  inferior  animals,  nn,  and  another  word,  no  bo. 
to  denote  that  inspiration  of  the  Almighty  which  givetli  him 
understanding,  and  makes  of  him  a rational  soul.  It  may 
be  doubted,  however,  whether  this  distinction  is  uniformly 
observed,  either  in  the  Scriptures  of  the  Old  or  of  the  New 
Testament.  And  it  may  be  better  for  us,  instead  of  attempting 
to  define  the  soul  d priori  by  its  essence,  to  define  it  rather 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


475 


SOUL  — 

cl  posteriori  bv  its  operations.  This  also  has  been  done  by 
Aristotle,  in  a definition  which  has  been  generally  adopted. 
He  says,  “ The  soul  is  that  by  which  we  lire,  feel,  or  perceive 
[will],  move  and  understand.”  This  is  a full  enumeration  of 
all  the  energies  which  Aristotle  assigned  to  the  soul,  and  they 
are  all  manifested  by  the  soul  as  it  exists  in  man.  Two  of 
them,  however,  the  energies  of  growth  and  motion,  are  usually 
treated  of  by  the  physiologist,  rather  than  by  the  psychologist. 
At  the  same  time,  life  and  movement  are  not  properties  of 
matter  ; and  therefore  they  were  enumerated  by  Aristotle  as 
the  properties  of  soul — the  soul  nutritive,  and  the  soul  motive. 
“ The  animating  form  of  a natural  body  is  neither  its  organi- 
zation, nor  its  figure,  nor  any  other  of  those  inferior  forms 
which  make  up  the  system  of  its  visible  qualities  ; but  it  is 
the  power  which,  not  being  that  organization,  nor  that  figure, 
nor  those  qualities,  is  yet  able  to  produce,  to  preserve,  and  to 
employ  them,”  1 This  is  what  is  now  called  the  principle  of 
life,  and  the  consideration  of  it  belongs  to  the  physiologist  — 
for,  although  in  the  human  being  life  and  soul  are  united,  it 
is  thought  they  may  still  be  separate  entities.  In  like  man- 
ner some  philosophers  have  contended  that  all  movement  im- 
plies the  existence  of  a soul,  and  hence  it  is  that  the  various 
phenomena  of  nature  have  been  referred  to  an  anima  mundi, 
or  soul  of  the  universe.  A modern  philosopher  of  great  name2 
enumerated  among  the  energies  of  the  human  soul  a special 
faculty  of  locomotion,  and  the  power  of  originating  move- 
ment or  change  is  ascribed  to  it  when  we  call  it  active.  The 
same  view  is  taken  by  Adolphe  Garnier.3  Still,  life  and  lo- 
comotion are  not  usually  treated  of  as  belonging  to  the  soul, 
but  rather  as  belonging  to  the  bodies  in  which  they  are  mani- 
fested. Hence  it  is  that  Dr.  Reid,  in  his  definition  of  the 
human  soul,  does  not  enumerate  the  special  energies  by  which 
we  live  and  move,  but  calls  it  that  by  which  we  think.  “ By 
the  mind  of  a man,”  says  he,4  “we  understand  that  in  him 
which  thinks,  remembers,  reasons,  wills.  . . . We  are 


1 Harris,  Phil.  Arrange.,  p.  279. 

3 Jouffroy,  in  his  Cours  Prof  esse  a la  Faculle  des  Lettres  in  1837. 

3 In  his  Trait*  des  Facultes  de  Fame,  iii.  tom.,  Svo,  Par.,  1852. 

4 Intell.  Pow..  essay  i.,  chap.  1. 


476 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SOUL  — 

conscious  that  we  think,  and  that  ire  have  a variety  of  thoughts 
of  different  kinds — such  as  seeing,  hearing,  remembering,  de- 
liberating, resolving,  loving,  hating,  and  many  other  kinds  of 
thought  — all  which  we  are  taught  by  nature  to  attribute  to 
one  internal  principle;  and  Hi  is  principle  of  thought  tee  call 
the  mind  or  soul  of  man.”  1 It  will  be  observed  that  Dr.  Reid 
uses  the  word  soul  as  synonymous  with  mind.  And,  perhaps, 
no  very  clear  nor  important  distinction  can  be  taken  between 
them.  The  plainest  and  most  common  distinction  taken  in 
the  use  of  these  words  is,  that  in  speaking  of  the  mind  of 
man  we  refer  more  to  the  various  powers  which  it  possesses, 
or  the  various  operations  which  it  performs : arid  in  speaking 
of  the  soul  of  man  we  refer  rather  to  the  nature  and  destiny 
of  the  human  being.  Thus  we  say  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
and  the  powers  of  the  mind .2  A difference  of  meaning  is 
more  observable  in  our  language  between  the  terms  spirit  and 
mind  than  between  said  and  mind.  Roth  the  latter  terms 
may  be  and  are  applied  indifferently  to  the  mental  principle 
as  living  and  moving  in  connection  with  a bodily  organism. 
But  the  term  spirit  properly  denotes  a being  without  a body. 
A being  that  never  had  a body  is  a pure  spirit.  A human 
soul  when  it  has  left  the  body  is  a disembodied  spirit.  Body 
is  animated  matter.  Mind  or  sold  is  incorporated  spirit. 

Into  these  verbal  criticisms,  however,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
enter  very  minutely,  because  in  psychological  inquiries  the 
term  mind  is  commonly  employed  to  denote  that  by  which  we 
feel,  know,  will,  and  reason — or  in  one  word  the  principle  of 


1 Dr.  Beid’s  is  the  psychological  definition.  But  the  soul  is  something  different  from 
the  ego , from  any  of  its  faculties,  and  from  the  sura  of  them  all.  Some  have  placed  its 
essence  in  thought,  as  the  Cartesians — in  sensation,  as  Locke  and  Condillac — or  in  the 
■will  or  activity,  like  Maine  de  Biran.  A cause  distinguished  from  its  acts,  distinguished 
from  its  modes  or  different  degrees  of  activity,  is  what  we  call  a force.  The  soul  then  is 
a force,  one  and  identical.  It  is,  as  defined  by  Tlato  (De  Leg.,  lib.  10),  a self-moving 
force.  Understanding  this  to  mean  bodily  or  local  motion,  Aristotle  has  argued  against 
this  definition.  — De  Anima , lib.  i.  cap.  3.  But  Plato  probably  meant  self  active  to  bo 
the  epithet  characteristic  of  the  mind  or  soul. — xivnoig  favTrjv  Kivovaa. 

a Mind  and  the  Latin  mens  were  probably  both  from  a root  which  is  now  lost  in  Europe, 
but  is  preserved  in  the  Sanscrit  mena , to  know.  The  Greek  voog  or  vovg,  from  the  verb 
voeujf  is  of  singular  origin  and  import.  Mind  is  more  limited  than  soul.  Soul,  besides 
the  rational  principle,  includes  the  living  principle,  and  maybe  applied  to  animals  and 
vegetables.  Voluntary  motion  should  not  be  denied  to  mind , as  is  very  generally  done. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


477 


SOUL  — 

thought.  We  know  this  inward  principle  as  manifested 
through  a system  of  bodily  organization  with  which  it  is 
united,  and  by  which  it  is  in  many  ways  affected.  But  “we 
are  taught  by  nature,”  says  Dr.  Reid,  “or  it  is  a primitive 
belief,  that  the  thinking  principle  is  something  different  from 
the  bodily  organism,  and  when  we  wish  to  signalize  its  pecu- 
liar nature  and  destiny,  we  call  it  soul  or  spirit.” 

Spirit,  Mind,  and  Soul,  — “ The  first  denoting  the  animating 
faculty,  the  breath  of  intelligence,  the  inspiring  principle,  the 
spring  of  energy  and  the  prompter  of  exertion ; the  second  is 
the  recording  power,  the  preserver  of  impressions,  the  storer 
of  deductions,  the  nurse  of  knowledge,  and  the  parent  of 
thought ; the  last  is  the  disembodied,  etherial,  self-conscious 
being,  concentrating  in  itself  all  the  purest  and  most  refined 
of  human  excellences,  every  generous  affection,  every  benevo- 
lent disposition,  every  intellectual  attainment,  every  ennobling 
virtue,  and  every  exalting  aspiration.”1 

“Animus,  Anima , rtvivya.  and  4u*>j  are  participles.  Anima 
est  ab  Animus.  Animus  vero  est  a Graeco  ’Ayquos  quod 
dici  volunt  quasi  ’ Ai/xo 5,  ab  ’Aw  sive  'Atyi,,  quod  est  revsu  ; et 
Latinis  a Spirando,  Spiritus.  Immo  et  est  4^2“  quod 
Hesychius  exponit  rtvs u.”  — Vossius  — quoted  from  Horne 
Tooke  in  Stewart’s  Philosoph.  Essays,  essay  v. 

“Indulsit  mundi  communis  conditor  illis 
Tantum  Animas;  nobis  Animum  quoque.” — Juv.,  Sat.  9,  y.  131. 

Anima,  which  is  common  to  man  and  brutes,  is  that  by 
which  we  live,  move,  and  are  invigorated ; whilst  Animus  is 
that  which  is  peculiar  to  mankind,  and  by  which  we  reason. 

The  triple  division  of  man  into  roCs,  4i>2>",  aHya,  occurs  fre- 
quently in  ancient  authors.  Plato,  Timceus;  Aristotle,  Pol.  1. 
The  Hellenist  Jews  seemed  to  have  used  the  term  rtvtvya  to 
denote  what  the  Greeks  called  rofj,  with  an  allusion  to  Gen. 
ii.  7.  Josephus,  Ant.  Jud.,  i.,  c.  2.  Thence  in  the  New  Test, 
we  have,  1 Thess.  v.  23,  7trcvfj.a,  4 o^ya. — Heb.  iv.  12, 
and  Grotius,  Note  on  Matthew  xxvi.  41. 2 

‘Vvzrl,  soul,  when  considered  separately,  signifies  the  prin- 


1 The  Purpose  of  Existence , 12mo,  1850,  p.  79. 
3 Fitzgerald,  Notes  on  Aristotle's  Ethics , p.  179. 


478 


VOCABULARY  01'  PHILOSOPHY. 


SOUL- 

ciple  of  life ; NoJ;,  mind,  the  principle  of  intelligence.  Or, 
according  to  Plutarch,  soul  is  the  cause  and  beginning  of 
motion,  and  vnud  of  order  and  harmony  with  respect  to 
motion.  Together  they  signify  an  intelligent  soul  (hvovs 
4 vxi)  'which  is  sometimes  called  a rational  soul 
Xoyixij).  Hence,  when  the  nature  of  the  soul  is  not  in  ques- 
tion, the  word  is  used  to  express  both.  Thus  in  the 

Phcvdo  the  soul  (4 wy)  is  said  sometimes  to  use  the  body  for 
the  examination  of  things  ; at  which  times,  according  to  Plato, 
it  forms  confused  and  imperfect  notions  of  things,  and  is  in- 
volved in  error.  But,  when  it  examines  things  by  itself,  it 
arrives  at  what  is  pure  and  always  existing,  and  immortal,  and 
uniform,  and  is  free  from  error.  Here  the  highest  operations 
of  voii;  “mind”  are  indisputably  attributed  to  ty>xh>  “soul.” 
Aristotle1  describing  4^^,  says  that  during  anger,  confidence, 
desire,  &c.,  it  participates  with  the  body ; but  that  the  act  of 
understanding  belongs  peculiarly  to  itself.” 2 
SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  — Anima  Mundi  — q.  v. 

SPACE  {■ spalium ).  — “ Space,  taken  in  the  most  general  sense, 
comprehends  whatever  is  extended,  and  may  be  measured  by 
the  three  dimensions,  length,  breadth,  and  depth.  In  this  sense 
it  is  the  same  with  extension.  Now,  space,  in  this  large  signi- 
fication, is  either  occupied  by  body,  or  it  is  not.  If  it  be  not, 
but  is  void  of  all  matter,  and  contains  nothing,  then  it  is  space 
in  the  strictest  signification  of  the  word,  and  as  it  is  commonly 
used  in  English  philosophical  language,  being  the  same  with 
what  is  called  a vacuum.”3 

Mr.  Locke4  has  attempted  to  show  that  we  acquire  the  idea 
of  space  by  sensation,  especially  by  the  senses  of  touch  and 
sight.  But  according  to  Dr.  Reid,5  “ space  is  not  so  properly 
an  object  of  sense  as  a necessary  concomitant  of  the  objects 
of  sight  and  touch.  It  is  when  we  see  or  touch  body  that  we 
get  the  idea  of  space;  but  the  idea  is  not  furnished  by  sense 
— it  is  a conception,  a priori,  of  the  reason.  Experience  fur- 
nishes the  occasion,  but  the  mind  rises  to  the  conception  by 

1 Dc  Anima.  lib.  i.,  cap.  i. 

5 Morgan,  On  Trinity  of  Plato , p.  54. 

8 Monboddo,  Anc.  Metaphys.,  b.  iv.,  cb.  2. 

4 Book  ii.,  cb.  4.  s IntcU.  Paw.,  essay  ii.,  oh.  19. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


479 


SPACE  — 

its  native  energy.  This  view  has  been  supported  by  Cousin, 
Cours  d’Histoire  de  la  Philosophic  au  xviii.  Siecle ; ' and  by 
Royer  Collard.1 2 

“In  the  philosophy  of  Kant  space  and  time  are  mere  forms 
of  the  sensibility.  By  means  of  the  external  sense  we  repre- 
sent to  ourselves  everything  as  in  space  ; and  by  the  internal 
sense  all  is  represented  in  the  relationship  of  time."3 

According  to  Kant,  space  is  a subjective  condition  of  the 
sensibility,  the  form  of  all  external  phenomena ; and  as  the 
sensibility  is  necessarily  anterior  in  the  subject  to  all  real  in- 
tuition, it  follows  that  the  form  of  all  these  phenomena  is  in 
the  mind  a priori.  There  can,  then,  be  no  question  about 
space  or  extension  but  in  a human  or  subjective  point  of  view. 
It  may  well  be  said  of  all  things,  in  so  far  as  they  appear 
existing  without  us,  that  they  are  enclosed  in  space;  but  not 
that  space  encloses  things  absolutely,  seen  or  not  seen,  and  by 
any  subject  whatsoever.  The  idea  of  space  has  no  objective 
validity,  it  is  real  only  relatively  to  phenomena,  to  things,  in 
so  far  as  they  appear  out  of  us ; it  is  purely  ideal  iu  so  far  as 
things  are  taken  in  themselves,  and  considered  independently 
of  the  forms  of  the  sensibility.4 

“ Space  (German,  Pawn ) is  a pure  intuition  which  lies  at 
the  foundation  of  all  external  intuitions,  and  is  represented  as 
an  infinitely  given  quantity.  It  is  the  formal  condition  of  all 
matter,  that  is,  without  it,  no  matter,  and  consequently  no 
corporeal  world,  can  be  thought.  Space  and  time  have  no 
transcendental  objectivity,  that  is,  they  are  in  themselves  non- 
existing, independent  of  our  intuition-faculty  ; but  they  have 
objectivity  in  respect  of  the  empirical  use,  that  is,  they  exist 
as  to  all  beings  that  possess  such  a faculty  of  intuition  as  our- 
selves.’’5 

“According  to  Leibnitz,  space  is  nothing  but  the  order  of 
things  co-existing,  as  time  is  the  order  of  things  successive — 
and  he  maintained,  ‘that,  supposing  the  whole  system  of  the 


1 2 tom.,  17  le§on. 

3 In  Jouffroy’s  QZuvres  du  Rad,  tom.  iii.,  fragmen  4,  p.424;  tom.  iv.,  fragmen  9,  p.33S. 

3 Analysis  of  Kant’s  Cidtick  of  Pure,  Reason,  8vo,  Lond.,  1844,  p.  9. 

4 Willm,  Hist,  de  la  Philosoph.  Allemande , tom.  i.,  p.  142. 

e Haywood,  Orit.  of  Pure  Reason , p.  603. 


480 


VOCABULARY  OF  rHILOSOPIIY. 


SPACE  — 

visible  world  to  be  moved  out  of  the  place  which  it  presently 
occupies,  into  some  other  portion  of  space,  beyond  the  limits 
of  this  universe,  still  it  would  be  in  the  same  space,  provided 
the  order  and  arrangement  of  the  bodies,  with  respect  to  one 
another,  was  continued  the  same.’  Now,  it  is  true,  that  bodies 
placed  in  any  kind  of  order,  must  necessarily  be  in  space; 
but  the  order  in  which  bodies  are  placed,  and  the  space  in 
which  they  are  placed,  must  necessarily  be  distinct.”  1 

“1.  Space  is  not  pure  nothing,  for  nothing  has  no  capacity; 
but  space  has  the  capacity  of  receiving  body. 

“ 2.  It  is  not  an  ens  rationis,  for  it  was  occupied  by  heaven 
and  earth  before  the  birth  of  man. 

“ 3.  It  is  not  an  accident  inhering  in  a subject,  i.  e.,  body, 
for  body  changes  its  place,  but  space  is  not  moved  with  it. 

“4.  It  is  not  the  superficies  of  one  body  surrounding  an- 
other, because  superficies  is  an  accident;  and  as  superficies  is 
a quantity  it  should  occupy  space;  but  space  cannot  occupy 
space.  Besides,  the  remotest  heaven  occupies  space,  and  has 
no  superficies  surrounding  it. 

“ 5.  It  is  not  the  relation  or  order  with  reference  to  certain 
fixed  points,  as  east,  west,  north,  and  south.  For  if  the  whole 
world  were  round,  bodies  would  change  place  and  not  their 
order,  or  they  may  change  their  order  and  not  their  place,  if 
the  sky,  with  the  fixed  points,  were  moved  by  itself. 

“ 6 and  7.  It  is  not  body,  nor  spirit. 

“ 8.  It  may  be  said  with  probability  that  space  cannot  be 
distinguished  from  the  divine  immensity,  and  therefore  from 
God.  It  is  infinite  and  eternal,  which  God  only  is.  He  is  the 
place  of  all  being,  for  no  being  is  out  of  Him.  And  although 
different  beings  are  in  different  places  externally,  they  are  all 
virtually  in  the  divine  immensity.”2 

Bardili  argued  for  the  reality  of  time  and  space  from  the 
fact  that  the  inferior  animals  perceive  or  have  notions  of  them. 
Yet  their  minds,  if  they  can  be  said  to  have  minds,  are  not 
subject  to  the  forms  or  laws  of  the  human  mind. 

But  if  space  be  something  to  the  mind,  which  has  the  idea 


* Monboddo,  Anc.  Melaphys.,  book  iv.,  chap.  1.  Letters  of  Clarke  and  Leibnitz. 
a Derodon,  Physic.,  pars.  1,  cb.  fi. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


481 


SPACE  — 

of  it,  and  to  the  bodies  -which  exist  in  it,  what  is  it?  “ Per- 
haps,” says  Dr.  Reid  ( ut  supra),  “ we  may  apply  to  it  what  the 
Peripatetics  said  of  their  first  matter,  that  whatever  it  is,  it  is 
potentially  only,  not  actually.”  This,  accordingly,  is  the  view 
taken  of  it  by  a great  admirer  of  the  Peripatetic  philosophy. 
“Space,”  says  Lord  Monboddo,1  “is  but  a relative;  and  it  is 
relative  to  body,  and  to  body  only,  and  this  in  three  respects, 
first,  as  to  its  capacity  of  receiving  body ; secondly,  as  to  its 
connecting  or  limiting  body ; and  lastly,  as  to  its  being  the 
distance  between  bodies  that  are  separated.  . . . Place  is 

space  occupied  by  body.  It  is  different  from  body  as  that 
which  contains  is  different  from  that  which  is  contained. 
. . . Space,  then,  is  place,  potentially ; and  when  it  is  filled 
with  body,  then  it  is  place,  actually.” 

Space,  as  containing  all  things,  was  by  Philo  and  others 
identified  with  the  Infinite.  And  the  text  (Acts  xvii.  28) 
which  says  that  “ in  God  we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our 
being,”  was  interpreted  to  mean  that  space  is  an  affection  or 
property  of  the  Deity.  Sir  Isaac  Newton  maintained  that  God 
by  existing  constitutes  time  and  space.  “Non  est  duratio  vel 
spatium  sed  durat  et  adest,  et  existendo  semper  et  ubique,  spatium 
et  durationem  constituit.”  Clarke  maintained  that  space  is  an 
attribute  or  property  of  the  Infinite  Deity.  Reid  and  Stewart, 
as  well  as  Cousin  and  Royer  Collard,  while  they  regard  space 
as  something  real  and  more  than  a relation,  have  not  posi- 
tively said  what  it  is. 

As  space  is  a necessary  conception  of  the  human  mind,  as 
it  is  conceived  of  as  infinite,  and  as  an  infinite  quality,  Dr. 
Clarke2  thought  that  from  these  views  we  may  argue  the  exist- 
ence of  an  infinite  substance,  to  which  this  quality  belongs. 

Stewart,  Act.  and  Mor.  Pow. ; Pownall,  Intellectual  Physics; 
Brougham,  Nat.  Theology. 

SPECIES  (from  the  old  verb,  specio,  to  see)  is  a word  of  different 
signification,  in  different  departments  of  philosophy. 

In  Logic,  species  was  defined  to  be,  “Id  quod  predicatin'  de 
pluribus  numero  differ entibus,  in  qucestione  quid  est?”  And 


1 Anc.  Mtlapliys.,  took  iv.,  chap.  2. 

a See  his  Demonstration  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  with  Butler’s  Letters  to 
him  and  the  Answers. 

42  2 a 


482 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SPECIES  — 

genus  was  defined  to  be,  “Id  quod  predicatin'  de  pluribus  difj'er- 
entibus  specie,  in  quaestione  quid  est?”  According  to  Derodon,1 
the  adequate  definition  of  genus  is,  “ Res  similes  eodem  nomine 
substantivo  donatce,  et  identficalce  cum  omnibus  inferioribus 
diverse  nomine  substantivo  donatis,  et  proprietate  quadam  incom- 
municabili  distinctis.”  And  of  species,  “lies  similes  eodem 
nomine  substantivo  donatce,  et  idcntificatce  cum  omnibus  inferi- 
oribus diverso  nomine  substantivo  donatis  et  omnes  proprieiates 
ita  similes  habeniibus,  ut  quodlibet  possit  habere  attributa  alio- 
rum , nullum  iarnen  habeat  actu  idem  sed  tantum  simile.” 

In  the  process  of  classification  [q.v.),  the  first  step  is  the 
formation  of  a species.  A species  is  a group  of  individuals 
agreeing  in  some  common  character,  and  designated  by  a 
common  name.  When  two  or  more  species  are  brought  to- 
gether in  the  same  way,  they  are  called  a genus. 

“ In  Logic,  genus  and  species  are  relative  terms  ; a concep- 
tion is  called  in  relation  to  its  superior,  species — to  its  inferior, 
genus.  The  summum  genus  is  the  last  result  of  the  abstracting 
process,  the  genus  which  can  never  in  turn  be  a species.  The 
infima  species  is  the  species  which  cannot  become  a genus; 
which  can  only  contain  individuals,  and  not  other  species. 
But  there  can  only  be  one  absolute  summum  genus,  whether 
we  call  it  ‘ thing,’  ‘ substance,’  or  ‘ essence.’  And  we  can 
scarcely  ever  ascertain  the  infima  species,  because  even  in  a 
handful  of  individuals,  we  cannot  say  with  certainty  that  there 
are  no  distinctions  on  which  a further  subdivision  into  smaller 
classes  might  be  founded.”2 

In  Mathematics,  the  term  species  was  used  in  its  primitive 
sense  of  appearance ; and  when  the  form  of  a figure  was  given, 
it  was  said  to  be  given  in  species. 

Algebra,  in  which  letters  are  used  for  numbers,  was  called, 
at  one  time,  the  specious  notation. 

In  Mineralogy,  species  is  determined  by  perfect  identity  of 
composition  ; the  form  goes  for  nothing. 

In  the  organized  kingdoms  of  nature,  on  the  contrary,  species 
is  founded  on  identity  of  form  and  structure,  both  external 
and  internal.  The  principal  characteristic  of  species  in  animals 


1 Log.,  p.  293. 

2 Thomson,  Outline  of  Laius  of  Thought , second  edition,  sect.  27. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


483 


SPECIES - 

and  vegetables,  is  the  power  to  produce  beings  like  them 
selves,  who  are  also  productive.  A species  may  be  modified 
by  external  influences  ; and  thus  give  rise  to  races  or  varie- 
ties ; but  it  never  abandons  its  own  proper  character  to  assume 
another. 

In  Natural  History,  species  includes  only  the  following 
conditions ; viz.,  separate  origin  and  distinctness  of  race, 
evinced  by  a constant  transmission  of  some  characteristic 
peculiarity  of  organization.1 

“Species,”  according  to  Dr.  Morton  (author  of  Crania 
Americana),  “ is  a primordial  organic  form.”  See  a descrip- 
tion of  species  in  Lyell’s  Geology. - 

“ By  maintaining  the  unity  of  the  human  species,  says  A.  v. 
Humboldt,* 3  we  at  the  same  time  repel  the  cheerless  assump- 
tion of  superior  and  inferior  races  of  men.”  “ This  eminent 
writer  appears  in  the  passage  quoted  to  exaggerate  the  extent 
of  uniformity  implied  in  a common  species.  It  is  unques- 
tionable that  mankind  form  one  species  in  the  sense  of  the 
natural  historian  ; but  it  does  not  follow  from  this  fact  that 
there  are  no  essential  hereditary  differences,  both  physical 
and  mental,  between  different  varieties  and  races  of  men. 
The  analogy  of  animal  species  would  make  it  probable  that 
such  essential  differences  do  exist ; for  we  see  that,  although 
all  horses,  dogs,  oxen,  sheep,  &c.,  form  respectively  one  spe- 
cies, yet  each  species  contains  varieties  or  races,  which  pos- 
sess certain  properties  in  different  degrees,  — which  are  more 
or  less  large,  active,  gentle,  intelligent,  hardy,  and  the  like. 
If  we  are  guided  by  the  analogy  of  animal  species,  it  is  as 
probable  that  an  Englishman  should  be  more  intelligent  than 
a negro,  as  that  a greyhound  should  be  more  fleet  than  a mas- 
tiff’, or  an  Arabian  horse  than  a Shetland  pony.”4 
Species  in  Perception. 

In  explaining  the  process  of  external  perception,  erhowwe 
come  to  the  knowledge  of  things  out  of  and  distant  from  us, 
it  was  maintained  that  these  objects  send  forth  species  or 
images  of  themselves,  which,  making  an  impression  on  the 


1 Dr.  Prichard.  a Chap.  37. 

3 Cosmos , vol.  i.,  p.  355,  Engl,  trans. 

4 Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  On  Politics,  chap.  27,  sect.  10. 


484 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SPECIES  - 

bodily  organs,  next  imprinted  themselves  on  the  mind  and 
issued  in  knowledge. 

The  species  considered  as  the  vicarious  representative  of  the 
object,  was  called  intentional.  And  as  it  affected  both  the 
intellect  and  the  sense,  was  distinguished  as  sensible  and 
intelligible. 

Species,  as  sensible,  was  distinguished  as  species  impressa,  as 
making  an  impression  upon  the  sense  — and  species  expressa, 
in  consequence  of  the  sense  or  imagination,  from  the  impres- 
sion, elaborating  another  species  of  the  object. 

Species,  as  intelligible,  was  also  distinguished  into  species 
impressa  and  spiecies  expressa.  The  species  intelli gibilis  was 
called  impressa,  as  it  determined  the  faculty  to  the  apprehen- 
sion of  this  object,  rather  than  of  that.  And  it  was  called 
expressa,  as  in  consequence  of  the  operation  of  the  faculty, 
knowledge  of  the  object  was  attained  to. 

According  to  some,  the  species  as  intelligible  were  conge- 
nite,  and  according  to  others  they  were  elaborated  by  the  in- 
tellect in  the  presence  of  the  phantasms. 

The  process  of  perception  is  thus  described  by  Tellez.1 

Socrates  by  his  figure,  &e.,  makes  an  impression  upon  the 
eye,  and  vision  follows — then  a species  is  impressed  upon  the 
phantasy,  phantasma  impressum ; the  phantasy  gives  the  phan- 
tasma expression,  the  intellectus  agens  purifies  and  spiritualizes 
it,  so  that  it  is  received  by  the  intellectus  patiens,  and  the 
knowledge  of  the  object  is  elicited. 

“ The  philosophy  schools  teach  that  for  the  cause  of  vision, 
the  thing  seen  sendeth  forth  on  every  side  a visible  species 
(in  English),  a visible  show,  apparition,  or  aspect,  or  a being 

seen,  the  receiving  of  which  into  the  eye  is  seeing 

Nay,  for  the  cause  of  understanding  also  the  thing  understood 
sendeth  forth  an  intelligible  species,  that  is,  an  intelligible 
being  seen,  which,  coming  into  the  understanding,  makes  it 
understood.” 2 

For  the  various  forms  under  which  the  doctrine  of  species 
has  been  held,  see  Reid.3 


1 Summa  Phil.  Arist.,  Paris,  1645,  p.  47. 

2 Hobbes,  Of  Man,  part  i.,  chap.  1. 

3 lntell.  Pow.,  essay  ii.,  chap.  8,  with  notes  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  and  note  D. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


485 


SPECIES  — 

The  doctrine  was  not  universally  received  during  the  Mid- 
dle Ages. 

“ Scholasticism  had  maintained  that  between  the  exterior 
bodies,  placed  before  us,  and  the  mind  of  man,  there  are 
images  which  belong  to  the  exterior  bodies,  and  make  more 
or  less  a part  of  them,  as  the  slSwt-a  of  Democritus,  images 
or  sensible  forms  which  represent  external  objects  by  the 
conformity  which  they  have  with  them.  So  the  mind  was 
supposed  to  be  able  to  know  spiritual  beings  only  through  the 
medium  of  intelligible  species.  Occam  destroyed  these  chime- 
ras, and  maintained  that  there  is  nothing  real  but  spiritual  or 
material  beings,  and  the  mind  of  man,  which  directly  con- 
ceives them.  Gabriel  Biel,  a pupil  of  Occam  (born  at  Spire, 
and  died  1495),  exhibited  with  much  sagacity  and  clearness 
the  theory  of  his  master.  Occam  renewed,  without  knowing 
it,  the  warfare  of  Arcesilas  against  the  Stoics ; and  he  is  in 
modern  Europe  the  forerunner  of  Eeid  and  of  the  Scotch 
school.”  1 

Mons.  Haureau2  says  of  Durandus  de  St.  Pourcain  that  he 
not  only  rejected  intelligible  species,  but  that  he  would  not 
admit  sensible  species.  To  feel,  to  think,  said  he,  are  simple 
acts  which  result  from  the  commerce  of  mind  with  an  external 
object ; and  this  commerce  takes  place  directly  without  any- 
thing intermediate. 

SPECIFICATION  (The  Principle  of)  is,  that  beings  the  most 
like  or  homogeneous  disagree  or  are  heterogeneous  in  some 
respect.  It  is  the  principle  of  variety  or  difference. 

Specification  (Process  of)  “is  the  counterpart  of  generaliza- 
tion. In  it  we  begin  with  the  most  extensive  class,  and 
descend,  step  by  step,  till  we  reach  the  lowest.  In  so  doing 
we  are  thinking  out  objects,  and  thinking  in  attributes.  In 
generalization  we  think  in  objects  and  think  out  attributes.” 3 
SPECULATION  ( speculor , to  regard  attentively). — “ To  speculate 
is,  from  premisses  given  or  assumed,  but  considered  unques- 
tionable, as  the  constituted  point  of  observation,  to  look 
abroad  upon  the  whole  field  of  intellectual  vision,  and  thence 


1 Cousin,  Hist,  of  Mod.  Phil.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  26. 

a Exam,  de  Phil.  Scholast tom.  i.,  p.  416. 

3 Spalding,  Log.,  p.  15. 


486 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SPECULATION"  - 

to  decide  upon  the  true  form  and  dimension  of  all  which  meets 
the  view.”1 

“ Speculation  stands  ojyposed  to  reflection,  a method  of 
thought  which  lias  to  do  with  something  given,  and  appro- 
priates the  same  by  continued  analysis  and  synthesis  of  its 
elements.  If  speculative  stand  thus  opposed  to  reflective  think- 
ing, it  must  necessarily  belong  to  the  former  not  to  set  out 
from  anything  given  as  its  subject,  but  from  determinations 
which  thought  finds  in  itself  as  the  necessary  and  primary 
ground  of  all  being  as  of  all  thinking.  In  this  sense,  all 
speculative  thinking  is  of  an  d priori,  and  all  reflective  think- 
ing of  an  d posteriori  nature.” 2 
It  is  that  part  of  philosophy  which  is  neither  practical  nor 
experimental.  The  speculative  part  of  philosophy  is  meta- 
physics. The  speculative  part  of  mathematics  is  that  which 
has  no  application  to  the  arts. 

SPIRITUALISM  ( spiritus , spirit)  is  not  any  particular  system 
of  philosophy,  but  the  doctrine,  whether  grounded  on  reason, 
sentiment,  or  faith,  that  there  are  substances  or  beings  which 
are  not  cognizable  by  the  senses,  and  which  do  not  reveal 
themselves  to  us  by  any  of  the  qualities  of  matter,  and  which 
we  therefore  call  immaterial  or  spiritual.  Materialism  denies 
this.  But  spiritualism  does  not  deny  the  existence  of  matter, 
and,  placing  itself  above  materialism,  admits  both  body  and 
spirit.  Hence  it  is  called  dualism,  as  opposed  to  the  denial 
of  the  existence  of  matter.  The  idealism  of  Berkeley  and 
Malebranche  may  be  said  to  reduce  material  existences  to 
mere  phenomena  of  the  mind.  Mysticism,  whether  religious 
' or  philosophical,  ends  with  resolving  mind  and  matter  into 
the  Divine  substance.  Mysticism  and  idealism  tend  to  pan- 
theism, materialism  to  atheism.  Spiritualism,  grounded  upon 
consciousness,  preserves  equally  God,  the  human  person,  and 
external  nature,  without  confounding  them  and  without  iso- 
lating the  one  from  the  other.3 

SPONTANEITY. — Leibnitz4  explains  “ spontaneity  to  mean  the 
true  and  real  dependence  of  our  actions  on  ourselves.”  Ilei- 


1 Marsh,  Prelim.  Essay  to  Aids  to  Reflection , p.  13. 

1 Muller,  Doctrine  of  Sin,  Introd. 

3 Did.  des  Sciences  Philosoph.  4 Opera , turn,  i.,  p.  450. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


487 


SPONTANEITY— 

neccius  calls  it  “the  faculty  of  directing  one’s  aim  to  a cer- 
tain end.”  1 It  is  a self-active  causality. 

SPONTANEOUS  is  opposed  to  reflective.  Those  operations  of 
mind  which  are  continually  going  on  without  any  effort  or 
intention  on  our  part  are  spontaneous.  IVhen  we  exercise  a 
volition,  and  make  an  effort  of  attention  to  direct  our  mental 
energy  in  any  particular  way,  or  towards  any  particular  ob- 
ject, we  are  said  to  reflect,  or  to  observe. 

STANDARD  OF  VIRTUE.  — Standard  is  that  by  which  other 
things  are  rated  or  valued.  “ Labour  alone,  therefore,  never 
varying  in  its  own  value,  is  alone  the  ultimate  and  real  stand- 
ard by  which  commodities  can  at  all  times  and  places  be  es- 
timated and  compared.” 2 

A standard  is  something  set  up  by  which  to  measure  the 
quantity  or  quality  of  some  other  thing.  Now  rectitude  is  the 
foundation  of  virtue.  The  standard  of  virtue  is  some  law  or 
rule  by  which  rectitude  can  be  measured.  To  the  law  of  God, 
and  to  the  testimony  of  an  enlightened  conscience,  if  they 
agree  not,  it  is  because  there  is  no  truth  nor  rightness  in  them. 
Now  the  will  of  God,  as  declared  by  the  constitution  and 
course  of  nature,  or  as  revealed  by  His  Word,  is  a standard 
by  which  we  may  measure  the  amount  of  rectitude,  in  action 
or  disposition.  According  as  they  agree,  in  a greater  or  less 
degree,  with  the  indications  of  the  divine  will,  in  the  same 
proportion  are  they  right,  or  in  accordance  with  rectitude. 
The  standard  of  virtue,  then,  is  the  will  of  God,  as  declared 
in  His  Word,  or  some  law  or  rule  deduced  from  the  constitu- 
tion of  nature  and  the  course  of  providence.  The  foundation 
of  virtue  is  the  ground  or  reason  on  which  the  law  or  rule 
rests.  — V.  Criterion. 

STATE  (States  of  Mind).  — “ The  reason  why  madness,  idiotism, 
&c.,  are  called  states 3 of  mind,  while  its  acts  and  operations 
are  not,  is  because  mankind  have  always  conceived  the  mind 
to  be  passive  in  the  former  and  active  in  the  latter.”4 


1 Turnbull,  Trans.,  vol.  i.,  p.  35.  3 Smith,  Wealth  of  Nat.,  b.  i.,  c.  5. 

3 et  The  term  state  has,  more  especially  of  late  years,  and  principally  by  Necessitarian 
philosophers,  been  applied  to  all  modifications  of  mind  indifferently.”  — Sir  William 

Ilamillon. 

4 Reid’s  Correspondence , p.  So. 


488 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


STATE  — 

Such  were  the  views  of  Dr.  Reid.  But  since  his  d:iy,  a 
change  has  passed  over  the  language  of  Scottish  psychology. 
No  change  of  phraseology,  because  no  change  of  doctrine,  is 
to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Mr.  Stewart.  But  in  those  of 
Dr.  Brown  the  difference  is  manifest.  Instead  of  speaking  of 
the  mind  as  operating,  or  as  acting,  or  as  energizing,  he  de- 
lights rather  to  speak  of  it  as  exhibiting  phenomena,  and  as 
passing  through,  or  existing  in,  different  states.  This  phrase- 
ology has  been  by  many  accepted  and  applauded.  It  is 
thought  that  by  adopting  it,  we  neither  affirm  nor  deny  the 
activity  of  the  mind,  and  thus  proceed  to  consider  its  mani- 
festations, unembarrassed  by  any  questions  as  to  the  way  in 
which  these  manifestations  are  brought  about.  But  it  may 
be  doubted  if  this  phraseology  leaves  the  question,  as  to  the 
activity  of  the  mind,  entire  and  untouched. 

If  Dr.  Brown  had  not  challenged  the  common  opinion,  he 
would  not,  probably,  have  disturbed  the  language  that  was 
previously  in  common  use  ; although  it  must  be  admitted  that 
ho  was  by  no  means  averse  to  novel  phrases.  At  all  events, 
the  tendency  of  his  philosophy  is  to  represent  the  mind  in  all 
its  manifestations  as  passive  — the  mere  recipient  of  changes 
made  upon  it  from  without.  Indeed,  his  system  of  philosophy, 
which  is  sensational  in  its  principles,  may  be  said  to  take  the 
bones  and  sinews  out  of  the  mind,  and  to  leave  only  a soft  and 
yielding  mass,  to  be  magnetized  by  the  palmistry  of  matter. 
That  the  mind  in  some  of  its  manifestations  is  passive,  rather 
than  active,  is  admitted  ; and  in  reference  to  these,  there  can 
be  no  objection  to  speak  of  it  as  existing  in  certain  states,  or 
passing  into  these  states.  But  in  adopting,  to  some  extent, 
this  phraseology,  we  must  not  let  go  the  testimony  which  is 
given  in  favour  of  the  activity  of  mind,  by  the  use  and  structure 
of  language.  Language  is  not  the  invention  of  philosophers. 
It  is  the  natural  expression  of  the  human  mind,  and  the  expo- 
nent of  those  views  which  are  natural  to  it.  Now,  the  phrase 
operations  of  mind,  being  in  common  use,  indicates  a common 
opinion  that  mind  is  naturally  active.  That  opinion  may  be 
erroneous,  and  it  is  open  to  philosophers  to  show,  if  they  can, 
that  it  is  so.  But  the  observation  of  Dr.  Reid  is,  that  “ until 
it  is  proved  that  the  mind  is  not  active  in  thinking,  but  merely 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


489 


STATE  — 

passive,  the  common  language  with  regard  to  its  operations 
ought  to  he  used,  and  ought  not  to  give  place  to  a phraseology 
invented  by  philosophers,  which  implies  its  being  merely 
passive.” 

And  in  another  place,1  he  says,  “ There  may  be  dis- 
tinctions that  have  a real  foundation,  and  which  may  be  ne- 
cessary in  philosophy,  which  are  not  made  in  common  lan- 
guage, because  not  necessary  in  the  common  business  of 
life.  But  I believe  no  instance  will  be  found  of  a distinc- 
tion made  in  all  languages,  which  has  not  a just  foundation 
in  nature.” 

If  any  change  of  phraseology  were  expedient,  the  phrase 
“ manifestations  of  mind”  would  touch  less  upon  the  question 
of  its  activity.  But  in  the  language  of  Dr.  Reid — “ The  mind 
is  from  its  very  nature,  a living  and  active  being.  Everything 
we  know  of  it  implies  life  and  active  energy ; and  the  reason 
why  all  its  modes  of  thinking  are  called  its  operations,  is,  that 
in  all  or  in  most  of  them,  it  is  not  merely  passive,  as  body  is, 
but  is  really  and  properly  active.  In  all  ages,  and  in  all  lan- 
guages, ancient  and  modern,  the  various  modes  of  thinking 
have  been  expressed  by  words  of  active  signification,  such  as 
seeing,  hearing,  reasoning,  willing,  and  the  like.  It  seems, 
therefore,  to  be  the  natural  judgment  of  mankind,  that  the 
mind  is  active  in  its  various  ways  of  thinking ; and  for  this 
reason  they  are  called  its  operations,  and  are  expressed  by 
active  verbs.” 

One  proof  of  the  mind  being  active  in  some  of  its  operations 
is,  that  these  operations  are  accompanied  with  effort,  and 
followed  by  languor.  In  attention,  we  are  conscious  of  effort ; 
and  the  result  of  long  continued  attention  is  languor  and  ex- 
haustion. This  could  not  be  the  case  if  the  mind  was  alto- 
gether passive — the  mere  recipient  of  impressions  made  — of 
ideas  introduced.  — V.  Operations  of  Mind. 

STATISTICS.  — “ The  observation,  registration,  and  arrange- 
ment of  those  facts  in  politics  which  admit  of  being  reduced 
to  a numerical  expression  has  been,  of  late  years,  made  the 
subject  of  a distinct  science,  and  comprehended  under  the  de- 


‘ Intcll.  Pow.,  essay  i.,  chap.  1. 


490 


VOCABULARY  OF  FIIILOSOFIIY. 


STATISTICS  - 

signation  of  statistics.  Both  the  name  and  the  separate  treat- 
ment of  the  subject,  were  due  to  Achenwall,1  who  died  in 
177 2. 2 This  science,  it  is  there  remarked,  does  not  discuss 
causes,  nor  reason  upon  probable  effects;  it  seeks  only  to 
collect,  arrange,  and  compare,  that  class  of  facts  which  alone 
(?)  can  form  the  basis  of  correct  conclusions  with  respect  to 
social  and  political  government.  ...  Its  peculiarity  is, 
that  it  proceeds  wholly  by  the  accumulation  and  comparison 
of  facts,  and  does  not  admit  of  any  kind  of  speculation.  . . . 
The  statist  commonly  prefers  to  employ  figures  and  tabular 
exhibitions.”3 

STOICS  (from  B-tod,  a porch).  — Zeno  opened  a school  at  Athens, 
in  the  “variegated  porch,”  so  called  from  the  paintings  of 
Polygnotus,  with  which  it  was  adorned,  whence  his  adherents 
were  called  “philosophers  of  the  porch.”  — Stoics.4 

“ From  the  Tasculan  Questions,"  says  Bentham,5  “ I learnt 
that  pain  is  no  evil.  Virtue  is  of  itself  sufficient  to  confer 
happiness  on  any  man  who  is  disposed  to  possess  it  on  these 
terms.  . . . 

“ This  was  the  sort  of  trash  which  a set  of  men  used  to 
amuse  themselves  with  talking,  while  parading  backwards  and 
forwards  in  colonnades,  called  porches : that  is  to  say,  the 
Stoics,  so  called  from  errod,  the  Greek  name  for  a porch.  In 
regard  to  these,  the  general  notion  has  been,  that  compared 
with  our  cotemporaries  in  the  same  ranks,  they  were,  generally 
speaking,  a good  sort  of  men ; and  assuredly,  in  all  times, 
good  sort  of  men,  talking  all  their  lives  long  nonsense,  in  an 
endless  variety  of  shapes,  never  have  been  wanting ; but  that 
from  talking  nonsense  in  this  or  any  other  shape,  they  or  their 
successors  have,  in  any  way  or  degree,  been  the  better,  this 
is  what  does  not  follow.” 


1 Godefrcy  Achenwall  was  born  at  Elbingcn,  in  Prussia,  in  1719,  studied  at  Jena, 
Ilalle,  and  Leipsic,  established  himself  at  Marburg  in  1746,  and  in  1748,  where  he  soon 
afterwards  obtained  a chair.  lie  was  distinguished  as  Professor  of  History  and  Statis- 
tics. But  he  also  published  several  works  on  the  Law  of  Nature  and  of  Nations. 

2 Upon  the  nature  and  province  of  the  science  of  statistics , see  the  Introduction  to 
the  Journal  of  the  London  Statistical  Society , vol.  i.,  1839. 

3 Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  Method  of  Ohscrv.  in  Polite,  chap.  5,  sect.  10. 

4 Schwegler,  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  138. 

® Dcontol.,  vol.  i.,  p.  302. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


491 


STOICS  — 

Their  philosophy  of  mind  may  be  judged  of  by  the  motto 
assigned  to  them — Nihil  est  in  intelleclu  nisi  prius  fuerit  in 
sensu.  Yet,  along  ■with  this,  they  held  that  the  mind  had  the 
power  of  framing  general  ideas,  but  these  were  derived  from 
experience.  Zeno  compared  the  hand  open  to  sensation ; half 
closed  upon  some  object  to  judgment ; fully  closed  upon  it  to 
tyavtaala  jcaraXynYi.*);,  comprehensive  judgment,  or  synthesis 
of  judgment.  And  when  the  one  hand  grasped  the  other  to 
enable  it  to  hold  more  firmly,  this  was  universal  and  definitive 
synthesis  or  science.  In  physics  they  said  all  things  were 
made  of  cause  and  matter.  In  morals  their  maxim  was  “ to 
live  agreeably  to  nature."  Mind  ought,  to  govern  matter. 
And  the  great  struggle  of  life  was,  to  lift  the  soul  above  the 
body,  and  the  evils  incident  to  it.  Their  two  great  rules  were 
avi%ov  and  — sustine,  abstine.* 1 

Ileinsius  (Dan.),  Philosoph.  Sioica  ;2  Lipsius  (Justus), 
Manududio  ad  Stoicam  Philosoph.  ;3  Gataker  (Thomas),  Dis- 
sertatio  de  Disciplina  Sioica,  prefixed  to  his  edition  of  An- 
toninus.1 

SUBJECT,  OBJECT,  SUBJECTIVE,  OBJECTIVE.  — “We 

frequently  meet,”  says  Dr.  Reid,  “with  a distinction  between 
things  in  the  mind  and  things  external  to  the  mind.  The  powers, 
faculties,  and  operations  of  the  mind,  are  things  in  the  mind. 
Everything  is  said  to  be  in  the  mind,  of  which  the  mind  is  the 

subject Excepting  the  mind  itself  and  things  in 

the  mind,  all  other  things  are  said  to  be  external.” 

By  the  term  subject  Dr.  Reid  meant  substance,  that  to  which 
powers  belong  or  in  which  qualities  reside  or  inhere.  The 
distinction,  therefore,  which  he  takes  between  things  in  the 
mind  and  things  external  to  the  mind,  is  equivalent  to  that 
which  is  expressed  among  continental  writers  by  the  ego  and 
the  non  ego,  or  se(/'and  not  self.  The  mind  and  things  in  the 
mind  constitute  the  ego.  “ All  other  things,”  says  Dr.  Reid, 
“ are  said  to  be  external.”  They  constitute  the  non  ego. 

“In  the  philosophy  of  mind,  subjective  denotes  what  is  to  be 
referred  to  the  thinking  subject,  the  ego ; objective,  what  be- 
longs to  the  object  of  thought,  the  non  ego.”b 

1 Diet,  des  Sciences  Fhitosoph.  4to,  Leyd.,  1627. 

3 4 to,  Antw.,  1664.  * 4to,  Camb.,  1643. 

1 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Discussions,  Lend,,  8yo,  1852,  p.  5,  note. 


492 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SUBJECT  - 

“The  subject  is  properly,  id  in  quo;  the  object,  id  circa  quod. 
Hence,  in  psychological  language,  the  subject  absolutely  is  the 
mind  that  knows  or  thinks,  i.  e.,  the  mind  considered  as  the 
subject  of  knowledge  or  thought  — the  object,  that  which  is 
known  or  thought  about.  The  adjectives  subjective  and  ob- 
jective are  convenient,  if  not  indispensable  expressions.”  1 
Sir  Will.  Hamilton2  explains  how  these  terms  should  have 
come  into  common  use  in  mental  philosophy. 

“ All  knowledge  is  a relation,  a relation  between  that  which 
knows  (in  scholastic  language,  the  subject  in  which  knowledge 
inheres)  and  that  which  is  known  (in  scholastic  language,  the 
object  about  which  knowledge  is  conversant) ; and  the  contents 
of  every  act  of  knowledge  are  made  up  of  elements,  and  regu- 
lated by  laws,  proceeding  partly  from  its  object  and  partly  from 
its  subject.  Now,  philosophy  proper  is  principally  and  primarily 
the  science  of  knowledge — its  first  and  most  important  problem 
being  to  determine,  What  can  we  know?  that  is,  what  are  the 
conditions  of  our  knowing,  whether  these  lie  in  the  nature  of 
the  object,  or  in  the  nature  of  the  subject  of  knowledge. 

“ But  philosophy  being  the  science  of  knowledge  ; and  the 
science  of  knowledge  supposing,  in  its  most  fundamental  and 
thorough -going  analysis,  the  distinction  of  the  subject  and 
object  of  knowledge ; it  is  evident  that  to  philosophy  the  subject 
of  knowledge  would  be  by  pre-eminence,  the  subject,  and  the 
object  of  knowledge,  the  object.  It  was  therefore  natural  that 
the  object  and  objective,  the  subject  and  subjective,  should  be 
employed  by  philosophers  as  simple  terms,  compendiously  to 
denote  the  grand  discrimination,  about  which  philosophy  was 
constantly  employed,  and  which  no  others  could  be  found  so 
precisely  and  promptly  to  express.” 

For  a disquisition  on  subject,  see  Tappan.3 — V.  Objective. 

SUBJECTIVISM  is  the  doctrine  of  Kant,  that  all  human  know- 
ledge is  merely  relative ; or  rather  that  we  cannot  prove  it 
to  be  absolute.  According  to  him,  we  cannot  objectify  the 
subjective;  that  is,  we  cannot  prove  that  what  appears  true  to 


1 Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works , p.  221,  note. 

2 In  note  b to  Reid’s  Works , p.  108. 

* Log sect.  4. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


493 


SUBJECTIVISM  — 

us  must  appear  true  to  all  intelligent  beings ; or  that  with 
different  faculties  what  now  appears  true  to  us  might  not 
appear  true.  But  to  call  our  knowledge  relative  is  merely 
calling  it  human  or  proportioned  to  the  faculties  of  a man ; 
just  as  the  knowledge  of  angels  may  be  called  angelic.  Our 
knowledge  may  be  admitted  to  be  relative  to  our  faculties  of 
apprehending  it ; but  that  does  not  make  it  less  certain.1 

SUBLIME  (The). — “ In  reflecting  on  the  circumstances  by  which 
sublimity  in  its  primitive  sense  is  specifically  distinguished, 
the  first  thing  that  strikes  us  is,  that  it  carries  the  thoughts  in 
a direction  opposite  to  that  in  which  the  great  and  universal 
law  of  terrestrial  gravitation  operates.” 2 

A sense  of  grandeur  and  sublimity  has  been  recognized  as 
one  of  the  reflex  senses  belonging  to  man.  It  is  different  from 
the  sense  of  the  beautiful,  though  closely  allied  to  it.  Beauty 
charms,  sublimity  moves  us,  and  is  often  accompanied  with  a 
feeling  resembling  fear,  while  beauty  rather  attracts  and 
draws  us  towards  it. 

There  is  a sublime  in  nature,  as  in  the  ocean  or  the  thunder 
— in  moral  action,  as  in  deeds  of  daring  and  self-denial — and 
in  art,  as  in  statuary  and  painting,  by  which  what  is  sublime 
in  nature  and  in  moral  character  is  represented  and  idealized. 

Kant  has  accurately  analyzed  our  feelings  of  sublimity  and 
beauty  in  his  Critique  du  Judgment ; Cousin,  Sur  le  Beau,  le 
Vrai,  et  le  Bon;  Burke,  On  the  Sublime  and  Beautiful;  Addison.3 
Dr.  Parr  addressed  an  Essay  on  the  Sublime  to  D.  Stewart. 

SUBSISTENTIA  is  a substantial  mode  added  to  a singular  nature, 
and  constituting  a suppositum  along  with  it.  It  means,  1.  The 
thing  itself,  the  suppositum  ; hence  we  call  the  three  persons 
of  the  Trinity  three  hypostases  or  subsistences.  2.  The  mode 
added  to  the  singular  nature  to  complete  its  existence  ; this  is 
the  metaphysical  sense.  3.  The  act  of  existing  per  se. 

“ Subsistentia  est  ‘ substantia:  completio;’  qua  carent  rerum 
naturalium  partes  a reliquis  divulsce.  Subsistens  dicitur  sup- 
positum aut  hypostasis.  Persona  est  suppositum  ratione  prce- 
ditum.”i 


1 Reid's  Works,  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  p.  513. 

- Stewart,  PUil.  Essays,  Essay  on  the  Sublime. 

3 Spectator,  vol.  vi.  1 Hutcheson,  Melaphys.,  pars  1,  cap.  5. 

43 


494 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


SUBSTANCE  is  “that  which  is  and  abides.” 

It  may  he  derived  from  subsistens  ( ens  per  se  subsistens ),  that 
which  subsists  of  or  by  itself ; or  from  substans  (id  quod  sub- 
stat),  that  which  lies  under  qualities  — the  vrtoxHfitvov  of  the 
Greeks.  But  in  Greek,  substance  is  denoted  by  ovaia — so  that 
which  truly  is,  or  essence,  seems  to  be  the  proper  meaning  of 
substance.  It  is  opposed  to  accident;  of  which  Aristotle  has 
said1  that  you  can  scarcely  predicate  of  it  that  it  is  anything. 
So  also  Augustine2  derives  substance  from  subsi-slendo  rather 
than  from  substando.  “ Sicut  ab  eo  quod  est  esse,  appellatur 
essentia ; ita  ab  eo  quod  est  subsistere,  substantiam  dicimus.” 
But  Locke  prefers  the  derivation  from  substan do.  lie  says: 3 
“ The  idea,  then,  we  have,  to  which  we  give  the  name  of  sub- 
stance, being  nothing  but  the  supposed  but  unknown  support 
of  these  qualities  we  find  existing,  which  we  imagine  cannot 
subsist,  sine  re  substante,  without  something  to  support  them, 
we  call  that  support  substantia  ; which,  according  to  the  true 
import  of  the  word,  is,  in  plain  English,  standing  under  or 
upholding.” 

Dr.  Hampden4  has  said,  “Substance,  in  its  logical  and  meta- 
physical sense,  is  that  nature  of  a thing  which  may  be  con- 
ceived to  remain  when  every  other  nature  is  removed  or  ab- 
stracted from  it — the  ultimate  point  in  analyzing  the  complex 
idea  of  any  object.  Accident  denotes  all  those  ideas  which  the 
analysis  excludes  as  not  belonging  to  the  mere  being  or  nature 
of  the  object.” 

Substance  has  been  defined,  ens  per  se  existens ; and  accident, 
ens  existens  non  in  se  sed  in  alio. 

Our  first  idea  of  substance  is  probably  derived  from  the  con- 
sciousness of  self — the  conviction  that,  while  our  sensations, 
thoughts,  and  purposes  are  changing,  we  continue  the  same. 
We  see  bodies  also  remaining  the  same  as  to  quantity  or  ex- 
tension, while  their  colour  and  figure,  their  state  of  motion  or 
of  rest,  may  be  changed. 

Substances,  it  has  been  said,  are  either  primary,  that  is,  sin- 
gular, individual  substances ; or  secondary,6  that  is  genera  and 


1 Metaphys .,  lib.  vii.  2 Be  Trinitate , lib.  vii.,  c.  4. 

8 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand .,  book  ii.,  ch.  23.  4 Bampton  Led vii.,  p.  337. 

8 Ilaurcau  (Phil.  Scholast .,  tom.  i.,  p.  60),  says  that  what  has  been  called  second  sub- 
stance is  just  one  of  its  modes  or  a species. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


495 


SUBSTANCE  — 

species  of  substance.  Substances  hare  also  been  divided  into 
complete  and  incomplete,  finite  and  infinite , &c.  But  these  are 
rather  divisions  of  being.  Substance  may,  however,  be  pro- 
perly divided  into  matter  and  spirit,  or  that  which  is  extended 
and  that  which  thinks. — V.  Essence. 

Substance  (The  Principle  of)  denotes  that  law  of  the  human 
mind  by  which  every  quality  or  mode  of  being  is  referred  to  a 
substance.  In  everything  which  we  perceive  or  can  imagine  as 
existing,  we  distinguish  two  parts,  qualities  variable  and  mul- 
tiplied, and  a being  one  and  identical ; and  these  two  are  so 
united  that  we  cannot  separate  them  in  our  intelligence,  nor 
think  of  qualities  without  a substance.  Memory  recalls  to 
us  the  many  modes  of  our  mind  ; but  amidst  all  these  modes 
we  believe  ourselves  to  be  the  same  individual  being.  So  in 
the  world  around  us  the  phenomena  are  continually  varying ; 
but  we  believe  that  these  phenomena  are  produced  by  causes 
which  remain,  as  substances,  the  same.  And  as  we  know  our- 
selves to  be  the  causes  of  our  own  acts,  and  to  be  able  to 
change  the  modes  of  our  own  mind,  so  we  believe  the  changes 
of  matter  to  be  produced  by  causes  which  belong  to  the  sub- 
stance of  it.  And  underlying  all  causes,  whether  of  finite 
mind  or  matter,  we  conceive  of  one  universal  and  absolute  cause, 
one  substance,  in  itself  persistent  and  upholding  all  things. 

SUBSUMPTION  (sub,  under  ; sumo,  to  take).  — “ When  we  are 
able  to  comprehend  why  or  how  a thing  is,  the  belief  of  the 
existence  of  that  thing  is  not  a primary  datum  of  conscious- 
ness, but  a subsumption  under  the  cognition  or  belief  which 
affords  its  reason.”  1 

To  subsume  is  to  place  any  one  cognition  under  another 
as  belonging  to  it.  In  the  judgment,  “ all  horses  are  animals,” 
the  conception  “ horses”  is  subsumed  under  that  of  “ animals.” 
The  minor  proposition  is  a subsumption  under  the  major  when 
it  is  placed  first.  Thus,  if  one  were  to  say,  “ No  man  is  wise 
in  all  things,”  and  another  to  respond,  “But you  are  a man,” 
this  proposition  is  a subsumption  under  the  former.  And  the 
major  being  assumed  ex  concesso,  and  the  minor  subsumed  as 
evidence,  the  conclusion  follows,  “ You  are  not  wise  in  all 
things.” 


1 Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Reid’s  Works,  note  A. 


496 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


SUCCESSION.  — “By  reflecting  on  the  appearance  of  various 
ideas  One  after  another  in  our  understanding,  we  get  the  notion 
of  succession.”  1 He  traces  our  notion  of  duration  or  time  to 
the  same  origin  ; or  rather  he  confounds  succession  and  dura- 
tion, the  measure  with  the  thing  measured.  According  to 
Cousin  and  others,  the  notion  of  time  is  logically  antecedent 
and  necessary  to  the  notion  of  succession.  Events  take  place 
in  time,  as  bodies  exist  in  space.  In  the  philosophy  of  Kant, 
time  is  not  an  empirical  notion,  but  like  space,  a form  of  the 
sensibility. — V.  Duration,  Time. 

SUFFICIENT  REASON  (Doctrine  of).  — “ Of  the  principle  of 
the  sufficient  reason,  the  following  account  is  given  by  Leib- 
nitz, in  his  controversial  correspondence  with  Dr.  Clarke : 
— ‘ The  great  foundation  of  mathematics  is  the  principle  of 
contradiction  or  identity ; that  is,  that  a proposition  cannot  be 
true  and  false  at  the  same  time.  But,  in  order  to  proceed 
from  mathematics  to  natural  philosophy,  another  principle  is 
requisite  (as  I have  observed  in  my  Theodiccea),  I mean,  the 
principle  of  the  sufficient  reason;  or,  in  other  words,  that 
nothing  happens  without  a reason  why  it  should  be  so,  rather 
than  otherwise.  And,  accordingly,  Archimedes  was  obliged, 
in  his  book  lie.  Equilibria,  to  take  for  granted,  that  if  there 
be  a balance,  in  which  everything  is  alike  on  both  sides,  and 
if  equal  weights  are  hung  on  the  two  ends  of  that  balance, 
the  whole  will  be  at  rest.  It  is  because  no  reason  can  be 
given  why  one  side  should  weigh  down  rather  than  the  other. 
Now  by  this  single  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason,  may  be 
demonstrated  the  being  of  a God,  and  all  the  other  parts  of 
metaphysics  or  natural  theology ; and  even,  in  some  measure, 
those  physical  truths  that  are  independent  of  mathematics, 
such  as  the  dynamical  principles,  or  the  principles  of  forces.’  ” - 
— V.  Reason  (Determining). 

The  principle  of  sufficient  reason  as  a law  of  thought  in- 
stated by  logicians  thus  — “ Every  judgment  we  accept  must 
rest  upon  a sufficient  ground  or  reason.”  From  this  law  follow 
such  principles  as  these  : — 1.  Granting  the  reason,  we  must 
grant  what  follows  from  it.  On  this,  syllogistic  inference 
depends.  2.  If  all  the  consequents  are  held  to  be  true,  the 


1 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand .,  b.  ii.,  cb.  14. 
3 See  Keid,  Act.  Poiv.}  essay  iv.,  chap.  9. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


497 


SUFFICIENT  — 

reason  must  be  true.  3.  If  ire  reject  the  consequent  ire  must 
reject  the  reason.  4.  If  we  admit  the  consequent,  we  do  not 
of  necessity  admit  the  reason,  as  there  may  be  other  reasons 
or  causes  of  the  same  effect. 

Thomson,  Outline  of  Laics  of  Thought But  according  to 
Mr.  Mansel,2  “ The  principle  of  sufficient  reason  is  no  law  of 
thought,  but  only  the  statement  that  every  act  of  thought 
must  be  governed  by  some  law  or  other.” 

SUGGESTION  (. suggero , to  bear  or  place  under,  to  prompt). 

“ It  is  the  received  doctrine  of  philosophers,  that  our  no- 
tions of  relations  can  only  be  got  by  comparing  the  related 
ideas : but  it  is  not  by  having  first  the  notions  of  mind  and 
sensation  and  then  comparing  them  together,  that  we  perceive 
the  one  to  have  the  relation  of  a subject  or  substratum,  and 
the  other  that  of  an  act  or  operation:  on  the  contrary,  one  of 
the  related  things,  viz.,  sensation,  suggests  to  us  both  the 
correlate  and  the  relation. 

“I  beg  leave  to  make  use  of  the  word  suggestion,  because  I 
know  not  one  more  proper,  to  express  a power  of  the  mind, 
which  seems  entirely  to  have  escaped  the  notice  of  philoso- 
phers, and  to  which  we  owe  many  of  our  simple  notions  which 
are  neither  impressions  nor  ideas,  as  well  as  many  original 
principles  of  belief.”3 

To  this  power  Dr.  Reid  refers  our  natural  judgments  or 
principles  of  common  sense.  Mr.  Stewart4  has  expressed  sur- 
prise that  Reid  should  have  apologized  for  introducing  a word 
which  had  already  been  employed  by  Berkeley,  to  denote 
those  intimations  which  are  the  results  of  experience  and 
habit.  And  Sir  4V.  Hamilton5  has  shown  that  in  the  more 
extensive  sense  of  Reid  the  word  had  been  used  by  Tertullian ; 
who,  speaking  of  the  universal  belief  of  the  soul’s  immortality, 
has  said,6  “ Kaiur a pleraque  suggeruntur,  quasi  cle  publico 
sensu  quo  animam  Deus  dilare  dignatus  est.” 

The  word  suggestion  is  much  used  in  the  philosophy  of 
Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  in  a sense  nearly  the  same  as  that  as- 
signed to  association,  by  other  philosophers.  He  calls  judg- 


1 P.  296.  3 Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  198. 

3 Reid,  Enquiry , ch.  2,  s.  7.  4 Dissert .,  p.  167,  second  ed. 

L Reid’s  Worlcs , p.  3,  note.  6 De  Anima.  c.  2. 

43  * 2 n 


498 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SUGGESTION— 

ment,  relative  suggestion.  Hutcheson1  says,  “ Sensus  est  in- 
terims qui  suggerit  praicipuc  intcllectiones  puras;  qua:  consci- 
entia,  aut  rejlectendi  vis  dicitur.”  It  is  not  so  properly  con- 
sciousness or  reflection  which  gives  the  new  ideas,  but  rather 
the  occasion  on  which  these  ideas  are  suggested.  It  is  when 
we  are  conscious  and  reflect  on  one  thing,  some  other  thing 
related  to  it,  but  not  antecedently  thought,  is  suggested. 

Locke2  said,  “ Simple  ideas,  the  materials  of  all  our  know- 
ledge, are  suggested  and  furnished  to  the  mind  only  by  those 
two  ways  mentioned  above,  viz.,  Sensation  and  Reflection. 
Cumberland3  had  said  before  him,  “ Utrobique  intelligimus 
propositions  quasdam  immutabilis  veritalis.  Hujusmodi  ali- 
quot veritaies  a rerum  hominumque  natura  mentibus  humanis 
nccessario  suggeri,  hoc  est  quod  a,  nobis  affirmative,  hoc  idem 
ab  adversariis  non  minus  diserle  denegatui:.” 

SUICIDE  ( sui  and  cccdes,  self-murder)  is  the  voluntary  taking 
away  of  one’s  own  life.  The  Stoics  thought  it  was  not  wrong 
to  do  so,  when  the  pains  and  inconveniences  of  our  lot  ex- 
ceeded its  enjoyments  and  advantages.  But  the  command, 
“Thou  shalt  not  kill,”  forbids  suicide  as  well  as  homicide.  It 
is  contrary  to  one  of  the  strongest  instincts  of  our  nature, 
that  of  self-preservation — and  at  variance  with  the  submission 
which  we  owe  to  God,  and  the  duties  incumbent  upon  us  to- 
wards our  fellow-creatures.  All  the  apologies  that  can  be 
offered  for  it  are  futile. 

Aristotle;4  Hermann,  Disputatio  de  Autocheiria  et  philoso- 
phice  et  ex  legibus  Romanis  considerate  ;5 6  Madame  do  Stael, 
Reflexions  svr  le  Suicide;  Stoeudlin,  Hist,  des  Opinions  et  des 
Doctrines  sur  le  Suicide ;®  Tissot,  Manie  du  Suicide;  Adams, 
On  Self-murder ; Donne,  Biaihanaios. 

SUPERSTITION  (so  called,  according  to  Lucretius,  quod  sit 
supersiantium  rerum,  i.  e.,  ccelestium  et  divinarum  quee  supra 
nos  stant,  nimis  et  superfluus  timor,  Aulus  Gellius,7)  is  not 
an  “excess  of  religion”  (at  least  in  the  ordinary  sense  of 
the  word  excess),  “as  if  any  one  could  have  too  much  of  true 


1 Log.  Conrpend .,  cap.  1. 

3 De  Lcgg.  Nat.,  c.  i.,  sect.  I. 
* 4to,  Leips.,  1809. 

T Nod.  Attic.,  lib.  10. 


a Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  b.  ii.,  ch.  2.  § 2. 

4 Ethic.,  lib.  iii.,  cap.  7,  lib.  v.,  cap.  11. 

6 8vo,  Goetting.,  1824. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


499 


SUPERSTITION-  - 

religion,  tut  any  misdirection  of  religious  feeling ; mani- 
fested either  in  showing  religious  veneration  or  regard  to 
objects  which  deserve  none;  that  is,  properly  speaking, 
the  worship  of  false  gods ; or,  in  the  assignment  of  such  a 
degree,  or  such  a kind  of  religious  veneration  to  any  object, 
as  that  object,  though  worthy  of  some  reverence,  does  not 
deserve ; or  in  the  worship  of  the  true  God  through  the  me- 
dium of  improper  rites  and  ceremonies.”  1 

“Superstition,”  says  Dr.  Hartley,  “may  be  defined  a mis- 
taken opinion  concerning  the  severity  and  punishments  of 
God,  magnifying  these  in  respect  to  ourselves  or  others.  It 
may  arise  from  a sense  of  guilt,  from  bodily  indisposition,  or 
from  erroneous  reasoning.” 

SUPR A-N ATUR,  ALI S M (supra,  above  ; natura,  nature)  is  the 
doctrine  that  in  nature  there  are  more  than  physical  causes  in 
operation,  and  that  in  religion  we  have  the  guidance  not 
merely  of  reason  but  of  revelation.  It  is  thus  opposed  to 
Naturalism  and  to  Rationalism  — q.  v.  In  Germany,  where 
the  word  originated,  the  principal  Supra-naturalists  are  Tho- 
luck,  Ilengstenberg,  Guericke,  &c. 

SYLLOGISM  (ciAViyifffioj,  a putting  together  of  judgments,  or 
propositions  or  reasonings). 

This  word  occurs  in  the  writings  of  Plato,  in  the  sense  of 
judging  or  reasoning;  but  not  in  the  technical  sense  assigned 
to  it  by  Aristotle. 

According  to  Aristotle,2  “ a syllogism  is  a speech  (or  enun- 
ciation) (xoyoj)  in  which  certain  things  (the  premises)  being 
supposed,  something  different  from  what  is  supposed  (the  con- 
clusion) follows  of  necessity ; and  this  solely  in  virtue  of  the 
suppositions  themselves.” 

“ A syllogism  is  a combination  of  two  judgments  necessitating 
a third  judgment  as  the  consequence  of  their  mutual  relation.”3 

Euler  likened  the  syllogism  to  three  concentric  circles,  of 
which  the  first  contained  the  second,  which  in  its  turn  con- 
tained the  third.  Thus,  if  A be  predicable  of  all  B,  and  B 
of  all  C,  it  follows  necessarily  that  A is  also  predicable  of  C. 


1 Wbately,  On  Bacon , p.  155. 

Q Prior.  Analyt lib.  i.;  cap.  1,  sect.  7. 

3 Mansel,  Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  61. 


500 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


SYLLOGISM  — 

In  a syllogism,  the  first  two  propositions  are  called  the  pre- 
mises; because  they  are  the  things  premised  or  put  before ; 
they  are  also  called  the  antecedents : the  first  of  them  is  called 
the  major  and  the  second  the  minor.  The  third  proposition, 
which  contains  the  thing  to  be  proved,  is  called  the  con- 
clusion or  consequent:  and  the  particle  which  unites  the 
conclusion  with  the  premises  is  called  the  consequentia  or  con- 
sequence.' 

In  a syllogism,  “ the  conclusion  having  two  terms,  a subject 
and  a predicate,  its  predicate  is  called  the  major  term,  and  its 
subject  the  minor  term.  In  order  to  prove  the  conclusion,  each 
of  its  terms  is,  in  the  premises,  compared  with  the  third  term, 
called  the  middle  term.  By  this  means  one  of  the  premises 
will  have  for  its  two  terms  the  major  term  and  the  middle 
term ; and  this  premise  is  called  the  major  premise,  or  the 
major  proposition  of  the  syllogism.  The  other  premise  must 
have  for  its  two  terms  the  minor  term  and  the  middle  term ; 
and  it  is  called  the  minor  proposition.  Thus  the  syllogism 
consists  of  three  propositions,  distinguished  by  the  names  of 
the  major,  the  minor,  and  the  conclusion ; and  although  each  of 
these  has  two  terms,  a subject  and  a predicate,  yet  there  are 
only  three  different  terms  in  all.  The  major  term  is  always  the 
predicate  of  the  conclusion,  and  is  also  either  the  subject  or 
predicate  of  the  major  proposition.  The  minor  term  is  always 
the  subject  of  the  conclusion,  and  is  also  either  the  subject  or 
predicate  of  the  minor  proposition.  The  middle  term  never 


1 Thus : — 

Every  virtue  is  laudable; 

Diligence  is  a virtue; 

Wherefore  diligence  is  laudable. 

“The  two  former  propositions  are  the  premises  or  antecedents , the  last  is  the  condu- 
sion  or  consequent , and  the  particle  wherefore  is  the  consequentia  or  consequence. 

“ The  consequent  may  be  true  and  the  consequence  false. 

“What  has  parts  is  divisible; 

The  human  soul  has  parts; 

Wherefore  the  human  soul  is  divisible. 

“The  consequent  may  be  true  although  the  consequence  is  false. 

“Antichrist  will  be  powerful. 

Therefore  he  will  be  impious 
“ His  impiety  will  not  flow  from  his  power.” 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


501 


SYLLOGISM  — 

enters  into  the  conclusion,  but  stands  in  both  premises,  either 
in  the  position  of  subject  or  of  predicate.”1 

According  to  the  various  positions  which  the  middle  term 
may  have  in  the  premises,  syllogisms  are  said  to  be  of  various 
figures.  And  as  all  the  possible  positions  of  the  middle  term 
are  only  four,  the  regular  figures  of  the  syllogisms  are  also  four ; 
and  a syllogism  is  said  to  be  drawn  in  the  first,  second,  third, 
or  fourth  figure  according  to  the  position  of  its  middle  term. 

There  is  another  division  of  syllogisms  according  to  their 
moods.  The  mood  of  a syllogism  is  determined  by  the  quality 
and  quantity  of  the  propositions  of  which  it  consists.  There 
are  sixty-four  moods  possible  in  every  figure.  And  the  theory 
of  the  syllogism  requires  that  we  show  what  are  the  par- 
ticular moods  in  each  figure , which  do  or  do  not  form  a just 
and  conclusive  syllogism.  The  legitimate  moods  of  the  first 
figure  are  demonstrated  from  the  axiom  called  Dictum  de  omni 
et  de  nullo.  The  legitimate  moods  of  the  other  figures  are 
proved  by  reducing  them  to  some  mood  of  the  first.2 

According  to  the  different  kinds  of  propositions  employed 
in  forming  them,  syllogisms  are  divided  into  Categorical  and 
Hypothetical.  Categorical  syllogisms  are  divided  into  Pure 
and  Modal.  Hypothetical  syllogisms  into  Conditional  and 
Disjunctive. 

In  the  Categorical  syllogism,  the  two  premisses  and  the  con- 
clusion are  all  categorical  propositions. 

One  premiss  of  a conditional  syllogism  is  a conditional  pro- 
position ; the  other  premiss  is  a categorical  proposition,  and 
either  asserts  the  antecedent  or  denies  the  consequent.  In 
the  former  case,  which  is  called  the  modus ponens,  the  conclu- 
sion infers  the  truth  of  the  consequent;  in  the  latter  case, 
which  is  called  the  modus  tollens,  the  conclusion  infers  the 
falsity  of  the  antecedent.  The  general  forms  of  these  two 
cases  are,  “ If  A is,  B is ; but  A is,  therefore  B is ; and  if  A 
is,  B is  not ; but  B is,  therefore  A is  not.”  “ If  what  we  learn 
from  the  Bible  is  true,  we  ought  not  to  do  evil  that  good  may 
come  ; but  what  we  learn  from  the  Bible  is  true,  therefore  we 
ought  not  to  do  evil  that  good  may  come.” 


1 Keid,  Account  of  Aristotle's  Logic,  chap.  3,  sect.  2. 

2 Christian  Wolf,  Smaller  Logicj  ch.  6. 


502 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


SYLLOGISM  — 

In  the  Disjunctive  syllogism,  vrc  commence  with  a disjunc- 
tive judgment,  and  proceed  either  by  asserting  the  truth  of 
one  member  of  the  division,  and  thence  inferring  the  falsity 
of  all  the  rest,  -which  is  called  the  modus  ponens,  or  else  by 
asserting  the  falsity  of  all  the  members  but  one,  and  hence 
inferring  the  truth  of  that  one,  which  latter  method  is  called 
the  modus  tollens.  The  general  form  of  these  two  cases  will 
be,  “Either  A is,  or  B is,  or  C is;  but  A is;  therefore  nei- 
ther B is,  nor  C is.”  And  “ Either  A is,  or  B is,  or  C is  ; but 
neither  B is,  nor  C is ; therefore  A is.”  Either  the  Pope  is 
infallible,  or  there  is  at  least  one  great  error  in  the  Romish 
Church ; but  the  Pope  is  not  infallible,  therefore  there  is  at 
least  one  great  error  in  the  Romish  Church.1 

Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.; 2 'Aldrich,  Wallis, 
Watts,  and  other  authors  on  Logic. 

SYMBOL.  -V.  Myth. 

SYMPATHY  [avyjtdOsia,  fellow-feeling). 

“ This  mutual  affection  which  the  Greeks  call  sympathy , 
tendeth  to  the  use  and  benefit  of  man  alone.”3 

“ These  sensitive  cogitations  are  not  pure  actions  springing 
from  the  soul  itself,  but  compassion  (sympathy)  with  the 
body.”4 

“ Pity  and  compassion  are  words  appropriated  to  signify  our 
fellow-feeling  with  the  sorrow  of  others.  Sympathy,  though 
its  meaning  was,  perhaps,  originally  the  same,  may  now,  how- 
ever, without  much  impropriety,  be  made  use  of  to  denote 
our  fellow-feeling  with  any  other  passion  whatever.”5 

Sympathy  with  sorrow  or  suffering  is  compassion;  sympathy 
with  joy  or  prosperity  is  congratulation. — V.  Antipathy. 
SYNCATEGOREMATIC.  — V.  Categorematic. 

SYNCRETISM  (awxptjtiay.6;,  from  avv,  together,  and  xprj-ei^u, 
to  behave  like  a Cretan).  — “The  Cretans  are  herein  very 
observable,  who,  being  accustomed  to  frequent  skirmishes 
and  fights,  as  soon  as  they  were  over,  were  reconciled  and 


1 Solly,  Syll.  of  Logic.  2 B.  iv.,  chap.  17. 

3 Holland,  Pliny,  b.  xx.,  Proem. 

4 Cudworth,  Immut.  Mor.,  book  iii.,  chap.  1,  p.  IS. 

5 Smith,  Theory  of  Mor.  Sent.,  part  i.,  sect.  1. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


503 


SYNCRETISM  — 

went  together.  And  this  was  it  which  they  commonly  called 
a Syncretism .* 

Syncretism  is  opposed  to  Eclecticism  in  philosophy.  Eclec- 
ticism ( q . v.)  while  it  takes  from  various  systems,  does  so  on 
the  principle  that  the  parts  so  taken,  when  brought  together, 
have  a kind  of  congruity  and  consistency  with  one  another. 
Syncretism  is  the  jumbling  together  of  different  systems  or 
parts  of  systems,  without  due  regard  to  their  being  consistent 
with  one  another.  It  is  told  of  a Roman  consul  that,  when  he 
arrived  in  Greece  he  called  before  him  the  philosophers  of  the 
different  schools,  and  generously  offered  to  act  as  moderator 
between  them.  Something  of  the  same  kind  was  proposed  by 
Charles  V ,2  in  reference  to  the  differences  between  Protestants 
and  Papists ; as  if  philosophy,  and  theology  which  is  the 
highest  philosophy,  instead  of  being  a search  after  truth,  were 
a mere  matter  of  diplomacy  or  compromise — a playing  at  pro- 
tocols. But  Syncretism  does  not  necessarily  aim  at  the  recon- 
ciling of  the  doctrines  which  it  brings  together ; it  merely 
places  them  in  juxtaposition. 

Philo  of  Alexandria  gave  the  first  example  of  syncretism, 
in  trying  to  unite  the  Oriental  philosophy  with  that  of  the 
Greeks.  The  Gnostics  tried  the  same  thing  with  the  doc- 
trines of  the  Christian  religion.  About  the  beginning  of  the 
seventeenth  century,  George  Calixtus,  a German  theologian, 
attempted  to  set  down  in  one  common  creed  the  belief  of  the 
Papists  and  the  Protestants ; but  succeeded  only  in  irritating 
both.  To  him  and  his  partizans  the  name  Syncretist  seems  to 
have  been  first  applied.3  Similar  efforts  -were  made  to  unite 
the  metaphysics  of  Aristotle  with  those  of  Descartes.  And 
the  attempts  which  have  frequently  been  made  to  reconcile 
the  discoveries  of  geology  with  the  cosmogony  of  Moses, 
deserve  no  name  but  that  of  syncretism,  in  the  sense  of  its 
being  “ a mixing  together  of  things  which  ought  to  be  kept 

1 Plutarch,  Of  Brotherly  Love. 

a After  his  retiring  from  the  toils  of  empire,  Charles  V.  employed  his  leisure  in  con- 
structing time-pieces,  and  on  experiencing  the  difficulty  of  making  their  movements 
synchronous,  he  is  said  to  have  exclaimed,  in  reference  to  the  attempt  to  reconcile  Pro- 
testants and  Papists,  “ How  could  I dream  of  making  two  great  bodies  of  men  think 
alike  when  I cannot  make  two  clocks  to  go  alike!  ” 

8 See  Walch’s  Introduction  to  Controversies  of  Lutheran  Church. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


504 

SYNCRETISM  — 

distinct.”  On  the  evils  of  syncretism,  see  Sewell,1  who  quotes 
as  against  it  the  text,  Dcut.  xxii.  9,  “Tliou  sliult  not  sow  thy 
vineyard  to  ilk  divers  seeds,"  &c. 

SYNDERESIS  (avv  fitatplu,  to  divide,  to  tear  asunder)  was  used 
to  denote  the  state  of  conviction  or  remorse  in  which  the 
mind  was  when  comparing  what  it  had  done  with  what  it 
ought  to  have  done.2 

SYNEIDESIS  (aviniSyais,  joint  knowledge;  from  avv  and  d8u>). 
— Conscience,  as  giving  knowledge  of  an  action  in  reference 
to  the  law  of  right  and  wrong,  was  called  the  Witness  who 
accused  or  excused.  The  operations  of  conscience  were' repre- 
sented by  the  three  members  of  a syllogism ; of  which  the 
first  contained  the  law,  the  second  the  testimony  of  the  wit- 
ness, and  the  third  the  decision  of  the  judge.  But  conscience 
not  only  pronounces  sentence ; it  carries  its  sentence  into 
effect.  — V.  Synderesis. 

He  who  has  transgressed  any  of  the  rules  of  which  con- 
science is  the  repository,  is  punished  by  the  reproaches  of  his 
own  mind.  lie  who  has  obeyed  these  rules,  is  acquitted  and 
rewarded  by  feelings  of  complacency  and  self-approbation. — 
V.  Synteresis. 

SYNTERESIS  (owtqprjai;,  the  conservatory;  from  owtijpen). — 
Conscience,  considered  as  the  repository  of  those  rules,  or 
general  maxims,  which  are  regarded  as  first  principles  in 
morals,  was  called  by  this  name  among  the  early  Christian 
moralists,  and  was  spoken  of  as  the  law  or  lawgiver. 

SYNTHESIS  (a vvdsats,  a putting  together,  composition)  “consists 
in  assuming  the  causes  discovered  and  established  as  princi- 
ples, and  by  them  explaining  the  phenomena  proceeding  from 
them  and  proving  the  explanation.”3 

“•E-very  synthesis  which  has  not  started  with  a complete 
analysis-Si ids  akan’csult  which,  in  Greek,  is-called  hypothesis ; - 
instead  of  which,  if  synthesis  has  Been  precededhy  a sufficient 
t fnahysis,~ihQ.  synthesis  founded  upon  that  analysis  leads  to  a 
result  which  in  Greek  is  called  system.  The  legitimacy  of 
every  synthesis  is  directly  owing  to  the  exactness  of  analysis ; 


1 Christ.  Morals , chap.  9. 

2 Aquinas,  Summce  Theolog pars  prima,  quast.  79,  articulus  12. 

3 Newton,  Optics. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


505 


SYNTHESIS  — 

every  system-  which  hr merely  an  hypothesis  is  a vain  system  ; 
everj^eyjitliesSs  which  has  not  been  preceded  by  analysis  is  a 
pure  -imagination : but  at  the  same  time  every  analj'sis  which 
does,  not  aspire  to  a synthesis  which  may  be  equal  to  itT  is  an 
analysis  which  halts  on  the  way.  On  the  one  hand,  synthesis 
without  analysis  gives  a false  science ; on  the  other  hand, 
analysis  without  synthesis  gives  an  incomplete  science.  An 
incomplete  science  is  a hundred  times  more  valuable  than  a 
false  science ; but  neither  a false  science  nor  an  incomplete 
science  is  the  ideal  of  science.  The  ideal  of  science,  the  ideal 
of  philosophy,  can  be  realized  only  by  a method  which  com- 
bines the  two  processes  of  analysis  and  synthesis.”  ' — V.  Ana- 
lysis, Method,  System. 

SYSTEM  (evatryx a ; from  owlotryn,  to  place  together)  is  a full  and 
connected  view  of  all  the  truths  of  some  department  of  know- 
ledge. An  organized  body  of  truth,  or  truths  arranged  under 
one  and  the  same  idea,  which  idea  is  as  the  life  or  soul  which 
assimilates  all  those  truths.  No  truth  is  altogether  isolated. 
Every  truth  has  relation  to  some  other.  And  we  should  try 
to  unite  the  facts  of  our  knowledge  so  as  to  see  them  in  their 
several  bearings.  This  we  do  when  we  frame  them  into  a 
system.  To  do  so  legitimately  we  must  begin  by  analysis  and 
end  with  synthesis.  But  system  applies  not  only  to  our  know- 
ledge, but  to  the  objects  of  our  knowledge.  Thus  we  speak 
of  the  planetary  system,  the  muscular  system,  the  nervous 
system.  We  believe  that  the  order  to  which  we  would  reduce 
our  ideas  has  a foundation  in  the  nature  of  things.  And  it  is 
this  belief  that  encourages  us  to  reduce  our  knowledge  of 
things  into  systematic  order.  The  doing  so  is  attended  with 
many  advantages.  At  the  same  time  a spirit  of  systematizing 
may  be  carried  too  far.  It  is  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  in  accord- 
ance with  the  order  of  nature  that  it  can  be  useful  or  sound. 
Condillac  has  a Traits  des  Systemes,  in  which  he  traces  their 
causes  and  their  dangerous  consequences. 

System,  Economy,  or  Constitution.— “A  System,  Economy,  or 
Constitution,  is  a one  or  a whole,  made  up  of  several  parts, 
but  yet  that  the  several  parts  even  considered  as  a whole  do 


44 


1 Cousin,  Hist.  Mod.  Phil.,  toI.  i.,  pp.  277,  278. 


506 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


SYSTEM  — 

not  complete  the  idea,  unless  in  the  notion  of  a whole  you 
include  the  relations  and  respects  which  these  parts  have  to 
each  other.  Every  work,  both  of  nature  and  of  art,  is  a 
system  ; and  as  every  particular  thing,  both  natural  and  arti- 
ficial, is  for  some  use  or  purpose  out  of  and  beyond  itself, 
one  may  add  to  what  has  been  already  brought  into  the 
idea  of  a system,  its  conduciveness  to  this  one  or  more  ends. 
Let  us  instance  in  a watch  — suppose  the  several  parts  of  it 
taken  to  pieces,  and  placed  apart  from  each  other ; let  a man 
have  ever  so  exact  a notion  of  these  several  parts,  unless  he 
considers  the  respects  and  relations  which  they  have  to  each 
other,  he  will  not  have  anything  like  the  idea  of  a watch. 
Suppose  these  several  parts  brought  together  and  any  how 
united:  neither  will  he  yet,  be  the  union  ever  so  close,  have  an 
idea  which  will  bear  any  resemblance  to  that  of  a watch.  But 
let  him  view  these  several  parts  put  together,  or  consider  them 
as  to  be  put  together  in'the  manner  of  a watch  ; let  him  form 
a notion  of  the  relations  which  these  several  parts  have  to  each 1 
other — all  conducive  in  their  respective  ways  to  this  purpose, 
showing  the  hour  of  the  day;  and  then  he  has  the  idea  of  a 
watch.  Thus  it  is  with  regard  to  the  inward  frame  of  man. 
Appetites,  passions,  affections,  and  the  principle  of  reflection, 
considered  merely  as  the  several  parts  of  our  inward  nature, 
do  not  give  us  an  idea  of  the  system  or  constitution  of  this 
nature ; because  the  constitution  is  formed  by  somewhat  not 
yet  taken  into  consideration,  namely,  by  the  relations  which 
these  several  parts  have  to  each  other,  the  chief  of  which  is 
the  authority  of  reflection  or  conscience.  It  is  from  consider- 
ing the  relations  which  the  several  appetites  and  passions  in 
the  inward  frame  have  to  each  other,  and,  above  all,  the 
supremacy  of  reflection  or  conscience,  that  we  get  the  idea  of 
the  system  or  constitution  of  human  nature.  And  from  the 
idea  itself  it  will  as  fully  appear,  that  this  our  nature,  i.  e., 
constitution,  is  adapted  to  virtue,  as  from  the  idea  of  a watch 
it  appears  that  its  nature,  i.  e.,  constitution  or  system,  is 
adapted  to  measure  time.”1  — V.  Method,  Theory. 


* Butler,  Preface  to  Sermons. 


VOCABULARY  OF  FniLOSOPIIY. 


507 


TABULA  B.ASA  (a  tablet  made  smooth). — The  ancients  were  in 
use  to  write  upon  tablets  covered  with  soft  wax,  on  which  the 
writing  was  traced  with  the  sharp  point  of  the  stylus,  or  iron 
pen.  When  the  writing  had  served  its  purpose,  it  was  effaced 
by  the  broad  end  of  the  stylus  being  employed  to  make  the 
wax  smooth.  The  tablet  was  then,  as  at  first,  tabula  rasa, 
ready  to  receive  any  writing  which  might  be  put  upon  it. 
In  opposition  to  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas  (g.  v.)  the  mind 
of  man  has  been  compared  to  a tabula  rasa,  or  a sheet  of 
white  paper  — having  at  first  nothing  written  upon  it,  but 
ready  to  receive  what  may  be  inscribed  on  it  by  the  hand  of 
experience.  This  view  is  maintained  by  Hobbes,  Locke,  and 
others.  On  the  other  hand,  Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury  com- 
pares the  mind  to  a book  all  written  over  within,  but  the 
leaves  of  which  are  closed,  till  they  are  gradually  opened  by 
the  hand  of  experience,  and  the  imprisoned  truths  or  ideas 
set  free.  Leibnitz,  speaking  of  the  difference  between  Locke 
and  him,  says: — “The  question  between  us  is  whether  the 
soul  in  itself  is  entirely  empty,  like  a tablet  upon  which 
nothing  has  been  written  ( tabula  rasa),  according  to  Aristotle,1 II 
and  the  author  of  the  Essay  on  Hum.  Under,  (book  ii.,  ch.  1, 
sect.  2) ; and  whether  all  that  is  there  traced  comes  wholly 
from  the  senses  and  experience ; or  whether  the  soul  originally 
contains  the  principles  of  several  notions  and  doctrines,  which 
the  external  objects  only  awaken  upon  occasions,  as  I believe 
with  Plato.”  Professor  Sedgwick,  instead  of  likening  the 
mind  to  a sheet  of  white  paper,  would  rather  liken  it  to  what 
in  the  art  of  dyeing  is  called  a “prepared  blank,”  that  is,  a 
piece  of  cloth  so  prepared  by  mordaunts  and  other  appliances, 
that  when  dipped  into  the  dyeing  vat  it  takes  on  the  colours 
intended,  and  comes  out  according  to  an  expected  pattern. 

“ The  soul  of  a child  is  yet  a white  paper  unscribbled  with 
observations  of  the  world,  wherewith,  at  length,  it  becomes  a 
blurred  note-book.” 2 

“If  it  be  true  that  the  mind  be  a blank  apart  from  the 
external  creation,  yet  how  elaborately  must  that  apparent 
blank  be  prepared,  when  by  simply  bringing  it  into  the  light 
and  warmth  of  the  objective,  it  glows  with  colours  not  of  earth, 


I De  Animci , lib.  iii.,  cap.  4,  sect.  14. 

II  Bishop  Earle. 


508 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


TABULA  RASA  — 

and  shows  that  from  the  first  it  had  been  written  over  with  a 
secret  writing  by  the  hand  of  God.”  1 

TACT.  — “ By  tact  we  mean  an  inferior  degree  of  talent — a skill 
or  adroitness  in  adapting  words  or  deeds  to  circumstances, 
involving,  of  course,  a quick  perception  of  the  propriety  of 
circumstances.  It  is  also  applied  to  a certain  degree  of  me- 
chanical skill.” 2 

TALENT. — “By  talent,  in  its  distinctive  meaning,  we  understand 
the  power  of  acquiring  and  adroitly  disposing  of  the  materials 
of  human  knowledge,  and  products  of  invention  in  their  already 
existing  forms,  without  the  infusion  of  any  new  enlivening 
spirit.  It  looks  no  farther  than  the  attainment  of  certain 
practical  ends,  which  experience  has  proved  attainable,  and 
the  dexterous  use  of  such  means  as  experience  has  proved  to 
be  efficient. 

“ Talent  values  effort  in  the  light  of  practical  utility;  genius 
always  for  its  own  sake,  labours  for  the  love  of  labour.  Talent 
may  be  acquired.  . . . Genius  always  belongs  to  the 

individual  character,  and  may  be  cultivated,  but  cannot  be 
acquired.”3 

“ Talent  describes  power  of  acquisition,  cxcellenceof  memory; 
genius  describes  power  of  representation,  excellency  of  fancy; 
intellect  describes  power  of  inference,  excellence  of  reason.”4 

“ Talent  lying  in  the  understanding  is  often  inherited ; genius 
being  the  action  of  reason  and  imagination,  rarely,  or  never.”6 

TASTE  (POWERS,  OR  PRINCIPLES  OF).- 

“His  tasteful  mind  enjoys 
Alike  the  complicated  charms,  which  glow 
Thro’  the  wide  landscape.”  — Cowper,  Power  of  Harmony , b.  ii. 

“ That  power  of  the  mind  by  which  we  are  capable  of  dis- 
cerning and  relishing  the  beauties  of  nature,  and  whatever 

is  excellent  in  the  fine  arts,  is  called  Taste Like 

the  taste  of  the  palate,  it  relishes  some  things,  is  disgusted 
with  others  ; with  regard  to  many,  is  indifferent  or  dubious  ; 


1 Harris,  Man  Primeval,  chap.  3. 

» Ibid,  p.  204. 

6 S.  T.  Coleridge. 


a Moffat,  Study  of  JSslhetics,  p.  206. 
4 Taylor,  Synonyms. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


509 


TASTE  — 

and  is  considerably  influenced  by  habit,  by  associations,  and 
by  opinion.  . . . 

“By  the  objects  of  Taste,  I mean  those  qualities  and  attri- 
butes of  things  which  are,  by  nature,  adapted  to  please  a good 
taste.  Mr.  Addison1  and  Dr.  Akenside2  after  him,  has  re- 
duced them  to  three — to  wit,  Novelty,  Grandeur,  and  Beauty.”  3 
— q.  v. 

The  best  definition  of  Taste  was  given  by  the  editor  of 
Spenser  (Mr.  Hughes),  when  he  called  it  a kind  of  extem- 
pore judgment.  Burke  explained  it  to  be  an  instinct  which 
immediately  awakes  the  emotions  of  pleasure  or  dislike. 
Akenside  is  clear  as  he  is  poetical  on  the  question : — 

“What,  then,  is.Iksfe  but  those  iuternal  powers, 

Active,  and  strong,  and  feelingly  alive 
To  each  fine  impulse?  a discerning  sense 
Of  decent  and  sublime,  with  quick  disgust 
From  things  deformed,  or  disarranged,  or  gross, 

In  species?  This,  nor  gems,  nor  stores  of  gold, 

Nor  purple  state,  nor  culture,  can  bestow, 

But  God  alone,  when  first  his  sacred  hand 
Imprints  the  secret  bias  of  the  soul/’ 

Pleasures  of  Imagin.,  b.  iii.,  1.  523. 

“ We  may  consider  Taste,  therefore,  to  be  a settled  habit  of 
discerning  faults  and  excellencies  in  a moment  — the  mind’s 
independent  expression  of  approval  or  aversion.  It  is  that 
faculty  by  which  we  discover  and  enjoy  the  beautiful,  the  pic- 
turesque, and  the  sublime  in  literature,  art,  and  nature.” 4 

The  objects  of  Taste  have  also  been  classed  as  the  Beauti- 
ful, the  Sublime,  and  the  Picturesque — q.  v.  The  question  is 
whether  these  objects  possess  certain  inherent  qualities  which 
may  be  so  called,  or  whether  they  awaken  pleasing  emotions 
by  suggesting  or  recalling  certain  pleasing  feelings  formerly 
experienced  in  connection  or  association  with  these  objects. 
The  latter  view  has  been  maintained  by  Mr.  Alison  in  his 
Essay  on  Taste,  and  by  Lord  Jeffrey  in  the  article  “ Beauty  ” 
in  the  Encyclopcedia  Britannica. 

Lord  Jeffrey  has  said,  “ It  appears  to  us,  then,  that  objects 


1 Spectator,  vol.  vi.  3 Pleasures  of  Imagination. 

3 Reid,  InteU.  Pow.,  essay  viii.,  chap.  1 and  2. 

* Pleasures,  die.,  of  Literature,  I2mo,  London.  1851,  pp.  55,  53. 

44* 


510 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


TASTE  — 

are  sublime  or  beautiful  — first,  ■when  they  are  the  natural 
signs  and  perpetual  concomitants  of  pleasurable  sensations,  as 
the  sound  of  thunder,  or  laughter,  or,  at  any  rate,  of  some 
lively  feeling  or  emotion  in  ourselves,  or  in  some  other  sen- 
tient beings;  or  secondly,  when  they  are  the  arbitrary  or  ac- 
cidental concomitants  of  such  feelings,  as  ideas  of  female 
beauty  ; or  thirdly,  when  they  bear  some  analogy  or  fancied 
resemblance  to  things  with  which  these  emotions  are  neces- 
sarily connected.  All  poetry  is  founded  on  this  last  — as 
silence  and  tranquillity — gradual  ascent  and  ambition — gra- 
dual descent  and  decay. 

Mr.  Stewart1  has  observed  that  “association  of  ideas  can 
never  account  for  a new  notion  or  a pleasure  essentially  dif- 
ferent from  all  others.” 

Gerard,  Essay  on  Taste;  Sir  Joshua  Reynolds,  Discourses 
before  Royal  Society;  Burke,  On  Sublime  and  Beautiful; 
Payne  Knight,  Enquiry  into  Principles  of  Taste;  Hume, 
Essay  on  Standard  of  Taste;  Brown,  Lectures;2  Stewart,  Phi- 
lo soph.  Essays ,3  Relative  to  Taste;  Sir  T.  L.  Dick,  Essay  on 
Taste,  prefixed  to  Price  on  the  Picturesque .4 * — V.  ^Esthetics. 

TELEOLOGY  (Wxof,  an  end ; 7.0705,  discourse)  is  the  doctrine 
of  Final  Causes  — q.  v.  It  does  not  constitute  a particular 
department  of  philosophy ; as  the  end  or  perfection  of  every 
being  belongs  to  the  consideration  of  that  branch  of  philo- 
sophy in  which  it  is  included.  But  teleology  is  the  philoso- 
phical consideration  of  final  causes,  generally. 

TEMPERAMENT  ( tempero , to  moderate,  to  season).  — “There 
are  only  two  species  of  temperament.  The  four  well-known 
varieties,  and  the  millions  which  are  less  known,  are  merely 
modifications  of  two  species,  and  combinations  of  their  modi- 
fications. These  are  the  active  and  the  passive  forms  ; and 
every  other  variety  may  be  conveniently  arranged  under 
them.”6 


1 Elements , cb.  5,  part  ii.,  p.  364,  4to. 

« 77.  3 Part  ii.  4 8vo,  1842. 

3 Lavater,  Zimmerman,  and  Ton  Hildebrandt  adopt  a similar  classification.  The 

author  of  the  treatise  on  “Diet,”  included  among  the  works  of  Hippocrates,  takes  the 

same  view  of  temperaments ; as  likewise  the  Brunonian  school,  which  maintained  two 

antagonist,  sthenic  and  asthenic , states. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


511 


TEMPERAMENT  — 

“As  character  comprises  the  entire  sphere  of  the  educated 
■will,  so  temperament  is  nothing  else  than  the  sum  of  our  natural 
inclinations  and  tendencies.  Inclination  is  the  material  of  the 
will,  developing  itself,  when  controlled,  into  character,  and  when 
controlling , into  passions.  Temperament  is,  therefore,  the  root 
of  our  passions ; and  the  latter,  like  the  former,  may  be  dis- 
tinguished into  two  principal  classes.  Intelligent  psycholo- 
gists and  physicians  have  always  recognized  this  fact ; the 
former  dividing  temperaments  into  active  and  passive,  the 
latter  classifying  the  passions  as  exciting  and  depressing. 

“IVe  would  apply  the  same  statement  to  the  affections  or 
emotions.  The  temperament  commonly  denominated  sanguine 
or  choleric  is  the  same  as  our  active  species ; and  that  known 
as  the  phlegmatic,  or  melancholy,  is  the  same  as  our  passive 
one.”  1 

Bodily  constitutions,  as  affecting  the  prevailing  bias  of  the 
mind,  have  been  called  temperaments ; and  have  been  dis- 
tinguished into  the  sanguine,  the  choleric,  the  melancholic, 
and  the  phlegmatic.  To  these  has  been  added  another,  called 
the  nervous  temperament.  According  as  the  bodily  constitu- 
tion of  individuals  can  be  characterized  by  one  or  other  of 
these  epithets,  a corresponding  difference  will  be  found  in  the 
general  state  or  disposition  of  the  mind  ; and  there  will  be  a 
bias,  or  tendency  to  be  moved  by  certain  principles  of  action 
rather  than  by  others. 

Mind  is  essentially  one.  But  we  speak  of  it  as  having  a 
constitution,  and  as  containing  certain  primary  elements  ; and, 
according  as  these  elements  are  combined  and  balanced,  there 
may  be  differences  in  the  constitution  of  individual  minds, 
just  as  there  are  differences  of  bodily  temperaments ; and  these 
differences  may  give  rise  to  a disposition  or  bias,  in  the  one 
case,  more  directly  than  in  the  other.  According  as  intellect, 
or  sensitivity,  or  will,  prevails  in  any  individual  mind,  there 
will  be  a correspondent  bias  resulting. 

But,  it  is  in  reference  to  original  differences  in  the  Primary 
desires,  that  differences  of  disjwsition  are  most  observable. 
Any  desire,  when  powerful,  draws  over  the  other  tendencies 


1 Feuchtersleben,  Dietetics  of  the  Soul , 12mo,  Lon.,  1852,  p.  85. 


512 


VOCABULARY  OS’  PHILOSOPHY. 


TEMPERAMENT  — 

of  the  mind  to  its  side  ; gives  a colour  to  the  whole  character 
of  the  man,  and  manifests  its  influence  throughout  all  his 
temper  and  conduct.  His  thoughts  run  in  a particular  channel, 
without  his  being  sensible  that  they  do  so,  except  by  the 
result.  There  is  an  under-current  of  feeling,  flowing  continu- 
ally within  him,  which  only  manifests  itself  by  the  direction 
in  which  it  carries  him.  This  constitutes  his  temper.1  Dis- 
position is  the  sum  of  a man’s  desires  and  feelings. 

In  the  works  of  Galen2  is  an  essay  to  show,  Quod  animi 
mores  corporis  temperamenta  seqnuntur. 

See  also  Feuchterslebcn,  Medical  Psychology. 

TEMPERANCE  (temperaniia)  is  moderation  as  to  pleasure. 
Aristotle3  confined  it  chiefly  to  the  pleasures  of  touch,  and  of 
taste  in  a slight  degree.  Hence,  perhaps,  Popish  writers  in 
treating  of  the  vices  of  intemperance  or  luxury,  dwell  much 
on  those  connected  with  the  senses  of  touch  and  taste.  By 
Cicero  the  Latin  word  temperaniia  was  used  to  denote  the 
duty  of  self-government  in  general.  Temperaniia  est  quee  ut 
in  rebus  expetendis  aut  fugiendis  rationem  sequamur  monet. 

Temperance  was  enumerated  as  one  of  the  four  cardinal 
virtues.  It  may  be  manifested  in  the  government  and  regu- 
lation of  all  our  natural  appetites,  desires,  passions,  and  affec- 
tions, and  may  thus  give  birth  to  many  virtues,  and  restrain 
from  many  vices.  As  distinguished  from  fortitude,  it  may  be 
said  to  consist  in  guarding  against  the  temptations  to  pleasure 
and  self-indulgence ; while  fortitude  consists  in  bearing  up 
against  the  evils  and  dangers  of  human  life. 

TENDENCY  ( tendo , to  stretch  towards). — “ He  freely  moves  and 
acts  according  to  his  most  natural  tendence  and  inclination.”4 
“But  if  at  first  the  appetites  and  necessities,  and  tendencies 
of  the  body,  did  tempt  the  soul,  much  more  will  this  be  done 
when  the  body  is  miserable  and  afflicted.”5 — V.  Inclination. 

TERM  (opoj,  terminus , a limit).  — A term  is  an  act  of  appre- 


1 The  balance  of  our  animal  principles,  I think,  constitutes  what  we  call  a man’s 

natural  temper. — Reid,  Act.  row.,  essay  iii.,  part  ii.,  chap.  8. 

a Tom.  iv.,  Leips.,  1822.  a Ethic .,  lib.  iii.,  cap.  10. 

4 Scott,  Christ.  Life , pt.  i.,  c.  1. 

5 Taylor,  Of  Repent .,  c.  7,  £ 1. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


513 


TERM  — 

hension  expressed  in  language  ; also  the  subject  or  predicate 
of  a proposition.  “ I call  that  a term  into  which  a proposition 
is  resolved,  as  for  instance,  the  predicate  and  that  of  which  it 
is  predicated.”  1 

“As  lines  terminate  a plane  and  constitute  figure,  so  its 
terms  are  the  limits  of  a proposition.  A proposition  consists 
of  two  terms;  that  which  is  spoken  of  is  called  the  subject; 
that  which  is  said  of  it  the  predicate;  and  these  are  called  the 
terms  (or  extremes),  because  logically  the  subject  is  placed 
Jirst  and  the  predicate  last.  In  the  middle  is  the  copula, 
which  indicates  the  act  of  judgment,  as  by  it  the  predicate  is 
affirmed  or  denied,  of  the  subject.” — Whately.  — V.  Propo- 
sition, Svllogism. 

Term  (An  Absolute  or  Hon-Relative),  one  that  is  considered 
by  itself,  and  conveys  no  idea  of  relation  to  anything  of  which 
it  is  a part,  or  to  any  other  part  distinguished  from  it.  Ab- 
solute terms  are  also  named  non-connotative,  as  merely  denoting 
an  object  without  implying  any  attribute  of  that  object;  as 
“Paris,”  “Romulus.” 

Term  (An  Abstract)  denotes  the  quality  of  a being,  without 
regard  to  the  subject  in  which  it  is;  as  “justice,”  “wisdom.” 
Abstract  terms  are  nouns  substantive. 

Term  (A  Common),  such  as  stands  for  several  individuals, 
which  are  called  its  significates ; as  “man,”  “city.”  Such 
terms,  and  such  only  can  be  affirmatively  predicated  of  seve- 
ral others,  and  they  are  therefore  called  predicables. 

Terms  (Compatible  or  Consistent)  express  two  views  which 
can  be  taken  of  the  same  object  at  the  same  time ; as  “ white 
and  hard.” 

Term  (A  Complex)  is  & proposition  — q.  v. 

Term  (A  Concrete)  denotes  the  quality  of  a being,  and  either 
expresses,  or  must  be  referred  to,  some  subject  in  which  it  is ; 
as  “ fool,”  “ philosopher,”  “ high,”  “ wise.”  Concrete  terms 
are  usually,  but  not  always,  nouns  adjective. 

Terms  (The  Contradictory  Opposition  of)  is,  when  they  differ- 
only  in  respectively  wanting  and  having  the  particle  “not,” 
or  its  equivalent.  One  or  other  of  such  terms  is  applicable  to 
every  object. 


Arist.,  Prior.  Ancdyt lib.  i.,  cap  1. 


514 


VOCABULARY  OF  rHILOSOMIY. 


TERM- 

Terms  (Contrary)  come  both  under  some  one  class,  but  are  tlie 
most  different  of  all  that  belong  to  that  class;  as  “wise”  and 
“foolish,”  both  coming  under  the  class  of  mental  qualities. 
There  are  some  objects  to  which  neither  of  such  terms  is 
applicable  ; a stone  is  neither  wise  nor  foolish. 

Term  (A  Definite),  one  which  marks  out  an  object  or  class 
of  beings ; as  “ Caesar,”  “ corporeal.”  Positive  terms  are 
definite. 

Term  (An  Indefinite),  one  which  does  not  mark  out,  but  only 
excludes  an  object;  as,  “ not-Coesar,”  “incorporeal.”  Priva- 
tive and  negative  terms  are  called  indefinite. 

Term  (A  Negative)  denotes  that  the  positive  view  could  not  be 
taken  of  the  object;  it  affirms  the  absence  of  a thing  from 
some  subject  iu  which  it  could  not  be  present;  as,  “a  dumb 
statue”  (you  would  not  say  “a  speaking  statue”).  “A  life- 
less corpse”  (you  would  not  say  “a  living  corpse”).  The 
same  term  may  be  negative,  positive,  or  privative,  as  it  is 
viewed  with  relation  to  contrary  ideas.  Thus  “immortal”  is 
privative  or  negative  viewed  with  relation  to  death,  and  posi- 
tive viewed  with  relation  to  life. 

Terms  (Opposite)  express  two  views  which  cannot  be  taken  of 
one  single  object  at  the  same  time ; as  “white  and  black.” 

Term  (A  Positive)  denotes  a certain  view  of  an  object,  as  being 
actually  taken  of  it;  as  “speech,”  “a  man  speaking.” 

Term  (A  Privative)  denotes  that  the  positive  view  might  con- 
ceivably be  taken  of  the  object,  but  is  not;  “dumbness,”  “a 
man  silent”  (you  might  say,  “a  man  speaking”).  “An  un- 
buried corpse”  (you  might  say,  “a  buried  corpse”). 

Term  (A  Relative),  that  which  expresses  an  object  viewed  in 
relation  to  the  whole,  or  to  another  part  of  a more  complex 
object  of  thought;  as  “half”  and  “whole,”  “master  and  ser- 
vant.” Such  nouns  are  called  correlative  to  each  other ; nor 
can  one  of  them  be  mentioned  without  a notion  of  the  other 
being  raised  in  the  mind. 

Term  (A  Simple)  expresses  a completed  act  of  apprehension, 
but  no  more ; and  may  be  used  alone  either  as  the  subject 
or  predicate  of  a proposition.  “Virtue  is  its  own  reward.” 
Virtue  is  a simple  term,  and  its  own  reward  is  also  a simple 
term. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


515 


TERM  — 

Term  (A  Singular),  such  as  stands  for  an  individual;  as  “So- 
crates,” “ London,”  “ this  man,”  “ that  city.”  Such  terms 
cannot  he  predicated  affirmatively  of  anything  hut  themselves. 
But  general  terms,  as  “fowl,”  “ bird,”  may  be  truly  affirmed 
of  many. 

TERMINISTS. — V.  Nominalism. 

TESTIMONY  “ is  the  declaration  of  one  who  professes  to  know 
the  truth  of  that  which  he  affirms.” 

“ The  difficulty  is,  when  testimonies  contradict  common 
experience,  and  the  reports  of  history  and  witnesses  clash  with 
the  ordinary  course  of  nature,  or  with  one  another.”  1 

If  testimony  were  not  a source  of  evidence,  we  must  lose  all 
benefit  of  the  experience  and  observation  of  others.  Much  of 
human  knowledge  rests  on  the  authority  of  testimony. 

According  to  Dr.  Reid,2  the  validity  of  this  authority  is 
resolvable  into  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind.  He  main- 
tains that  we  have  a natural  principle  of  veracity,  which  has 
its  counterpart  in  a natural  principle  of  credulity  — that  is, 
while  we  are  naturally  disposed  to  speak  the  truth,  we  are 
naturally  disposed  to  believe  what  is  spoken  by  others. 

But,  says  Mr.  Locke,3  “ Testimony  may  be  fallacious.  He 
who  declares  a thing,  1.  May  be  mistaken,  or  imposed  upon. 
2.  He  may  be  an  impostor  and  intend  to  deceive.” 

The  evidence  of  testimony  is,  therefore,  only  probable,  and 
requires  to  be  carefully  examined. 

The  nature  of  the  thing  testified  to — whether  it  be  a matter 
of  science  or  of  common  life  — the  character  of  the  person 
testifying — whether  the  testimony  be  that  of  one  or  of  many — 
whether  it  be  given  voluntarily  or  compulsorily,  hastily  or 
deliberately,  are  some  of  the  circumstances  to  be  attended  to. 

Testimony  may  be  oral  or  written.  The  coin,  the  monu- 
ment, and  other  material  proofs  have  also  been  called  testi- 
mony. So  that  testimony  includes  tradition  and  history. 

Mr.  Hume  maintained  that  no  amount  of  testimony  can  be 
sufficient  to  establish  the  truth  of  a miracle.  See  reply  to  him 


1 Locke,  Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  book  if.,  chap.  16. 

3 Inquiry,  ch.  6,  sect.  24. 

8 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  book  iv.,  ch.  15, 16. 


51G 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


TESTIMONY  — 

by  Dr.  Adams,1  in  his  Essay  on  Miracles,  and  Dr.  Campbell  on 
Miracles,  and  Dr.  Douglas  on  Miracles. 

It  was  maintained  by  Craig,  a celebrated  English  geometri- 
cian, and  by  Petersen,  that  the  value  of  testimony  decreases 
by  the  lapse  of  time.  And  Laplace,  in  some  measure,  favoured 
this  view.  But  if  the  matter  of  fact  be  well  authenticated  in 
the  first  instance,  lapse  of  time  and  continued  belief  in  it  may 
add  to  the  validity  of  the  evidence.  — V.  Evidence. 

THEISM  (®£of,  God)  is  opposed  to  atheism.  It  is  not  absolutely 
opposed,  by  its  derivation,  to  Pantheism,  or  the  belief  that  the 
universe  is  God ; nor  to  Polytheism,  or  the  belief  that  there 
are  many  Gods ; nor  to  Ditheism,  or  the  belief  that  there  are 
two  divine  principles,  one  of  good  and  another  of  evil.  But 
usage,  penes  quern  est  arbitrium.  et  norma  loquendi,  has  re- 
stricted this  word  to  the  belief  in  one  intelligent  and  free 
spirit,  separate  from  his  works.  “To  believe  that  everything 
is  governed,  ordered,  or  regulated  for  the  best,  by  a designing 
principle  or  mind,  necessarily  good  and  permanent,  is  to  be  a 
perfect  Theist.”2 

“ These  are  they  who  are  strictly  and  properly  called  Theists, 
who  affirm  that  a perfectly  conscious,  understanding  being,  or 
mind,  existing  from  eternity,  was  the  cause  of  all  other  things ; 
and  they,  on  the  contrary,  who  derive  all  things  from  senseless 
matter,  as  the  first  original,  and  deny  that  there  is  any  con- 
scious, understanding  being,  self-existent  or  unmade,  are  those 
that  are  properly  called  Atheists.” 3 

“Though,  in  a strict  and  proper  sense,  they  be  only  Theists 
who  acknowledge  one  God  perfectly  omnipotent,  the  sole 
original  of  all  things,  and  as  well  the  cause  of  matter  as  of 
anything  else ; yet  it  seems  reasonable  that  such  consideration 
should  be  had  of  the  infirmity  of  human  understandings,  as  to 
extend  the  word  further,  that  it  may  comprehend  within  it 

1 “ Hume  told  Caddell  the  bookseller,  that  he  had  a great  desire  to  be  introduced  to 
as  many  of  the  persons  who  had  written  against  him  as  could  be  collected;  and  re- 
quested Caddell  to  bring  him  and  them  together.  Accordingly,  Dr.  Douglas,  Dr. 
Adams,  &c.,  were  invited  by  Caddell  to  dine  at  his  house  in  order  to  meet  Hume.  They 
came;  and  Dr.  Price,  who  was  of  the  party,  assured  me  that  they  were  all  delighted 
with  David.” — Rogers’s  Table  Talk. 

Shaftesbury,  Inquiry,  book  i.,  pt.  i.,  sect.  2, 

3 Cudworth,  Intell.  Syst.,  book  i.,  ch.  4,  sect.  4. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


517 


THEISM  — 

those  also  "who  assort  one  intellectual  self-existent  from  eter- 
nity, the  framer  and  governor  of  the  whole  world,  though  not 
the  creator  of  the  matter;  and  that  none  should  be  condemned 
for  absolute  Atheists  merely  because  they  hold  eternal  uncre- 
ated matter,  unless  they  also  deny  an  eternal  unmade  mind, 
ruling  over  the  matter,  and  so  make  senseless  matter  the 
sole  original  of  all  things.”  1 

Theist  and  Deist  both  signify  simply  one  who  believes  in 
God ; and  about  the  beginning  of  last  century  both  were 
employed  to  denote  one  who  believes  in  God  independently  of 
revelation.  “Averse  as  I am  to  the  cause  of  Theism  or 
name  of  Deist,  when  taken  in  a sense  exclusive  of  revelation, 
I consider  still  that,  in  strictness,  the  root  of  all  is  Theism  ; 
and  that  to  be  a settled  Christian,  it  is  necessary  to  be  first 
of  all  a good  Theist.”2  But  from  about  the  time  of  Shaftes- 
bury, the  term  Deist  has  generally  been  applied  to  such  as 
are  indifferent  or  hostile  to  the  claims  of  revelation.  Bal- 
guy’s  First  Letter  to  a Deist  was  against  Lord  Shaftesbury. 
His  Second  Letter  to  a Deist  was  against  Tindal.  All  the 
Deistical  writers  noticed  by  Leland  were  unfriendly  to  reve- 
lation. 

“ The  words  Deist  and  Theist  are,  strictly  speaking,  perhaps 
synonymous  ; but  yet  it  is  generally  to  be  observed  that  the 
former  is  used  in  a bad,  and  the  latter  in  a good  sense.  Cus- 
tom has  appropriated  the  term  Deist  to  the  enemies  of  revela- 
tion and  of  Christianity  in  particular ; while  the  word  Theist 
is  considered  applicable  to  all  who  believe  in  ono  God.”3 4 * 

“ Theistfe  generaiim  vocantur,  qui  Deum  esse  tenent,  site  rede 
sive  prave  ceeteroquin  de  Deo  sentiatit.  Deistae  vocabaniur  prce- 
sertim  sceculo  proxime  elapso  philosophi,  qui  Deum  quidem  esse 
affirmabant,  providentiam  vero,  revetationem,  miracula,  uno 
verbo,  quidquid  supernaturale  audit,  tollebant 
THEOCRACY  (®fo$,  God  ; jspavoj,  rule). — Government  under  the 
Mosaic  dispensation  is  called  theocracy. 

“It  will  easily  appear,”  says  Lowman,6  “that  the  general 


1 Cudworth,  Intcll.  Syst .,  sect.  7. 

a Shaftesbury,  The  Moralists,  part  i.,  sect.  2. 

8 Irons,  On  Final  Causes , App.,  p.  207. 

4Ubaghs,  Theodieeot  Elementa , p.  11, 

6 On  Civil  Government  of  the  Hebrews , chap.  7, 


45 


518 


VOCABULARY  OF  FIIILOSOPIIY. 


THEOCRACY  — 

union  of  the  tribes  as  one  body  may  be  conceived  after  this 
manner — that  the  congregation  of  Israel,  or  the  whole  people 
enacted  by  themselves  or  their  representatives  ; that  the  great 
council  advised,  consulted,  proposed:  that  the  judge  presided 
in  their  councils,  and  had  the  chief  hand  in  executing  what 
was  resolved  in  them ; and  that  Jehovah,  by  the  oracle,  was 
to  assent  to  and  approve  what  was  resolved,  and  authorize  the 
execution  of  it  in  matters  of  the  greatest  importance  to  the 
whole  state,  so  that  the  general  union  of  the  whole  nation 
may  not  improperly  be  thus  expressed.  It  was  by  the  com- 
mand of  the  people  and  advice  of  the  senate,  the  judge  pre- 
siding and  the  oracle  approving." 

Egypt,  down  to  a certain  period,  was  governed  by  priests 
in  the  name  of  their  gods,  and  Peru  by  Incas,  who  were 
regarded  as  the  children  of  the  sun.  Mahomet,  speaking  in 
the  name  of  God,  exercised  a theocratic  sway,  and  that  of  the 
Grand  Lama  in  Thibet  is  similar. 

“In  the  Contrat  Social  of  Rousseau,  the  sovereignty  of 
number,  of  the  numerical  majority,  is  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  the  work.  For  a long  time  he  follows  out  the  con- 
sequences of  it  with  inflexible  rigour ; a time  arrives,  how- 
ever, when  he  abandons  them,  and  abandons  them  with  great 
effect ; he  wishes  to  give  his  fundamental  laws,  his  constitu- 
tion, to  the  rising  society  ; his  high  intellect  warned  him  that 
such  a work  could  not  proceed  from  universal  suffrage,  from 
the  numerical  majority,  from  the  multitude : ‘ A God,’  said 
he,  ‘ must  give  laws  to  men.’  It  is  not  magistracy,  it  is  not 
sovereignty It  is  a particular  and  supe- 

rior function,  which  has  nothing  in  common  with  human 
empire.”  1 

The  term  theocracy  has  been  applied  to  the  power  wielded 
by  the  Pope  during  the  Middle  Ages  ; and  Count  de  Maistre, 
in  his  work  Du  Pape,  has  argued  strenuously  in  support  of 
the  supreme  power,  temporal  and  spiritual,  of  the  sovereign 
pontiff.  But  the  celibacy  of  the  Romish  priests  is  an  obstacle 
to  their  theocratical  organization.  “ Look  at  Asia,  Egypt ; all 
the  great  theocracies  are  the  work  of  a clergy,  which  is  a com- 


1 Guizot,  Hist,  of  Civilization,  vol.  i.,  p.  387.  Contrat  Social,  b.  ii.,  ch.  8. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


519 


THEOCRACY— 

plete  society  within  itself,  which  suffices  for  its  own  wants, 
and  borrows  nothing  from  without.” 1 
THEODICY  (0£oS,  God;  Sixrj,  a pleading  or  justification),  a 
vindication  of  the  ways  of  God. — This  word  was  employed  by 
Leibnitz,  who2 *  maintained  that  the  existence  of  moral  evil 
has  its  origin  in  the  free  will  of  the  creature,  while  metaphy- 
sical evil  is  nothing  but  the  limitation  which  is  involved  in 
the  essence  of  finite  beings,  and  that  out  of  this  both  physical 
and  moral  evil  naturally  flow.  But  these  finite  beings  are 
designed  to  attain  the  utmost  felicity  they  are  capable  of  en- 
joying, while  each,  as  a part,  contributes  to  the  perfection  of 
the  whole,  which,  of  the  many  worlds  that  were  possible,  is 
the  very  best.  On  this  account  it  has  been  called  the  theory 
of  optimism  — q.  v. 

In  Manuals  of  Philosophy  the  term  theodicy  is  applied  to 
that  part  which  treats  of  the  being,  perfections,  and  government 
of  God,  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 

In  the  Manuel  de  Philosophic,  a l’ usage  des  Colleges, 3 Theo- 
dicie,  which  is  written  by  Emille  Saisset,  is  called  rational 
theology,  or  the  theology  of  reason,  independent  of  revelation. 
“ It  proposes  to  establish  the  existence  of  a being  infinitely 
perfect,  and  to  determine  his  attributes  and  essential  relations 
to  the  world.”  It  treats  of  the  existence,  attributes,  and 
providence  of  God,  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul  — which 
were  formerly  included  under  metaphysics. 

According  to  Kant,  the  objections  which  a theodicy  should 
meet  are : 1.  The  existence  of  moral  evil,  as  contrary  to  the 
holiness  of  God.  2.  Of  physical  evil,  as  contrary  to  his  good- 
ness. 3.  The  disproportion  between  the  crimes  and  the  pun- 
ishments of  this  life  as  repugnant  to  his  justice.  He  approves 
of  the  vindication  adopted  by  Job  against  bis  friends,  founded 
on  our  imperfect  knowledge  of  God’s  ways. 

“"When  the  Jewish  mind  began  to  philosophize,  and  endea- 
voured to  produce  dialectic  proofs,  its  theodicean  philosophy, 
or  justif  cation  of  God,  stopped,  in  the  book  of  Job,  at  the 
avowal  of  the  incomprehensibility  of  the  destinies  of  mankind.”  4 

1 Guizot,  Hist,  of  Ci cilization,  vol.  i.,  p.  182. 

2 In  his  Essais  de  Theodicee , sur  la  bonle  de  Dicu , la  liberty  de  Vliomme  et  Vorigine  du 

malt  published  in  1710. 

* 8 vo,  Paris,  184(5, 


4 Bunsen,  Hippolytus , vol.  ii.,  p.  7. 


520 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


THEODICY  — 

Butler,  Analogy,  part  i.,  eh.  7,  treats  of  the  government  of 
God ; considered  as  a scheme  or  constitution  imperfectly  com- 
prehended, part  ii.,  ch.  4. 

THEOGONY  (0eo{,  God ; yovrj,  generation)  is  that  part  of  Pagan 
theology  which  treats  of  the  genealogy  and  filiation  of  their 
deities.  It  is  the  title  of  a celebrated  Greek  poem  by  Ilesiod, 
which  has  been  commented  on  by  M.  J.  D.  Guigniaut.1  The 
Works  and  Days,  and  Theogony  of  Hesiod  were  translated 
from  the  Greek,  with  remarks  by  Thomas  Cooke.2 

THEOLOGY  (©to?,  God;  \6yos,  discourse).  — “ Theology , what 
is  it  but  the  science  of  things  divine  ? What  science  can  be 
attained  unto  without  the  help  of  natural  discourse  and  rea- 
son?”3 

“ I mean  theology,  which,  containing  the  knowledge  of  God 
and  his  creatures,  our  duty  to  Him  and  to  our  fellow-creatures, 
and  a view  of  our  present  and  future  state,  is  the  comprehen- 
sion of  all  other  knowledge  directed  to  its  true  end,  i.  e.,  the 
honour  and  veneration  of  the  Creator,  and  the  happiness  of 
mankind.  This  is  that  noble  study  which  is  every  man’s  duty, 
and  every  one  that  is  a rational  creature  is  capable  of.”4 

The  word  theology  as  now  used,  without  any  qualifying 
epithet,  denotes  that  knowledge  of  God  and  of  our  duty  to 
him  which  we  derive  from  express  revelation.  In  this  re- 
stricted sense  it  is  opposed  to  philosophy,  and  is  divided  into 
speculative  or  dogmatic — and  moral  or  practical,  according  as 
it  is  occupied  with  the  doctrines  or  the  precepts  which  have 
been  revealed  for  our  belief  and  guidance.  But  the  Greeks 
gave  the  name  of  ( dtoXoyot, ) to  those  who,  like  Hesiod  and 
Orpheus,  with  no  higher  inspiration  than  that  of  the  poet, 
sang  of  the  nature  of  the  gods  and  the  origin  of  all  things. 
Aristotle5  said  that  of  the  three  speculative  sciences,  physics, 
mathematics,  and  theology — the  last  was  the  highest,  as  treat- 
ing of  the  most  elevated  of  beings.  Among  the  Romans, 
from  the  time  of  Numa  Pompilius  to  that  of  the  emperors, 
the  knowledge  and  worship  of  the  gods  was  made  subservient 


1 De  la  Theogome  d'TUsiode,  Paris,  1835. 

a 2 vols.,  4to,  Lorn!.,  1728.  :i  Hooker,  Lccles.  Pol.,  b.  iii.,  sect.  8. 

4 Lo<'ke,  On  the  Cond.  of  the  Understand.,  sect.  22. 

8 Metaphys. , lib.  xi.,  ch.  G. 


VOCABULARY  OR  PHILOSOPHY. 


521 


THEOLOGY  — 

to  the  interests  of  the  state.  So  that,  according  to  Augustin,1 
there  were  three  kinds  of  theology — the  poetical , or  that  of  the 
poets — the  physical,  or  that  of  the  philosophers — and  the  po- 
litical, or  that  of  the  legislator. 

Among  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  there  being  no  divine 
revelation,  the  distinction  between  faith  and  reason  was  not 
taken.  Christians  were  long  unwilling  to  admit  that  any  satis- 
factory knowledge  of  God  and  his  attributes,  and  of  the 
relations  between  Him  and  his  creatures,  could  be  had  inde- 
pendently of  revelation.  And  it  was  not  till  after  Descartes 
that  the  distinction  of  theology,  as  natural,  and  positive  or 
revealed,  was  commonly  taken.  The  distinction  is  rather 
obscured  in  the  Essais  de  Theodicee  of  Leibnitz,  but  clearly 
expressed  by  Wolf  in  the  title  of  his  work,  Theologia  Natu- 
ralis  Methodo  Scientrftca  Pertractata.2  He  thinks  it  is  demon- 
strative, and  calls  it3  “The  science  which  has  for  its  object 
the  existence  of  God  and  his  attributes,  and  the  consequences 
of  these  attributes  in  relation  to  other  beings,  with  the  refu- 
tation of  all  errors  contrary  to  the  true  idea  of  God  ; in  short, 
all  that  is  now  commonly  included  under  natural  theology  or 
theodicy,  or  both. 

Natural  Theology. — This  phrase  has  been  very  commonly  em- 
ployed, but  it  has  been  challenged. 

“ The  name  natural  theology,  which  ever  and  anon  we  still 
hear  applied  to  the  philosophical  cognition  of  the  Divine 
Being  and  his  existence,  ought  carefully  to  be  avoided.  Such 
a designation  is  based  on  a thorough  misconception  and  total 
inversion  of  ideas.  Every  system  of  theology  that  is  not  super- 
natural, or  at  least  that  does  not  profess  to  be  so,  but  pre- 
tends to  understand  naturally  the  idea  of  God,  and  regards  the 
knowledge  of  the  divine  essence  as  a branch  of  natural  science, 
or  derives  the  idea  simply  from  nature,  is  even  on  that  account 
false.  Missing  and  entirely  mistaking  its  proper  object,  it 
must,  in  short,  prove  absolutely  null  and  void.  Properly, 
indeed,  this  inquiry  needs  no  peculiar  word,  nor  special  divi- 
sion, and  scientific  designation.  The  name  generally  of  phi- 
losophy, or  specially  of  a philosophy  of  God,  is  perfectly 


1 De  Civitate,  lib.  vi.,  c.  1. 

s 2 vols.,  4to,  Frankfort  and  Leipzig*,  1736-37. 


3 Prolegom.y  sect.  4. 


522 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


THEOLOGY  — 

sufficient  to  designate  the  investigation  into  science  and  faith, 
and  their  reciprocal  relation  — their  abiding  discord,  or  its 
harmonious  reconciliation  and  intrinsic  concord."  1 

In  Coleridge's  Aids  to  Reflection,  natural  is  opposed  to 
spiritual,  as  sensuous  to  super-sensuous  or  super-natural. 

This  objection  might  be  obviated  by  calling  that  knowledge 
of  God  and  of  his  attributes  and  administration  which  the 
light  of  reason  furnishes,  rational  theology.  But  this  phrase 
has  been  of  late  years  employed  in  a different  sense,  especially 
in  Germany.  Natural  theology  confines  itself  exclusively  to 
that  knowledge  of  God  which  the  light  of  nature  furnishes, 
and  does  not  intermeddle  with  the  discoveries  or  the  doctrines 
of  positive  or  revealed  theology.  It  prosecutes  its  inquiries  by 
the  unassisted  strength  of  reason  within  its  own  sphere.  But 
rational  theology  carries  the  torch  or  light  of  reason  into  the 
domain  of  revelation.  It  criticises  and  compares  texts — ana- 
lyzes doctrines — examines  traditions  — and  brings  all  the  in- 
struments of  philosophy  to  bear  upon  things  divine  and  spi- 
ritual, in  order  to  reduce  them  to  harmony  with  things  human 
and  rational. — V.  Rationalism. 

THEOPATHY  (®fo$,  Deity  ; 7td0o;,  suffering  or  feeling). — A word 
used  by  Dr.  Hartley  as  synonymous  with  piety,  or  a sense  of 
Deity. 

THEORY  (Oiupla,  contemplation,  speculation).  — Theory  and 
theoretical  are  properly  opposed  to  practice  and  practical. 
Theory  is  mere  knowledge ; practice  is  the  application  of  it. 
Though  distinct  they  are  dependent,  and  there  is  no  opposi- 
tion between  them.  Theory  is  the  knowledge  of  the  principles 
by  which  practice  accomplishes  its  end.  Hypothetical  and 
theoretical  are  sometimes  used  as  synonymous  with  conjectu- 
ral. But  this  is  unphilosophical  in  so  far  as  theoretical  is  con- 
cerned. Theory  always  implies  knowledge  — knowledge  of  a 
thing  in  its  principles  or  causes. 

“ Theory  is  a general  collection  of  the  inferences  drawn  from 
facts  and  compressed  into  principles." 2 

“With  Plato,  6noptlr  is  applied  to  a deep  contemplation  of 


1 Schlcgel,  Philosoph.  of  Life , &c.,  Bolin’s  edit.,  p.  194. 

2 Parr,  Sequel  to  a Printed  Paper , 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


523 


THEORY— 

the  truth.  By  Aristotle  it  is  always  opposed  to  rtpai-tsiv,  and 
to  rtoiHv,  so  that  he  makes  philosophy  theoretical, practical,  and 
artistical.  The  Latins  and  Boethius  rendered  8iu>piiv  by  specu- 
lari.  With  us  it  means  a learned  discourse  of  philosophers 
of  speculative  use."1 

“ Theory  denotes  the  most  general  laws  to  which  certain 
facts  can  he  reduced.”  — Mackintosh;2  and3  the  distinctions' 
between  hypothesis  and  theory  are  thus  stated : — 

1.  The  principles  employed  in  the  explanation  (of  the  phe- 
nomena) should  be  known  really  to  exist ; in  which  consists 
the  main  distinction  between  hypothesis  and  theory.  Gravity 
is  a principle  universally  known  to  exist ; ether  and  a nervous 
fluid  are  mere  suppositions.  2.  These  principles  should  be 
known  to  produce  effects  like  those  which  are  ascribed  to  them 
in  the  theory.  This  is  a further  distinction  between  hypothesis 
and  theory ; for  there  are  an  infinite  number  of  degrees  of 
likeness,  from  the  faint  resemblances  which  have  led  some  to 
fancy  that  the  functions  of  the  nerves  depend  on  electricity,  to 
the  remarkable  coincidences  between  the  appearances  of  pro- 
jectiles on  earth,  and  the  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies, 
which  constitute  the  Newtonian  system ; a theory  now  perfect, 
though  exclusively  founded  on  analogy,  and  in  which  one  of 
the  classes  of  phenomena  brought  together  by  it  is  not  the 
subject  of  direct  experience.  3.  It  should  correspond,  if  not 
with  all  the  facts  to  be  explained,  at  least  with  so  great  a 
majority  of  them  as  to  render  it  highly  probable  that  means 
will  in  time  be  found  of  reconciling  it  to  all.  It  is  only  on 
this  ground  that  the  Newtonian  system  justly  claimed  the  title 
of  a legitimate  theory  during  that  long  period  when  it  was 
unable  to  explain  many  celestial  appearances,  before  the 
labours  of  a century  and  the  genius  of  Laplace  at  length  com- 
pleted the  theory,  by  adapting  it  to  all  the  phenomena.  A 
theory  may  be  just  before  it  is  complete. 

“ Theory  and  hypothesis  may  be  distinguished  thus:  a hypo- 
thesis is  a guess  or  supposition,  made  concerning  the  cause  of 
some  particular  fact,  with  the  view  of  trying  experiments  or 
making  observations  to  discover  the  truth.  A theory  is  a com- 


1 Trendelenburg,  Elementa  Log.  Arist p.  76. 

a Prtl.  Digs.,  p.  61,  Whewell’s  edit. 


At  p.  367. 


524 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


THEORY— 

plete  system  of  suppositions  put  together  for  the  purpose  of 
explaining  all  the  facts  that  belong  to  some  one  science.  For 
example  — astronomers  have  suggested  many  hypotheses,  in 
order  to  account  for  the  luminous  stream  -which  follows  comets. 
They  have  also  formed  many  theories  of  the  heavens ; or  in 
other  words,  complete  explanations  of  all  the  appearances  of 
the  heavenly  bodies  and  their  movements.  When  a theory  has 
been  generally  received  by  men  of  science,  it  is  called  a system  ; 
as  the  Ptolemaic  system;  the  Copernican  system;  the  New- 
tonian system.”  1 

See  a paper  on  Theory  in  Blackwood’s  Mag.  for  August, 
1830.  — V.  Hypothesis. 

THEOSOPHISM  or  THEOSOPHY  (0toS,  God;  00 *i»,  know- 
ledge). 

“ The  Theosophists,  neither  contented  with  the  natural  light 
of  human  reason,  nor  with  the  simple  doctrines  of  Scripture 
understood  in  their  literal  sense,  have  recourse  to  an  internal 
supernatural  light  superior  to  all  other  illuminations,  from 
which  they  profess  to  derive  a mysterious  and  divine  philoso- 
sophy  manifested  only  to  the  chosen  favourites  of  heaven.” 2 

See  Tholuck  (F.  A.  D.),  Theosophia  Persarum  Pant.heistica.3 

Theosophia  seems  at  one  time  to  have  been  used  as  synony- 
mous with  theologia.  Thus  in  John  Major’s  Commentary  on 
the  First  Book  of  the  Sentences,  published  in  1510,  Mr.  David 
Cranston  is  styled  In  Sacra  Theosophia  Baccalaureus. 

The  theosophists  are  a school  of  philosophers  who  would 
mix  enthusiasm  with  observation,  alchemy  with  theology, 
metaphysics  with  medicine,  and  clothe  the  whole  with  a form 
of  mystery  and  inspiration.  It  began  with  Paracelsus  at  the 
opening  of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  has  survived  in  Saint 
Martin  to  the  end  of  the  eighteenth.  Paracelsus,  Jacob 
Boehm,  and  Saint  Martin,  may  be  called  popular,  while  Cor- 
nelius Agrippa,  Valentine  Weigelius,  Robert  Fludd,  and  Van 
Helmont,  are  more  philosophical  in  their  doctrines.  The  Rev. 
Will.  Law  was  also  a theosopliist.  But  they  all  hold  different 
doctrines  ; so  that  they  cannot  be  reduced  to  a system. 


1 Taylor,  Elements  of  Thought . 

s Enfield,  Hist,  of  Phil.,  vol.  ii. 

3 8vo,  Berlin,  1821.  App.  1838. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


525 


THEGSOPHXSM  — 

“ The  thcosophist  is  one  who  gives  you  a theory  of  God,  or 
of  the  works  of  God,  which  has  not  reason,  but  an  inspiration 
of  his  own  for  its  basis.”  1 

“Both  the  politics  and  the  theosophy  of  Coleridge  were  at 
the  mercy  of  a discursive  genius,  intellectually  bold,  educa- 
tionally timid,  which,  anxious,  or  rather  willing,  to  bring 
conviction  and  speculation  together,  mooting  all  points  as  it 
went,  and  throwing  the  subtlest  glancing  lights  on  many, 
ended  in  satisfying  nobody,  and  concluding  nothing.”2 
THESIS  (fltffij,  from  tlQryxi,  to  lay  down)  is  a position  or  propo- 
sition, the  truth  of  which  is  not  plain  from  the  terms,  but 
requires  evidence,  or  explanation,  or  proof.  In  the  schools  it 
was  especially  applied  to  those  propositions  in  theology,  philo- 
sophy, law,  and  medicine,  which  the  candidates  for  degrees 
were  required  to  defend. 

THOUGHT  AND  THINKING  “ are  used  in  a more,  and  in  a 
less  restricted  signification.  In  the  former  meaning  they  are 
limited  to  the  discursive  energies  alone;  in  the  latter,  they  are 
co-extensive  with  consciousness.”3 

Thinking  is  employed  by  Sir  Will.  Hamilton4 *  as  compre- 
hending all  our  cognitive  energies. 

By  Descartes,6  cogitatio,  penstie,  is  used  to  denote  or  com- 
prehend “all  that  in  us  of  which  we  are  immediately  con- 
scious. Thus  all  the  operations  of  the  will,  of  the  imagination 
and  senses,  are  thoughts.”  Again,  in  reply  to  the  question, 
What  is  a thing  which  thinks  ? he  says,6  “ It  is  a thing  which 
doubts,  understands,  conceives,  affirms,  desires,  wills,  and 
does  not  will,  which  imagines,  also,  and  feels.” 

“ Though  thinking  be  supposed  ever  so  much  the  proper 
action  of  the  soul,  yet  it  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  that  it 
should  be  always  thinking,  always  in  action.”7 

“ Thought  proper,  as  distinguished  from  other  facts  of  con- 


1 Vaughan,  Hours  with  Mystics , vol.  i.,  p.  45. 

0 Hunt,  Imagination  and  Fancy , 12mo,  1844,  p.  276. 

3 Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Feid's  Works,  p.  222,  note. 

4 Discussions , &c.,  Append,  i.,  p.  578. 

6 Fesp.  ad  Sec.  Obj.,  p.  85,  Ed.,  1G63. 

0 Medit.  ii.,  p.  11. 

1 Locke,  Fssay  on  Hum.  Understand.,  book  ii.,  ch.  1. 


526 


VOCABULARY  OF  miLOSOPHY. 


THOUGHT— 

sciousness,  may  be  adequately  described  as  the  act  of  knowing 
or  judging  of  things  by  means  of  concepts.”  ' — V.  Train  op 
Thought. 

TIME  ( tern  pus ) . — Continuation  of  existence  is  duration ; duration 
unlimited  is  eternity  ; duration  limited  is  time. 

By  Aristotle,  time  was  defined  to  be  “ tlie  measure  of  mo- 
tion, secundum  prius  et  posterius.  We  get  the  idea  of  time  on 
the  occasion  when  we  observe  first  and  last,  that  is  succession. 
Duration  without  succession  would  be  timeless,  immeasurable. 
But  how  are  we  to  fix  what  is  first  and  last  in  the  motion  of 
any  body  ? By  men  in  all  ages  the  motions  of  the  heavenly 
bodies  have  been  made  the  measure  of  duration.  So  that  the 
full  definition  of  time  is  — ‘It  is  the  measure  of  the  duration 
of  things  that  exist  in  succession,  by  the  motion  of  the  hea- 
venly bodies.’  ”1 2 

“As  our  conception  of  space  originates  in  that  of  body,  and 
our  conception  of  motion  in  that  of  space,  so  our  conception 
of  time  originates  in  that  of  motion ; and  particularly  in  those 
regular  and  equable  motions  carried  on  in  the  heavens,  the 
parts  of  which,  from  their  perfect  similarity  to  each  other,  are 
correct  measures  of  the  continuous  and  successive  quantity 
called  time,  with  which  they  are  conceived  to  co-exist.  Time, 
therefore,  may  be  defined  the  perceived  number  of  successive 
movements ; for  as  number  ascertains  the  greater  or  lesser 
quantity  of  things  numbered,  so  time  ascertains  the  greater 
or  lesser  quantity  of  motion  performed.”  3 

According  to  Mr.  Locke,4  “Reflection  upon  the  train  of  ideas, 
which  appear  one  after  another  in  our  minds,  is  that  which 
furnishes  us  with  the  idea  of  succession ; and  the  distance 
between  any  two  parts  of  that  succession,  is  that  we  call  du- 
ration.” Now  by  attending  to  the  train  of  ideas  in  our  minds 
we  may  have  the  idea  of  succession — but  this  presupposes  the 
idea  of  duration  in  which  the  succession  takes  place.  “We 
may  measure  duration  by  the  succession  of  thoughts  in  the 
mind,  as  we  measure  length  by  inches  or  feet,  but  the  notion 


1 Mansel,  Prolegom.  Log.,  p.  22. 

a Monboddo,  Ancient  Mdapliys.,  book  iv.,  chap.  1. 

* Gillies,  Analysis  of  Aristotle , chap.  2. 

4 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand book  ii.,  ebap.  14. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


527 


TIME  — 

or  idea  of  duration  must  be  antecedent  to  the  mensuration  of 
it,  as  the  notion  of  length  is  antecedent  to  its  being  mea- 
sured.’'1 

See  also  Cousin  (On  Locke)  Coursde  Philosoph.  ;2  Stewart, 
Phil.  Essays  ;3  see  also  the  Fragments  of  Royer  Collard.4 

Dr.  Reid* 6 *  says,  “ I know  of  no  ideas  or  notions  that  have  a 
better  claim  to  be  accounted  simple  and  original  than  those 

of  space  and  time The  sense  of  seeing,  by  itself, 

gives  us  the  conception  and  belief  of  only  two  dimensions  of 
extension,  but  the  sense  of  touch  discovers  three  ; and  reason, 
from  the  contemplation  of  finite  extended  things,  leads  ns  neces- 
sarily to  the  belief  of  an  immensity  that  contains  them. 

“ In  like  manner,  memory  gives  us  the  conception  and 
belief  of  finite  intervals  of  duration.  From  the  contemplation 
of  these,  reason  leads  us  necessarily  to  the  belief  of  an  eternity 
which  comprehends  all  things  that  have  a beginning  and  an 
end.”  In  another  passage  of  the  same  essay,6  he  says,  “We 
are  at  a loss  to  what  category  or  class  of  things  we  ought  to 
refer  them.  They  are  not  beings,  but  rather  the  receptacles 
of  every  created  being,  without  which  it  could  not  have  had 
the  possibility  of  existence.  Philosophers  have  endeavoured 
to  reduce  all  the  objects  of  human  thought  to  these  three 
classes,  of  substances,  modes,  and  relations.  To  which  of 
them  shall  we  refer  time,  space,  and  number,  the  most  common 
objects  of  thought?” 

In  the  philosophy  of  Kant,  “ Time  is  a necessary  repre- 
sentation which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  intuition.  Time 
is  given,  a priori  — it  is  the  form  of  the  internal  sense,  and 
the  formal  condition,  a.  priori,  of  phenomena  in  general. 
Hence  it  will  be  seen  that  all  intuition  is  nothing  but  the  re- 
presentation of  phenomena;  that  the  things  we  see  or  en- 
visage are  not  in  themselves  what  they  are  taken  for ; that  if 
we  did  away  with  ourselves,  that  is  to  say,  the  subject  or  sub- 
jective quality  of  our  senses  in  general,  every  quality  that  we 
discover  in  time  and  space,  and  even  time  and  space  them- 
selves, would  disappear.  What  objects  maybe  in  themselves, 

1 Reid,  lntell.  Pow.,  essay  ii.,  chap.  5. 

0 Le5ons,  17, 18.  8 Essay  ii.,  ch.  2. 

4 At  the  end  of  tom.  iv.  of  CEuvres  de  Reid. 

8 Ut  supra.  6 Chap.  3. 


528 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


TIME  — 

separated  from  tlie  receptivity  of  our  sensibility,  is  quite  un- 
known to  us.”  1 

“ One  of  the  commonest  errors  is  to  regard  time  as  an  agent. 
But  in  reality,  time  does  nothing,  and  is  nothing.  We  use  it 
as  a compendious  expression  for  all  those  causes  which  ope- 
rate slowly  and  imperceptibly  ; but  unless  some  positive  cause 
is  in  action,  no  change  takes  place  in  the  lapse  of  1,000  years: 
e.  g.,  a drop  of  water  encased  in  a cavity  of  silex.”2 — V. 
Space. 

TOPOLOGY. — V.  Mejioria  Teciinica. 

TRADITION  ( trado , to  hand  down)  “ is  any  way  of  delivering 
a thing  or  word  to  another.”  — Bp.  Taylor.3  ‘‘Tradition  is 
the  Mercury  (messenger)  of  the  human  race.” — Tiberghien.4 

“Tradition!  oh  tradition!  thou  of  the  seraph  tongue, 

The  ark  that  links  two  ages,  the  ancient  and  the  young.” 

Adam  Mickiewiiz. 

Nescire  quid  antea  quam  natus  sis  accident,  id  est  semper 
esse  pucrum .5 

When  we  believe  the  testimony  of  others  not  given  by  them- 
selves directly,  but  by  others,  this  is  tradition.  It  is  testimony 
not  written  by  the  witness,  nor  dictated  by  him  to  be  written, 
but  handed  down  memoriter,  from  generation  to  generation. 

“ Aocording  to  the  principle  of  tradition  (as  the  ground  of 
certainty),  it  is  supposed  that  God  himself  first  imparted  truth 
to  the  world,  pure  and  unmixed  from  heaven.  In  the  para- 
disiacal state,  and  during  the  whole  period  from  the  first  man 
down  to  the  Christian  era,  it  is  said  by  these  philosophers 
there  was  a channel  of  divine  communication  almost  perpe- 
tually open  between  the  mind  of  man  and  God.  Here  accord- 
ingly, it  is  thought  we  lay  hold  upon  a kind  of  truth  which 
is  not  subject  to  the  infirmity  of  human  reason,  and  which 
coming  down  to  us  by  verbal  or  documental  tradition  from 
the  mind  of  Deity  itself,  affords  us  at  once  a solid  basis  for 
all  truth,  and  a final  appeal  against  all  error.”6 

1 Analysis  of  Kant's  Criticism  of  Pure  Reason.  By  the  Translator,  8vo,  Lond., 

1844,  p.  10. 

« Coplcstone,  Remains,  p.  323.  3 Dissuasive  from  Popery. 

4 Essai  des  Connaiss.  Humaines,  p.  50.  ‘ Cicero,  Orator.,  cap.  14. 

0 Morell,  Philosoph.  Tender.,  p.  17. 


VOCABULARY'  OF  MILOSOPHY. 


529 


TRADITION  — 


See  Molitor  (-J.  F.),  Philosophic  de  la  tradition.1 

On  the  necessity  of  Tradition,  see  Irenceus ? 

TRAIN  OF  THOUGHT.  — “The  subject  of  the  association  of 
ideas,"  says  Mr.  Stewart,* 3  “naturally  divides  itself  into  two 
parts.  The  first  relates  to  the  influence  of  association  in  re- 
gulating the  succession  of  our  thoughts  ; the  second,  to  its  in- 
fluence on  the  intellectual  powers,  and  on  the  moral  character, 
by  the  more  indissoluble  combinations  which  it  leads  us  to 
form  in  infancy  and  early  youth.” — V.  Combination  of 
Ideas. 

"While  we  are  awake  a constant  succession  of  thoughts  is 
passing  through  the  mind.  Hobbes  calls  it  the  con-seqnence 
or  train  of  imaginations,  the  train  of  thoughts* and  mental  dis- 
course. lie  says  it  is  of  two  sorts.  The  first  is  unguided, 
without  design,  and  inconstant.  The  second  is  more  constant, 
as  being  regulated  by  some  desire  and  design.  That  is,  it  is 
spontaneous  or  intentional. 

In  the  Train  of  Thought,  or  the  succession  of  the  various 
modes  of  consciousness,  it  has  been  observed  that  they  succeed 
in  some  kind  of  order.  “Not  every  thought  to  every  thought 
succeeds  indifferently,”  says  Hobbes.  And  it  has  long  been 
matter  of  inquiry  among  philosophers  to  detect  the  law  or 
laws  according  to  which  the  train  or  succession  of  thought  is 
determined. 

According  to  Aristotle,  the  consecution  of  thoughts  is  either 
necessary  or  habitual.  By  the  necessary  consecution  of  thoughts, 
it  is  probable  that  he  meant  that  connection  or  dependence 
subsisting  between  notions,  one  of  which  cannot  be  thought 
without  our  thinking  the  other ; as  cause  and  effect,  means 
and  end,  quality  and  substance,  body  and  space.  This  conse- 
cution or  connection  of  thoughts  admits  of  no  further  expla- 
nation, than  to  say,  that  such  is  the  constitution  of  the  human 
mind. 

The  habitual  consecution  of  thoughts  differs  in  different  in- 
dividuals : but  the  general  laws,  according  to  which  it  is  regu- 
lated, are  chiefly  three,  viz.: — The  law  of  similars,  the  law 
of  contraries,  and  the  law  of  co-adjacents.  From  the  time  of 


1 Svo,  Paris,  1S37.  3 1.,  10. 

3 Elements , vol.  i.,  chap.  5. 

2k 


46 


530 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


TRAIN  OF  THOUGHT  - 

Aristotle,  these  laws  have  been  noticed  and  illustrated  by  all 
writers  on  the  subject.  But  it  has  been  thought  that  these 
may  be  reduced  to  one  supreme  aud  universal  law ; and  Sir 
James  Mackintosh'  expresses  his  surprise  that  Dr.  Brown 
should  have  spoken  of  this  as  a discovery  of  his  own,  when 
the  same  thing  had  been  hinted  by  Aristotle,  distinctly  laid 
down  by  Hobbes,  and  fully  unfolded  both  by  Hartley  and 
Condillac. 

The  brief  and  obscure  text  of  Aristotle,  in  his  Treatise  on 
Memory  and  Reminiscence,  has  been  explained  as  containing 
the  universal  law  as  to  the  consecution  of  thoughts.2  It  is 
proposed  to  call  this  the  law  of  Redintegration.  “ Thoughts 
which  have,  at  any  time,  recent  or  remote,  stood  to  each  other 
in  the  relation  of  co-existence  or  immediate  consecution,  do, 
when  severally  reproduced,  tend  to  reproduce  each  other.” 
In  other  words,  “The  parts  of  any  total  thought,  when  sub- 
sequently called  into  consciousness,  are  apt  to  suggest,  imme- 
diately, the  parts  to  which  they  were  proximately  related,  and 
mediately,  the  whole  of  which  they  were  constituent.” 
Hobbes,  Leviathan ;3  Human  Nat.;*  Reid,  Intell.  Row.6 
TRANSCENDENT,  TRANSCENDENTAL  {fransccndo,  to  go 
beyond,  to  surpass,  to  be  supreme). 

“ To  be  impenetrable,  discerptible,  and  unactive,  is  the 
nature  of  all  body  and  matter,  as  such ; and  the  properties 
of  a spirit  are  the  direct  contrary,  to  be  penetrable,  indis- 
cerptible,  and  self-motive ; yea,  so  different  they  are  in  all 
things,  that  they  seem  to  have  nothing  but  being  and  the 
transcendental  attributes  of  that  in  common.”6 

Transcendental  is  that  which  is  above  the  prsedicamental. 
Being  is  transcendental.  The  prcedicamental  is  what  belongs 
to  a certain  category  of  being ; as  the  ten  samma  genera.  As 
being  cannot  be  included  under  any  genus,  but  transcends  them 
all,  so  the  properties  or  affections  of  being  have  also  been 
called  transcendental.  The  three  properties  of  being  commonly 
enumerated  are  unnm,  verum,  and  bonum.  To  these  some  add 


1 Dissert.,  p.  348,  Edit.  TVhewell. 

a Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works,  p.  897. 

8 Part  i.,  chap.  3.  4 * P.  17. 

6 Glanvill,  Essay  i. 


8 Essay  iv. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


531 


TRANSCENDENT  — 

aliquid  and  res:  and  these,  with  ens,  make  the  sis  iranscen- 
dentals.  But  res  and  aliquid  mean  only  the  same  as  ens.  The 
first  three  are  properly  called  transcendenials,  as  these  only 
are  passions  or  affections  of  being,  as  being.  — V.  Unity, 
Truth,  Good. 

“In  the  schools,  transcendentalis  and  transcendens  were 
convertible  expressions  employed  to  mark  a term  or  notion 
which  transcended,  that  is,  which  rose  above,  and  thus  con- 
tained under  it,  the  categories  or  summa  genera  of  Aristotle. 
Such,  for  example,  is  being,  of  which  the  ten  categories  are 
only  subdivisions.  Kant,  according  to  his  wont,  twisted  these 
old  terms  into  a new  signification.  First  of  all,  he  distin- 
guished them  from  each  other.  Transcendent  ( transcendens ) 
he  employed  to  denote  what  is  wholly  beyond  experience, 
being  neither  given  as  an  a posteriori  nor  a priori  element 
of  cognition  — what  therefore  transcends  every_  category  of 
thought.  Transcendental  ( transcendentalis ) he  applied  to  sig- 
nify the  d priori  or  necessary  cognitions  which,  though  mani- 
fested in,  as  affording  the  conditions  of,  experience,  transcend 
the  sphere  of  that  contingent  or  adventitious  knowledge  which 
we  acquire  by  experience.  Transcendental  is  not  therefore 
what  transcends,  but  what  in  fact  constitutes  a category  of 
thought.  This  term,  though  probably  from  another  quarter, 
has  found  favour  with  Mr.  Stewart,  who  proposes  to  exchange 
the  expression  principles  of  common  sense,  for,  among  other 
names,  that  of  transcendental  truths.”  1 

In  the  philosophy  of  Kant  all  those  principles  of  knowledge 
which  are  original  and  primary,  and  which  are  determined  d 
priori  are  called  transcendental.  They  involve  necessary  and 
universal  truths,  and  thus  transcend  all  truth  derived  from 
experience  which  must  always  be  contingent  and  particular. 
The  principles  of  knowledge,  which  are  pure  and  transcen- 
dental, form  the  ground  of  all  knowledge  that  is  empirical  or 
determined  d posteriori.  In  this  sense  transcendental  is  op- 
posed to  empirical. 

“ There  is  a philosophic  (and  inasmuch  as  it  is  actualized  by 
an  effort  of  freedom,  an  artificial ) conscioustiess  which  lies 
beneath,  or  (as  it  were)  behind  the  spontaneous  consciousness 


* Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works,  note  A,  sect.  5. 


532 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOF1IY. 


TRANSCENDENT  — 

natural  to  all  reflecting  beings.  As  the  elder  Romans  distin- 
guished their  northern  provinces  into  Cis-Alpine  and  Trans- 
Alpine,  so  may  we  divide  all  the  objects  of  human  knowledge 
into  those  on  this  side,  and  those  on  the  other  side  of  the 
spontaneous  consciousness;  citra  et  t ran s conscieniiam  commu- 
nem.  The  latter  is  exclusively  the  domain  of  pure  philosophy, 
which  is,  therefore,  properly  entitled  transcendental  in  order 
to  discriminate  it  at  once,  both  from  mere  reflection  and 
representation  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  from  those 
flights  of  lawless  speculation,  which,  abandoned  by  dll  dis- 
tinct consciousness,  because  transgressing  the  bounds  and 
purposes  of  our  intellectual  faculties,  are  justly  condemned  as 
transcendent.”  1 

Transcendent  is  opposed  to  immanent  — q.  v. 

Transcendental  is  opposed  to  empirical  — q.  v. 
TRANSFERENCE  and  TRANSLATION  are  terms  employed 
by  the  author  of  the  Light  of  Nature  Pursued,  to  denote  the 
fact  that  our  desires  are  often  transferred  from  primary  objects 
to  those  which  are  secondary  or  subservient ; as  from  the 
desire  of  greatness  or  honour  may  arise,  in  a secondary  way, 
the  desire  of  wealth  as  a means  of  greatness  or  power.2 — V. 
Desire. 

TRAN SMXGRATION.  — V.  Metempsychosis. 
TRANSPOSITION.  — F.  Conversion. 

TRIVIUM  . — The  seven  Liberal  Arts  were  Grammar,  Rhetoric, 
Logic,  Arithmetic,  Geometry,  Astronomy,  and  Music. 

Lingua,  Tropus,  Ratio,  Numerus,  Tonus,  Angulus,  Astra. 
Grammar,  Logic,  and  Rhetoric,  constituted  the  Tritium — ires 
vice  in  unum,  because  they  all  refer  to  words  or  language. 
Arithmetic,  Geometry,  Music,  and  Astronomy,  constituted  the 
Quadrivium  — quatuor  vice  in  unum,  because  they  all  refer  to 
quantity. 

‘‘Gramm,  loquitur,  Bia.  verba  docet,  Rhet.  verba  colorat; 

Mus.  canit.,  Ar.  numerat,  Geo.  ponderat,  Ast.  colit  astra.” 

The  Mechanical  Arts  were  Rus,  Nemus,  Arma,  Faber,  Vul- 
nera,  Lana,  Rates ; or,  Agriculture,  Propagation  of  Trees, 


1 Coleridge,  Biograph.  Liter.,  p.  143. 

a Tucker,  Light  of  Natio’c;  chapter  on  Transference  or  Translation. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


533 


TKIVITJM  — 

Manufacture  of  Arms,  Carpenters’  work,  Medicine,  'Weaving, 
and  Ship-building. 

TEXJTH  has  been  distinguished  by  most  metaphysical  writers, 
according  as  it  respects  being,  knowledge,  and  speech,  into 
veritas  entis,  cognitionis , et  signi.  By  others,  truth  has  been 
distinguished  as  entitative,  objective,  and  formal,  the  truth  of 
signs  being  included  under  the  last. 

Veritas  entis  — Transcendental  or  Metaphysical  Truth. 

The  pillar  and  ground  of  all  truth  is  in  truth  of  being — that 
truth  by  which  a thing  is  what  it  is,  by  which  it  has  its  own 
nature  and  properties,  and  has  not  merely  the  appearance  but 
reality  of  being.  Thus  gold  has  truth  of  being,  i.  e.,  is  real 
gold,  when  it  has  not  only  the  appearance,  but  all  the  pro- 
perties belonging  to  that  metal.  Philosophy  is  the  knowledge 
of  being,  and  if  there  were  no  real  being,  that  is,  if  truth 
could  not  be  predicated'  of  things,  there  could  be  no  know- 
ledge. But  things  exist  independently  of  being  known. 
They  do  not  exist  because  they  are  known,  nor  as  they  are 
known.  But  they  are  known  because  they  are,  and  as  they 
are,  when  known  fully. 

Veritas  Cognitionis. 

Truth,  as  predicated  of  knowledge,  is  the  conformity  of  our 
knowledge  with  the  reality  of  the  object  known — for,  as  know- 
ledge is  the  knowledge  of  something,  when  a thing  is  known 
as  it  is,  that  knowledge  is  formally  true.  To  know  that  fire  is 
hot,  is  true  knowledge.  Objective  truth  is  the. conformity  of 
the  thing  or  object  known  with  true  knowledge.  But  there 
seems  to  be  little  difference  whether  we  say  that  truth  consists 
in  the  conformity  of  the  formal  conception  to  the  thing  known 
or  conceived  of,  or  in  the  conformity  of  the  thing  as  it  is  to 
true  knowledge. 

Veritas  Signi. 

The  truth  of  the  sign  consists  in  its  adequateness  or  con- 
formity to  the  thing  signified.  If  falsity  in  those  things  which 
imitate  another  consists  not  in  so  far  as  they  imitate,  but  in  so 
far  as  they  cannot  imitate  it  or  represent  it  adequately  or 
fully,  so  the  truth  of  a representation  or  sign  consists  in  its 
being  adequate  to  the  thing  signified.  The  truth  and  ade- 
quacy of  signs  belongs  to  enunciation  in  logic. 

43* 


534 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


TRUTH  - 

“ Independent  of  the  truth  which  consists  in  the  conformity 
of  thoughts  to  things,  called  scientific — and  of  that  which  lies 
in  the  correspondence  of  words  with  thougths,  called  moral 
truth  — there  is  a truth  called  logical,  depending  on  the  self- 

consistency  of  thoughts  themselves Thought  is 

valueless  except  in  so  far  as  it  leads  to  correct  knowledge  of 
things ; a higher  truth  than  the  merely  logical,  in  subser- 
vience to  which  alone  the  logical  is  desirable.  The  reason 
that  we  sedulously  avoid  the  purely  logical  error  of  holding 
two  contradictory  propositions  is,  that  we  believe  one  of  them 
to  be  a fair  representation  of  facts,  so  that  in  adopting  tfio 
other  we  should  admit  a falsehood,  which  is  always  abhorrent 
to  the  mind.  If  we  call  the  logical  truth,  subjective,  as  con- 
sisting in  the  due  direction  of  the  thinking  subject,  we  may 
call  this  higher  metaphysical  truth,  objective,  because  it  de- 
pends on  our  thoughts  fairly  representing  the  objects  that 
give  rise  to  them.” 1 

Veritas  esl  adccquatio  intellectus  et  rei,  secundum  quod  intel- 
lectus  dicit  esse  quod  est,  vel  non  esse  quod  non  esl.”2 

Truth,  in  the  strict  logical  sense,  applies  to  propositions  and 
to  nothing  else  ; and  consists  in  the  conformity  of  the  declara- 
tion made  to  the  actual  state  of  the  case ; agreeably  to  Al- 
drich’s definition  of  “a  true”  proposition — vera  est  quee  quod 
res  est  dicit. 

In  its  etymological  sense,  truth  signifies  that  which  the 
speaker  “trows,”  or  believes  to  be  the  fact.  The  etymology 
of  the  word  to  /xrj  "Krfiov,  seems  to  be  similar ; denoting 

non-concealment.  In  this  sense  it  is  opposed  to  a lie; 
and  may  be  called  moral,  as  the  other  may  be  called  logical 
truth. 

“ Truth  is  not  unfrequently  applied,  in  loose  and  inaccurate 
language,  to  arguments ; when  the  proper  expression  would  be 
‘ correctness,’  ‘ conclusiveness,’  or  ‘ validity.’ 

“ Truth  again,  is  often  used  in  the  sense  of  reality,  to  or. 
People  speak  of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  facts;  properly  speaking, 
they  are  either  real  or  fictitious : it  is  the  statement  that  is 


Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought , sect.  81,  82. 
Aquinas,  Contra.  Gent.,  i.,  49. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


535 


TRUTH  - 

‘true'  or  ‘false.’  The  ‘true’  cause  of  anything,  is  a common 
expression  ; ‘ meaning  that  which  may  with  truth  be  assigned 
as  the  cause.’  The  senses  of  falsehood  correspond.”1 

“ Necessary  truths  are  such  as  are  known  independently  of 
inductive  proof.  They  are,  therefore,  either  self-evident  pro- 
positions, or  deduced  from  self-evident  propositions.’"2 

Necessary  truths  are  those  in  which  we  not  only  learn  that 
the  proposition  is  true,  but  see  that  it  must  be  true ; in  which 
the  negation  is  not  only  false,  but  impossible  ; in  which  we 
cannot,  even  by  an  effort  of  the  imagination,  or  in  a supposi- 
tion, conceive  the  reverse  of  what  is  asserted.  The  relations 
of  numbers  are  the  examples  of  such  truths.  Two  and  three 
make  five.  We  cannot  conceive  it  to  be  otherwise. 

“A  necessary  truth  or  law  of  reason,  is  a truth  or  law  the 
opposite  of  which  is  inconceivable,  contradictory,  nonsensical, 
impossible  ; more  shortly,  it  is  a truth,  in  the  fixing  of  which 
nature  had  only  one  alternative,  be  it  positive  or  negative. 
Nature  might  have  fixed  that  the  sun  should  go  round  the 
earth,  instead  of  the  earth  round  the  sun  ; at  least  we  see 
nothing  in  that  supposition  which  is  contradictory  and  absurd. 
Either  alternative  was  equally  possible.  But  nature  could  not 
have  fixed  that  two  straight  lines  should,  in  any  circumstances, 
enclose  a space  ; for  this  involves  a contradiction.”3 

Contingent  truths  are  those  which,  without  doing  violence  to 
reason,  we  may  conceive  to  be  otherwise.  If  I say  “Grass  is 
green,”  “ Socrates  was  a philosopher,”  I assert  propositions 
which  are  true,  but  need  not  have  been  so.  It  might  have 
pleased  the  Creator  to  make  grass  blue — and  Socrates  might 
never  have  lived. 

“ There  are  truths  of  reasoning  (reason)  and  truths  of  fact. 
Truths  of  reason  are  necessary,  and  their  contradictory  is  im- 
possible— those  of  fact  are  contingent,  and  their  opposite  is 
possible.  When  a truth  is  necessary  you  can  find  the  reason 
by  analysis,  resolving  it  into  ideas  and  truths  more  simple,  till 
you  come  to  what  is  primitive.” 4 


1 Whately,  Log Appendix  i. 

a Kidd,  Principles  of  Reasoning , chap.  7. 

3 Eerrier,  Inst,  of  Metaphys.}  p.  19. 

4 Leibnitz,  JYouveaux  Essais,  iv.,  2;  Monadologie , sect.  33. 


536 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


TRUTH  — 

“ Though  the  primary  truths  of  fact  and  the  primary  truths 
of  intelligence  (the  contingent  and  necessary  truths  of  Reid) 
form  two  very  distinct  classes  of  the  original  beliefs  or  intui- 
tions of  our  consciousness,  there  appears  no  sufficient  ground 
to  regard  their  sources  as  different,  and  therefore  to  be  distin- 
guished by  different  names.  In  this  I regret  that  I am  unable 
to  agree  with  Mr.  Stewart.  See  his  Elements,  vol.  ii.,  chap.  1, 
and  his  Account  of  Reid,  supra,  p.  27,  b.”  1 

“ Truth  implies  something  really  existing.  An  assertion 
respecting  the  future  may  be  probable  or  improbable,  it  may 
be  honest  or  deceitful,  it  may  be  prudent  or  imprudent,  it  may 
have  any  relation  we  please  to  the  mind  of  the  person  who 
makes  it,  or  of  him  who  hears  it,  but  it  can  have  no  relation 
at  all  to  a thing  which  is  not.  The  Stoics  said,  Cicero  will 
either  be  Consul  or  not.  One  of  these  is  true,  therefore  the 
event  is  certain.  But  truth  cannot  be  predicated  of  that  which 
is  not.”2 

“Truth  implies  a report  of  something  that  is;  reality  denotes 
the  existence  of  a thing,  whether  affirmed  and  reported  of  or 
not.  The  thing  reported  either  is  or  is  not;  the  report  is 
either  true  or  false.  The  things  themselves  are  sometimes 
called  truths,  instead  of  facts  or  realities.  And  assertions  con- 
cerning matters  of  fact  are  called  facts.  Thus  we  hear  of 
false  facts,  a thing  literally  impossible  and  absurd.”3 

“ No  pleasure  is  comparable  to  the  standing  upon  the  van- 
tage-ground of  truth  (a  hill  not  to  be  commanded,  and  where 
the  air  is  alwajrs  clear  and  serene),  and  to  see  the  errors  and 
wanderings  and  mists  and  tempests  in  the  vale  below ; so 
always  that  this  prospect  be  with  pity,  and  not  with  swelling 
or  pride.”4  — V.  Falsity,  Reality. 

TRUTHS  (First  ) are  such  as  do  not  depend  on  any  prior  truth. 
They  carry  evidence  in  themselves.  They  are  assented  to  as 
soon  as  they  are  understood.  The  assent  given  to  them  is  so 
full,  that  while  experience  may  confirm  or  familiarize  it,  it  can 
scarcely  be  said  to  increase  it,  and  so  clear  that  no  proposition 


1 Sir  William  Hamilton,  Reid's  Worlcs , note  a,  p.  743. 

a Coplestone,  Enquiry  into  Necessity,  Preface,  p.  15. 

3 ILid.,  Remains,  p.  105. 

4 Bacon's  Essay  on  Truth. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


537 


TRUTHS  — 

contradicting  them  can  be  admitted  as  more  clear.  That  a 
whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts ; that  a change  implies 
the  operation  of  a cause ; that  qualities  do  not  exist  without  a 
substance ; that  there  are  other  beings  in  the  world  besides 
ourselves;  may  be  given  as  examples  of  first  truths.  These 
truths  are  and  must  be  assented  to  by  every  rational  being,  as 
soon  as  the  terms  expressing  them  are  understood.  They 
have  been  called  *mrai  twoitu,  communes  notitice,  natural  judg- 
ments, primitive  beliefs,  fundamental  laws  of  the  human 
mind,  principles  of  common  sense,  principles  of  reason,  prin- 
ciples of  reasoning,  &c. 

. . . “To  determine  how  great  is  the  number  of  these 

propositions  is  impossible ; for  they  are  not  in  the  soul  as  pro- 
positions ; but  it  is  an  undoubted  truth  that  a mind  awaking 
out  of  nothing  into  being,  and  presented  with  particular  ob- 
jects, would  not  fail  at  once  to  judge  concerning  them  accord- 
ing to,  and  by  the  force  of,  some  such  innate  principles  as 
these,  or  just  as  a man  would  judge  who  had  learnt  these  ex- 
plicit propositions ; which  indeed  are  so  nearly  allied  to  its 
own  nature,  that  they  may  be  called  almost  a part  of  itself. 
....  Therefore  I take  the  mind  or  soul  of  man  not  to  be 
so  perfectly  indifferent  to  receive  all  impressions  as  a rasa 
tabula,  or  white  paper.  . . . “ Hence  there  may  be  some 

practical  principles  also  innate  in  the  foregoing  sense,  though 
not  in  the  form  of  propositions.”  1 

“From  the  earliest  records  of  time,  and  following  the  course 
of  history,  we  everywhere  find  the  principles  of  common  sense, 
as  universal  elements  of  human  thought  and  action.  No  vio- 
lence can  suppress,  no  sophisms  obscure  them.  They  steadily 
and  unerringly  guide  us  through  the  revolutions  and  destruc- 
tion of  nations  and  empires.  The  eye  pierces  with  rapid 
glance  through  the  long  vista  of  ages  amid  the  sanguinary 
conflicts,  the  territorial  aggrandizements,  and  chequered  fea- 
tures of  states  and  kingdoms  ; and  from  the  wreck  of  all  that 
is  debasing,  glorious,  or  powerful,  we  still  recognize  the  great 
and  universal  truths  of  humanity.  One  generation  passes 
away  after  another,  but  they  remain  for  ever  the  same.  They 
are  the  life-blood  of  human  nature ; the  intellectual  air  we 


1 Watts,  Philosoph.  Essays , sect.  4 and  3. 


538 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


TRUTHS - 

breathe.  Without  them  society  could  not  for  a single  hour 
subsist;  governments,  laws,  institutions,  religion,  the  man- 
ners and  customs  of  men,  bear  the  indelible  imprint  of  their 
universality  and  indestructibility.  They  are  revealed  in  the 
daily  and  hourly  actions,  thoughts,'  and  speech  of  all  men ; 
and  must  ever  form  the  basis  of  all  systems  of  philosophy ; 
for  without  them  it  can  only  be  a phantom,  a delusion,  an 
unmeaning  assemblage  of  words.” — Yan  de  Weyer. 

On  the  nature,  origin,  and  validity  of  first  truths,  the  fol- 
lowing authors  may  be  consulted: — Lord  Herbert,  De  Veri- 
tate ; Buffier,  Treatise  of  First  Truths;  Reid,  Inquiry  and 
Fssays  on  Intell.  Foie. ; Sir  Will.  Hamilton,  Ileid’s  Works.'  — 
V.  Common  Sense,  Reminiscence. 

TYPE  (viirtof,  typus,  from  tvrtru,  to  strike). 

“ Great  father  of  the  gods,  when  for  our  crimes 
Thou  send’st  some  heavy  judgment  on  the  times, — 

Some  tyrant  king,  the  terror  of  his  age, 

The  type  and  true  vicegerent  of  thy  rage! 

Thus  punish  him.” — Dryden,  Persius,  sat.  3. 

“ So  St.  Hierome  offered  wine,  not  water,  in  the  type  of  his 
blood.”1 2 

Among  the  Greeks  the  first  model  which  statuaries  made  in 
clay  of  their  projected  work  was  called  -tiirto;.  Type  means 
the  first  rude  form  or  figure  of  anything — an  adumbration  or 
shadowing  forth.  The  thing  fashioned  according  to  it  was 
the  ectype,  and  the  type  in  contrast  the  protype.  But  archetype 
was  applied  to  the  original  idea,  model,  or  exemplar,  not 
copied,  but  of  which  other  things  were  copies. 

“A  type  is  an  example  of  any  class,  for  instance,  a species 
of  a genus,  which  is  considered  as  eminently  possessing  the 
characters  of  the  class.”3 

For  the  meaning  of  a type  in  the  arts  of  design,  see  Sir 
Edmund  Head,  Hist,  of  Painting .4  — V.  IIomotype. 


1 Appendix,  note  A. 

a Bishop  Taylor,  Of  Real  Presence , sect.  6. 

3 W he  well,  Induct.  Sciences , viii.,  ii.,  10. 

4 Preface,  p.  39. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


539 


UBIETY  [ubi,  where)  is  the  presence  of  one  thing  to  another,  or 
the  presence  of  a thing  in  place.  The  schoolmen  distinguished 
ubiety  as  — 

1.  Circumscriptive,  by  which  a body  is  so  in  one  place  that 
its  parts  are  answerable  to  the  parts  of  space  in  which  it  is, 
and  exclude  every  other  body. 

2.  Definitive,  as  when  a human  spirit  is  limited  or  defined 
in  its  presence  to  the  same  place  as  a human  body. 

3..  Depletive,  as  when  the  Infinite  Spirit  is  present  through 
every  portion  of  space. 

This  last  is  sometimes  called  ubiquity,  and  means  the 
Divine  Omnipresence.* 1 

UN  CONDITIONED.  — “ This  term  has  been  employed  in  a two- 
fold signification,  as  denoting  either  the  entire  absence  of  all 
restriction,  or  more  widely,  the  entire  absence  of  all  relation. 
The  former  we  regard  as  its  only  legitimate  application.” 2 

In  the  philosophy  of  Kant  it  is  that  which  is  absolutely  and 
in  itself,  or  internally  possible,  and  is  exempted  from  the  con- 
ditions circumscribing  a thing  in  time  or  space. — V.  Abso- 
lute, Infinite. 

UNDERSTANDING.  — “ Perhaps  the  safer  use  of  the  term,  for 
general  purposes,  is  to  take  it  as  the  mind,  or  rather  as  the 
man  himself  considered  as  a concipient  as  well  as  a percipient 
being,  and  reason  as  a power  supervening.”3 

“ In  its  wider  acceptation,  understanding  is  the  entire  power 
of  perceiving  and  conceiving,  exclusive  of  the  sensibility  ; the 
power  of  dealing  with  the  impressions  of  sense,  and  composing 
them  into  wholes  according  to  a law  of  unity  ; and  in  its  most 
comprehensive  meaning  it  includes  even  simple  apprehension. 
Thus  taken  at  large  it  is  the  whole  spontaneity  of  the  repre- 
senting mind ; that  which  puts  together  the  multifarious 
materials  supplied  by  the  passive  faculty  of  sense,  or  pure  re- 
ceptivity. But  we  may  consider  the  understanding  in  another 
point  of  view,  not  as  the  simple  faculty  of  thought,  which  pro- 
duces intuitions  and  conceptions  spontaneously,  and  comes  into 
play  as  the  mere  tool  or  organ  of  the  spiritual  mind ; but  as  a 


1 Leibnitz,  Kouv.  Essais , lir.  ii.,  chap.  23,  sect.  21. 

1 Calderwood,  Phil,  of  the  Infinite,  p.  36. 

a Coleridge,  Statesman’s  Manual,  App.  b,  p.  264. 


540 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


UNDERSTANDING  - 

power  that  is  exercised  on  objects  which  it  supplies  to  itself, 
which  does  not  simply  think  and  reflect,  but  which  examines 
its  thoughts,  arranges  and  compares  them  ; and  this  for  scien- 
tific, not  for  directly  practical,  purposes.  To  intellectualize 
upon  religion,  and  to  receive  it  by  means  of  the  understanding 
are  two  different  things,  and  the  common  exertion  of  this 
faculty  should  of  course  be  distinguished  from  that  special 
use  of  it,  in  which  one  man  differs  from  another,  by  reason 
of  stronger  original  powers  of  mind,  or  greater  improvement 
of  them  by  exercise.” 1 

“ The  understanding  is  the  medial  faculty,  or  faculty  of 
means,  as  reason  on  the  other  hand  is  the  source  of  ideas  or 
ultimate  ends.  By  reason  we  determine  the  ultimate  end  ; by 
the  understanding  we  are  enabled  to  select  and  adopt  the 
appropriate  means  for  the  attainment  of,  or  approximation  to, 
this  end,  according  to  circumstances.  But  an  ultimate  end 
must  of  necessity  be  an  idea,  that  is,  that  which  is  not  repre- 
sentable by  the  senses,  and  has  no  correspondent  in  nature,  or 

the  world  of  the  senses Understanding  and  sense 

constitute  the  natural  mind  of  man,  mind  of  the  flesh,  ^fjoi^ua 
crapzdf,  as  likewise  curtst?,  the  intellectual  power  of  the 

living  or  animal  soul,  which  St.  Paul  everywhere  contradis- 
tinguishes from  the  spirit,  that  is,  the  power  resulting  from 
the  union  and  co-influence  of  the  will  and  reason  — oofyia  or 
wisdom.”2 

“ The  reason  and  the  understanding  have  not  been  steadily 

distinguished  by  English  writers To  understand 

anything  is  to  apprehend  it  according  to  certain  assumed  ideas 
and  rules ; we  do  not  include  in  the  meaning  of  the  word  an 
examination  of  the  ground  of  the  ideas  and  rules  by  reference 
to  which  we  understand  the  thing.  We  understand  a language, 
when  we  apprehend  what  is  said,  according  to  the  established 
vocabulary  and  grammar  of  the  language  ; without  inquiring 
how  the  words  came  to  have  their  meaning,  or  what  is  the 
ground  of  the  grammatical  rules.  We  understand  the  sense 
without  reasoning  about  the  etymology  and  syntax. 

“ Reasoning  may  be  requisite  to  understanding.  We  may 


1 Coleridge,  Aids  to  Reflection , vol.  Li.,  p.  38. 

0 Ibid.,  Notes  on  English  Div.}  vol.  ii.,  p.  338. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


541 


UNDERSTANDING  - 

hare  to  reason  about  the  syntax  in  order  to  understand  the 
sense.  But  understanding  leaves  still  room  for  reasoning. 
Also  we  may  understand  •what  is  not  conformable  to  reason  ; 
as  ■when  we  understand  a man’s  arguments,  and  think  them 
unfounded  in  reason. 

“We  reason  in  order  to  deduce  rules  from  first  principles, 
or  from  one  another.  But  the  rules  and  principles  -which 
must  be  expressed  when  we  reason,  may  be  only  implied  when 
we  understand.  We  may  understand  the  sense  of  a speech 
without  thinking  of  rules  of  grammar. 

“ The  reason  is  employed  both  in  understanding  and  in 
reasoning ; but  the  principles  which  are  explicitly  asserted  in 
reasoning,  are  only  implicitly  applied  in  understanding.  The 
reason  includes  both  the  faculty  of  seeing  first  principles,  and 
the  reasoning  faculty  by  which  we  obtain  other  principles. 
The  understanding  is  the  faculty  of  applying  principles,  how- 
ever obtained.”  1 

Anselm  considered  the  facts  of  consciousness  under  the 
fourfold  arrangement  of  Sensibility,  Will,  Reason,  and  Intel- 
ligence ; and  showed  that  the  two  last  are  not  identical.2 

“ ‘ There  is  one  faculty,’  says  Aristotle,3  ‘ by  which  man 
comprehends  and  embodies  in  his  belief  first  principles 
which  cannot  be  proved,  which  he  must  receive  from  some 
authority ; there  is  another  by  which,  when  a new  fact  is 
laid  before  him,  he  can  show  that  it  is  in  conformity  with 
some  principle  possessed  before.  One  process  resembles  the 
collection  of  materials  for  building  — the  other  their  orderly 
arrangement.  One  is  intuition,  — the  other  logic.  One  vois, 
the  other  iruefr-gt].’  Or  to  use  a modern  distinction,  one  is 
reason  in  its  highest  sense,  the  other  understanding.” 4 

“ I use  the  term  understanding,  not  for  the  noetic  faculty, 
intellect  proper,  or  place  of  principles,  but  for  the  dianoetic, 
or  discursive  faculty  in  its  widest  signification,  for  the  faculty 


■ Whewell,  Elements  of  Morality,  Introd.,  sect.  11. 

- Matter,  Sist.  de  la  Philosoph.  dans  ses  Eapporls  avec  Religion,  p.  IAS.  Paris, 
1851. 

* EtJi.,  lib.  6. 

* Sewell,  Christ.  Mor.,  ohap.  21, 

47 


542 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


UNDERSTANDING  — 

of  relations  or  comparisons ; and  thus  in  the  meaning  in 
■which  Versiand  is  now  employed  by  the  Germans.”  1 2 

“Understanding,  intellect  ( Versiand ) is  the  faculty  which 
conjoins  the-  diversity  which  is  furnished  us  by  the  senses, 
and  forms  into  a whole  the  sensible  representations  which 
are  given  to  us.  The  word  Versiand  is  used  occasionally  as 
being  synonymous  with  Vernunft  (reason),  and  is  the  faculty 
of  cognition  in  general,  and  in  this  sense  the  critic  of  pure 
reason  might  be  termed  also  the  critic  of  pure  understanding. 
The  discursive  understanding  is  the  faculty  of  cognizing  ob- 
jects, not  immediately,  but  through  conceptions.  And  as 
intuition  belongs  to  cognition,  and  as  a faculty  of  a complete 
spontaneousness  of  intuition,  or  which  perceives  the  intuition 
not  passively,  but  produces  spontaneously  from  itself,  a cog- 
nition-faculty different  from,  and  independent  of,  what  is  the 
sensibility,  would  be,  consequently,  understanding  in  the 
widest  sense ; we  might  think  such  an  intuitive,  envisaging 
understanding  ( intellectus  intuitivus ) negatively,  as  a non- 
discursive  understanding.  The  gemeiner  Menschen  Yerstand 
and  the  Gemeinsinn  are  sensus  communis  logicus,  or  common 
sense  ; and  the  gesunder  Versiand,  sound  sense.  Sir  J.  Mack- 
intosh prefers  the  term  intellect  to  that  of  understanding  as 
the  source  of  conceptions.” 2 — V.  Reason,  Intellect. 

UNIFICATION  is  the  act  of  so  uniting  ourselves  with  another 
as  to  form  one  being.  Unification  with  God  was  the  final  aim 
of  the  Neo-Platonicians.  And  unification  with  God  is  also 
one  of  the  beliefs  of  the  Chinese  philosopher,  Lao  Tseu. 

UNITARIAN  (A)  is  a believer  in  one  God.  It  is  the  same  in 
meaning  as  Monotheist.  In  this  large  sense  it  is  applicable 
to  all  Christians,  for  they  all  believe  in  the  unity  of  the  Divine 
nature  ; and  also  to  Jews  and  Mahommedans.  It  may  even 
include  Deists,  or  those  who  believe  in  God  on  grounds  of 
reason  alone.  But  the  name  is  commonly  opposed  to  Trini- 
tarian, and  is  applied  to  those  who,  accepting  the  Christian 
revelation,  believe  in  God  as  existing  in  one  person,  and 
acknowledge  Jesus  Christ  as  his  messenger  to  men. 

UNITY  or  ONENESS  ( unum , one)  is  a property  of  being.  If 
anything  is,  it  is  one  and  not  many.  Omne  ens  est  unum. 


1 Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Discussions,  &c.,  8vo.,  Lond.,  1852,  p.  4,  note. 

2 Haywood,  Crit.  of  Pure  Reason,  p.  C05. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


543 


UKTTY— 

Unity  is  defined  to  be  that  property,  qua  ens  est  indivisum 
in  se  et  division  ab  omni  alio. 

Locke1  makes  unity  synonymous  with  number.  But  Aris- 
totle2 more  correctly  makes  unity  the  element  of  number,  and 
says  that  unity  is  indivisibleness.  That  which  is  indivisible, 
and  has  no  position,  is  a monad.  That  which  is  indivisible, 
but  has  a position,  is  a point.  That  which  is  divisible  only 
in  one  sense  is  a line.  That  which  is  divisible  in  two  senses 
is  a plane.  And  that  which  is  divisible  in  three  senses  -is  a 
body  in  respect  of  quantity. 

. According  to  Aristotle,3  the  modes  of  unity  are  reducible  to 
four,  that  of  continuity,  especially  natural  continuity,  which 
is  not  the  result  of  contact  or  tie — that  of  a whole  naturally, 
which  has  figure  and  form,  and  not  like  things  united  by  vio- 
lence— that  of  an  individual  or  that  which  is  numerically 
indivisible  — and  that  of  a universal,  which  is  indivisible  in 
form  and  in  respect  of  science. 

Unity  has  been  divided  into  transcendental  or  entitative,  by 
which  a being  is  indivisible  in  itself — logical,  by  which  things 
like  each  other  are  classed  together  for  the  purposes  of  science 
— and  moral,  by  which  many  are  embodied  as  one  for  the  pur- 
poses of  life,  as  many  citizens  make  one  society,  many  soldiers 
one  army. 

Unity  is  opposed  to  plurality,  which  is  nothing  but  plures 
entitates  aid  imitates. 

Unity  is  specific  or  numerical.  The  former  may  rather  be 
called  similitude,  and  the  latter  identity .4 

“ The  essential  diversity  of  the  ideas  unity  and  sameness  was 
among  the  elementary  principles  of  the  old  logicians  ; and  the 
sophisms  grounded  on  the  confusion  of  these  terms  have  been 
ably  exposed  by  Leibnitz  in  his  critique  on  Wissowatius.”5 — 
V.  Distinction",  Identity. 

UUTVERSALS.  — “The  same  colour  being  observed  to-day  in 
chalk  or  snow,  which  the  mind  yesterday  received  from  milk, 
it  considers  that  appearance  alone,  makes  it  a representative 


1 Essay  on  Hum.  Understand .,  b.  ii.,  ch.  16. 

3 Metaphys.,  lib.  iv.,  cap.  6,  lib.  x.,  cap.  1. 

2 Ibid.,  lib.  x.,  cap.  1.  * Ilutcheson,  Metaphys ..  pars  3.  cap.  3. 

e Coleridge,  Second  Lay  Sermon,  p.  367.  See  also,  Aids  to  Reflection , p.  157. 

43 


544 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


UNIVERSALS  — 

of  all  of  that  kind,  and  having  given  it  the  name  of  whiteness, 
it  by  that  sound  signifies  the  same  quality,  wheresoever  to  be 
imagined  or  met  with,  and  thus  universals,  whether  ideas  or 
terms,  are  made."  1 

Universal  terms  may  denote,  1.  A mathematical  universality, 
as  all  circles  (no  exception)  have  a centre  and  circumference. 
2.  A physical  universality,  as  all  men  use  words  to  express 
their  thoughts  (though  the  dumb  cannot).  3.  A moral  univer- 
sality, as  all  men  are  governed  by  affection  rather  than  by 
reason. 

Universal  [uninn  versus  alia ) means,  according  to  its  composi- 
tion, one  towards  many.  It  is  defined  by  Aristotle,2  “ that 
which  by  its  nature  is  fit  to  be  predicated  of  many.”  And3 
“ that  which  by  its  nature  has  a fitness  or  capacity  to  be  in 
many.”  It  implies  unity  with  community,  or  unity  shared  in 
by  many. 

Universals  have  been  divided  into,  1.  Metaphysical  or  uni- 
versalia  ante  rem.  2.  Physical,  or  universalia  in  re.  3.  Logical, 
or  universalia  post  rem. 

By  the  first  are  meant  those  archetypal  forms,  according  to 
which  all  things  were  created.  As  existing  in  the  Divine 
mind  and  furnishing  the  pattern  for  the  Divine  working,  these 
may  be  said  to  correspond  with  the  ideas  of  Plato. 

By  universals  in  the  second  sense  are  meant  certain  common 
natures,  which,  one  in  themselves,  are  diffused  over  or  shared 
in  by  many  — as  rationality  by  all  men. 

By  universals  in  the  third  sense  are  meant  general  notions 
framed  by  the  human  intellect,  and  predicated  of  many  things, 
on  the  ground  of  their  possessing  common  properties  — as 
animal,  which  may  be  predicated  of  man,  lion,  horse,  &c. 

Realists  give  prominence  to  universals  in  the  first  and  second 
signification.  Nominalists  hold  that  the  true  meaning  of  uni- 
versals is  that  assigned  in  the  third  sense.  While  concep- 
tualists  hold  an  intermediate  view.4 

In  ancient  philosophy  the  universals  were  called  prcedicables 


* Locke,  Essay  on  Ilum.  Understand.,  book  ii.,  ch.  6. 

0 Lib.  de  Interpret.,  cap.  5.  3 Metaphys lib.  v.,  cap.  13. 

4 Reid,  lntell.  Paw.,  essay  y.,  chap.  G;  Thomson,  Outline  of  Laws  of  Thought , 2d  edit., 
pect.  23. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


545 


UNIVERSALS  — 

[q.  v.),  and  were  arranged  in  fire  classes,  genus,  species,  dif- 
ferentia, proprium,  and  accidens.  It  is  argued  that  there  can 
he  neither  more  nor  fewer.  For  whatever  is  predicated  of  many 
is  predicated  essentially  or  accidentally ; if  essentially,  either  of 
the  whole  essence,  and  then  it  is  a species;  of  a common  part 
of  the  essence,  and  then  it  is  a genus ; or  of  a proper  part  of  the 
essence,  and  then  it  is  the  differentia  essentialis;  if  accidentally, 
it  either  flows  from  the  essence  of  the  subject,  and  is  its  pro- 
prium, or  does  not  flow  from  its  essence,  and  is  its  accidens. 

Or  it  may  be  argued  thus — universality  is  a fitness  of  being 
predicated  of  many,  which  implies  identity  or  sameness,  or  at 
least  resemblance.  There  will  therefore  be  as  many  classes  of 
universals  as  there  are  kinds  of  identity.  Now,  when  one  thing 
is  said  to  be  the  same  with  another,  it  is  so  either  essentially 
or  accidentally ; if  essentially,  it  is  so  either  completely  or  in- 
completely; if  completely,  it  gives  a species ; if  incompletely,  it 
is  so  in  form,  and  gives  the  differentia,  or  in  matter  and  gives 
the  genus;  if  accidentally,  it  is  the  same  either  necessarily  and 
inseparably,  and  constitutes  the  proprium  — or  contingently 
and  separably,  and  is  the  accidens. — Tellez.’  But  the  fivefold 
classification  of  universals  is  censured  by  Derodon.2 

UNIVOCAL  WORDS  (una,  one ; vox,  word  or  meaning)  “ are 
such  as  signify  but  one  idea,  or  at  least  but  one  sort  of  thing ; 
the  words  book,  bible,  fish,  house,  elephant,  may  be  called 
univocal  ivords,  for  I know  not  that  they  signify  anything  else 
but  those  ideas  to  which  they  are  generally  affixed.”3 

“ I think  it  is  a good  division  in  Aristotle,  that  the  same 
word  may  be  applied  to  different  things  in  three  ways:  uni- 
vocally,  analogically,  and  equivocally.  Univocally,  when  the 
things  are  species  of  the  same  genus ; analogically,  when  the 
things  are  related  by  some  similitude  or  analogy  ; equivocally, 
when  they  have  no  relation  but  a common  name.”4 

In  Logic  a common  term  is  called  univocal  in  respect  of  those 
things  or  persons  to  which  it  is  applicable  in  the  same  signifi- 
cation, as  the  term  “ man.”  Whately  observes  that  the  “ usual 


1 Summa,  pars  1.  dis.  v.,  sect.  1. 

2 Log.,  pars.  2,  cap.  6.  Sec  also  Thomson,  Outline,  of  Laws  of  Thought,  sect.  37. 

3 Watts,  Log. , b.  i.,  c.  4. 

4 Reid,  Correspondence , p.  75. 

47  * 2 l 


546 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


UNIVOCAL  - 

division  of  nouns  into  univocal , equivocal,  and  analogous,  and 
into  nouns  of  the  first  and  second  intention,  are  not,  strictly 
speaking,  divisions  of  words,  but  divisions  of  the  manner  of 
employing  them;  the  same  word  may  be  employed  either  uni- 
vocally,  equivocally,  or  analogously ; either  in  the  first  inten- 
tion or  the  second.”  1 

V.  Analogous,  Equivocal,  Intention. 

UTILITY,  said  Kant,2  “ is  nothing  scarcely  but  a frame  or  case 
which  may  serve  to  facilitate  the  sale  of  a picture,  or  draw 
to  it  the  attention  of  those  who  are  not  connoisseurs ; but 
cannot  recommend  it  to  true  lovers  of  the  art,  or  determine 
its  price.” 

“ What  is  useful  only  has  no  value  in  itself;  but  derives  all 
its  merit  from  the  end  for  which  it  is  useful.”3 

“ Utility  is  an  idea  essentially  relative,  which  supposes  a 
higher  term.”4 

The  doctrine  of  utility  in  morals  is,  that  actions  are  right 
because  they  are  useful.  It  has  been  held  under  various  forms. 
Some  who  maintain  that  utility  or  beneficial  tendency  is  what 
makes  an  action  right,  hold  that  a virtuous  agent  may  be 
prompted  by  self-love  (as  Paley),  or  by  benevolence  (as  Ru- 
therforth),  or  partly  by  both  (as  Hume).  And  the  beneficial 
tendency  of  actions  has  by  some  been  viewed  solely  in  refer- 
ence to  this  life  (as  Hume  and  Bentham),  while  by  others  it 
has  been  extended  to  a future  state  (as  Paley),  and  the  obli- 
gation to  do  such  actions  has  been  represented  as  arising  from 
the  rewards  and  punishments  of  that  future  state,  as  made 
known  by  the  light  of  nature  and  by  revelation  (as  Dwight). 

The  fundamental  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  utility  in  all 
its  modifications,  is  that  taken  by  Dr.  Ileid,6  viz.,  “that 
agreeableness  and  utility  are  not  moral  conceptions,  nor  have 
they  any  connection  with  morality.  What  a man  does, 
merely  because  it  is  agreeable,  is  not  virtue.  Therefore  the 
Epicurean  system  was  justly  thought  by  Cicero,  and  the  best 
moralists  among  the  ancients,  to  subvert  morality,  and  to 
substitute  another  principle  in  its  room ; and  this  system  is 


1 Whately,  Log.,  b.  ii.,  cb.  5,  2 1. 

8 Keid,  Act.  Pow.,  essay  v.,  ch.  5. 

b Act.  row.,  essay  v.,  ch.  5. 


a Metaphys.  des  Mceurs , p.  15. 

4 Manuel  de.  rhilosoph.,  p.  334. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


547 


UTILITY  — 

liable  to  the  same  censure.”  “ Honestum,  igitur,  id  intelligi- 
mils,  quod  tale  est,  ut,  detracta  omni  utilitaie,  sine  ullis  premiis 
fructibusve,  per  seipsum  jure  possit  laudari.”1 


YELLEITY  ( volo , to  will)  is  an  indolent  or  inactive  -wish  or 
inclination  towards  a thing,  which  leads  to  no  energetic  effort 
to  obtain  it,  as  when  it  is  said,  “ The  cat  likes  fish  but  will 
not  touch  the  water.” 

“ The  toishing  of  a thing  is  not  properly  the  loilling  it,  but 
it  is  that  which  is  called  by  the  schools  an  imperfect  velleity, 
and  imports  no  more  than  an  idle  inoperative  complacency 
in,  and  desire  of  the  end,  without  any  consideration  of  the 
means.”2 

“A  volition  which  cannot  carry  itself  into  execution.”  — 
Muller. — V.  Volition. 

VERACITY  is  the  duty  of  preserving  the  truth  in  our  conver- 
sation. It  is  natural  for  us  to  speak  as  we  think,  and  to 
believe  that  others  do  the  same.  So  much  so  that  Dr.  Reid 
enumerates  an  instinct  of  veracity  and  a corresponding  instinct 
of  credulity  as  principles  of  human  nature.  Children  do  not 
distrust  nor  deceive.  It  is  not  till  interest  or  passion  prompts 
men,  that  they  conceal  or  disguise  the  truth.  The  means 
employed  for  this  purpose  are  either  saying  what  is  false,  or 
equivocation  and  reservation  — q.  v. 

VERBAL  is  opposed  to  real  ( q . v.),  1.  As  name  is  opposed  to 
thing ; and  2.  As  insincere  is  opposed  to  sincere.  “ Great 
acclamations  and  verbal  praises  and  acknowledgments,  without 
an  honest  and  sincere  endeavour  to  please  and  obey  him,  are 
but  pieces  of  mockery  and  hypocritical  compliment.”3 

“ Sometimes  the  question  turns  on  the  meaning  and  extent 
of  the  terms  employed  ; sometimes  on  the  things  signified  by 
them.  If  it  be  made  to  appear,  therefore,  that  the  opposite 
sides  of  a certain  question  may  be  held  by  parties  not  differing 
in  their  opinion  of  the  matter  in  hand,  then  that  question 


1 De  Finibus , ii.,  14. 

3 Hale,  Cord.  Of  Afflictions. 


a South. 


548 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


VERBAL  - 

may  be  pronounced  verbal;  or  depending  on  the  different 
senses  in  which  they  employ  the  terms.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
it  appears  that  they  employ  the  terms  in  the  same  sense,  but 
still  differ  as  to  the  application  of  one  of  them  to  the  other, 
then  it  may  be  pronounced  that  the  question  is  real — that 
they  differ  as  to  the  opinions  they  hold  of  the  things  or 
questions.” 1 

VIRTUAL  is  opposed  to  actual.  — “It  is  not,  in  this  sense,  the 
foundation  of  Christian  doctrine,  but  it  contains  it  all ; not 
only  in  general,  but  in  special ; not  only  virtual,  but  actual; 
not  mediate,  but  immediate  ; for  a few  lines  would  have  served 
for  a foundation  general,  virtual,  and  mediate.”2 

A thing  has  a virtual  existence  when  it  has  all  the  con- 
ditions necessary  to  its  actual  existence.  The  statue  exists 
virtually  in  the  brass  or  iron,  the  oak  in  the  acorn.  The 
cause  virtually  contains  the  effect.  In  the  philosophy  of 
Aristotle,  the  distinction  between  Siivayi;,  and  or 

fVtpyna,  i.  e.,  potentia  or  virtus,  and  actus  is  frequent  and 
fundamental. 

“ A letter  of  credit  does  not  in  reality  contain  the  sum  which 
it  represents ; that  sum  is  only  really  in  the  coffer  of  the 
banker.  Yet  the  letter  contains  the  sum  in  a certain  sense, 
since  it  holds  its  place.  This  sum  is  in  still  another  sense, 
contained ; it  is  virtually  in  the  credit  of  the  banker  who 
subscribes  the  letter.  To  express  these  differences  in  the 
language  of  Descartes,  the  sum  is  contained  formally  in  the 
coffer  of  the  banker,  objectively  in  the  letter  which  he  sub- 
scribed, and  eminently  in  the  credit  which  enabled  him  to 
subscribe  ; and  thus  the  coffer  contains  the  reality  formal  of 
the  sum,  the  letter  the  reality  objective,  and  the. credit  of  the 
banker  the  reality  eminent.”3 

VIRTUE.  — “ For  if  virtue  be  an  election  annexed  unto  our  nature, 
and  consisteth  in  a mean,  which  is  determined  by  reason,  and 
that  mean  is  the  very  myddes  of  two  things  vicious,  the  one  is 
surplusage,  the  other  in  lacke,”4  &c. 


1 Whately.  3 Bp.  Taylor,  Dissuas.from  Popery,  ,'ect.  3. 

3 Royer  Collard.  (Euvres  de  Reid,  tom.  ii.,  p.  356. 

3 Sir  T.  Elyot,  The  Gmernour,  b.  ii.,  c.  10. 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


549 


VIRTUE  — 

Virtue,  in  Latin,  from  vir,  a man,  and  apt-ti-  in  Greek,  from 
"Aprji,  Mars,  give  us  the  primary  idea  of  manly  strength. 
Virtue  then  implies  opposition  or  struggle.  In  man,  the 
struggle  is  between  reason  and  passion  — between  right  and 
wrong.  To  hold  by  the  former  is  virtue,  to  yield  to  the  latter 
is  vice.  According  to  Aristotle,  virtue  is  a practical  habit 
acquired  by  doing  virtuous  acts.  He  called  those  virtues  intel- 
lectual, by  which  the  intellect  was  strengthened,  and  moral, 
by  which  the  life  was  regulated.  Another  ancient  division 
was  that  of  the  cardinal  virtues  — which  correspond  to  the 
moral  virtues.  The  theological  virtues  were  faith,  hope,  and 
charity. 

The  opposite  of  virtue  is  vice. 

Aristotle  is  quoted  by  Bacon  in  Seventh  Book  Of  the  Ad- 
vancement of  Learning,  as  saying, 

“As  beasts  cannot  be  said  to  have  vice  or  virtue,  so  neither 
can  the  gods  ; for  as  the  condition  of  the  latter  is  something 
more  elevated  than  virtue,  so  that  of  the  former  is  something 
different  from  vice.” 1 

As  virtue  implies  trial  or  difficulty,  it  cannot  be  predicated 
of  God.  He  is  holy. 

Kant  frequently  insists  upon  the  distinction  between  virtue 
and  holiness.  In  a holy  being,  the  will  is  uniformly  and 
without  struggle  in  accordance  with  the  moral  law.  In  a 
virtuous  being,  the  will  is  liable  to  the  solicitations  of  the 
sensibility,  in  opposition  or  resistance  to  the  dictates  of  reason. 
This  is  the  only  state  of  which  man  is  capable  in  this  life.  But 
he  ought  to  aim  and  aspire  to  the  attainment  of  the  higher  or 
holy  state,  in  which  the  will  without  struggle  is  always  in 
accordance  with  reason.  The  Stoics  thought  the  beau  ideal 
of  virtue,  or  the  complete  subjection  of  sense  and  appetite 
to  reason,  attainable  in  this  life. — V.  Duty-,  Merit,  Obliga- 
tion, Rectitude,  Standard,  Nature  of  Things. 

VOLITION  ( volo , to  will)  “ is  an  act  of  the  mind  knowingly 
exerting  that  dominion  it  takes  itself  to  have  over  any  part  of 
the  man,  by  employing  it  in,  or  withholding  it  from,  any  par- 
ticular action.”2 


1 Moffet,  Trans.,  p.  200. 

2 Locke,  Essay  on.  Hum.  Understand book  ii.,  chap.  21,  sect.  15. 


550 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


VOLITION  - 

“ There  is  an  error  which  lies  under  the  word  volition. 
Under  that  word  you  include  both  the  final  perception  of  the 
understanding  which  is  passive,  and  also  the  first  operation  or 
exertion  of  the  active  faculty  of  self-motive  power.  These 
two  you  think  to  be  necessarily  connected.  I think  there  is 
no  connection  at  all  between  them ; and  that  in  their  not 
being  connected  lies  the  difference  between  action  and  pas- 
sion ; which  difference  is  the  essence  of  liberty." 1 

Things  are  sought  as  ends  or  as  means. 

The  schoolmen  distinguished  three  acts  of  will,  circa  finem, 
Velleity,  Intention , and  Fruition.  Gen.  iii.  C: — When  the 
woman  saw  that  the  tree  was  good  for  food,  and  that  it  was 
pleasant  to  the  eyes,  and  a tree  to  be  desired  to  make  one 
wise  (this  is  velleity),  she  took  thereof  (this  is  intention)  and 
did  eat  (this  is  fruition).  There  are  also  three  acts,  circa, 
media,  viz.,  consent,  approving  of  means — election,  or  choosing 
the  most  fit,  and  application,  use,  or  employing  of  them.  — V. 
Election,  Will. 


WELL-BEING.  — “ This  is  beyond  all  doubt,  and  indisputable," 
says  Leighton  in  his  Theological  Lectures,  “ that  all  men  wish 
well  to  themselves ; nor  can  the  mind  of  man  divest  itself  of 
this  propensity,  without  divesting  itself  of  its  being.  This  is 
what  the  schoolmen  mean  when  in  their  manner  of  expression 
they  say  that  ‘ the  will  ( voluntas , not  arbitrium)  is  carried 
towards  happiness,  not  simply  as  will,  but  as  nature.'  ‘ No 
man  hateth  his  own  flesh.’  " 

“One  conclusion  follows  inevitably  from  the  preceding  posi- 
tion,” says  Coleridge,2  “ namely,  that  this  propensity  can  never 
be  legitimately  made  the  principle  of  morality,  even  because 
it  is  no  part  or  appurtenance  of  the  moral  will : and  because 
the  proper  object  of  the  moral  principle  is  to  limit  and  control 
this  propensity,  and  to  determine  in  what  it  may  be,  and  in 
what  it  ought  to  be,  gratified ; while  it  is  the  business  of 


1 Dr.  Sam.  Clarke,  Second  Letter  to  a Gentleman , p.  410. 

2 Aids  to  Reflection , vol.  i.,  p.  20,  edit.  1848. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


. 551 


WELL-BEING  — 

philosophy  to  instruct  the  understanding,  and  the  office  of  re- 
ligion to  convince  the  whole  man,  that  otherwise  than  as  a 
regulated,  and  of  course  therefore  a subordinate,  end,  this 
propensity,  innate  and  inalienable  though  it  be,  can  never  be 
realized  or  fulfilled.’-’ — V.  Happiness. 

WHOLE  (cAoj). — “ There  are  wholes  of  different  kinds ; for,  in  the 
first  place , there  is  an  extended  whole,  of  which  the  parts  lie 
contiguous,  such  as  body  and  space.  Secondly,  There  is  a 
whole,  of  which  the  parts  are  separated  or  discrete,  such  as 
number,  which,  from  thence,  is  called  quantity  discrete.  Thirdly, 
There  is  a whole,  of  which  the  parts  do  not  exist  together,  but 
only  by  succession,  such  as  time,  consisting  of  minutes,  hours, 
and  days,  or  as  many  more  parts  as  we  please,  but  which  all 
exist  successively,  or  not  together.  Fourthly,  There  is  what 
may  be  called  a logical  whole,  of  which  the  several  specieses 
ar & parts.  Animal,  for  example,  is  a whole,  in  this  sense,  and 
man,  dog,  horse,  &c.,  are  the  several  parts  of  it.  And  fifthly, 
The  different  qualities  of  the  same  substance,  may  be  said  to 
be  parts  of  that  substance.”  1 

A whole  is  either  divisible  or  indivisible. 

Every  whole  as  a whole  is  one  and  undivided.  But  though 
not  divided,  a whole  may  be  divisible  in  thought,  by  being 
reduced  to  its  elements  mentally,  or  it  may  be  altogether 
indivisible  even  in  thought.  This  latter  is  what  metaphysicians 
call  Totum  perfectionale,  and  it  is  only  applicable  to  Deity,  who 
is  wholly  in  the  universe,  and  wholly  in  every  part  of  it. 

A divisible  whole  is  distinguished  as  potential,  or  that  which 
is  divisible  into  parts  by  which  it  is  not  constituted,  as  animal 
may  be  divided  into  man  and  brute,  but  is  not  constituted 
by  them  ; and  actual,  or  that  which  is  divisible  into  parts  by 
which  it  is  constituted,  as  man  may  be  divided  into  soul  and 
body. 

An  actual  whole  is  either  physical  or  metaphysical.  A 
physical  whole  is  constituted  by  physical  composition,  and  is 
integral  when  composed  of  the  integrant  parts  of  matter,  or 
essential  when  composed  of  matter  and  form.  A metaphysical 
whole  is  constituted  by  metaphysical  composition,  which  is 


* Monboddo,  Ancient  Melaphys.,  book  ii.,  chap.  12. 


552 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


WHOLE  - 

fourfold : 1.  A whole  made  up  of  genus  and  differentia  is  an 
essential  specific  whole — as  man,  in  so  far  as  he  is  a species  of 
animal,  is  made  up  of  the  genus  (animal)  and  the  differentia 
(rational).  2.  A whole  made  up  of  the  specific  nature  and  the 
individual  differentia,  is  an  essential  numerical  whole.  3.  A 
whole  of  existence  contains  a singular  essence  and  existence 
added.  4.  A whole  of  subsistence  has  subsistence  added  to 
existence.1 

According  to  Derodon,2  an  essential  whole  is  that  from  which 
if  any  part  be  taken  the  being  perishes  — as  man  in  respect 
of  his  body  and  soul.  An  integral  whole  is  that  from  which, 
if  any  part  be  taken,  the  being  is  not  entire  but  mutilated. 
Man  with  all  his  members  is  an  integral  whole ; cut  off  a limb, 
he  is  not  an  integral,  but  still  an  essential  whole. 

“A  whole  is  composed  of  distinct  parts.  Composition  may 
be  physical,  metaphysical,  or  logical. 

“A  physical  whole  is  made  up  of  parts  distinct  and  sepa- 
rate, and  is  natural,  as  a tree,  artificial,  as  a house,  moral,  or 
conventional,  as  a family,  a city,  &c. 

“A  metaphysical  whole  arises  from  metaphysical  composi- 
tion, as  potence  and  act,  essence  and  existence,  &c. 

“A  logical  whole  is  composed  by  genus  and  differentia,  and 
is  called  a higher  notion,  which  can  be  resolved  into  notions 
under  it,  as  genus  into  species,  species  into  lower  species. 
Thus,  animal  is  divided  into  rational  and  irrational,  knowledge: 
into  science,  art,  experience,  opinion,  belief. 

“ Of  the  parts  into  which  a whole  is  divisible,  some  are  es- 
sential, so  that  if  one  is  wanting  the  being  ceases,  as  the  head 
or  heart  in  man ; others  are  integral,  of  which  if  one  or  more 
be  wanting  the  being  is  not  entire,  as  in  man,  an  eye  or  arms ; 
others  are  constituent,  such  as  concur  to  form  the  substance 
of  the  thing,  as  oxygen  and  hydrogen  in  water.”3 
WHY?  — As  an  interrogative,  this  word  is  employed  in  three 
senses,  viz.,  — “By  what  proof  (or  reason)?”  “From  what 
cause  ?”  “ For  what  purpose  ?”  This  last  is  commonly  called 
the  “ final  cause,”  — e.  g.,  “ Why  is  this  prisoner  guilty  of  the 
crime?”  “Why  does  a stone  fall  to  the  earth?”  “Why 


1 Baronius,  Mdaphys.  Gcneralts,  sect.  15. 
8 Peemans,  Introd.  ad  Philosop7t.,  p.  72. 


2 Log.,  3 pars.,  p.  70. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


553 


WHY?- 

did  you  go  to  London?”  Much  confusion  has  arisen  from 
not  distinguishing  these  different  inquiries.1 

WILL  . — Some  modern  philosophers,  especially  among  the  French, 
have  employed  the  term  activity  as  synonymous  with  will. 
But  the  former  is  of  wider  signification  than  the  latter.  Acti- 
vity is  the  power  of  producing  change,  whatever  the  change 
may  be.  Will  is  the  power  of  producing  acts  of  willing. — V. 
Volition. 

“ Every  man  is  conscious  of  a power  to  determine,”  says 
Dr.  Reid,2  “ in  things  which  he  conceives  to  depend  upon  his 
determination.  To  this  power  we  give  the  name  of  will.” 

“ Will  is  an  ambiguous  word,  being  sometimes  put- for  the 
faculty  of  willing ; sometimes  for  the  act  of  that  faculty, 
besides  other  meanings.  But  volition  always  signifies  the  act 
of  willing,  and  nothing  else.  Willingness,  I think,  is  opposed 
to  unwillingness  or  aversion.  A man  is  willing  to  do  what  he 
has  no  aversion  to  do,  or  what  he  has  some  desire  to  do,  though 
perhaps  he  has  not  the  opportunity ; and  I think  this  is  never 
called  volition.”3 

“ By  the  term  will  I do  not  mean  to  express  a more  or  less 
highly  developed  faculty  of  desiring  ; but  that  innate  intellec- 
tual energy  which,  unfolding  itself  from  all  the  other  forces 
of  the  mind,  like  a flower  from  its  petals,  radiates  through  the 
whole  sphere  of  our  activity  — a faculty  which  we  are  better 
able  to  feel  than  to  define,  and  which  we  might,  perhaps,  most 
appropriately  designate  as  the  purely  practical  faculty  of 
man.”4 

“Appetite  is  the  will’s  solicitor,  and  the  will  is  appetite’s 
controller ; what  we  covet  according  to  the  one,  by  the  other 
we  often  reject.”5 

On  the  difference  between  desiring  and  willing,  see  Locke, 
Essay  on  Hum.  Understand. ; 6 Reid,  Act.  Pow.;1  Stewart,  Ac?. 
and  Mor.  Pow .e 

By  some  philosophers  this  difference  has  been  overlooked, 
and  they  have  completely  identified  desire  and  volition. 


1 Whately,  Log.,  Appendix  1.  a Act.  Pow.,  essay  ii.,  ch.  1. 

2 Correspondence,  of  Dr.  Reid , p.  79.  4 Feuchtersleben,  Dietetics  of  the  Soul. 

6 Hooker,  J Eccles.  Pol.,  book  i.  8 Book  ii.,  ch.  21. 

’ Essay  ii.,  ch.  2.  * Append.,  p.  471. 

48 


554 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


WILL  — 

“ What  is  desire,”  says  Dr.  Priestley,1  “ besides  a wish  to 
obtain  some  apprehended  good?  And  is  not  every  wish  a voli- 
tion ? Every  volition  is  nothing  more  than  a desire,  viz.,  a 
desire  to  accomplish  some  end,  which  end  may  be  considered 
as  the  object  of  the  passion  or  affection.” 

“ Volition,”  says  Mr.  Belsham,  “ is  a modification  of  the 
passion  of  desire.”  Mr.  James  Mill,  in  his  Analysis  of  Hie 
Hum.  Mind,  holds  that  the  will  is  nothing  but  the  desire  that 
is  most  powerful  at  the  time.  Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  in  his  Lec- 
tures on  Mor.  Philosophy,  has  not  spoken  of  the  faculty  of  will 
or  of  acts  of  volition  as  separate  from  our  desires.  And  in  his 
Essay  on  Cause  and  Effect,2  he  has  said,  “Those  brief  feelings 
which  the  body  immediately  obeys  are  commonly  termed  voli- 
tions, while  the  more  lasting  wishes  are  simply  denominated 
desires.” 

The  view  opposed  to  this  is  strongly  asserted  in  the  follow- 
ing passage:  — “We  regard  it  as  of  great  moment  that  the 
will  should  be  looked  on  as  a distinct  power  or  energy  of  the 
mind.  Not  that  we  mean  to  represent  it  as  exercised  apart 
from  all  other  faculties  ; on  the  contrary,  it  blends  itself  with 
every  other  power.  It  associates  itself  with  our  intellectual 
decisions  on  the  one  hand,  and  our  emotional  attachments  on 
the  other,  but  contains  an  important  element  which  cannot 
be  resolved  into  either  the  one  or  the  other,  or  into  both  com- 
bined. The  other  powers,  such  as  the  sensibility,  the  reason, 
the  conscience,  may  influence  the  will,  but  they  cannot  consti- 
tute it,  nor  yield  its  peculiar  workings.  We  have  only  by 
consciousness  to  look  into  our  souls,  as  the  will  is  working,  to 
discover  a power,  which,  though  intimately  connected  with 
the  other  attributes  of  mind,  even  as  they  are  closely  related 
to  each  other,  does  yet  stand  out  distinctly  from  them,  with 
its  peculiar  functions  and  its  own  province.  We  hold  that 
there  cannot  be  an  undertaking  more  perilous  to  the  best  inte- 
rests of  philosophy  and  humanity,  than  the  attempt  to  resolve 
the  will  into  anything  inferior  to  itself.  In  particular  it 
may  be,  and  should  be  distinguished  from  that  with  which  it 
has  been  so  often  confounded,  the  emotional  part  of  man’s 
nature.” 


1 Philosoph.  Kccess.,  p.  35. 


a Sect.  3. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


555 


WILL  — 

According  to  Ritter,1  “ it  was  a principle  with  the  Stoics  that 
will  and  desire  are  one  with  thought,  and  may  he  resolved 
into  it.”  Hence  their  saying,  ’Omne  actum  est  in  iniellectu. 
And  hence  they  maintained  that  passion  was  just  an  erro- 
neous judgment.  But  this  is  to  confound  faculties  which  are 
distinct.  By  the  intellect  we  know  or  understand,  by  the  sen- 
sitivity we  feel  or  desire,  and  by  the  will  we  determine  to  do 
or  not  to  do,  to  do  this  or  to  do  that. 

Intellectus  est  prior  voluntate,  non  enim  est  voluntas  nisi  de 
bono  intellecto.  — Thomas  Aquinas.2 

Ea  qua;  sunt  in  iniellectu  sinit  principia  eorum  qua;  sunt  in 
affectu,  in  quantum  scilicet  bonum  intellectum  movet  affectum? 

In  what  sense  the  understanding  moves  the  will  is  shown 
by  Aquinas.4 

“ Whether  or  no  the  judgment  does  certainly  and  infallibly 
command  and  draw  after  it  the  acts  of  the  will,  this  is  certain, 
it  does  of  necessity  precede  them,  and  no  man  can  fix  his  love 
upon  anything  till  his  judgment  reports  it  to  the  will  as 
amiable.”5 

On  the  question,  whether  the  connection  between  the  intel- 
lect and  the  will  be  direct  or  indirect,  see  Locke,  Essay  on 
Hum.  Understand .;6  Jonathan  Edwards,  Inquiry ;7  Dr.  Turn- 
bull,  Christ.  Philosoph? 

Will  (Freedom  of). — “This  is  the  essential  attribute  of  a will, 
and  contained  in  the  very  idea,  that  whatever  determines  the 
will  acquires  this  power  from  a previous  determination  of  the 
ivill  itself.  The  will  is  ultimately  self-determined,  or  it  is  no 
longer  a will  under  the  law  of  perfect  freedom,  but  a nature 
under  the  mechanism  of  cause  and  effect.”  5 

“We  need  only  to  reflect  on  our  own  experience  to  be  con- 
vinced that  the  man  makes  the  motive,  and  not  the  motive  the 
man.  What  is  a strong  motive  to  one  man,  is  no  motive  at  all 
to  another.  If,  then,  the  man  determines  the  motive,  what 
determines  the  man  to  a good  and  worthy  act,  wo  will  say,  or 
a virtuous  course  of  conduct?  The  intelligent  ivill,  or  the 
self-determining  power  ? True,  in  part  it  is ; and  therefore 

1 Hist,  of  Anc  Philosophy  vol.  iii.,  p.  555.  a Sum.  Theol.,  ii.,  1,  quasst.  83. 

B Ibidem , ii.,  2,  qusest.  7,  art.  2.  4 Ibid.,  ii.,  1,  qnaest.  9,  art.  1. 

8 South,  Sermon  on  Malt,  x.,  37.  6 B.  i.,  eh.  21.  7 Part  i.,  sect.  2. 

8 P.  190.  fl  Coleridge,  Aids  to  Reflection,  toI.  i.,  p.  227. 


556 


VOCABULARY  OP  PHILOSOPHY. 


WILL  — 

the  will  is  pre-eminently,  the  spiritual  constituent  in  our  being. 
But  will  any  man  admit,  that  his  own  will  is  the  only  and 
sufficient  determinant  of*all  he  is,  and  all  he  does?  Is  no- 
thing to  be  attributed  to  the  harmony  of  the  system  to  which 
it  belongs,  and  to  the  pre-established  fitness  of  the  objects 
and  agents,  known  and  unknown,  that  surround  him,  as  act- 
ing on  the  will,  though,  doubtless,  with  it  likewise?  a process 
which  the  co-instantaneous,  yet  reciprocal  action  of  the  air 
and  the  vital  energy  of  the  lungs  in  breathing,  may  help  to 
render  intelligible.”* 1 

“ It  is  very  true  that  in  willing  an  act,  or  in  any  act  of  self- 
determination,  I am  or  may  be  induced  by  a variety  of  motives 
or  impulses — my  will  may  be  moved ; but  this  does  not  exclude 
the  power  of  origination,  for  the  consent  even  to  the  outward 
inducement  or  stimulus,  still  requires  this  unique  act  of  self- 
determination  in  order  to  the  energy  requisite  to  the  fulfilment 
of  the  deed.  That  it  is  so,  who  shall  doubt  who  is  conscious 
of  the  power?  or  if  he  believes  that  he  has  not  this  conscious- 
ness he  belies  his  own  nature.  The  actuation  of  the  individual 
will  not  only  does  not  exclude  self-determination,  but  implies 
it  — implies  that,  though  actuated,  but  actuated  only  because 
already  self-operant,  it  is  not  compelled  or  acting  under  the 
law  of  outward  causation.  How  often  do  we  not  see  that  a 
stern  resolve  has  produced  a series  of  actions,  which,  sustained 
by  the  inward  energy  of  the  man,  has  ended  in  its  complete 
achievement?  Contrast  this  with  the  life  and  conduct  of  the 
wayward,  the  fickle  and  the  unsteady,  and  it  is  impossible  not 
to  find  the  inward  conviction  strengthened  and  confirmed,  that 
the  will  is  the  inward  and  enduring  essence  of  man’s  being.”2 

“ The  central  point  of  our  consciousness — that  which  makes 
each  man  what  he  is  in  distinction  from  every  other  man  — 
that  which  expresses  the  real  concrete  essence  of  the  mind 
apart  from  its  regulated  laws  and  formal  processes,  is  the  will. 
Will  expresses  power,  spontaneity,  the  capacity  of  acting  in- 
dependently and  for  ourselves.”3 

“ Will  may  be  defined  to  be  the  faculty  which  is  apprehended 
in  the  consciousness,  as  the  originating  power  of  the  personal 


1 Coleridge,  Aids  to  Reflection,  vol.  i.,  p.  44. 

1 Orcen,  Mental  Dynamics,  p.  54.  a More'll,  Phil,  of  Relig.,  p.  3. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


557 


WILL  — 

self.  Not  that  it  can  he  seen  to  he  an  absolute  poorer  of  self- 
origination ; it  is  possible  that  it  may  always  he  determined 
by  subtile  forces  which  do  not  fall  within  the  sphere  of  con- 
sciousness. But  so  far  as  apprehension  can  reach,  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  will  appear  to  have  their  origin  in  an  activity 
of  the  personal  self.”1  — V.  Nature,  Free-will,  Liberty, 
Necessity. 

WISDOM,  says  Sir  W.  Temple,  “is  that  which  makes  man  judge 
what  are  the  best  ends,  and  what  the  best  means  to  attain 
them.” 

“Wisdom,”  says  Sir  J.  Mackintosh,  “is  the  habitual  em- 
ployment of  a patient  and  comprehensive  understanding  in 
combining  various  and  remote  means  to  promote  the  happi- 
ness of  mankind.” 

Wisdom  is  the  right  use  or  exercise  of  knowledge,  and  differs 
from  knowledge,  as  the  use  which  is  made  of  a power  or  faculty 
differs  from  the  power  or  faculty  itself. 

Proverbs  eh.  xv.,  v.  2,  The  tongue  of  the  wise  useth  know- 
ledge aright.  Knowledge  puffeth  up.  Knowledge  is  proud 
that  he  hath  learned  so  much.  Wisdom  is  humble  that  he 
knows  no  more. 

The  word  corresponding  to  wisdom  was  used  among  the 
Greeks  to  designate  philosophy.  And  in  our  translation  of 
the  Scriptures,  the  word  wisdom  frequently  denotes  the  reli- 
gious sentiment,  or  the  fear  and  love  of  God. 

WIT  [wile,  to  know)  originally  signified  knowledge  or  wisdom. 
We  still  say,  in  his  wits,  out  of  his  wits,  for  in  or  out  of  a sound 
mind.  Mr.  Locke2  says,  “ Wit  lies  most  in  the  assemblage  of 
ideas,  and  putting  those  together  with  quickness  and  variety, 
wherein  can  be  found  any  resemblance  or  congruity,  thereby 
to  make  up  pleasant  pictures,  and  agreeable  visions  in  the 
fancy.  Judgment,  on  the  contrary,  lies  quite  on  the  other 
side,  in  separating  carefully  one  from  another,  ideas,  wherein 
can  be  found  the  least  difference,  thereby  to  avoid  being  mis- 
led by  similitude,  and  by  affinity  to  take  one  thing  for  another. 
This  is  a way  of  proceeding  quite  contrary  to  metaphor  and 
allusion,  wherein,  for  the  most  part,  lies  that  entertainment 
and  pleasantry  of  wit,  which  strikes  so  lively  on  the  fancy, 

1 Thompson,  Christ.  Theism,,  book  i.,  ch.  3.  9 Essay,  b.  ii.,  ch.  11. 

48  s 


558 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


WIT— 

and  therefore  is  so  acceptable  to  all  people;  because  its  beauty 
appears  at  first  sight,  and  there  is  required  no  labour  of 
thought  to  examine  what  truth  or  reason  there  is  in  it.” 
“This,”  says  Mr.  Addison,’  “is,  I think,  the  best  and  most 
philosophical  account  that  I ever  met  with  of  wit,  which  gene- 
rally, though  not  always,  consists  in  such  a resemblance  and 
congruity  of  ideas  as  this  author  mentions.  I shall  only  add 
to  it,  by  way  of  explanation,  that  every  resemblance  of  ideas 
is  not  that  which  we  call  ivit,  unless  it  be  such  an  one  that 
gives  delight  and  surprise  to  the  reader : these  two  properties 
seem  essential  to  wit,  more  particularly  the  last  of  them.  . . . 
Mr.  Locke’s  account  of  wit,  with  this  short  explanation,  com- 
prehends most  of  the  species  of  ivit,  as  metaphors,  similitudes, 
allegories,  enigmas,  mottoes,  parables,  fables,  dreams,  visions, 
dramatic  writings,  burlesques,  and  all  the  methods  of  allu- 
sion ; as  there  are  many  other  pieces  of  wit,  how  remote  soever 
they  may  appear  at  first  sight,  from  the  foregoing  description, 
which,  upon  examination,  will  be  found  to  agree  with  it.” 

“ It  is  the  design  of  wit,”  says  Dr.  Campbell,1 2  “to  excite  in 
the  mind  an  agreeable  surprise,  and  that  arising,  not  from 
anything  marvellous  in  the  subject,  but  solely  from  the 
imagery  she  employs,  or  the  strange  assemblage  of  related 
ideas  presented  to  the  mind.  This  end  is  effected  in  one  or 
other  of  these  three  ways : first,  in  debasing  things  pompous 
or  seemingly  grave:  I say  seemingly  grave,  because  to  vilify 
what  is  truly  grave,  has  something  shocking  in  it,  which 
rarely  fails  to  counteract  the  end  ; secondly,  in  aggrandizing 
things  little  and  frivolous ; thirdly,  in  setting  ordinary  objects, 
by  means  not  only  remote  but  apparently  contrary,  in  a par- 
ticular and  uncommon  point  of  view.” 

Dr.  Barrow,9  speaking  of  facetiousness,  says,  “Sometimes  it 
lieth  in  pat  allusion  to  a known  story,  or  in  seasonable  appli- 
cation of  a trivial  saying,  or  in  forging  an  apposite  tale: 
sometimes  it  playeth  in  words  and  phrases,  taking  advantage 
from  the  ambiguity  of  their  sense,  or  the  affinity  of  their 
sound : sometimes  it  is  wrapped  in  a dress  of  humorous 
expression ; sometimes  it  lurketh  under  an  odd  similitude ; 


1 Spectator,  62.  » Phil,  of  Rhet.,  b.  i.,  ch.  2,  sect,  1. 

0 Sermon  against  Foolish  Talking. 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


559 


WIT  — 

sometimes  it  is  lodged  in  a sly  question,  in  a smart  answer,  in 
a quirkish  reason,  in  a shrewd  intimation,  in  cunningly 
diverting  or  cleverly  retorting  an  objection:  sometimes  it  is 
couched  in  a bold  scheme  of  speech,  in  a tart  irony,  in  a lusty 
hyperbole,  in  a startling  metaphor,  in  a plausible  reconciling 
of  contradictions,  or  in  acute  nonsense:  sometimes  a scenical 
representation  of  persons  or  things,  a counterfeit  speech,  a 
mimical  look  or  gesture  passeth  for  it : sometimes  an  affected 
simplicity:  sometimes  a presumptuous  bluntness  giveth  it 
being ; sometimes  it  riseth  from  a lucky  hitting  upon  what  is 
strange:  sometimes  from  a crafty  wresting  obvious  matter  to 
the  purpose : often  it  consisteth  in  one  knows  not  what,  and 
springeth  up  one  can  hardly  tell  how.” 

“True  wit  is  like  the  brilliant  stone 
Dug  from  the  Indian  mine; 

Which  boasts  two  various  powers  in  one  — 

To  cut  as  well  as  shine. 

“Genius,  like  that,  if  polished  bright, 

With  the  same  gifts  abounds, 

Appears  at  once  both  keen  and  bright, 

And  sparkles  while  it  wounds.”  — Asotf. 

WIT  and  HUMOUR  commonly  concur  in  a tendency  to  provoke 
laughter,  by  exhibiting  a curious  and  unexpected  affinity ; the 
first  generally  by  comparison,  either  direct  or  implied,  the 
second  by  connecting  in  some  other  relation,  such  as  causality 
or  vicinity,  objects  apparently  the  most  dissimilar  and  hetero- 
geneous ; which  incongruous  affinity  gives  the  true  meaning 
of  the  word  oddity,  and  is  the  proper  object  of  laughter.”1 
“ The  feeling  of  the  ludicrous  seems  to  be  awakened  by  the 
discovery  of  an  unexpected  relation  between  objects  in  other 
respects  wholly  dissimilar.”  2 

Dr.  Trusler  says  that  wit  relates  to  the  matter,  humour  to  the 
manner ; that  our  old  comedies  abounded  with  wit,  and  our  old 
actors  with  humour ; that  humour  always  excites  laughter,  but 
wit  does  not;  that  a fellow  of  hum  our  will  set  a whole  company 
in  a roar,  but  that  there  is  a smartness  in  wit,  which  cuts  while 
it  pleases.  Wit,  he  adds,  always  implies  sense  and  abilities, 

1 Campbell,  Phil,  of  Phet.f  b.  i.,  chap.  2,  sect.  2. 

a M-Cosh,  Typical  Forms , b.  iii.,  chap.  2,  § 5. 


560 


VOCABULARY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


WIT  and  HUMOUR  - 

while  humour  does  not;  humour  is  chiefly  relished  by  the 
vulgar,  but  education  is  requisite  to  comprehend  wit.1 

Lord  Shaftesbury  has  an  Essay  on  the  Freedom  of  Wit  and 
Humour .* 


Z00N0MY  (?wok,  animal;  voyo law).  — That  department  of 
knowledge  which  ascertains  the  laws  of  organic  life.  Dr. 
Darwin  published  a well-known  work  under  this  title,  in 
which  he  classifies  the  facts  belonging  to  animal  life,  and  by 
comparing  them  seeks  to  unravel  the  theory  of  diseases. 


1 Taylor,  Synonym, s. 


* Charactorislicks,  vol.  i. 


APPENDIX. 


A VOCABULARY  OF  SOME  PRINCIPAL  KANTIAN  AND  OTHER  META- 
PHYSICAL TERMS. 

[From  Morel'.'?  Edition  of  Tennemann’s  Manual.  London,  1852.] 

The  most  remarkable  division  of  the  human  mind,  in  Kant’s 

system  is  that  into : 

Vermmft.  The  Intuitional  Faculty,  or  Reason,  which  he  divides  into  theore- 
tical and  practical,  and  which  gives  birth  to  Ideas  (Irfeen),  the  highest 
perceptions  of  the  mind,  which  are  innate,  but  stimulated  into  action  by 
Experience. 

Ver8tand.  Understanding  or  Intellect;  also  divided  into  theoretical  and 
practical ; the  parent  of  Conceptions  or  Notions  ( Begriffe ),  which  are 
the  generalizations  of  Thought,  and  mediate  representations  of  things. 
They  are  divided  into  conceptions  derived  from  Experience,  and  concep- 
tions derived  from  the  Understanding  itself. 

Under  the  operations  of  the  mind  we  find  the  following  terms ; 

Anschauuiig,  rendered,  in  this  edition,  by  Intuitional  and  Sensational  Percep- 
tion, gives  immediate  representations  of  things. 

Voretellung.  Representation  (the  Greek  favraaia),  applies  to  Intuitional  and 
Sensational  Perceptions,  and  also  to  conceptions  which  are  their  gene- 
ralizations. 

Erkenntniss.  Cognition,  representing  the  active  co-operation  of  the  Intel- 
lect bearing  on  the  object  presented  by  Sensational  and  Intuitional 
Perception. 

Geftihl  has  been  translated  Emotion  and  Feeling. 

IFissen.  Science ; sometimes  Knowledge,  but  never  Cognition. 

A marked  feature  of  Kant’s,  and  indeed  of  all  modern  German 

philosophy,  is  the  division  of  the  universe  of  things  into  Subjective 

and  Objective. 

The  Subjective  implies  the  internal  individual  element,  in  perception,  feeling, 
and  knowledge.  It  must  be  referred  to  its  centre  and  source  ; — Das  Ich, 
translated  the  Ego,  I or  Me,  implying  the  Percipient  Self-hood. 

2 m (561) 


562 


APPENDIX. 


The  Objective  is  the  oxternally-causod  olement  in  our  perception  and  know- 
ledge, derivablo  from  the  Nicht-Ich  — Non-Ego  ; or  in  plain  English, 
from  without. 

Another  broad  distinction  in  the  Transcendental  School  is  that 

between 

Dae  Sega,  translated  Ease,  or  Being,  and  signifying  bare,  empty  Existence, 
admitted  of  no  predicates ; and 

Daa  Weaen.  Real  concrete  Existence,  or  Essence  manifested  in  Qualified  or 
Conditional  Nature. 

Ena  Werclen.  The  Eeae  in  a state  of  action,  i.  e.  active  Existence;  differing 
from  it  as  dynamical  from  static  electricity. 

Daa  Abacilnte,  the  Absolute,  explains  itself  as  the  contrast  to  the  Relative, 
and  implies  the  Ground  and  Real  Principal  and  Basis  of  all  things. 

The  editor  has  also  been  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  coining  a 

few  words,  in  order  to  give  an  adequate  rendering  of  the  author’s 

thoughts.  Thus  he  has  translated  — 

Eenkbnrkeit.  Thinkableness;  Capacity  of  being  thought. 

Erkennt.  Cognized;  (a  word  for  which  wo  have  the  sanction  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton.) 

Teleologiach  = Teleological.  The  science  of  the  adaptation  of  means  to  ends. 
Final  Causes. 

Apodiktik  — A podiklik.  Demonstration. 

Pddngogik=  Padagogik.  The  Science  of  Education. 

JEathetik  = JEatlietica.  Theory  of  the  Fine  Arts. 

Prop'ddentik  = Propcedcutik.  Introductory  Preparation. 

Moment  = Momentum.  This  term  was  borrowed  from  Mechanics  by  Hegel 
(See  his  Wissenschaft  der  Logik,  vol.  3,  p.  104,  ed.  1841).  He  employs 
it  to  denote  the  two  contending  forces  which  are  mutually  dependent, 
and  whose  contradiction  forms  an  equation.  Hence  his  formula  Eeae  = 
Nothing.  Here  Eaae  and  Nothing  are  momentums,  giving  birth  to 
Werden,  i.  o.  Existence.  Thus  the  momentum  contributes  to  tho  same 
oneness  of  operation  in  contradictory  forces  that  we  see  in  Mechanics, 
amidst  contrast  and  diversity,  in  weight  and  distance,  in  the  case  of  the 
balance. 

Potenz.  Potency  or  dogreo.  (Schelliug’s  term  for  the  Serial  Order). 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


( From  Tennemann)  with  a few  additions. 


B.C. 

Rome 

Olymp. 

640 

114 

35,1 

Thales  born,  ac.  to  Apollodorus. 

630 

116 

35,3 

Solon  born. 

629 

125 

38 

Thales  born,  ac.  to  Meiners. 

611 

143 

42,2 

Anaximander  born. 

608 

146 

43,1 

Pythagoras  born,  ac.  to  Larcher. 

698 

156 

45,3 

Solon  published  his  laws.  Pherecydes  born  about 
the  same  time. 

697 

157 

45,4 

Thales  foretold  an  eclipse. 

584 

170 

49 

Pythagoras  born,  ac.  to  Meiners. 

561 

193 

55,1 

Solon  died. 

657 

197 

56 

Anaximenes  flourished. 

548 

206 

58,1 

Thales  died. 

547 

207 

58,2 

Anaximander  died. 

543 

211 

57,2 

Thales  died,  ac.  to  some.  Pherecydes  died. 

540 

214 

60 

Pythagoras  founded  a school  at  Croto. 

536 

218 

61 

Xenophanes  settled  at  Elea. 

504 

250 

69 

Pythagoras  died.  Parmenides  flourished,  ac.  to 
some. 

500 

254 

70,1 

Anaxagoras  and  Philolaus  born.  Heraclitus  and 
Leucippus  flourished. 

Anaximenes  died. 

496 

258 

71,1 

Ocellus  Lucanus  flourished. 

494 

260 

71,3 

Democritus  born. 

490 

264 

72,3 

Battle  of  Marathon. 

489 

265 

72,4 

Pythagoras  died,  ac.  to  some. 

480 

274 

75,1 

Battle  of  Salamis. 

472 

282 

77 

Diogenes  of  Apollonia  flourished. 

470 

284 

77.3 

Democritus  born,  ac.  to  Thrasyllus. 

469 

285 

77,4 

Socrates  born.  Parmenides  flourished. 

460 

284 

80 

Parmenides  came  from  Elea  to  Athens  with  Zeno. 
Democritus  born,  ac.  to  Apollodorus. 

Empedocles  flourished,  ac.  to  some. 

456 

298 

81 

Anaxagoras  repaired  to  Athens. 

450 

304 

82,3 

Xenophon  born. 

444 

310 

84 

Melissus. 

Gorgias  wrote  his  treatise  Ilcpi  4>v<k&>j 

(563) 

564 


APPENDIX. 


B.C. 

Rome 

Olymp. 

442 

312 

86 

Protagoras  and  Prodicus  flourished. 

432 

322 

87,1 

Beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

431 

323 

87,2 

Anaxagoras  accused. 

430 

324 

87,3 

Plato  born,  ac.  to  Corsini. 

429 

325 

87,4 

Plato  born,  ac.  to  Dodwell.  Pericles  died. 

428 

326 

88,1 

Anaxagoras  died. 

427 

327 

88.2 

Gorgias  sent  ambassador  to  Athens.  Diagoras  fl. 

414 

340 

91,3 

Diogenes  of  Sinope  born. 

407 

347 

93,2 

Democritus  died,  ac.  to  Eusebius. 

404 

350 

94,1 

Close  of  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

400 

354 

95,1 

Socrates  died  ; his  disciples  retired  to  Megara. 
Euclid  and  Arcliytas  flourished. 

389 

365 

97,4 

Plato’s  first  voyage  to  Syracuse. 

384 

370 

99,1 

Aristotle  born.  Pyrrho  born. 

380 

374 

100 

102 

Antisthenes  and  Aristippus  flourished. 
Aristotle  repaired  to  Athens. 

Eudoxus  flourished. 

364 

390 

104,1 

Plato’s  second  voyage  to  Syracuse. 

361 

393 

104,4 

Plato’s  third  voyage  to  Syracuse. 

360 

394 

105 

Xenophon  died. 

356 

398 

106 

Alexander  born. 

348 

406 

108,1 

Plato  died;  Speusippus  succeeded  him. 

343 

411 

109,2 

Aristotle  became  preceptor  to  Alexander. 

340 

414 

110,1 

Diogenes  and  Crates  (the  Cynics)  Pyrrho  and  Anax- 
archus  flourished.  Zeno  of  Cittium  born. 

339 

416 

110,2 

Speusippus  died.  Xenocrates  began  to  teach. 

337 

417 

110,4 

Battle  of  Cheronaea.  Epicurus  born. 

336 

418 

111,1 

Philip,  king  of  Macedon,  died. 

335 

419 

111,2 

Aristotle  opened  his  school  at  the  Lycseum. 

324 

430 

114,1 

Diogenes  the  Cynic  died. 

323 

431 

114,2 

Alexander  the  Great  died.  Ptolemy,  the  son  of 
Lagus,  succeeded  him  in  Egypt. 

322 

432 

114,3 

Aristotle  died  ; Theophrastus  succeeded  him. 

320 

434 

115 

Demetrius  Pliulereus,  and  Dicaaarchus  of  Messana 
flourished. 

316 

438 

116,1 

Arcesilaus  born  (or  later). 

314 

440 

116,3 

Xenocrates  died  ; Polemo  succeeded  him. 

313 

441 

116,4 

Theophrastus  became  celebrated.  Crates. 

305 

449 

118,3 

Epicurus  opened  his  school  at  Athens. 

300 

454 

120,1 

Stilpo,  and  Theodorus  the  Atheist,  flourished. 
Zeno  founded  a school  at  Athens. 

Diodorus  and  Philo. 

288 

466 

123,1 

Pyrrho  died. 

286 

468 

123,3 

Theophrastus  died.  Pyrrho  died  about  the  same 
time;  succeeded  by  Strato. 

Ptolemy  Philadelphus  became  king  of  Egypt. 

285 

469 

123,4 

280 

474 

125,1 

Chrysippus  born. 

272 

482 

126,4 

Timon  flourished. 

CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


565 


B.C. 

Rome 

Olymp. 

270 

484 

127,2 

Epicurus  died. 

269 

485 

127,3 

Strato  died  ; succeeded  by  Lyco. 

264 

490 

128,3 

Zeno,  the  Stoic,  died  (or  later) ; succeeded  by 
Cleanthes. 

260 

494 

130 

Persaeus. — Aristo  of  Chios. — Herillus  flourished. 

241 

513 

134,1 

Arcesilaus  died  (or  later). 

217 

537 

141,3 

Carneades  born. 

212 

542 

143 

Zeno  of  Tarsus  flourished. 

208 

546 

144 

Chrysippus  died,  ac.  to  Menage.  Diogenes  of 
Babylon. 

185 

569 

148,4 

Panaetius  born  (ac.  to  some,  later). 

155 

599 

156,3 

Embassy  from  the  Athenians  to  Rome.  (Critolaus, 
Carneades  the  Stoic,  and  Diogenes  of  Babylon). 

146 

608 

158,3 

Greece  and  Carthage  subjected  to  Rome. 
Antipater  of  Tarsus. 

142 

612 

159,3 

Macedon  became  a Roman  province. 

135 

619 

161,2 

Posidonius  born. 

129 

625 

162,4 

Carneades  died;  succeeded  by  Clitomachus. 

115 

639 

Panaetius  accompanied  Scipio  Africanus  to  Alex- 
andria. 

107) 

or  l 

647 

167,2 

Cicero  born. 

106  J 

170 

Clitomachus  died ; succeeded  by  Philo.  Posidonius 
flourished. 

84 

666 

171,1 

Sylla  took  Athens.  Philo  retired  to  Rome. 
Antiochus. 

86 

667 

171,2 

Lucretius  born  (ac.  to  others,  earlier).  Posidonius 
died. 

69 

685 

178 

Antiochus  died. 

63 

691 

172,2 

Judaea  became  a Roman  province. 

50 

182,2 

Posidonius  died  ; succeeded  by  Jason. 
Lucretius  died. 

48 

183,1 

Cratippus,  the  Peripatetic,  flourished. 

44) 

or  l 

711 

184,2 

Cicero  died. 

43  j 

30 

724 

187,3 

Egypt  became  a Roman  province. 

27 

727 

188,2 

Augustus  became  Emperor.  Philo  the  Jew  born. 

49 


566 


APPENDIX. 


A.C. 

Roman  Emperors. 

1 

Augustus. 

Birth  of  Christ. 

3 

Seneca  the  philosopher  born. 

Sextus  the  Pythagorean. 

Nicolaus  of  Damascus,  and  Xenarchus  flou- 
rished. 

Athenodorus  the  Stoic. 

14 

Tiberius. 

15 

Sotion. 

33 

Crucifixion  of  Jesus  Christ. 

34 

Philo  the  Jew  flourished. 

37 

Caligula. 

Flavius  Josephus  born. 

41 

Claudius. 

60 

Plutarch  of  Chaeronea  born. 

54 

Nero. 

65 

Seneca  died. 

66 

Cornutus  and  Musonius  exiled. 

69 

Galba,  Otho, 

Yitellius. 

Apollonius  of  Tyana  flourished. 

79 

Titus. 

81 

Musonius  Rufus  recalled  from  exile. 

82 

Domitian. 

Domitian  banished  the  philosophers  and  ma- 

89 

thematicians  from  Romo. 
Justin  Martyr  born. 
Epictetus  flourished. 

90 

Apollonius  of  Tyana  died. 

95 

97 

Nerva. 

Plutarch  flourished. 

99 

Trajan. 

Tacitus. 

Gnostics. 

118 

Adrian. 

Secundus  of  Athens.  Plutarch  died. 

120 

122 

Euphrates  the  Stoic  died. 

131 

Galen  Born.  Favorinus.  Basilides  the 
Gnostic. 

134 

Arrian  flourished. 

138 

Akiblia  the  Rabbin  died. 

139 

Antonius  Pius. 

Calv.  Taurus.  Apollonius  the  Stoic. 
Basilides  the  Stoic. 

160 

Apuleius. 

161 

M.  Aurelius  An- 
toninus. 

Alcinous.  Numenius. 

165 

Peregrinus  the  Cynic,  and  Justin  Martyr 
died. 

Lucian. 

170 

Athenagorus  and  Tatianus.  Atticus  the 
Platonist. 

Bardesanes. 

180 

Commodus. 

Maximus  of  Tyre.  Death  of  Antoninus. 
Ircnseus.  Juda  the  Rabbi.  The  Talmud. 

A.C. 

185 

193 

200 

205 

212 

218 

220 

222 

232 

233 

235 

238 

239 

242 

243 

244 

246 

253 

252 

252 

253 

269 

270 

275 

276 

277 

282 

284 

304 

306 

321 

326 

330 

333 

337 

340 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


567 


Roman  Emperors. 


Pertinax. 

Julianus. 

Sept.  Severus. 


Caracalla. 
Macrinus. 
Antoninus  Helio- 
gabalus. 

Alex.  Severus. 


Maximinus. 

Gordian. 

Gordian  the  son. 


Philip. 

Trajanus  Decius. 

Trebonianus. 

Gallus  and  Vi- 
bius. 

Ilostilianus. 

ASmilius  Valeria- 
nus. 

Flavius  Claudius. 

Aurelian. 

Flavius  Tacitus. 

Aurel.  Probus. 

Aurelius  Carus. 

Diocletian. 

Constantine  and 
Maximianus. 

Constantine  the 
Great. 

Constantine  con- 
verted to  Chris- 
tianity. 


Constantius  and 
Constans. 


Origen  born. 

Ammonius  Saccas  founded  a school. 

Clemens  of  Alexandria.  Alexander  of 
Aphrodisias. 

Galen  died. 

Plotinus  born.  Philostratus. 

Clemens  of  Alexandria  died. 

Tertullian  died. 


Plotinus  became  a disciple  of  Ammonius. 
Forphyrius  born. 

Ulpianus. 

Plotinus  travelled  into  Persia. 

Plotinus  came  to  Rome. 

Amelius  became  a disciple  of  Plotinus. 


Longinus  flourished. 
Origen  died. 


Plotinus  died. 
Longinus  put  to  death. 

The  Manichaeans. 

Arnobius. 

Porphyrius  died. 


Iamblichus  flourished. 


Arnobius  died. 

Lactantius  died. 

Iamblichus  died.  Themistius. 


Eusebius  bishop  of  Csesarea  died. 


568 


APPENDIX. 


A.C. 

Roman  Emperors. 

354 

Augustine  born. 

355 

Themistius  taught  at  Constantinople. 

300 

Julian. 

Sallustius. 

863 

Jovianus. 

304 

Valentinianus 
and  Valens. 

379 

Theodosius  the 
Great. 

Eunapius. 

380 

Nemesius  flourished. 

384 

St.  Jerome  flourished. 

391 

Gregorius  of  Nazianzus  died. 

394 

Gregorius  of  Nyssa. 

395 

Arcadius  and 

Ilonorius. 

The  Romas  empire  divided. 

398 

St.  Ambrosius  died. 

400 

Nemesius  died. 

401 

Greek  Emperors. 

Plutarch  the  son  of  Nestorius  flourished. 

402 

Arcadius. 

408 

Theodosius  II. 

409 

Macrobius.  Pelagius. 

410 

Synesius. 

412 

Proclus  born. 

415 

Death  of  Hypatia. 

418 

Pelagius  condemned. 

430 

St.  Augustine,  and  Plutarch  the  son  of  Nes- 
torius, died. 

434 

Syrianus  flourished. 

450 

Marcianus. 

Hierocles  and  Olympiodorus  flourished.  Syri- 
anus died. 

457 

Leo  I. 

470 

Claudianus  Mamertinus  flourished.  Boethius 
born. 

474 

Leo  II. 

Zeno  Isauricus. 

Marcianus  Capella  flourished. 

476 

End  of  the  Wes- 
tern Empire. 

480 

Salvanius.  Cassiodorus  born. 

485 

Proclus  died.  Ammonius  the  son  of  Her- 
mias.  Ilierocles. 

487 

j®neas  of  Gaza  flourished. 

490 

Marinus  died. 

491 

Anastasius. 

Marinus  succeeded  by  Isidorus. 

518 

Justin  I. 

626 

Boethius  beheaded. 

527 

Justinian. 

529 

The  Schools  of  philosophy  closed  at  Athens. 

533 

Philoponus  flourished. 

CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


569 


A.C. 

Greek  Emperors. 

539 

Cassiodorus  retired  to  a convent. 

549 

Damascius  and  Simplicius  flourished. 

663 

Justinian  II. 

575 

Tiberius  II. 

Cassiodorus  died. 

682 

Mauritius. 

602 

Phocas. 

604 

Gregory  the  Great  died. 

610 

Heraclius. 

622 

Flight  of  Mahomet. 

636 

Isidorus  of  Seville  died. 

641 

Constantine  III. 

and  IV. 
Constans  II. 

668 

Constantine  V. 

673 

The  venerable  Bede  born. 

685 

Justinus  II. 

694 

Leontius. 

698 

Tiberius  III. 

711 

Philippicus. 

713 

Anastasius  II. 

716 

Theodosius  III. 

717 

Leo  III.  Isauricus 

735 

Bede  died. 

736 

Alcuin  born. 

741 

Constant.  VI. 

753 

Almanzour  the 
Khalif. 

754 

John  of  Damascus  died. 

776 

Rhabanus  Maurus  born. 

796 

Irene. 

Emperors  of 
Germany. 

800 

Charlemagne. 

Haroun  al  Raschid. 
Alkendi  flourished. 

804 

Louis  the  Pious. 

Alcuin  died. 

814 

Lothaire. 

840 

855 

Louis  II. 

856 

Rhabanus  died. 

875 

Charles  the  Bald. 

J.  Scot  Erigena  came  to  France. 

877 

Louis  III. 

879 

Alfred  the  Great. 

880 

Charles  the  Fat. 

886 

Erigena  died. 

887 

Arnolphe. 

891 

Photius  died. 

899 

Louis  IV. 

912 

Conrad. 

49* 

570 


APPENDIX. 


A.  C. 

German  Emperors. 

919 

Henry  the  Fowler. 

937 

Otho  the  Great. 

954 

Alfarabi  died. 

974 

Otho  II. 

980 

Avicenna  born. 

987 

Otho  III. 

999 

Henry  II. 

Gerbert,  Pope  Sylvester  II. 

1002 

1003 

Sylvester  II.  died. 

1020 

Mich.  Const.  Psellus  born. 

1025 

Conrad  II. 

1034 

Anselm  born. 

1036 

Avicenna  died. 

1039 

Henry  III. 

1042 

Lanfranc  entered  the  convent  of  Bee. 

1055 

Hildebert  of  Lavardin  born. 

1056 

Henry  IV. 

1060 

Anselm  became  prior  of  Bee. 

1072 

P.  Damianus  died.  Algazel  born. 

1079 

Abelard  born. 

1080 

Berengarias  of  Tours  died. 

1089 

Lanfranc,  archbishop  of  Canterbury,  died. 

1091 

Bernard  of  Clairvaux  died. 

1092 

Roscellin  found  guilty  of  heresy  at  Soissons. 

1096 

Hugues  of  St.  Victor  born. 

1100 

Psellus  died  (later,  ac.  to  some). 
Eustrachius  of  Nicsea. 

1107 

Henry  V. 

1109 

Anselm,  archbishop  of  Canterbury,  died. 
Alghazali  d.  at  Bagdad  (ac.  to  Hammer). 

1114 

Alanus  of  Ryssel  born. 

1117 

Anselm  of  Laon  died. 

1118 

Abelard  taught  at  Paris. 

1120 

Abelard  became  monk  of  St.  Denis. 

William  of  Champeaux,  bishop  of  Chalons, 
died. 

1126 

Lothaire. 

1127 

Algazel  died  at  Bagdad. 

1134 

1138 

Hildebert  died. 

1139 

Conrad  III. 

Moses  Maimonides  born. 

1140 

Hugo  of  St.  Victor  died. 

1141 

Gilbertus  Porretanus  became  bishop  of  Poic- 
tiers. 

1142 

Abelard  died. 

1146 

Assembly  of  ecclesiastics  at  Paris  and  Rheims 

* 

to  oppose  Gilbertus  Porretanus. 

1150 

Lombardus  wrote  his  Sentences. 

Will,  of  Conches  died.  Rob.  Pulleyn  die<L 

A.  C. 

1153 

1154 

11(54 

1173 

1180 

1190 

1193 

1198 

1203 

1205 

1206 

1209 

1214 

1217 

1218 

1221 

1224 

1234 

1236 

1245 

1247 

1248 

1250 

1251 

1252 

1253 

1254 

1256 

1264 

1273 

1274 

1275 

1277 

1280 

1292 

1293 

1294 

1300 

1308 

1310 

1314 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


571 


German  Emperors. 
Fred.  Barbarossa. 

Henry  VI. 

Otho  IV. 

Frederic  II. 


Conrad  IV. 

Rodolphus  I. 

Adolpbus  of  Nas- 
sau. 

Albert  I. 

Henry  VII. 

Louis  V. 


Bernard  of  Clairvaux  died. 

Gilbertus  Porretanus  died. 

Peter  Lombardus  and  Hugo  of  Amiens  died. 
Richard  of  St.  Victor  and  Robert  of  Melun 
died. 

Johnof  Salisbury  died.  Walterof  St.  Victor. 
Thophail  died. 

Albert  the  Great  born,  according  to  some. 

Alanus  of  Ryssel  died. 

Moses  Maimonidcs  and  Peter  of  Poictiers 
died. 

Albert  the  Great  born,  according  to  others. 
Peter  of  Poictiers  and  Averroes  died. 

David  of  Dinant.  Amalric  of  Chartres  died. 
Roger  Bacon  born. 

Averroes  died,  according  to  some. 

Michael  Scot  at  Toledo. 

Bonaventura  born. 

Thomas  Aquinas  born. 

Raymond  Lulli  born. 

Albert  the  Great,  doctor  of  theology  at  Paris. 
Alexander  of  Hales  died. 

Thomas  Aquinas  went  to  Paris.  iEgidius 
Colonna  born. 

Will,  of  Auvergne,  bishop  of  Paris,  died. 
Thomas  Aquinas  began  to  lecture  on  Lom- 
bardus. 

Peter  of  Abano  born. 

Foundation  of  the  Sorbonne. 

Robert  Grossetete  died. 

Niceph.  Blemmydes  flourished. 

Thom.  Aquinas  became  Doctor  of  Theology. 
Vincent  of  Beauvais  died. 

Thomas  Aquinas  died.  Bonaventura  died. 
J.  Duns  Scotus  and  Walter  Burleigh  born. 
John  XXI.  (Petr.  Hispanus)  died. 

Albert  the  Great  died. 

Roger  Bacon  died,  according  to  Wood. 
Henry  of  Ghent  died. 

Roger  Bacon  died,  according  to  some. 
Richard  of  Middleton  died. 

J.  Duns  Scotus  died. 

Georgius  Pachymeres  died  about  this  time. 


572 


APPENDIX. 


A.  C. 

German  Emperors. 

1315 

1316 

1322 

1323 

1325 

1330 

1332 

1337 

1343 

1346 

Charles  IV. 

1347 

1349 

1350 

1357 

1358 

1361 

1363 

1374 

1379 

Wenceslaus. 

1380 

1382 

1395 

1396 

1397 

1400 

Robert. 

1401 

1408 

1410 

Sigismund. 

1415 

1419 

1425 

1429 

1430 

1435 

1436 

1438 

Albert  II. 

1440 

Frederic  III. 

1443 

Raymond  Lulli  died. 

Franc.  Mayron  introduced  disputes  in  the 
Sorbonne. 

JSgidius  Colonna  died. 

Peter  of  Abano  died. 

Occam  resisted  the  Pope. 

Herv6  (Hcrvseus  Natalis)  died. 

Franc.  Mayron  died. 

Occam  sought  the  protection  of  the  emperor 
Louis. 

Will.  Durand  of  Saint  Pourjain,  died. 
Theodorus  Metochita  died. 

Walter  Burleigh  died. 

Occam  died. 

Occam  died,  according  to  others. 

Thomas  of  Bradwardine  and  Robert  Holcot 
died. 

Peter  d’Ailly  born. 

Thomas  of  Strasburg  died. 

J.  Buridan  still  alive. 

Gregory  of  Rimini  died. 

J.  Tauler  died. 

J.  Gerson  born. 

Petrarch  died. 

Nic.  Oramus,  or  Oresmius,  died. 

Thomas  a Kempis  born. 

Bessarion  and  George  of  Trebisond  born. 
Marsilius  of  Inghen  died. 

Henry  of  Ilesse  died. 

Nicolas  Cusanus  born. 

Laur.  Valla  died. 

Matthceus  of  Cracow  died. 

Emmanuel  Chrysoloras  died. 

J.  Wessel  Gansfort  born. 

Peter  D’Ailly  died. 

J.  Gerson  died. 

Theodorus  Gaza  arrived  in  Italy. 

Marsilius  Ficinus  born. 

Raymond  de  Sabunde  taught  at  Toulouse. 
George  Gemisthus  Pletho  and  Bessarion  re- 
paired to  Florence. 

Invention  of  Printing.  Foundation  of  the 
Platonic  Academy  at  Florence. 

Nicolas  de  Clemange  died. 

Rodolphus  Agricola  born. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE, 


573 


A.  C. 

German  Emperors. 

1453 

Taking  of  Con- 
stantinople. 

1455 

Nicolas  V.  died.  Reuchlin  born. 

1457 

Laur.  Valla  died. 

1462 

P.  Pomponatius  born. 

1463 

John  Picas  of  Mirandula  born. 

1464 

Geo.  Scholarius  Gennadius  and  Nicolas  Cu- 
sanus  died. 

Cosmo  de’  Medici  and  Pius  II.  died. 

1467 

Erasmus  born. 

1471 

Thomas  a Kempis  died. 

1472 

Bessarion  died. 

1473 

Persecution  of  the  Nominalists  at  Paris. 
Augustinus  Niphus  born. 

1478 

Theodoras  Gaza  died. 

1480 

Thomas  More  born. 

1481 

Franc.  Philelphus  died. 

1483 

Paulus  Jovius  born. 

1484 

Jul.  Cees.  Scaliger  born. 

1485 

Rodolphus  Agricola  died. 

1486 

J.  Argyropulus  and  George  of  Trebisond 
died,  ac.  to  some. 

Agrippa  of  Nettesheim  born. 

1489 

J.  Wessel  died. 

1492 

Maximilian  I. 

Lorenzo  de’  Medici  died.  Louis  Vives  born. 

1493 

Discovery  of 

America. 

Hermolaus  Barbaras  died.  Theophrastus 
Paracelsus  born. 

1494 

J.  Picus  of  Mirandula  and  Angelus  Politianus 
died. 

1495 

Gabr.  Biel  died. 

1497 

Melancthon  born. 

1499 

Marcilius  Ficinus  died. 

1500 

Dominicus  of  Flanders  died. 

1501 

Jerome  Cardan  born. 

1508 

Bernardinus  Telesius  born. 

1509 

Andr.  Ceesalpinus  born. 

1512 

Alex.  Achillinus  died. 

1515 

Petrus  Ramus  born.  Macchiavelli  flourished. 

1517 

Beginning  of  the 
Reformation. 

1520 

Charles  V. 

Fr.  Piccolomini  born. 

1522 

J.  Reuchlin  died. 

1525 

P.  Pomponatius  died.  Fr.  Zorzi  flourished. 

1527 

Nich.  Macchiavelli  died. 

1529 

Fr.  Patritius  born. 

1532 

Ant.  Zimara  died.  Jac.  Zabarella  born. 

1533 

J.  Fr.  Picus  of  Mirandula  killed. 

574 


APPENDIX. 


A.  0. 

German  Emperors. 

1533 

Nic.  Leonicus  died.  Val.  Weigel  and  Mon- 

1535 

taigne  born. 

H.  Cornelius  Agrippa  died.  Sir  T.  More 

1536 

beheaded. 

Erasmus  died.  Fr.  Zorzi  died. 

1537 

Jac.  Faber  died. 

1540 

Marius  Nizolius  and  L.  Vives  died. 

1541 

Institution  of  the  Jesuits. 

Theophr.  Paracelsus  died.  Charron  bom. 

1542 

Gasp.  Contarini  died. 

1543 

Copernicus  died. 

1546 

Augustinus  Niphus  died. 

1547 

Jac.  Sadoletus  died.  Nic.  Taurellus  and 

1552 

Justus  Lipsius  born. 

Paulus  Jovius  died.  Cses.  Cremoninus  born. 

1553 

Sim.  Porta  died. 

1555 

Ferdinand  I. 

1560 

Phil.  Melancthon  died. 

1561 

Franc.  Bacon  born. 

1562 

Ant.  Talceus  died.  Fr.  Sanchez  born. 

1564 

Maximilian  II. 

1568 

Thomas  Campanella  born. 

1569 

1572 

P.  Ramus  died.  Dan.  Sennert  born. 

1574 

J.  Sepulveda  died. 
Robert  Fludd  born. 

1575 

Jac.  Bohm  born. 

1576 

Rodolph  II. 

Jer.  Cardan  died. 

1577 

J.  P.  Van  Ilelmont  born. 

1578 

Berigard  born.  Alex.  Piccolomini  died. 

1580 

Giordano  Bruno  quitted  Italy. 

1581 

Lord  Herbert  of  Clierbury  born. 

1583 

Grotius  born. 

1586 

Jac.  Schegk  died.  Luc.  Vanini  and  Le 

1588 

Vayer  born. 

Bernardus  Telesius  born.  Th.  Hobbes  born. 

1589 

Val.  Weigel  died. 
Jac.  Zabarella  died. 

1592 

Mich,  de  Montaigne  died.  Gassendi  and 

1596 

Comenius  born. 

R.  Descartes  born.  J.  Bodin  died. 

1597 

Fr.  Patritius  died. 

1600 

Giord.  Bruno  burnt. 

1603 

P.  Charron  and  And.  Caesalpinus  died. 

1604 

Fr.  Piccolomini  died. 

1606 

Nic.  Taurellus  and  Just.  Lipsius  died. 

1614 

Matthias. 

Mart.  Schoock  born.  Fr.  Suarez  died. 

Fr.  Merc.  Van  Helmont  born. 

1619 

Ferdinand  II. 

L.  Vanini  burnt. 

A.  C. 

1621 

1623 

1624 

1625 

1626 

1628 

1630 

1632 

1634 

1637 

1638 

1639 

1642 

1644 

1645 

1646 

1647 

1648 

1649 

1650 

1651 

1654 

1655 

1657 

1659 

1662 

1663 

1665 

1666 

1669 

1670 

1671 

1672 

1675 

1676 

1677 

1679 

1680 

1684 

1685 

1687 

1688 

1694 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


575 


German  Emperors. 


Ferdinand  III. 


Leopold  I. 


J.  Barclay  died. 

Blaise  Pascal  bom. 

Jac.  Bohm  died. 

Clanberg,  Geulinx,  and  Wittich  born. 

Fr.  Bacon  died. 

Rud.  Goclenius  died. 

Huet  born.  Caes.  Cremoninus  died. 

Fr.  Sanchez  died. 

Benedict  Spinoza,  J.  Locke,  Silv.  Regis, 
Sam.  Puffendorf,  and  Rich.  Cumberland 
born. 

B.  Becker  born. 

Dan.  Sennert  and  Robert  Fludd  died. 

Nic.  Malebranche  bom. 

Th.  Campanella  died. 

Galileo  died.  Newton  born. 

J.  Baptiste  Van  Helmont  died. 

Grotius  died. 

Leibnitz  and  Poiret  born. 

Bayle  born. 

Herbert  of  Cherbury  and  Mersenna  died. 
Scioppius  died. 

Descartes  died. 

William  of  Tschirnliausen  born. 

J.  Selden  died. 

Gassendi  died.  Chr.  Thomasius  born. 

Adr.  Heerebord  died.  Wollaston  born. 
Blaise  Pascal  died. 

Berigard  died. 

J.  Clauberg  and  Mart.  Schoock  died. 

J.  De  Silhon  died. 

Geulinx  and  J.  Coccejus  died. 

Sorbiere  died. 

Comenius  died.  Ant.  Earl  of  Shaftesbury  b. 
Le  Vayer  died. 

Sam.  Clarke  born. 

M.  Von  Kronland  and  Voetius  died. 

Ben.  Spinoza  died.  Th.  Gale,  Fr.  Glisson, 
and  Harrington  died. 

Chr.  Wolf  bom.  Jer.  Hirnhaym  and  Hobbes 
died. 

Jos.  Glanville  and  La  Rochefoucauld  died. 
Berkeley  born.  Jac.  Thomasius  died. 

Lamb.  Velthuysen  died. 

Henr.  More  and  Wittich  died. 

Cudworth  and  Parker  died. 

Ant.  Arnault  and  Sam.  Puffendorf  died. 

Fr.  Hutcheson  and  Voltaire  born. 


576. 


APPENDIX. 


A.  C. 

German  Emperors. 

1695 

Nicole  died. 

1698 

Balthasar  Becker  and  J.  Pordage  died. 

1699 

Fr.  Merc.  Van  Helmont  died. 

1701 

J.  Locke  and  Bossuet  died. 

1705 

Joseph  I. 

J.  Ray  died. 

1706 

Bayle  died. 

1707 

Silv.  Regis  died. 

1708 

Tschirnhausen  and  Jacquelot  died. 

1711 

Hume  born. 

1712 

Crusius  and  Rousseau  born. 

1713 

Charles  VI. 

Ant.  Earl  of  Shaftesbury  died. 

1715 

Malebranche  died.  Condillac  and  Helvetiue 

1716 

born. 

Gell'ert  born. 
Leibnitz  died. 

1718 

M.  Aug.  Fardella  died. 

1719 

P.  Poiret  and  Rich.  Cumberland  died. 

1720 

Bonnet  born. 

1721 

Huet  died. 

1722 

Boulainvilliers  died. 

1723 

Adam  Smith  born. 

1724 

Wollaston  died.  Kant  bora. 

1727 

Newton  died. 

1728 

Chr.  Thomasius  and  Thiimmig  died. 

1729 

Sam.  Clarke,  Collins,  Gundling,  and  Fr. 

1731 

Buddeus  died. 

And.  Rudiger  died. 

J.  Priestley  bora.  Mandeville  died. 

1733 

W.  Derham  died. 

1735 

Le  Clerc  died. 

1736 

Charles  VII. 

1740 

Frederic  II,  King 

1742 

of  Prussia. 

Garve  bora. 

1743 

Jacobi  born. 

1744 

Baptist  Vico  and  Joachim  Lange  died. 

1745 

Francis  I. 

Platner  bora. 

1747 

Fr.  Hutcheson  died. 

1748 

Dc  Crouzaz  and  Burlamaqui  died. 

1750 

Bilfinger  died. 

1751 

La  Mettrie  died. 

1752 

Hansch  died. 

1754 

Berkeley  and  Christ.  Wolf  died. 

1755 

Montesquieu  died. 

1756 

1757 

David  Hartley  died.  Gall  born. 

1758 

Ch.  Reinhold  bora. 

1759 

Maupertuis  died. 

A.  C. 

1762 

1765 

1766 

1769 

1770 

1771 

1772 

1774 

1775 

1776 

1777 

1778 

1779 

1780 

1781 

1782 

1783 

1784 

1785 

1786 

1788 

1789 

1790 

1791 

1792 

1793 

1796 

1798 

1800 

1801 

1802 

1803 

1804 

1806 

1808 

1809 

1812 

1813 

1814 

1815 

1816 

1817 

1818 

1819 

1820 

1821 

1822 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


577 


German  Emperors. 


Joseph  II. 


French  Revolu- 
tion. 

Leopold  IL 
Francis  II. 


50 


Alex.  Baumgarten  died.  Fichte  born. 
Herm.  Sam.  Reimarus  died. 

Thomas  Abbt  and  Gottsched  died. 

Gellert  died. 

Winckler,  D’Argens,  and  Formey  died. 
Helvetius  died. 

J.  Ulr.  Cramer  died.  Swedenborg  died. 
Quesnay  died. 

Crusius  and  Walch  died.  Schelling  born. 
Hume  died.  Spurzheim  born. 

Meier  and  Lambert  died. 

Voltaire  and  Rousseau  died. 

Sulzer  died. 

Condillac  and  Batteux  died. 

Ernesti  and  Lessing  died. 

Henry  Home  and  Iselin  died. 

D’Alembert  died. 

Diderot  died. 

Baumeister  and  De  Mably  died. 
Mendelssohn  died. 

Hamann  and  Filangieri  died. 


A.  Smith,  F.  Hemsterhuys  and  Basedow  d. 
Rich.  Price,  Daries,  and  Nettelbladt  died. 
Victor  Cousin  born. 

Bonnet,  Moritz,  and  Beccaria  died. 

Th.  Reid  died.  Jouffroy  born. 

Garve  died. 

Sol.  Maimon  died. 

Heidenreich  and  Irving  died. 

Engel  died. 

J.  Beattie  and  Herder  died. 

Kant,  Jos.  Priestley,  and  Saint-Martin  d. 
Tiedemann  died. 

Bardili  died. 

J.  A.  Eberhard,  Steinbart,  and  Thos.  Payne, 
died. 

K.  Chr.  E.  Schmid  died. 

J.  A.  II.  Ulrich  died. 

Fichte  died. 

Mesmer  died. 

Ferguson  died. 

De  Dalberg  died. 

- Platner  and  Campe  died. 

Jacobi  and  Solger  died. 

Wyttenbach  and  Klein  died.  Gall  d. 

Feder  and  Buhle  died. 

Eschenmaycr  died. 

2x 


578 


APPENDIX. 


A.  C. 

German  Emperors. 

1823 

Reinlioid  and  Maass  died. 

1828 

D.  Stewart  and  Bouterwek  died. 

1829 

Frederic  Schlegel. 

1831 

Hegel.  Whateley. 

1832 

Krause.  Schulze.  Spurzheim  died. 

1834 

Schleiermacher. 

1836 

Brownson.  J.  Mill  died.  Ritter. 

1837 

Ferdinand  IV. 

Fourier.  Whewell. 

1838 

Schopenhauer  died.  Day. 

1839 

Way  land. 

1840 

Krug. 

1841 

Herbart.  Emerson.  Upham. 

1842 

Degerando.  Sch  mucker. 

1843 

Francis. 

Fries.  Fr.  Baader.  J.  S.  Mill. 

1844 

Bouvier. 

Baynes. 

1846 

Rauch. 

1848 

W.  A.  Butler.  Blakey. 

1849 

Ilickok. 

1850 

Jouffroy.  Chalybans.  M'Cosh. 

1851 

Joseph  I. 

Oersted. 

1852 

Diction,  des  Sciences  Philos,  completed. 
Fortlage.  Wright’s  Transl.  of  Cousin. 

1854 

Hamilton’s  Reid.  Schelling  died. 

1856 

Hamilton,  Sir  Wm.,  died.  Schwegler’s  Hist. 
Philos.,  Transl.  by  Seelye. 

1857 

Haven. 

1859 

Mansell.  Jamieson. 

1860 

Young.  Dagg. 

GERMAN 


PHILOSOPHERS  OF  THE  MOST  RECENT  ERA. 


Arranged  by  Schools.* 


I.  SCHOOL  OF  KANT. 


Kant. 

Neeb. 

Schwartz. 

Reinhold. 

Jacob. 

Schmalz. 

Mellin. 

Tieftrunk. 

Bergk. 

Schultz. 

Kiesewetter. 

Feuerbach. 

Schmid. 

Hoffbauer. 

Fiillebom. 

Heydenreich. 

Kiinhardt. 

Flugge. 

Beck. 

Berger  (Emmanuel). 

Born. 

Ben  David. 

Kern. 

Kinker. 

Dietz. 

Boethius. 

Matthiae. 

Mutschelle. 

Kindervater. 

Wendt. 

Snell. 

Socher  (Joseph). 

Stoeudlin. 

Schaumann. 

Fischhaber. 

Buhle. 

Schmidt-Phiseldek. 

Pcelitz. 

Tennemann. 

II.  DISSENTERS  FROM  THE  SCHOOL  OF  KANT. 

Schulze. 

Maimon. 

Ruckert. 

Beck. 

Bouterweck. 

Krug. 

Berg. 

Bardili. 

III.  SCHOOL  OF  FICHTE. 

Fichte. 

Schad. 

Reinhold. 

Forberg. 

Niethammer. 

Michaelis. 

Schelling. 

IV.  SCHOOL  OF  JACOBI. 

Jacobi. 

Ancillon. 

Salat.. 

Koeppen. 

Weiss  (C.) 

Schmid  (Theod. 

Fries. 

Weiller. 

* From  the  Diet,  des  Sciences  Pkilosophiqucs.  Tom.  ri.  1042. 

(579) 


580 


RECENT  PHILOSOPHERS. 


V.  SCHOOL  OF  SCHELLING  AND  HEGEL. 


Schelling. 

Hegel. 

Novalis. 

Weber. 

Ast. 


Kayssler. 

Klein. 

Rixner. 

Abicht. 


Zimmer. 
Stutzmann. 
Berger  (Eric). 
Suabedissen. 


VI.  MYSTICS  AND  DISSIDENTS. 


Hamann. 

Baader. 

Schlegel  (Frederic). 
Weishaupt. 


Herder. 

Schleiermacher. 

Solger. 

Richter  (Jean  Paul). 


Schneller. 

Krause. 

Herbart. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX 


OF 

AUTHORS  AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


Abelard,  Peter  (1079-1142). 

1.  Opera  (Paris,  1616)  Cousin  (1849). 

2.  Recently  discovered  works  (Sic  et  Non)  (1831  Rheniwald,  1836  Cousin, 

1851  Hanlce  and  Lindenlcohl). 

Belief.  Scholastic  Philosophy. 

Acadamie  des  Sciences  Morales  et  Politiques. 

Ideology. 

Achenwall,  G.  (1719-1772). 

Jus.  Natural,  1750-1781. 

Statistics. 

Acontius,  or  Concio,  James.  (XYIth  Cent.) 

Re  Methodo  investig.  artium.  1558. 

Method. 

Adams,  Dr.  IVm.  (1707-89). 

1.  Sermon  on  the  Nature  and  Obligation  of  Virtue.  1777. 

Obligation.  Rectitude.  Sanction. 

2.  Essay  on  Miracles,  in  answer  to  Hume.  1752. 

Miracles.  Testimony. 

3.  Essay  on  Self-Murder. 

Suicide. 

Addison,  Joseph  (1672 — 1719). 

Spectator,  1711-1714. 

Faculties  of  the  Mind  (Classification  of).  Fancy.  Imagination. 
Physiognomy.  Taste.  Wit. 
iEsop.  (Vlth  Cent.  B.  C.) 

Apologue.  Fable.  

Agonistes,  or  Philosophical  Strictures. 

Consciousness  and  Feeling. 

Agrippa,  Cornelius  (de  Nettesheim)  (1486 — 1535). 

1.  De  Incertitudine  et  Vanitate  Scientiarum.  (1527.) 

2.  De  Occulta  Philosophia.  (1533.) 

3.  Opera  (about  1550)  in  German.  1856. 

Anima  Mundi.  Archetype.  Theosophism. 

50* 


(581) 


582 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Ahrens,  Heinrich,  (b.  1S08.) 

1.  Coins  de  Psychologic.  2 vols.  Paris.  1837-38. 

2.  Orgunische  Stautslehre  auf  pliilos.-anthropol.  Grundlage.  Vienna, 

(1830). 

Causality.  Personality. 

Akensidk,  Mark  (1721 — 1770). 

The  Pleasures  of  the  Imagination.  1744. 

Imagination  and  Memory.  Laughter.  Taste. 

Albertus,  Magnus  (d.  1280). 

Scholastic  Philosophy. 

Albigenses,  or  Cathari. 

Manicheism. 

Alcuin,  Flaecus  Albinus.  (736 — 804.) 

Opera  ( Frobcnii ) 1777.  a.  De  llatione  Animce. 

Faculty. 

Ai,diuch,  Ilcnry,  D.D.  (1647 — 1710). 

a.  Artis  LogictE  Compendium.  1691.  b.  Traml.  with  Questions.  1825. 
Conceiving.  Definition.  Intention.  Notions  first  and  second.  Syllo- 
gism. Truth. 

Alembert,  D.  (J.  Le  Rond).  (1717-83). 

Melanges  de  Litterat.  Amsterd.  1767. 

Metaphysics.  Reminiscence. 

Alexandria,  School  of. 

Matter,  Essai  llistorique  sur  Vlcole  d' Alexandria.  Paris.  1820. 

Anima  Mundi.  Eclecticism.  Ecstasy.  Emanation.  Pnoumatology. 
Unification. 

Alison,  Archibald  (1757—1828.) 

Essays  on  the  Nature  and  Principles  of  Taste.  (1790.) 

Beauty.  Taste. 

Alitheus,  Theophilus  (Lyser). 

Polygamia  Triumphatrix.  1682. 

Polygamy. 

Alliot,  Dr. 

Psychology  and  Theology.  12mo.  Lond.  1855. 

Psychology. 

Alstediijs,  J.  II.  (1588-1638.) 

Scientiarum  Omnium  Encyclopedia.  1630.  Four  vols.  folio. 
Archelogy. 

Ames,  Wm.  (1576-1633). 

Mysticism. 

Ammonius,  Hermi®  (filius)  (ab.  A.  C.  500.) 

Commentaria  in  PrtEdicamenta  ( Categor .)  Aristotelis  (1546) — Ed.  Bran- 
dis (1836). 

Acroamatieal.  Organon.  Prmprmdicamcnta. 

Ampere,  A.  M.  (1775-1836). 

Nosology. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


583 


Anaxagoras.  (B.  C.  500 — 428). 

Fragments  of  his  Works,  ed.  by  Schaubach  (1827),  Schorn  (1829).  On 
his  Philosophy,  Cams  (1797),  Schleiermacher  (1815),  Breier 
(1840.) 

Atom.  Criterion. 

Anaximander,  of  Miletus.  (B.  C.  610 — 546). 

Schleiermacher.  (1811.) 

Mathematics.  Potential. 

Anaximenes,  (ah.  B.  C.  556). 

Grolhe.  (16S9.) 

Atheism. 

Ancillon,  J.  P.  F.  (1767—1837). 

Essai  ear  V Idie  et  le  Sentim.  de  VInfini.  Melanges,  (1809.)  Essais, 
(1S17.)  Nouv.  Essais.  (1824.) 

Infinite. 

Andre,  Y.  M.  (1675—1764). 

1.  Essai  stir  le  Beau.  (1741). 

2.  CEuvres  (Guyot).  1766. 

Beauty. 

Andronicus,  (of  Rhodes).  (1st  Cent.  B.  C.) 

Metaphysics. 

Anselm,  of  Canterbury.  (1033 — 1109). 

Opera  (Gerberon).  1675.  2 d and  best,  (1721.)  Cf.  Frank  (1842.)  Haste 
(1843).  Bouchitte  Bemusat  (Paris,  1853.) 

Belief.  Optimism.  Understanding. 

Anselme,  Anth.  L’Abbe.  (1652 — 1737). 

Snr  le  Souverain  Bien  des  ancient  (in  Mem.  de  l’ Acad.  d’Inscr.  et  B.  L.) 
Good,  the  Chief. 

Antiochds,  of  Askalon.  (B.  C.  1st  Cent.) 

Academics. 

Antisthenes,  the  Cynic.  (B.  C.  422.) 

Cynic. 

Antoninus,  M.  AuMius.  (121 — 180.) 

Be  Rebus  sin's,  Lib.  XII.  Comment  Perpet.,  etc.  Studio  Opcraquc  Th, 
Gataker.  Cambr.  1643.  Bond.  1697. 

Rectitude. 

Apuleius,  Lucius  (ab.  A.  D.  160). 

Liber  de  Deo  Socratis.  (1625.) 

Demon. 

Aquinas,  Thomas,  “ the  Angelic  Doctor.”  (1227 — 1274). 

1.  Opera.  1570.  (Venice,  1745-60.) 

Arbor  Porphyriana. 

2.  Summa  Theologice.  (Nicolai.)  Paris,  1663. 

Analogy  and  Experience.  Certainty.  Negation.  Privation.  Syn- 
deresis.  AY ill. 


584 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Aquinas,  Thomas. 

3.  De  Veritate  Catholicce  fidei  contra.errorea  gentilium.  (1475.) 
Certainty.  Intellect.  Truth. 

4.  Opuacula.  ( Oper.  six.) 

Intention  (First  and  Second). 

5.  De  Magiatro.  (Oper.  is. — xiii.) 

Reminiscence.  Scholastic  Philosophy. 

Arcesilaus,  (ab.  B.  C.  316). 

Academics.  Species. 

AncnELAUs,  of  Miletus,  (ab.  B.  C.  460). 

Atom. 

Archimedes.  (B.  C.  467-287). 

De  Equilibria.  ( Opera  Torelli.  Oxford.  1793). 

Sufficient  Reason  (Doctrine  of). 

Archytas,  of  Tarentum.  (Vth  Cent.  B.  C.) 

Category. 

Argyropolus,  John.  (XVth  Cent.) 

Entelechy. 

Aristides.  (lid  Cent.  A.  D.) 

Apology. 

Aristippus,  of  Cyrene.  (FI.  B.  C.  380.) 

Hedonism. 

Aristotle.  (B.  C.  384-322).  (Aristotelians  and  Peripatetics). 

1.  Topica. 

Definition.  Difference. 

2.  Metaphyaica.  (Bohn.) 

Contradiction.  Criterion.  Disposition.  Element.  Entelechy.  Ex- 
cluded Middle.  Form.  Habit.  Metaphysics.  Method.  Part. 
Power.  Principle.  Secundum  Quid.  Theology.  Unity.  Uni- 
versal. 

3.  De  Anima,  vepi  ip  I’X’iS- 

Contraries.  Intellectus  patiens.  Life.  Sensibles  common  and  pro- 
per. Soul.  Spirit,  mind  and  soul  (under  soul).  Substance.  Ta- 
bula Rasa. 

4.  Organon.  (Categor.  Interpretat.  Analyt.  pr.  and  poa.  Top.  Soph.) 
Criterion.  Demonstration.  Organon. 

5.  Prior  Analyt. 

Deduction.  Grammar.  Induction.  Logic.  Syllogism.  Term. 

6.  Boater  Analyt. 

Definition.  Division.  Experience.  Grammar.  Logic.  Science. 

7.  Ethica  Nicom. 

Dreaming.  Election.  Ends.  Equity.  Ethics.  Friendship.  Habit. 
Happiness.  Ignorance.  Justice.  Method.  Motive.  Person. 
Suicide.  Temperament.  Understanding. 

8.  Phyeica. 

Chance.  Eclecticism.  Esoteric.  Privation. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


585 


Aristotle. 

9.  Economics. 

Economics. 

10.  Rhetorica. 

Ethology.  Metaphor  and  Simile. 

11.  Interpretations,  Liber  de.  Iltpi  ippyvtlai. 

Grammar.  Modality.  Universal. 

12.  De  Memoria  et  lieminiscentia. 

Memory.  Reminiscence.  Train  of  Thought. 

13.  Poet. 

Metaphor. 

14.  De  Generations  Animalium. 

Nature  (Course  or  power  of).  - 

15.  Physiognomy  (spurious). 

Physiognomy. 

16.  Categor. 

Quantity. 

17.  De  Sensu  et  Sensili. 

Sensibles,  Common  and  proper. 

18.  Polit. 

Society  (Desire  of).  Do.  (Political,  Capacity  of).  Spirit,  mind  and 
soul  (under  soul). 

19.  Logic.  (See  Organon.) 

Sophism.  Theory. 

Abduction.  Accidental.  Acroamatical.  Actual.  Amphibology. 
Analytic.  Apodeictic.  A priori.  Argument.  Attribute.  Auto- 
maton. Axiom.  Being.  Capacity.  Categories.  Cause.  Causes 
(final  doctrine  of).  Choice.  Consciousness.  Consent  (argument 
from  universal).  Cosmogony.  Discursus.  Empirics.  Enthusiasm, 
Enthymeme.  Epicurean.  Essence.  Fallacy.  Hypothesis.  Idea. 
Intellect  and  Intelligence.  Judgment  Mind.  Monad.  Motion. 
Noology.  Number.  Objective.  ^Ontology.  Opposed.  Potential. 
Problem.  Proposition.  Propriety.  Quiddity.  Rationale.  Reason. 
Relation.  Scholastic  Philosophy.  Sensorium.  Sensus  Communis. 
Space.  Syncretism.  Transcendent.  Univocal.  Virtual.  Virtue. 
Armixians. 

Metaphysics. 

Arnauld,  Ant.  (1623-1694). 

1.  GEuvres,  43  vols.  4to.  Paris.  1775-83. 

2.  (Euvres  Philosophiqucs  de  comprenant : 1.  les  Objects  contre  les  Meditat. 

de  Descartes.  2.  Logique  de  Port  Royal.  3.  Des  Vraies  et  des 
Fausses  Idees,  (1683).  {Jourdain,  1846.) 

Faculties  of  the  Mind,  (Classification  of).  Psychology. 

Arnobius.  (326.) 

Disputation,  adv.  Gcntes.(Orellius,  1816.) 

Immateriality. 


586 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Arnot. 

Illustr.  of  Proverbs. 

Secularism. 

Arrian.  (lid  Cent.  A.  D.) 

1.  Opera  ( Dubner  and  Muller,  Paris,  1846). 

2.  J)e  Expeditions  Alexandri  Magni.  ( Kruger , 1851.) 

Gymnosophist. 

Arthur,  Archibald.  (1744r— 1797.) 

Discourses  on  Theological  and  Literary  Subjects.  1803. 

Chance. 

Aschasi.  (1515-1568). 

The  Schoolmaster  (1570).  ( Upton,  1711).  Works  (Bennet)  1761  and 
1815. 

Imitation. 

Atomists. 

Empiric.  Impression. 

Augustine,  Aurelius.  (354-430). 

1.  Opera,  a.  (Benedictine  Edit.  1679-1700).  11  vols.  folio, 

b.  Edit.  Paris.  Altera.  1836-1842.  11  vols.  roy.  8vo. 

c.  Migne’s  Edit.  1841.  16  vols.  8vo. 

d.  Caillau.  1842.  43  vols.  8vo. 

2.  De  Civitate  Dei.  (Strange.  1852.) 

Essence.  Evil.  (Good  the  Chief).  Idea.  Religion.  Theology. 

3.  De  Summo  Bono. 

Bonum  Summum.  Error. 

4.  De  vera  Religione. 

Certainty.  Religion. 

5.  De  Spirit,  et  Litera. 

Prescience. 

6.  De  Magistro. 

Reminiscence. 

7.  De  Trinitate,  lib.  XV. 

Substance. 

Aesthetics.  Belief.  Blasphemy.  Immateriality. 

Augustus.  (B.  C.  63 — A.  D.  14.) 

Apothegm. 

Aulus  Gellics,  or  Agellus.  (Ild  Century.) 

Noctes  Atticee.  Ex.  Edit.  Gronovii,  etc.  Lond.  1824.  4 vols.  8vo. 
Acroamatical.  Esoteric.  Religion.  Superstition. 

Austin,  John. 

The  Province  of  Jurisprudence  determined.  Lond.  1832,  (with  an  outline 
of  a Course  of  Lectures  on  General  Jurisprudence). 

Law.  Sanction. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


587 


Autenrieth,  J.  H.  F.  von.  (1772-1835.) 

Uber  den  Menschen  xind  seine  Hoffnung  einer  Fortdauer.  ( Tubing , 1825.) 
On  Man  and  his  Hope  of  Immortality. 

Immortality  (of  the  Soul). 

Averrrces,  (or  Ibn  Roschd.)  (Xllth  Century.) 

Reason. 

Baader,  F.  X.  Von.  (1165-1841).  Cf.  Hoffmann  (1836). 

Traite  sur  VExtase.  1817. 

Ecstasy. 

Bachmann,  K.  F.  (1785-1855). 

System  der  Logile.  1828).  Transl.  into  French  and  Russian. 
Enthymeme. 

Backer,  Geo.  de. 

Le  Dictionnaire  de  Proverbes  Francais.  8vo.  1710. 

Proverbs. 

Bacon,  Francis.  (1560-1626).  Works  (Montagu)  16  vols.  1825-34. 

1.  Instauratio  Magna  (i.  e.  Novum  Organum).  1620.  ( Bohn’s  Scientific 

Library.) 

Acatalepsy.  Anticipation  of  Nature.  Aphorisms.  Axiom.  Causa- 
lity. Error.  Experimentum  Crucis.  Form.  Interpretation  of 
Nature.  Method.  Observation.  Organon. 

2.  Advancement  of  Learning.  Transl.  by  Moffet. 

Acatalepsy.  Category.  Habit.  Invention.  Metaphysics.  Perfec- 
tibility (the  Doctrine  of).  Philosophy.  Virtue. 

3.  Sylva  Sy l varum,  or  a Naturall  Historic.  1627.  Montagu,  vol.  iv. 
Antipathy. 

4.  De  Dignitate  el  Augmentis  Scientiarum.  1623. 

Causes  final,  doctrine  of.  Idol.  Magic. 

5.  Cogitata  et  Visa,  De  Interpretat.  Nature.  (Montagu  X.) 

Idol. 

6.  On  the  Wisdom  of  the  Ancients,  (Montagu  III.) 

Myth  and  Mythology. 

7.  Apophthegms. 

Rationalists. 

8.  Essay  on  Truth. 

Truth. 

Art.  Genius.  Induction.  Knowledge.  Prejudice. 

Bacon,  Roger.  (1214-1292). 

Scholastic  Philosophy. 

Badham,  David,  M.  D. 

Insect  Life.  Edinb.  1845. 

Instinct.  

Bailey,  Samuel.  (1787). 

1.  Letters  on  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind.  1851. 

Abstraction  (Logical).  Belief.  Faculties  of  the  Mind  (Classification). 


588 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Bailey,  Samuel. 

2.  Discourses  on  Liter,  and  Philos.  Subjects  before  Literary  Societies. 

London,  1852. 

Analogy.  Experimcntum  Crucis. 

3.  Theory  of  Reasoning.  Land.  1851.  8vo. 

Inference  and  Proof.  Observation. 

Bakewkll,  Fred.  C. 

Natural  Evidence  of  a Future  Life.  1835. 

Immortality  (of  the  soul.) 

Balguy,  John.  (1686 — 1748.) 

A Collection  of  Tracts.  Letter  to  a Deist.  Divine  Rectitude.  Lond.  1734. 
Theism. 

Balqoy,  Thomas.  (1716-95.) 

Divine  Benevolence  Asserted.  Lond.  1803. 

Innate. 

Ballantyne. 

Examin.  of  the  Human  Mind. 

Nominalism. 

Baptista,  Porta. 

Treatise  on  Natural  Magic.  (1589 — 1591.) 

Magic. 

Barbeyjiac,  John.  (1674 — 1729.) 

Notes  on  Grotius  De  Jar.  Bel.  et  Pads.  1720. 

Law. 

Barlow. 

Connection  between  Physiology  and  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

Instinct. 

Baronius  (Baron)  Robert.  (XVIIth  Century.  Scotch.) 

Metaphysica  Generalis.  Lugd.  Bat.  1657. 

Abstractive.  Liberty.  Whole. 

Barrow,  Dr.  Isaac.  (1630 — 1677.) 

1.  Works.  ( Tillotson ).  1683-7. 

2.  Sermons. 

Apprehension.  Wit. 

3.  Mathematical  Lectures.  1734. 

Intellect. 

Barrow,  Sir  John. 

Autobiography.  Lond.  1847. 

Memory. 

Barthez,  P.  J. 

Mechanique  des  Mouvemens.  1798. 

Life.  

Baumgartkn,  A.  G.  (1714 — 1762.) 

AEsthetica.  2 vols.  8vo.  Frankf.  1750-58.  Cf.  Meier  (1763.) 
^Esthetics. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


589 


Baxter,  Andrew.  (16S6 — 1750.) 

Immateriality  of  the  Soul.  3 d Ed.  Loud.  1745. 

Materialism. 

Bayer,  John.  (XVIth  Cent.) 

Uranometria,  1603. 

Anima  Mundi. 

Eaynes. 

Essay  on  Analytic  of  Logical  Forms.  Edinb.  1850. 

Concept.  Conception. 

Beattie,  James.  (1735 — 1803.) 

1.  Essay  on  Truth.  (1770.)  1th  Edit.  1807. 

Analogy  and  Induction.  Common  Sense.  Sentiment  and  Opinion. 

2.  Dissertations,  Moral  and  Critical.  1783. 

Genius.  Grammar.  Imagination.  Memory. 

3.  Theory  of  Language.  (1788).  The  first  Ed.  appeared  with  2. 
Grammar. 

4.  Elements  of  Moral  Science.  (1790-3.) 

Appetite.  Inclination. 

5.  Essays.  Poetry  and  Music.  Laughter  and  Ludicrous  Composition. 
Intuition.  Laughter.  Psychology. 

Beausobre,  Isaac.  (1659-1738.) 

Histoire  du  Manicheisme.  1734. 

Manicheism. 

Becnics. 

Disputationes.  Apatheia  Sapientis  Stoici.  4to.  Copenhag.  1695. 
Apathy. 

Belsham,  Thomas.  (1750 — 1829.) 

Moral  Philosophy.  1801. 

Materialism.  Will. 

Bentham,  Jeremy.  (1748 — 1832.) 

1.  Introduction  to  the  Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation.  1780. 1823. 
Asceticism. 

2.  Deontology,  or  the  Science  of  Morality.  ( Bowring . 1834.) 

Deontology.  Stoics. 

Sanction.  Utility. 

Berard,  F.  (1789 — 1828.) 

llapport.  du  Physigue  et  du  Moral.  1823. 

Life. 

Berkeley,  George,  Bp.  (16S4 — 175S.) 

1.  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge.  1734.  1776.  1820. 

Abstraction  (Logical).  Externality.  Outness.  Pneumatology.  Sign. 

2.  Alcipliron,  or  the  Minute  Philosopher,  in  Seven  Dialogues.  1732. 
Analogy.  Beauty. 

61 


590 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Berkeley,  George. 

3.  Worhs.  1784—1820. 

Idealism. 

4.  Sin's. 

Objective. 

5.  Essay  towards  a New  Theory  of  Vision. 

Outness.  Sign. 

6.  Theory  of  Vision  Vindicated. 

Sign. 

Catalepsy.  Consent  (Argument  from  Universal).  Empiric.  Expe- 
rimentum  Crueis.  Idealist.  Immatcrialism.  Nihilism.  Notion. 
Psychology.  Skepticism.  Spiritualism.  Suggestion. 

Bernard,  de  Chartres.  (Xllth  Cent.) 

Megaeosmus  el  Microcosmus  (MS.) 

Macrocosm  and  Microcosm. 

Bernier,  Francis  (1625-1688.) 

Abrtgl  de  la  Philosophic  de  Gassendi.  Lyons.  1678.  7 vols.  12mo. 

A priori  and  A posteriori. 

Bernoulli,  John.  (1667 — 1748.) 

Discourse  on  3Iution.  1727. 

Motion.  

Beza,  Theodore.  (1519 — 1605.) 

Reply  to  Ochinus  on  Polygamy.  ( Traclat . Gen.  1568.) 

Polygamy. 

Bible,  The. 

Adoration.  Blasphemy.  Body.  Cardinal  Virtues.  Certainty.  De- 
miurge. Dreaming.  Gnome.  Proverb.  Prudence.  Spirit.  Mind 
and  Soul.  Space.  Syncretism.  Theocracy.  Understanding. 
Wisdom. 

Bichat,  M.  F.  X.  (1771—1802.) 

•1.  Anatomic  Generate  appliq.  ct  la  Physiologie.  None.  Ed.  4 vols.  8vo. 
Paris,  1812. 

2.  Sur  la  vie  et  la  Mori.  1802. 

Life. 

Bilfinger,  G.  B.  (1693 — 1750.)  See  Leibnitz. 

De  Harmonia  Prcestabilita.  4to.  Tubing.  1721 — 1740. 

Automaton.  Harmony  Pre-established. 

Biran,  Maine  de.  (1766 — 1824.) 

1.  (Euvres  Philosophiques  (Cousin).  4 vols.  Paris.  1841. 

Soul. 

2.  A' our.  Considerat.  sur  le  Rapport  du  Physique  et  du  Moral  de  V Homme. 

(Posthumous.  Cousin.)  8vo.  Paris.  1834. 

Causality. 

3.  L' Influence  de  Habitude.  (Prize  Essay  of  Nat.  Institute.  1800.) 
Habit. 


AND  OP  PROPER  NAMES. 


591 


Blackstone,  William.  (1723 — 1780.) 

Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  England.  Oxford.  1765-9. 

Evidence. 

Blackwell,  Thomas.  (1701 — 1757.) 

Letters  concerning  Mythology,  8vo.  Lond.  1748. 

Mythology. 

Blair,  Hugh.  (1718—1800.) 

1.  Sermons.  1777 — 1801. 

Compunction. 

2.  Lectures  on  Rhetoric  and  Belles  Lettres.  1783. 

Genius. 

Blackwood’s  Magazine.  Aug.  1830. 

Theory. 

Blakesi.ey. 

Aristotle  in  the  Encyclop.  Metropol. 

Acroamatical. 

Blank,  Sir  Gilbert.  (1749— 1S34.) 

1.  A Lecture  on  Muscular  Motion.  Lond.  1790. 

Catalepsy. 

2.  Elements  of  Medical  Logic.  1818. 

Experimeutum  Crucis. 

Bledsoe,  Albert  Taylor,  LL.D,  Prof,  of  Math,  and  Astron.  in  Univ.  of  Mis- 
sissippi— (now  in  Univ.  of  Virginia.) 

1.  An  Examinat.  of  Edwards’  Inq.  into  the  Freedom  of  the  Will.  Phi- 

ladelphia, 1845. 

2.  A Theodicy.  Philada.  1S55. 

Evil. 

Bceiim,  Jacob.  (1575 — 1624.) 

Pneumatology.  Theosophism. 

Bcerhaave,  Herman.  (1668 — 1738.) 

Life. 

Bcethius,  Ancus  Manlius.  (470 — 526.) 

1.  De  Consolatione  Philosophies.  ( Best  Edit,  by  Obbarius.  Jena,  1843.) 
Idea.  Reminiscence. 

2.  In  Predicament.  Aristotelis.  Opera.  Basil.  1570. 

Infinite. 

Argument.  Intellect  and  Intelligence.  Maxim.  Person.  Realism. 
Scholastic  Philosophy.  Theory. 

Boilkau-Despreaux.  (1G36 — 1711.) 

Rationale. 

Bolingbroke,  Lord  Henry  St.  John.  (1678 — 1751.) 

Worhs  (Mallett,  1754).  Philadelphia,  1841.  4 vols.  Svo. 

Archetype.  Dualism.  Irony.  Motion.  Reminiscence. 

Bonald.  (1753 — 1840.) 

Savago  and  Barbarous. 


592 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


BonaventurA.  The  “ Seraphic  Doctor.”  (1221 — 1274.) 

1.  Ilinerarium  mentis  in  Dcum. 

2.  Opera.  (Home.  1538-96.  7 vols.  fol.) 

Ecstasy. 

Bonnel,  M. 

De  la  Controversy  de  Hossuet  et  FCnelon,  eur  le  Quictisme.  8vo.  Macon, 
1850. 

Quietism. 

Bonnet,  Charles  de.  (1720 — 1793.) 

CEnvres.  Neufchatel.  1773-83.  8 vols.  4to. 

Continuity.  Notion.  Perfectibility. 

Boscovich,  R.  J.  (1741 — 1787). 

1.  See  Stay. 

Experience. 

2.  Dissertationes  dues  de  viribus  vivis.  4to.  1745. 

Force. 

3.  De  Solis  ac  Lima  Defcctibus.  Lond.  1776. 

Hypothesis. 

Catalepsy.  Ilylozoism. 

Bossuet,  J.  B.  (1627 — 1704). 

1.  CEnvres  pliilosophiques.  (Simon.)  Contenant  : Libre  Arbitre  ; De  la 

Connaiseance  Dicu  ct  de  soi-meme  ; Traite  de  la  Concupiscence. 
Prescience. 

Faculties  of  the  Mind  (Classification  of). 

2.  CEnvres.  59  vols.  12mo.  Paris,  1825. 

Distinction. 

Error.  Quietism. 

Boswell,  James  (1740—1795). 

Life  of  Johnson. 

Equivocation. 

Bougeant,  Father  (1690 — 1743). 

A Philosophical  Amusement  on  the  Language  of  Beasts.  1739. 

Instinct. 

Bouvier,  Bishop  of  Mans  (b.  1783). 

1.  Institutionee  philosophic a,  logica,  metaphysica,et  moralis.  1 vol.  12»io. 

2.  Histoire  abregee  de  la  philosophic.  2 vols.  8vo.  (1844.) 

Art. 

Bowen,  Francis  (b.  1811). 

1.  The  Principles  of  Metaphys.  and  Ethic.  Science  applied  to  the  Evi- 

dences of  Beligion.  (Lowell  Led.  1849.)  New  Edit.,  revised  and 
annotated.  Boston,  1855. 

Appetite  and  Instinct. 

2.  Essays  on  Speculative  Philosophy.  Boston,  1842. 

Consciousness. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


593 


Boyle,  Robert,  Hod.  (1626 — 1691). 

1.  Works.  6 vols.  4to.  Lond.  1772. 

2.  Enquiry  into  the  vulgarly  received  Notion  of  Nature.  12mo.  Lond. 

1685. 

Macrocosm. 

Bozzellt,  F. 

J)c  V Union  de  la  Philosophic  avec  la  Morale. 

Brach. 

Sensation. 

Brahe,  Tycho  (1546 — 1601). 

Hypothesis. 

Brahma. 

Metempsychosis. 

Breton  le  Raoul. 

Super  Lib.  Poster  Analyt. 

Intention  (First  and  Second). 

Brewster,  D.,  Sir. 

Letters  on  Natural  Magic,  bth  Ed.  1842. 

Magic. 

Bridgewater,  Earl  of,  Rev.  F.  H.  Egerton  (1756 — 1829). 

Treatises.  Cf.  — 1.  Chalmers.  2.  Kidd.  3.  Whewell.  4.  Bell.  5.  Boget. 
6.  Buclcland.  7.  Kirby.  S.  Prout.  {New  edit.  Bohn.) 

Causes  (Final,  Doctrine  of).  Design. 

British  Association. 

Phrenology. 

Brougham,  Henry,  Lord  (b.  177S). 

1.  Preliminary  Discourse. 

Analysis  and  Synthesis. 

2.  Natural  Theology. 

Space. 

Browne,  Peter,  Bishop  (d.  1735). 

Human  Understanding.  2 Edit.  1729. 

Notion. 

Browne,  Thomas,  Sir,  M.  D.  (1605 — 1682). 

1.  Works.  {Bohn,  1852.) 

2.  Pseudodoxia  Epidemica ; Enquiries  into  Vulgar  and  Common  Er- 

rors. (6 th  Ed.  1672.) 

Metempsychosis,  Nature  (Course  or  power  of). 

Idiosyncracy. 

Brown,  John,  Dr.  (1736-88).  (Brunonian  School). 

Temperament. 

Brown,  Thomas,  M.  D.  (1778 — 1S20). 

1.  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind.  1820. 

Association.  Conceptualism.  Credulity.  Faculties  of  the  Mind  (Clas- 
sification of ).  Friendship.  Identity.  Taste. 

51*  2o 


594 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OE  AUTHORS 


Brown,  Thomas. 

2.  Observat.  on  the  Nature  and  Tendency  of  Hume’s  Doctrine  concerning 

the  Delation  of  Cause  and  Effect.  1801.  3 d Edit.  1818. 

Causality. 

3.  Lectures  on  Moral  Philosophy.  t 
Will. 

Analogy  and  Metaphor.  Combination.  Fitness.  Hypothesis.  Physi- 
ology. Power.  State.  Suggestion.  Train  of  Thought. 
Brucker,  J.  J.  (1696 — 1770). 

Tentamen  introductionis  in  historiam  doctrines  de  ideis.  Jena,  1719.  4tO. 
Association. 

Buchanan,  David. 

Historia  Animes  Humance. 

Bdchanan,  J. 

Faith  in  God  and  Mod.  Atheism  compared.  2 vols.  1855. 

Atheism.  Certainty. 

Buddeus,  J.  J.  (1667 — 1729). 

Elcmenta  philosophies  practices.  Halle,  1697. 

Anima  Mundi. 

Buffier,  Claude  (1661 — 1737). 

1.  Cours  general  des  sciences  ( Traiti  ties  premieres  verites — a.  Trea- 

tise of  First  Truths;  b.  Logic).  Fo).  1732. 

Design.  Principles.  Truth. 

2.  (Euvres  Philosopliiques  ( Bouillier ).  1842. 

Relation.  Sentiment. 

Buhle,  J.  T.  (1763—1821). 

Commentatio  de  Libris  Aristotelis,  Exot.  el  Acroamat.  in  his  Edition  of 
the  Organ.  Rhetor.  & Polit.  of  A.  Deux  Fonts.,  1792.  Strasburg, 
1800.  5 vols.  8vo. 

Acroamatical.  Anticipation.  Notion. 

Bunsen. 

Hippolytus  and  His  Age.  4 vols.  Lond.  1852. 

Theodicy. 

Burke,  Edmund  (1720 — 1797). 

1.  Works.  1792—1827.  (Bohn,  1857.) 

2.  Reflections  on  the  French  Revolution.  1790. 

Classification. 

3.  Philos.  Enquiry  into  the  Origin  of  our  Ideas  on  the  Sublime  and  Beau- 

tiful. 1773. 

Beauty.  Sublime  (The).  Taste. 

4.  Letters  on  a Regicide  Peace. 

Analogy  and  Metaphor. 

5.  Defence  of  Natural  Society. 

Irony. 

Bdrlamaqui,  J.  J.  (1694 — 1748). 

Droit  naturel  ( Principles  of  Natural  Law).  1766-68, 

Rule. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


595 


Burnett  Prize  Essays.  See  Thompson,  R.  A.,  and  Tulloch. 

Causes,  Final  (Doctrine  of).  Design. 

Burton,  Robert  (1576 — 1639). 

Anatomy  of  Melancholy . (1651.) 

Apprehension. 

Bushnan,  J.  S. 

Philosophy  of  Instinct  and  Reason. 

Instinct. 

Butler,  Joseph  (1692 — 1752). 

1.  Fifteen  Sermons.  1726.  (Upon  Human  Nature,  or  Man  considered 

as  a Moral  Agent.) 

Apathy.  Benevolence.  Conscience.  Injury.  Nature  (Human).  System. 

2.  Six  Sermons,  preached  on  Public  Occasions.  Appended  to  1.  in  later 

editions.  (New  York,  ISIS.) 

3.  The  Analogy  of  Religion , Natural  and  Revealed,  to  the  Constitution 

and  Course  of  Nature.  1736.  4to.  With  two  Dissertations  : a.  On 
Personal  Identity ; b.  On  the  Nature  of  Virtue. 

Analogy.  Association.  Evidence,  a.  Identity;  b.  Fitness.  Habit. 
Moral.  Natural.  Theodicy. 

4.  Letters  to  Clarke. 

Space. 

Butler,  Sam.  (1612 — 16S0). 

Hudibras.  1663—1673. 

Form.  Intention  (Logical).  Physiognomy. 

Butler,  Win.  Archer  (1814 — 1S48). 

Lect.  on  the  History  of  Anc.  Philosophy,  ed.  by  Thompson.  Camb.  1856. 
Philad.  1857. 

Ontology. 

Byron  (178S— 1824). 

Poetry.  Skepticism. 

Cabanis,  J.  G.  (1757—1808). 

Rapports  du  Physique  et  da  Moral  de  Vhomme.  1802.  2 Tols.  8vo. 

Life. 

Cairns,  lVm. 

On  Moral  Freedom.  1844. 

Originate. 

Cajetan. 

De  Nom.  Analog. 

Analogy. 

Caldertvood,  Hen. 

Philosophy  of  the  Infinite.  1854. 

Absolute.  Infinite.  Unconditional. 

Calixtus,  George  (1586 — 1658). 

Syncretism. 


596 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Calovius,  Abr.  (1612-86). 

Treatises  on  the  Doctrine  of  First  Principles,  1651. 

Noology. 

Calvinists. 

Metaphysics. 

Cambridge  Journal  op  Philosophy. 

Sophism.  

Campanella,  Thom.  (1568 — 1639). 

De  Sensu  Rerum  ct  Magia.  4to.  Franef.  1620.  Paris,  1637. 

Magic. 

Campbell,  George  (1719 — 96). 

1.  On  the  Gospels.  Preliminary  Dissertations. 

Blasphemy. 

2.  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric. 

Evidence.  lVit.  Wit  and  Humour. 

3.  Dissertation  on  Miracles. 

Miracle.  Testimony. 

Psychology. 

Cardaillac,  .T.  J.  S.  De  (b.  1766). 

Etudes  Element  de  Philos.  2 vols.  1830. 

Analysis  and  Synthesis. 

Carleton,  Compton. 

Philos.  Univer.  de  Anima. 

Sensibles. 

Carneades  (B.  C.  160). 

Academies. 

Carpenter,  W.  B.,  Dr. 

Principles  of  Human  Physiology.  Loud.  1846. 

Ideational. 

Cartesian.  (Seo  Des  Cartes.) 

Certainty.  Egoism.  Form.  Notion.  Perception.  Soul. 

Carus. 

History  of  Psychology.  8vo.  Leipzig,  1808. 

Life,  Psychology. 

Casaubon,  Meric,  D.  D.  (1599 — 1671). 

A Treatise  concerning  Enthusiasm.  Loud.  1655. 

Enthusiasm. 

Casmann,  Otto. 

i’sychologia  Antliropologica,  sive  animee  huraance  doctrina.  ( Hanau , 1594. 
Psychology. 

Catholic  Philosophy.  Load. 

Choice. 

Chalmers,  Thomas,  D.  D.  (1780—1847).  Works,  25  vols.  Glasgow. 

1.  Natural  Theology. 

Atheism.  Holiness. 


AND  or  PROPER  NAMES. 


597 


Chalmers,  Thomas,  D.  D. 

2.  Sketches  of  Moral  and  Jl rental  Philosophy. 

Emotion.  Gratitude.  Mental  Philosophy. 

3.  Bridgewater  Treatise.  Adaptat.  of  External  Nature  to  Moral  and 

Intellect.  Cunstit.  of  Man.  3 d Edit.  1834. 

Obligation. 

Chalybaius,  H.  M.,  Dr. 

Historical  Development  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  from  Kant  to  Hegel. 
Transl.  by  E.  Ebersheim.  Edinburg.  I.  & T.  Clarlc.  1854. 
Dogmatism.  Notion. 

ChARMIDES. 

Academics. 

Chariion,  Peter  (1541 — 1613). 

De  la  Sagesse.  Rouen,  1623. 

Nature. 

Chastei.,  Mons. 

Les  Rationalities  et  les  Traditionalistes.  12mo.  Paris,  1850. 
Reminiscence. 

Chaucer.  (1328—1400.) 

Canterbury  Tales. 

Prologue. 

Chauvins.  (1640—1725.) 

Lexicon  Pliilosoph.  1692. 

Contingent.  Essence.  Faculty. 

Chretien. 

Essay  on  Logical  Method. 

Conception  and  Idea.  Logie.  Realism. 

Christianity. 

Fate. 

Ciirysippus.  (B.  C.  IVth  Cent.) 

Axiom.  Eudemonism.  Fatalism. 

Cicero,  Marcus  Tullius.  (B.  C.  107 — 43.)  Life  by  Middleton,  1741. 

I.  Opera.  ( Verhurgius.)  11  vols.  Svo.  Amst.  1724. 

1.  Epistolce  ad  P.  Atticum. 

Acroamatical. 

2.  De  Natura  Deorum.  ( 7V.  by  Francklin,  1775.) 

Anthropomorphism.  Anticipation.  Consent  (Argument  from  Uni- 
versal). Innate  Ideas.  Nature.  Religion.  Society  (Desire  of). 

3.  De  Oratore. 

Art.  Definition.  Idea.  Ideal.  Meraoria  technica,  or  Mnemonics. 
Method.  Tradition. 

4.  Tusculanarum  Disputationum.  Lib.  V. 

Authority.  Consent  (Argument  from  Universal).  Entelechyr  Gym- 
nosophist.  Reminiscence.  Stoics. 


598 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Cicero,  Marcus  Tullius. 

5.  De  fuibus  bonorum  et  malorum.  Lib.  V. 

Bonum  Suinmum.  Ends.  Good  (the  Chief).  Justice.  Method. 
Rectitude.  Utility. 

6.  De  Officiis. 

Consent  (Argument  from  Universal).  Occasion.  Philosophy.  So- 
ciety (Desire  of).  Society  (Political,  Capacity  of). 

7.  De  Fato. 

Ethics.  Fatalism. 

8.  Dc  In  yen  tion  c Rlietorica. 

Faculty.  Ideal.  Occasion. 

9.  Lcr.lius  seu  de  Amicitia.  ( TV.  by  Yonge,  1851.) 

Friendship. 

10.  De  claria  Oratoribus  (Brutus.) 

Method. 

11.  Paradoxa. 

Paradox. 

12.  Academicarum  Quasi. 

Principle. 

13.  Dc  Legibus.  ( Tr . by  Barham,  1841.) 

Society  (Desire  of). 

Argument,  Argumentation.  Eclecticism.  Economics.  Essence.  Evil. 
Magnanimity.  Perception.  Scholastic  Philosophy.  Temperance. 
Clarice,  Dr.  John.  (d.  1759.) 

An  Enquiry  into  the  Cause  and  Origin  of  Evil.  (Boyle  Lectures.)  Loud. 
1720-21.  2 vols.  8vo. 

A Priori.  Evil. 

Clarice,  Samuel,  D.D.  (1G73 — 1729.) 

I.  Works.  4 vols.  folio.  Loud.  1738. 

1.  Sermons.  10  vols.  8vo.  Loud.  1730. 

Adjuration.  Chance.  Deist. 

2.  Letter  to  Dodicell  concerning  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul,  with  four 

defences.  0 th  Edit.  1731. 

Adscititious. 

3.  A Demonstration  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  in  opposition 

to  Hobbes,  Spinoza,  &c.  (Boyle  Led.)  1705.  With  Butler's  Letters 
and  Clarke’s  Answers.  (XVI  Serm.  on  the  Being  and  Attrib.  of 
God,  the  Obligat.  of  Natur.  Belig.,  and  the  Truth  and  Certainty  of 
the  Christ.  Revelation.) 

Choice.  Eternity  of  God.  Nature  (Course  or  Power  of ).  Possible. 
Space.  Volition. 

4.  A Collection  of  Papers  which  passed  between  Leibnitz  and  Clarke  on 

Nat.  Philosophy  and  Religion.  With  Remarks  on  a Book  entitled, 
A Philosophical  Enquiry  concerning  Human  Liberty.  Loud.  1717. 
Necessity.  Sensorium.  Space. 

A Priori.  Evil.  Fitness.  Nature  of  things. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


599 


Clemens,  Alexandrinus.  (About  A.  D.  150 — 120.) 

Opera.  (Potter.  Ox f.  1715.  Venice,  1757.  Leipz.  1831.  Stromata, 
Lib.  vii.) 

Eclecticism.  Metaphysics. 

Clitomachus.  (B.  C.  160.) 

Academics. 

Clodids,  Chr.  Aq.  H.  (Born  at  Altenburg.  1772 — 1836.) 

Be  Virtutibus  quas  Cardinales  appellant.  4to.  Leipz.  1815. 

Cardinal  Virtues. 

Cogan,  Thomas,  M.  D.  (1736 — 1S18.) 

1.  A Philoaoph.  Treatise  on  the  Passions.  2d  Edit.  Bath,  1S02. 
Passions  (The). 

2.  An  Ethical  Treat,  on  the  Passions,  founded  on  the  principles  investi- 

gated in  the  Philos.  Treatise.  Part  I.  On  Well-being  or  Happi- 
ness.' 1807.  Part  II.  On  Conduct  conduc.  to  Happiness.  1S10. 
Bath. 

Admiration.  Appetite.  Benevolence.  Desire.  Ethics.  Passions  (The). 

3.  Theological  Disquisitions,  a.  On  Natural  Beligion.  b.  On  the  Jewish. 

Dispensation  respecting  Religion  and  Morals.  1S12. 

Monotheism. 

Colebrook,  II.  T.  (1765 — 1S37.) 

Gymnosophist. 

Coleridge,  Samuel  Taylor.  (1772 — 1S34.) 

1.  Physiology  of  Life.  Hints  towards  the  formation  of  a more  compre- 

hensive Theory  of  Life.  Posthum.  Edit,  by  IFcitson.  ISIS. 
Analogy.  Life. 

2.  Aids  to  Reflection.  (1825.)  5th  Edit.  2 vols.  Svo.  Lond.  1S43. 
Aphorism.  Attention  and  Thought.  Happiness.  Instinct.  Morality. 

Prudence.  Reason  and  Understanding.  Theology.  Understand- 
ing. Unity.  Well-being.  Will  (Freedom  of). 

3.  The  Friend.  1S09-1810.)  Fourth  Edit.  (H.  N.  Coleridge.)  3 vols. 

Lond.  1S44. 

Apologue.  Method.  Nature.  Reason  and  Understanding. 

4.  Church  and  State.  (1830.)  Lond.  1839. 

Conception.  Contraries.  Form.  Sensation  and  Reception. 

5.  Notes  on  English  Divines.  (1853.) 

Conception  and  Idea.  Enthusiasm.  Person.  Understanding. 

6.  Worhs.  7 vols.  Svo.  N.  Y.  1853. 

Instinct. 

7.  Literary  Remains.  4 vols.  Svo.  Lond.  1S36-39. 

Reason  (Impersonal). 

8.  Biographia  Literaria.  London,  1847. 

Memory.  Transcendent. 

9.  On  Method.  Introduct.  to  Encyclop.  Metropol. 

Method.  Pscychology. 


600 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Coleridge,  Samuel  Taylor. 

10.  Lay  Sermons.  1.  The  Statesman’s  Manual,  or  the  Bible  the  best  guide 
to  politic,  shill,  etc.  2.  Isaiah  32  : 20. 

Understanding.  Unity. 

Causes  (final,  Doctrine  of).  Fancy.  Talent.  Theosophism. 
Collard,  Royer. 

CEuvrcs  completes  de  Reid  trad,  par  Jouffroy,  avec  une  iutrodue.  notes, 
fragm.  de  M.  Royer-Collard.  6 vols.  8vo.  1828 — 1835. 
Consciousness.  Induction  (Principles  of).  Rationalism.  Sensibles. 
Space.  Time.  Virtual. 

Combe. 

Phrenology. 

Comenius,  Amos  John.  (d.  1671.) 

Anima  Mundi. 

Communism. 

Socialism. 

Comte,  Auguste.  (1798.) 

Cours  de  Philosophic  positive.  1839. 

Feticliism.  Force.  Observation.  Positivism. 

Comte,  F.  C.  L.  (1782—1837.) 

1.  Traits  de  Legislation,  on  expose  des  lois  gene)',  suiv.  lesq.  les  peupl. 

prosperent,  &c.  1826.  4 vols.  8vo.  2d  Edit.  1832. 

Method. 

2.  See  Say,  J.  B. 

Society. 

CoNCEPTUALISTS. 

Conceptualism.  Nominalism. 

Condillac,  L’abbe  Etienne  Bonnot  de  (1715 — 1780). 

1.  L’ Art  de  raisonner  (in  vol.  VIII.  of  the  edition  of  his  Works  published 

in  1798). 

2.  Traite  des  Systbmes.  2 vols.  12mo.  1749.  (VIII.  vol.  ed.  of  1798). 

3.  QHuvres  Completes.  23  vols.  8vo.  1821-22. 

Analogy  and  Experience.  Attention.  Empiric.  Idea.  Ideology. 
Memory.  Metaphysics.  Rationalism.  Sensism.  Sensualism. 
Soul.  Train  of  Thought. 

Condorcet,  J.  A.  de  Caritat,  Marquis  de  (1743 — 1794). 

CEuvres  Completes.  Didot.  12  vols.  8vo.  1847 — 1849. 

Perfectibility. 

Copernicus.  N.  (1473 — 1543). 

De  revolntionibus  orbium  Ccelcstibus.  Nuremberg,  1543. 

Hypothesis.  Theory. 

Copleston,  Edward,  D.  D.,  Bp.  of  Llandaff  (1776 — 1849). 

1.  An  Enquiry  into  the  Doctrines  of  Necessity  and  Predestination.  In 
four  Discourses.  Svo.  Lond.  1821. 

Analogy  (p.  21). 


AND  OF  PROPER.  NAMES. 


601 


Copleston,  Edward,  D.  D.,  Bp.  of  Llandaff. 

2.  Remains.  8vo.  Load.  1854. 

Certainty  (p.  S4).  Time.  Truth. 

Couper,  R.,  M.  D. 

Genius. 

Cousix,  Victor  (1792). 

(Ettvrea  philosophiques  de.  12  vols.  8vo.  (1840-46). 

1.  1st  Series.  Cours  de  la  Philosophie  Moderne.  5 vols.  8 VO.  1846. 

1 1st  vol.  Histoire  dcs  princip.  syst.  de  Philosoph. 

Causation. 

“ Idecs  dn  bean,  dn  vrai,  et  dn  bien. 

a.  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful.  Translated  by  Daniel. 
New  York,  1849. 

b.  The  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good , Lectures  on. 
Translated  by  Wight.  New  York,  1852. 

Ideal.  Sublime  (The). 

“ Eeol.  8ensua/iste. 

“ Eeol.  Ecossaise. 

“ Eeol.  de  Kant. 

Infinite.  Innate. 

2.  lid  Series.  Cours  d’ Hist,  de  la  Philos,  mod.  (182S.)  3 vols.  8vo.  1841. 
Course  of  Hist,  of  Modern  Philosophy.  Translated  by 

Wight.  0.  W.  New  York,  1852. 

* 1st  vol.  Introd.  it  l’ Histoire  generate  de  la  Philos. 

’2d  “ Esquisse  d’une  Hist.  gen.  de  la  Phil,  au  X VI He  Siec. 

Space. 

* 3d  “ Exam,  du  Syst.  de  Locke — translated  by  C.  S.  Henry,  D.D. 
4th  Edit.  New  York,  1S56. 

Time. 

Consciousness.  Identical  Proposition.  Ideology.  Infinite. 
Monad.  Mysticism.  Myth.  Psychology.  Reason 
(Spontaneity  of ).  Reflection.  Sentiment.  Species. 
Synthesis. 

3.  Illd  Series.  Frogmens  Philosophiques.  (1826.)  4 vols.  8vo.  1840. 

* 1st  vol.  Phil,  ancienne. 

10  2d  “ “ scholastique.  K 

11 3d  “ “ moderne. 

12  4th  u u contemporaine . 

Eclecticism.  Scholastic  Philosophy. 

4.  Abailard  d’,  (Euvres  inedites.  4to.  Paris,  1836.  Do.  Opera — Notes, 
&c.,  adj.  v.  Cousin,  etc.  1849. 

Macrocosm.  Nominalism.  Scholastic  Philosophy. 

5.  De  la  Metaphysique  d’Aristote — suivi  d’un  Essai  de  traduction  de 
ler  et  du  12e  livres  de  Metaph.  2d  Edit.  1838. 

Entelechy. 

52 


-2d 


a3d 
‘4th 
1 5 th 


602 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OP  AUTHORS 


Cousin,  Victor. 

6.  OEuvres  Complites  dc  Platon,  trad,  da  grec  en  franc,  accomp.  d'argum. 
ph  Hun.  et  de  notes  histor.  et  philol.  1825 — 1840.  13  vols.  Svo 

Myth. 

Absolute.  Apperception.  Causality.  Empiric.  Idea  (p.  224). 
Realism.  Reason  (Impersonal).  Succession. 

Cowley,  Abraham  (1618 — 1687). 

JFor/cs.  12 th  Edit.  2 vols.  12mo.  Land.  1721.  ( Hurd.  1772). 

A Discourse  concerning  the  Government  of  Oliver  Cromwell.  Works  II.  579. 
Sciomnchy. 

CowrEit,  Wm.  (1731 — 1800). 

Taste  (Powers  of). 

CrACANTHORP. 

Logic. 

Notion. 

Craig,  John,  Dr.  (2d  part  of  XVIIth  Cent.). 

Testimony. 

Crates  (B.  C.  32S). 

Cynic. 

Creuzer,  F.  (b.  1771). 

Symbolik.  Zd  Edit.  1836.  Trad,  par  Guigniaut.  Par.  1825— 36. 

Myth  and  Mythology. • 

Crombie,  Alexander,  LL.D.  (1760 — 1842.) 

A Defence  of  Philosophical  Necessity.  8vo.  1793. 

Libertarian. 

Cross,  J. 

Attempt  to  establish.  Physiogn.  upon  Scientific  Principles.  Glasg.  1817. 
Physiognomy. 

Crousaz,  John  Peter  de.  (1663 — 1750.) 

1.  Trait 6 de  Beau. 

Beauty. 

2.  Art  of  Thinking,  («  new  treatise  of,)  concerning  the  conduct  and  im- 

provement of  the  mind.  2 vols.  8vo.  Loud.  1724. 

Proprium  (The),  or  Property. 

3.  Examen  du  Pyrrhonisme,  anciente  et  moderne,  ( against  Bayle.)  Folio. 

Haye.  1733.  # 

Skepticism. 

CuDWonTH,  Ralph,  D.D.  (1617 — 1688.) 

1.  The  True  Intellectual  System  of  the  Unit’.,  wherein  all  the  reason  and 
philosophy  of  Atheism  is  confuted,  Ac.  ( Originally  pull.  1678.) 
Andover,  1837.  With  Mosheim’s  Notes.  2d  Edit.  1773.  Transl. 
by  Harrison.  3 vols.  8vo.  Lond.  1845. 

Anirnn  Mundi.  Archetype.  Atheism.  Atom.  Cosmogony.  Deism. 
Design.  Ditheism.  Fatalism.  God.  Nature  or  Force  (Plastic). 
Nature  of  things.  Potential.  Skepticism.  Theism. 


AND  OF  PROPER.  NAMES. 


603 


Cud  wo  urn,  Ralph,  D.  D. 

2.  A Treatise  concerning  Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality.  (1731.) — 
Contained  also  in  all  the  editions  mentioned  under  1. 

Certainty.  Sympathy. 

Culverwell,  Nathaniel.  (1650.) 

An  eleg.  and  learn.  Discourse  of  the  Light  of  Mature,  (on  Prov.  20 : 27.) 
4to.  Land.  1661. 

Nature  (Law  of). 

Cumberland,  Richard,  D.  D.  Bp.  of  Peterborough.  (1632 — 1718.) 

De  Legibus  Matures  Eisquisitio  Philosophica.  -1  to.  Loud.  1672. 
Benevolence.  Suggestion. 

Ctrenic  School. 

Hedonism. 

Damiron,  Ph.  (1794.) 

1.  Cuurs  d’Eslhetique.  8vo.  Paris,  1S42. 

^Esthetics. 

2.  Essai  sur  V Historic  de  la  Philosophic  en  France  au  dixneuviime 

siecle.  2 Tom.  Svo.  Par.  182S — 1834. 

Eclecticism.  Ideology. 

Darwin,  Erasmus,  M.  D.  F.  R.  S.  (1731—1802.) 

Zoonomia,  or  the  Laws  of  Organic  Life.  2d  Ed.  4 yols.  Svo.  Edinb.  1801. 
Instinct.  Zoonomy. 

Davies,  Sir  John.  (1570 — 1626.) 

On  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul.  1599. 

Fancy.  Reason. 

Day,  Jeremiah,  (b.  1773.) 

On  the  Will  (Self-determining  power  of ).  1S38. 

Ability.  Inability  (Moral).  Power. 

Degerando. 

1.  Hist.  Compar.  des  Systemes  de  Philosophic.  4 vols.  8vo.  1847. 
Method. 

2.  Des  Signes  et  de  V Art  de  Denser.  4 vols.  Svo.  1800. 

Sign. 

Delisle  de  Salles. 

Philosophic  de  la  Mature.  10  vols.  Svo.  1804. 

Naturalism. 

Democritus.  (B.  C.  460 — 357.) 

Atheism.  Atom.  Cosmogony.  Criterion.  Empiric.  Fatalism.  Na- 
ture or  Force  (plastic).  Species. 

De  Morgan,  Augustus,  of  Trinity  Coll.,  Camhr. 

Formal  Logic. 

Logic. 

De  Quincey,  Thomas.  (1786 — -I860.) 

1.  Sketches,  Critical  and  Prograph icul. 

Genius  and  Talent. 


004 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


De  Quincey,  Thomas. 

2.  Confessions  of  an  English.  Opium-eater.  3 d Edit.  Loud.  1S23. 
Memory. 

Deroron,  David.  (1600—1664.) 

Opera.  1644.  1.  Phys. 

Art.  Form. 

2.  Ee  Pradicam. 

Cause.  Quantity.  Space. 

3.  De  Universalibut. 

Difference. 

4.  Prcem.  Metaphys, 

Metaphysics. 

5.  Logica  Pettit.  1659. 

Proprium  (The),  or  Property.  Species.  Universal.  Whole. 

Dk  Sales,  Francis.  (1567 — 1622.) 

I Euvret  Completes.  16  volt.  8vo.  Par.  1833. 

Ecstasy. 

Des  Cartes,  Rene  (1596 — 1650)  and  Cartesians. 

I.  (1)  a.  Opera  Omnia.  9 vols.  4to.  Amst.  1692 — 1701 — 1713.  b.  Geo- 
metria.  Vol.  iv.  c.  Epistolce.  Vol.  vi — viii. 
b.  Instinct. 

II.  (2)  Opera  Philosophiea.  Edit.  Quart.  Amst.  1663. 

(3)  Meditat.  de  Prima  Philosoph.  in  quibus  Dei  exist,  et  anim.  hum.  a 

corp.  diet,  demon,  cum  respons,  auctoris,  et  Epist.  ad  Vcetium. 
Imagination.  Infinite.  Objective.  Thought  and  Thinking. 

(4)  Principia  Philosophies. 

a.  De  Principiis  cognit.  human. 

b.  De  Priucip.  rerum  material. 

Attribute.  Essence.  Indefinite.  Perception.  Quality. 

(5)  Dissert,  de  Methodo.  On  Method. 

Error.  Method. 

(6)  Tractatus  de  passionibut  animal.  (Traiti  des  Passions  de  I’dnie. 

Par.  1650.) 

Affection.  Passions. 

III.  (7)  (Enures  par  Cousin.  11  vols.  8vo.  1826. 

Life. 

(8)  Ilegules  ad  directionem  ingenii. 

Mathematics.  Notion. 

Axiom.  Category.  Causes  (Final,  Doctrine  of).  Causes  (Occa- 
sional, Doctrine  of).  Certainty.  Doubt.  Empiric.  Enthy- 
meme.  Extension.  Genius.  Idea  (225).  Impression.  Matter. 
Mode.  Optimism.  Perfect.  Primary.  Psychology.  Reason. 
Sensorium.  Syncretion.  Theology.  Virtual. 

Des  Maistre,  Joseph. 

Soirees  de  St.  Petersbourgh.  2 vols.  8vo.  1850. 

Notion.  Savage. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


C05 


De  Tract,  Destutt. 

Elements  d’ Ideologic.  6 vols.  1 8 m o . 1827. 

Attention.  Metaphysics. 

Devey,  J. 

Logic,  i 881. 

Introduction  (Method  or  Process  of). 

D'Hoi.bach,  Baron  P.  H.  T.  (1723-89.) 

Systeme  de  la  Nature.  1770. 

Naturalism. 

Diagoras  of  Melos  (or  Delos.)  (420  B.  C.) 

Atheism. 

Dick,  Sir  Thomas  L. 

Essay  on  Taste.  Pref.  to  Price  (q.  v.)  on  the  Picturesque.  8vo.  1842. 
Picturesque.  Taste. 

Dictionnaike  des  Sciences  Philosoph.  Paris,  1844-52.  6 vols.  8vo. 

Argumentation.  Asceticism.  Assent.  Being.  Consciousness  (111). 
Contraries.  Creation.  Determinism.  Dogmatism.  Entelechy. 
Faculty  (185).  Modality.  Mode.  Negation.  Notion.  Physio- 
logy.  Quality.  Quantity.  Socialism.  Spiritualism.  Stoics. 
Diogenes  (B.  C.  413 — 324). 

Cynic.  Motion. 

Diogenes  Laertius  (2d  Cent.  B.C.). 

De  vitis  dogmatis  et  apophthegmat.  eorum  qui  in  philosophia  clamerunt, 
libri  X.  Gr.  et  Lat.  (Aldobrand,  Stephani,  Casaubon,  Menagii). 
Folio.  Load.  1664.  Amst.  (2  vols.  4to)  1692.  The  Lives  and  Opi- 
nions of  Eminent  Philosophers.  Translated  by  Yonge.  Lond. 
Bohn,  1853. 

Anticipation.  Axiom.  Cynic.  Eclecticism.  Element.  Idea  (223). 
Dobrisch. 

Abstract. 

Donaldson. 

1.  New  Cratylus.  1839. 

Ethnography. 

2.  Yarronianus,  or  Introd.  to  Latin.  1844. 

Religion. 

Donne,  John  (1573 — 1641). 

Biathanatis.  A declar.  of  that  paradox  or  thesis,  that  self-homicide  is 
not  60  naturally  Sin  that  it  may  never  be  otherwise.  Lond.  1644, 
1700. 

Suicide. 

Doublabo. 

Letters. 

Elements. 

Douglas,  John,  D.  D.,  Bp.  of  Salisbury  (1721 — 1807). 

1.  Select  Works.  Salisb.  1S20, 


606 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Douglas,  John,  D.D. 

2.  The  Criterion  ; or,  Rules  by  which  the  Miracles  in  the  New  Teat,  are 
disting,  from  the  Spurious  Miracles  of  Pagans  and  Papists.  New 
Edit.  1807.  4th  Edit.  1833,  and  in  his  Works,  p.  383. 

Miracles.  Testimony. 

Dote. 

Theory  of  Human  Progression. 

Political  Science. 

Drew,  Samuel  (1705 — 1833). 

An  Orig.  Essay  on  the  fmmater.  and  Immortal,  of  the  Hum.  Soul,  founded 
solely  upon  Physic,  and  Rat.  Principles.  (1802.)  4th  Ed.  Lond. 
1S19. 

Materialism. 

Drummond,  William,  Sir  (d.  1828). 

1.  Academical  Questions.  1805. 

Idealism.  Principle. 

2.  (Edipus  Judaic  its.  8vo.  Lond.  1811. 

Irony. 

Drusius,  John  (1550 — 1616). 

A Collection  of  Hebrew  and  Arabic  Apothegms.  1612. 

Apothegms. 

Dryden,  John  (1631 — 1700). 

Works,  ed.  by  Sir  Walter  Scott.  2d  Edit.  18  vols.  8vo.  Edin.  1821. 
Attribute.  Genius.  Type. 

Dumarsais. 

Essay  on  Abstraction.  (Euvres  Completes  ( Duchosal  <Jk  Millon).  7 vols. 

8 vo.  1797. 

Abstraction  (10). 

Duff,  Rev.  W. 

Essays  on  Original  Genius.  Lond.  1767.  8vo. 

Genius. 

Duns  Scotds,  John  (ab.  1265 — 1308). 

Opera  Omnia.  Lugduu.  1639.  12  vols.  fol. 

Scholastic  Philosophy. 

Durandus  de,  St.  Pourcain  (d.  1333). 

Species. 

Dutrochet,  R.  .1.  H.  (1776 — 1847). 

Theorie  de  l' Habitude.  1810. 

Habit. 

Duval-Jouve. 

Logique,  Traite  de.  18-14. 

Language.  

Dwight,  Timothy  (1752 — 1827). 

Theology  explained  and  defended,  in  a Series  of  Sermons.  (1818.) 
4 vols.  8vo.  New  Yorlr,  1846. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


607 


Earle,  John,  Bp.  of  Salisbury  (1601 — 1665). 

Tabula  Rasa. 

Ecpuantus. 

Atom. 

Eddersheim.  (See  Chalyb,eus.) 

Edwards,  Jonathan,  President  (1703 — 175S). 

1.  A careful  and  strict  Inquiry  into  the  prevailing  Notions  of  the  Freedom 

of  the  Will,  with  Remarks  on  [ Lord  Karnes’s]  Essays  on  the  Prin- 
ciples of  Morality  and  Natural  Religion,  in  volume  I.  of  his  Works. 
Land.  1S34. 

Choice.  Motive.  Necessity.  Will. 

2.  A Dissertation  on  the  End  for  which  God  created  the  World.  Do. 

3.  The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Original  Sin  defended.  Do. 

Ellis,  John,  D.  D. 

1.  The  Knowledge  of  Divine  Things  from  Revelation,  not  from  Reason 

or  Nature.  1743.  Zd  Ed.  Loud.  1811. 

2.  Some  Considerations  upon  Mr.  Locke’s  Hypothesis,  that  the  Idea  of 

God  is  attainable  by  Ideas  of  Reflexion.  An  addition  to  a book 
entitled,  The  Knowledge,  &c.  Lond.  1743. 

Innate. 

Eltot,  Thomas,  Sir  (1546). 

1.  The  Govemour.  1564.  {New  ed.  by  Eliot.  1834.) 

Abstinence.  Virtue. 

2 . The  Castell  of  Health.  (1534). 

Element. 

Empedocles  (ab.  442  B.  C.) 

Atom. 

Encyclopaedia  Buitannica.  1th  Edit.  21  vols.  4to.  1842.  8 tk  Edit,  by 
Traill  (now  publishing). 

The  Dissertations  ( Stewart , Mackintosh).  9 vols.  4to.  1842. 
Encyclopedia  Metropolitana.  50  vols.  4to.  1845. 

Sciences  (The  Occult). 

Enfield,  IVm.  (1741—1797). 

The  Hist,  of  Philosophy,  from  the  Earliest  Times  to  the  Beginn.  of  the 
Present  Cent.,  draton  up  from  Brucker.  2 vols.  8vo.  Lond.  1819. 
Theosophism. 

Epictetus  (B.  C.  90). 

Enchiridion  (Wolf).  Lond.  1670. 

Abstinence. 

Epicurus  (ab.  344  B.  C.  — 271)  and  Epicurean  Philosophy. 

1.  Physica  et  Meteorologica.  ( Schneider .)  Leipz.  1813. 

2.  Fragmenra.  (Orellius.)  Leipz.  1818. 

Anticipation.  Atheism.  Atom.  Certainty  (86).  Cosmogony.  Cri- 
terion. Eclecticism.  Epicurean.  Endemonism.  Fatalism.  Idea. 
Logic.  Naturalism.  Utility. 


008 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Equivocation, 

A Treatise  of \ from  a M S.  written  ab.  1600.  12mo.  Lond.  1851. 

Reservation  (Mental). 

Erasmus,  Desiderius  (116“ — 1536). 

I.  (1)  Opera  Omnia.  10  vols.  in  11  fol.  Lugd.  Bat.  1703. 

(2)  Adagiormn  Opus.  Do.  Vol.  II. 

(3)  Apothegmatum.  12mo.  Basil,  1558.  Venice,  1577.  ( Extracted 

from  the  Adages.) 

Adage.  Apophthegm. 

Essay  on  Causality,  by  on  Undergraduate.  Lond.  1851. 

Causality  (80). 

Essay  on  Cause  and  Effect.  8yo.  Lond.  1824. 

Causality  (78). 

Essays,  Cambridge.  (1856.) 

Casuistry. 

Etheridge. 

Hebrew  Literature.  8vo.  Lond.  1856. 

Kabala. 

Ethnological  Journal.  (1848.) 

Ethnography. 

Euclid  (ab.  2S0  B.  C.). 

The  Elements  of  Euclid.  {Simeon.)  15 th  Ed.  Lond.  1811. 

Intuition.  Knowledge. 

Euler,  L.  (1707-83). 

Lcttres  d une  princesee  d’Allcmagne  ( Letters  to  a German  Princess).  Pe- 
tertb.  1768-72.  3 vols.  8vo.  Paris,  1812. 

Antecedent. 

Eearn,  John. 

Essay  on  Human  Consciousness.  1811.  4to. 

Consciousness. 

Feinagle. 

Hew  Art  of  Memory.  1812. 

Mcmoria  Technica. 

F£nelon  (1651—1751). 

1.  (Enures  Completes.  10  vols.  imp.  8vo.  Par.  1851. 

2.  Maximes  des  Saints.  II.  223. 

Maxim.  Quietism. 

3.  Sur  Vexistenee  de  Dieu.  I.  89. 

Prescience.  Reason. 

4.  Sur  le  Quietisme.  II.  223. — III.  572. 

Evil.  Mysticism.  Quietism. 

Ferguson,  Adam.  (1724 — 1816.) 

1.  Essay  on  the  History  of  Civil  Society.  1th  Edit.  Lond.  1814. 

Art.  Civility.  Savage  and  Barbarous.  Society. 

2.  Moral  and  Political  Science.  2 vols.  4to.  Edinb.  1792. 

3.  Institutes  of  Moral  Philosophy.  1770. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


609 


Ferrier,  James,  Prof. 

Institutes  of  Metaphysics.  Edinb.  and  Lond.  1854. 

Agniology.  Contradiction.  Epistemology.  Essence.  Harmony. 
Influx  (Physical).  Phenomenon.  Philosophy.  Truth. 
Feuchtersleben. 

1.  Medical  Psychology.  Svo.  1847. 

Imagination.  Sensation.  Temperament. 

2.  Dietetics  of  the  Soul.  12mo.  Lond.  1852. 

Temperament.  Will. 

Feuerbach,  L.  A.  (b.  1804). 

Das  Wesen  der  Religion.  Leipz.  1845. 

Acosmist. 

Ficinus,  Marsilius.  (1433 — 1491.) 

Opera  Omnia.  1471.  Basil,  1561.  Paris,  1641. 

Hermetic  Books. 

Fichte,  J.  G.  (1762—1814.) 

S'dmmtliche  Werlee.  8 vol.  Perl.  1845 — 46.  (Ed.  by  his  son,  J.  H.  Fichte.) 
JEsthetics.  Idealism.  Intuition.  Nihilism.  Objective.  Sensism. 
Figcier,  Louis. 

L' Alchemic  et  Les  Alchimistes.  Paris,  1850 — 1S56. 

Alchemy.  Rosicrucians. 

Filiangieri,  Gaetano.  (1752 — 1788.) 

Scicnza  della  Legislazione.  Naples,  17S0. 

Society. 

Fischerus,  John  Henr. 

Dissertat.  de  Stoicis  Apatheias  f also  suspeetis.  4to.  Leipz.  1716. 
Apathy. 

Fitzgerald. 

Notes  to  Aristotle’s  Ethics.  8vo.  Dublin,  1850. 

Objective.  Quantity.  Soul.  Spirit.  Mind  and  Occasion. 

Flavel,  John.  (1627—1691.) 

Discourse  of  the  Occasion,  Causes,  Nature,  Rise,  Growth,  and  Remedies 
of  Mental  Errors.  London,  1691. 

Fludd,  Robert.  (1591 — 1637.) 

Opera.  Oppenheim,  1617 — 1638.  6 vols.  folio. 

Macrocosm.  Theosophism. 

Fostenelle,  Bern,  le  Bov.  (1657 — 1757.) 

CEuvres.  11  vols.  12mo.  Par.  1667. 

Perfectibility. 

Formey,  J.  H.  S.  (1711—1797.) 

Le  Philosophe  Chretien.  2d  Edit.  Leide.  1752. 

Psychopanny  chism. 

Foster,  C.  J. 

Elements  of  Jurisprudence.  Post  Svo.  Lond.  (Wo/roii),  1854. 
Jurisprudence. 


610 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Foucnen,  Simon.  (1644 — 1696.) 

Bissertat.  sur  le  rech.  de  la  Verite,  on  sur  la  ph ilosoph.  des  academic. 
Pan's,  1690.  12mo.  Bissertat.  de  Pliil.  AccuUm.  12mo.  Paris, 

1692. 

Academics. 

1’uimiEn,  F.  C.  M.  (1772— 1S37.) 

1.  Theorie  des  Quat.  Mouvcm.  1S08. 

2.  Assoc.  Domest.  Agric . 1S22. 

3.  Aon ee a n M on <! e.  1S45. 

4.  Pieges  ct  Charlatanisme.  1831. 

5.  Fausse  Industrie.  1835-36.  2 vols.  12mo. 

Socialism. 

Franck,  Adolphe.  1809. 

1.  la  Kahbale,  on  philosophic  rbligiense  des  Uebreux.  Par.  1843.  8vo. 

( TV.  into  Germ,  by  Gelinch,  1844.) 

Knbala. 

2.  Dictionn.  des  Sc.  philos.  q.  v. 

Fkanki.in,  Benjamin.  (1706 — 1790.) 

T Varies.  (Sparks.)  Nets  Ed.  Philada.  1858.  10  vols.  8vo. 

Experimentum  Crucis. 

French. 

Zoological  Journal,  iV o.  I. 

Instinct. 

Folleh,  Thomas.  (1608 — 1661.) 

The  History  of  the  Worthies  of  England.  ( Nutall .)  3 vols.  8vo.  Loud. 
1S40. 

Assertory.  Dichotomy. 

Gaius.  (Xllth  Cent.) 

Institutiones  (BoeeJcing)  Bonn.  1842.  12mo. 

Nature  (Law  of). 

Galen,  Claudius.  (131 — 200.) 

Opera  Omnia,  gr.  et  lat.  (Kuhn.)  Leipz.  1821-33.  20  vols.  8vo. 

Empiric.  Temperament. 

Galileo,  Galilei.  (1564 — 1642.) 

Opera.  Milan.  1808.  13  vols.  8vo.  (An  edition  designed  to  be  more 

complete  than  any  other  teas  commenced  in  1842,  at  Florence.) 
Invention. 

Gall,  Fr.  Joseph.  (1758 — 1528.) 

Sur  les  Fonctions  du  Cerveau  et  sur  celles  de  chacune  de  ses  parties. 
Paris,  1822-25.  6 vols.  8vo. 

Organ.  Phrenology. 

Gambier,  Rev.  James  E. 

Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Moral  Evidence.  Eivington,  Loud,  1824. 
8vo. 

Evidence. 


AND  or  PROPER  NAMES. 


611 


Garat,  D.  J.  (1749—1833.) 

Analyse  dc  V Entendement  humain.  1794. 

Ideology. 

Garnikr,  Adolphe,  (b.  1801.) 

1.  Traite  des  Facultes  de  I’Ame.  Par.  1S52.  3 vols.  8vo.  ( Crowned 

by  the  Fr.  Acad,  in  1853.) 

, Consciousness. 

2.  Cf.  Diet,  des  Scien.  Philos. 

Judgment.  Soul. 

Gassendi,  Peter.  (1592 — 1655.) 

1.  See  Bernier,  F. 

2.  Opera  Omnia.  6 vols.  fol.  Leyd.  1658. 

3.  a.  De  Vita,  Moribus  et  Doctrina  Fpicur.  Lyons,  1647.  b.  Syntag. 

Phil.  Epic.  1649. 

Epicurean. 

4.  Disquisit.  Jletaph.  sen  dubit.  et  instant,  adv.  Cartesii  Metaphysicam, 

et  resp.  Amst.  1644. 

A priori.  Atom.  Idea  (228).  Impression. 

Gataker,  Thomas.  (1574 — 1654.)  See  Antoninus. 

Dissertatio  de  Disciplina  Stoica. 

Stoics. 

Gerard,  Alex.  (172S — 1795.) 

1.  Essay  on  Genius.  Land.  1767 — 1774. 

Genius. 

2.  An  Essay  on  Taste.  (Gold  medal,  1759.)  1780. 

Taste. 

Gkrlach,  G.  VI.  (b.  1786.) 

Commentates  Exhib.  de  Probabilit.  Disputot.  4to.  Gotting. 

Gerson,  John.  (1363—1429.) 

I.  (1)  Opera  Omnia  (Du.  Pin.)  5 vols.  fol.  Antw.  1706. 

(2)  De  Mystica  Tlieologia  Speculation.  Oper.  III.  361. 

Ecstasy. 

Geulincx,  Arnold.  (1625 — 1669.) 

1.  Quasstiones  Quodlibeticce.  1652.  2.  Logica.  1662.  3.  Ethica.  1675. 

4.  Compendium  Physicce.  1688.  5.  Annot.  ad  Cartesii  Principia. 

1690.  6.  Annot.  3Iajora.  1691.  7.  Metaphysica.  1691. 

Causes  occasional  (Doctrine  of). 

Gibbon,  E.  (1737—1794.) 

History  of  the  Decline  and  Fall  of  the  Roman  Empire.  12  vols.  8vo. 
Lond.  1815.  (Mihnan,  2 d Edit.  1846.  3 d.  Smith’s  Notes.  55.) 

Bohn’s  Ed.,  with  variorum  Notes.  54. 

Asceticism. 

Gibbons,  Thomas,  D.  D.  (1720 — 1785.) 

Sermons,  with  an  hymn  to  each  subject.  Lond.  1762. 

Eternity. 


612 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Gillies,  John.  (1747 — 1S36.) 

1.  Transl.  of  Aristotle’s  Ethics  and  Politics.  2 d Edit.  1S04. 

2.  Supplement  to  the  Analysis  of  Aristotle's  spec.  Works.  3d  Edition. 

1 S 1 3 . 

Automaton.  Cause  (76).  Predicament.  Time. 

Glanvill,  Joseph.  (1636 — 1680.) 

1.  Lux  Oritntalis ; or  on  enquiry  into  the  opinion  of  the  Eastern  sages 

concerning  the  pre-existence  of  souls;  being  a keg  to  unlock  the 
gra>id  mysteries  of  Providence,  in  relation  to  man’s  sin  and  misery. 
1662.  12mo.  ( Annot . by  More,  1682,  8vo.) 

Idiosyncrasy. 

2.  The  Vanity  of  Dogmatizing  ; a discourse  of  the  shortness  and  uncer- 

tainty of  our  knowledge  and  its  causes.  Loud.  1661,  Svo. 
Immanent. 

3.  Scepsis  Scientijica,  or  confessed  ignorance  the  way  to  science/  in  an 

Essay  on  the  van.  of  dogmat.  Loud.  1665,  4t,o. — (A  development 
of  2.) 

Scepticism.  Transcendent. 

GlASSFORd,  James. 

Essay  on  the  Principles  of  Evidence.  8vo.  Edinb.  1820. 

Evidence. 

Goclknius,  Rudolph,  Sr.  (1547 — 1628). 

Psychologia;  h.  e.,  de  homin.  perfections,  anima  et  imprimis  ortu  ; com- 
mentat.  et  disputat.  theologorr.  et  philosophorr.  nostra;  cetatis. 
Marb.  1590,  1597. 

Psychology. 

Good,  John  Mason,  M.  D.  (1764 — 1827). 

The  Book  of  Nature.  1826.  3 vols.  8vo. 

Instinct. 

Goodwin,  Thomas,  D.  D.  (1600 — 1709). 

Works.  5 vols.  fol.  Loud.  1681. 

Causation. 

Green.  J.  II.  (Cf.  Coleridge.) 

1.  Vital  Dynamics.  Hunterian  Orat.  1840. 

2.  Mental  Dynamics.  Hunterian  Orat.  1847- 
Instinct.  Will. 

Gregory,  John,  M.  D.  (1724 — 1733). 

1.  Observations  on  the  Duties,  Office,  and  Qualifications  of  a Physician, 

and  on  the  Method  of  prosecuting  Inquiries  in  Philosophy.  Edinb. 
1769.  Svo.  ( French  by  Vertac.  Par.  1787.) 

2.  Works.  ( Tytler .)  1788.  Edinb.  4 vols.  Svo. 

Hypothesis. 

Grote,  George  (b.  1794). 

History  of  Greece.  12  vols.  Bond.  1846 — 1855. 

Dialectics.  Fctichism.  Myth.  Sophism. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


613 


Groups,  Hugo  (1583 — 1645). 

1.  Philosophorum  Sententics  de  Plato.  Op.  om.  then l.  ] I f.  379. 

Fatalism. 

2.  De  Jure  belli  ac  pads.  Lib.  III.  (Gronovii,  Rarbeyrac.) 
Jurisprudence.  Law.  Nature. 

3.  Annot.  in  IV  Evangelia.  Opera  Thcolog.  (Land.  1679)  II.  pars  I. 

Amst.  1720. 

Soul. 

Groye,  Henry  (1GS3 — 1737-8). 

A System  of  Moral  Philosophy.  2d  Ed.  2 vols.  8vo.  Loud.  1749. 
Justice. 

Guericke,  II.  E.  F. 

1.  Kirchengeschichte.  8th  Ed.  1854—55. 

2.  Symbolik.  2d  Ed.  1846. 

3.  Archciologie.  1847. 

4.  Einleitung  in  das  N.  T.  1843. 

Supranaturalism. 

Guigniaut,  J.  D.  (b.  1794). 

1.  La  Theogonie  d’Hesiode.  Par.  1S35. 

Theogony. 

2.  Religions  de  V Antiquite.  Tr.from  Creuzer,  and  developed.  10  vols. 

8vo.  Par.  1825— 1851. 

Guizot,  F.  P.  G.  (b.  1787). 

1.  Meditations  et  etudes  morales.  3 d Edit.  1855. 

Belief.  Education. 

2.  History  of  Civilization.  Tr..  by  IF.  Hazlitt.  3 vols.  sm.  8vo.  Lond. 

1846.  (Hist,  gener.  de  la  Civilis.  en  Europe  — Civilis.  en  France. 
(1828—1830.) 

Immateriality.  Theocracy. 

Gurney,  Joseph  John  (17SS — 1847). 

Thoughts  on  Habit  and  Discipline.  6th.  Ed.  1852. 

Prescience. 

Hale,  Sir  Mathew  (1609 — 1676). 

1.  The  Primitive  Origination  of  Mankind  considered  and  examined  ac- 

cording to  the  Light  of  Nature.  Fol.  Lond.  1677. 

Law.  Ratiocination. 

2.  Works.  ( Thirlivall .)  Lond.  1805.  2 vols.  8vo. 

3.  Contemplations,  Moral  and  Divine:  Works,  vol.  II.,  Of  Afflictions, 

p.  200. 

Verbal. 

Hales,  John  (1584 — 1656). 

1.  Works  ( Lord  Hailes’).  3 vols.  12mo.  1765. 

2.  Golden  Remains.  (1659.  2iJ  Edit.  Lond.  1673.) 

Acroamatical. 

53 


C14 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


IIall,  Joseph,  D.  D.,  Bp.  of  Norwich  (1574 — 1650). 

Works  (Hall).  12  vols.  8vo.  Oxford,  1837.  Contemplations  on  the  0. 
and  N.  T.  Works  I.  & II. 

Being. 

Hamilton,  Sir  William,  Prof,  of  Log.  and  Metapli.,  Univ.  of  Edinh.  (1788 
—1856). 

1.  Discussions  on  Philosophy  and  Literature,  Edueat.  and  Univ.  Reform. 

Chief  y from  Ed.  Rev.  8vo.  Loud.  1S52.  2d  Edit.  ’53.  N.  Y.  1S55, 
with  Introd.  Essay  on  Hist,  of  Phil.  Specul.  by  Turnbull. 

Absolute.  Argument.  Causation.  Conception.  Consciousness.  In- 
duction. Infinite.  Logic  (295).  Necessity  (Logical).  Notions 
(First  and  Second).  Origination.  Quality  (Occult).  Reason  (Im- 
personal). Sensism.  Subject,  Object.  Thought  and  Thinking. 
Understanding. 

2.  Works  of  Reid.  Pref.  Notes  and  Supplementary  Dissertation  by  Sir 

IU»1.  Hamilton,  bth  Ed.  1858.  Edinh. 

Anticipation.  Apperception.  A priori.  Axiom.  Belief.  Brocard. 
Category.  Cause.  Concurring.  Concept.  Conceptualism.  Con- 
sciousness. Definition.  Deontology.  Determinism.  Dichotomy. 
Ego.  Egoism.  Enthymeme.  Faculty.  Fancy.  Feeling.  Form. 
Idea.  Ideal.  Impression.  Intellect  and  Intelligence.  Intuition. 
Knowledge  (2S0  and  284).  Logic  (294).  Matter.  Maxim.  Mode. 
Motive.  Nature.  Necessity  (Doctrine  of).  Nihilism.  Noology. 
Notion.  Objective.  Operations  (of  the  Mind).  Organon.  Parci- 
mony  (Law  of ).  Perception.  Pneumatology.  Power.  Primary. 
Quality.  Real.  Realism.  Reason.  Retention.  Sensation.  Sen- 
siblcs,  Common  and  Proper.  Sensus  Communis.  Sentiment.  Sen- 
timent and  Opinion.  Species.  States  of  Mind.  Subjectivism. 
Subsumption.  Suggestion.  Thought  and  Thinking.  Transcendent. 
Truth.  Truths  (First). 

S.  Edinburg  Review.  N.  115,  vol.  LII. 

Art.  Elimination.  Ideology.  Notions  (First  and  Second).  Real- 
ism. 

4.  Lectures  on  Logic  (quoted  by  Dove). 

Science. 

Criterion.  Ethology. 

IIasipdf.n,  Renn  Dickson,  D.  D.,  Bp.  of  Hereford. 

1.  Introd.  to  Mor.  Phil.  2d  Ed.  1856. 

Analogy  and  Experience.  Causes  (Final,  Doctrine  of).  Moral.  Ob- 
servation. 

2.  Philosophical  Evidence  of  Christianity.  1827. 

Analogy  and  Induction. 

3.  The  Scholastic  Philosophy  consid.  in  its  Relations  to  Chr.  Theology. 

( Hampton  Led.  1832).  3d  Edit.  Loud.  1848. 

Element.  Obligation.  Rationale.  Scholastic.  Substance. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


615 


Hancock,  Thos. 

Essay  on  Instinct . 

Innate.  Instinct. 

Harrington.  (See  Coleridge.) 

A ids  to  Reflection. 

Reason. 

Harris,  James.  (1709 — 1780.) 

Works.  Oxford,  1841. 

1.  Philosophical  Arrangements. 

Art,  Capacity.  Common  Sense.  Element.  Genius.  Macrocosm. 
Matter.  Metaphor.  Quality  (414,  415,  416).  Quantity  (Discrete 
and  Continuous).  Relation.  Soul. 

2.  Dialogue  on  Art. 

Art.  Cause.  Common  Sense  (the  Philosophy  of). 

3.  Dialogue  concerning  Happiness. 

Happiness.  Passion.  Rectitude.  Society  (Desire  of). 

4.  Hermes. 

Mind.  Reminiscence. 

Harris,  John. 

Man  Primeval.  1S49. 

Tabula  Rasa. 

Hartley,  David,  Dr.  (1705 — 57.) 

Observat.  on  Man;  his  frame,  his  duty,  etc.  3 vols.  Land.  1791. 
Association.  Superstition.  Theopathy.  Train  of  thought. 
Haywood,  F. 

1.  Critick  of  Pure  Reason,  by  Kant.  Tr.  with  notes,  etc.  2d  Edition. 

181S. 

Apperception.  Cognition.  Conception.  Dialectic.  Practical.  Un- 
derstanding. 

2.  Explanation  of  Terms  in  the  Crit.  of  Pure  Reason.  (Analysis.  1844.) 
Ostensive.  Schema. 

Head,  Edmund,  Sir. 

Handbook  of  Painting.  1S47. 

Type. 

Hegel  (and  Hegelians)  G.  W.  F.  (1770 — 1831). 

Works.  18  vols.  Svo.  Berlin,  1834-45. 

Acosmist.  Esthetics.  Idealism. 

Heineccius. 

Spontaneity. 

Heinsius,  Dan.  (15S0 — 1655). 

Philusnph.  Stoica.  4to.  Leyden,  1627. 

Stoics. 

Henderson. 

The  Philosophy  of  Kant. 

Ideal.  Noology.  Noumenon.  Proverbs. 


616 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


IIehacutus  (B.  C.  504). 

Aphorism.  Atheism.  Criterion.  Empiric.  Motion. 

Herbart. 

Faculty  (190). 

Herbert,  Lord,  of  Cherbury.  (1581 — 1648.) 

Pc  Veritate  prout  distinguitur  a revelatione.  Edit.  Tertia.  1 vol. 
1705. 

Memory.  Principles.  Tabula  Rasa.  Truths. 

Herman,  Godfrey. 

Myth  and  Mythology. 

Hermes,  or  Mercury  (and  Hermetic). 

Hermetic  Books.  Macrocosm. 

IIermolaus,  Barbaras. 

Entcleehy. 

IIerschbl,  Sir  John. 

On  the  Study  of  Nut.  Phil.  ( Lardner’s  Encyclopaedia,  No.  XIV.). 
Experience.  Observation. 

Hesiod. 

Worhs,  Pays,  and  Theogony.  Transl.  hy  Thomas  Coolce.  2 vols.  4to. 
Land.  1728. 

Cosmogony.  Theogony.  Theology. 

Heusde,  Ph.  IV.  von.  (1778 — 1839.) 

Initia  Philosophies  llhetoricae.  3 vols.  Utrecht,  1827 — 1836.  2d  Edit. 
1 vol.  Leyd.  1842. 

Idea.  Ideal.  ,• 

IIierocles.  (About  A.  D.  450.) 

In  Aurea  Pythagor.  Carmina.  Ed.  Needham. 

Intellect. 

Hilaire,  St.  Barthelemy. 

1.  Transl.  of  the  Organon.  Preface. 

Art. 

2.  Logique  : in  Piet.  d.  Scienc.  Philos. 

Logic. 

Hippocrates. 

Aphorism.  Temperament. 

Hobbes,  Thomas  (1588 — 1679). 

Works.  11  vols.  8vo.  (Molesworth.)  Loud.  1839. 

1.  Human  Nature. 

Evil.  Memory.  Reminiscence.  Train  of  Thought. 

2.  Phil.  Prima. 

Extension. 

3.  Of  Man. 

Merit.  Sensus  Communis.  Species. 

4.  Opera.  Edit,  hy  Molesivorth. 

Factitious.  Power. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


617 


Hobbes,  Thomas. 

5.  Leviathan 

Train  of  Thought. 

Atheism.  Benevolence.  Certainty.  Determinism.  Idea  (228).  Justice. 
Law.  Self-love.  Society  (Desire  of ). 

Holland,  Sir  H. 

Mental  Physiol. 

Attention. 

Holyoake. 

Secularism. 

Homer. 

Cosmogony.  Metaphor.  Observatiou. 

Hooker,  Richard.  (1554 — 1600.) 

Ecclesiastical  Polity.  ( Works  edited  by  Keble.  3 vols.  Oxford, 
1841.  y 

Law.  Rectitude.  Theology.  Will. 

Horace.  (B.  C.  65 — A.  D.  8.) 

Epistolce  (Are  Poeticee). 

Justice.  Magnanimity.  Rationale. 

Horsley,  Bp.  (1733 — 1806.) 

Obligation. 

Howell,  James.  (1591—1666.) 

Familiar  Letters.  ( Epistolee  Ho-Elianas.)  10(7i  Edition.  London, 
1661. 

Sciolist. 

Hughes. 

Spenser,  ( Editor  of). 

Taste. 

Hum  ANITA  RIANISM. 

Socialism. 

Humboldt,  Alexander  von. 

Cosmos.  ( OttL ) 4 vols.  Load.  1849-52.) 

Observation.  Species. 

Hume,  David.  (1711 — 66.) 

1.  Essays  and  Treatises  on  several  subjects.  4to.  1758.  Embracing 

Essay  on  Skeptical  Philosophy,  Inquiry  concerning  the  general 
principles  of  Morals,  Essay  on  Miracles,  Essay  on  Standard  of 
Taste,  Concerning  Human  Understanding. 

Abstraction  (Logical,  9,  10).  Anthropomorphism.  Association. 
Conscience.  Miracle.  Proof.  Quality  (Occult).  Scepticism. 
Self-love.  Taste.  Testimony. 

2.  Dialogues  on  Natural  History  of  Religion. 

Beauty.  Causality.  Consciousness  (113).  Consent  (Argum.  from 

LTniv.).  Empiric.  Impression.  Nihilism.  Power.  Psychology. 

Sentiment.  Utility. 

53* 


618 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Hunt,  Leigh. 

Imagination  and  Fancy.  12mo.  1844. 

Imagination  and  Memory.  Theosophism. 

IIutciieson,  Francis.  (1694 — 1747.) 

1.  Inquiry  concerning  Beauty  and  Virtue.  5 th  Edit.  1753.  Moral  good 

and  evil. 

^Esthetics.  Beauty.  Self-love.  Senses  (Reflex). 

2.  Jlfetaphysical  Synopsis.  6th  Edit.  1774. 

Atheism.  Bonum.  Certainty.  Existence  and  Essence.  Indi- 
vidual. Quality.  Quantity.  Senses  (Reflex).  Sign.  Subsis- 

tentia.  Unity. 

3.  Essay  on  the  Passions,  'id  Edit.  1769,  with  illustrations  of  the  Moral 

Sense. 

Desire.  Laughter.  Passions. 

4.  Oratio  inauguralis,  Be  naturali  kominum  socialitate.  4to.  Glasg. 

1730. 

Innate  ideas.  Society  (Desire  of). 

5.  Philosophia  Moralis.  1742. 

Senses  (Reflet-  Sign. 

6.  Log.  Compend. 

Benevolence.  Sense  and  idea.  Suggestion. 

IIlJTTNER. 

Be  My  this  Platonis.  4to.  Leipz.  1788. 

Myth  and  Mythology. 

IIutton  i a ns. 

Hypothesis. 

Hyde,  Thomas.  (1036 — 1703.) 

Religionis  Veterum  Persarum  Historia.  8vo.  Oxford,  1700,  1760. 
Sabaism. 


Identity,  Pehsonal,  Review  ok  the  Doctrines  of.  London.  1827. 

Identity. 

Ionian  School. 

Empiric. 

Irknjeus.  (d.  ab.  202  or  208.) 

Works.  Grahc,  1702.  Massuet,  1734.  Stieren,  1853. 

Tradition. 

Irons.  IV.  J.  (b.  1812.) 

On  the  whole  Boclrine  of  Final  Causes.  Lond.  1836. 

Cause.  Causes  final,  (Doctrine  of).  Fact.  Faculties  of  the  Mind, 
(Classification  of).  Theism. 

Irving. 

English.  Composition. 

Allegory.  Metaphor. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


619 


Irving,  Washington. 

Sketch-Bool:. 

Imagination. 

Jacobi. 

Providence. 

Jacques,  Amadee. 

1.  Mem.  de  VAcadem.  Roy.  (1841.) 

Common  Sense. 

2.  Manuel  de  Philosophic.  Partie  Psychologique. 

Jamblichcs.  (IVth  Cent.) 

Be  Mysteriis.  Oxon.  167S. 

Esoteric. 

Jardine. 

Gunpowder  Plot. 

Equivocation. 

Jeffrey,  Lord.  (1773 — 1850.) 

1.  A-rticle  “ Beauty,"  in  Encyclopaedia  Brilannica. 

Beauty. 

2.  Life  of  Jeffrey,  ly  Cockburn.  1852. 

Perceptions. 

Jerome.  (331 — 422.) 

Opera.  11  vols.  fol.  Vcronce.  1734. 

Scholastic. 

Job  xxi.  26,  27. 

Adoration. 

Johnson,  Dr.  Sam.  (1709 — S4.) 

Works.  9 vols.  Oxf.  1825. 

Apologue.  Assumption.  Equivocation. 

Jonson,  Ben. 

English  Grammar. 

Fancy.  Grammar  (Universal.) 

Josephus,  Flavius.  (A.  D.  37 — 93.) 

Antiquit.  Judaicar.  Libri  XX.  (Opera.  2 vols.  folio.  Amsterdam. 
1726.) 

Soul. 

JotVETT. 

Epistles  of  St.  Paul. 

Casuistry. 

Jocffroy,  Mons. 

1.  Melanges  Philosoph.  1833. 

Eclecticism.  Faculty.  Good  (the  Chief).  Order. 

2.  Droit.  Nat. 

Person.  Reason. 


620 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Jouffrot,  Mons. 

3.  M (moire  par.  de  la  Legitimite  et  de  la  Distinction  de  la  Psychologie 

et  de  la  Physiologie  (in  his  Nouveaux  Melanges  and  in  Memoiret 
de  l’ Acad,  dcs  Sciences  Morales  et  Politigues.  Vol.  XI. 
Psychology. 

4.  Court  Pro/esse  & la  Faculty  des  Letires.  1837. 

Soul. 

Journal  of  Pscychol.  Med.  1S57. 

Ideation. 

Journal  of  the  London  Statistical  Society.  Vol.  I.  1839. 

Statistics. 

Justinian. 

Pandects. 

Equity. 

JUVENAL. 

Good  ( the  Chief.) 

Society  (Political,  Capacity  of). 

Ivames,  Lord.  (1696 — 1782.) 

1.  Elements  of  Criticism.  1762. 

Beauty.  Custom.  Emotion.  Feeling.  Mode. 

2.  Essay  on  Liberty  and  Necessity. 

Motive. 

3.  History  of  Man.  1774. 

Society. 

Kanada. 

Atom. 

Kant,  Immanuel.  (1724 — 1804.)  (See  Henderson,  Mansel,  Haywood.) 

1.  Criticism  of  Pure  Reason.  ( Ilayujood , Mciklejohn.)  Crit.  de  la 

Raison  Pure.  2d  Edit.  1848. 

Cognition.  Conception.  Ideal.  Metaphysics.  Methodology.  Pa- 
ralogism of  Pure  Reason.  Reason  and  Understanding. 

2.  Analysis  of  K.  Criticism  of  Pure  Reason,  by  the  Translator.  8vo. 

Land.  1844. 

Space.  Time. 

3.  Metagjhys.  des  Moeurs. 

Utility. 

Absolute.  Abstraction.  ^Esthetics.  Amphiboly.  Analytics.  An- 
thropology. Antinomy.  Apodeictic.  Apperception.  Apprehen- 
sion. A priori.  Architectonic.  Association.  Autonomy.  Axiom. 
Belief.  Bonum  suramum.  Catalepsy.  Category.  Causality. 
Causes  (Doctrine  of  final).  Certainty.  Concept.  Contradiction. 
Deist.  Demonstration.  Dialectic.  Dogmatism.  Duration.  Es- 
sence. Faculties  of  the  Mind  (Classification  of).  Form.  Idea. 
Immanent.  Imperative  (the  Categorical).  Indiscernibles  (Iden- 
tity of).  Innate  (ideas).  Intuition.  Matter.  Maxim.  Modal- 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


621 


East,  Immanuel. 

ity.  Motive.  Noogonie.  Noologists.  Noumenon.  Objective. 
Ontology.  Outness.  Perception.  Perfectibility.  Postulate. 
Practical.  Psychology.  Reason.  Schema.  Sensation.  Subject- 
ivism. Sublime  (The).  Succession.  Theodicy.  Transcendent. 
Unconditioned.  Utility.  Virtue. 

Karslake. 

Aids  to  Logic. 

Analogy  and  Example.  Cause.  Condition.  Demonstration.  Sci- 
ence. 

Kepler,  John.  (155T — 1631.) 

Inertia. 

Kernius. 

Dissert,  ill  Epicuri  Prolepsin.  Gcett.  1736. 

Anticipation. 

Kidd. 

Principles  of  Reasoning. 

Truth. 

King,  Archbishop.  (1650 — 1729.) 

Essay  on  Origin_of  Evil.  Translated  by  Law.  4th  Edit.  Cambridge, 
1758. 

A priori  and  A posteriori.  Evil.  Obligation. 

Kirby,  lYm.  (1759 — 1S50.) 

Rridgeicater  Treatise  on  Histor.  habits  and  instincts  of  Animals.  2d 
Edit.  1S35. 

Instinct. 

Kircrer,  Athanasius.  (1601 — 80.) 

CEdipus  (Egyptiacns.  Fol.  Rom.  1652. 

Kabala. 

Kirwan. 

Logic. 

Logic. 

Knight,  Payne. 

Enquiry  into  Principles  of  Taste. 

Beauty.  Taste. 

Ksox,  Vicesimus.  (1752 — 1821.) 

Essays.  ( Works.  7 vols.  8vo.  Loud.  1S24.) 

Civility. 

Krause,  C.  C.  F.  (1781—1832.) 

Absolute. 

Labarte. 

Hand-book  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

Naturalism. 

Lacoddre. 

Inst.  Philos. 

Autotheists.  Factitious.  Pantheism. 


622 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Lactantius,  L.  C.  F.  (3d  and  4th  Cent.) 

Bivines  Institution es.  (Opera,  Par.  1748.) 

Religion.  Society. 

L.ELIOS  and  Hortensius ; or,  Thoughts  on  the  Nature  and  Objects  of  Taste 
and  Genius.  Edinb.  1782. 

Genius. 

Lafarge. 

Causes,  Occasional  (Doctrine  of). 

Lambert,  J.  H.  (1728-77.) 

D as  Neue  Organon.  1763. 

Organon. 

Laplace,  P.  S.  (1749 — 1827.) 

Essai  Phil,  sur  les  Probabilites.  5th  Edit. 

Chances  (Theory  of).  Method.  Testimony.  Theory. 
LaromiguiSre. 

Attention. 

Latham,  Dr. 

Natural  History  of  Varieties  of  Man.  Land.  1830. 

Anthropology. 

Lauder,  T.  D.,  Sir.  (1784 — 1846.)  (See  Price,  Sir  Uvedale.) 

Beauty. 

Lavater,  J.  C.  (1741—1801.) 

Physiognomy.  (Tr.  by  Hunter.)  5 vols.  4to.  1789-98. 

Physiognomy.  Temperament. 

Law,  Edmund,  Bishop.  (1703-87.)  (See  King.) 

Innate. 

Law,  Rev.  William.  (1686—1761.) 

Theosophism. 

Le  Brun. 

Genius. 

Le  Clerc,  John.  (1657 — 1736.) 

Bibliotheque  Choisie.  28  vols.  Amst.  1703-13. 

Atheism. 

Le  Grand. 

Institut.  Philosophies.  1675. 

Extension.  Individual. 

Leibnitz,  Godfrey  William.  (1646 — 1716.) 

1.  Opera  Omnia.  6 vols.  4to.  Genev.  1768. 

2.  Opera  Plujosophica.  Berlin,  1840. 

3.  CEuvrcs  Historiques.  Fol.  Hanovre,  1843. 

4.  OEuvres  Mathematiques.  Berlin,  1849-50. 

5.  (Euvres  d'apres  les  MSS.  Originaux.  Tome  Premier.  Bidot  Fr. 

Par.  1859. 

Anticipation.  Apperception.  Automaton.  Cause.  Causes  (final, 
Doctrine  of).  Conceiving.  Concept.  Continuity  (Law  of).  Con- 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES, 


623 


Leibnitz,  Godfrey  'William. 

tradiction.  Definition.  Determinism.  Dynamism.  Eclecticism. 
Empiric.  Essence.  Evil.  Force.  Harmony.  Hylozoism.  Idea. 
Identity  (personal).  Indefinite.  Indiscernibles  (Identity  of).  In- 
dividual. Inertia.  Jurisprudence.  Knowledge.  Monad.  Neces- 
sity (Doctrine  of).  Noogonie.  Noology.  Notions  (intuitive). 
Optimism.  Perceptions  (obscure).  Perfectibility.  Prescience. 
Privation.  Psychology.  Reason  (determining).  Scientia  Media. 
Soul.  Space.  Spontaneity.  Sufficient  Reason  (Doctrine  of). 
Tabula  Rasa.  Theodicy.  Theology.  Truth.  Ubiety.  Unity. 
Lf.ighton,  Robert.  (1613-SI.) 

Theological  Lectures.  Translated.  Land.  1S2S. 

Reason.  Well-being. 

Leland,  John.  (1691 — 1766.) 

Fiero  of  Ileistical  Writers.  Lond.  1837. 

Deists.  Theism. 

Lelut. 

Da  Demon  de  Socrate.  1836.  1850. 

Demon. 

Lemoine,  A. 

A Treatise  on  Miracles.  8vo.  Lond.  1747. 

Miracle. 

Lennep. 

Memory. 

Lerminier. 

Sur  le  Droit. 

Jurisprudence. 

Lessing,  G.  E.  (1729-81.) 

Perfectibility. 

L’Estrange,  Sir  Roger.  (1616 — 1704.) 

Fables  of  uEsop  and  other  Eminent  Mythologists.  Fol.  Lond.  1704. 
Fable. 

Leucippus.  (Bet.  4th  and  5th  Cent.  B.  C.) 

Atheism.  Atom.  Cosmogony.  Criterion.  Force. 

Lewes,  G.  H. 

1.  Biographical  Hist,  of  Philosophy.  4 vols.  1845. 

Acosmist.  Belief.  Idealism. 

2.  Comte's  Philosophy  of  Sciences.  1vol.  1853. 

Positivism. 

Lewis,  Sir  G.  C. 

1.  On  the  Influence  of  Authority  in  Matters  of  Opinion. 

Authority.  Fact.  Opinion. 

2.  Methods  of  Observation  in  Politics. 

Custom.  Law.  Rationale.  Science.  Species.  Statistics. 


624 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Lindley. 

Introduction  to  Jurisprudence. 

Law. 

Linglet,  Du  Fresnoy.  (1674—1755.) 

Histoire  de  la  Philosoph.  Ilermen.  3 vols.  12m6.  1742. 

Hermetic  Books. 

Linnaeus,  Chas.  (I707-7S.) 

Life. 

Linus. 

Cosmogony. 

Lipsius,  Justus.  (1547 — 1606.) 

Manuductio  ad  Stoicam  Philosoph.  4to.  Antw.  1664. 

Anticipation.  Stoics. 

Locke,  John.  (1632 — 1704.) 

Worlcs.  3 vols.  fol.  London,  1714.  8th  Edition,  1777.  1 0th  Edition, 
1801. 

1.  An  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,  (15 th  Edit.  1760.) 
Combination  and  Connection  of  Ideas.  Combination  of  Ideas.  Con- 
sciousness. Custom.  Definition.  Enthusiasm.  Error.  Essence. 
Evidence.  Experience.  Extension.  Faculties  of  the  Mind  (Clas- 
sification of).  Identical  proposition.  Identity.  Identity  (Personal). 
Idealogy.  Inference.  Innate  (Ideai).  Intuition.  Knowledge. 
Language.  Liberty  of  the  Will.  Maxim.  Memory.  Mode.  Na- 
tural. Notion.  Perception.  Power.  Prejudice.  Probable.  Qua- 
lity. Reason.  Reflection.  Relation.  Remembrance.  Society  (De- 
sire of).  Space.  Substance.  Succession.  Suggestion.  Syllogism. 
Tabula  Rasa.  Testimony.  Thought.  Time.  Unity.  Universals. 
Volition.  Will.  Wit. 

2.  Thoughts  concerning  Education.  Qth  Edit.  1732. 

Education. 

3.  A Discourse  of  Miracles. 

Miracle. 

4.  Of  the  Conduct  of  the  Understanding. 

Theology. 

5.  Life  by  Lord  King.  2 d Edit.  Lond.  1S30. 

Obligation. 

Abstraction,  logical  (p.  10).  Analogy.  Antipathy.  Archetype. 
Association.  Axiom.  Body.  Casuality.  Causation.  Certainty. 
Choice.  Conception  and  Idea.  Conscience.  Continuity.  Dura- 
tion. Ecstasy.  Empiric.  Factitious.  Idea.  Idealist.  Illation. 
Noogonie.  Noology.  Observation.  Psychology.  Rationalism. 
Sanction.  Senses  (Reflex).  Sensism.  Soul. 

Longinus,  C.  (210 — 273.) 

Trinon  Magicum.  12mo.  Francf.  1616. 

Magic. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


625 


Lowmax,  Moses.  (16S0 — 1P40.) 

Civil  Government  of  the  Hebrews.  Zone/.  1710. 

Theocracy. 

Lucretius,  C.  T.  (b.  B.  C.  96.) 

He  rerum  Natura. 

Natural.  Superstition. 

Lully,  Raymond  (1235 — 1315). 

Kabala.  Scholastic. 

Luther.  (14S3 — 1546.) 

Psychopanny  chism. 

Lyell,  Sir  Charles. 

1.  Manual  of  Elementary  Geology.  4th  Edit.  1852. 

2.  Principles  of  Geology.  Sth  Edit.  1850. 

Species. 

Macaulay,  T.  B.  (1S00-60). 

Essays.  2d  Edit.  Lond.  1844. 

Apophthegm. 

Maccall,  William. 

Elements  of  Individualism.  8vo.  Lond.  1S47. 

Individual. 

M'Cosh,  James. 

1.  The  Method  of  the  Divine  Government,  Physical  and  Moral.  Edinb. 

1850.  Zd  Edit.  1S52.  5th  Edit.  1856. 

Antimony.  Archetype.  Art.  Consciousness.  Innate.  Law.  Pro- 
vidence. 

2.  Typical  Forms  and  Spec.  Ends  in  Creat.  (by  M.  & Dickie).  2d  Ed.  1857. 
Analogue.  Chance.  Classification.  Homologues.  Homotypes.  Imagi- 
nation and  Memory.  Morphology.  Wit  and  Humour. 

Mackintosh,  James,  Sir  (1765 — 1832). 

1.  Miscellaneous  Works.  2d  Edit.  Lond.  1851. 

Observation. 

2.  Dissertation  on  the  Progress  of  Ethical  Philosophy.  Encyc.  Brit. 

( Whewell.) 

Emotion.  Eudemonism.  Natural.  Theory.  Train  of  Thought 

3.  A Discourse  of  the  Law  of  Nature  and  of  Nations.  ( Works,  161.) 
Jurisprudence. 

4.  On  the  Philosophical  Genius  of  Bacon  and  Locke.  ( Works,  147.) 
Critick.  Understanding.  Wisdom. 

Macrobius,  A.  T.  (mid.  of  Yth  Cent.). 

Saturn. 

Custom. 

MacVicar,  John  G.,  D.  D. 

1.  The  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful.  Edinb.  1S55. 

Aesthetics. 

2.  Enquiry  into  Human  Nature.  Svo.  Edinb.  1853. 

Apperception. 

54 


2 Q 


626 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Madan,  Martin  (1726—1813). 

Thelyphthora ; a Treatise  on  Telltale  Ruin.  1780. 

Polygamy. 

Magendie. 

Life. 

Magi. 

Dualism. 

Mahomet  (510 — 632). 

Fate. 

Maimonides  (1135 — 1205). 

Re  More  Nevochim  ( tr . Buxtorf).  Basil,  1629. 

Sabaism. 

Maistre  de,  Count  (1753 — 1821). 

Ru  Pape. 

Theocracy. 

Major,  John. 

Commentary  on  the  First  Book  of  the  Sentences.  1510. 

Theosophism. 

Maeebranciie,  Nicolas  (163S — 1715). 

1.  Re  la  recherche  de  la  verite.  Sept  edit.  4 vols.  12mo.  Paris,  1721. 

(The  Search  after  Truth,  transl.  by  Taylor.  Oxford,  1694.) 
Anthropomorphism.  Causes  (Occasional,  Doctrine  of ).  Error.  Evil. 
Excluded  Middle.  Passions.  Perfectibility.  Prejudice. 

2.  Entretiens  Metaphysiques. 

Optimism. 

3.  Traite  de  Morale.  Rotterd.  1684. 

Order. 

Psychology.  Reason.  Spiritualism. 

Mammertus,  Claudianus  (Flour.  470). 

Immateriality.  . 

Mandeville,  B.  (1670 — 1733). 

Benevolence. 

Manes  (Illd  Cent.  A.  D.)  and  Manicheans. 

A priori.  Dualism.  Evil. 

Mansel. 

1.  Prol.  Logic. 

Conceiving.  Concept.  Definition.  Faculties  of  the  Mind  (Classifi- 
cation of).  Induction.  Intuition.  Judgment.  Law  and  Form. 
Matter.  Metaphysics.  Ontology.  Syllogism.  Thought. 

2.  Aldrich,  with  Notes.  1849. 

Definition.  Intention. 

3.  An  Examination  of  Mr.  Maurice’s  Theory  of  a fixed  slate  out  of 

time. 

Eternity. 

4.  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Kant. 

Infinite.  Phenomenon. 

Absolute,  Abstract.  Acosmist. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


627 


Mangel  de  Philosophie,  a l’usage  de  Colleges.  Paris,  1846. 

Reminiscence.  Theodicy.  Utility. 

Marsh. 

Preliminary  Essay  to  Coleridge’s  Aids  to  Reflection.  (See  Cole- 
ridge). 

Speculation. 

Martin,  Saint. 

Pneumatology.  Theosophism. 

Martin,  T.  H. 

Philosophie  Spiritualiste  de  la  Nature.  2 tom.  Par.  1849. 

Nature  (Philosophy  of ). 

Martinius. 

Person. 

Matter,  J.  (b.  1791). 

].  Hist.  Critique  du  Gnosticisme.  3 Tom.  Paris,  1S43. 

Manicheism. 

2.  Histoire  de  la  Philosoph.  dans  see  Rapports  avec  Religion.  Paris, 
1854. 

Understanding. 

Maurice. 

Moral  and  Metaphysical  Philosophy. 

Acroamatical.  Electicism.  Entelechy.  Eternity.  Secundum 
Quid. 

Mayne,  Z. 

Notion. 

Mato,  H.  (d.  1850). 

Catelepsy. 

Meiklejohn. 

Transl.  of  Kant’s  Criticism  of  Pure  Reason,  with  Notes. 

Apperception.  Apprehension.  Ideal.  Opinion. 

Meiners,  C.  (1747—1810). 

Melanges. 

Apathy. 

Mejerus  (1662). 

Noology. 

Melancthon,  Philip  (1497 — 1568). 

Opera.  (Witem.  1601.  Bretschneider.  28  vols.  1839 — 1S60.) 
Entelechy. 

Melito  (ab.  177). 

Anthropomorphism. 

Mendelssohn  (1729-86). 

Esthetics. 

Mercier. 

De  la  Perfectibilile  Humaine.  8yo.  Paris,  1842. 

Perfectibility. 


628 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Michael  Angelo  (1475 — 1564). 

Genius. 

Michelet. 

Examen  Critique  de  la  Metaph.  d’Aristote.  8vo.  Par.  1856. 
Mickiewitz,  Adam. 

Tradition. 

Mill,  James  (1773 — 1836). 

Analysis  nf  the  Phenomena  of  the  Human  Mind.  Lond.  1829. 

Ideation.  Will. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  Dr. 

1.  A System  of  Logic,  ratiocinative  and  inductive.  3 d Ed.  2 vols.  8vo. 

Lond.  1851. 

Attribute.  Body.  Category.  Chance.  Classification.  Combination. 
Connotative.  Copula.  Deduction.  Definition.  Ethnology.  Func- 
tion. Induction.  Judgment.  Law.  Mysticism.  Norm.  Oppo- 
sition (in  Logic).  Ratiocination.  Reasoning. 

2.  Essays  on  some  Unsettled  Questions  of  Political  Economy.  Lond.  1844. 
Experience.  Idea  (228).  Science. 

Milton,  John  (1608-74). 

1.  Prose  Works  (St.  John).  5 vols.  Lond.  1848-53. 

2.  Poetical  Works  (Bnjdges).  6 vols.  Lond.  1835. 

Antinomy.  Capacity.  Education.  Fancy.  Idea. 

Mishna  (commenced  ab.  B.  C.  30). 

Kabala. 

Moffat. 

Study  of  Aesthetics.  Cincinnati,  1856. 

Genius.  Poetry.  Tact.  Talent. 

Molierf.  (1622—1675). 

Femmes  Savantes.  1692. 

Reason. 

Molina  (1535 — 1601)  and  Molinists. 

Apathy.  Scientia  Media. 

Molitor,  J.  F. 

Philosophic  de  la  Tradition.  8vo.  Paris,  1837. 

Tradition. 

Monboddo  (1714-79). 

Ancient  Metaphysics.  3 vols.  Edinb.  1779. 

Being.  Capacity.  Category.  Cause.  Contingent.  Discursus. 
Entelechy.  Fancy.  Form.  Habit.  Intellect.  Matter.  Meta- 
physics. Mind.  Part.  Philosophy.  Predicate.  Privation.  Space. 
Time.  Whole. 

2.  Origin  and  Progress  of  Language.  2d  Edit.  6 vols.  Edinb.  1784. 
Category.  Grammar. 

Montaigne  (1533 — 92). 

Laughter.  Scepticism. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


629 


Montemont. 

Grammaire  General  on  Philosophic  des  Langues.  2 tom.  Svo.  Par.  1845. 
Grammar. 

Montesquieu,  Charles  de  Secondat,  Baron  of  (1689 — 1655). 

1.  L’ Esprit  de  lot's.  ( (Euvres . 7 vols.  Amsterd.  1777.) 

2.  Do.  transl.  htj  Nugent.  2d  Edit.  Land.  1752. 

Classification.  Jurisprudence.  Justice.  Law.  Savage. 

More,  Henry,  D.  D.  (1614-87). 

1.  Theological  Works.  Folio.  Loud.  1708. 

2.  Collection  of  Philosophical  Writings,  ith  Edition.  Folio.  London, 

1712. 

3.  Enchiridion  cthicum.  Amst.  1695. 

Enthusiasm. 

4.  A Brief  Discourse  of  Enthusiasm.  ( Philos . Writings.) 

Existence.  God. 

5.  Antidote  against  Atheism.  (Do.) 

Justice.  Physiognomy. 

6.  Conjectura  Cabbalistica.  Fol.  Lond.  1673.  (And  Philos.  Writings.) 

7.  Immortality  of  Soul,  as  demonstrated  from  Nature  and  Reason.  (Do.) 
Anima  Mundi.  Archseus.  Causality.  Economics. 

More,  Thomas,  Sir  (1480 — 1535). 

Workes.  Folio.  1557. 

Antecedent.  Sophism. 

Moore,  Thomas  (1779 — 1S52). 

Idea.  Notion.  Proverb. 

Morell,  J.  D. 

1.  Elements  of  Psychology.  8vo.  Lond.  1853. 

Faculties  of  Mind  (Classif.  of ).  Knowledge.  Life.  Sensation. 

2.  History  of  Philosophy. 

Identism. 

3.  Speculat.  Philos,  of  Europe  in  1 9 th  Cent.  1846. 

Occasion.  Origin. 

4.  Philosoph.  Tendencies  of  the  Age.  8vo.  Lond.  1848. 

Philosophy.  Positivism.  Reason.  Tradition.  Will. 

5.  Philosophy  of  Religion.  1849. 

Reason  and  Understanding. 

6.  Manchester  Papers. 

Imminence. 

Anthropology.  Automaton.  Dogmatism.  Scholastic  Philosophy. 
Morgan. 

On  the  Trinity  of  Plato. 

Soul. 

Morton,  S.  G.,  Dr. 

Crania  Americana.  Fol.  Phil.  1S39. 

Species. 

54* 


630 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OP  AUTHORS 


Mosheim,  J.  L.  (1695 — 1755.) 

Ecclesiastical  History.  Tr.  by  Murdoch.  Edit,  by  Soames.  4 vols.  8vo. 
Loud.  1841.  (Reid,  1848.) 

Rosicrucians. 

Muller,  J.  G.  (Balle). 

Rilduiiy  u.  Gebrauch  d.  Wortes  Religio.  Sludien  u.  Kritihen.  1835. 
Religion. 

Muller,  Julius. 

Christian  Doctrine  of  Sin.  Tr.  by  Palesford.  Edinb.  1852. 
Speculation. 

Murillo  (1618-82). 

Genius. 

Murray,  Hugh  (1779—1846). 

Enquiries  respecting  the  Character  of  Nations  and  the  Progress  of  So- 
ciety. Edinb.  1S08. 

Savage  and  barbarous. 

Nemesius.  (End  of  4th  Cent.) 

De  Natura  Hominis.  Antic.  1565.  Tr.  by  Wither.  1636. 
Immateriality.  Psychology. 

Neo-Platonicians.  (See  Alexandria,  School  of). 

Newton,  Sir  Isaac.  (1642 — 1727.) 

Opera.  (Horsley.)  5 vols.  4to.  Land.  1779-85. 

Analysis.  Eternity  of  God.  Genius.  Induction.  Instinct.  In- 
vention. Matter.  Sensorium.  Space.  Synthesis.  Theory. 
Nicephorus,  Blemmydes.  (13th  Cent.) 

Science. 

Niemeier,  J.  B. 

Dissert,  de  Stoic.  Apotheia.  4to.  Helmse.  1679. 

Apathy. 

Nominalists. 

Conceptualism.  Nominalism.  Scholastics. 

Norris,  John.  (1657 — 1711.) 

Essay  towards  the  Theory  of  the  Ideal  or  Intelligible  World.  2 vols. 
8vo.  Lond.  1701—4. 

Instinct.  Notion. 

North. 

Plutarch.  (Translat.) 

Sophism. 

Notes  and  Queries.  1857. 

Reminiscence. 

Occam,  William  (d.  1347),  and  Occamists. 

Nominalism.  Objective.  Species. 

Ocellus,  Lueanus.  (About  500  B.  C.) 

Tlcpi  rou  ravros, 

Eotelecby. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


681 


Ochinus,  Bernnrdus.  (14S7 — 1564). 

Polygamy. 

Oldfield. 

Essay  towards  the  Improvement  of  Reason.  8vo.  Lond.  1707. 

Conception  and  Imagination.  Essence.  Existence  and  Essence. 
Innate.  Person.  Sign. 

Olysipiodohus.  (About  A.  D.  501.) 

Commentary  on  the  Phcedo  of  Plato. 

Reminiscence. 

Organicists. 

Life. 

Origen.  (185 — 254.) 

Contra  Celsum.  (Spencer.)  Cantab.  1658. 

Esoteric.  InDate  Ideas. 

Orpheus. 

Cosmogony.  Theology. 

Oswald,  Dr. 

Appeal  to  Common  Sense  in  behalf  of  Religion. 

Common  Sense. 

Owen,  Prof. 

On  the  Archetype  and  Homolog.  of  the  Vertebr.  Skelet.  1848. 
Ilomologue.  Morphology. 

Owen. 

Perfectibility. 

Oxford  (English  Prize  Essays  for).  1S56. 

Essay  on  Comparative  Mythology. 

Myth. 

Paffe,  Mons. 

Stir  la  Sensibilite. 

Noology.  Sensation  and  Perception. 

Paley,  William.  (1743 — 1805.) 

1.  Works.  4 vols.  8vo.  Lond.  1838. 

2.  Natural  Theology.  1 6th  Edit.  Lond.  1819. 

Automaton.  Causes,  Final  (Doctrine  of).  Cumulatire  Argument. 
Design.  Instinct.  Law. 

3.  Principles  of  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy.  14 th  Edit.  1803. 
Assent.  Contract.  Divorce.  Expediency  (Doctrine  of).  Obliga- 
tion. Person.  Polygamy.  Sanction.  Utility. 

4.  Evidences  of  Christianity.  7th.  Edit.  Lond.  1800. 

Apophthegm.  Contract.  Cumulative  Argument. 

Panckoucke. 

Dictionnaire  dcs  Proverbes. 

Proverbs. 

Paracelsus.  (1493 — 1541.) 

Anima  mundi.  Archaeus.  Macrocosm.  Theosophism. 


632 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Parmenides,  (b.  ab.  536  B.  C.) 

Criterion.  Motion. 

Parr,  Samuel,  Dr.  (1747—1825.) 

1.  Essay  on  the  Sublime.  Wor/cs.  8 Tola.  8vo.  Load.  1828. 

Sublime. 

2.  Sequel  to  the  printed  Paper.  2d  Edit.  Pond.  1792. 

Theory. 

Pascal,  Blaise.  (1623 — 1662.) 

Treatise  of  a Vacuum.  (Euvrcs.  (5  vols.  8vo.,  & la  Haye.  1779.)  v.  4. 
Perfectibility. 

Pasqualis,  Martinez,  (d.  1779.) 

Pneumatology. 

Patricius. 

Translation  of  Philoponus. 

Metaphysics. 

Paul. 

Analysis  of  Aristotle' s Ethics. 

Ends.  Method. 

Paulicians. 

A priori. 

Patne,  George. 

Elements  of  Mental  and  Moral  Science.  Zd  Edit.  1845. 

Conscience. 

Peemans. 

Introd.  ad  Pliilosoph.  12mo.  Lovan.  1840. 

Analysis  and  Synthesis.  Art.  Attribute.  Ethics.  Existence. 
Philosophy.  Whole. 

P£re,  Conseils  d’un  sur  l’Education. 

Education. 

Peripatetics. 

Form.  Idea. 

Petersen. 

Testimony. 

Petiionius. 

Scholastic. 

Piiilo  Judaeus.  (1st  Century.) 

Opera.  Mangey.  2 vols.  fol.  London,  1742.  Pfeiffer.  5 vols.  8vo. 
Erl.  1785. 

Ecstasy.  Space.  Syncretism. 

Philon. 

Academics. 

Philoponus.  (See  Patricius.) 

PlCCOLOMINEUS. 

rhilosoph.  dc  Moribus,  Franco/'.  1583. 

Chance.  Reminiscence. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


633 


Picus,  J.  Paris. 

Cabalistarum  Selectiora  Obscurioraque  Dogmata.  12mo.  Ven it.  1569. 
Kabala. 

Pierron.  (See  Zevort.) 

Introd.  d la  Metaphys.  d’Aristote,  1840. 

Contradiction. 

Plato  (B.  C.  430 — 347)  and  Platonists. 

Opera.  Franc.  1602.  11  vols.  Svo.  Land.  1826.  10  vol3.  Stallbaum. 

1.  Republica  sive  de  jnsto. 

Criterion.  Justice.  Method.  Myth.  Society  (Desire  of). 

2.  Convivium  sive  de  amore. 

Demon. 

3.  Cratylus,  sive  de  recta  nominum  ratine. 

Grammar  (Universal). 

4.  Phcedo,  sive  de  animo. 

Immortality  (of  the  Soul). 

5.  Tin ia:us  sive  de  Fatima. 

Life.  Myth.  Privation.  Scholastic  Philosophy.  Soul,  Spirit,  Mind 
and  Syllogism. 

6.  Gorqias,  sive  de  Rhetorica. 

Myth. 

7.  Protagoras,  sive  Sophistte. 

Society  (Desire  of ). 

Academics.  .Esthetics.  Anima  Mundi.  Apology.  Atheism.  Beauty. 
Cardinal  Virtues.  Cause.  Demiurge.  Dichotomy.  Eclecticism. 
Empiric.  Enthusiasm.  Epicurean.  Esoteric.  Eternity.  Evil. 
Form.  Idea.  Ideal.  Metempsychosis.  Mind.  Morality.  Mys- 
ticism. Nature  or  Force  (Plastic).  Noology.  Notion.  Number. 
Passions.  Pneumatology.  Propriety.  Prudence.  Reason.  Rea- 
son (Impersonal).  Reminiscence.  Same.  Soul.  Tabula  Rasa. 
Theory.  Universal. 

Pleasures  of  Literature.  12mo.  Loud.  1851. 

Genius.  Method.  Taste. 

Plethon. 

Cardinal  Virtues. 

Pliny.  (23—79.) 

Transl.  by  Holland.  2 vols.  folio.  1601. 

Gymnosophist.  Memoria  Technica.  Sympathy. 

Plotinus.  (205—270.) 

Oper.  Pltilosopb.  Omn.  Libr.  LIV.  Fol.  Basil,  1580. 

Esthetics.  Category.  Demiurge.  Ecstasy.  Hylozoism. 
Plutarch,  (d.  ab.  A.  D.  120.) 

1.  Opera.  2 vols.  fol.  Paris,  1624. 

2.  The  Philosophy  commonly  called  the  Morals.  Tr.  by  Holland.  Load. 

1657. 


634 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Plutarch. 

3.  Dialogue  on  the  Demon  of  Socrates. 

4.  De  Fato. 

5.  Of  Brotherly  Love. 

Acroamatical.  Apophthegm.  Demon.  Enthusiasm.  Fatalism.  Idea. 
Potential.  Soul.  Syncretism. 

Pocock,  Edw.  (1604 — 1691.) 

Specimen  Hist.  Arab.  4to.  Oxford,  1649. 

Sabaism. 

POCOCKK. 

India  in  Greece. 

Myth. 

Poiret,  Peter.  (1646 — 1719.) 

The  Divine  (Economy,  written  origin,  in  French.  6 vols.  870.  Land. 
1713. 

Mysticism. 

Poljgn  ac,  Melchoir  de,  Cardinal.  (1661 — 1741.) 

Anti-Lucretius,  sire  de  Deo  et  Natura.  Loud.  1751. 

Instinct. 

Polybius.  (B.  C.  203 — 123.) 

Ilistoriarum.  3 vols.  8vo.  Leips.  1764. 

Occasion. 

Pope,  Alexander.  (1688 — 1744.) 

Worhs  (Roscoe).  8 vols.  8 vo.  Lond.  1846. 

Apathy.  Genius.  Merit.  Philanthropy.  Rationale. 

Pordage. 

Mysticism. 

Porphyry.  (233 — 304.; 

1.  Select  Worhs.  Transl.  by  Taylor.  Lond.  1823. 

2.  Introd.  ad  Categor. 

Arbor  porphyriana.  Difference.  Ecstasy.  Esoteric.  Individual 
Realism. 

Porteus,  B.  (1731 — 1808.) 

Worhs.  6 vols.  8vo.  Lond.  1816. 

Apprehension.  Immortality. 

Port  Royalists. 

Logica  sive  Are  Coyitandi.  E.  tertia  edit,  in  Lat.  vers.  Lond.  1674. 
Academics.  Category.  Conception  and  Imagination.  Conception 
and  Idea.  Definition.  Division.  Extension  (Logical).  Judg- 
ment. Method.  Mode.  Quantity.  Reasoning. 

Posts,  Edward,  M.  A. 

Introduc.  to  Poster.  Analyt.  of  Aristotle.  1850. 

Contradiction.  Dialectics.  Organon. 

Potamos,  of  Alexandria. 

Eclecticism. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


635 


PoWNALL. 

Intellectual  Physics. 

Space. 

Price,  Richard.  (1723 — 1791.) 

1.  A Review  of  the  principal  Questions  and  Difficulties  in  Morals.  4to. 

Loud.  175S. 

Fitness.  Impossible.  Merit.  " 

2.  Letters  on  Materialism  and  Philosophical  Necessity. 

Argumentation.  Beauty.  Materialism.  Perfectibility.  Rectitude. 

Rule.  Sensibles.  Testimony. 

Price,  Sir  Uvedale. 

On  the  Picturesque,  with  Essay  on  Taste  by  Sir  T.  L.  Diclc.  8vo.  1842. 
Beauty.  Picturesque. 

Prichard,  Dr.  J.  C.  (1786 — 1845.) 

Natural  History  of  Man.  Lond.  1843. 

Species. 

Priestley,  Joseph.  (1733 — 1804.) 

1.  Examination  of  Reid,  Reattic,  and  Oswald.  Lond.  1775. 

Credulity.  Instinct. 

2.  Disquisitions  on  Mutter  and  Spirit ; Three  Dissertations  on  the  Doctr. 

of  Materialism  and  Philosophical  Necessity.  Lond.  1778.  Birm. 

1782. 

Libertarian.  Materialism.  Perfectibility.  Psychology.  Will. 
Priscian.  (4th  Cent.) 

Scholastic  Philosophy. 

Protagoras. 

Certainty.  Criterion.  Empiric. 

Ptolemy.  (Born  A.  D.  70.) 

Geographies.  Lib.  XIII.  Essend.  1835-44. 

Theory. 

Puffenporf,  S.  (1631 — 1694.) 

De  officio  hominis  el  Civis.  (Johnson.)  2d  Edit.  Lond.  1737. 
Jurisprudence.  Law.  Nature. 

Purpose,  The,  of  Existence.  12mo.  1850. 

Soul.  Spirit.  Mind,  etc. 

Pursuit  of  Knowledge.  Weekly  Vol.  31. 

Hypothesis. 

Pyrrho.  (About  340  B.  C.) 

Scepticism. 

Pythagoras.  (B.  C.  586 — 506). 

Anima  mundi.  Cardinal  virtues.  Categories.  Dualism.  Eclecti- 
cism. Idea.  Intellect.  Mathematics.  Metempsychosis.  Nature 
or  Force  (Plastic).  Number.  Philosophy.  Psychism.  Reason. 
Soul. 


636 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Pythagoreans. 

Cause.  Criterion.  Deontology.  Entelcchy.  Esoteric  and  Exo- 
teric. Justice.  Privation. 


Quadius. 

Disputatio  tritum  illud  Stoic. paradoxon  vcpi  rrj g oiraStiaj  expendene.  4to. 
Sedini.  1720. 

Apathy. 

Quadrates.  (About  A.  D.  125.) 

Apologies  fragmentum.  ( Grabc  Spicileg.  Id.  125.) 

Apology. 

Quesne,  Mons. 

Lettrea  sur  le  Psych isme.  8vo.  Paris,  1852. 

Psychism. 

Quintilian.  (A.  D.  42 — 122.) 

Allegory.  Argument.  Art.  Memoria  Technica.  Perception. 
Scholastic. 

Raleigh,  Sir  Walter.  (1552 — 1618.) 

Hist,  of  the  World.  1614.  ( Works.  8 vols.  8vo.  Oxf.  1829.) 

Magic. 

Ramists. 

Argument. 

Ramsey,  Allan.  (1685 — 1758.) 

Scots  Proverbs.  1736.  ( Works.  2 vols.  8vo.  Lond.  1800.) 

Proverb. 

Ramus,  Peter.  (1515—1572.) 

lnstitut.  Dialectical.  Libr.  Duo.  Cantab.  1611. 

Dichotomy. 

Raphael.  (1483 — 1520.) 

Genius. 

Rassow,  Hermann. 

Aristotelis  de  Hot  ion  is  Definitione  Doctrina.  Berol.  1,43. 

Intellect. 

Rationalists.  (See  Sensationalists,  Ancient.) 

Rattray. 

Antipathy. 

Ravaisson,  M.  Felix. 

1.  Essai  sur  la  Metaphysique  d'Aristote.  8vo.  Par.  1838. 

Esoteric.  Form. 

2.  De  V Habitude.  8vo.  Par.  1838. 

Habit. 

Ray,  John.  (1628—1705.) 

Complete  Collect,  of  English  Proverbs,  also  Scotch,  dec.  ( Belfour .)  5th 
Edit.  Lond.  1813. 

Proverbs. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


637 


Realist. 

Conceptualism.  Nominalism. 

Regis,  P.  S.  (1632—1707). 

Systime  de  la  Philosophic.  3 vols.  4to.  Par.  1690. 

Causes  (Occasional,  Doctrine  of). 

Reid,  Thomas  (1710 — 1795). 

1.  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind  on  the  Principles  of  Common  Sense. 

(1763.) 

Credulity.  Ego.  Experimentum  Crucis.  Extension.  ''Idealism. 
Language.  Reason.  Relation.  Sign.  Testimony.  Truths. 

2.  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers.  (1785.) 

Causation.  Common  Sense.  Conceiving.  Conception  and  Imagina- 
tion. Conceptualism.  Conscience.  Consent  (Argument  from  Uni- 
versal). Egoism.  Extension.  Faculty.  Feeling.  Generalization. 
Grammar  (Universal).  Grandeur.  Habit.  Hypothesis.  Idea. 
Identity.  Immanent.  Immaterialism.  Impression.  Induction. 
Idol.  Judgment.  Knowledge.  Matter.  Memory.  Novelty.  Ope- 
rations (of  the  Mind).  Perception.  Prejudice.  Principles.  Pro- 
bable. Quality  (Occult).  Reflection.  Relation.  Sensation.  Senti- 
ment and  Opinion.  Space.  Species.  States  (of  Mind).  Time. 
Train  of  Thought.  Truths.  Universals. 

3.  Essays  on  the  Active  Powers.  (17S8.) 

Approbation.  Conscience.  Credulity.  Design.  Disposition.  Habit- 
Imitation.  Impulse.  Instinct.  Liberty.  Macrocosm.  Monad. 
Motive.  Nature  (Course  or  Power  of ).  Power.  Rectitude.  Right. 
Scientia  (Media).  Sufficient  Reason  (Doctrine  of).  Temperament. 
Utility.  AVill. 

4.  Account  of  Aristotle’s  Logic.  (1774.) 

Definition.  Distinction.  Division.  Predicate.  Proposition.  Sophism. 
Soul.  Syllogism. 

5.  Correspondence.  (1764 — 1793.) 

Choice.  Immanent.  Libertarian.  Motive.  Power.  States  (of 
Mind).  Univocal  Words.  Will. 

6.  Essay  on  Quantity. 

Quantity. 

7.  Works.  Preface,  Notes,  and  Supplementary  Dissertations,  by  Sir 

William  Hamilton,  (bth  Ed.  1858.) 

Abstraction  (Psychological).  Do.  (Logical).  ^Esthetics.  Affections. 
Ambition.  Apperception.  Appetite.  Association.  Attention. 
Axiom.  Beauty.  Belief.  Benevolence.  Capacity.  Causality. 
Causes  (Final,  Doctrine  of).  Common  Sense  (the  Philosophy  of). 
Conception  and  Idea.  Empiric.  Entelechy.  Fetichism.  Idealist. 
Imagination.  Law.  Law  and  Cause.  Notion.  Objective.  Pri- 
mary. Psychology.  Rationalism.  Sensation  and  Perception. 
Subject  (Object.)  Veracity. 

55 


638 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OP  AUTHORS 


Relationalist. 

Conceptualism. 

Reitchlin,  or  Cafnio  (1454 — 1522). 

De  Arte  Cabalistica.  Libri  tres.  fol.  Hagen.  1517. 

Kabala. 

Review,  Edinburg.  (1S44,  1S50). 

Absulute  (5).  Entbymeme.  Ethnography.  Intention.  Observation. 
Opinion.  Realism. 

Review,  North  British  (No.  27). 

Conception  and  Idea. 

Review,  Quahteiily. 

Consilience.  Deduction.  Divorce.  Induction  (Principles  of). 
Reynolds,  Joshua,  Sir  (1723-92). 

Discourses  on  Painting,  delivered  to  the  Students  of  the  Royal  Academy. 
(1771-82.)  Loud.  1S39. 

Taste. 

Richteiuts. 

1.  Dissertatio  de  Cynicis.  (1701.) 

Cynic. 

2.  De  Ideis  Platon  is. 

Idea. 

Ritter,  II.  (b.  1791). 

1.  Geschiclile  der  Philosophic.  12  vols.  8vo.  Hamb.  1836-53. 

2.  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy,  translated  by  Morrison.  4 vols.  8vo. 

Land.  1846. 

Esoteric.  Will. 

Rivitrs. 

Cause. 

Robinet,  J.  B.  R.  (1735—1820). 

Traite  dc  la  Nature. 

Naturalism. 

Robinson. 

Eudoxa. 

Apodeictic. 

Robison,  John  (1739 — 1805). 

Proofs  of  a Conspiracy  against  All  Religions  and  Governments  of  Eu- 
rope, carried  on  in  Meetings  of  Free-Masons,  Illuminati,  and  Read- 
ing-Societies. 4 th  Edit.  Lond.  1798. 

Illuminati. 

R.OCIIEFOUCA OLD  (1613-80). 

Moral  Rrflec.  and  Maxims.  Lond.  1706. 

Benevolence.  Maxim. 

Rogers,  Samuel  (1762 — 1855). 

Table  Tall:.  Lond.  1856. 

Testimony. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


639 


Rollin,  Charles  (1661 — 1141). 

Maxims. 

Maxim. 

Roman  law. 

Equity. 

Rousseau,  J.  J.  (1712-78). 

Contrat  Social.  ( CEuvres . 27  vols.  8vo.  Paris,  1824r-28.) 

Sensation.  Theocracy. 

Roussf.lot. 

Ftudes  de  la  Philosophic  dans  le  Moyen  Age.  3 tom.  8vo.  Paris,  1850-2. 
Scholastic. 

Royer-Collard.  (See  Collard.) 

Rush,  Benj.,  Dr.  (1745 — 1813). 

1.  Medical  Inquiries.  Philad.  1793. 

Association. 

2.  Inq.  into  the  Influence  of  Physic.  Causes  upon  the  Moral  Faculty  ( in 

the  3d  edit,  of  his  Med.  Inq.  4 vols.  8vo.)  1809. 

Conscience. 

Rutherforth,  Thom.  (1712-71). 

Institutes  of  Natural  Law ; Led.  on  Grotius’  de  Jure.  2 vols.  8vo. 
Cambr.  1754-56. 

Jurisprudence.  Utility. 

Saint  Hiliare,  Barthelemy. 

De  la  Logique  d’Aristote. 

Organon. 

Saisset,  Emile. 

Art.  Matiere,  in  Did.  des  Scien.  Phil. 

Matter. 

Salvianus  (390 — 484). 

De  Gubernat.  Dei,  et  justo  press entique  ej.judicio.  Oxon.  1633.  Althorp. 
1611.  Transl.  Lond.  1700. 

Scholastic. 

Sanchez,  Fr.,  or  Sanctius  (d.  1632). 

Tradatus  de  multum  nobili  et  prima  universali  scientia,  quod  nihil 
scitur.  4to.  Lyons,  1581. 

Skepticism. 

Sanderson,  Rob.,  Bp.  (15S7 — 1662). 

1.  De  Oblig.  Conscientice.  Prcelectiones  decent.  Oxon.  1672.  Lond.  1696 

(with  transl.  by  Whetcell,  1S51). 

Obligation. 

2.  De  Juramenti  Obligations.  Lond.  1695. 

Nature.  Obligation.  Predicate. 

Sarnanus. 

Tradatio  de  secundis  Intentionibus  secundum  doctrinam  Scoti.  4to. 
Ursellis.  1622. 

Intention. 


640 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Sayary. 

Sur  la  Certitude.  1847. 

Certainty. 

Savigny. 

Systeme  dee  Iiechts. 

Law. 

Say,  John  Baptist  (1767 — 1832). 

Coins  Complct  d’Econom  Polit.  practique.  6 vols.  8vo.  1829.  Transl. 
by  Prinsep.  Loud.  1821. 

Society. 

Schelling,  F.  W.  T.  (b.  1775). 

J’usitiv.  Philosoph.  d.  Offenbarung.  1842. 

Absolute.  .Esthetics.  Anima  mundi.  Atheism.  Idealism.  Idcntism. 
IndifFercntism.  Intuition.  Life.  Soul. 

Schiller,  F.  (1759 — 1S05). 

Works.  10  vols.  Stuttgart,  1844. 

Perfectibility.  » 

Schlkgel,  Fred,  von  (1722 — 1S29). 

Philosophy  of  Life.  (Morrison.)  Loud.  (Bohn)  1847. 

Theology. 

ScnMiD. 

JDictionnaire  pour  eervir  au.r  eerits  de  JCant.  (1798). 

Concept. 

Schmidt,  Car. 

Essai  sur  les  jlfystiques  du  Quatorzihne  siicle.  Strasburg,  1836. 
Mysticism. 

Schoolmen. 

Consciousness.  Essence.  Eternity. 

Schubert,  G.  H. 

Geschichte  des  Lebcns.  3 vols.  Leipz.  1806. 

Soul. 

Schultz. 

Life. 

Sen weg ler,  Albert. 

History  of  Philosophy  in  Epitome,  translated  by  Seelye.  2 d Edition. 
New  York,  1S56. 

Actual.  Metaphysics.  Stoics. 

Scott,  John  (1638 — 1694). 

1.  Works.  C vols.  8vo.  Oxford,  1826. 

2.  The  Christian  Life,  from  its  Beginning  to  its  Consummation  in  Glory . 

5 vols.  8vo.  Loud.  1712. 

Tendency. 

Scott,  Walter  (1771—1832). 

Genius.  Reminiscence. 

Scotists.  (See  Schoolmen.) 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


641 


Scotus,  Joannes  Erigena  (d.  8S6). 

De  divisione  Naturcje.  Lib.  V.  Ed.  Gale.  Oxon.  1681.  Fol. 
Scholastic. 

Sedgwick,  Prof.  Adam. 

Discourse  on  the  Studies  of  the  University.  2 d Edit.  Cambridge,  1834. 
With  add.  and  prel.  disc.  5th  Edit.  1850. 

Tabula  Rasa. 

Seiler. 

The  Wisdom  of  the  Streets,  or  the  Meaning  and  Use  of  German  Pro- 
verbs. Augsburg,  1816. 

Proverb. 

Selden,  John.  (1584 — 1654.) 

De  Jure  Eaturali  et  gentium,  in  Opera  ( Wilkins.  3 vols.  fol.  Loud. 
1726.)  Vol.  I. 

Nature. 

Semple. 

Introduction  to  Metaphysic  of  Ethics. 

Antinomy.  Intuition.  Schema. 

Seneca,  L.  A.  (b.  B.  C.  1.) 

1.  Epislohx. 

Consent  (Argument  from  Universal).  Ideal. 

2.  Dc  Clementia.  In  Opera.  Par.  1607. 

Society. 

Authority.  Cause.  Enthusiasm.  Evil.  Idea. 

Senior,  N.  W. 

Four  Lectures  on  Political  Economy.  1S52. 

Observation. 

Sensationalists  (Ancient.)  See  Rationalists. 

Criterion. 

Sensationalists  (Modern.) 

Certainty. 

Sepher  Tetsira. 

Kabala. 

Sergeant,  J. 

Solid  Ph  ilosophy  asserted  against  the  Fancies  of  the  Idealists.  1697. 
Notion. 

Sewell,  lYm. 

Christian  Morals.  4 vols.  Land.  1841. 

Assent.  Association.  Experience.  Morality.  Person.  Syncretism. 
Understanding. 

Sextus  Empiricus,  (ab.  A.  D.  200.) 

Hypothesis.  Criterion. 

55*  2 k 


642 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Shaftesbury,  A.  A.  C.,  Earl  of.  (1671 — 1713.) 

1.  Characteris.  of  Man,  Manners,  Opinions,  and  Times.  3 Tola.  Lond.  1749. 
^Esthetics. 

2.  Letters  concerning  Enthusiasm.  (1708.)  Charac.  Vol.  I. 

Enthusiasm. 

3.  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue  and  Merit.  Do.  Vo!.  II. 

Atheism.  Dsemonist.  Enthusiasm.  Polytheism.  Theism. 

4.  Miscellaneous  Reflections.  Do.  Vol.  III. 

Apologue.  Dogmatism. 

5.  The  Moralists  ; a Rhapsody  (Deity  and  Providence.)  Do.  II. 
Gratitude.  Sense.  Theism. 

6.  Sen s us  Communis ; Essay  on  freedom  of  TVi'f  and  Humour.  Do.  I. 
Wit  and  Humour. 

Shakspeare,  Wm.  (1564 — 1616.) 

1.  Macbeth. 

Compunction. 

2.  Hamlet. 

Equivocation.  Metaphysics. 

3.  Merchant  of  Venice. 

Fancy.  Harmony  of  the  Spheres. 

Genius.  Imagination.  Observation. 

SnAnp. 

Dissertation  on  Genius.  Lond.  1755. 

Genius. 

Shelley,  P.  B.  (1792*— 1822.) 

Works.  Lond.  1836,  1847. 

Imagination  and  Memory. 

Sheppard. 

Characters  of  Theophrastus,  Gr.  with  notes.  8vo.  Lond.  1852. 
Sophism. 

SnERLOCK,  Wm.  (1641 — 1707.) 

1.  The  Happiness  of  Good  Men,  or  a Discourse  of  the  Immortality 

of  the  Soul.  4th  Edit.  Svo.  Lond.  1726. 

Immortality.  Innate. 

2.  Divine  Providence,  bill  Edit.  Lond.  1715. 

Providence. 

Simonides.  (YIth  Cent.  B.  C.) 

Memoria  Techniea. 

Simplicius.  (Vlth  Cent.) 

Ad  Cptegor.  Aristotelis.  Eel!.  1499. 

Acroamatical. 

Smart,  B.  II. 

1.  Manual  of  Logic.  1849. 

Being. 

2.  Somatology.  8vo„  Lond.  1839. 

Sign. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


643 


Smedley. 

Moral  Evidence.  1850. 

Evidence. 

Smeleie,  Win.  (1740-95). 

Philosophy  of  Natural  History.  1790-99. 

Instinct. 

Smith,  Adam.  (1723-90.) 

Complete  Works  ( Dugald  Stewart).  5 vols.  8vo.  Edinb.  1812. 

1.  Theory  of  the  Moral  Sentiments. — To  which  is  added,  a Dissertat.  on 

the  Origin  of  Languages.  10<A  Edit.  2 vols.  8vo.  Land.  1804. 
Apathy.  Beauty.  Benevolence.  Conscience.  Epicurean.  Propriety. 
Sentiment.  Sign.  Sympathy. 

2.  Essays  on  Philosophical  Subjects.  4to.  Lond.  1795. 

Externality.  Idea. 

3.  An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations. 

(1776).  8vo.  Loud.  1826.  M‘Culloch,  1846. 

Ends.  Ontology.  Standard  of  Virtue. 

Smith,  John.  (1618 — 1652.) 

Posthumous  Tracts.  1660. 

Reason. 

Smith,  Dr.  Southwood. 

The  Philosophy  of  Health;  or,  an  Exposition  of  the  Physical  and  Mental 
Constitution  of  Man.  3d  Edit.  Lond.  1847. 

Organ. 

Smith,  Sydney.  (1777 — 1845.) 

Elementary  Sketches  of  Moral  Philosophy,  delivered  1804-5-6.  2d  Edit. 
Lond.  1850. 

Abstraction  (10).  Metaphysics. 

Socrates.  (B.  C.  469 — 396.) 

Apology.  Cardinal  virtues.  Causes,  final  (Doctrine  of).  Cynics. 
Demiurge.  Demon.  Dialectics.  Empiric.  Idea.  Individual. 
Induction  (Method  of ).  Invention.  Pneumatology.  Psychology. 
Reason.  Reminiscence.  Species. 

Soley,  Thomas. 

Syllabus  of  Logic.  8vo.  1839. 

Distribution.  Syllogism. 

SOMATOPSYCHOXOLOGIA. 

Nature  (Course  or  power  of). 

Sopater. 

On  Hermogenes.  apud  Ehet.  Grcec.  Ed.  Wah. 

Science. 

Sophists. 

Idea.  Irony. 

South,  Robert.  (1633 — 1716.) 

Sermons.  12  vols.  1704-44.  Lond.  2 vols.  8vo.  1850. 

Autocracy.  Miracle.  Phenomena.  Velleity.  Will. 


644 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Southev,  Robert.  (1774 — 1843.) 

Sir  Thom,  J. foorc,  or  Colloquies  on  the  Progress  and  Prospects  of  Society. 
2 d Edit.  Loud.  1831. 

Consent. 

Spalding. 

Logic. 

Dichotomy.  Distribution.  Inference.  Specification  (Process  of). 
Sparrow,  Bp.  Anthony,  (d.  1685). 

A Rationale  upon  the  Book  of  Common  Prayer.  London,  1657 — 1668. 
Oxford,  1839. 

Rationale. 

Spectator.  8 vols.  Loud.  1712. 

Continuity.  Instinct.  Laughter. 

Spencer,  John.  (1630 — 1695.) 

De  legibus  Hebrceorum.  2 vols.  fol.  Cambridge,  1727.  (Pf a ff.  Tubing. 
1732.) 

Sabaism. 

Spenser,  Edmund.  (1553 — 1598.) 

TEorfts.  (Todd.)  8 vols.  8vo.  Lond.  1805. 

Idea. 

Speusippus. 

Academics. 

Spinoza,  Benedict  de.  (1632 — 1677.) 

1.  Ethica  ordin.  Geometrica  demons.  (Opera.  Vol.  I.) 

Acosmist.  Immanent. 

2.  Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus.  (Opera.  Vol.  III.) 

Rationalism. 

3.  Opera  Omnia.  Ed.  Bruder.  3 vols.  18mo.  Lips.  1843. 

Atheism.  Hylozoism.  Objective.  Pantheism. 

Spurzheim. 

Phrenology.  Physiognomy. 

StaEl,  Madame  de.  (1766 — 1817.) 

1.  Germany. 

Enthusiasm. 

2.  Reflexions  sur  le  Suicide. 

Empiric.  Suicide. 

Staudlin,  C.  F. 

1.  History  and  Spirit  of  Scepticism.  2 vols.  Leipzig,  1794-5. 
Scepticism. 

2.  Hist,  des  Opinions  et  des  Doctrines  sur  le  Suicide.  8vo.  Gcett.  1824. 
Suicide, 

Stahl. 

Anima  mundi.  Life.  Perceptions. 

Stallo,  J.  B.,  A.  M. 

General  Principles  of  Philosophy  of  Nature.  Lond.  1848. 

Nature  (Philosophy  of). 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


645 


Stay. 

De  Systemate.  Boscovich. 

Experience. 

Stewart,  Dugald.  (1753 — 1S2S..) 

3.  Elements  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind.  1792 — 1814,  1S43. 
Conception.  Fancy.  Generalization.  Identity  (Personal).  Idio- 
syncrasy. Imagination  and  Conception.  Imitation.  Impression. 
Induction.  Induction  (Principle  of).  Intuition.  Law  (Physi- 
cal, etc.).  Memory.  Observation.  Phenomenon.  Postulate. 
Principles.  Probable.  Remembrance.  Sensus  Communis.  Taste. 
Train  of  thought.  Truth. 

2.  Active  and  Moral  Potoers,  Philosophy  of.  2 vols.  8vo.  182S. 
Conscience.  Credulity.  Deontology.  Design.  Evil.  Intellect. 

Matter.  Optimism.  Reason.  Reminiscence.  Space.  Will. 

3.  Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy.  7th  Edit.  1844. 

Consciousness.  Matter. 

4.  On  the  Progress  of  Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Philosophy,  &c.  Prelim. 

Dissertat.  to  Encyc.  Brit.  1815. 

Continuity  (Law  of).  Egotism.  Factitious.  Idealist.  Monad. 
Suggestion. 

5.  Philosophical  Essays.  3 d Edit.  1818.  With  Preliminary  Disser- 

tation. 

Abstraction  (Logical).  Force.  Idea.  Ideology.  Mysticism.  Out- 
ness. Picturesque.  Primary.  Psychology.  Sensation.  Sensi- 
bles.  Sentiment.  Soul,  Spirit,  Mind,  etc.  Sublime.  Taste. 

Time. 

6.  Dissertations  on  Beid. 

Abstraction  (Psychological).  Action.  Ambition.  Analogy.  Anal- 
ysis and  Synthesis.  Appetite.  Art.  Association.  Atom.  Au- 
tomatism. Axiom.  Beauty.  Casuistry.  Causation.  Conception 
and  Idea.  Consciousness.  Necessity  (Logical).  Notion.  Rea- 
soning. State.  Transcendent.  Truth. 

Stilt.ingfleet,  Edward.  (1635 — 1699.) 

Worl-s.  6 vols.  fol.  Land.  1710. 

Notion. 

Stodbart,  Sir  John. 

TJniv.  Grammar,  or  Science  of  Language,  in  Encyclop.  Metropol. 
Conception  and  Idea. 

Stoics. 

Anima  mundi.  Anticipation.  Apathy.  Axiom.  Category.  Causes, 
final  (Doctrine  of).  Common  Sense  (the  Philosophy  of).  Cynic. 
Eclecticism.  Element.  Fate.  Hylozoism.  Idea.  Ideal.  Im- 
pression. Species.  Stoics.  Suicide.  Virtue.  Will. 

Story,  Joseph.  (1779 — 1845.) 

Comment,  on  Equity  Jurisprud. 

Equity. 


646 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Strabo,  (d.  ab.  25  A.  D.) 

Iter.  Geographic.  Libri  XVII.  (Falconer.)  2 vols.  fol.  Oxon.  1807. 
Aeroamatical. 

Straton  (of  Lampsacus). 

Anima  mundi.  Atheism.  Ilj'lozoism.  Nature  or  Force  (Plastic). 
Strauss,  D.  F. 

Life  of  Jesus.  From  4th  German  Edit.  3 vols.  Lond.  1840. 
Rationalism. 

Suarez,  Franc.  (154S— 1617.) 

De  Legibus.  1570. 

Cause.  Law. 

Sumner,  J.  B.,  Abp.  of  Canterbury. 

A Treatise  on  the  Records  of  Creation,  and  on  the  Moral  Attributes  of 
the  Creator.  4th  Edit.  Lond.  1825. 

Quietism. 

Swedenborg,  Emanuel.  (1688 — 1772.) 

Mysticism.  Pneumatology. 

Swift,  Jonathan,  Dean.  (1667 — 1745.) 

Worles.  19  vols.  8vo.  (Scott.)  Edinb.  1819.  2 vols.  8vo.  Lond.  1853. 
Immaterialism. 

Sydenham,  T.  (1624-89.) 

. Plato. 

Sylvius,  F.  D.  (1614-72.) 

Life. 

Tacitus,  (b.  A.  D.  56.) 

Opera.  Ernesti.  Lips.  1772. 

Occasion. 

Tappan,  II.  P. 

1.  Doctrine  of  the  Will  by  an  Appeal  to  Consciousness.  3 vols.  12mo. 
Choice.  Consciousness.  Definition. 

2.  Logic  (Elements  of).  N.  Y.  1856. 

Function.  Subject. 

Tatham,  Edward.  (1749 — 92.) 

The  Chart  and  Scale  of  Truth  by  which  to  find  the  Cause  of  Error. 
(Bampton  Led.  1789.)  Grenfield.  2 vols.  8vo.  Lond.  1840. 
Axiom.  Intuition. 

Taylor,  Henry,  (d.  1785.) 

• Apology  of  Ben.  Mordacai  to  his  friends  for  embracing  Christianity. 
2 d Edit.  Lond.  1784. 

Person. 

Taylor,  Isaac. 

1.  Elements  of  Thought,  or  Concise  Explanations  of  the  principal  terms 
of  Intellectual  Philosophy.  8th  Edit.  Lond.  1846.  2 d American 

from  9th  Lond.  1851. 

Active.  Analogy.  Association.  Attention.  Classification.  Com- 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


647 


Taylor,  Isaac. 

plex.  Conception.  Conclusion.  Contingent.  Data.  Design. 
Distribution.  Division.  Doubt.  Essence.  Extension.  Faculties 
of  the  Mind  (Classification  of).  Identity  (Personal).  Inference. 
Intuition.  Method.  Mode.  Prejudice.  Primary.  Reason.  Re- 
lation. Sophism. 

2.  Natural  History  of  Enthusiasm.  8th  Edit.  Lond.  1842. 
Enthusiasm. 

Taylor,  Jeremy,  Bp.  (1613 — 77.) 

Works  ( Heher ) 3 d Edit.  15  vols.  8vo.  lond.  1839. 

Belief.  Brocard.  Philanthropy.  Tendency.  Tradition.  Type. 
Virtual. 

Taylor,  William.  (1765—1836.) 

English  Synonyms  discriminated.  1850. 

Action  and  Act.  Adage.  Affirmation.  Archetype.  Choice.  Cos- 
mogony. Custom.  Dialectic.  Distinction.  Equity.  Imagination 
and  Fancy.  Intellect.  Mind.  Optimism.  Remembrance.  Sen- 
timent. Talent.  Wit  and  Humour. 

Tellez. 

Summa  Philos.  Arist.  Paris,  1645. 

Species.  Universals. 

Temple,  Sir  W.  (1628 — 1700.) 

Apathy.  Wisdom. 

Tennemann. 

1.  Grundriss. 

2.  Histor.  of  Philos.  Trans,  by  Johnson.  Ed.  by  Morell,  1852. 

Reason.  Scholastic  Philosophy. 

Terminists.  See  Occamists. 

Tertullian,  Q.  S.  F.  (lid  Cent.) 

He  Anima  (Opera,  fol.  Pan's,  1695. 

Immateriality.  Suggestion. 

Thales,  (b.  656  B.  C.) 

Atheism. 

Themistius.  (fl.  362  A.  D.) 

Contraries.  Paraphrase. 

Tholuck,  F.  A.  D.  (b.  1799.) 

Sznfismus  et  Theosophia  Persarum  Pantheistica.  8vo.  Berlin.  1821. 
App.  1S38. 

Supra-naturalism. 

Thomists.  See  Schoolmen. 

Thomson,  Wm. 

1.  Outline  of  the  Necessary  Laws  of  Thought.  2 d Edit.  1849. 

Classification.  Colligation  Of  Facts.  Conception  and  Imagination. 
Conceptualism.  Excluded  Middle.  Form.  Function.  Identical 
Proposition.  Induction.  Judgment.  Logic.  Method.  Notion. 


648 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Thompson,  'Win. 

Realism.  Sensation  and  Perception.  Species.  Sufficient.  Truth. 
Universals. 

2.  Principles  of  Necessary  and  Contingent  Truth.  Hampton  Edit.  1853. 
Conception  and  Imagination. 

3.  Christian  Theism. 

Originate.  Person.  Reason.  Will. 

Abstraction  (Logical)  6,  7.  Analogy.  A priori.  Art.  Attribute. 
Thotu,  or  Taaut. 

Hermetic  Books. 

TnunoT. 

De  V Entendement. 

Cardinal  Virtues.  Habit.  Perception.  Sensation. 

Tibergiiien,  William. 

Essai  des  Connaissances  Humaines.  1844. 

Absolute  Certainty.  Existence.  Harmony.  Idea.  Knowledge.  Law. 
Macrocosm.  Perceptions.  Tradition. 

Tindal,  Matthew.  (1657 — 1733.) 

Christianity  as  old  as  the  Creation.  Lond.  1730. 

Theism. 

Tissot,  J. 

Manie  du  Suicide.  1840. 

Suicide. 

Tooke,  John  Horne.  (1736 — 1812.) 

The  Diversions  of  Purley  (Taylor).  2 vols.  8vo.  Lond.  1829.  1 vol. 

1857. 

Soul.  Spirit  Mind. 

Townsend,  Dr. 

CEdipus  Romanus. 

Irony. 

Tracy  (Ant  L.  C.  L.  Destutt  de.)  1754 — 1836. 

Elements  d' Ideologic.  1801 — 1805. 

Ideology. 

Trencii,  Richard  C. 

1.  The  Study  of  Words.  Lond.  1851. 

Apprehend  and  Comprehend.  Invention. 

2.  Notes  on  the  Parables  of  our  Lord.  Lond.  1841. 

Gnome.  Myth.  Parable. 

Trendelenburg. 

1.  Notoe  in  Ariel. 

Assumption. 

2.  De  Ideis  Platonis  Lineamenta.  8vo.  Berol.  1842. 

Idea  (228). 

3.  Elementa  Log.  Ariel.  8vo.  Basil.  1842. 

Logic.  Objective.  Science.  Theory. 

Sophism. 


AND  OF  PROPER.  NAMES. 


649 


Trusler,  Dr.  John.  (1735 — 1820.) 

The  difference  heticeen  words  esteemed  synonym,  in  the  Engl  Lang.  1766. 
Intellect  and  Intelligence.  Wit  and  Humour. 

Truth,  Guesses  at. 

Second  Series,  1 3-18. 

Eclecticism.  Education.  Ideal. 

Tucker,  Abraham.  (1705 — 74.) 

Light  of  Nature  pursued.  7 vols.  8vo.  1805.  2 vols.  1837. 

Bonum  Summum.  Esoteric.  Fate.  Ratiocination.  Transference. 
Tulloch,  Dr.  J. 

Theism.  Burnett  Prize  Essay. 

Retention. 

Turgot,  A.  R.  J.  (1727-SI). 

1.  See  Encyclopedic  Frangaise. 

Existence  and  Essence. 

2.  (Enures.  9 vols.  8vo.  1808-11. 

Dinate.  Perfectibility. 

Turnbull,  Dr.  George,  (d.  1752.) 

1.  Translation  of  Leibnitz. 

Spontaneity. 

2.  Christian  Philosophy.  ( Second  part  of  the  Princip.  of  Moral  Phi- 

losophy. 2 vols.  8vo.  Land.  1740. 

Will. 

Turnbull,  Wm.  B. 

Nature  and  Origin  of  Laws. 

Self  love. 

Tyranxion  (1st  Cent.  B.  C.). 

Metaphysics. 

Tyrell. 

On  the  Law  of  Nature. 

Nature.  Sanction. 

Ubaghs,  J.  C. 

Theodiceee  Elementa. 

Theism. 

Upham,  Thos.  C. 

Life  of  Madame  Guyon — isith  History  of  Findon.  N.  Y.  1S47. 
Quietism. 

Van  Helmont  (1577—1644). 

Anima  mundi.  Archaeus.  Macrocosm.  Mysticism.  Theosophism. 
Van  Mildert,  Wm.  (1765 — 1836). 

Bampton  Lectures  for  1814.  ( Theolog . Works.  6 vols.  8vo.  Oxf.  183S. 
Vol.  IV.) 

Deist. 

56 


650 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Van  de  Veyer. 

Truths. 

Varro  (B.  C.  116—27). 

Custom.  Good  (The  Chief). 

Vaughan,  Dr. 

1.  Hours  with,  the  Mystics. 

Tkeosophism. 

2.  Essays. 

Indifferentism. 

Mysticism. 

Vedas. 

Mysticism. 

Vincrntius  Lirinensis  (d.  ab.  450). 

Common  itorium.  O.rf.  1836. 

Authority  (The  Argument  from). 

VlNET,  A. 

Essais  o' e Philosoph.  Morale  et  de  Morale  Eeligieuse.  Paris,  1847. 
Individual. 

Virey. 

He  la  Physiologie  dans  *es  Rapports  avcc  la  Philosophic.  1843. 
Instinct. 

Virgil  (B.  C.  70 — 18). 

Custom. 

Volney,  Constantine  Chassebceuf,  Count  (1757 — 1820). 

1.  GEuvres.  8 vols.  8vo.  Par.  1820-26. 

2.  Le  loi  naturelle,  on  Catechisme  du  citoyen  franQaise  (Par.  1793),  after- 

wards known  as  “Principes  physiques  de  la  morale.” 

Ideology. 

Von  Hildebrandt. 

Temperament. 

Vossius,  Gerard  John  (1577 — 1649). 

Opera.  6 vols.  fol.  Amst.  1701.  Vol.  I. : Etymologicon  linguae  Latinm. 
Absurd.  Alchemy.  Certainty.  Condition.  Soul  (477). 

Wagnerus.  (1670.) 

Noology. 

Walch,  J.  G.  (1693—1775.) 

Streitigkeiten.  ( Introduction  to  Controversies  of  the  Lutheran  Church.) 

2 d Edit.  1733—1739. 

Syncretism. 

Wallis,  John  (1616 — 1703). 

Institutio  Logicce.  Edit,  quint.  Oxon.  1729.) 

Induction.  Postulate.  Syllogism. 

Warburton,  Wm.  (1698 — 1779). 

The  Hivine  Legation  of  Moses  demonstrated.  ( Works.  12  vols.  8vo. 
Land.  1811.  Vol.  I.— VI.) 

Esoteric  find  Exoteric.  Obligation. 


AND  or  PROPER  NAMES. 


651 


Wardlaw,  Ralph  (1779 — 1853). 

Christian  Ethics;  or,  Moral  Philosophy  on  the  Principles  of  Divine 
llevelation.  3d  Edit.  Lond.  1837. 

Fitness. 

Waterland,  Daniel  (1683 — 1740). 

Works.  11  vols.  in  12.  8vo.  Oxford,  1823-28.  6 vols.  1843. 

Necessity.  Pantheism.  R.atio.  Real.  , 

Watson,  Richard  (1737 — 1816). 

An  Apology  for  the  Bible.  2 d Edit.  Lond.  1796. 

Authentic. 

Watson,  Thomas,  Rev, 

Intimations  and  Evidences  of  a Future  State.  Lond.  1792. 

Immortality  (of  the  Soul). 

Watt,  James  (1736 — IS  1 9). 

Invention. 

Watts,  Isaac  (1674— 174S). 

1.  Logic,  or  the  Right  Use  of  Reason.  ( Works.  9 vols.  8vo.  London, 

1812.  Vol.  VII.  311.) 

Argumentation.  Negation.  Privation.  Syllogism.  Universal  Words. 

2.  Scheme  of  Ontology ; or,  the  Science  of  Being  in  General.  Do. 

Vol.  VIII.  485. 

Ontology. 

3.  Philosophical  Essays.  Do.  Vol.  VIII.  331. 

Truths. 

Passions. 

Weigelius,  Valentine  (1533-88). 

Theosophism. 

Wernerians. 

Hypothesis. 

Wesley,  Chns. 

Guide  to  Syllogism.  Bohn. 

Distribution. 

Whately,  Richard,  Archbishop. 

1.  Elements  of  Logic.  9th  Edit.  1S50. 

Conclusion.  Connotativo.  Conversion.  Copula.  Distribution.  Gene- 
ralization. Genus.  Impossible.  Individual.  Induction.  Infer- 
ence. Intention  (Logical).  Knowledge.  Logic.  Metaphor.  Pos- 
sible. Proof.  Proprium.  Reason.  Reasoning.  Reduction. 
Same.  Sincerity.  Term.  Truth.  Universal.  Verbal.  Why  ? 

2.  Elements  of  Rhetoric.  7th  Edit.  1850. 

Fable.  Fact. 

3.  Tract  on  Instinct. 

Instinct. 

4.  Historic  Doubts  relat.  to  Nap.  Bonaparte.  10 th  Edit.  1850. 

Irony. 


652 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Whatelev,  Richard. 

5.  Lessons  on  Morals. 

Moral.  Selfish.  Self-love. 

6.  On  Bacon.  Essays.  ith  Edit.  1S58. 

Selfish.  Superstition. 

Ahscissio  Infiniti.  Abstraction  (7).  Do.  (Logical)  (8).  Accident. 
Analogue.  Analogy.  Antecedent.  Apprehension.  Argument. 
Assertion.  Authority.  Categorematic.  Certainty.  Classification. 
Definition.  Difference.  Discursus.  Division.  Equity.  Experi- 
ence. 

Wheivell,  Wm. 

1.  Philosophy  of  the  Biductive  Sciences.  2d  Ed.  1S17. 

vEtiology.  Art.  Colligation  of  Facts.  Conception  and  Idea.  Con- 
silience. Deduction.  Fact.  Induction.  Type. 

2.  Elements  of  Morality,  including  Polity.  2d  Ed.  1828. 

Conscience.  Happiness.  Intellect.  Jurisprudence.  Morality.  Na- 
ture. Obligation.  Right.  Understanding. 

3.  Preface  to  Mackintosh's  Prel.  Dissert. 

Deontology.  Eudemonism. 

4.  On  the  Intellectual  Powers  acc.  to  Plato.  Cambr.  Philos.  Trane.  1855. 
Dialectics.  Reason. 

5.  On  Induction. 

Fact. 

6.  Supplemental  Volume. 

Ilomologue.  Mythology. 

7.  Astronomy  and  General  Physics, considered  with  ref.  to  Natur.  Theolog. 

Bridgw.  Treatise.  7th  Edit.  1839. 

Law. 

8.  On  the  Foundations  of  Morals.  Four  Sermons  lef.  Univ.  of  Cambr. 

1837.  2d  Ed.  Cambr. 

Obligation. 

9.  Lectures  on  Systematic  Morality.  8vo.  1816. 

Whitehead. 

On  Materialism. 

Materialism. 

Wilkins,  John,  Bp.  ( 1614—72). 

Of  the  Principles  and  Duties  of  Natural  Religion.  5th  Edit.  London, 
1701. 

Evil.  Immutability. 

WlLI.M. 

Hist,  de  la  Philosophic  Allemande,  depuis  Kant  jusqu’d  Hegel.  4 vols.  8vo. 
1848. 

Motive.  Noumenon.  Postulate.  Space. 

Wissowatius,  A.  (1008 — 78). 

Unity. 


AND  OF  PROPER  NAMES. 


653 


Wolff,  Christinn.  (1679 — 1754.) 

1.  Philosophia  Rationalis  s.  logic,  method,  scientijica  pertrac.  Frcft.and 

Leipz.  1722,  1732.  4to. 

2.  Psychologic)  Empirica.  Frcft.  and  Leipz.  1732.  4to. 

3.  Opera  Omnia.  Halis.  1744.  A A VI.  4to. 

Aesthetics.  Cause  (76).  Equity.  Experience.  Knowledge. 
Wollaston,  Win.  (1659 — 1724.) 

Religion  of  Future  delineated.  Lond.  1726.  7th  Edit.  1750. 

Agent. 

Wordsworth,  AYm.  (1770 — 1850.) 

Poems.  New  Edit.  Lond.  1S50. 

Duty.  Fancy.  Imagination.  Imagination  and  Memory. 

Xenocrates.  (B.  C.  400 — 314.) 

Academics. 

Xenophanes.  (FI.  bet.  540  and  500  B.  C.) 

Atheism. 

Xenophon.  (B.  C.  450 — 360.) 

1.  Jfemorabilia  of  Socrates.  } Both  in  Opera.  10  yols,  Edinb.  1S10. 

2.  (Economies . 5 (Paris,  1561.) 

Apology.  Cardinal  virtues.  Causes,  final  (Doctrine  of).  Design. 
Dialectics.  Economics. 

Young,  Edward,  Dr.  (1684—1765.) 

Night  Thoughts.  (Works.  5 vols.  Lond.  1774.) 

Reason. 

Young,  John. 

Lectures  on  Intellectual  Philosophy.  (Cairns.)  1834. 

Impossible.  Memory. 

Zeidlerus.  (1680.) 

Noology. 

Zeno.  (Ab.  B.  C.  250.) 

Cynic.  Epicurean.  Fate.  Idea.  Motion.  Propriety.  Stoics. 
Zevort.  (See  Pieruon.) 

Contradiction. 

Zimmerman,  J.  G.  (172S — 1795.) 

Solitude  cons,  with  respect  to  its  influence  upon  the  Mind  and  Heart. 
Tr.  by  Mercier.  2d  Edit.  Lond.  1792. 

Temperament. 

Zohar,  The. 

Kabaln, 

Zoroaster.  (B.  C.  5S9 — 513.) 

Zend-Avesta.  Trad,  par  Du  Pierrot).  2 vols.  in  3.  4to.  Par.  1771. 
Dualism.  Emanation. 

56* 


!; 


■ . - 


- 


INDEX  OF  TERMS 


Abduction  Page  1 

Ability  (Natural  and  Moral)  1 

Abscissio  Infiniti  2 

Absolute  2 

Abstinence 5 

Abstract,  Abstraction  5 

Abstractive  and  Intuitive  10 

Absurd 10 

Academics 10 

Academy  11 

Acatalepsy 11 

Accident  11 

Accidental 12 

Acosmist  13 

Aeroamatical  13 

Act  and  Action 14 

Active 16 

Activity,  v.  Will. 

Actual  16 

Actus  Primus 16 

Secundus  16 

Adage 16 

Adjuration  17 

Admiration 17 

Adoration  17 

Adscititious  17 

Aesthetics 17 

Aetiology 18 

Affection  18 

Affinity 18 

Affirmation 18 

A Fortiori 19 

Agent 19 

Aguoiology 19 

Alchemy  19 

Allegory 19 

Ambition 20 

Amphibology  20 

Amphiboly 20 

Analogue... 20 

Analogy 20 

and  Metaphor 24 


Analogy  and  Example Page  25 

and  Experience 25 

and  Induction  26 

Analysis  and  Synthesis 26 

Analytics  28 

Angelology  28 

Anima  Mundi 28 

Animism  28 

Antecedent  29 

Anthropology 29 

Anthropomorphism  30 

Anticipation  31 

Antinomy 32 

Antipathy  33 

A Parte  Ante,  A Parte  Post 34 

Apathy 34 

Aphorism 35 

Apodeictie 36 

Apologue 36 

Apology 37 

Apophthegm 37 

Apperception 38 

Appetite  38 

Apprehension 40 

Apprehend  and  Comprehend 40 

Approbation  (Moral)  „.  41 

A Priori  and  A Posteriori 41 

Arbor  Porphyriana  43 

Archaeus 44 

Archelogy  44 

Archetype  44 

Architectonick 45 

Argument  45 

(Indirect) 46 

Argumentation 47 

Art 48 

Asceticism 50 

Assent 51 

Assertion 51 

Assertory 51 

Association  52 

Assumption 53 

(655) 


65(5 


INDEX  OF  TERMS, 


Atheism 

Atom,  Atomism  

Attention 

Attribute  

Authentic 

Authority  (Principle  of)' 

Autocrasy  

Automaton  and  Automatic 

Automatism 

Autonomy  

Autotheists 

Axiom  

Beauty 

Being  ..a 

Belief 

Benevolence  

Blasphemy  

Body  

Bonutn  

, Morale 

, Summuin 

Brocard  

Cmnesthesis  

Capacity  

Cardinal  Virtues 

Casuistry 

Catalepsy  

Categorcmatic 

Categorical,  v.  Proposition. 

Category 

Causality 

Causation  

Cause  

Causes  (Final)  

(Occasional)  

Certainty,  Certitude 

Chance 

Chances  (Theory  of)  

Charity  

Chastity  

Choice  

Chrematistics  

Civility,  Courteousness 

Classification 

Cognition 

Colligation  of  Facts  

Combination  and  Connection  of 

Ideas  

Common  Sense  

(Philosophy  of) 

Common,  v.  Term. 

Compact 

Comparison  

Compassion,  v.  Sympathy. 
Complex 


Comprehension 98 

Compunction  98 

Conceiving  and  Apprehending...  98 

Concept  99 

Conception  100 

— — — and  Imagination 101 

and  Idea 103 

Conceptualism  104 

Conclusion 105 

Concrete  105 

Condignity,  v.  Merit. 

Condition 105 

Conditional,  v.  Proposition. 

Congruity 106 

Conjugate 107 

Connotative 107 

Consanguinity 107 

Conscience 107 

Consciousness 109 

and  Feeling 113 

Consent  114 

(Universal) 114 

Consequent,  v.  Antecedent. 

Consilience  of  Inductions 114 

Constitutive 115 

Contemplation 115 

Continence 115 

Contingent  115 

Continuity  (Law  of)  117 

Contract 118 

Contradiction  (Principle  of) 119 

Contraries  120 

Conversion  121 

Copula  121 

Cosmogony  121 

Cosmology,  v.  Metaphysics. 
Craniology,  v.  Phrenology. 
Cranioscopy,  v.  Organ. 

Creation 122 

Credulity  122 

Criterion 122 

Critick,  Criticism,  Critique 123 

Cumulative  (The  Argument)  124 

Custom 124 

Cynic  125 

Dsemonist  126 

Data  126 

Deduction  126 

De  Facto,  De  Jure 127 

Definition  127 

Deist 130 

Demiurge  130 

Demon 131 

Demonstration 131 

Denomination  (External),  v.  Mode. 
Deontology  132 


54 

55 

56 

57 

58 

58 

59 

59 

60 

60 

61 

61 

62 

63 

64 

66 

66 

67 

67 

68 

68 

69 

69 

69 

70 

71 

72 

72 

73 

77 

80 

75 

81 

83 

84 

87 

89 

89 

89 

89 

90 

90 

91 

92 

93 

93 

95 

95 

97 

97 

97 


INDEX  OF  TERMS. 


657 


Design 

Desire 

Destiny 

Determinism  

Dialectic 

Dialectics 

Diauoiology,  v.  Noology. 

Dichotomy 

Dictum  de  Omni  et  Nullo 

Simplieiter 

Difference 

Dilemma 

Discover}',  t\  Invention. 

Diseursus 

Disjunctive,  v.  Proposition. 

Disposition 

Distinction 

Distribution 

Ditheism 

Division 

Divorce 

Dogmatism 

Doubt  

Dreaming 

Dualism,  Duality  

Duration 

Duty 

Dynamism 

Eclecticism  

Economics  

Ecstacy 

Ectype,  v.  Type. 

Education 

Effect 

Ego 

Egoism,  Egoist 

Election  

Element 

Elementology,  t>.  Methodology. 

Elicit 

Elimination 

Emanation 

Eminently,  v.  Virtual. 

Emotion 

Empiric,  Empiricism 

Emulation 

Ends 

Ens 

Entelechy 

Enthusiasm 

Enthymeme 

Entity 

Enunciation 

Epicheirema 

Epicurean 

Epistemology 


Episyllogism 163 

Equanimity,  v.  Magnanimity. 

Equity 163 

Equivocal 161 

Equivocation 165 

Error 166 

Esoteric  and  Exoteric 167 

Essence 168 

Eternity 170 

of  God 171 

Ethics 171 

Ethnography 172 

Ethnology  172 

Ethology  172 

Eudemonism 172 

Euretic  or  Euristic,  v.  Ostensive. 

Evidence 172 

Evil 174 

Example,  v.  Analogy. 

Excluded  Middle 175 

Existence 175 

Exoteric,  v.  Esoteric. 

Expediency  (Doctrine  of) 176 

Experience 176 

Experiment,  v.  Observation. 

Experimentum  Crucis  180 

Extension 181 

Externality  or  Outness  1S3 

Fable  183 

Fact 1S3 

Factitious 184 

Faculty 184 

Faculties  of  the  Mind 183 

Faith,  v.  Belief. 

Fallacy 191 

Fallacia  jEquivocationis 191 

Amphibolite  191 

Compositionis 191 

Divisionis 191 

Accentus 191 

Figurte  Dictionis 191 

Accidcntis 191 

A Dicto  Secundum  quid 

ad  Dictum  Simplieiter..  192 

Ignorantionis  Elenchi 192 

A non  Causa  pro  Causa...  192 

Consequentis  192 

Petitionis  Principii  192 

Plurium  Interrogationum.  192 

False,  Falsity  193 

Fancy 193 

Fashion,  v.  Custom. 

Fatalism,  Fate 195 

Fear 196 

Feeling 196 

Fetichism 198 

S 


133 

134 

135 

135 

136 

136 

137 

13S 

138 

138 

139 

140 

140 

141 

142 

143 

143 

145 

145 

146 

147 

147 

148 

148 

148 

148 

150 

151 

151 

152 

152 

153 

153 

154 

155 

155 

155 

156 

157 

158 

158 

159 

159 

161 

161 

162 

162 

162 

163 

163 

O . 


INDEX  OF  TERMS. 


658 

Figure,  v.  Syllogism. 

Fitness  and  Unfitness, 

Force 

Form 

Formally,  v.  Real,  Virtual,  Action. 

Fortitude 

Free  Will,  v.  Liberty,  Necessity. 

Friendship 

Function ;• ... 

Generalization 

General  Term,  v.  Term. 

Genius 

Genuine,  v.  Authentic. 

Genus 

Gnome 

God 

Good  (The  Chief)  

Grammar  (Universal) 

Grandeur  

Gratitude 

Gymnosophist 

Habit 

Happiness 

Harmony  (Pre-established)  

of  the  Spheres 

Hatred,  v.  Love. 

Hedonism 

Hermetic  Books  

Heuristic,  v.  Ostensive. 

Holiness 

Homologue 

Homonymous,  v.  Equivocal. 

Homotype 

Humour 

Hylozoism  

Hypostasis,  v.  Subsistentia. 

Hypothesis 

Hypothetical,  v.  Proposition. 

I,  v.  Ego,  Subject. 

Idea 

Ideal 

Idealism 

Idealist 

Ideation  and  Identional 

Identical  Proposition 

Identism  or  Identity  

Identity  ..- 

(Personal) 

(Principle  of ) 

Ideology  or  Ideology 

Idiosyncrasy 

Idol 

Ignorance 

Illation  


Illuminati..... 239 

Imagination 239 

and  Fancy  240 

and  Conception  242 

and  MemoryI, * * * * * 7 242 

Imitation 242 

Immanence  243 

Immanent 243 

Immaterialism 244 

Immateriality  245 

Immortality  (of  the  Soul) 245 

Immutability 245 

Impenetrability 245 

Imperato,  v.  Elicit,  Act. 

Imperative 245 

Impossible  246 

Impression  246 

Impulse  and  Impulsive 247 

Imputation 248 

Inclination  248 

Indefinite 248 

Indifference  (Liberty  of)  248 

Indifferent  Action 249 

Indifferentism  or  Identism  249 

Indiscernibles  (Identity  of ) 249 

Individual 250 

Individualism 250 

Individuality 251 

Individuation  251 

Induction  (Process  of)  252 

(Principle  of ) 254 

Inertia 255 

In  Esse,  In  Posse 255 

Inference 255 

and  Proof 256 

Infinite 256 

Influx  (Physical) 258 

Injury  259 

Innate  Ideas 259 

Instinct 263 

Intellect 265 

Intellection  266 

Intelligence 267 

Intellectus,  Patiens,  Agens 267 

Intent  or  Intention 368 

Intention  (First  and  Second) 269 

Interpretation  of  Nature  270 

Intuition 270 

Invention 273 

Irony  273 

Judgment 274 

Jurisprudence 276 

Justice  279 

Ivabala 279 

Knowledge 280 


199 

200 

201 

204 

204 

204 

205 

206 

208 

209 

209 

210 

210 

211 

212 

212 

212 

215 

216 

217 

218 

218 

218 

21S 

219 

219 

219 

220 

222 

228 

231 

232 

232 

233 

233 

234 

234 

236 

236 

, 237 

237 

238 

238 


INDEX  OF  TERMS. 


659 


Language  231- 

Laughter  2S4 

Law  2S5 

(Empirical)  2SS 

Lemma 289 

Libertarian  2S9 

Liberty  of  Will 289 

Life 291 

Logic  293 

Love  and  Hatred 296 

Macrocosm  and  Microcosm  296 

Magic 297 

Magnanimity  and  Equanimity...  297 

Manicheism  298 

Materialism 299 

Mathematics '. 299 

Matter  300 

and  Form  301 

Maxim 302 

Memory 302 

Memoria Technica  orMnemonies.  307 

Mental  Philosophy 308 

Merit  SOS 

Metaphor 309 

Metaphysics  310 

Metempsychosis 315 

Method  316 

Methodology 319 

Metonymy,  v.  Intention. 

Microcosm,  v.  Macrocosm. 

Mind 319 

Miracle 320 

Mnemonics,  v.  Memoria  Technica. 

Modality  320 

Mode  321 

Molecule  322 

Monad  323 

Monadology 323 

Monogtimy  324 

Monotheism  324 

Mood,  v.  Syllogism. 

Moral  324 

Faculty,  v.  Conscience. 

Morality 325 

Moral  Philosophy  326 

Moral  Sense,  v.  Senses  (Reflex). 

Morphology 327 

Motion  32S 

Motive  32S 

Mysticism 332 

Mystery  332 

Myth  and  Mythology 334 

Natura,  v.  Nature. 

Natural  335 

Naturalism 336 


Nature  336 

(Course  of)  33S 

(Plastic)  339 

(Philosophy  of)  339 

(Law  of)  339  ' 

(of  Things) 340 

(Human) 342 

Necessity 342 

(Doctrine  of) 343 

Negation  345 

Nihilism 345 

Nihilum  or  Nothing  346 

Nominalism 346 

Non-contradiction,  a.  Contradiction. 

Non  Sequitur  347 

Noogonie 347 

Noology 347 

Norm 348 

Notion  348 

Notiones  Communes  352 

Noumenon  352 

Novelty  353 

Number 354 

Oath 354 

Object,  v.  Subject. 

Objective 354 

Obligation  355 

Observation 358 

Occasion  361 


Occasional  Causes,  v.  Cause. 
Occult  Qualities,  v.  Quality. 
Occult  Sciences,  v.  Sciences. 
One,  v.  Unity. 

Oneiromancy,  v.  Dreaming. 


Ontology  362 

Operations  of  the  Mind  363 

Opinion  .- 364 

Opposed,  Opposition  364 

Optimism 365 

Order  366 

Organ 367 

Organon  or  Organum  368 

Origin 369 

Origination  369 

Ostensivo 369 

Oughtness,  v.  Duty. 

Outness 369 

Pact,  v.  Contract,  Promise. 
Palingenesia,  v.  Perfectibility'. 

Pantheism 370 

Parable  370 

Paradox 370 

Paralogism  371 

Parcimony' (Law  of)  371 

Paronymous,  v.  Conjugate. 


660 


INDEX  OP  TERMS, 


Part  

Passion  

Passions  (The)  

Perception  

Perceptions  (Obscure)  

Perfect,  Perfection  

Perfectibility 

Peripatetic  

Person,  Personality 

Petitio  Principii  

Phantasm,  v.  Idea. 
Phenomenology,  v.  Nature. 

Phenomenon 

Philanthropy  

Philosophy  

Phrenology  

Physiognomy  

Physiology  and  Physics 

Picturesque  

Pneumatics  

Pneumatology  

Poetry  or  Poesy  

Pollicitation,  v.  Promise. 

Polygamy  

Polytheism  

Positive,  v.  Moral,  Term. 

Positivism 

Possible 

Postulate 

Potential  

Potentiality,  v.  Capacity. 

Power 

Practical  

Praedicnte  

Praedicable  

Predicament 

Prm-Praedicamenta 

Prejudice 

Premiss  

Prescience 

Presen tative,  v.  Knowledge. 

Primary 

Principia  Essendi 

Principle  

Principles  of  Knowledge 

Express  or  Operative 

of  Action 

Privation  

Probability,  v.  Chances. 

Probable  

Problem 

Progress,  v.  Perfectibility. 

Promise  and  Pollicitation  

Proof  

Property 

Proposition  

Propriety 


Proprium 40S 

Prosyllogism,  v.  Epieheirema. 
Protype,  v.  Type. 

Proverb  408 

Providence  409 

Prudence  410 

Pscyhism 411 

Pseyhology  411 

Psychopannychism  414 

Pyrrhonism,  v.  Academics,  Scepticism. 

Quadrivium,  v.  Trivium. 

Quality 414 

(Occult)  416 

Quantity  41  fi 

Discrete,  etc 417 

Quiddity  418 

Quietism  419 

Race,  v.  Species. 

Ratio  419 

Ratiocination  419 

Rationale  420 

Rationalism 420 

Rationalists 421 

Real  421 

Realism  422 

Reason 422 

(Spontaneity  of) 424 

and  Understanding  424 

(Impersonal)  428 

(Determining) 431 

• Reasoning 431 

Recollection,  v.  Remembrance. 

Rectitude 432 

Redintegration,  v.  Train  of  Thought. 

Reduction  in  Logie 434 

Reflection  435 

Reflex  Senses,  v.  Senses  (Reflex). 

Regulative 436 

Relation 436 

Relative  438 

Religion 43S 

Remembrance 439 

Reminiscence  440 

Representative,  a.  Knowledge. 

Reservation  or  Restriction  443 

Retention 444 

Right 444 

Rosicrucians 446 

Rule  447 

Sabaism 448 

Same  448 

Sanction  448 

Savage  and  Barbarous  449 

Scepticism 450 


371 

372 

372 

373 

374 

376 

377 

378 

378 

3S0 

3S0 

3S1 

383 

384 

385 

387 

387 

3S8 

388 

389 

390 

390 

390 

391 

392 

393 

393 

396 

390 

396 

397 

397 

397 

398 

398 

398 

399 

399 

399 

400 

401 

402 

403 

404 

404 

405 

406 

406 

408 


INDEX  OF  TERMS. 


661 


Schema 451 

Scholastic 451 

Scholastic  Philosophy 452 

Science 453 

Sciences  (Occult).; 455 

Seientia  (Media) 455 

Sciolist  455 

Sciomachy 455 

Secularism 456 

Secundum  Quid 456 

Self-consciousness,  v.  Apperception. 

Selfishness 456 

Self-love 457 

Somatology 458 

Sensation  459 

and  Perception  460 

Sense 462 

Senses  (Reflex) 462 

Sensibility  or  Sensitivity 463 

Sensible®,  Common  and  Proper...  463 
Sensism,  Sensualism,  Scnsuistn...  464 

Sensorium 464 

Sensus  Communis 465 

Sentiment 465 

and  Opinion 467 

Sign  468 

Significates,  »>.  Term. 

Simile,  v.  Metaphor. 

Sin,  v.  Evil. 

Sincerity 469 

Significates,  v.  Term  (Common). 
Singular,  v.  Term. 

Socialism  469 

Society  (Desire  of  ) 470 

(Political  Capacity  of )...  471 

Somatology,  v.  Nature. 

Sophism,  Sophister,  Sophistical..  471 

Sorites 472 

Soul .' 473 

— — , Spirit,  Mind  477 

of  theWorldjV.AnimaMundi. 

Space  478 

Species 481 

in  Perception  483 

Specification  (Principle  of) 485 

Speculation  485 

Spirit,  t>.  Soul. 

Spiritualism 486 

Spontaneity 486 

Spontaneous  487 

Standard  of  Virtue 487 

States  of  Mind 4S7 

Statistics 489 

Stoics  , 490 

Subject,  Object  491 

Subjectivism  492 

Sublime  (The) 4975 

57 


Subsistentia 493 

Substance 494 

(Principle  of) 495 

Subsumption  495 

Succession  496 

Sufficient  Reason 496 

Suggestion 497 

Suicide  498 

Superstition 498 

Supra-Naturalism 499 

Syllogism  , 499 

Symbol,  v.  Myth. 

Sympathy  502 

Syncategorematic,  v.  Categorematic. 

Syncretism 502 

Synderesis 504 

Syneidesis 504 

Synteresis 504 

Synthesis 504 

System  505 

, Economy  505 

Tabula  Rasa  507 

Tact  508 

Talent 508 

Taste 508 

Teleology 510 

Temperament  510 

Temperance 512 

Tendency 512 

Term 512 

(Absolute) 513 

(Abstract) 513 

(Common) 513 

(Compatible)  513 

(Complex)  513 

(Concrete) 513 

(Contradictory)  513 

(Contrary)  514 

(Definite)  514 

(Indefinite) 514 

(Negative)  514 

(Opposite) 514 

(Positive)  514 

(Privative) 514 

(Relative) 514 

(Simple)  514 

(Singular) 515 

Terminists,  v.  Nominalism. 

Testimony 515 

Theism 516 

Theocracy  517 

Theodicy  519 

Theogony 520 

Theology  520 

, Natural  521 

Theopathy 522 


INDEX  OF  TERMS. 


6(52 


Theory  522 

Theosophism  , Theosophy 524 

Thesis 525 

Thought  ;>nd  Thinking 525 

Time 526 

Topology,  v.  Memoria  Teehnica. 

Tradition  528 

Train  of  Thought 529 

Transcendent 530 

Transcendental 530 

Transference,  Translation 532 

Transmigration,  v.  Metempsychosis. 
Transposition,  v.  Conversion. 

Trivium 532 

Truth 533 

Truths  (First) 536 

Type 538 

Ubiety 539 

Unconditioned 539 

Understanding  539 

Unification 542 

Unitarian 542 

Unity  or  Oneness 542 


Univcrsals 543 

Univocal  Words 545 

Usage,  v.  Custom. 

Utility 546 

Yellcity 547 

Veracity 547 

Verbal  ^ 547 

Veritas  Entis,  I 

Cognitionis,  U.  Truth. 

Signi,  J 

Virtual 548 

Virtue 548 

Volition 549 

Well-being 550 

Whole 551 

AFhy  ? 552 

Will 553 

Wisdom  557 

Wit 557 

Wit  and  Humour 559 

Zoonomy 560 


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Bengel’s  Gnomon  of  the  New  Testament.— 

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5 


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Luther  on  Galatians.— a Commentary  on  St.  Paul’s 
Epistle  to  the  Galatians,  by  Martin  Luther.  To  which 
is  prefixed  Tischer’s  Life  of  Luther,  abridged ; a short 
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6 


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Kurtz’S  Church  History. — Text  Book  of  Church  His- 
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Kurtz,  D.  D.  2 vols.,  Crown  8vo.,  cloth. 

Vol.  I.  To  the  Reformation,  $1.50. 

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Hoffman’s  Christianity  in  the  First  Century ; 

or,  The  New  Birth  of  the  Social  Life  of  Man  through 
the  Rising  of  Christianity.  By  Christopher  Hoff- 
man. Translated  from  the  German.  12mo.,  cloth,  $1.50. 

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^ Works.  2 yoIs.,  Crown  8vo.,  cloth,  $4.00. 

The  merits  of  this  Christian  author  have  been  universally  acknowledged,  so  that  it 
were  superfluous  to  dwell  in  commendation  of  his  works.  One  of  his  sermons  has 
long  and  deservedly  been  regarded  as  the  masterpiece  of  sacred  oratory  in  our  language, 
and  surpassing  in  elevation  and  dignity  of  sentiment  the  best  effusions  of  Massillon  or 
Bourduloue.  The  late  Dr.  John  Brown,  6low  and  cautious  in  his  judgment  of  author- 
ship, does  not  hesitate  to  affirm  of  Maclaurin,  that,  “ while  scarcely  less  intellectual 
than  Butler,  he  is  as  spiritual  as  Leighton”  In  regard  to  particular  treatises,  he 
remarks  that  the  “Essay  on  the  Prejudices  against  the  Gospel,”  and  the  sermons  on 
“ The  Sins  of  Men  not  Chargeable  on  God,”  and  “ On  Glorying  in  the  Cross  of  Christ,” 
“are  compositions,  the  first  for  profundity  and  acuteness,  the  last  for  impressive 
eloquence,  to  which  in  the  whole  range  of  theological  literature  we  will  not  easily  find 
any  thing  superior.” 

The  truth  is,  that  the  merited  fame  of  the  sermon  last  mentioned  has  somewhat 
thrown  into  the  shade  productions  of  the  author,  if  not  so  brilliant,  decidedly  more 
valuable.  The  “ Essay  on  the  Prejudices  against  the  Gospel,”  has  been  lately  reprinted 
under  the  editorship,  and  with  the  warm  commendation,  of  Dr.  Buchanan  of  the  New 
College,  Edinburgh,  whose  high  place  as  an  author  in  the  department  of  Christian 
Apologetics  gives  effect  to  his  testimony  when  he  speaks  of  Maclaurin  as  “perhaps  the 
profoundest  theologian  in  Scotland  of  the  age  to  which  he  belonged.”  The  other 
sermon  to  which  Dr.  Brown  alludes,  when  thoroughly  studied,  will  be  found  a specimen 
of  searching  analysis  into  the  springs  of  action,  equal  to  the  best  reasonings  of  Butler. 
The  discussion  on  “ the  Scripture  Doctrine  of  Divine  Grace,”  though  incomplete  as  a 
treatise,  is  quite  remarkable  for  the  lucidity  and  power  of  thought  it  displays. 

Some  of  these  treatises  have  appeared  in  numerous  editions,  either  separately  or 
conjunctly, — a fact  that  attests  the  esteem  in  which  they  have  been  held.  The  demand 
for  them  is  unabated.  And  in  these  circumstances  it  is  amazing,  and  not  very  credit- 
able, that  no  comphte  edition  of  this  author’s  worlcs  ever  has  been  published.  Indeed,  with 
the  exception  of  Collins’  edition  of  the  Sermons  and  the  minor  Treatise.s,  long  since 
out  of  print,  no  edition  worthy  of  Maclaurin  as  a standard  classic  in  our  religious 
literature  has  ever  appeared  until  now. 


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